Planas v. Gil, G.R. No.

L-46440, January 18, 1939

Acebedo Optical v. C.A et. al., G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
Petitioner is a corporation who applied with the Office of the City mayor of
Iligan for a business permit. It was then approved but with following conditions
subject to the opposition by the local optometrists.
Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), lodged a
complaint against the petitioner before the office of the city mayor alleging that
Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in the business permit. An
investigation was conducted and it turned out that the petitioner is guilty on
violating the conditions.
This resulted to a complaint filed by the petitioners on the revocation of its
business permit. The business permit of the petitioner is thus revoked in an
investigation conducted by the Office of the City Mayor. Petitioner asserts
that city mayor acted beyond the scope of his authority in imposing the
assailed conditions in subject business permit.

On a petition filed by the petitioner, he alleges that : a. e is denied due

process for not given an opportunity to present its evidence 2. Denied equal
protection because some other businesses is not imposed by limitation 3. the
City Mayor had no authority to impose the special conditions on its business
permit; and (4) the City Legal Officer had no authority to conduct the
investigation as the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Optometry.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor special conditions in the grant of business
permit is a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: No, it is not a valid exercise of police power.

Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue

licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not
revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. In the case under
consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to
petitioner was burdened with several conditions. A business permit is issued
primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot,
through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like
that of optometry. Hence, the special conditions in business permit is not a
valid exercise of police power The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the
special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does
not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or
beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or
acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null and void
and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to
give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires.
Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963
A petition of numerous residents in the Municipality of Macabebe province of
Pampanga to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river
in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered
removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. Thereafter, it found
the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his
decision ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures
of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the
expense of the respondent. The position of Lovina and Nelly as the appellees
was that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained,
final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or
stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters
and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the
state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial
power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
It may not be amiss to state that the power of the Secretary of Public Works to
investigate and clear public streams free from unauthorized encroachments
and obstructions was granted as far back as Act 3208 of the old Philippine
Legislature, and has been upheld by this Court. The Court do not believe that
the absence of an express appeal to the courts under the present Republic
Act 2056 is a substantial difference, so far as the Constitution is concerned,
for it is a well-known rule that due process does not have to be judicial
process; and moreover, the judicial review of the Secretary's decision would
always remain, even if not expressly granted, whenever his act violates the
law or the Constitution, or imports abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A 2056 is unconstitutional

Ruling:
No. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to
remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams,
constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make. It thus
appears that the delegation by Congress to executive or administrative
agencies of functions of judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial functions is
incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or administrative
powers, is not in violation of the Separation of Powers The mere fact that an
officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply
the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the
fact that these acts may affect private, rights do not constitute an exercise of
judicial powers.

Senator Robert S. Jaworksi v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463

January 14, 2004

Sometime on March, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument
denominated as “Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation or
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming which granted SAGE the authority to
operate and maintain Sports Betting station in Pagcors casino locations and
internet gamin facilities to service local and international bettors. Pursuant to
this authority granted by pagcor, SAGE commenced its operations by
conducting gambling on the internet on a trial run basis. Thereafter, Senator
Jaworski filed a petition praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in
favor of SAGE be nullified. He contends that Pacgor is not authorized under
its legislative franchise to operate gambling on the internet thus committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. At the
time of its enactment, internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were
confined exclusively to real-space. He further contends that internet gambling
is not within the purview of territorial jurisdiction of Philippines and other terms
connected to gambling refer to a physical structure in real-space.

Issue: Whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise include the right to vest

another entity, SAGE in this case, with the authority to operate Internet
gambling

Ruling:
No. A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to
corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at
will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration,
either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions
and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the
public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the
franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom
it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the
quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public
in exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal
language. A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to exist for the
common good. Hence, the special privileges and franchises it receives are
subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. There is
therefore a reserved right of the State to inquire how these privileges had
been employed, and whether they have been abused. While PAGCOR is
allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its
franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as
SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power.

Department of Health v. Camposano, G.R. No. 157684. April

27, 2005
Facts:
Some employees filed a complaint before the DOH against Director Dir. IV
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and
respondents arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of
1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg worth P330,000.00. On August 8,
1996, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents
and their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of
RA 3019. Thereafter, Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued
Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298) creating an ad-hoc
committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR
employees. PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the
investigation, in his resolution, it recommends to his Excellency President
Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the government service be
imposed thereon. Then President Ramos issued an order dismissing the
respondents. CA ruled that the Commission had no power to investigate the
charges against respondents. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the Commission had power to investigate charges against

respondents

Ruling:
Yes. Administrative investigation of complaints against presidential appointees
currently undertaken by various presidential committees or government
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations shall
continue notwithstanding the creation and organization of the Commission.
This, however, shall be without prejudice to the Commission, in its discretion,
taking over the investigation if the matter under investigation is within its
jurisdiction. The investigation was authorized under Administrative Order No.
298 dated October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look
into the administrative charges filed against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais,
Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique
L. Perez. The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with
the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions
for officers and employees under the former's jurisdiction.16 Thus, the health
secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents. Concededly, the health
secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action should
be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively
charged and investigated. However, the actual exercise of the disciplining
authority's prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the law
and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid
decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigator's recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the
evidence gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the
honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively
charged.