Villegas v.

Hui Chiong Tsai Po

86 SCRA 462
FACTS:
Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then
Manila mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537.The Municipal Board of Manila
enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government
and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the
requisite mayors permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila.
Thus, a case was filed with CFI-Manila to stop enforcement of the ordinance. CFI-Manila
declared
the
ordinance
void.
Thus,
the
present
petition
for
certiorari.
ISSUES:

1. (1) Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of uniformity of taxation?

2. (2) Does it violate the principle against undue designation of legislative power?
3. (3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution?
RULING:

1. (1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it
fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who
are required to pay it. The same amount of P50 is being collected from every
employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether
he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.
2. (2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality
fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the action, thus
conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power, such ordinance is
invalid.
3. (3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City
Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him
the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given
to
all
persons,
both
aliens
and
citizens.
Thus, the ordinance is invalid.
Primicirias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
83 SCRA 462
Facts: On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias, plaintiff-appellee, was during his car
within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdanetas Municipal Police asked him
to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series
of 1964, and more particularly, for overtaking a truck. The policeman then asked for

plaintiffs license which he surrendered, and a temporary operators permit was issued to
him. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against
Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964. Due to the institution of the
criminal case, plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance.
Issue: WON the ordinance is null and void.
Held: An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is must not
contravene . . . the statute, for it is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are
inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. Following this general rule,
whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give
way.
The ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise
known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Pursuant to Section 63, Republic Act No.
4136, the ordinance at bar is thus placed within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not
Act No. 3992. The validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, must therefore be determined
vis-a-vis Republic Act No. 4136, the mother statute so to speak, which was in force at the
time the criminal case was brought against Primicias for the violation of the said ordinance.c
Baguio Citizens Action Inc v City Council
121 SCRA 368
Facts: This is a petition for declaratory relief originally filed in the CFI of Baguio, Branch II
involving the validity of Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council of Baguio City. Said
ordinance considered all squatters of public land who are duly registered as such at the time
of the promulgation of the ordinance as bonafide occupants of their respective lots.
Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief, praying for a judgment declaring the
Ordinance as invalid and illegal ab initio. Respondents-appellees, the City Council and the
City Mayor, filed motions to dismiss the petition which were denied.
Issue: WON the Ordinance is valid?
Held: No, not valid. City Council has no power to legalize squatting. The Ordinance in
question is a patent nullity. It considered all squatters of public land in the City of Baguio as
bona-fide occupants of their respective lots. No amount of acquiescence on the part of the
city officials will elevate squatting from being an unlawful act into lawful. The land occupied
by the squatters are portions of water sheds, reservations, scattered portions of the public
domain within the Baguio townsite. Certainly, there is more reason then to void the actions
taken by the City of Baguio through the questioned ordinance. Being unquestionably a
public land, no disposition thereof could be made by the City of Baguio without prior
legislative authority. It is the fundamental principle that the state possesses plenary power
in law to determine who shall be favored recipients of public domain, as well as under what
terms such privilege may be granted not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of
exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. And the law has laid in the
Director of Lands the power of exclusive control, administrations, disposition and alienation
of public land that includes the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of
concessions or disposition and management of the lands of public domains.

Lopez v Civil Service Commission

195 SCRA 777
FACTS: Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto
Abellana, was appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container
Terminal, Manila South Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. A law was passed
wherein the DOTC was reorganized, and the number of Assistant Harbor Master in the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was reduced from (3) three to (2) two. After a careful
evaluation of a placement committee of the PPA, Luz was rated third.
Luz protested/appealed the appointment of Lopez, but the PPA General Manager said Luz
was not qualified for the two slots. Luz then appealed to the CSC. The CSC ordered for a reassessment which the PPA complied. Still, the CSC found that the re-assessment was not in
order. It ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was in the best position to
assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-consultant who was merely
a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. It directed the appointment of Luz as
the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez appointment and instead
substituting its decision for that of the PPA.
RULING:The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in
promoting the morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil
servants is not disputed by petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of
appointment delegated to the heads of departments or agencies of the government is not
controverted by the respondents. In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil
service employees according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially
where it is assisted by a screening committee composed of persons who are in the best
position to screen the qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity,
performance and capabilities of the future appointees.
The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the
legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. To go beyond
this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the appointing authority and to
give to the Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does not confer.
This does not mean that the Commission's act of approving or disapproving becomes
ministerial.
The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments
shall be exercised by the respondent Commission. The Commission is actually authorized to
do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate eligibility: "If he
does, his appointment is approved; if not it is disapproved." We further ruled that the
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it believed that the
private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment of
the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. The Commission cannot exceed its
power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority.

Municipal of La Libertad v Penaflor

453 SCRA 833

Facts: Before November 13, 1995, respondent, Rural Health Midwife who had been in the
employ of the office of petitioner for about twenty years,[1] filed an application for a 15-day
leave of absence effective said date. At that time respondent had an accumulated unused
leave credits of more than one year. The application for leave was recommended for
approval by her superior. On November 13, 1995, unaware if her application for leave had
been approved, respondent began availing of it. Subsequently, she was notified that she had
been terminated effective November 13, 1995.
ISSUE: WON Camero alone should be held liable since he acted beyond the scope of his
legal duty and authority in terminating the services of respondent.
HELD: NO. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that public officials
discharged their official duties in good faith remains. In the petition at bar, petitioner failed
to prove malice the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse, or a
state of mind which prompts a conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another.
Moreover, Camero has not acted beyond his authority. Since it is not claimed that
respondent was a head of department or office in the office of petitioner, then following Sec.
444(5) of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, under which a mayor is empowered to [a]ppoint
all officials whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal funds and
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be
authorized by law to appoint, former Mayor Camero did not have to secure the concurrence
of the Sangguniang Bayan to terminate respondents services.

Technology Development v Court of Appeals

201 SCRA 9
Facts: Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal
briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo
Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office of the mayor some
documents, including the Building permit, mayors permit, and Region III-Pollution of
Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.
Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent Acting
Mayor, without notice, caused the padlock of companys plant premises, effectively causing
stoppage of its operation.
Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition, mandamus with
preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in
grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the
lower courts ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant. YES.
Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion. NO.

Held:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control
if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the
then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements,
now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as
much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his
police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or
otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control
and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the
emissions in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution
emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in
the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that
petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was
required to bring the following:
a. Building permit;
b. Mayor's permit; and
c. Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources AntiPollution permit.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents
of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor
through channels.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made. It found that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to
the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria,
but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was
good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or

validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and
prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
The Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this
dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to
promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential
imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious
effect of the pollution of the environment.