De Rama v.

CA
G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001 | J. Ynares-Santiago | Appointive Local Officials;
Midnight Appointments not applicable to Mayors.

Petitioner: CONRADO L. DE RAMA

Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION, THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION), ELADIO MARTINEZ, DIVINO DE JESUS, MORELL AYALA, ARISTEO
CATALLA, DAISY PORTA, FLORDELIZA ORIASEL, GRACIELA GLORY, FELECIDAD
ORINDAY, MA. PETRA MUFFET LUCE, ELSA MARINO, BERNARDITA MENDOZA,
JANE MACATANGAY, ADELFO GLODOVIZA AND FLORINO RAMOS

Summary: Mayor De Rama sought the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal

employees on the basis of the prohibition on midnight appointments. The CSC denied
the petition of Mayor De Rama on the basis that the prohibition on midnight
appointments applies only to the President.

Doctrine: The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on
so-called "midnight appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months
immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or
Acting President.

FACTS:
1. On July 13, 1995, Mayor De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of
14 municipal employees of Pagbilao Quezon on the basis of Article VII, Section
15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.

2. On April 30, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner's request for the recall of the
appointments of the fourteen employees and declared that the prohibition on
Midnight appointments apply only to the President.

3. Upon appeal, The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no abuse of the
appointment power by the former mayor. The CA thus dismissed the petition

4. Petitioner is now before the Supreme Court questioning the decision of the CA

ISSUE:

1. Whether a Mayor is prohibited from appointing employees two months before the
end of his term.

RATIO:

No.
● The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the
appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only
reason he cited to justify his action was that these were "midnight appointments"
that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the
CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential
appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective
officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

● It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee's
assumption of the position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which
cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal
except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.” Moreover, it is
well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a
completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the
position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as
well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment,
or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is
previous notice and hearing.

● Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position of town
mayor was to issue Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the appointments of
the private respondents. There was no previous notice, much less a hearing
accorded to the latter. Clearly, it was petitioner who acted in undue haste to
remove the private respondents without regard for the simple requirements of
due process of law. In doing so, he overstepped the bounds of his authority.
While he argues that the appointing power has the sole authority to revoke said
appointments, there is no debate that he does not have blanket authority to do
so. Neither can he question the CSC's jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall.

● Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised

Administrative Code specifically provides that "an appointment accepted by the
appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall
remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission." Thus, it is the
CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when
such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the civil service law and regulations.

● Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled

on the above-cited grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner
to justify the recall was that these were "midnight appointments." The CSC
correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called "midnight
appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to
the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
PLAZA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 138464, 18 January 2008 | J. Acuna | Local Officials

Petitioners: HON. GOVERNOR DEMOCRITO O. PLAZA, DANILO S. SAMSON, FE

TAN-CEBRIAN, VIRGINIA M. GETES, ADULFO A. LLAGAS, FRANCISCO U.
FERNANDEZ AND JOSEFINA V. BAJADE
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS

Doctrine: The law provides for the preventive suspension of appointive local officials
and employees pending investigation of the charges against them. The suspension
given to private respondents cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified for it is one of
those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. To be entitled
to back salaries, private respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges,
but their suspension must likewise be unjustified.

FACTS:

1. A few months after his assumption as Governor of Agusan del Sur in 1992,
petitioner Democrito Plaza received separate administrative complaints against
the following:

Tan for allegedly committed a conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the
service, Gilsano was charged with neglect in the performance of duty, and
Quismundo was allegedly liable for technical malversation, an act prejudicial to
the best interests of the service.

2. Pursuant to Book I, Title Three, Section 86 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991), Plaza issued Executive Order No. 01, Series of
1992, creating a Provincial Investigating Committee composed of the following
petitioners:

Chairperson – Atty. Danilo Samson

Provincial Legal Officer

Secretary – Ms. Fe Tan-Cebrian

Acting Provincial Personnel Officer

Members – Virginia M. Getes

SP Member

Adulfo A. Llagas
Asst. Provincial Treasurer
Officer-in-Charge
 3. On various dates in October 1992, petitioner Samson, acting as Chairperson of
the Administrative Investigating Committee, notified private respondents of the
administrative complaints. Private respondents were required to answer in writing
under oath within 72 hours from receipt together with the affidavits of their
witnesses, if any, and to state whether they would opt for a formal investigation or
would waive such right.
4. Instead of filing their answers, private respondents filed separate Motions to
Inhibit/Dismiss seeking to inhibit Samson on the ground that he had no authority
under the law to conduct the administrative investigations because his
appointment as Provincial Legal Officer had not been acted upon by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur, which concurrence is of utmost
necessity to confer upon his appointment by the Provincial Governor the
imprimatur of legality and validity. Another issue raised by respondents was that
they could not expect to be given due process and the cold neutrality of an
impartial committee.
5. On October 26, 1992, Samson issued an Omnibus Oder denying private
respondents motions to dismiss/inhibit.
6. On November 9, 1992, Plaza issued Memorandum Orders ordering the
preventive suspension of private respondents for a period of 60 days effective
upon receipt of orders.
7. Meantime, Resolution was issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan reiterating
the rejection of the appointment of Samson as Provincial Legal Officer of the
province for lack of the required 5 years law practice.
8. RTC dismissed the petition. It reasoned that the respondents failed to exhaust
the available remedies since the proper forum to decide the dispute is the Civil
Service Commission.
9. Cout of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. It opined that Samson’s
authority as chairman of the PIC is not invalidated by the lack of concurrence of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in his appointments as the Provincial Legal
Officer. Moreover, the preventive suspension of respondents may be ordered
even without a hearing as such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. It likewise ruled that the filing of the
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC was not a delay which would
interrupt the running of the period of preventive suspension. Lastly, the CA
pronounced that to sanction preventive suspension pending resolution of an
administrative case is equivalent to indefinite suspension which the Constitution
prohibits.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the suspension by Samson was valid.
2. Whether or not employees are entitled to backwages.

RATIO:

1. Yes, the CA opined that Samson’s authority as chairman of the PIC is not
invalidated by the lack of concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
 his appointment as the Provincial Legal Officer. Moreover, the preventive
suspension of respondents may be ordered even without a hearing as such
suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. It likewise ruled that the filing of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC was not a delay which would interrupt the running
of the period of preventive suspension. Lastly, the CA pronounced that to
sanction preventive suspension pending resolution of an administrative case
is equivalent to indefinite suspension which the Constitution prohibits.

2. The preventive suspension of the private respondents is authorized by R.A.

No. 7160, Section 85(a) of the LGC of 1991 states:

Sec. 85. Preventive Suspension of Appointive Local Officials and Employees.

– (a) The local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not
exceeding sixty days any subordinate official or employee under his authority
pending investigation if the charge against such official or employee involves
dishonesty, oppressive or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty, or if there is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of the
charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

Clearly, the law provides for the preventive suspension of appointive local
officials and employees pending investigation of the charges against them.
The suspension given to private respondents cannot, therefore, be
considered unjustified for it is one of those sacrifices which holding a public
office requires for the public good. To be entitled to back salaries, private
respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges, but their
suspension must likewise be unjustified.
Atienza v. Villarosa
G.R. No. 161081 │ 10 May 2005 │CALLEJO, SR., J.: │Appointive Local Officials
Petitioner: Ramon M. Atienza, in his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of
Occidental Mindoro
Respondents: Jose T. Villarosa, in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Occidental
Mindoro
Summary:
The petitioner received the memorandum issued by the governor concerning the authority
to sign purchase orders of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs, and
maintenance of the sangguniang panlalawigan. In reply to the memorandum, the petitioner
contended that such authority was vested in him, and coursing it to the Governor for his
approval was no longer necessary. Unimpressed, the respondent issued the memorandum
relating to the termination of the contract of services of casual/job order employees and
the reappointment of the respective recommendees. The petitioner thus filed with the CA
petition for prohibition assailing as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the
respondent's Memoranda. CA dismissed the case. Petitioner appealed to the SC. SC
granted the petition. SC held that the Memoranda issued by the respondent are NULL
AND VOID.
Doctrine:
1. VICE-GOVERNOR AS APPROVING AUTHORITY OF PURCHASE ORDERS FOR
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN – Since it is the Vice-Governor who
approves disbursement vouchers and approves the payment for the procurement
of the supplies, materials, and equipment needed for the operation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, then he also has the authority to approve the
purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment.
2. VICE-GOVERNOR AS APPOINTING AUTHORITY OF CASUAL AND JOB
ORDER EMPLOYEES OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN – While the
Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose salaries are
paid out of the provincial funds this does not extend to the officials and employees
of the Sangguniang Paanlalawiganand of the Office of the Vice-Governor whose
salaries are paid out of the funds appropriated for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
because such authority is lodged with the Vice-Governor. In the same manner, the
authority to appoint casual and job-order employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-Governor.

Facts:
● On June 26, 2002, Governor Villarosa issued a memorandum requiring that all purchase
orders for supplies, materials, and equipment, including fuel, repairs, and maintenance
for the upkeep of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be signed by him.
● Vice-Governor Atienza however, contended that such authority was vested in him by the
Local Government Code.
● In response, Gov. Villarosa issued a memorandum ordering the dismissal of V-Gov.
Atienza’s appointees in the provincial government.
● V-Gov. Atienza asked Gov. Villarosa to reconsider both his actions but refused.
● V-Gov. Atienza filed a prohibition suit in the CA against the 2 memoranda as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. V-Gov. Atienza claimed that these
memoranda excluded him from the use and enjoyment of his office in violation of the
pertinent provisions of RA 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991, and its
 implementing rules and regulations. It was prayed that the respondent Governor be
enjoined from implementing the assailed memoranda.
● CA dismissed the case and upheld Gov. Villarosa’s power to sign the purchase orders
and the dismissal of V-Gov. Atienza’s appointees can no longer be stopped as Gov.
Villarosa’s orders had already been implemented.
● V-Gov. Atienza appealed to the SC.
Issues:
1. Whether it is the Vice-Governor or the Governor who is authorized to approve purchase
orders issued in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, and equipment,
including fuel, repairs, and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
2. Whether the Governor, as the local chief executive, has the authority to terminate or
cancel the appointments of casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members and the Office of the Vice-Governor

Ruling:
1. SC held that it is the Vice-Governor who has such authority.
Under Rep. Act No. 7160, local legislative power for the province is exercised by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Vice-Governor is its presiding officer. Being vested
with legislative powers, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan enacts ordinances, and
resolutions, and appropriates funds for the general welfare of the province in accordance
with the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160. The same statute vests upon the
Vice-Governor the power to:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn
on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
sangguniang panlalawigan.
The Vice-Governor, as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has
administrative control of the funds of the said body. Accordingly, it is the Vice-Governor
who has the authority to approve disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated
for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto necessarily
includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same applying the
doctrine of necessary implication.
Since it is the Vice-Governor who approves disbursement vouchers and approves the
payment for the procurement of the supplies, materials, and equipment needed for the
operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, then he also has the authority to approve
the purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment.
2. SC declared that the Governor, with respect to the appointment of the officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has no such authority.
Among the powers granted to the Governor under Section 465 of Rep. Act No. 7160 are:
Sec. 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.– (a) The
provincial governor, as the chief executive of the provincial government, shall exercise
such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other
laws.
 (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
provincial governor shall:
(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly
paid out of provincial funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in
this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint.
On the other hand, Section 466 vests on the Vice-Governor the power to, among others:
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules, and regulations, appoint all officials and employees
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, except those whose manner of appointment is
specifically provided in this Code.
Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose
salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because such authority is lodged with the
Vice-Governor. In the same manner, the authority to appoint casual and job-order
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-Governor.

Petitioner Atienza and respondent Villarosa had ceased to be the Vice-Governor and Governor, respectively, of the Province of
Occidental Mindoro when the newly-elected officials of the province took their oaths of office. The petitioner Vice-Governor did not
run for re-election during the May 2004 elections while the respondent Governor did not succeed in his re-election bid. The
expiration of their terms of office has effectively rendered the case moot.
 QUIROG v. AUMENTADO
November 11, 2008 | J. Leonardo-De Castro | Midnight Appointments of Local
Government Officials

PETITIONERS:
● G.R. No. 163443: LIZA M. QUIROG AND RENE L. RELAMPAGOS
● G.R. No. 163568: CIVIL SERVICE COMISSION
RESPONDENTS:
● G.R. No. 163443: GOVERNOR ERICO B. AUMENTADO
● G.R. No. 163568: COURT OF APPEALS AND GOV. ERICO B. AUMENTADO

SUMMARY: Liza M. Quirog was permanently appointed Provincial Government

Department Head of the Office of the Bohol Provincial Agriculture (PGDH-OPA) by
then Governor Rene L. Relampagos. Prior to her appointment, Quirog had already
been discharging the duties of such office. Erico B. Aumentado, Relampagos’
successor, contends that the appointment of Quirog is not valid for being a midnight
appointment.

DOCTRINE: It cannot also be said that Quirog's appointment was a midnight

appointment. The constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments,
specifically, those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.

FACTS:
1. Liza M. Quirog was permanently appointed Provincial Government Department
Head of the Office of the Bohol Provincial Agriculture (PGDH-OPA) by then
Governor Rene L. Relampagos.
2. Her appointment was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. She then
took her oath of office on June 1, 2001.
3. In 2001, the Director of the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VII
(CSCROVII), invalidated Quirog’s appointment for allegedly being in violation of a
CSC Resolution released on June 4, 2001.
4. Quirog and Relampagos moved for reconsideration contending that a year prior
to her permanent appointment, she was already acting Provincial Agriculturist.
5. The CSCROVII denied the motion for reconsideration holding that Quirog and
Relampagos had no legal personality to file the same.
6. On appeal to the CSC, the order of the CSCROVII was reversed and Quirog’s
appointment was approved.
7. On December 10, 2001, incumbent Bohol Governor Erico B. Aumentado filed an
amended motion for reconsideration insisting that petitioners had no legal
personality to sue and insisted that Quirog’s appointment was a midnight
appointment.
8. The CSC denied Aumentado’s motion for reconsideration.
9. On appeal to the CA, the latter granted Aumentado’s petition. It later denied the
motion for consideration of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Quirog and Relampagos have the legal standing to sue.
2. Whether Quirog’s appointment partakes of a midnight appointment.

RULING:
1. Quirog has legal standing, but Relampagos does not.
● In the recent case of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the Court
declared that both the appointing authority and the appointee are equally
real parties in interest who have the requisite legal standing to bring an
action challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment.
● Clearly, pursuant to Abella, Jr., Quirog had the right to ask for
reconsideration of, or to appeal the adverse ruling of CSCROVII. In
contrast, Relampagos, by reason of the expiration of his term as governor,
had lost the legal personality to contest the disapproval of the
appointment.

2. Quirog’s appointment does not partake of a midnight appointment.

● CSC Resolution No. 010988 was issued three days after Quirog’s oath, or
on June 4, 2001. Evidently, the CSCROVII should not have subjected
Quirog's appointment to the requirements under said resolution, as its
application is against the prospective application of laws. Having no
provision regarding its retroactive application to appointments made prior
to its effectivity, CSC Resolution No. 010988 must be taken to be of
prospective application.
● It cannot also be said that Quirog's appointment was a midnight
appointment. The constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight
appointments, specifically, those made within two (2) months immediately
prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or
Acting President.
● We, however, hasten to add that the aforementioned ruling does not mean
that the raison d'etre behind the prohibition against midnight appointments
may not be applied to those made by chief executives of local government
units, as here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage,
nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely
for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new
policies.
● The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight
appointment. For it is beyond dispute that Quirog had been discharging
and performing the duties concomitant with the subject position for a year
prior to her permanent appointment thereto. Surely, the fact that she was
only permanently appointed to the position of PGDH-OPA after a year of
being the Acting Provincial Agriculturist more than adequately shows that
the filling up of the position resulted from deliberate action and a careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the Acting Provincial
Agriculturist since June 2000 all the more highlights the public need for
said position to be permanently filled up.
SALES v. CARREON, JR.
February 13, 2007, J. Sandoval-Gutierrez

Petitioner: PATRICIO E. SALES, ROGER R. SARIMOS, AL B. BUSICO, MARIMEL S.

SAGARIO, CAMILA B. BAGCOR, JONAS C. SALON, LILIBETH O. OBERES, NOEL E.
MAWILI, MARIO C. PAUSAL, JAMES D. TUGAHAN, MARIBETH C. DANGCALAN,
CAMILO P. RECAMARA, ANDRO H. AGDA, GERALDINE S. CARIN, MYRNA G.
SAGARIO, OSCAR E. MONCOPA, LOURDIRICO E. GUDMALIN, EUFEMIO A.
MONTEDERAMOS, JR., CORNELIO E. JUMAWAN, JR., ELBA R. CASALANG,
MERLA E. CAIDIC, RESTY C. SOCOBOS, JOSE DARRY O. SAGARION, MARIA LUZ
S. SIENES, BOB C. HAYAG, RONIE L. LABISIG, FRANNIE M. ANTIVO, RONILO B.
RUIZ, ANASTACIA A. PAILAGA, LERNIE S. FREJOLES, ROMILO D. BAJAS, ISIDRA
T. GALLEPOSO, LEAH S. AUSTER, JOIEVELYNN E. HERRERA, JOELYALLUZ C.
DOSIDOS, GLADYS M. ADAZA, NICARATA A. GALLEPOSO, MARIA LIEZEL S.
CUARESMA, ARLO B. CAGATAN, JOSEPHINE S. CABILIN, LEA C. ALAG, PILAR A.
JAMOLOD, AND BENJAMIN M. SUMALPONG.
Respondents: HON. RODOLFO H. CARREON, JR., AND THE CITY GOVERNMENT
OF DAPITAN CITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR, HON. RODOLFO H. CARREON,
JR.
Summary: On June 1, 18 and 27, 2001, his last month in office, then Dapitan City
Mayor Ruiz issued 83 appointments, including the petitioners in this instant case. The
newly elected Mayor Carreon, Jr., assumed office and issued Memorandum Orders
Nos. 1 and 2 revoking the 83 appointments signed by his predecessor on the ground
that the latter violated CSC Resolution No. 01-988 in relation to CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 7, Series of 2001, imposing a ban on issuing appointments in the civil
service during the election period. Thereupon, Mayor Carreon, Jr., prohibited the
release of the salaries and benefits of the 83 appointees. The appointments Mayor Ruiz
issued are not valid. The publication of vacancies was made even before the positions
involved actually became vacant. Clearly, respondent's action violated Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7041.
Doctrine: The CSC is required to publish the lists of vacant positions and such
publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local
government units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by
the appointing authority after they have been reported to the CSC as vacant and only
after publication.

Facts:

1. During the May 2001 elections, then Mayor Joseph Cedrick Ruiz of Dapitan City,
running for re-election, was defeated by respondent Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr.
2. On June 1, 18 and 27, 2001, his last month in office, then Dapitan City Mayor
Ruiz issued 83 appointments, including the petitioners in this instant case.
3. The newly elected Mayor Carreon, Jr., assumed office and issued Memorandum
Orders Nos. 1 and 2 revoking the 83 appointments signed by his predecessor on
the ground that the latter violated CSC Resolution No. 01-988 in relation to CSC
 Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2001, imposing a ban on issuing
appointments in the civil service during the election period. Thereupon,
Mayor Carreon, Jr., prohibited the release of the salaries and benefits of the 83
appointees.

Issues: Whether the 83 appointments are valid.

Ruling: No.

No, the appointments Mayor Ruiz issued are not valid.

This case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue
“midnight appointments, especially after their successors have been proclaimed. It does
not only cause anomisities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also
affects efficiency in local governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time and
energy in defending their appointment instead of attending to their functions.

However, not all “midnight” appointments are invalid.

Each appointment must be judged on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of
the individual appointment and the circumstances surrounding the same. It is only when
the appointments were made en masse by the outgoing administration and shown to
have been made through hurried maneuvers and under circumstances departing from
good faith, morality, and propriety that this Court has struck down “midnight”
appointments.

It is State policy that "opportunities for government employment shall be open to all
qualified citizens" and "employees shall be selected on the basis of fitness to perform
the duties and assume the responsibilities of the positions." It was precisely in order to
ensure transparency and equal opportunity in the recruitment and hiring of government
personnel, that Republic Act No. 7041 was enacted.

Vacant positions shall not be filled until after publication: Provided, however, that
vacant and unfilled positions that are:

a) primarily confidential;

b) policy-determining;

c) highly technical;

d) co-terminous with that of the appointing authority; or

e) limited to the duration of a particular project,

shall be excluded from the list required by law.

SEC. 3. Publication of Vacancies. - The Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Commission shall publish once every quarter a complete list of all the existing vacant
positions in the Government throughout the country, including the qualification
standards required for each position and, thereafter, certify under oath to the completion
of publication. Copies of such publication shall be sold at cost to the public and
distributed free of charge to the various personnel office of the government where they
shall be available for inspection by the public: Provided, That said publication shall be
posted by the Chief Personnel or Administrative Officer of all local government units in
at least three (3) public and conspicuous places in their respective municipalities and
provinces: Provided, further, That any vacant position published therein shall be open to
any qualified person who does not necessarily belong to the same office with the
vacancy or who occupies a position next-in-rank to the vacancy: Provided, finally, That
the Civil Service Commission shall not act on any appointment to fill up a vacant
position unless the same has been reported to and published by the Commission.

The CSC is required to publish the lists of vacant positions and such publication shall be
posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in
the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing
authority after they have been reported to the CSC as vacant and only after publication.

Here, the publication of vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually
became vacant. Clearly, respondent's action violated Section 2 of R.A. No. 7041.

Moreover, the CSC found that there was no first-level representative appointed to the
Personnel Selection Board, which deliberated on the appointments to first-level
positions.

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 1988, as amended, provides that the
Personnel Selection Board shall be composed of the following:

1. Official of department/agency directly responsible for personnel

management;
2. Representative of management;
3. Representative of organizational unit which may be an office,
department, or division where the vacancy is;
4. Representative of rank-and-file employees, one (1) for the
first-level and one (1) for the second-level, who shall both be chosen
by duly registered/accredited employees' association in the
department or agency. The former shall sit during the screening of
candidates for vacancy in the first-level, while the latter shall
participate in the screening of candidates for vacancy in the second
level. In cases where there is no employees' association in the
 department or agency, the representative shall be chosen at large by
the employees through a general election to be called for the
purpose.

Petitioners admitted that after the retirement on April 22, 2000 of Beltran Faconete, the
first-level representative to the Personnel Selection Board, no other first-level
representative to replace him was chosen by the Dapitan City Government Employees
Association. Yet, the city government Personnel Selection Board proceeded to
deliberate and recommend the appointments of applicants to the 43 first-level positions.
Petitioners contend, however, that although there was no such representative, the
action of the Board is still valid.

Petitioners' contention lacks merit.

Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V-A of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (also known as the Civil Service Law), provides:

SEC. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same

may be recalled on any of the following grounds:

a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provide in the agency’s Merit

Promotion Plan;
b) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board;
c) Violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement between
management and the employees relative to promotion; or
d) Violations of other civil service laws, rules and regulations.

Verily, in deliberating and recommending to former Mayor Ruiz the appointments

of herein petitioners to the vacant positions sans the required representation, the
Board violated the above CSC Rules. Hence, the appointments he issued are not
valid. They may be recalled. In Mathay, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court
upheld the authority of the CSC to take appropriate action on all appointments,
including its authority to recall appointments made in disregard of the
applicable provisions of Civil Service Law and regulations.

In sum, for being in violation of Section 2, R.A. No. 7041, CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 18, as amended, and Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V-A of the Administrative Code of 1987, the appointments of
the above-named petitioners are declared void.
MONTUERTO V. TY (G.R. No. 177736)
October 6, 2008 | J. Nachura | Appointment of Heads in Departments or Offices of
the Municipal Government

Petitioner: MELANIE P. MONTUERTO

Respondents: HONORABLE MAYOR ROLANDO E. TY and THE

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN, represented by HONORABLE VICE-MAYOR RICHARD D.
JAGUROS, all of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran

SUMMARY: While Montuerto’s appointment as Municipal Budget Officer was

alleged to have been verbally approved by the then Sangguniang Bayan, there was
no written document proving the same. Since the Local Government requires the
concurrence of the SB in the appointment of the heads of departments or offices in
the municipal government evidenced by an ordinance or a resolution, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Civil Service validly revoked Montuerto’s appointment.

Doctrine: Under Section 443(a) and (d) of RA 7160 or the Local

Government Code, the head of a department or office in the municipal government
shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all
Sangguniang Bayan members. Furthermore, the concurrence required under R.A.
No. 7160 is through the enactment of a resolution or an ordinance.

FACTS:
1. Melanie P. Montuerto (MONTUERTO) was appointed as Municipal Budget Officer
by the then Mayor Sabitsana of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran. Her
appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC).
2. The Sangguniang Bayan of Almeria, Biliran passed Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
Resolution No. 01-S-2002 entitled "A Resolution Requesting the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office, to Revoke the Appointment of Mrs. Melanie P.
Montuerto, Municipal Budget Officer of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran for
Failure to Secure the Required Concurrence from the Sangguniang Bayan."
3. The Municipality of Almeria, Biliran submitted the 201 file of MONTUERTO to the
CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) which showed that MONTUERTO’s appointment
did lack the required concurrence of the local sanggunian. On the other hand,
MONTUERTO submitted to the same office a Joint-Affidavit executed by the
majority of the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Almeria, Biliran, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
“4. Since the regular session focused on the deliberations regarding the
municipal budget, the concurrence on the appointment of Municipal
Budget Officer Melanie P. Montuerto was not highlighted and the
concurrence was inadvertently omitted in the Minutes of the Regular
 Session for 2 March 1992. But, we can still fully recall that there was really
a verbal concurrence on the appointment of Municipal Budget Officer
Melanie P. Montuerto x x x.”
4. The CSCRO recalled MONTUERTO’s appointment. MONTUERTO filed a motion
for reconsideration.
5. Before resolving the motion, the CSCRO required the incumbent SB Secretary to
submit a certification regarding the present issue. The certification provided that
no documents exist to show the SB’s concurrence on MONTUERTO’s
appointment, however, the SB minutes on one of its regular session pointed out
the presence of a budget officer who explained fully the details of the municipal
annual budget. Likewise, MONTUERTO submitted a copy of the said minutes.
6. The CSCRO denied MONTUERTO’s motion. On appeal, both the CSC Central
Office and the CA ruled against MONTUERTO. MONTUERTO brought the
present case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of MONTUERTO as Municipal Budget Officer,
without the written concurrence of the Sanggunian, but duly approved by the CSC, can
still be revoked by the Commission
RATIO:
YES, the appointment of MONTUERTO as Municipal Budget Officer, without the
written concurrence of the Sanggunian, can still be revoked by the Civil Service
Commission.
● The law is clear. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 or
the Local Government Code, the head of a department or office in the municipal
government, such as the Municipal Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the
mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang Bayan members
subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. Per records, the appointment of
petitioner was never submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for its concurrence or,
even if so submitted, no such concurrence was obtained. Such factual finding of
quasi-judicial agencies, especially if adopted and affirmed by the CA, is deemed
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. This Court
is not a trier of facts and generally, does not weigh anew evidence already
passed upon by the CA. Absent a showing that this case falls under any of the
exceptions to this general rule, this Court will refrain from disturbing the findings
of fact of the tribunals below.
● Moreover, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the verbal concurrence
allegedly given by the Sanggunian, as postulated by the petitioner, is not the
concurrence required and envisioned under R.A. No. 7160. The Sanggunian, as
a body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance. Absent such resolution of
concurrence, the appointment of petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory
requirement of Section 443(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 7160. Without a valid
appointment, petitioner acquired no legal title to the Office of Municipal Budget
Officer, even if she had served as such for ten years.
● Accordingly, the CSC has the authority to recall the appointment of the petitioner.
 MMDA v. VIRON
August 15, 2007 | J. Carpio Morales | Intergovernmental Relations

PETITIONERS:
● G.R. No. 170656: THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY AND BAYANI FERNANDO AS CHAIRMAN OF THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
● G.R. NO. 170657: HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND BAYANI
FERNANDO AS CHAIRMAN OF THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
RESPONDENTS:
● G.R. No. 170656: VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.,
● G.R. NO. 170657: MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC.,

SUMMARY: Viron and Mencorp filed separation petitions before the RTC assailing
the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 179 promulgated by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo wherein the MMDA was tasked as the primary implementing body
to decongest traffic in Metro Manila.

DOCTRINE: While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may
be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid
delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards
as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments
under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991.

FACTS:
1. On February 10, 2023, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. No. 179 for
the purpose of decongesting the traffic in Metro Manila. The E.O. noted that the primary
cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the
streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes.
2. Included in the E.O. was the recommendation of MMDA to decongest traffic by
eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and
providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities.
3. The EO designated MMDA as its implementing agency. Pursuant thereto, Metro Manila
Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued
Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 expressing full support of the Project.
4. On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a corporation engaged int he
business of public transportation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. It
stressed that the MMDA’s authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus
operationers to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of
their property.
5. Later, Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator,
filed a similar petition against Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA
Chairman Fernando. It asked the court to declare E.O. No. 179 unconstitutional and
 illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land
transportation units.
6. The petitions were eventually consolidated.
7. On January 24, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision sustaining the constitutionality and
legality of the the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to
administer Metro Manila's basic services including those of transport and traffic
management. It further held that the aforementioned E.O. was a valid exercise of police
power.
8. Both Viron and Mencorp filed for reconsideration. The Trial Court, reversed its initial
decision. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether MMDA has the authority to implement such project.

RULING: No, MMDA does not have the authority to implement the Project.

● E.O. No. 125, which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of
legislative powers, reorganized the then Ministry (now Department) of Transportation
and Communications. The President mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy,
planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity
to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The
grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer
comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications.

● As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the
authority and responsibility to exercise the mandate given to the department.
Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations
and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the
law.

● Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and
projects for transportation, it follows that the President may exercise the same power and
authority to order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for
transportation.

● Such authority springs from the President's power of control over all executive
departments as well as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article
VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

● This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code
of 1987. Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37, Book IV of the same Code defines the
President's power of supervision and control over the executive departments, viz:
(1) Supervision and Control. - Supervision and control shall include authority to
act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
 review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a
different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the
relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass
supervision and control as defined in this paragraph

● Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the

President may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty.

● Respecting the President's authority to order the implementation of the Project in the
exercise of the police power of the State, suffice it to stress that the powers vested in the
DOTC Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for
transportation and communications and to issue orders, rules and regulations to
implement such mandate (which, as previously discussed, may also be exercised by the
President) have been so delegated for the good and welfare of the people. Hence, these
powers partake of the nature of police power.

● Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the
Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people.

● While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as
it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may
be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the
Local Government Code of 1991.

● The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding,
the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be
sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.

● It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC,
and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the
one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or
cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the
Project in question.

● By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President
clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179
ultra vires.

● In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a
specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.
● To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area as a "special
development and administrative region" and placed the administration of "metro-wide"
basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.

● Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform "planning,
monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services," including transport and
traffic management.

● The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and

policy-setting body has been settled in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc –
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There
is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. x x x Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units,
there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to
'enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare' of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the
charter itself, a 'development authority.' It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private
sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself.

● In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have
been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the
MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents' terminals.

● Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of
such power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
 MMDA v. GARIN
G.R. NO. 130230, April 15, 2005 | J. Chico-Nazario | Intergovernmental Relations; With
the National Government and its agencies

Petitioner: METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Respondents: DANTE O. GARIN

Summary: Respondent Dante Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt and had his
driver’s license confiscated for parking illegally. He questioned the said confiscation and
filed a complaint before the RTC, arguing that MMDA’s charter in allowing it to
confiscate driver’s licenses without being first heard is a violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The MMDA counters that it has power to issue circulars
allowing for the confiscation of a driver’s license under since the latter is a privilege
subject to reasonable regulation under the police power.

Doctrine: There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. The MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature.

FACTS:

1. Respondent Dante Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR)
and his driver’s license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street,
Binondo, Manila by a traffic enforcer of petitioner Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA).
2. He wrote to the MMDA requesting the return of his driver’s license, and
expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
3. Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with the RTC
Parañaque contending that Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924, MMDA’s charter,
grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their
licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation,
thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
4. The MMDA countered that a license is neither a contract nor a property right, but
is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power.
5. The petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does
not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the
right to appeal the revocation.
6. The RTC held that the MMDA’s summary confiscation of a driver’s license
without first giving the driver an opportunity to be heard violates the due process
under the Constitution.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not the MMDA can validly confiscate driver’s licenses pursuant to
police power?

RATIO:

NO.

● The MMDA is not vested with police power.

● In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., the
Supreme Court categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the
MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature.
● Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
● Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised
by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.
● The National Legislature may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as to local government units (LGUs).
● Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units and as a "special development and administrative region,” basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the
MMDA.
● However, the MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
All its functions are administrative in nature.
● There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power.
● The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that
transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided
by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic
management, and the Court is aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to
untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these
laudable intentions are limited by the MMDA’s enabling law, which we can but
interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be
authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate
source.
 PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 129546, December 13, 2005 | J. Chico-Nazario | Intergovernmental Relations;
With the National Government and its agencies

Petitioners: PROVINCE OF RIZAL, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MATEO, PINTONG

BOCAUE MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE, CONCERNED CITIZENS OF RIZAL,
INC., ROLANDO E. VILLACORTE, BERNARDO HIDALGO, ANANIAS EBUENGA,
VILMA T. MONTAJES, FEDERICO MUNAR, JR., ROLANDO BEÑAS, SR., ET AL.,
AND KILOSBAYAN, INC.
Respondents: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT &
NATURAL RESOURCES, LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS & HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY OF BUDGET &
MANAGEMENT, METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Summary: The petitioner local government units and concerned citizens are assailing
Proclamation No. 635 of the Office of the President through the Executive Secretary
which excluded lands in San Mateo, Rizal from the Marikina Watershed Reservation
Area to be used as landfill sites for the garbage of Metro Manila.

Doctrine: Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent
either of these mandatory requirements, the project's implementation is illegal.

FACTS:

1. In 1988, the respondent Secretaries of the DPWH, DENR and the Governor of
the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC, now MMDA) entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which provides that the DENR is allowing the
MMC to use its property located in San Mateo, Rizal to be used as a sanitary
landfill site for the solid wastes of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig. The DPWH is to commence
immediately upon signing of the MOA the construction/development of said
dumpsite.
2. The said land was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, the
Community Environment and Natural Resource Office (CENRO) in Rizal
Province submitted a Memorandum that the construction and operation of the
dumpsite runs contrary to the Revised Forestry Code. Further, more than 1,000
families will be adversely affected by the dumping operations.
3. The Province of Rizal and the municipality of San Mateo also objected to the
dumpsite. The Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo even issued a Resolution
banning the creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its jurisdiction.
4. Another letter was sent by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
stating that its environmental management program to upgrade the water quality
 of the Laguna Lake is incompatible within the watershed because of the heavy
pollution, including the risk of diseases, generated by such activities.
5. Even the DENR later wrote to the MMA Chairman stating that the MOA was a
costly error since the area is inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation. The
DENR then recommended that all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage
dumpsite be dismantled and the dumpsite be transferred to another area.
6. Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government
agencies aforementioned, the Office of the President, through Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635 which
excluded the subject land from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to be used
as landfill sites under the administration of the MMDA.
7. The petitioners thereafter filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
8. The CA denied the petitions.
9. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Proclamation No. 635 which allows for the use of lands in San
Mateo, Rizal which is also within the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area is
valid.

RATIO:

NO.

● The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed violates Rep.
Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code.
● Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the
provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years
earlier, on 10 October 1991.
● Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state "to require all
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate
local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions." Likewise, Section 27 requires prior
consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities
and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained.
● Here, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force
declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required
consultations. However, he added that "(t)his is the problem, sir, the officials we
may have been talking with at the time this was established may no longer be
incumbent and this is our difficulty now. That is what we are trying to do now, a
continuing dialogue."
● The ambivalent reply of Director Uranza was brought to the fore when, at the
height of the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway to stop dump
trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal
 openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they
would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
● The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were in fact
fulfilling their mandate, when they did this. Section 16 of the Local Government
Code allows every local government unit to "exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare," which involve,
among other things, "promoting health and safety, enhancing the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, and preserving the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants."
● Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project's implementation is
illegal. Thus, the following projects and programs require consultations with the
appropriate local government units:
o May cause pollution;
o May bring about climatic change;
o May cause the depletion of non-renewable resources;
o May result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover;
o May eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet;
and
o Other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular
group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.