DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
 What is administrative law?

• Administrative law is the branch of public law

which fixes the organization and determines the
competence of administrative authorities, and
indicates to the individual remedies for the
violation of his rights. (Goodnow, Comparative
Administrative Law, p. 8)
What is administrative law in actual
practice in the Philippines?

• On the basis of the different definitions of

administrative law, and considering how
administrative law presently operates in this
jurisdiction from day to day, it is perhaps easier
to understand administrative law by having in
mind that:
1. It is a branch of public law;

2. It deals with the activities of executive or administrative

agencies, known and referred to as “boards”, “bureaus”,
“commissions”, “authority”, “office” and “administration”;

3. These “boards”, “bureaus”, “commissions”, “authority”, “office”

and “administration” can exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers and functions in the sense that they can issue
rules and regulations not contrary to the guidelines set up by law
and they can resolve the issues or the cases submitted to them;
4. Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative
bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce
have the force of law and are entitled to great respect. They have
in their favor a presumption of legality. (Gonzales vs Land Bank
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 7675, March 22, 1990)

Example
There is a legal presumption that the rates fixed by the National
Telecommunications Commission are reasonable. It must be
conceded that the fixing of the rates by the government through its
authorized agent involves the exercise of reasonable discretion and
unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the courts will not
interfere. Courts do not interfere with administrative action prior to
its completion or finality. (Radio Communications of the Philippines
vs NTC, G.R. No. 66683, April 23, 1990)
5. In the resolution of cases or issues presented to
administrative bodies and offices, they are not
bound by the technical rules of evidence. Strict
observance of the same is not indispensable in
administrative cases. (Daduvo vs CSC, 42 SCAD
750, 223 SCRA 747)
6. An administrative decision may properly be amended or set
aside only upon clear showing that the administrative official
or tribunal has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. There is an abuse of discretion
when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, such as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion of personal hostility. (Heirs of Tanjuan vs Office of the
President, et al., G.R. No. 126847, December 4, 1996)
7. Factual findings of administrative bodies should be
accorded not only respect but also finality if they are
supported by substantial evidence even if not
overwhelming or preponderant. (Casa Filipino Realty
Corporation vs Office of the President, 241 SCRA 165)

8. Although findings of facts of an administrative agency

is persuasive in courts and carries with it a strong
presumption of correctness, nonetheless, the
interpretation and application of laws is the court’s
prerogative. (Prudential Bank vs Serrano, G.R. No.
49293; Prudential Bank vs Gapultos, G.R. No. 41835,
January 19,1990)
9. Administrative remedies should first be
exhausted before filing a petition for relief.
(Walstrom vs Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387,
January 29, 1990)

10. On purely legal question, however, the aggrieved

party need not exhaust administrative remedies.
REASON: Nothing of an administrative nature
is to be done or can be done in the administrative
forum. (Prudential Bank vs Serrano, supra)
11. If a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court
(Industrial Enterprises, Inc vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
88550, April 8, 1990). This is known as the principle
of primary jurisdiction
Trace the origin of administrative law
The origin of administrative law could be traced to the following:

1. Statutes – Setting up administrative authorities either by

creating boards and commissions or administrative officers
or by confiding the powers and duties to existing boards,
commissions, or officers, to amplify, apply, execute, and
supervise the operation of, and determine controversies
arising under particular laws in the enactment of which the
legislature decided for matters of convenience or for quicker
or more efficient administration to withhold the
controversies, at least in the first instance, from the courts of
law.
2. Increase of government functions and
concerns – Complexities of modern life necessarily
increase the functions and concerns of government
which, in turn, requires the legislature to create more
administrative agencies which will take charge in
attending to matters that demand their special
competence and expertise.
3. Necessity of government control and regulation –
The government has intervened in contractual relations
that are affected with public interest. As it is now, the
government has exercised control and regulation of many
aspects of business such as but not limited to labor and
management relations, immigration and deportation,
banking, recruitment of overseas workers, insurance,
telecommunication industry, water services, finance,
foreign exchange, health, food and drugs, regulation of
profession, regulation of sports activities, including the
monitoring of player’s credentials and citizenship, morals,
investment, energy regulation, forest development,
mining, land conversion, election, tax collection and
administration, human settlements and regulation of
subdivisions, civil service and eligibility of government
employees, and many other businesses and activities that
are impressed with public interest.
 In the course of the exercise of the above-
mentioned functions and responsibilities, rules,
regulations, decisions and orders are issued every
now and then by the different agencies of the
government. All of these, in turn, contribute to the
growth and development of administrative law.
What are the sources of administrative law?

Administrative law is derived from the following

sources:

1. The Constitution (i.e., Article IX, Section 1 of the

1987 Constitution which provides as follows: “The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit” ).
2. Statutes creating administrative bodies

Example:
The Board of Energy was created by Presidential Decree
No. 1208, dated October 6, 1977.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) took over the functions of the Overseas
Employment Development Board (OEDB). It was created by
Executive Order No. 797 dated May 1, 1972.
The Workmen’s Compensation Commission was
abolished on March 31, 1976, and it was replaced by the
Employees Compensation Commission as provided by
Article 176 of the New Labor Code of the Philippines,
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended.
3. Court decisions – interpreting the charters of
administrative agencies and defining their
powers and responsibilities.

Example:
Jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court
containing interpretations involving the principle of
primary jurisdiction; exhaustion of administrative
remedies; due process in administrative
proceedings, etc.
4. The body of rules, regulations and orders issued
by administrative agencies

Example:
Rules, regulations, circulars issued by the different
administrative agencies of the government.
Decisions and orders of administrative bodies in
cases submitted to them (i.e. decisions of the
National Labor Relations Commission n complaints
filed by employees against their employers).
What are the administrative bodies or
agencies in the Philippines?

1) Administrative bodies for regulation under police power.

Example:
a) Commission on Immigration and Deportation
b) Securities and Exchange Commission
c) Professional Regulation Commission
d) Bureau of Food and Drug
e) Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
f) Board of Food Inspectors
g) Monetary Board
h) Land Transportation Office
2) Administrative bodies for regulation of public utilities.

Example:
a) Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
b) National Telecommunications Commission
c) Board of Energy
d) National Water and Resources Council
e) Civil Aeronautics Board
f) Board of Marine Inquiry
3) Administrative bodies to carry on governmental
functions.

Example:
a) Bureau of Internal Revenue
b) Bureau of Customs
c) Civil Service Commission
d) Board of Special Inquiry
e) Bureau of Lands
f) Land Registration Authority
4) Administrative bodies that adjudicates and
decides industrial controversies.

Example:
a) National Labor Relations Commission
b) Philippine Overseas Employment Adjudication
Office
c) Human Settlement Regulatory Commission or
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
5) Administrative bodies making the government
a private party.

Example:
a) Commission on Audit
b) Social Security System Adjudication Office
6) Administrative bodies that grant privileges.

Example:
a) Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
b) Board of Pardons and Parole
c) Bureau of Lands
d) Land Transportation and Franchising Regulatory
Board

In the case of PLDT vs City of Bacolod (G.R. No. 149179,

July 15, 2005), the Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of
Local Government Finance under the Department of
Finance is NOT an administrative agency whose findings
on questions of facts are given weight by the courts.
Define administration
• It is an activity of the executive officer of the government.
The government administers when it appoints an officer,
instructs its diplomatic agents, assesses and collects its
taxes, drills its army, investigates a case of the commission
of crime and executed the judgment of court. Whenever we
see the government in action as opposed to deliberation or
the rendering of a judicial decision, there we say is
administration. Administration is thus to be found in all the
manifestation of executive action. (Goodnow, Comparative
Administrative Law, p.12).

Administration, as it is presently understood, refers to the

aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reigns of
government are for the time being. (U.S. vs Dorr, 2 Phil. 332)
What are the two aspects of
administration?

There are two (2) aspects of administration,

namely:

1. Internal administration – This includes

the legal structure or organization of public
administration and the legal aspects of each
institutional activity (i.e. personnel, material,
physical and planning activities.
2. External administration – This is
concerned with the problems of administrative
regulations or the exercise of power for
carrying out the ends for which such powers
were delegated. (42 Am. Jur., 290)
Distinguish the following:
(a) Administration and politics;
(b) Administration and law;
(c) Administration of government and
administration of justice;
(d) Administration as an organization and
administration as a government.
(a) Administration and politics

ADMINISTRATION POLITICS
Administration has something to do Politics has something to do with
with the execution of the policies of policies or expressions of the State’s
the State. will

Execution of said policies is entrusted

to the body of officers, called
administrative officers
(b) Administration and law
ADMINISTRATION
Administration achieves public
security by preventive measures. It
selects a hierarchy of officials to each
of whom definite work is assigned, and
it is governed by ends rather than
rules. It is personal. Hence, it is often
arbitrary and is subject to the abuse
incident to personal as contrasted with
impersonal or law-regulated action.
LAW
It operates by redress or punishment
rather than by prevention. It
formulates general rules of action and
visits infraction of these rules with
penalties. It does not supervise action.
It leaves individuals free to act, but
imposes pains on those who do not act
in accordance with the rules
prescribed. (Roscoe Pound in
Proclamation, Pol. Sci. Association,
pp. 232-233)
(c) Administration of government and
administration of justice
ADMINISTRATION OF
GOVERNMENT
The administrative officers who are
charged with the administration of
government determine what is the law
to find out whether they are
competent to act and if so, whether it
is wise for them to act
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The judicial officers who are charged
with the administration of justice
decides controversies between
individuals and government officers as
to the applicability in the cases in a
question of a particular rule of law.
Hence, they determine what law is
applicable to the facts brought before
them
(d) Administration as an organization and
government
ADMINISTRATION AS AN
ORGANIZATION
Administration refers to that group of
aggregate of persons in whose hands
the reigns of government are for the
time being (U.S. vs Dorr, 2 Phil. 332).
It indicates the entire administrative
organization extending down from the
Chief Executive to the most humble of
his subordinates. It is thus the totality
of the executive and administrative
authorities. (Goodnow, op. cit., p. 5 )
ADMINISTRATION AS A
GOVERNMENT
As an element of the State, a
government is defined as “that
institution or aggregate of institutions
by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rules of
action which are necessary to enable
men to live in a social state, or which
are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the
power or authority of prescribing
them.” (U.S. vs Dorr, 2 Phil. 332;
Bacani vs National Coconut
Corporation, 53 O.G. 2798)
What are the weaknesses of
administrative action?
Administration suffers from the following weaknesses:

1. Tendency toward arbitrariness;

2. Lack of legal knowledge and attitude in sound judicial technique;
3. Susceptibility to political bias or pressure, often brought about by
uncertainty of tenure and lack of sufficient safeguards for
independence;
4. A disregard for the safeguards that insure a full and fair hearing;
5. Absence of standard rules of procedure suitable to the activities
of each agency; and
6. A dangerous combination of legislative, executive, and judicial
functions. (Lawyer’s Journal, Vol. 7, p. 560; Macapagal,
Judicial Supremacy over Administrative Bodies, Lawyer’s
Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 312 – 314)
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THEIR
NATURE, CREATION, ESTABLISHMENT
AND ABOLITION
What is the nature of administrative
agencies?

• An administrative agency is an organ of government entrusted

with the task of enacting specific rules and regulations to
effectuate the purpose of the statute creating it. Its functions
and powers are quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, or in some
instances, it acts as an agent of the executive branch of the
government, in which case, it is entrusted with the duty to
exercise executive and administrative functions.
What are the two principal powers and
functions of administrative agencies?

Administrative agencies have two principal kinds

of powers and functions namely:

1. Rule-making power or quasi-legislative

function
2. Power of adjudication or quasi-judicial
function. (Stasoni Cases and other Materials
on Administrative Tribunals, 2nd ed., 71)
How are administrative bodies created and established?

• Administrative agencies may be created by: (1)

the Constitution; (2) the legislature in legislative
enactments; or (3) by authority of law
Does the legislature exercise control over
administrative agencies?
• Yes. The legislative branch of government enacts the law that
creates an administrative agency: (1) It prescribes the mode of
appointment, the term of office and the compensation; (2) It
fixes its authority and procedure; (3) It determines the size of its
personnel and staff; (4) It exercises continuing surveillance over
its activities; (5) It may investigate its operations for
remedial/corrective legislation.

At present, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee as well as the

appropriate committees in each House of Congress play an
important role in the investigation of anomalies and irregularities
of the different administration offices and agencies.
 Likewise, the Ombudsman, a Constitutional
Office organized precisely to look into and
investigate any irregularity of government officials
and employees, exercise an important role in filing
appropriate criminal cases against erring
government officials and employees.
Of course, the Sandiganbayan takes part in the
trial of complaints filed by the Ombudsman.
III. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
 A. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE MAKING
POWER
1. DIFFERENT KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND
REGULATIONS

a) Supplementary or detailed legislation – They are rules and

regulations “to fix the details” in the execution and enforcement of a policy
set out in the law, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
b) Interpretative legislation – They are rules and regulations construing or
interpreting the provisions of a statute to be enforced and they are binding
on all concerned until they are changed, e.g. BIR Circulars, CB Circulars, etc.
They have the effect of law and are entitled to great respect; they have in
their favor the presumption of legality (Gonzales vs Land Bank, 183 SCRA
520). The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a
subsequent correct application of the law. (Manila Jockey Club vs Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998)
c) Contingent legislation – They are rules and regulations
made by an administrative authority on the existence of certain
facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
(Cruz vs Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234). Contingent Regulation – It
is issued on account of the concurrence of a certain
contingency, as determined by the administrative
agencies. On the basis of the latter’s determination, the
operation of a law may either be enforced or
suspended.

Example:
Authority of the Governor General to lift the prohibition against
the importation of foreign cattle upon determination that there
was no longer a threat of contagion caused by ruinderpest
epidemic, was sustained by the Supreme Court in Cruz vs.
Youngberg (56 Phil. 234).
 2. REQUISITES OF A VALID ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE OR REGULATION

What are the requisites of a valid administrative

regulation?
• The following requisites must be complied with
CODE: ASAR
A–uthorized (Its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature)
S–cope of authority (It must be within the scope of the
authority given by the legislature)
A–ccording to prescribed procedure (It must be promulgated
in accordance with the prescribed procedure
R–easonable (It must be reasonable)
 Requisite

DISCUSSION OF EACH REQUISITE

1. Authority to promulgate an
administrative regulation –
This is granted either by the charter itself of an
administrative body, or by the law it is supposed
to enforce. Hence, any and all administrative
regulations issued by the administrative agency
should not be contrary to the said charter or law
that creates them, and that they should be in
conformity with the standards prescribed by law.
Explanation of each requisite

The promulgation of the said rules and

regulations must be authorized by the
legislature – The authority to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations is found in
the charter itself of the administrative body or in
the law which it seeks to enforce.
EXAMPLE:

a) Implementing rules and regulations regarding employment

of women and minors; employment of househelpers and
employment of home workers were promulgated to
implement Articles 153 to 155 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines
b) Implementing rules and regulations to improve
telecommunications industry is authorized under Republic
Act No. 7925
c) Implementing rules and regulations to promote liberalized
foreign investment is authorized under Republic Act No. 8179
 Requisite

2. The said rules and regulations must be

within the scope of legislative authority
– Rules and regulations which are beyond the
limits of legislative authority are not valid rules
and regulations. It has been the consistent rule
of the Supreme Court that rules and regulations
are valid only when they are within the
framework of the policy which the legislature
seeks to implement. (U.S. vs Barias, 11 Phil.
327)
Administrative rules and regulations must be germane to
the object and purpose of the law and must conform to the
standards, policies and limitations prescribed by law.
(Delman vs Philippines Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA
340)

An administrative agency cannot amend an act of

Congress. (Santos vs Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419)

NOTE: In People vs Maceren, 79 SCRA 450, the Secretary

of Agriculture exceeded his authority in penalizing electro-
fishing by means of an administrative order.
Can traffic enforcers remove license plates
of illegally parked vehicles?

• No. This was declared illegal in Metropolitan Traffic

Command vs Gonong (187 SCRA 432). The alleged
justification to the practice of removing license plates of
illegally parked vehicles was LOI 43, but another law,
Presidential Decree No. 1605, was issued, and under this
law, the authority of the Metro Manila Commission is
limited only to suspension or revocation of the license of
the driver who violated traffic rules. Said Presidential
Decree No. 1605 did not include the authority to remove
license plates or the confiscation of license of the erring
driver.
Can the impounding of a vehicle be
sustained under a letter of instruction
prohibiting private extra heavy and
heavy vehicles from using public streets
on weekends and holidays?

• No, as declared in Bautista vs Junio, (127 SCRA 329) on

the ground that the impounding of a vehicle finds no
statutory justification, and therefore ultra vires. The
prohibition itself, however, to said vehicles from using
public streets on weekends and holidays, was sustained.
 NEW CASE:
METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. DANTE O. GARIN
G.R. NO. 130230, APRIL 15, 2005

There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA

police power, let alone legislative power.

The power to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s

license without the need of legislative enactment is an
authorized exercise of police power.
FACTS:
1. Atty. Dante Garin parked his vehicle illegally
along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila.
2. Atty. Garin sent a letter to Prospero Oreta, the
MMDA Chairman with these requests: (a) that
his driver’s license be returned to him. On the
same date, he expressed his preference that his
case be filed in court.
3. He did not receive a reply. Subsequently he filed
a complaint with the RTC of Paranaque City. His
contentions are as follows:
a. Without implementing rules and regulations,
Section 5[f] of Republic Act No. 7924 grants
MMDA the unbridled discretion to deprive erring
motorists of their licenses.
b. It will be pre-empt a judicial determination of the
validity of the deprivation, hence, it violates the due
process clause.
c. Said law also violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative authority.
d. Said law will also allow MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.

MMDA, on the otherhand, invoked its police power.

ISSUE:
Are the said contentions valid?

HELD:
1. There is no syllable in Republic Act No.
7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power.

2. Even the Metro Manila Council has not

been delegated any legislative power.
3. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units,
there is no provision in Republic Act No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its council to “enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for general
wefare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is,
as termed in the charter itself, a “development authority”.
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people’s organization and the private
sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature xxx.
4. Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of
government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that
given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate its
administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDA’s functions.

5. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances

and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis.

6. The power therefore to confiscate and suspend or

revoke driver’s license without the need of legislative
enactment is an authorized exercise of police power.
 Requisite

3. It must be promulgated in accordance

with prescribed procedure.
Administrative regulations of general
application does not require previous notice and
hearing except where the legislature itself requires
it and mandates that the same shall first require
the ascertainment of facts elicited from an
appropriate investigation.
What is the prescribed procedure referred
to as the third requisite?

• The prescribed procedure is notice and hearing,

if this is so required by law, and publication, as
required by Executive Order No. 200
Is previous notice and hearing always required
in the promulgation of administrative
regulations of general circulation?

• It is not required unless the legislature requires

it, or unless the regulation is in effect a
settlement of a controversy between specific
parties in which case it is considered as an
administrative adjudication, hence, it will
require notice and hearing.
Regarding the rates prescribed by
administrative agencies, when is prior notice
and hearing required and when is it not
required?

• When the administrative agency prescribes the rates in the

exercise of its legislative functions, prior notice and hearing
to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process.
However, when said rates are prescribed by an
administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the
validity of said rates. (Philippine Consumers Foundation,
Inc. vs Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, 153
SCRA 622)
When are rules/rates issued in the exercise of a
legislative function and when are they issued in
the exercise of a quasi-judicial function?

• When legislative in character:

When the rules or rates issued or prescribed by
an administrative agency are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country,
they may partake of a legislative character.
• When quasi-judicial in character:
Where the rules and the rates imposed apply
exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding
of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

EXAMPLE: A Department Order of the Department

of Education and Culture which prescribed maximum
school fees that may be charged by all private schools
in the country for school year 1987 to 1988.
Was that order issued in the exercise of a
legislative function or quasi-judicial
function?

It was issued in the exercise of legislative function,

according to the Supreme Court in Philippine
Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports. (Supra)
Will a violation of an administrative
regulation give rise to a criminal prosecution?

• No, unless the law makes the violation

punishable and prescribes a penalty.
 Requisite

4. The administrative rule or regulation

must be reasonable – An administrative
rule or regulation must be reasonable, not
arbitrary and capricious. The reasonableness of
a regulation depends on the reason or the
purpose for which a regulation is issued.
Example:

In Agustin vs Edu, Letter of Instruction No. 229

which required the use of “early warning devices”
(EWD) is not repugnant to the due process clause.
It was considered justified for traffic safety.
In Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs Board of
Transportation, a regulation phasing out taxicabs
more than six years old was reasonable as it is
intended to promote not only the safety of the
passengers but also the comfort and the
convenience of the passengers.
Prohibition to private extra heavy and heavy vehicles from
using public streets on weekends and holidays was
sustained by the Supreme Court in Bautista vs. Junio. It is
apparently intended to improve traffic conditions during
the designated days.
In Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, MECS Order No. 52, Series of
1985, which mandates the taking and passing of the
National Medial Admission Test (NMAT) as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, was held to
be a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The
rationale for issuing the said order is the improvement of
the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools.
 AGUSTIN VS. EDU
88 SCRA 195
FACTS:
Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No.
229 requiring the use of “Early Warning Devices (EWD)”. Petitioner
claims that the use of the said early warning devices is not necessary
because his car is already equipped with blinking lights.

ISSUE:
Is the said Letter of Instruction arbitrary?

HELD:
It is not arbitrary and not repugnant to the due process clause. There
is nothing in Letter of Instruction No. 229 which compels car owners
to purchase the prescribed early warning device. Vehicle owners can
produce the device themselves with a little ingenuity.
 BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO
127 SCRA 329
FACTS:
Letter of Instruction No. 869 is an energy conservation
measure which prohibits the use of heavy and extra-heavy
private vehicles from using public streets on weekends and
holidays. Pursuant thereto, Memorandum Circular No. 39
was issued, imposing penalties of “fine, confiscation of
vehicle, and cancellation of registration”.
Petitioner contends that: (1) said letter of instruction is a
violation of his right to use and enjoy private property and of
his right to travel, hence, a violation of due process; and (2)
that said memorandum circular was likewise unconstitutional
for it violates the doctrine of undue delegation of power.
ISSUE:
Is the said letter of instruction and memorandum circular
constitutional is the confiscation or impounding of the vehicle
under Memorandum Circular ultra vires or not?

HELD:
The said Letter of Instruction was sustained but the confiscation
or impounding of the vehicle was ultra vires because a penalty
can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required
by law. While the imposition of a fine or the suspension of
registration is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the impounding of the vehicle finds no statutory
justification.
 TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ
152 SCRA 730
FACTS:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2382 or the Medical Act of
1959, MECS Order No. 52, Series of 1985, was issued. It
mandates the taking and passing of the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of said law and
MECS Order No. 52, and sought to be admitted to the
College of Medicine for 1987-1988, without successfully
taking the NMAT.
ISSUE:
Are the said law and regulation constitutional? Whether there is
some reasonable relation between requirement of passing
NMAT as a condition for admission to the medical school on the
one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the
general community, on the other hand.

HELD:
The Medical Act of 1959, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52,
Series of 1985, are constitutional. They constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the State as it is intended to
promote the public order, the health and physical safety and
well being of the population.
Likewise, the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks
of those authorized to practice medicine.
There is a violation between the requirement of
passing the NMAT and the securing of the health
and safety of the general community because the
regulation of the practice of medicine is a
reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public.
The said requirement is the protection of the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance in those who would undertake to
treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
3. REQUISITES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS WITH A PENALTY
The requisites for the validity of administrative
regulations with penal sanctions are the following:

1. The law itself which authorizes administrative

authorities to issue the same must declare as punishable
the violation of the rules and regulations issued under its
authority;
2. The law should define or fix the penalty for the
violation of the said rules and regulations;
3. Publication of said rules and regulations must be
made.
 CASES:
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
79 SCRA 450

FACTS:
Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits “the use of any
obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing”. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources subsequently promulgated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 prohibiting electro-fishing
in all Philippine waters. Said order was amended by A.O. 841, by
instructing the ban against electro-fishing to fresh water fishes.
The respondents were charged for having violated A.O. 841. The
complaint alleged that the five accused used an electro-cutting
device locally known as “senso” to catch fish through electric
current, in the waters of Barrio San Pablo, Sta, Cruz. The criminal
complaint was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the CFI.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether A.O. 84 and 841, penalizing electro-fishing, are devoid of
any legal basis, and hence, invalid?

HELD:
Yes. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded its
authority in issuing F.A.O. Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are
not warranted by R.A. No. 8512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law
does not expressly prohibit electro-fishing. Since electro-fishing is
not banned under the law, and the Secretary is powerless to penalize
it, hence A.O. Nos. 84 and 84-1 are devoid of any legal basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro-fishing, a penal

provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the Old
Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself. But a mere administrative
regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro-fishing.

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a

particular department must be in harmony with the visions of the
law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. An administrative agency cannot amend the act of
Congress. The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it
has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amend or expand
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
 PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY
51 O.G. 48850
FACTS:
Central Bank issued a circular (Circular No. 20) requiring those who
had foreign currency to sell the same to Central Bank. Que Po Lay
was accused of violating Circular No. 20 but he claimed that the said
circular has not yet been published in the Official Gazette before his
alleged violation of the same and he should therefore be acquitted.

HELD:
The Supreme Court sustained the defense and held that before the
public is bound by its contents, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published so the people will be officially informed of the
same, particularly the penalties for violating thereof.
 GIL BALBUENA VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
110 PHIL. 150, G.R. NO. L-14283
NOVEMBER 21, 1960

FACTS:
Petitioners, members of the religious sect “Jehovah’s Witnesses”,
challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1265, by virtue of
which the Secretary of Education issued Department Order No. 8,
prescribing compulsory flag ceremony in all schools as an undue
delegation of legislative power. Section 1 of the Act requires all
educational institutions to observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be
simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the
Philippine National Anthem. Section 2 thereof authorizes the Secretary of
Education to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag
ceremony.
HELD:

The requirements constitute an adequate standard to wit, simplicity

and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the national
anthem – especially when contrasted with other standards heretofore
upheld by the courts such as “public interest”, “public welfare”,
“interest of law and order”, “justice equity” and the “substantial
merits of the case”, or “adequate and efficient instruction”. That the
legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no
objection to the validity of the statute, or all that is required of it is
the laying down of standard and policy that will limit the discretion of
the regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the
manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the
administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.
 Without a definite standard, there would be no reasonable
means to ascertain whether or not the administrative agency
concerned has acted within the scope of authority as
determined by the legislature. When this happens, the power
of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the
government other than that in which it is lodged by the
Constitution. (Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc vs. Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. L-19850, January 30, 1964)
REQUIREMENT AS TO PUBLICATION OF ALL
LAWS AS A CONDITION FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY

What should be published?

1. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws.
2. Presidential Decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same
are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA
446)
How should the publication be made?

Borrowing the words of Justice Isagani Cruz,

the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose id to inform
the public of the contents of the law.
Where should the law be published?

The law should be published in the Official

Gazette, and not just in newspapers of general
circulation. (Tanada vs. Tuvera, Ibid.)
When does a law take effect?
A law takes effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided. (Art. 2, New Civil Code). As
enunciated in Tanada vs. Tuvera, however, laws
shall be published in the Official Gazette, and not
just in newspapers of general circulation.
Should administrative rules and regulations
be published?

It depends. If the purpose of the

administrative rules and regulations is to enforce
or implement existing law, they must be
published. If the administrative regulation is of
general circulation or penal in nature, it should
be published. If regulations are merely
interpretative or merely internal in nature, they
need not be published.
From what day shall fifteen-day period (required for the
effectivity of a law or regulation) be counted?

The fifteen-day period is counted from the date

of release for circulation of the edition in the
Official Gazette, not from the date or printed date
of the edition of the Official Gazette. (People vs.
Verdicano, 132 SCRA 523)
What is the meaning of the phrase “unless
otherwise provided”?
This means that the law itself can provide when it shall
become effective. The law can provide that it shall become
effective thirty (30) days, or twenty (20) days, after its
publication in the Official Gazette, but in no case can it
provide that it shall take effect immediately and without
publication, if it imposes a penalty, following the rationale
in Tañada vs. Tuvera, Pesigan vs. Angeles (129 SCRA 174),
and People vs. Que Po Lay “that before the public is bound
by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially informed of said contents and its penalties”.
4. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS EXERCISED IN
THE COURSE OF EXERCISING QUASI-
LEGISLATIVE POWERS

An administrative agency merely exercises the

power of subordinate legislation which means that
it can promulgate rules and regulations intended
to carry out the provisions of the law and
implement legislative policy. In the course of
exercising said function, an administrative
agency is vested with different powers and
functions, to wit:
1) Enabling Powers – They are those powers that enable
an administrative agency to do an act which the law
precisely entrust to it.

Example:
a) The Land Transportation Office or LTO, is the one
entrusted with the function of registering all motor vehicles
including driver’s license.
b) The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board is the one
entrusted with the function of approving application of
subdivision developers
c) The Commission on Higher Education or CHED is the one
entrusted with the function of issuing accreditation of
colleges in the Philippines.
2) Summary Powers – They are those powers exercised by
administrative authorities to perform coercive measures upon
persons or things without the need of securing judicial warrant.

Example:
a) An order issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
not to allow a Fil-Am player from playing in the PBA on the
ground of citizenship

b) The forcible evacuation of people residing within six (6) km.

radius of Mayon Volcano to avoid loss of lives and properties.
3) Examining Powers – This is the power of an administrative
agency to examine and inspect books, papers, and records to
investigate the activities of persons under its jurisdiction.

Example:
a) The Bureau of Internal Revenue or BIR, can lawfully examine the
financial statements and books of accounts of persons and
companies
b) The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation or BID, can examine
the citizenship papers of any Fil-Am player whose citizenship is
under question
c) The Bureau of Labor Standard can inspect business
establishments to determine whether they comply or not with
occupational help and safety standards as provided for by the Labor
Code of the Philippines
4) Dispensing Power – This is the power of an
administrative officer to grant exemption from the
performance of a general duty.

Example:
a) The Bureau of Internal Revenue can exempt some
business establishments from compliance with some laws
or rules which are entrusted to it for enforcement.
b) The Movie and Television Regulatory and Classification
Board or MTRCB, can grant exemption or relax a rule or
rules regarding the showing of a film.
5) NOTICE AND HEARING

Is notice and hearing necessary in the promulgation of a

general regulation issued or to be issued by an
administrative body?

It is not necessary when the rules are merely legal

opinions. It is not also necessary when substantive rules
are being prepared and when the class to be affected is
large and the questions to be resolved involved the use of
discretion committed to the rule making body.
6) WHEN IS IT NECESSARY?

An administrative rule in the nature of subordinate

legislation which will implement a law by providing
its details, must be heard before they are adopted.
In other words, when a rule or regulation is being
issued by an administrative agency in the exercise
of its quasi-legislative authority, the requirement of
notice, hearing and publication shall be complied
with.
 CRUZ VS. CSC
G.R. NO. 144464, NOVEMBER 27, 2001
FACTS:
Private individual Esteban wrote a letter to the
Chairperson of the CSC claiming that during the
examinations for non-professional in the career
civil service, Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of
Norzagaray, Bulacan, falsely pretended to be the
examinee, Cruz, a co-employee in the said office,
and took the examination for the latter.
The Director IV of the CSC wrote a Memorandum to the Civil
Service Commissioner declaring that based on the record, she
found a prima facie case against petitioners Paitim and Cruz. A
fact finding investigation was conducted and a ‘Formal Charge’
for “Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service” was filed against petitioners
before the CSC.

After filing their Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss

averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be
deprived of their right to due process because the CSC was the
complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time.
Said motion was denied as well as their motion for
reconsideration.
 The Attorney III of CSC was directed to
conduct the formal administrative investigation.
She found petitioner guilty of ‘Dishonesty’ and
ordered their dismissal from the government
service.
The CSC thereafter issued a Resolution finding
the petitioners guilty of the charges and ordered
their dismissal from the government service.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were denied due process because the CSC acted
as the investigator, the complainant, the prosecutor and the judge all at
the same time.

RULING:
No. Petitioners were not denied due process.
The CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative cases instituted
by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its
officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1,
Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, Paragraph 11 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which states:

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought

before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and
review decisions and actions of its officers and of the agencies attached
to it. x x x
 The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does
not mean that it could be an impartial judge. As an
administrative body, its decision was based on substantial
findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being
considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme
Court.

Petitioners were also properly informed of the charges. They

submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend
themselves. Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim that there was
a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
7) CAN LEGISLATIVE POWERS BE DELEGATED?

Legislative powers may be delegated in the following

cases:

1. When authorized by the Constitution such as

in the following cases:
a) The Congress may by law grant emergency powers to
the President. (Section 23 [2], Article VI)
b) Congress may by law grant tariff powers to the
President (Section 28 [2], Article VI)
2. Legislative powers may be delegated to
local governments:
a) Police power has been expressly delegated by the
legislature to the local law-making bodies;
b) Eminent Domain.

3. Legislative powers may be delegated to the

people at large:
a) REFERENDUM – a method of submitting an important
legislative measure to a direct vote of the whole people;
b) PLEBISCITE – a device to obtain a direct popular vote on
a matter of political importance.
4. Legislative powers may be delegated to
administrative bodies (e.g. POEA,
LTFRB, CAB, OWWA, BOI, BMI etc.).
8) TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A GIVEN
POWER HAS BEEN VALIDLY EXERCISED
BY A PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT.

FIRST TEST: The first test is to determine whether

or not the power in question, regardless of its nature,
is granted by the Constitution to the department
which seeks to exercise such power. If it is granted by
the Constitution, the exercise of the power is
sustained.
SECOND TEST: If the power sought to be
exercised is not expressly conferred by the
Constitution, can the power sought to be exercised
be reasonably inferred from, or is it necessary to
the proper exercise of, the express power granted
to the department seeking to exercise said power,
hence, justified under the DOCTRINE OF
IMPLICATION.
What is the doctrine of implication?
This means that even in the absence of an
express conferment, the exercise of a given power
may be justified or reasonably inferred from the
express power already granted, or that it may be
necessary to the proper exercise of the express
power granted to the department seeking to
exercise the said power.
9) DISTINGUISH LEGISLATIVE POWER
FROM QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Legislative power is the power to make laws and
the power to fix a legislative policy. This cannot be
delegated by the legislature to administrative
agencies. Quasi-legislative power is also known as
the power of subordinate legislation. It is the power
of administrative agencies to issue administrative
rules and regulations in order to implement the law
and the legislative policy fixed by the legislature.
10) WHAT IS THE GUIDELINE TO OBSERVE IN
ORDER TO INSURE THAT THERE IS A VALID
AND LAWFUL DELEGATION OF POWER?

The legislature should lay down (1) A policy and a (2) definite
standard by which the executive or administrative officer or
board may be guided in the exercise of his discretionary
authority. If this is observed, there is a valid delegation of
legislative power (Cervantes vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-
4043, May 26, 1952). If, on the other hand, the statute
furnishes no standard and the officer or board is granted
uncontrolled or unlimited discretion, such a statute is an
unconstitutional delegation of power.
11) WHAT IS THE CLASSIFICATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS?

An administrative agency may either be involved in the task

of adopting rules and regulations intended to carry out the
provisions of a law and to implement legislative policy, or in
the task of interpreting the statute being administered.

The rules they adopt to implement the law and the said
policy are called legislative rules or regulations.

The rules arising from their interpretation of the law are

called interpretative regulations.
12) DISTINGUISH LEGISLATIVE
REGULATIONS FROM
INTERPRETATIVE REGULATION

Legislative regulations Interpretative regulations

What is employed in
promulgating this regulation is
not the discretion to
determine what the law shall
be, as this is exclusively vested
in the legislature, but the
discretion on how the law
shall be enforced.
They constitute the
administrator’s construction
of a statute and they are valid
if they construe the statute
correctly. If not, they are
subject to judicial review.
B. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
1. DEFINE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER.

Quasi-judicial power is the power of an administrative

agency to hear, determine, and make findings of facts,
and to resolve the case presented to it on the basis of
the said findings of facts and on the basis of its
interpretation of the laws and jurisprudence
concerning the issues of the case, subject only to the
power of the courts to review and scrutinize the same
on questions of law and jurisdiction.
2. WHY IS QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER GRANTED
TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY?

Quasi-judicial power is needed so that the administrative

officers in the different boards, bureaus and offices can
perform their executive duties as well as their quasi-
judicial authority. For this purpose, the legislative may
grant to such boards, bureaus and offices quasi-judicial
powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion
as an incident to the performance of administrative
functions.
3. WHAT IS THE LIMITATION TO THE LEGISLATURE
WHENEVER IT GRANTS QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY?

The legislature must state its intention in express terms that

would leave no doubt that the power and jurisdiction being
transferred are not those vested in the courts but only those
powers and jurisdiction which are incidental to or in connection
with the performance of administrative duties. The case of
Miller vs. Mardo, et al. (Supra) which was cited earlier,
illustrates this limitation to the power of the legislature in
granting quasi-judicial power to administrative agencies.
4. WHAT IS THE MAIN FUNCTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS IN-
CHARGE OF SAID BOARDS, BUREAUS
AND OFFICES?

Their main function is to enforce the law

entrusted to them for implementation. The exercise
of quasi-judicial power is only incidental to their
main function of enforcing the law.
5. POWERS INCLUDED IN THE TERM
“QUASI-JUDICIAL”.

The following powers are included:

(1)Determinative Powers; and

(2) Summary Powers
Two kinds of determinative powers:

a) Enabling Powers – Powers of administrative bodies to act, to

grant or deny applications for licenses to engage in a particular
business or occupation. (i.e. Power of the Land Transportation
Office to grant professional or non-professional driver’s license).

b) Directing Powers – Powers of administrative agencies to see to

it that laws and regulations are duly complied with (i.e. The
Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board may require
subdivision developers to submit subdivision plans and other
requirements to see to it that the Cherry Ville incident in Antipolo,
Rizal, may not happen again).
6. DIFFERENT POWERS
Directing powers are further classified into:

a. Dispensing Powers – Authority to grant

exemption, or be relieved, from complying with a
law or regulation. (i.e. Authority of the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
to relieve school bus operators from an earlier
requirement to paint their school buses with
yellow every beginning of the school year).
b. Examining Powers – This refers to the investigatory or
inquisitorial powers of administrative agencies which includes
the following:

(b.1) Power to conduct inspection of accounts, records,

documents, and other papers relative to its investigation.
(b.2) Power to obtain other information which it finds relevant
to a matter being investigated.
(b.3) Power to issue subpoena and notices.
(b.4) Power to swear and interrogate witnesses.
(b.5) Power to inspect premises.
(b.6) Power to require written answers to questionnaires.
(b.7) Power to require periodic or special reports.
(b.8) Power to require the filing of statements. (Am. Jur. P. 323)
c. Summary Powers – This refers to the power of
administrative agencies to apply compulsion or
force against a person or property without the
need of prior judicial warrant. (i.e. Authority of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to
prohibit certain persons and animals from leaving
the NAIA and to order that they be subject first to
quarantine regulations and procedures.
7. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM THE
EXERCISE OF THE SAID POWERS?

They are administrative proceedings that

partake of the nature of a judicial proceeding,
hence, they are described as a proceeding of a
quasi-judicial character. (Morgan vs. U.S. 468)
8. WHY DO THEY PARTAKE OF THE NATURE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS?

They partake of the nature of judicial proceedings because

they involve the task of hearing, taking and evaluating the
evidence, and the making of factual findings based on the
evidence presented, and issuing the order or decision on
the basis of the said findings and their interpretation of
the law entrusted to their enforcement, subject only to the
ultimate power of the courts to review the same on
questions of law and jurisdiction.
9. ARE THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
ADVERSARIAL IN NATURE?

Some proceedings before administrative

agencies are adversarial in nature and some are
held ex-parte.
10. WHEN ARE PROCEEDINGS ADVERSARIAL
AND WHEN ARE THEY HELD EX-PARTE?

They are adversarial when the order or decision of an

administrative agency is in favor of one person or party
and against another. In such a case, the said order or
decision is issued to protect public interest (2 Am. Jur.
2nd, 143-144). EXAMPLE: Complaint for unlawful
dismissal filed by the employees of Philippine Airlines in
the National Labor Relations Commission. A decision for
or against the employees or for or against Philippine
Airlines is adversarial in nature. A return to work order
that may be issued in the process of an ongoing strike is
designed to protect public interest.
An administrative proceeding may be held ex-parte if
there is an urgent and compelling reason to take an
immediate action on a matter that is injurious to a
public interest, health and sanitation, public safety and
morals. EXAMPLE: (1) An order directing policemen
to confine lepers to Culion Leper Colony to protect the
people from being adversely affected by the contagious
disease of leprosy; (2) An order directing that
restaurants operating as fronts of prostitution and
illegal gambling activities be closed to protect morals.
JURISDICTION
11. WHAT IS JURISDICTION?

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; the

right to act in a particular case (Palma vs. Q.S., Inc., 17 SCRA 97).
The authority to decide a case and not the decision rendered
therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.
Any error that the Court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, and it is a settled rule
in this jurisdiction that, while errors of jurisdiction may be
reviewed and corrected by certiorari, errors of judgment may be
reviewed only by appeal.
Who has exclusive jurisdiction over courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk?
This Court, in the case of Sanz Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, held that:

“Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judge’s and
court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Public respondent Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to
the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme
Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of
the judiciary”
12. SOURCE OF AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARDS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES.

Said authority and jurisdiction is derived from the

Constitution, or from the statute that created the
administrative board, bureaus, and offices. The
administrative agencies created under the 1987
Constitution are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
All other agencies are created by law or by the legislature.
13. ARE THE ORDERS AND THE
DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARDS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES
FINAL?

The factual findings of said administrative boards,

bureaus and offices are final if they are supported
by substantial evidence. They are, however,
appealable on questions of law and jurisdiction.
14. WHEN IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION CONSIDERED RES JUDICATA?

The Supreme Court ruled that whenever any board,

tribunal or person is by law vested with authority to
judicially determine a question, such determination,
when it has become final, is as conclusive between
the same parties litigating for the same cause as
though the adjudication had been made by a court of
general jurisdiction. (174 SCRA 258)
15. WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?

The decisions and orders of administrative

agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial
authority, have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment. (Brillantes vs.
Castro, 99 Phil. 497)
PRINCIPLES OF MAJOR PRINCIPLE
1) Doctrine of finality of administrative decisions
2) Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
3) Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
4) Doctrine of qualified political agency
5) Doctrine of res judicata in administrative
proceedings
6) Due process in administrative proceedings
7) Requisites of judicial review
DISCUSSION OF EACH PRINCIPLE
1. DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

What is necessary before a decision of an

administrative body may be subject of judicial review?
Administrative action must have been fully completed
before a decision of an administrative body may be subject of
judicial review. Otherwise, it will only cause delay to the
disposition of administrative proceedings.
Is there an instance when the court can intervene prior to
the completion of an administrative action?

Yes, such as in the following cases:

1. When the administrative officer assumes to act in violation of the
Constitution and other laws;
2. When a questioned order is not reviewable in any other way, and
the complainant will suffer great and obvious damage if the order is
carried out, or when such relief is expressly allowed by law;
3. When the questioned order is made in excess of power and
therefore a deprivation of a right granted by the statute. (2 Am. Jur.
2nd, pp. 424-425)
Are the orders and decisions of administrative
boards, bureaus and offices, final?

Already answered.

What is the doctrine of res judicata in

administrative proceedings?

Already answered.
2.DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and
provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts for
reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a case unless available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given opportunity to act and correct errors committed in the administrative
forum. (Teotico vs. Ageda, Jr., G.R. No. 87437, May 29, 1991)

The doctrine of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.
(Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs. Judge Abad, G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1991)
What is the consequence of the non-observance of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

It results in lack of a cause of action which is

one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court
for the dismissal of the complaint. (Sunville
Timber Products, Inc. vs. Judge Abad, G.R. No.
85502, February 24, 1991)
Is the deficiency (non-observance of the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

It is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it

operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground
for a motion to dismiss and the court may then
proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been
observed. (Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs.
Judge Abad, G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1991)
What are the reasons for the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Under the principle of separation of powers, the judiciary

is enjoined not to interfere on matters which are within
the competence of the other departments. The theory is
that the administrative authorities are in a better position
to resolve questions addressed to their particular
expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in
their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if
given a chance to do so. (Sunville Timber Products, Inc.
vs. Judge Abad, G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1991)
Is the observance of the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies absolute?

No. The said doctrine yields to the following exceptions as

enumerated in Paat vs Court of Appeals (266 SCRA 167):

1) When there is violation of due process;

2) When the issue involved is purely legal; (see also Duenas vs.
SSHA, G.R. No. 14917, June 4, 2004)

3) When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction; (see also Mangubat vs. Osmeña, 105
Phil. 1308)
4) When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned; (see also Tan vs. Veterans Backpay
Commission, 105 Phil. 377)

5) When there is irreparable injury; (see also De Lara vs. Plaribel,

14 SCRA 291)

6) When he respondent is a department secretary whose acts as

an alter ego of the president bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter; (see also Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod
ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa,
Inc. vs. Dominguez, G.R. No. 85439)

7) When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would

be unreasonable;

8) When it would amount to a nullification of the claim;

9) When the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (see also Marcoso vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
96605, May 8, 1992)

10) When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy adequate
remedy; (see also National Development Co. vs. Collector of
Customs, 9 SCRA 429; National Food Authority vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 115121-25, 68 SCAD 246, February 9, 1996)
and

11) When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of

judicial intervention. (see also Aquino vs. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177)
3. DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION OR PRIOR RESORT

What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort?

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that courts cannot determine a

dispute on a question requiring the special knowledge and expertise of the
administrative tribunals (Septimo vs. Judge Villarama, G.R. No. 101943,
February 18, 1992). If the case therefore is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of
facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the jurisdiction of a court. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, April 18, 1990).
What happens when a claim which is originally
cognizable in court, requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body?

In such a case, the judicial process is suspended

pending referral of such issues to the administrative body
for its view. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, April 18, 1990)
What is the rationale behind the observance of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or prior resort?

1. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business

entrusted to an administrative agency are secured.

2. The limited function of review by the judiciary are more

rationally exercised, by preliminary report, for ascertaining and
interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues, to agencies that
are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained
through experience, and by more flexible procedure. (Ibid.; Antipolo
Realty Corp. vs. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399).
What is the purpose of the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction?

The purpose of the doctrine of primary administrative

jurisdiction, as enunciated in Director of Lands vs.
Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 79684, February 19,
1991), is more in consonance with reality. Its purpose,
according to the Supreme Court, is not only to give
the administrative agency the opportunity to decide
the controversy by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to courts”.
What is the difference between the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
Doctrine of exhaustion of Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
administrative remedies
1. The administrative agency has 1. Both the court and administrative
authority to pass on every question agency have jurisdiction to pass on
raised by a person resorting to a question when a particular case is
judicial relief and enables the court presented to court, as an original
to withhold its aid entirely until the matter, rather than a matter of
administrative remedies have been review.
exhausted.
2. The claim or matter is cognizable 2. The claim or matter is cognizable
in the first instance by an by both the court and
administrative agency alone. administrative agency.
3. The purpose of the rule is to 3. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
control the timing of judicial relief not concerned with judicial review
from adjudicative action of an but determines in some instances
agency. whether initial action should be
taken by a court or administrative
agency.
 Note: Both principles do not apply
where the issue involved is a pure question
of law.
4.DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL
AGENCY
What is the doctrine of qualified political agency?

The doctrine of qualified political agency is a corollary rule to the control

powers of the President. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by Constitution or
law to act in person as the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Carpio vs. Executive
Q Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992, En Banc, Paras, J.)
What is the extent of the President's power of control over the executive branch of the
government?

The presidential power of control over the executive branch of the

government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to
the lowliest clerk and has been held to mean, “the power of the
President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter. It is at the very heart of
the meaning of Chief Executive." (Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 96409, February 14, 1992, En Banc, Paras, J.)
The President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet, who, in turn, and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department. (Supra)
5.DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS?
What is the doctrine of res judicata in administrative
proceedings?

The doctrine of res judicata forbids the reopening of a matter that

has been determined by competent authority. The prevailing rule is
that the doctrine applies to judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive and administrative officers acting within their
jurisdiction. The principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudication
extends to all bodies upon whom judicial power has been
confirmed.
What is the basis of the doctrine of res
judicata in administrative proceedings?

The judgment of courts an awards of quasi-

judicial agencies must become final at some
definite date fixed by the law. (Carreon vs. W.C.C.,
77 SCRA 297)
What are the instances when the doctrine of res judicata
is not applicable to administrative proceedings?

In Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, (Section 5, Rule XIII, Books of
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code) for instance, the
Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to labor
relations proceedings “considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such
proceedings are non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities obtaining in courts of law.” Said pronouncement, added the
Court, is in consonance with the jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
exercise of administrative powers.
Neither does the doctrine apply to judgments based on prohibited or void
contracts. (B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 159 SCRA 355)
6. DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

What is the common requirement of procedural due

process, whether in judicial or administrative
proceedings?

There is a common requirement of procedural due process,

whether in judicial or administrative proceedings, and this is the
element of NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. For as
long therefore as the defendant, or anyone similarly situated, is
given a notice and an opportunity to be heard, he cannot later on
complain that he was declared in default or that the decision has
been rendered against him in his absence, for he has already been
notified and given the opportunity to be heard.
What is procedural due process as
understood in administrative proceedings?

For the Supreme Court to sustain the findings of an

administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions,
such body must abide by the elementary rules of due
process. However, procedural due process as
understood in administrative proceedings accepts of a
more flexible standard as long as the proceeding were
undertaken in an atmosphere of fairness and justice.
(Valderama and Sons, Inc. vs. Drilon, G.R. No.78212,
January 22, 1999, First Division, Gancayco J.)
How can an "atmosphere of fairness and justice," as referred to
in
Valderama and Sons, Inc. vs. Drilon be attained?

The answer would still be to comply with the

cardinal rights to be observed in administrative
proceedings, as pronounced in Ang Tibay vs. CIR
(69 Phil. 635) as follows:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence in support thereof;

2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3. The decision must have something to support itself;

4. The evidence must be substantial;

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,

or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision;

7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its

decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
EXPLANATION OF EACH REQUISITE
FIRST REQUISITE: The right to a hearing
– The element of notice and opportunity to be
heard is part and parcel of due process, whether in
judicial or administrative proceedings. In the
absence of this element, there can be no fair play.
Is notice and hearing always necessary in
administrative determinations?

It is necessary only when some constitutional

rights is claimed to be invaded.
When is notice and hearing not necessary?
1. It is not necessary if the purpose of an administrative determination is
to decide whether a right or privilege which an applicant does not
possess shall be granted to him or withheld in the exercise of a
discretion vested by statute.
2. It is not also necessary if the power exercised is essentially
administrative or executive and not judicial or quasi-judicial, unless
otherwise required by law.
3. Even if the power exercised is quasi-judicial, notice or hearing may not
be necessary to due process of law if no personal or property rights are
involved.
4. When powers of determination and action of a quasi-judicial character
are given to officers entrusted with duties of local or municipal
administration by which not of the property, but the lives of
individuals, may be affected, and which, from their nature, must be
exercised without a prior hearing or notice to the parties who may be
affected. (42 Am. Jur., pp. 474-475)
What are the instances of valid administrative
determinations without prior notice and hearing?

Nuisance per se may be the subject of summary abatement.

(Article 704 New Civil Code).
Permits to operate and maintain night clubs, cabaret,
massage parlors, discohouses, may be revoked when found
out to be used for immoral activities or fronts of prostitution.
(Darling Apt. Co. vs. Springer, 137 ALR 803).
Preventive suspension of government employees on account
of graft cahrges. (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
SECOND REQUISITE: A tribunal must
consider the evidence presented - The right
of a party to present his own case and submit his
evidence to support thereof will be a useless right
if there is no corresponding duty on the part of
administrative tribunal to consider the same.
THIRD REQUISITE: The decision must have something to
support itself – A decision which does not state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, deprived not
only the parties but also the practitioners , professors and students
as to the factual and legal considerations that guided the court, or
even a quasi-judicial tribunal, in reaching a decision. Decisions of
courts and administrative tribunals, particularly the decisions of
the Supreme Court, are discussed, scrutinized and cited by lawyers
and non-lawyers alike from time to time and in the years to come.
This goes on and on even at a time when those who wrote them
have banished from the broad face of the earth. Even dissenting
opinions in yesteryears are made as references for, in several
instances, they appear more convincing to the next generation of
lawyers, judges, professors, scholars and law students.
FOURTH REQUISITE: The evidence must be
substantial – It is not enough that there is an
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence
“is more than a mere scintilla”. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is
precisely the difference between an administrative
proceeding and a criminal case where the evidence
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
What must be the reason for this rule?
The obvious purpose of this rule is to free
administrative bodies from the compulsion of
technical rules of evidence and procedure.
FIFTH REQUISITE: The decision must be
rendered on the basis of the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected - Any other evidence not
presented or disclosed during the proceedings
cannot be made the basis of the decision. They are
not known to the parties and neither are they
brought to the attention of the administrative
tribunal making the decision.
It is sufficient, however, that administrative findings of
facts are supported by evidence. Such finding will not be
disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant
(Earth Minerals Exploration, Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary, Catalino Macaraig, G.R. No. 78569,
February 11, 1991, 2nd Div., Paras, J.), and except when
the former have acted without or in excess with their
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. (Biak na
Bato Mining Company vs. Tanco, Jr., G.R. No. 342670-
68, January 25, 1991, 2nd Div., Paras, J.).
SIXTH REQUISITE: The board or its judges must
act on its or their own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision - This means that the
administrative officer who is entrusted with the duty to
decide a case, must be the one to make a decision based on
the factual findings laid on his table and based on his own
interpretation of the law entrusted to him for
implementation. Necessarily, he cannot entrust the same
to anyone in his office for his determination and
appreciation of the facts of the case and of the law,
involved is certainly different from anyone in his staff.
SEVENTH REQUISITE: In all controversial
questions, the decision must be rendered in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it - It is a part and parcel of
fair play that the reasons involved, particularly the reasons
for the decision, should be stated clearly in the decision so
that the parties will know not only the factual findings but
also how the one making the decision appreciates the
totality of the circumstances involved in the case and his
own appreciation of what law applies to the facts and the
evidence presented before him.
7. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

What are the requisites before an administrative

decision may be subject of judicial review?

Before an administrative decision may be subject of judicial

review, the following requisites should be complied with:
1) The administrative action has already been fully completed and
has therefore become final; (This is known as Doctrine of
Finality of Administrative Action)

2) The administrative remedies have been exhausted. (This is

known as the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies)
How can a party appeal from a final award, order or
decision of an administrative agency, board or tribunal?

1. With respect to the decision, order/rulings of the three

independent commissions created under and by virtue of
1987 Constitution, namely: (1) Civil Service Commission;
(2) Comelec; and (3) Commission on Audit: The aggrieved
party has to file a petition for certiorari within thirty (30) days
from receipt of said decision, order of ruling. This petition is
actually a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 and,
therefore, the ground or the issue to be brought to the Supreme
Court for decision is limited to grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. IX, Section 7,
1987 Constitution)
2. With respect to Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-
Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals: Secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of
the Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, provides as follows:

"Sec. 1. Scope - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.”
 "Sec. 2. Cases not covered - This Rule shall
not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines.”

"Sec. 3. Where to appeal - An Appeal under

this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the man herein provided,
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law."
“Sec. 4. Period of appeal - The appeal shall be taken within
15 days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication
is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.
Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket
fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days."
"Sec. 5. How appeal taken - Appeal shall be taken by filing a
verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the
Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the
adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy
of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated
as such by the petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk
of court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful
fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from
payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified
motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of
Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing
and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the denial."
3. Regarding appeal by certiorari to the Supreme
Court: Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, provides as follows: Section 1.
Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A Party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
What question can be raised in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme
Court?

Only questions of law may be raised in the petition

and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on
appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the
petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the
elevation of the whole record of the case.
Is this mode of appeal different from certiorari as
a special civil action under Rule 65?

An appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court

under Rule 45 is different from the special action
of certioriari under Rule 65.
What is the difference?
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
UNDER RULE 45 CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
1. The petition is based on 1. The Petition raises the issues as
questions of law which the to whether the lower court acted
appellant desires the appellate without or in excess of
court to resolve. jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
2. Involves the review of the discretion.
judgment, award, or final order 2. May be directed against an
on the merits. interlocutory order of the court
3. Must be made within the prior to appeal from the
reglementary period for appeal. judgment or where is there not
4. Stays with the judgment, award, appeal or other plain, speedy or
or order appealed from. adequate remedy.
5. Petitioner and respondent are the 3. May be filed not less than sixty
original parties to the action, and (60) from notice of the judgment
the lower court or quasi-judicial order or resolution sought to be
agency is not to be impleaded. assailed.
6. Prior filing of a motion for
reconsideration is not required (Sec.
1, Rule 45)
7. The appellate court is in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review.
4. Does not stay the challenged proceeding
unless a writ of preliminary injunction or
a temporary restraining order shall have
been issued.
5. The parties are the aggrieved party
against the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency and the prevailing parties, who
thereby respectively become the
petitioner and respondents.
6. A motion for reconsideration is a
condition precedent (Villa-Rey Transit
vs. Belo, L-18957, April 23, 1963).
7. The Higher court exercises original
jurisdiction under its power of control
and supervision over the proceedings of
lower courts. (In Re: Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of the
Rural Bank of Bokod vs. BIR, G.R. No.
158261, December 18, 2006, citing the
case of Paa vs. CA
Can a petition be categorized as a petition
under Rules 65 and 45 of the Rules of Court?

No and neither may a petitioner or petitioners

delegate upon the court the task of determining
which rule the petition should fall. The Supreme
Court ruled that under Circular No. 2-90, wrong
or inappropriate mode of appeal merits an
outright dismissal.
(See Ibañez vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 540)
In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. What is the
reason for this?

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of

factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings
on these matters are received with respect and are in fact
binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions.
(FNCB vs. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990,
192 SCRA 514; Universal Motors vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-47432, January 27, 1992)
Distinguish questions of law from questions of facts.
QUESTIONS OF LAW
If the facts are established or
admitted, their legal effect is a
question of law for the court to
determine.
There is a question of law in a given
case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. (Ramos vs.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., 19
SCRA 289)
QUESTIONS OF FACTS
A question of fact arises when there
is a conflict in testimony. The
question must be resolved by the
court. No question of fact exists if
only one conclusion is possible from
the facts established.
There is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts. (Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of the P.I., 19 SCRA
289)
What is the test of whether a question is one
of law or of fact?
Whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it is a question of fact. (Crisostomo vs.
Garcia, G.R. No. 164787, January 31, 2006;
Velayo-Fong vs. Spouses Velayo, G.R. 155488,
December 6, 2006; L&L Lawrence Footwear, Inc.
vs. PCI Leasing and Finance Corp., G.R. No.
160531, August 30, 2005).
Is the finding of negligence a question of
law or of fact?
The finding of negligence is a question of fact. In
the same vein, whether one acted in good faith or
in bad faith is a question of fact. Hence, they are
not proper subjects of the Supreme Court's
discretionary power of judicial review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which is concerned solely
with questions of law. (PNB vs. Campos, G.R. No.
167270, Jun 30, 2006)
What are the exceptions to conclusiveness of
facts?
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations surmises or conjecture;
2. When the interference made is manifestly
absurd, mistaken or impossible;
3. When there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of facts are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellants and appellees;
7. When the findings of fact are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners‘ main and reply briefs are not disputed by
respondents; and
10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record. (Ontimare vs. Elep, G.R. No. 159224,
January 20, 2006; Citibank vs. Sabeniano, G.R. No. 156132,
October 16, 2006)
Within what period can a party appeal by a certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals?

The petition shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the

judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the
denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed
and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Supreme Court may, for justifiable reasons, grant an
extension of 30 days only within to file the petition. (Section 2,
Rule 45, Appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, Comments on
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended)
Besides the foregoing reliefs and remedies,
what is the general relief that may also be
availed of under the 1987 Constitution?
General relief, when proper, may also be availed of under the
provisions of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides as follows: "The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
( NOTE: New definition of judicial power as
well as the case of Manila Prince Hotel vs.
GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., G.R.
No. 122156 has already been discussed in
Chapter VI.)
What are the most common remedies
available to an aggrieved party with respect
to a decision or order of administrative
agencies and offices?
The common remedies are the following:
1. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1 of the New
Rules of Court.
2. A petition for prohibition may also be filed under Section 2, Rule 65 of
the New Rules of Court.
3. A petition for mandamus may also be filed under Rule 65, Section 3 of
the New Rules of Court.
4. A quo-warranto proceeding may also be filed under Section 1, Rule 66
of the New Rules of Court.
5. Petition for habeas corpus may also be filed under Section 1, Rule 102 of
the New Rules of Court.
V. OTHER ANCILLIARY PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
What are the other principles of
administrative law?
They are the following:
1. Administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules
of evidence and procedure.
2. The findings of facts of administrative bodies are binding to
the courts if they are supported by substantial evidence.
3. Administrative bodies can resolve questions of law in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial function but (a) the same is
only an incident to their primary power of regulation and to
perform executive duties; and (b) their resolution is subject
to judicial review.
4. Requisites for validity of administrative rules and
regulations.
5. Requisites for validity of administrative
regulations with penal sanctions.
6. Legal force and effects of administrative rules
and regulations.
7. Legal effects of duly executed acts of an
administrative body.
8. “Republic of the Philippines” and “National
Government" are not interchangeable.
BRIEF EXPLANATION OF
EACH PRINCIPLE

1. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ARE NOT

BOUND BY THE TECHNICAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE
Administrative agencies charged with the task of adjudicating
contested cases are necessarily involved in exercising functions
which are judicial in nature. This does not mean, however, that they
are bound to observe the technical rules of evidence and procedure
observed by the regular courts of justice.

The reason for this is because administrative tribunals are expected

to adjudicate cases expeditiously and without unnecessary delay.
The main function of administrative agencies is primarily to
enforce the law entrusted to them for implementation. The exercise
of quasi-judicial power is only incidental to their main function of
enforcing the law.
AL-AMANAH ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 100599, APRIL 8, 1992

The Civil Service Commission is free from the

rigidity of certain procedural requirements.
FACTS:
The investigating committee found Malbun guilty of neglect of
duty and imposed the penalty of forced registration without
prejudice to reinstatement.
The Merit Systems Protection Board agreed with the
investigating committee's findings that there is no proof that
Malbun tolerated the anomalies nor is there any showing that he
has benefited directly or indirectly from the transactions to the
detriment of the Bank, and is therefore presumed to have acted in
good faith.
The Civil Service Commission found Malbun guilty not only of
"gross neglect of duty" which is a less grave offense under Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 8, 1970, but also
of “Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest
of the Service,” which are grave offenses under the said
Memorandum Circular.
Philippines Al-Almanah Bank moved to reconsider the said
finding of the Civil Service Commission and urged that the
previous conviction of Malbun in 1979, for "Neglect of Duty"
and subsequent suspension from the service, should be
considered in determining the proper penalty against Malbun.
The Bank contends that the proper penalty should be
dismissal.
The Civil Service Commission refused, however, to consider
the prior conviction of Malbun on the ground that this is not a
newly discovered evidence and that the Bank in the exercise of
its reasonable diligence could have discovered and produced
the document during the hearing conducted or could have
presented the same in its appeal to the Merit Systems
Protection Board as well as in the Commission.
ISSUE:
Is the said contention of Civil Service Commission correct?

HELD:
No. The prior conviction should have been considered by the Commission
in imposing the proper penalty on Malbun, although it was presented only
in the bank's motion for reconsideration or for new trial.
Malbun's prior conviction in 1979 is not a newly discovered evidence but
"forgotten evidence.” It already existed or was already available before or
during the trial which was known and obtainable by the bank and could
have been presented were it not for the oversight or forgetfulness of
Malbun. Therefore, applying rigid technical rules, such document is not
admissible as evidence against Malbun.
However, administrative agencies like the Civil Service Commission
exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements. Therefore, the Commission should have admitted
the document showing the prior conviction of Malbun, considering that it is
a public document and within the judicial notice of the Commission.
2. THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES ARE BINDING TO THE COURTS IF THEY
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

In Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 99357, January 27, 1992),
the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

1. Factual findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only

respect but finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained
by these quasi-judicial tribunals from handling specific matters falling
under their jurisdiction.

2. Courts cannot take cognizance of such factual issues.

3. In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot re-

examine the sufficiency of the evidence.
 4. The findings of fact must be respected, as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence.

"Factual findings of administrative bodies should be accorded

not only respect but even finality if they are supported by
substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or
preponderant.”
(Casa Realty Filipino vs. Office of the President)
“The factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive on the
parties absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion. The findings
of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not
only respect but even finality.”
(Sesbreno vs. Ala, et al., G.R. No. 95393, and Sesbreno vs. Cahig, et
al., G.R. No. 103471, May 5, 1992, En Banc, Paras, J.)
“Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of the
executive department can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of
jurisdiction, fraud or error of law. There being no motion for its
reconsideration, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources became final on July 3, 1959, 30 days from receipt by the
parties of the copies of the decision.”
(Heirs of Proceso Bautista vs. Barza, G.R. No. 79167, May 7, 1992, Third
Division, Romero, J.)

“Factual findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only

respect but also even finality if they are supported by substantial
evidence. However, deviation from this rule must be made when the
administrative agency clearly misappreciated the facts. In the present
case, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are at variance with
those of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR).
Petitioners have not sufficiently proved that the findings of fact of the
"Court of Appeals are totally devoid of support in the
records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion. Wherefore, the
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals are conclusive
and binding on this Court even if contrary to those of the
DANR, so long as such findings are supported by the
records or based on substantial evidence. (Mendizabel vs.
Apao, G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006)
NOTE: The Court of Appeals held that the evidence
presented by respondents ‘tend to disprove the factual
findings of administrative bodies.'
3. ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES CAN RESOLVE QUESTIONS
OF LAW IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR QUASI-JUDICIAL
FUNCTION BUT (A) THE SAME IS ONLY AN INCIDENT
TO THEIR PRIMARY POWER OF REGULATION AND TO
PERFORM EXECUTIVE DUTIES; AND (B) THEIR
RESOLUTION IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, administrative

agencies are necessarily involved in the resolution of contested
cases brought to their determination. On matters involving
questions of law, the authority vested in administrative agencies is
merely to interpret the law entrusted to them for implementation.
But such interpretation, however, is only incidental to their
primary power of regulation and to perform executive duties.
More than this, the resolution is subject to judicial review.
 This means that an administrative action or
decision may be disturbed or set aside by the
judicial department if there is an error of law, or
abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either
the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
(Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
95832, May 10, 1992, En Banc, Padilla, J.)
Before an administrative determination may be subject of
judicial review, it is required, however:

1. That the administrative action has already been fully

completed and has become final; and
2. That all the administrative remedies have been exhausted.

The first requirement is what is known and referred to as

the Principle of Finality of Administrative Requirement and
the second requirement is what is known and referred to as
the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Decisions of administrative agencies may be subject to review by any

court specified by the statute, or in the absence thereof, it is subject to
review by any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the
provision on venue of the Rules of Court. (Board of Commissioners vs.
Judge Capulong, G.R. No. 95612, May 31, 1991)

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies
to the same level or rank of the Regional Trial Court except those
specifically provided for under the law. As the Bureau of Immigration is
not of equal rank as the Regional Trial Court, its decisions may be
appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for
certiorari by the Regional Trial Court. (Sec. 2[1], Batas Pambansa Blg.
129).
4. REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS

Already discussed. Just remember the important points, as discussed earlier,

thus:

1. Requisites of a valid administrative regulation

2. Requirement as to publication of all laws as a condition for their

effectivity

3. Requisites for validity of administrative regulations with penal sanctions

4. Cases:
Old Cases:
a) People vs. Maceren (79 SCRA 450)
b) Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong (187 SCRA 432)
c) Bautista vs. Junio (127 SCRA 239)
d) Agustin vs. Edu (88 SCRA 195)
e) Tablarin vs. Gutierrez (152 SCRA 730)

New Cases:
a) MMDA vs. Dante Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005
VI. IS THERE A RELIEF FROM WITHIN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ITSELF?
 Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an
action or decision of lower administrative authorities may be
appealed to, or reviewed by, higher administrative
authorities or superiors like the Department Head (EO 292,
Book VII, Chapter 4, Section 19), or to the Commission or
Board en banc (e.g. National Labor Relations Commission,
Securities and Exchange Commission, National
Telecommunications Commission). In fact, an appeal need
not be filed at once. A motion for reconsideration may suffice
to obtain desired changes in the decision so long as no rights
have vested in the meantime and so long as they have not
passed beyond the control of the administrative authorities.
A resolution therefore of a labor arbiter, is
reviewable by any of the divisions of the National
Labor Relations Commission, and thereafter,
whoever is the aggrieved party may appeal the
decision to the Commission En Banc. The
hierarchy of authorities within the framework of
the National Labor Relations Commission ends
here. The decision of the Commission En Banc is
now appealable to the Court of Appeals, not to the
Supreme Court, unlike before.
 EXAMPLE:

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT/DECISION

GREETINGS:
You are hereby notified that on ___________,
JUDGMENT/DECISION, copy attached, was rendered in the
above-entitled case.
Under Article 232 of the Labor Code (as amended by R.A.
No. 6715) and pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of
the NLRC, no motion for reconsideration from said
judgment shall be entertained, but only an appeal, a notice of
memorandum thereof, in 5 typewritten copies must be filed
before the Labor Arbiter or the Executive Labor Arbiter of
this Office within 10 calendar days upon receipt thereof.
 An appeal shall be deemed perfected only upon the
payment of an appeal fee. PROVIDED, that in case of judgment
involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable and duly accredited bonding company, an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
The decision of the Labor Arbiters reinstating a dismissed
employee, in so far as the reinstatement is concerned shall
immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in
the payroll.
Quezon City, Philippines, ______________.

_______________________
Labor Arbitration Officer
VII. RELIEF AFTER RESOLUTION OF THE
HIGHEST LEVEL OF AUTHORITY IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONCERNED
What relief is available as against an action or decision
of an administrative bureau, agency, or office?

It depends. If the law that created the said administrative

bureau, agency or office provides for an appeal as well as the
procedure and the requisites for taking that appeal, the specific relief
or reliefs provided for in the law itself can be obtained. If the law
does not provide for an appeal, or for judicial relief or review, the
questioned decision can nevertheless be the subject of judicial
review under Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court on the ground of
lack or jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
What is required prior to judicial review of an administrative decision?

1. That the administrative action has already

been completed; and
2. That all the administrative remedies have been
exhausted.
Is compliance with the said requirements
absolute?

No. The said requirements need not be complied with in

the following instances:

1. When the question involved is purely legal, or where

the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
oppresive (Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga
Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntinlupa, et al. vs. Dominguez, G.R. No. 85439;
Bunye, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 91927,
January 13, 1992);
2. When there is an urgent need for judicial intervention
(Aquino vs. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177);

3. When the administrative body is in estoppel (Tan vs.

Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377);

4. When the claim involved is small (Cipriano vs.

Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291);

5. When irreparable damage will be suffered (De Lara vs.

Plaribel, 14 SCRA 269);
6. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy (National Development Co. vs. Collector of
Customs, 9 SCRA 429);

7. When strong public interest is involved (Arrow

Transportation Corp. vs. Board of Transportation, 63
SCRA 193); and

8. When the subject of controversy is private land

(Morcoso vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96605, May
8, 1992).
Can the reviewing court re-examine the
sufficiency of the evidence and receive
additional evidence that was not submitted
to the administrative agency concerned?

As a rule, factual findings of administrative agencies

will not be disturbed by the courts except in the following
cases: (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, supra; Alejandro vs. Court of
Appeals, 191 SCRA 700; Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 203 SCRA 504 [1991])
1. When it is not supported by substantial
evidence;
2. When it is vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion;
3. When the procedure which led to the
factual findings is irregular;
4. When palpable errors are committed;
5. When abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or
capriciousness is manifest.
What are the other matters that may not be interfered with by the courts?

1. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may

not be interfered by the courts except if an agency or
official concerned has acted arbitrarily and with grave
abuse of discretion. (Beautifont vs. Court of Appeals, 157
SCRA 481 [1988]). Example: Power granted to LTFRB
to grant provisional increase in transportation fares.

2. Appeal to the courts will not lie from an interlocutory

order. Example: Order of NLRC to set a motion for
execution for hearing by the Labor Arbiter a quo.
Assuming that an order is interlocutory, is there a relief that is available to a party
aggrieved by the said kind of order?

Yes, a special civil action for certiorari is

available if the administrative agency, board or
tribunal concerned acted without jurisdiction, in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, or if petitioner's right to due process is
disregarded. (Philippine Airlines vs. Civil
Aeronautic Board, 20 SCRA 727 [1967])
 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
20 SCRA 727

FACTS:
Philippine Airlines questioned the provisional permit to operate four
aircrafts on the following grounds: (1) alleged violation of due process
for failure to hear its evidence; (2) alleged absence of factual basis for
granting said provisional permit; (3) there is no public need; (4)
documents to support legality of the grant were not disclosed to it.
CAB countered that petitioner was notified about the hearing and it
was represented during the hearing when the proposed service and
feasibility of operations were subject of discussion and debate. CAB
and private respondent claimed that the promised grant is
interlocutory.
ISSUE:
Is PAL's petition for certiorari tenable? Is there abuse of discretion
in granting the said provisional permit to operate four aircrafts?

HELD:
PAL's petition for certiorari was sustained as a special civil action
which allows an aggrieved party to complain against any tribunal,
board or officer exercising functions judicial in character without or
in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion.
The claim, however, that there was violation of due process was not
sustained for there was notice and hearing. Besides, CAB has the
power to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend
or revoke, in whole or in part the temporary permit it has issued.
VIII. APPEAL FROM, OR REVIEW OF
ORDERS, ACTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE
DIFFERENT EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,
BUREAUS AND OFFICES
 OLD CASES

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 112844, JUNE 2, 1995
61 SCAD 720

(As long as the parties were given opportunity to be

heard before the judgment was rendered, the
demands of due process were sufficiently met)
FACTS:

Despite prior disapproval of petitioner's request for renewal

of permit to operate, the DECS Inter-Agency Technical
Committee (IATCOM) recommended the grant of permit to the
school in 1987, provided that it improves its buildings,
laboratory and library facilities before the start of school year
1987-1988. Petitioner continued to fail to improve itself in
1988.
In 1989, the TPME (DECS Technical Panel for Maritime
Education) recommended the gradual phase-out of the courses
in Bachelor of Science in Marine Education and eventual
closure should the school fail to meet minimum standards.
On August 8, 1989, despite another inspection, the inspection
team reiterated the recommendation for the gradual phase-out
of the school and for the non-acceptance of freshman beginning
SY 1990-1991. DECS approved and implemented the
recommendation and accordingly issued the phase-out order.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. When motion was denied,
it appealed to the Office of the President. While the appeal was
pending, DECS issued a closure order dated August 27, 1991,
effective the second semester of SY 1991-1992. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration of said order of closure. While the said
motion for reconsideration was pending in the DECS, the Office
of the President dismissed the appeal filed earlier. Again,
petitioner moved for the reconsideration but the same was
denied.
Due to the denial, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals on the following grounds: (1) There was violation
of due process because the basis for affirmance of the DECS phase-
out and closure orders was not sufficiently disclosed; (2) that it had
presented incontrovertible proof that it had introduced substantial
improvements on its facilities for the past two and a half years.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition as well as the subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioner to the
Supreme Court faulting the Court of Appeals in not setting aside
the questioned resolution which was allegedly rendered without
due process since it is not fully afforded opportunity to present
evidence, and was not sufficiently informed of the basis for the
closure orders which were not yet final and executory.
ISSUE:
Was there a violation of due process? Is the closure order valid? Is the basis of
the affirmance of the DECS' phase-out and closure orders disclosed to the
petitioner?

HELD:
Before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders, petitioner was duly
notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and
to comply with pertinent orders and regulations. Petitioner has gone all the way
up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the phase-out and closure
orders. There is thus no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to explain its
side as well as to comply with the alleged deficiencies (Board of Medical
Education vs. Alfonso, 176 SCRA 304 (1989]). As long as the parties were given
opportunity to be heard before the judgment was rendered, the demands of due
process were sufficiently met (Lindo vs. COMELEC, 194 SCRA 25). It should
also be noted that petitioner herein repeatedly sought reconsideration of the
various orders of respondent DECS and its motion were duly considered by
respondent DECS to the extent of allowing and granting its request for re-
inspection of its premises.
 The phase-out and closure orders were based not only on
petitioner's deficiencies as a maritime institution but also on its
continued operation without the requisite authorization for the DECS
and acceptance of freshman students in blatant violation of the latter's
order and/or persistent warnings not to do so. Verily, there are
sufficient grounds to uphold the phase-out and closure orders of the
DECS which were issued conformably with Sec. 28 of the Education
Act of 1982.
In the case at bench, it is not the function of this Court nor any
other court for that matter - X X X to review the decisions and order of
the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution
meets the standards required for permission to operate and to
continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power
or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary.
Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any court would have the
competence to do so.
 ILOCOS SUR ELECTRIC CORPORATION, INC. VS. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 106161, FEBRUARY 1, 1995
58 SCAD 679

(Under Section 10 of P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D.

No. 1645, the National Electrification Administration has
no power to hear and decide termination cases of
employees in electric corporations.
That authority is vested in the Labor Arbiter.)
FACTS:

Engr. Egdon Sabio, Manager of the Engineering Department

of the Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative (ISECO) was dismissed
on July 1, 1989, by virtue of ISECO's Bond Resolution No. 63,
S. 1989, dated July 19, 1989. He was placed under preventive
suspension without pay effective July 1, 1989.
Engr. Sabio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
damages against petitioner in the Department of Labor. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Engr. Sabio and ordered ISECO
to reinstate the latter with full backwages. ISECO appealed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether NLRC has jurisdiction over the case of Engr. Sabio.
Whether the Board of Directors of ISECO dismissed Engr. Sabio in
accordance with law.

HELD:
Under Section 10 of P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645 only
the power of supervisions and control over electric cooperatives and
other borrowers, supervised or controlled, is given to the NEA. There
is nothing in said law which provides that the NEA administration
has the power to hear and decide termination of employees in
electric cooperatives. That authority is vested in the Labor Arbiter.
The dismissal arose from a purely labor dispute which falls within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
NLRC.
 CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE METROPOLITAN
WATERWORKS SYSTEM (MWSS) VS. VASQUEZ, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 109113, JANUARY 25, 1995,
58 SCAD 409

(The decision to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is

vested in the government agencies entrusted with that function.
Neither the Court, nor Congress, nor the Ombudsman should
interfere in the exercise of said discretion which is a policy
decision, unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a
fraudulent award.)
FACTS:
MWSS published its invitation for pre-qualification and bids. Fourteen
(14) contractors submitted applications to the Awards Committee for
Construction Services and Technical Equipment (PBAC-CSTE). After
evaluation, only 11 were pre-qualified to bid.
Meanwhile, between February 10 and March 24, 1992, former MWSS
Administrator Luis Sison, issued 6 addenda to the biding documents
that embodied some suggestions of respondent Philippine Large
Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturer's Association (PLDPPMA).
After the 3 lowest bidders for Project APM-01 and APM-02 were
known, PBAC-CSTE recommended the rejection of all bids and to
conduct a re-bidding because of ambiguity of Addendum No. 6 of the
bidding documents, lack of provision of maintenance/repair materials
for bidders who opted to use fiberglass reinforced pipes, and the use
for a further review of the pipe design by the consultant, NJS.
Finally, on June, 1992, PBAC-CSTE submitted to bid evaluation
report. It recommended the second lowest but complying bidder,
FF Cruz and Co., Inc. for APM-01. Meanwhile, on April 7, 1992,
PLDPPMA, private respondent, through its President, filed a
letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman protesting
the public bidding on APM-01 and APM-02, charging that there
was an "apparent plan” on the part of MWSS to favor suppliers
of fiberglass pipes, and urging the Ombudsman to investigate the
complaint and hold in abeyance the award of the contracts.
The Ombudsman, in its order dated October 19, 1992, directed
the Board of Trustees of MWSS to set aside the recommendation
of PBAC-CSTE. MWSS moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.
ISSUE:
Can the Ombudsman interfere in the adjudicative responsibility of the
MWSS Board of Trustees?

HELD:
The MWSS, a government-owned and controlled corporation created by
law through R.A. No. 6234, is charged with the construction, maintenance
and operation of waterworks system to insure an uninterrupted and
adequate supply and distribution of potable water. It is the agency that
should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the projection of
the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its development
plans. The exercise of this discretion is a policy decision that necessitates,
among other things, prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation,
and deliberation - matters that can best be discharged by it. MWSS has
passed Resolution No. 32-93 to likewise show its approval of the technical
specification for fiberglass. All these should deserve weight.
NOTE: This affirms the decision of the Supreme
Court in Razon, Inc. vs. PPA (151 SCRA 233), thus:

"x x x we have said that neither this Court nor congress

and now perhaps the Ombudsman, could be expected to
have the time and technical expertise to look into matters
of this nature. While we cannot go so far as to say,
MWSS would have the monopoly of technical know-how
in the waterworks system, by the very nature of its
functions, however, it obviously must enjoy the
advantage over other agencies on the subject at hand.”
Likewise, this affirms the decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr.
and Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary (190 SCRA
673)
The decision in Bureau Veritas vs. Office of the
President is emphatic. The Supreme Court said: "The
discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts
is vested in the Government agencies entrusted with
that function. The discretion given to the authorities on
this matter is of such wide latitude that the Courts will
not interfere therewith, unless it is used as a shield to a
fraudulent award."
 SECRETARY OF HEALTH, ET AL. VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 112243, FEBRUARY 23, 1995, 59 SCAD 270

(Jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case

remains with it until the full termination of the case,
unless the law provides the contrary.)
FACTS:
For gross misconduct and dishonesty, Fe Siballuca, Administrative
Officer III of the Provincial Health of Cagayan, was placed under a 90
day preventive suspension. She instituted an action to nullify the said
order of suspension claiming that when the New Local Government
Code took effect on January 1, 1992, the Secretary of Health had lost his
disciplinary power and authority over her, considering that such power
of the provincial Health Office is now vested in the Provincial Governor.
The Secretary of Health moved to dismiss the action and to quash the
temporary restraining order obtained and opposed the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, contending that the private respondent had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that the New Local
Government Code did not divest him of his disciplinary jurisdiction
over the private respondent.
The trial court ruled in favor of Siballuca and issued
an order for execution of judgment.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was
denied. They filed a Notice of Appeal with the court
a quo and moved to stay execution of the asserted
decision. Both were denied.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals
but the same was dismissed on the ground that the
petition could not be a substitute for a lost appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the decision of the Court of Appeals correct?

HELD:
No. At the time of the commencement of the administrative action, the
operative laws are the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order
No. 119. Under the said laws, the Secretary of Health exercises control,
direction and supervision over his subordinates, which include private
respondent. Consequently, since jurisdiction has been acquired by the
Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before the
effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, it
continues until the final DISPOSITION of the administrative case.
Jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case remains with it until
the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the contrary.
Respondent, a civil servant, cannot use the courts of justice as a shield to
prevent the implementation of administrative sanctions of executive
agencies against erring public servants.
 NEW CASES

AMADORE VS. ROMULO

G.R. NO. 161608, AUGUST 9, 2005

(Only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to be

filed from a decision, resolution or order of the Office of
the President. A second motion for reconsideration is
allowed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.)
FACTS:

Petitioner Amadore, the Director of PAGASA entered into a contract with

Inter-Technical Pacific Philippines, Inc. (INTER PAC) for the supply,
delivery installation, testing and commissioning of S-Band Weather
Surveillance Radar System and Other Related Equipment for Baguio and
Tanay Radar Stations. The contract was approved by then Secretary
Padolina of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
The concerned employees of the DOST reported the rampant graft and
corruption in the DOST. The charge of entering into a contract manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government was filed against petitioner,
Director Ferraris and Deputy Director Angeles. The PCAGC found them
guilty and recommended their dismissal from the service.
Then Executive Secretary Romulo approved the recommendation
of the PCAGC and dismissed petitioner, Deputy Director Ferraris
and Deputy Director Angeles from government service. They filed
a motion for reconsideration. The complaint against Deputy
Director Ferraris was dismissed, while Deputy Director Angeles
was suspended for six (6) months and petitioner's dismissal from
the service was affirmed.
An urgent motion to admit second motion for reconsideration was
filed by petitioner and Deputy Director Angeles on the ground
that they were unable to present documents which, if admitted,
would probably alter the decision of the Office of the President.
The second motion for reconsideration was denied with finality.
ISSUE:
Whether a second motion for reconsideration for the
decision of the Office of the President is allowed.

RULING:
A second motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Office of the President may only be allowed in exceptionally
meritorious cases. Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987,
prescribes the rules and regulations governing appeals to the
Office of the President of the Philippines. Section 7 and 9 read
as follows:
Sec. 7. Decision/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by
special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless
a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party
shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases.
Sec. 9. The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
It is clear from Sec. 7 of Administrative Order No. 18
that only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to
be filed from a decision, resolution or order of the Office
of the President. A second motion for reconsideration is
allowed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.
In the case of petitioner, he, together with a co-
respondent, filed a second motion for reconsideration
claiming he will be presenting evidence that he was not
able to present during the hearings, which, if admitted,
will probably change the judgment.
 SGMC REALTY CORPORATION VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. NO. 126999, AUGUST 30, 2000

(Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the

Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from
receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order
complained of or appealed from.)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) a complaint for breach of contract, violation of
property rights and damages against private respondents. Their
complaint was dismissed.
Petitioners then filed a petition for review with the Board of
Commissioners of the HLURB. The petition was dismissed so they
filed an appeal with public respondent. Public respondent, without
delving into the merits of the case, dismissed the appeal for being
filed out of time and denied their motion for reconsideration.
Alleging that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding
that the period to appeal from the HLURB to the Office of the
President is fifteen (15) days and not thirty (30) days as mandated
in the 1994 Rules of Procedure adopted by the HLURB, petitioners
filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that the reglementary
period within which to appeal the decision of
HLURB to public respondent is fifteen days.
RULING:
No. Public respondent did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, issued by
public respondent reads:

“Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an

appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within
thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of
the decision /resolution/order complained of or appealed
from.”
 The said thirty (30) day period mentioned
under Administrative Order No. 18 is subject to
the qualification that there are no other statutory
periods of appeal applicable. If there are special
laws governing particular cases which provide for
a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same
shall prevail over the thirty-period provided for in
the administrative order.
Indeed, there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of fifteen
(15) days within which to appeal a case to public respondent. First,
Section 15 of PD No. 957 provides that the decisions of the National
Housing Authority (NHA) shall become final and executor after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of the decision.
Second, Section 2 of PD No. 1344 states that decisions of the NHA shall
become final and executor after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the
date of its receipt. The latter decree provides that the decisions of NHA
are appealable only to the Office of the President. Further, we note that
the regulatory functions of the NHA relating to housing and land
development has been transferred to Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission, now known as the HLURB. Thus, said presidential
issuances providing for a reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days
apply in this case. Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30) days
set forth in Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer
holds true for being in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid
presidential decrees. For it is axiomatic that administrative rules
derive their validity from the statute that they are intended to
implement.
 CABRERA VS. LAPID
G.R. NO. 129098, DECEMBER 6, 2006

(Direct resort to the SC from a resolution or order of the

Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure.)
FACTS:
Petitioner Amelia Cabrera accused named respondents Manuel Lapid,
Fernando Baltazar, Reynaldo F. Cabrera and Superintendent Diony
Ventura, respectively, in their capacities of Governor of Pampanga,
Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, Vice-Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, and
Superintendent of the PNP-Region 3, Pampanga of violating Section 3(e)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In her Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Ombudsman,
petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the
Municipality of Sasmuan over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting
it to fishpond operations. According to petitioner, she had spent
approximately P5,000,000.00 for its construction before the fishpond
operations commenced in August 1995. A month later, petitioner
learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her
fishpond as it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak
River. Thus, petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to dissuade
respondents from destroying her property.
Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the
destruction of petitioner’s fishpond. The property was
demolished on 10 October 1995 by dynamite blasting. Petitioner
alleged that the demolition was purposely carried out in the
presence of media representatives and other government
officials to gain media mileage. Petitioner imputed evident bad
faith on respondents Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor Cabrera in
allowing the destruction of the fishpond despite their prior
knowledge of the existence of the lease agreement. She also
charged respondents Governor Lapid and Senior Superintendent
Ventura with gross inexcusable negligence for ordering the
destruction of the fishpond without first verifying its legality.
On 13 May 1996, the Ombudsman issued assailed
Resolution, dismissing petitioner’s complaint. The dismissal
was based on the declaration that the fishpond was a
nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in
the exercise of the police power of the State.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution. In its
May 21, 1997 Order, the Ombudsman affirmed its earlier
Resolution.
Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
assail the Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner can resort directly to the Supreme Court from a resolution or
order of the Ombudsman.

RULING:
Direct resort to the SC from a resolution or order of the Ombudsman is not
sanctioned by any rule of procedure.
Clearly, this is an appeal from the questioned issuances of the Ombudsman.
However, such direct resort to this Court from a resolution or order of the
Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure.
Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989. The provision allowed direct appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The
right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases. The provision does not cover resolutions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. The provision does not cover resolutions of
the Ombudsman in criminal cases. More importantly, Sec 27 of RA No. 6770
insofar as it allowed a direct appeal to this Court was declared unconstitutional in
Fabian vs. Hon. Desierto (356 SCRA 787).
However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not
without any recourse. Where grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the
existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The
remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in
preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
But in this case, petitioner has taken the position that the
Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary to
law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That
is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a reading
of the assignment of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not
impute grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in
issuing the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely
questions his findings and conclusions. As stated earlier,
direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review
on certiorari is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By
availing of a wrong remedy, the petition should be dismissed
outright.
Should an order of preventive suspension be nullified because the
Secretary of Health lost his disciplinary power and authority when
the new Local Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992?

No. The jurisdiction acquired by the Secretary

of Health before the effectivity of the Local
Government Code on January 1, 1992, continues
until the final disposition of the administrative
case.
THE MECHANICS OR THE MANNER OF APPEALING THE DECISION OF
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT IS DIFFERENT BECAUSE IT IS A
CONSTITUTIONAL BODY

Both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, any decision, order or ruling of
the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The same is true with respect to any decision, order or ruling of the
Commission on Elections and the Civil Service Commission. (Orocio vs.
Commission on Audit, et al., G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992; Manalansang
vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 93500, February 5, 1991; Villanueva
vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 97071, February 27, 1992)
What is the relief available against
awards of ale lots issued by NHA?
An action to annul awards of sale of its lots should
first be filed in the National Housing Authority.
Thereafter, an appeal may be filed in the Office of
the President within thirty three (33) days from
receipt of the NHA decision awarding the lot to
another party. After which step, the aggrieved party
can go to the Courts under Rule 65. (Swan, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97319; Swan, et al. vs.
Abesamis, G.R. No. 101054, August 4, 1992)
The old case of Raymundo vs. PHHC (114
SCRA 717)had this ruling:
“The power to dispose of the lands placed under the
administration of Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation
is lodged in said body. There is no provision of law authorizing
courts to review decisions of respondent PHHC and to take
cognizance of actions to annul awards of sale or any other actions
made by it pursuant to the authority granted it by law. If the courts
are to take cognizance of cases involving errors or abuse of power
exercised by the respondent PHHC, the remedy would be by
means of an action for certiorari or prohibition to set aside the
orders of decisions of the respondent PHHC, and not a direct
action for specific performance as the one instituted in this case.
But this special civil action would not lie unless there is an
allegation of abuse of discretion of lack of jurisdiction.
Can the courts interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
discretion to determine whether or not to file an information against
an accused?
GENERAL RULE
The Ombudsman having authorized the Special Prosecutor to
investigate the charges, and we cannot assume that the former
acted without any justifiable cause, the latter is and should, at
this stage, be the proper adjudicator of the question as to the
existence of a case warranting the filing of an information in
court. To deny said functionary of the opportunity to discharge
such duty through this prohibitory recourse, under the obtaining
circumstances herein before explained, would be violative of
settled rules of criminal procedure and would, in effect grant an
immunity against even an investigative proceeding. (Sesbreno
vs. Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 97289, March 21, 1991;
Tabaa-Candang vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 97127, March 21, 1991)
EXCEPTION
Except if there is a misapprehension of justice
and the courts have to step in to prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to
harass, oppress, and persecute a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines against
whom an information for subversion had been
filed. The petitioners, Fernando and Mison, are by
no means, opposition men who need to be rescued
from the “iron arm" of the law.
IX. METHODS OF REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
What are the methods of review of
administrative action?

The methods of review of administrative action

may be (1) Statutory or Non-Statutory; (2) Direct
or Collateral.
a) Statutory Methods - They are those that are
provided by a specific statutory provision. The
manner and extent of its exercise is therefore
governed by statutes.

b) Non-Statutory Methods - Are those methods

which are not expressly provided for by law. They
are resorted by courts on account of their inherent
power to review such proceedings and to decide
questions of jurisdiction and questions of law.
c) Direct Proceeding - This is a proceeding which includes a
petition for review or relief from a judgment. The purpose of
which is to seek relief other than to set aside judgment, although
it may involve an attack on the judgment itself.

d) Collateral Attack - Through collateral attack, there is an

attempt to question in a subsequent proceeding, the
conclusiveness or validity of a prior administrative decision on
the ground that the decision of invalid for lack of jurisdiction
over the person, or over the subject matter, or because the
decision attacked was not the act of the administrative body
concerned which is vested with the power to make the said
determination.
STATUTORY METHODS
(They are available on account of a specific law that
allows it. If statutory methods for review are available,
they are ordinarily exclusive, and the use of non-
statutory methods will not likely be permitted.)
Example:
1. Judicial review of the decisions of the Constitutional
Commissions, those created under Article IX(A),
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution (Commission on
Elections, Commission on Audit, and Civil Service
Commission)

"Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by

law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy thereof."
2. Judicial Review of decisions and final orders under the
Labor Code of the Philippines

Judgments and final orders issued under the Labor Code

of the Philippines may only be brought to the Supreme
Court under Rule 65. The reliefs in Rule 65 are the
following:

(a) Petition for Certiorari, Section 1, Rule 65

(b) Petition for Prohibition, Section 2, Rule 65
Within what period shall the petition for
certiorari be filed?

There is no rule which specifies the period

within which a petition for certiorari should be
filed. The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a
petition for certiorari is the reasonableness of the
duration of time that has expired from the
commission of the act complained of, up to the
institution of the proceedings to annul the same.
NOTE:

1. In San Juan vs. Cuento (G.R. No. 45063, April 15, 1988, 160
SCRA 277), it was held that an interval of 2 years is too long.
2. In Allied Leasing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA
71 [1991]).
3. In Claridad vs. Santos (120 SCRA 148), 99 days in filing
certiorari after receipt of denial of the motion for
reconsideration was considered as barred laches.
4. In People vs. Magallanes (G.R. No. 118013, 64 SCAD 968,
October 11. 1995, citing Philec Workers Union vs. Young,
January 22, 1992), 3 months in filing certiorari after receipt
of the denial for the Motion for Reconsideration was accepted.
5. The period has now been settled to 60 days.
NON-STATUTORY METHODS (If there is no specific law granting review, relief is obtained by means of the
common law remedies, or by the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, habeas corpus, quo-warranto or
prohibition)
Example:
1. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
Section 1 of the New Rules of Court.
2. A petition for prohibition may also be filed under
Section 2, Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court.
3. A petition for mandamus may also be filed under
Rule 65, Section 3 of the New Rules of Court.
4. A quo-warranto proceeding may also be filed
under Section 1, Rule 66 of the New Rules of Court.
5. Petition for habeas corpus may also be filed under
Section 1, Rule 102 of the New Rules of Court.
DIRECT PROCEEDING (Administrative action is being questioned in a subsequent proceeding on account of
lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This also includes a
petition for review or a relief from judgment.)
Example:
1. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court
2. Appeal under Rule 43, Section 1 of the New
Rules of Court.
COLLATERAL ATTACK (The conclusiveness or
validity of a prior administrative decision is
being questioned on the ground that the
decision is invalid for lack of jurisdiction over
the person, or over the subject matter, or
because the decision attacked was not the act
of the administrative body concerned which is
vested with the power to make the said
determination).
Can the citizenship of an individual be attacked in a collateral proceeding?

No. (Co vs. House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692)
Is a certificate of title issued under an administrative
proceeding
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a
judicial registration
proceeding?

Yes, provided that the land covered by said certificate is a

disposable public land within the contemplation of the public
land law. (Ybañez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
68291, March 6, 1991).
Can a decree of registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto be attacked on the ground of actual fraud in a collateral proceeding?

No, such attack must be direct and not through a

collateral proceeding. The validity of the certificate
of title in this regard can be threshed out only in an
action expressly filed for the purpose. (Ibid.)
X. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION
What specifically are the guarantees provided
by the Constitution to said commissions?

The Constitution provides for the following guarantees:

1. The Members of the Constitutional Commissions cannot be

removed from office except by impeachment. (Article XI, Section 2)

2. The powers conferred to each of the said Commissions cannot be

withdrawn or reduced by statute. (Article IX[B], [C], and [D])

3. The term of office of the Chairman and the Commissioners is seven

(7) years without re-appointment. (Ibid.)
4. Their term of office are staggered in order that the majority of them
may not be appointed by the same President. (Ibid.)
5. They may not be re-appointed or appointed in an acting capacity.
(Ibid.)
6. Their salaries are fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their
tenure. (Section 3, Article IX[A])
7. All the said commissions may promulgate its own procedural rules.
(Section 5, Ibid.)
8. All the said commissions may promulgate its own procedural rules.
(Section 6, Ibid.)
9. All the said commissions can appoint their own officials and
employees in accordance with law. (Section 4, Ibid.)
10. The Chairman and members of all the said commissions are subject to
certain disqualifications and inhibitions so they will not be distracted
from performing their duties and functions. (Section 2, Ibid.)
11. All the said commissions are independent. (Section 1, Ibid.)
12. All the said commissions are created by the Constitution and they may
not be abolished by statute. (Section 1, Ibid.)
What is the mechanics of staggering the
terms?

Every two (2) years, the term of one

Commissioner expires leaving behind two
experienced Commissioners. If a vacancy occurs,
the commissioner so appointed to fill up the
vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor.
No member shall be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity?

The last sentence of Section 1(2), Article IX[B]

states: "In no case shall any member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

Under this rule, the President may not fill up a

vacancy by designating one of the Commissioners
a temporary Chairman.
 BRILLANTES VS. YORAC
192 SCRA 358

FACTS:
Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then an Associate
Commissioner of the Commission on Elections, was
designated by President Corazon C. Aquino as Acting
Chairperson of the Commission because the regular
chairman was appointed to another position in the
government. The petitioner challenged the designation
invoking the prohibition that "no member may be
appointed or designated in a temporary capacity."
ISSUE:
Is the said designation valid?

HELD:
The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Commission
on Elections must be extended permanent appointments by
the President but such appointments shall have the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. The President has no
power to designate a temporary Chairman. This prerogative
may be exercised by the members of the Commission on
Elections for they may, by a majority vote, designate one of
them as temporary chairman pending the appointment of a
permanent chairman by the President.
Within what period must a case or matter
be decided by each commission?

Section 7, Article IX [A] answers this question, thus:

“Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its

Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Who made the said decisions?
Decisions are made by the said commissions, not by the
individual members of said commissions. REASON: The
said constitutional commissions are collegial bodies. The
cases pending in said commissions should, therefore, be
decided "by a majority vote of all its members and Section
7 fixes a period of sixty (60) days from the date of its
submission within which to make that decision.“
Again, the sixty (60)-day period is counted from the filing
of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the
Rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself
How many days within which to file a
petition for certiorari?

The aggrieved party has to file a petition for certiorari within thirty
(30) days from receipt of said decision, order or ruling. This
petition is actually a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
and, therefore, the ground or the issue to be brought to the
Supreme Court for decision is limited to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.
There is lack of jurisdiction if the grave abuse of discretion was
done in a capricious or whimsical manner. Excess of jurisdiction
presupposes that the court has jurisdiction but it has overstepped
the permissible bounds in the exercise thereof. (Galido vs. Comelec,
93 SCRA 78 [1991]); Rivera vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA 178 [1991])
It is now settled that in providing that the decisions,
orders or rulings of Comelec "may be brought the
Supreme Court on certiorari," the Constitution in
its Article IX[A], Section 7, means the special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1.
For this reason, the aggrieved party must first file a
motion for reconsideration before the petition for
certiorari is brought to the Supreme Court. (Reyes
vs. Regional Trial Court, et al., G.R. No. 108886, 61
SCAD 44, May 5, 1995)
 REYES VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 108886, MAY 5, 1995
61 SCAD 44

FACTS:
After the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Aquiles U. Reyes as the 8th
winning candidate for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nauja, Oriental Mindoro.
Thereafter, Adolfo G. Comia, a candidate for the same
position, filed before the trial court an election protest alleging
that the Board of Canvassers had committed a mistake in the
mathematical computation of the total number of votes
garnered by petitioner.
After the mistake was admitted and rectified, the trial court
annulled the proclamation of Reyes and declared Comia as the
duly elected winner.
Reyes filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC and also a
petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals.
The COMELEC's First Division dismissed Reyes' appeal on the
ground that he failed to pay the appeal fee within the
prescribed period and the Court of Appeals dismissed his
petition in view of his pending appeal in the COMELEC citing
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 which prohibits the filing of
multiple petitions involving the same issues.
 Reyes then brought the present action. Reyes contends that
both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed
a grave abuse discretion, the first, by assuming jurisdiction over
the election contest filed by Comia despite the fact that the case
was filed more than ten days after Reyes' proclamation, and the
second, i.e., the COMELEC's First Division, by dismissing Reyes'
appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the
appeal fee.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Reyes failed to first
file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc
before filing his petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
contrary to Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution. It likewise
held that the COMELEC's First Division properly dismissed Reyes'
appeal from the decision of the trial court for his failure to pay the
appeal fee within the time for perfecting an appeal.
 The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC,
raises a fundamental question. He contends that the filing
of the present petition, without Reyes first filing a motion
for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates
Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution because under this
provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
HELD:

This is correct. It is now settled that providing that the decisions,

orders and rulings of COMELEC “may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari," the Constitution in its Article IX(A), Section 7
means the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1
(Galido vs. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 78 (1991); Rivera vs. COMELEC,
199 SCRA 178 [1991]). Since a basic condition for bringing such
action is that Reyes first file a motion for reconsideration
(Regalado, Remedial Law, pp. 459-460 (1998), it follows that
Reyes' failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to present action.
 Reyes argues that this requirement may be
dispensed with because the only question raised in
his petition is a question of law. This is not
correct. The questions raised by Reyes involve the
interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions in the light of the facts of this case. The
questions tendered are, therefore, not pure
questions of law.
Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc is required for the filing of a petition
for certiorari is clear from the provisions of Article IX(C),
Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. Conformably to these
provisions of the Constitution, all election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the
COMELEC in Division. Should a party be dissatisfied with
the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc. It is, therefore, the
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that is,
in accordance with Article IX(A), Section 7, may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.”
 Reyes also assails the decision of the trial court as
having been rendered without jurisdiction. He contends
that the election protest of Comia was filed more than 10
days after his (Reyes) proclamation. Reyes, however, is
estopped to raise this question now. He did not only
appeal from the decision of the trial court to the
COMELEC raising this question, but he also filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals.
Having decided on this course of action, he should not be
allowed to file the present petition just because he lost in
those cases.