Ron - Republic vs. CA, G.R. No.

90482 (1991)
Facts:
● Republic Planters Bank (RPB) filed a complaint in the RTC for sum of
money/delivery of personal property with restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction against Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM)
and the National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA)
● They asked the court to order PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA to render a
faithful account of different bank accounts being held; to render a faithful
inventory of all the sugar stocks for the crop year 84-85; to remit dollar
accounts held; to deliver sugar stocks of crop year 84-85; pay interests and
penalties for accounts covered by unpaid sugar quedans, damages,
attorney’s fees and cost of the suit
● PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA entered into a Compromise Agreement.
● Private respondents assert that the SRA and RPB do not have the legal
authority to sue for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. They
further argued that petitioners have no legal personality to initiate the instant
petition for (a) SRA is not a party in the case before the trial court; the only
reason why it became involved was because of the contempt proceedings
initiated by private respondents against SRA's Arsenio Yulo, Carlos
Ledesma and Bibiano Sabino; RPB was a signatory to the Compromise
Agreement as a Trustee and, as such, regarded itself as only a nominal
party and in a series of pleadings it recognized the final and executory
nature of the decision approving the compromise agreement.

Ruling:
● The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar Regulatory
Administration may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines and that the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
does not have the authority to represent said petitioner in this case.
● Executive Order No. 18, enacted on 28 May 1986 and which took effect
immediately, abolished the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM)
and created the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) which shall be
under the Office of the President. However, under the third paragraph of
Section 13 thereof, the PHILSUCOM was allowed to continue as a juridical
entity for three (3) years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of
and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose
of continuing the functions for which it was established, under the
supervision of the SRA.
 ● Section 3 of said Executive Order enumerates the powers and functions of
the SRA; but it does not specifically include the power to represent the
Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against it, nor the power to
sue and be sued although it has the power to "enter, make and execute
routinary contracts as may be necessary for or incidental to the attainment
of its purposes between any persons, firms, public or private, and the
Government of the Philippines" and "[t]o do all such other things, transact
such other businesses and perform such functions directly or indirectly
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purposes of the Sugar
Regulatory Administration."
● It is apparent that its charter does not grant the SRA the power to represent
the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against the latter.
● It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers
as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied
in the exercise thereof.

Evan - Eugenio vs. CSC, G.R. No. 115863 (1995)

FACTS:
Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, Eugenio applied for a Career
Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank.

On August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.

On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission passed ResolutionNo.93-

4359. Part of it says “Foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service Commission
hereby resolves to streamline, reorganize and effect changes in its organizational
structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as
the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission.” (Basically wala
na CESO)

Petitioner filed an action to nullify Res No. 93-4359 stating that the CSC usurped the
Legislative functions of congress (in violation of the constitution) when it abolished CESB
(an office created by law)

HELD:
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 which adopted the Integrated
Reorganization Plan.
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be
abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation
and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function.

Robby - Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998)

Sec. 31 in relation to Secs. 21-23, Book III, Administrative Code

SHORT VERSION:
FACTS:
Pres Ramos issued AO 308 adopting a national computerized identification reference
system among the key basic services and social security providers and creation of IACC
to draw up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System.

ISSUE: AO 308 involves subject appropriate to be covered by an administrative order?

RULING: NO.

Administrative order

- ordinance issued by the President wc relates to specific aspects in the admin

operation of government
- in harmony w the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the
law and carrying out the legislative policy
AO 308 implements legislative policy of Admin Code?
NO. See # 8.
Admin Code
● general law
● incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles of governance
● embodies changes in admin structures and procedures designed to serve the
people

LONG VERSION:
FACTS:
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.

Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several
grounds. One of them is that: The establishment of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308
by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of congress.
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to
privacy.

On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the
executive and administrative powers of the president without encroaching on the
legislative powers of congress.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate.

RULING: Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.
The Constitution has vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power
to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative
by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution
has lodged it elsewhere.

The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President. It is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive
Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a
whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices.
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders
as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this
end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.
 Mara - Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, 677 SCRA 408 (2012)

FACTS:

In 2001, PGMA issued EO 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)

and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for
possible graft and corruption against presidential appointees.In 2010, President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III issued (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to
the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA).

Respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a

complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA)
which arose from the purchase of LWUA of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam because a case is already

pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, petitioner assails the
constitutionality of EO 13. He contends that the President is not authorized under any
existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA).

ISSUE:

WON E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF

CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES.

HELD: NO. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under E.O. 292. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292) 1,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the

1
E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:

(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating,
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and

(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to
E.O. 292.

Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization
by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable
under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct
office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply
transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President
Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative
structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division.

The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates
of eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the
bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact
that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the
2010 annual budget,no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was
ever required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.

PETITION DISMISSED.

Jasmine - Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 637 SCRA 78
(2010)

FACTS:

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is an ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task of investigating reports of graft and corruption committed
by third-level public officers and employees during the previous administration. The PTC
shall have all the powers of an investigative body but not of a quasi-judicial body.

ISSUE:

Is the PTC a valid office?

RULING:
No, although it was validly created. The creation of offices is primarily a legislative
function, but the President may do so either from a valid delegation from Congress or his
inherent duty as Chief Executive on ensuring faithful execution. The PTC is not created
from the restructuring of the Office of the President as it was only recently created. The
allowed forms of restructuring are: (1) abolish/consolidate offices, (2) transfer office from
OP to dept and vv, and (3) transfer function from OP to dept and vv. The PTC would have
been constitutional if not for violating the equal protection clause (focuses only on Arroyo
administration).

(nice one, evan! Sana ol. hahaha)

A. Control of Administrative Action

1. By the President

Secs. 1, 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution

Secs. 1-7, 21-23, Book III, Administrative Code
Secs. 1, 38, Book IV, Administrative Code

Ree - Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989)

FACTS:
● During the Marcos regime, there were gross demotion in economic, political,
and social rank in the Philippines. The military establishment has brought
threats over the civilian supremacy and spiteful military terrorize the state with
life-threatening brutality. The use of propaganda also destabilized the country.
Furthermore, Mr. Marcos and his associates left the economy of the country
devastated. They positioned the Philippines with enormous foreign debt the
reason of which was Marcos’ plunder disposition. On February 1986, Mr.
Marcos was overthrown from the presidency through the non-violent "people
power" revolution and forced the 20-yearlong regime in exile.
● While Philippines is recovering from the economic devastation, Mrs. Aquino,
the succeeding President, exhausted its effort to alleviate the poverty of the
masses within three years, whereas the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has
remained obscure.
● Mr. Marcos then, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. With the willpower of the President, Mrs. Aquino vindicated
that such return of the Marcoses and residence thereafter, will endanger the
national security and public safety, thus the President decides to bar their return
to the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to bar the return of
the Marcoses to the Philippines concerns the national interest?
2. Whether or not the President, under the powers granted by the Constitution,
may forbid the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?
3. Whether or not the decision if the President of forbidding the Marcoses to return
in the country was caused by acting arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

RULING:
● The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek
to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family whose command
has brought havoc to the country, which proves that there exist factual bases
for the President's decision.
● The Petitioners assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is
not enumerated is impliedly denied to her.” However, it is known to the public
that the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution, unless his/her actions speak otherwise
to what the Constitution is upholding.
● Consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the
different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent
of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution.
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollary, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated.
● The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of
the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the
President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or
the laws that the needs of the nation demand. The President is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties
in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
● Moreover, the decision of the President was not considered to be arbitrary or
with grave abuse of discretion primarily because of the President’s desire of
maintaining peace and order in the country and public interest.
● The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
● However, the respondents solicit the President’s sense of compassion to allow
a man to come home to die in his country. Nevertheless, the instant petition in
prohibiting the Marcoses to return to the Philippines due to a serious threat to
national interest and welfare was dismissed.

a. Control and Supervision

Elle - Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1990)

February 14, 1992 J. Paras

Citizen Antonio Carpio v. Executive, Local Government, and National Defense

Secetaries, and the National Treasurer

Historical background: After the war, the Integrated National Police was
created under the President with the Philippine Constabulary, of military
component, as the nucleus and the police forces as civilian component. This
design eroded the INP’s civilian character and resulted in inequities since the
military had superior benefits and privileges. Later, the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 determined the basic tenet of a modern police
organization is to remove it from the military. Hence, the "one police force,
national in scope, and civilian in character" provision that is now Article XVI,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

Facts:
Pursuant to the constitutional provision, the Congress passed RA 6975
establishing the Philippine National Police under a reorganized DILG. Under
the law, the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) shall have
administrative control over the PNP while “operational supervision and control”
is given to the local government units. Citizen, taxpayer and member of the bar
Antonio Carpio filed a petition seeking the declaration of RA 6975 as
unconstitutional.

He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened (emasculated) the NAPOLCOM

by limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control”
remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the
PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local police
heads also undermine the power of the president

Issue: Whether RA 6975 is unconstitutional for limiting the executive’s power

of control over the PNP?

Ruling: NO.
The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President,
is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be
expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he
will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this
doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive.” Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of
control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who,
in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under
their respective jurisdiction in the executive department.”

Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed
under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety
agencies created under the assailed Act,the funding of the PNP being in large
part subsidized by the national government.

There is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section

51 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local executives
are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. Unless countermanded
by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM.
 The national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers
of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being
integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject
to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.

Finally, the creation of a Special Oversight Committee did not encroach upon
the President's power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. It is an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tasked solely with
planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or absorption"
into the Department of the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved
agencies."

Angge - Moran vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 192957 (2014)

MORAN v. OFFICE OF FTHE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192957 | September 29, 2014 | VILLARAMA, JR., J.

● Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a verified
complaint against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc. pursuant to the relevant
provisions of RA 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines.
● The complaint alleged that the private respondent should be held liable for the
product imperfections of a BMW car which it sold to complainant.
● CAO rendered a Decision in favor of complainant and ordered the private
respondent to refund the purchase price of the BMW car in addition to the payment
of costs of litigation and administrative fines.
● The private respondent sought reconsideration of the Decision but the CAO denied
the motion in an Order. They then appealed to the Secretary of the DTI, the quasi-
judicial agency designated by Article 165 of RA 7394 to entertain appeals from the
adverse decisions and orders of the CAO. DTI Secretary dismissed the appeal
who then filed an appeal with the public respondent OP.
● OP granted the appeal, reversed the DTI Secretary’s Resolution, and dismissed
the complaint. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration with the OP, but the
OP denied said motion.
● complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and alleged lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the OP for ruling on cases involving a violation of RA 7394. he CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was a wrong mode of
appeal and for the failure of the petitioner to state material dates. CA likewise
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.
● Since the original complainant Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. passed away, his widow,
Concordia V. Moran filed the present petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner
argues that the CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari which alleged error
of jurisdiction on the part of the OP.
 ● Petitioner contends that in cases alleging error of jurisdiction on the part of the OP,
the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari with the CA because appeal is
not available to correct lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, even though appeal is
available, it is not considered as the plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy.
She claims that the OP lacked appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the DTI
in cases involving a violation of RA 7394 based on Article 166 11 thereof, which
expressly confers appellate jurisdiction to review such decisions of the DTI to the
proper court through a petition for certiorari. Hence, the OP cannot be deemed as
the "proper court" within the purview of Article 166.
● Private respondent argues that the CA was correct in denying the petition for
certiorari since this was an improper remedy in view of the availability of an appeal
from the OP. Furthermore, the private respondent confirms the appellate
jurisdiction of the OP over the DTI based on the constitutional power of control of
the OP over Executive Departments and the well-entrenched doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
● OSG claims that the availability of an appeal from the OP precluded the petitioner
from availing of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Even though there is an
allegation of error of jurisdiction, the OSG avers that appeal still takes precedence
over a petition for certiorari as long as the same is at the disposal of the petitioner.
However, in the present case, the OSG claims that the OP acted within its
jurisdiction in deciding the case on appeal from the DTI Secretary as Article 166 of
RA 7394 must yield to the constitutional power of control of the OP over Executive
Departments. The OSG also cites the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies to support the appellate jurisdiction of the OP over the DTI.

ISSUE: Is the CA correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that
petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of appeal?

HELD: NO. CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

● Under the Consumer Act (RA 7394), the DTI has the authority and the mandate to
act upon complaints filed by consumers pursuant to the State policy of protecting
the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales, acts or
practices. Said law provided for an arbitration procedure whereby consumer
complaints are heard and investigated by consumer arbitration officers whose
decisions are appealable to the DTI Secretary.
● Article 166 thereof provides: ART. 166. Decision on Appeal. – The Secretary shall
decide the appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof.1âwphi1 The decision
becomes final after 15 days from receipt thereof unless a petition for certiorari is
filed with the proper court.
● The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No. 18, 14
Series of 1987. Section 1 thereof provides:
● SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office
of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved
party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from… (Emphasis
supplied.)
● In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of Investments, we
interpreted the above provision and declared that "a decision or order issued by a
department or agency need notbe appealed to the Office of the President when
there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal."
● Petitioner further contends that from the decision of respondent BOI, appeal to the
Office of the President should be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of
the President to review acts of department secretaries will be rendered illusory by
mere rules of procedure.
● The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down
in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been
defined as the "power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."
● Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the
executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative
control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be
effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the more
in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial
in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Court’s rulemaking power. The
Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning the procedure in all courts.
● Administrative Order No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedy of
appeal to the Office of the President from the decisions of executive departments
and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order issued by a department
or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a
special law that provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the
enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate
judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI involving petitioner’s application
for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over A.O.
No. 18.
● In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate
judicial relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari
with the "proper court."
● Hence, private respondent should have elevated the case directly to the CA
through a petition for certiorari which Moran correctly did.

June - Ocampo vs. Enriquez , G.R. No. 225973 (2016)

Facts:
• During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then
candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow
the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga
Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections.
• On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding
the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan
ng Mga Bayani.
• On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a
directive to the Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for
President Marcos.
• Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition
with the Court.

Issue:

Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed

grave abuse of discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum
and directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB?

Held:
• No. The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to
have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political
question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the excercise of his
powers under the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to
allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public
domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine
purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his
wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There
being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as
discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that political question
is outside the ambit of judicial review.
• Sec 1, Art. VII of the Constitution does not define what are “truly political
questions” and “those which are not truly political," and that identification
of these two species may be problematic since there has been no clear
standard. In the end, however, We resolved that, "[i]n our jurisdiction,
the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-
justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits."
• Here, AFP Regulations G161-375 was issued by order of the DND
Secretary, who, as the alter ego of the President, has supervision and
control over the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP and the PVAO.
The Veterans Memorial Historical Division of the PVAO is tasked to
administer, develop and maintain military shrines such as the LNMB. As
held in Our Decision, AFP Regulations G 161-375 is presumptively valid
and has the force and effect of a law and that, until set aside by the
Court, is binding upon executive and administrative agencies like public
respondents, including the President as the chief executor of the laws.
 Ron - Mondano vs. Silvosa, G.R. No. L-7708 (1955)

FACTS:
● The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit,
province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a
sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing
him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage
for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling.
● Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial
governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report.
● The provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the
petitioner from office.
● Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against
the petitioner over his objection.
● The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case
against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the
respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect.

Ruling:
● Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
● Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power
of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local
governments over which he has been granted only the power of general
supervision as may be provided by law.
● The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision
over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c)
of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction.
● Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus
or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over
which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may
be provided by law.
● In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power
of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
 done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.
● The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision
over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and
investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by 􏰂nal judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."
● The charges preferred against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province
of Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is
unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the
municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of law.

Evan - Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs. IAC, 146 SCRA 294 (1986)

FACTS:
Acusar was supposed to relocate his cockpit in Bogo, Cebu but failed to do so
in time. As such, the CFI deemed that he has waived his rights to the cockpit.
Mayor Martinez now issued the license to Sevilla to which Acusar objected.
After the Court dismissed his complaint, he went to the Phil Gamefowl
Commission to have his license re-issued and succeeded.

ISSUE:
Does the PGC have the power to issue the license?

HELD:
No. It is the municipal mayor, with authority of Sanggunian, who can issue such
permits. The PGC can only supervise mayors in granting licences, but not
review, disapprove, or substitute judgment (these now constitute control, which
the PGC does not have).

b. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

Robby - Angeles vs. Gaite, G.R. No. 165276 (2009)

SHORT VERSION:
FACT:

The petitioner filed a motion for review of certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals. The case starts when the grandchild, under the custody of her
grandmother, was taken away by her half brother in different provinces. Because of that,
the petitioner filed a case against the half brother of her grandchild. The investigating
prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the case. This was however
denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner
then filed a petition for review with SEC Perez and was also denied. She tried appealing
to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the ground of Memorandum
Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the
dismissal. Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since it
diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of
Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.

ISSUE: MC No. 58 invalid regulation bc it diminishes President’s power of control and

bestows upon Sec of Justice almost unfettered (not confined or restricted) power?

RULING: NO.

President’s act of delegating authority to Sec of Justice is within purview of the doctrine
of qualified political agency.

Recognizes the establishment of a single executive. All exec and admin orgs are adjuncts
of the Exec Dept, heads of the various exec depts are assistants and agents of the Chief
Exec, and, except in cases where the Chief Exec is required by the Consti or law to act
in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
exec and admin functions of the Chief Exec are performed by and through the exec depts,
and the acts of Secretaries of such depts, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Exec presumptively
the acts of the Chief Exec.

Heads of exec depts occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity and
should be of the President’s bosom confidence (Jefferson). Subject to the direction of the
President (Atty-General Cushing). Without minimizing the importance of heads of various
depts, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Each head
of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that dept
where the Pres is required by law to exercise authority.

Acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business are, unless disapprove or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Limits of President’s power to delegate?

● Suspend writ of habeas corpus

● Proclaim martial law
● Pardoning power
By no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in
question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
Power to review SoJ’s decision dealing w preliminary investigation of cases cannot
be delegated?
NO. Unduly hamper President’s effectivity in running the govt.
 President has not fully abdicated his power of control. Allows an appeal if
imposable penalty is RP or higher.

LONG VERSION:
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan,
to take care and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to
such child and took care of her as her own. Petitioner also gave the same
attention to the half-brother of the grand niece. The latter would seek
petitioner’s financial support ranging from daily subsistence to
hospitalization expenses.
2. After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael
Vistan, failed to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan
had a falling out. Since no more support was given to the latter, he took his
half-sister away. He brought her to different provinces while asked the help
of certain individuals to mislead the petitioner and the police.
3. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a dragnet
operation.
4. The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation
of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse
Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise
filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and
Maria Mercedes.
5. The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing
of the case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also
issued a decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review
with USEC. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for
review with SEC Perez and was also denied
6. She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by
such on the ground of Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal
or a petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death
7. Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal
8. Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since t
diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the
Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.

Issue
 W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power
of the President?

Ruling
NO, it does not diminish the power of the President

The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue

of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political
agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.

Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive,
"all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department;
the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive."The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding
the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted
and applied the law as it should be.

Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30,
1993 reads:

In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines

enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the
review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued
by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal
cases are reiterated and clarified.

No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions

of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal
cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those
involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to deathx x x.

Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately
preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.

It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power
to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the
disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly
expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief
Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the
exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second-
guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is
he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of
justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary – his own alter ego.

BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:

Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponenciain Villena, makes this clear that

“There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the

Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and
no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those
powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and
the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11,
idem).”

These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our
fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms,
or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by
co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the
judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands
the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by
no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is
of similar gravitasand exceptional import.

In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the
Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be
considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated.
Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum
Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetuaor higher.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing
allpreliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly
hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every
decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter’s expertise in said matter.

The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very

existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders
thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in
running the government.

2. By the Legislative Deparment

Secs. 21-22, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

 Mara - Macalintal vs. COMELEC, supra

Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas
Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that Section
5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution
which requires that thevoter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
anm election.

Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim.
In that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United States is
deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.

Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to
vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the
requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon
which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino
abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who,
on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. WON THE RA 9189 is constitutional

2. WON the provision that Congress shall “review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission” is valid

HELD:

1. YES (except for some provisions). Contrary to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d)
circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of
overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that
necessarily presupposes that the qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" is not
physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are
components of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189.
The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained
his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his
physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent
resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his
intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law,
he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his
 domicile the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c)
of the law.

2. NO. By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the
COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act." This provision
of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law
— the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and
regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative
expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation. Once a law is enacted and
approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The
legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that
body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve,
review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC. By vesting itself with the powers
to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.

PUNO:
1. NO. The intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission to apply the
residence requirements to absentee voters is evident from its deliberations. They
precisely used the phrase "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD" to stress that the
absentee voter must have all the qualifications in Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution. In the course of the deliberations, Fr. Bernas perceived a problem that
may arise from the meaning of the second residence requirement on the place of
registration and voting. As noted, a qualified voter normally registers and votes in the
place where he is domiciled or has resided for six months. Fr. Bernas feared that the
second residence requirement may pose a constitutional obstacle to absentee voting
"unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast
in the place of his domicile."

Physical presence is not a mere test of intent but the "principal confirming evidence of
the intention of the person." Until such promise is fulfilled, he continues to be a
domiciliary of another country. Until then, he does not possess the necessary
requisites and therefore, cannot be considered a qualified voter.
2. NO. The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our scheme of government. As the
constitutional body charged with the administration of our election laws, it is endowed
with independence in the exercise of some of its powers and the discharge of its
responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer
our election laws belongs to this categoryof powers as this has been vested
exclusively by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon
by Congress in the exercise of its oversight powers.

If IRR is illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, the courts can strike them
down inan appropriate case. This power is vested to the courts under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution defining the scope of judicial power, and more
specifically under Section 5, Article VIII empowering this Court to review, revise,
 reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, "all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question."

Again, this power is exclusive and is not meant to be shared by any other branch or
agency of the government.

Jasmine - ABAKADA Guro vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715 (2008)

FACTS:
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs.

The Department of Finance, Department of Budget and Management, National Economic

Development Authority, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs and the Civil
Service Commission were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and
regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.

Abakada Guro Party list, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of RA 9335. Among other things, they assail the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation
of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon
the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.

HELD:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as
binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to
its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by
the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA9335, Congress
arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under
this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as
is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made
by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by

Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles
of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. Legislative power (or the power to propose,
enact, amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers,
the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power
requires the act of both chambers. Corollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of
the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the
validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional
committee legislative veto are invalid.

3. By the Judicial Department

Sec. 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution

Art. 7, Civil Code

4. By the Ombudsman

Secs. 12-13, Article XI, 1987 Constitution

B. Powers, Functions and Duties of Administrative Agencies

1. In General

Ree - Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940)

FACTS:
● Maximo Calalang filed this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution ,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.;
and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the opening
of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
● Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all
 animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places abovementioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
● It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the
regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the acts of the respondents are unconstitutional as it constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power? NO.

RULING:
● The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain
acts.
● Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets.”
● The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules
and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in
said Act.
● The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which
the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations
on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
 function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided
the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law.
But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
● Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise
of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules
and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit
upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of
the public. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated.
● The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law
to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop
the wheels of government.

Elle - Matienzo vs. Abellera, 162 SCRA 1 (1988)

June 1, 1988 J. Gutierrez, Jr.

Rufino Matienzo, Espiritu, Franco and La Suerte Transportation Corp. v. Hon.

Abellera and Hon. Asuncion, Chairman and Member of the Board of
Transportation, respectively

Facts: The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators
in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admittedly operate "colorum" or
"kabit" taxicab units. Private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent
Board or the legalization of their unauthorized "excess" taxi cab units citing
Presidential Decree no. 101 "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of
clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and
responsible operators." The respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the
applications or hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to operate
their "excess taxicab units" for which legalization was sought. The petitioners
alleged that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions
for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents. They
argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman nor any member thereof
had the power, at the time the petitions were filed, to legitimize clandestine
operations under PD 101 as such power had been limited to a period of six (6)
months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They
state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes a functus officio.
Issue: Whether the Board of Transportation has the power to grant such petitions?

Ruling: YES. Presidential Decree no. 101 vested in the Board of Transportation
the power, among others `”To grant special permits of limited term for the operation
of public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary
to replace or convert clandestine operators into legitimate and responsible
operators." It is argued that under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the State "to
eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators by replacing or
allowing them to become legitimate and responsible ones.” In view thereof, it is
maintained that the respondent Board may continue to grant to "colorum"
operators the benefits of legalization under PD 101, despite the lapse of its power,
after six (6) months, to do so, without taking punitive measures against the said
operators. Indeed, a reading of section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the
respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards the legalization
of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing
in section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six
(6) months after promulgation of the decree. Rather, it merely provides for the
withdrawal of the State’s waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators or
their illegal acts. Elearly, there is no impediment to the Board’s exercise of
jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates
of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101.

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or

commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally
construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that
which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative
intent should be upheld as being germane to the law.

The fate of the private respondent’s petitions is initially for the Board to determine.
From the records of the case, acceptance of the respondent’s applications appears
to be a question correctly within the discretion of the respondent Board to decide.
As a rule, where the jurisdiction of the BOT to take cognizance of an application or
legalization is settled, the Court enjoins the exercise thereof only when there is
fraud, abuse of discretion or error of law. Furthermore, PD 101 does not require
such notice or hearing or the grant of temporary authority. The provisional nature
of the authority and the act that the primary application shall be given a full hearing
are the safeguards against its abuse. As to the applications for legalization
themselves, the Public Service Act does enjoin the Board to give notice and
hearing before exercising any of its powers under Sec. 16 thereof.
 a. Express and Implied

Angge - Villegas vs. Subido, 30 SCRA 498 (1969)

VILLEGAS v. SUBIDO
G.R. No. L-26534 | November 28, 1969 | FERNANDO, J.:
SORRY T_T sobrang panget ng pagkakasulat nung case di ko magets masyado T_T )
FACTS:
● The Power of respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to direct the Mayor of
Manila, petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, to replace the other petitioners as station
commanders of the three Manila police precincts, is challenged in this prohibition
proceeding filed with the Court of First Instance.
● There is no dispute that petitioner, as Mayor, by virtue of the statutory grant of
authority of "immediate control over the executive functions of the different
departments," could pick the police officials to be entrusted with such responsibility.
The choice fell on the three other petitioners, then police captains.
● Respondent Commissioner would dispute their designation as such on the ground
of lack for each of them of "an Inspector First Class (Police Detective Major)"
eligibility. Petitioners prevailed, the lower court being unable to locate any legal
provision to warrant such an exercise of power on the part of respondent
Commissioner. The case is before us now on appeal.
● The petition for prohibition, with preliminary injunction being sought, was filed in
the Court of First Instance. After the allegation as to parties, it was set forth therein
that in an endorsement, respondent Commissioner directed that petitioners
Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro be replaced as station commanders of the three
police precincts of Manila as their continued employment as such was illegal, the
eligibility required being that of an inspector first class, allegedly not possessed by
them.
● The petitioner Mayor replied, asserting that he felt obliged "to disregard said
directive, it being in excess of the authority vested in CSC."
● Respondent Commissioner of Civil Service was however adamant, reiterating hiis
directive for the replacement of the other petitioners as station commanders.
● Then came the allegation why in this particular case respondent Commissioner of
Civil Service acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or, at the very least, with
grave abuse of discretion.
● In the answer by respondent Commissioner, the facts as set forth were admitted,
but there was an explicit denial of the grounds relied upon to show lack or excess
of jurisdiction or his acting with grave abuse of discretion.
● The decision now on appeal, noted that respondent Commissioner did not dispute
the civil service eligibilities and training of petitioners Barbers, Paralejas and
Lazaro.
● What cannot be denied, as stressed in such decision, is the absence of any law
"which prescribes that precinct commanders be police majors," resulting
necessarily in the directive of respondent Commissioner of Civil Service being
 declared null and void, the writ of prohibition thus being the appropriate remedy,
with an injunction perpetually restraining him from the commission of the acts
complained of.
HELD:
● What is clear is that it is petitioner City Mayor that could so designate the other
petitioners to assume the position of station commanders. That power is his, and
his alone. He is not required by law to share it with respondent Commissioner, who
must justify by the valid conferment of authority the action taken by him in requiring
that the City Mayor replace the other petitioners. Power is not to be presumed, it
must be shown. Respondent Commissioner failed to do so. It was not surprising
therefore that the lower court ruled against him.
● As set forth at the outset, we sustain the lower court and affirm the judgment
appealed from.
● 1. The power of petitioner City Mayor as to who could be designated as station
commanders of the three Manila police precincts is conceded. No dispute as to his
authority to do so exists. The Charter is clear. The narrow question, therefore, is
whether such designation could be frustrated by the directive of the respondent
Commissioner. For this official to be justified in interposing a negative, he must
show that an applicable law authorizes him to do so.
● It is well-settled that respondent Commissioner at the most may inquire only as to
the eligibility of the person thus chosen to fill up a vacant position. If he were, then
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service must so attest. That function being
discharged, his participation ceases.
● In this particular case, the eligibility of the other petitioners as police captains is
admitted. That was duly set forth in the decision now on appeal. More than that,
their being exceptionally well-qualified, was likewise duly noted therein, a finding
of fact binding on us as this appeal raises purely questions of law. The justification
for the directive of respondent Commissioner is thus premised on his alleged
power to insist on a specific eligibility for each of the other petitioners designated,
that of "Inspector First Class (Police or Detective Major)."
● In his brief, however, he can point to no express provision that would confer on
him such a power. His failure is understandable because there is none. At the
most, then, he would rely on a reading of the Civil Service Act from which,
mistakenly to our mind, he would infer such authority.
● There is thus an admission from respondent Commissioner himself that his power
is necessarily limited. He would, however, construe such a restricted authority
expansively. He would rely on an ambiguity. It would be a stultification of well-
settled principles of public law if from the vagueness of a statute, competence to
act could be predicated. If such a purpose were within the contemplation of
Congress, an appropriate form of words could have been utilized. The absence of
such language negates its existence.
● Respondent Commissioner would seek support for such untenable view by
asserting that under certain provisions of the Act, he is empowered to issue rules
and regulations as well as to promulgate standards, policies and guidelines. This
is to rely on a frail reed. To do so is to offend against the primacy that should be
accorded a statute as contrasted with decrees coming from the Executive
 Department, necessarily of lower category. What is worse, the rules in question
are not issued by the President, but by one of his subordinates; their binding force
then is not as great. Much less could they supersede applicable statutes, not only
in what they command but also in what they omit. It does not admit of doubt that
in the hierarchy of legal norms, such rules and standards definitely occupy an
inferior status. If the statute is silent as to the existence of power, there the matter
rests.
● Only Congress can remedy the situation. It is not for respondent Commissioner to
do so on the flimsy allegation that he possesses authority to promulgate rules and
standards dealing specifically with the supervision, the preparation and rating of
all civil service examinations,14 the making of investigation and special reports
upon all matters relating to the enforcement of the civil service law,15 the authority
to pass upon all removal, separation and suspension of permanent officers and
employees in the competitive and classified service,16 and the determination of
appeals instituted by any person believing himself to be aggrieved 17 — a power
which does not have the remotest connection with an exercise by petitioner City
Mayor of a competence exclusively lodged in him to designate the other petitioners
as precinct commanders.
● The respect to be accorded to the exercise of the authority to appoint by the official
entrusted by law to do so and the minimum interference allowed the Commissioner
of Civil Service under his power to inquire into the eligibility of the appointee lends
further support to the conclusion arrived at. It would appear clear, therefore, that
respondent Commissioner does not possess any statutory authority to interfere
with the power of petitioner City Mayor to make the designation of the other
petitioners.
● 2. Respondent Commissioner, in his answer to the petition assailing his directive,
would lend plausibility to his claim that he was legally empowered to do so by this
argument: "Furthermore, said assignments are not in conformity with the
recommendation of the U.S. Agency for International Development to assign and
shift MPD personnel to positions to which they have qualified in appropriate
examinations."20 To state such a contention is to reject it. As a foundation for the
challenged directive it is, to put it mildly, far from stable. As an asserted basis to
justify what respondent did, it is far from persuasive. To put it bluntly, as a source
of power, its value is nil. It would not be easy to imagine a plea more offensive to
our sovereignty and derogatory to our dignity as an independent nation.
● All governmental powers are lodged in officials of our government both national
and local. An alien agency at the most may be permitted to serve in an advisory
capacity. It can suggest, but it cannot command. Its wishes do not constitute law.
Our officials, therefore, are not bound to obey. If it were otherwise, then a posture
of subserviency and mendicancy would be sanctioned. That this Court cannot
allow.

June - Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292 (1994)
Facts:

· On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish,Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna
LakeDevelopment Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open
garbagedumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful
effects on thehealth of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of
thesurrounding area.

· The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of
Caloocan wasmaintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing
an EnvironmentalCompliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources, as required
under Presidential DecreeNo. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under
Republic Act No. 4850, as amendedby Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

· The LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving
streams couldconsiderably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it
indicates thepresence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the
sample duringcollection or handling.

· On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the
CityGovernment of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and
otherentities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage
andother waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

· On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National
Police,enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage
dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

· The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City ana ction for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order.

· In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the

sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the
peoplein Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction

Issues:
1. Whether or not LLDA can exercise jurisdiction in maintaining the ecological balance
of the Camarin open dumpsite.

2. Whether or not LLDA has the power to issue a cease and desist order under RA
4850 on dumping of garbage in Camarin.

Held:

1. Yes. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for
another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20(20) of
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration
and pollution.

Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from
the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas.

2. Yes. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813
and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or
modify orders requiring the discontinuance or pollution."

While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency
has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In
the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of
the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well
be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
 b. Discretionary and Ministerial

Secs. 6-10, RA 9485

Ron - Cariño vs. Capulong, 222 SCRA 593 (1993)

Facts:
● Regional Director Venancio R. Nava, Region IX-DECS, reminded AMA "of
the provisions of the Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232,
specifically Article E, Section 7, Rule III, Part III that the filling of application
shall be at least one (1) year before the opening of classes" and the
"provisions of the Private School Law reiterated in the Educational Act of
1992 which prohibits the operation of unauthorized schools or courses.
● AMA proceeded to announce its opening through news and print media,
and thereupon, started to enroll students in elementary, secondary and
tertiary levels. Taking remedial action, the DECS Regional Director directed
AMA to stop enrollment and to desist from operating without prior
authorization.
● AMA, however, not only continued the enrollment but even started to hold
regular classes, and thereafter, on 15 June 1990, 􏰂led a formal application
to operate.
● Again, AMA ignored the directive and continued to operate illegally.
● Regional Director received a letter from AMA asking that the parties await
the decision of the Secretary of DECS on its application for a permit to
operate before the closure order is effected. On 27 June 1990, the
Secretary of DECS denied AMA's application.
● AMA filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, a petition for prohibition,
certiorari and mandamus against the Hon. Isidro Cariño, DEC's Secretary
and Atty. Venancio R. Nava, Regional Director, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, Region IX to annul and set aside the closure order and
to enjoin the respondents from closing or padlocking AMACC, Davao City.

Ruling:
● The action filed by the private respondents in the court below is a petition
for mandamus to compel the petitioners to approve their application to
operate AMACC- Davao City as an educational institution.
● As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty but not a discretionary function.
● A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room
for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a
discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of
judgment.
● In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial
duty of the petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the
 petitioners because it had to be exercised in accordance with - and not in
violation of - the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
● Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be
exercised in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed.

Evan - Luego vs. CSC, G.R. No. L-69137 (1986)

FACTS:
Luego was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor
Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as
“temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent
Tuozo and another employee. Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent
better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that
the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is
revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor
Ronald Duterte, the new mayor.

ISSUE:
Is the CSC correct?

HELD:
No. The appointing authority labelled Luego’s appointment as permanent, and such must
be respected by the CSC. It is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer for it can only approve or review the
appointment as to compliance with Civil Service Law. Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according
to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question which only the appointing authority can decide.

c. Errors in the Exercise of Powers

Robby - Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CTA, 234 SCRA 348 (1994)

Case remanded to CTA for further proceedings.

SHORT VERSION
FACTS:
Citybank filed claim for refund with BIR. In order to interrupt the running of prescriptive
period, filed a petition claiming refund of its income overpayments with the CTA.

CIR could not present any evidence by reason of the repeated failure of the Tax
Credit/Refund Division of the BIR to transmit the records of the case + investigation report
to the SolGen despite repeated requests. Constrained to submit the case without
presenting any evidence. Motion to suspend proceedings denied. Order for refund issued.

ISSUE: BIR, represented by CIR, denied its day in court by reason of

mistakes/negligence of its officials?

RULING: YES.

Several postponements sought by SolGen due to unavailability of necessary records.

The Govt is not bound by the errors committed by its agents. In the performance of its
governmental fxns, the State cannot be estopped by the neglect of its agent and officers.
Although the Govt may generally be estopped through the affirmative acts of public
officers acting w/in their authority, the neglect or omission of public duties as exemplified
in this case will not and should not produce that effect.

The errors of certain admin officers should never be allowed to jeopardize the Govt’s
position, if justified, stands to be prejudiced just because of bureaucratic lethargy.

LONG VERSION

Facts:

The judicial proceedings over the present controversy commenced with CTA Case No.
4099, wherein the Court of Tax Appeals ordered herein petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to grant a refund to herein private respondent Citytrust Banking
Corporation (Citytrust) in the amount of P13,314,506.14, representing its overpaid income
taxes for 1984 and 1985, but denied its claim for the alleged refundable amount reflected
in its 1983 income tax return on the ground of prescription.1 That judgment of the tax
court was affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals. 


The order for refund was based on the following findings of the Court of Tax Appeals: (1)
the fact of withholding has been established by the statements and certificates of
withholding taxes accomplished by herein private respondent's withholding agents, the
authenticity of which were neither disputed nor controverted by herein petitioner; (2) no
evidence was presented which could effectively dispute the correctness of the income tax
return filed by herein respondent corporation and other material facts stated therein; (3)
no deficiency assessment was issued by herein petitioner; and (4) there was an audit
report submitted by the BIR Assessment Branch, recommending the refund of overpaid
taxes for the years concerned (Exhibits Y to Y-3), which enjoys the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty
Issues:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision rendered by the Court
of Tax Appeals ordering a refund in favor of Citytrust.

Held:

Yes. After a careful review of the records, we find that under the peculiar circumstances
of this case, the ends of substantial justice and public interest would be better subserved
by the remand of this case to the Court of Tax Appeals for further proceedings. It is the
sense of this Court that the BIR, represented herein by petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, was denied its day in court by reason of the mistakes and/or negligence
of its officials and employees.

It is a long and firmly settled rule of law that the Government is not bound by the errors
committed by its agents. In the performance of its governmental functions, the State
cannot be estopped by the neglect of its agent and officers. Although the Government
may generally be estopped through the affirmative acts of public officers acting within
their authority, their neglect or omission of public duties as exemplified in this case will
not and should not produce that effect. Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation through which
the government agencies continue to operate and with which the State effects its
functions for the welfare of its constituents.21 The errors of certain administrative officers
should never be allowed to jeopardize the Government's financial position, 22 especially
in the case at bar where the amount involves millions of pesos the collection whereof, if
justified, stands to be prejudiced just because of bureaucratic lethargy.

Herein private respondent cannot be entitled to refund and at the same time be liable for
a tax deficiency assessment for the same year.

Mara - Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, 525 SCRA 11 (2007)

G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:

● Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in
the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion,"
"Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
● On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654 which took effect on July 3,
1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and "More" were
considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%.
● However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner
issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% advaloremtax.
 ● On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the
implementation of RMC 37-93. CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective for it has
fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
● On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against petitioner in her private capacity because the issuance of RMC 37-93
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process
of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Motion to dismiss by Petitioner
denied.
● CA: Art 32 governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not
be alleged in the complaint for damages.

ISSUE: WON the act of petitioner was done in the performance of her functions as
a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which
should be applied (liability attaches only upon showing of malice)

HELD: NO.
General Rule: Special law/provision prevails.
Art 32 NCC2: provides for specific acts
Admin Code: “acts” in general

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office,
where said public officer:
(1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or
(2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also
private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code,
laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts
done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers,

2
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them
liable for damages.

Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government
officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of
official duties, without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil
suit against the official concerned. Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies
in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that may give rise to
an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of
rights and liberties.

While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law,
Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer
liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be
committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code,
which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties,
Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant
case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.

PETITION DENIED.

Jasmine - Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785 (2009)

FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, Soriano, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, made the
following remarks on the show:

“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa

putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito]
kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, odiba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi
ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito. “

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints
were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents against petitioner
in connection with the above broadcast.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, preventively

suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with
Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986 (the PD that created MTRCB), in
relation to Sec. 3, Chapter 8 of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner then filed an action to nullify the preventive suspension order. He claimed that
the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision
authorizing it are invalid in as much as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB
to issue preventive suspension.

HELD:
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may
be conferred by the Constitutionor by statute. They have in fine only such powers or
authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining
whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once
ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the
MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the
authority, albeit impliedly,to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this
authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of,its power of regulation
and supervision.

But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD1986, without more,
would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive
suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and
supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others,
indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to
prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the
aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the
law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in
furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or
supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has
actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely
formalized a power which PD1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

Complementing this provision is Sec. 3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB “to
exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment
of the purpose and objectives of [the law].” As earlier explained, the investiture of
supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it
did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as may be
proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and proved.

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the

principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative
powers. Administrative regulations or “subordinate legislation” calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of “the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law.” Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room in its
operations and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample
latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due
regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to effectively
and efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.

(Diba ang layo na ng binasa mo, go go lang! :) )

Ree - Cipriano vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165983 (2004)

FACTS:
● Petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002.
● On the date of the elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution adopting the
recommendation of the Commission's Law Department to deny due course to or
cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections,
including petitioners. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that
petitioner and all the other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered
voters in the barangay where they intended to run.
● Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the SK elections and her name was
not deleted from the official list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner
was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman,
and thereafter took her oath of office.
● Petitioner, after learning of Resolution filed with the COMELEC a motion for
reconsideration of said resolution. She argued that a certificate of candidacy may only
be denied due course or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any registered
candidate for the same position under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
 filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.)
● According to petitioner, the report of the Election O7cer of Pasay City cannot be
considered a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the
COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due course to or cancel one's certificate of
candidacy. Petitioner also claimed that she was denied due process when her
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and hearing.
Petitioner further argued that the COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction to act
on the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the first instance because it is the
Division of the Commission that has authority to decide election-related cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. Finally, she contended that she may only
be removed by a petition for quo warranto after her proclamation as duly-elected SK
Chairman.
● In their answer, the Commission in its resolution stated: “in the event that the
disqualified candidate is proclaimed the winner despite his disqualification or despite
the pending disqualification case filed before his proclamation, but which is
subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of said disqualified candidate is
hereby declared void from the beginning, even if the dispositive portion of the
resolution disqualifying him or canceling his certificate of candidacy does not provide
for such an annulment.”

ISSUE:
1. May the COMELEC on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and administer
election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of
candidacy on the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law?

RULING:
● The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to govern the conduct of
elections and to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and
peaceful. It is mandated to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
● As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of
government — executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers.
● The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example, include the power to
determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and
inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and
government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
 elections. It also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the
conduct of elections.
● Its legislative authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and regulations
implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the
Commission is required to enforce and administer.
● The Constitution has also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when it was granted
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials.
● Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission also exercises
other powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the
authority to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exercise of
such authority, however, must be in accordance with the conditions set by law.
● The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. We disagree. The Commission may not, by itself,
without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt.
● The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due
course to petitioner's certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due
course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While
the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into
matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.
● Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or cancellation
of one's certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the
Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 18 We have earlier enumerated
the scope of the Commission's administrative functions. On the other hand, where a
power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but
does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge or is conferred upon an officer
other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.
● It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the
candidate be notified of the Commission's inquiry into the veracity of the contents of
his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own evidence
to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.

Elle - Filipinas Engineering vs. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 (1985)

February 28, 1985 J. Cuevas
Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Hon. Jaime Ferrer, et. al., COMELEC
Commissioners, et. al.

Facts:
In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, Commissioners of the
COMELEC issued an invitation to bid call no. 127 on September 16, 1969 calling for the
submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting
booths (with specifications).

Among the 17 bidders were Acme Steel Manufacturing and Filipinas Engineering.
COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting
booths. However, the losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas Engineering
filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme. The lower court denied the writ
prayed for. Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower
court has no jurisdiction over the case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving
an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its
invitation to bid; and
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the
premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them
from complying with their contract.
RulinIt has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction
to review on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the
conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.

The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may
not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being
non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order,
and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any
question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the
trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

2. Investigatory

Angge - Cariño vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

CARIÑO V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 96681 | December 2, 1991 | NARVASA, J.
FACTS:
● 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT)
undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and
highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to
act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
● According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions"
after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises without disrupting classes as
a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no
response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying
away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in
peaceable assemblies, etc.
● Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were
served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to
initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into
the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.
● Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8)
private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School,
Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA.
● For failure to heed the return-to-work order, private respondents were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given 5 days to
answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for 90) days
"pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced.
● An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807.
● In the administrative case in which CHR complainants were, among others, named
respondents. the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation,
and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending
resolution by the SC of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary
restraining order."
 ● But when their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee,
which later also denied their motion for reconsideration. "the respondents led by
their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings." The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for 9
months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.
● MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before RTC against petitioner which was
dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the SC on certiorari and alleged violation of
the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly. The ACT also
filed a similar petition
● Respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to the Commission on Human
Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
● On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he
(Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the)
Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin
and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants'
counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended
without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b)
expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize."
● In an Order, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and
required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within
ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve
the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit."
● It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should
not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;"
there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission
was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the
Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case
decided by the Supreme Court" .
HELD:
● The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine
with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been
passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject
to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil
Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
● The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
● The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
● The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have. 22
● The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the
powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
● As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise
that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth.
It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending
such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
● But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
● "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve
or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . .
to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
● The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
 function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm
L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
● "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits
of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
● In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment." 32
● Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even
if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or
civil or political rights had been transgressed.
● These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted
to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
● The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things.
It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education
Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same
ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions
involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining
teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate.

June - Department of Health vs. Camposano, 457 SCRA 438 (2005)

Facts:
Respondents are former employees of the DOH-NCR. Some concerned DOH-NCR
employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman against respondents
arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous
Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330, 000.00
from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory.

Issue:
Whether or not the Presidential Commission against Graft and Corruption (PGAGC) has
jurisdiction to investigate the admin complaints against the respondents.

Held:

Yes. Executive Order (EO) No. 151 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate
administrative complaints against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and
corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is evident that EO 151 authorizes
the PCAGC to investigate charges against presidential, not non-presidential, appointees.
In its

Preamble, specifically in its "Whereas" clauses, the EO "specifically tasked [the PCAGC]
to . . . investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption . . . ." More
pointedly, Section 3 states that the "Commission shall have jurisdiction over all
administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner
against presidential appointees . . . ." The Court notes, however, that respondents were
not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The investigation was authorized under
Administrative Order No. 298 dated October

25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the administrative charges
filed against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera,
Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique L. Perez. [. . .] The Chief Executive's power to create the
Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted
full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has
the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with
the law.

With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting
the inquiry. Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with regard to cases
involving non-presidential appointees was rectified in Executive Order No. 12, which
created the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC).

Non-presidential appointees who may have acted in conspiracy, or who may have been
involved with a presidential appointee, may now be investigated by the PAGC.

3. Quasi-Legislative /Rule-Making
 a. In General

(Jan)Ron - Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970)

FACTS:
Petitioner Romeo Edu (Land Transportation Commissioner) filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition against respondent Judge Vicente Ericta, seeking to annul and set aside
his order for the issuance for a writ of preliminary injunction directed against the
enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2. The petition stemmed from another pending
suit filed by Teddy Galo assailing the validity of the enactment of the Reflector Law for
undue exercise of legislative power.

The Reflector Law included provisions that required the installation of reflectors on motor
vehicles before registration with the LTO. Some of these provisions were reproduced in
Administrative Order No. 2.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Reflector Law is constitutional
2. Whether the issuance of AO No. 2 is a valid delegation of legislative power

HELD:
1. YES. In the Reflector Law, the legislative objective is public safety and is thus a
valid exercise of police power.

2. YES. The Reflector Law’s primary consideration is public safety. There is likewise
a categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into
actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. His Administrative Order No.
2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent
Galo.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the
nondelegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety.
 To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. A
distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally
may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made.

Petition granted.
Judge ordered to dismiss Galo’s petition.

Ople vs. Torres, supra

(jan)Evan - Smart Communications vs. NTC, 408 SCRA 768 (2003)

FACTS:
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000 (Billing Circular), promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. They issued another Memorandums to all public
telecommunications entities regarding the validation and billing of all prepaid sim cards.

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the NTC,
seeking to declare the two memorandums, alleging that the NTC had no jurisdiction
to regulate the sale of consumer goods which belonged to the DTI under the Consumer
Act of the Philippines and that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative
of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law
and will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service.

Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed for, and was granted by the
RTC, a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in- Intervention.

NTC filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed
as G.R. No. 152063. Thus, two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated
February 17, 2003.

ISSUE:
Whether the memorandums issued by NTC are unconstitutional

HELD:
NO. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (Billing Circular)
and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-
making power.

Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative
power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law.

The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative

agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. The courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
premises of the regulatory statute administered.

Petition granted.

(jan) Robby - ABAKADA Guro vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056 (2005). Only the
part on Delegation of Legislative Powers

SHORT VERSION:
FACTS:
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition of questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon

recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article
VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.

RULING: No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion
as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not
abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done,
who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is
not a delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

LONG VERSION:
FACTS:
For resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated
September 1, 2005 upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9337 or the VAT
Reform Act.

Petitioners reiterate that R.A. No. 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase
the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. The
recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of
either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark
necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy
making.

ISSUE:
Whether the stand-by authority of the executive is an undue delegation of power

HELD:
NO. In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is acting as the agent of the legislative department,
to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined
and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.

Congress granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a
fact, namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or the
national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (11/2%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary
of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then
the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the
President effective January 1, 2006.

Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to
the execution of a law.

The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of
the President is to simply execute the legislative policy.

Motion for reconsiderations denied.

b. Doctrine of Delegation of Legislative Power

Pangasinan Tranportation, supra

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
KMU vs. Garcia, 239 SCRA 386 (1994)