THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 211231. April 3, 2019.]

CITY GOVERNMENT OF VALENZUELA, REPRESENTED BY ITS

CITY MAYOR, HON. SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN , petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES SILVINO ABACAN AND REMEDIOS LAZARO ,
respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution
dated April 3, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 211231 (CITY GOVERNMENT OF VALENZUELA,
represented by its City Mayor, HON. SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN,
petitioner, v. SPOUSES SILVINO ABACAN and REMEDIOS LAZARO,
respondents). — This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed
by the City Government of Valenzuela (Valenzuela City), represented by its
Mayor, Sherwin T. Gatchalian (Mayor Gatchalian), assailing the August 30,
2013 Decision 2 and February 7, 2014 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 98581. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial
Court November 17, 2011 Decision in Civil Case No. 102-V-10. 4
Spouses Silvino Abacan and Remedios Lazaro (the Abacan Spouses)
are the registered owners of a 1,203-square meter parcel of land located on
G. Lazaro Street, Dalandanan, Valenzuela City. 5 The property is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-54073. 6
In a September 9, 2009 Letter, Valenzuela City formally offered the
Abacan Spouses to purchase their property at P400.00 per square meter, or
a total of P481,200.00. However, the Abacan Spouses rejected the offer. 7
Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Valenzuela City enacted
City Ordinance No. 75, series of 2010, which authorized Mayor Gatchalian to
initiate expropriation proceedings over the Abacan Spouses' property for the
construction of a public school building and appropriation of the project's
funds. 8
On August 12, 2010, Valenzuela City, represented by Mayor
Gatchalian, filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for
expropriation against the Abacan Spouses. 9 CAIHTE

On August 26, 2010, the Abacan Spouses filed their Answer. They
averred that Valenzuela City's offer was way below the current Bureau of
Internal Revenue zonal valuation. 10
On September 16, 2010, Valenzuela City manifested that it issued Land
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 Bank of the Philippines Check No. 0000392622 worth P72,180.00, under
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160. The check was issued payable to the
Abacan Spouses, representing around 15% of the total fair market value of
the property based on current tax declarations. 11
In its September 30, 2010 Order, the Regional Trial Court authorized
the issuance of a Writ of Possession in Valenzuela City's favor. It directed the
Branch Sheriff to place the property in the city government's possession. 12
During pre-trial, the parties agreed that the lone issue for resolution
was the amount of just compensation. 13
In its January 14, 2011 Order, the Regional Trial Court ruled that
Valenzuela City had the right to take the property to construct the school
building. 14 Following Rule 67, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the trial court appointed three (3) Commissioners tasked with determining
the amount of just compensation due on Valenzuela City. 15
Subsequently, the Board of Commissioners set the just compensation
at P7,500.00 per square meter, or a total of P9,022,500.00. 16 This was
assailed by Valenzuela City, insisting that the just compensation must be
based on the property's fair market value per the tax declaration, which was
P400.00 per square meter. 17
In its November 17, 2011 Decision, the Regional Trial Court directed
Valenzuela City to pay the Abacan Spouses P6,000.00 per square meter, or a
total of P7,218,000.00, for the property. 18 The dispositive portion of the
Decision read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby ORDERS plaintiff to
pay defendant Spouses Silvino Abacan and Remedios Lazaro the just
compensation for the expropriated property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. B-54073, in the amount of P6,000.00 per
square meter, or a total of P7,218,000.00 for the 1,203 square meter
property, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
November 5, 2010, until full payment is made.
Defendants, on the other hand, are hereby DIRECTED to
present the Owner's Duplicate of said TCT No. B-54073 to the
Register of Deeds of Valenzuela City, which is in turn directed, upon
payment by defendant of the corresponding capital gains tax, to
cancel said title and issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of
title under the name of plaintiff, City Government of Valenzuela.
SO ORDERED. 19

Valenzuela City filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in

the Regional Trial Court March 5, 2012 Order. 20
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its August 30, 2013 Decision,21
affirmed the November 17, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court. It held
that the trial court had carefully studied the expropriated property when it
fixed the amount of just compensation. It also found that the trial court not
only relied on the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation, but also
evaluated the Commissioners' Report. It also noted how the trial court
considered that Valenzuela City, in August 2001, had purchased a 3,000-
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 square meter property for P5,000.00 per square meter, and that the
properties in that vicinity were valued at P5,300 per square meter by 2003.
22

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. The Decision dated November 17, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 269 of Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 102-
V-10 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 23 (Emphasis in the original)
Valenzuela City filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 24 which was denied
in the Court of Appeals February 7, 2014 Resolution. 25
Undeterred, Valenzuela City filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari
26 against the Abacan Spouses on February 28, 2014.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's Decision in fixing the amount of just compensation. The Court of
Appeals allegedly based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts,
"speculations, surmises[,] and conjectures." 27 DETACa

Similarly, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in

considering only the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation and the
price of the property it had purchased in 2001 as sufficient bases to
determine the amount of just compensation. 28 According to petitioner, the
property in question is not a commercial lot, but a vacant or idle residential
l o t 29 per Tax Declaration No. C-015-04245. That the Court of Appeals
disregarded this allegedly violates the power bestowed upon local
government units to prescribe zoning classifications, as held in Republic of
the Philippines v. Far East Enterprises, Inc. 30
Further, petitioner claims that the just compensation of P6,000.00 per
square meter valuation was arbitrary 31 and unjustified. 32
In a June 4, 2014 Resolution, 33 this Court required respondents to
comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice.
In their Comment/Opposition to Petition for Review on Certiorari 34 filed
on July 15, 2014, respondents counter that the trial court did not err in
determining the just compensation. They note that the trial court based its
determination on the Commissioners' Report and documentary evidence
presented in court. Such documentary evidence include: (1) the Bureau of
Internal Revenue zonal valuation, which pegged the just compensation at
P5,300.00 per square meter; (2) a 2000 Deed of Sale, showing that
petitioner purchased the property where Dalandanan National High School
and the Astrodome were erected at P5,000.00 per square meter; and (3) a
2001 Deed of Sale, showing that petitioner purchased another property on
G. Lazaro Street as the expropriated property at P12,500.00 per square
meter. 35
In its August 18, 2014 Resolution, 36 this Court noted respondents'
Comment/Opposition and required petitioner to file a reply within 10 days
from notice.
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 Petitioner filed its Reply 37 on September 29, 2014. It asserts that the
three (3) parameters laid down in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco 38
— (1) character of the property; (2) price; and (3) time of actual taking —
should have been considered in setting the amount of just compensation. 39
It cites Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974, which lists, among others: (1) the
classification and use for which the property is suited; (2) development costs
for improving the land; and (3) the value declared by owners, as standards
for assessment of land value. Petitioner points out that the property, prior to
expropriation, was a vacant or idle residential land without improvements,
low-lying, and situated in a flood-prone area. 40
For this Court's resolution is the lone issue of whether or not the
classification of a property in the tax declaration must prevail over that in
the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation and Commissioners' Report
in the determination of the amount of just compensation.
This Petition is denied for lack of merit.
I
This Court is not a trier of facts. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. 41
A question of fact exists when the truth or falsity of the alleged facts is
doubted 42 or when the issue entails a review of the evidence presented. 43
Factual issues of an expropriated property's valuation are generally beyond
the scope of a petition under Rule 45.
Further, factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, shall not be disturbed by this Court, unless they are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. 44 That is not
the case here.
Jurisprudence, however, has provided several exceptions to the rule.
For this Court to review the facts, the "exceptions must be alleged,
substantiated, and proved by the parties[.]" 45 Here, petitioner alleges that
the Court of Appeals Decision was "based on [a] misapprehension of facts
and/or are based on speculations, surmises[,] and conjectures." 46 Petitioner,
however, fails to substantiate its allegation.
On these procedural grounds alone, the Petition ought to be denied.
Nonetheless, even if its propriety is admitted, this Court finds no reason to
depart from the findings of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial
court's ruling.
II
Among the State's inherent powers that need not be expressly granted
is eminent domain, which "enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner." 47
The exercise of this power is limited by Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which states that "[p]rivate property [shall] not be taken for
public use without just compensation[.]" 48
Section 19 49 of the Local Government Code confers the power of
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 eminent domain to local government units. The requisites for the local
government's exercise of eminent domain are:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property. aDSIHc

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,

purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner
of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted. 50 (Citation omitted)
The procedure on the exercise of the power of eminent domain or
expropriation is governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. As explained in
National Power Corporation v. Posada: 51
It undergoes two phases. The first phase determines the propriety of
the action. The second phase determines the compensation to be
paid to the landowner. Thus:
There are two (2) stages in every action for
expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of
course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves
nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So,
too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for
thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety
thereof) shall be filed or heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the Court of "the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken."
This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and
findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It
would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and
leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the
issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may
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 believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of
the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously,
too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the
order by taking an appeal therefrom. 52 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
Here, the parties agreed that only the issue of just compensation
remains.
In expropriation cases, just compensation is "the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator." 53 It means:
. . . an equivalent for the value of the land (property) taken. Anything
beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than
compensation. To compensate is to render something which is equal
to that taken or received. The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation;" to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real,
substantial, full, ample. "Just compensation," therefore, . . . means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained.
The exercise of the power being necessary for the public good,
and all [the] property being held subject to its exercise when, and as
the public good requires it, it would be unjust to the public that it
should be required to pay the owner more than a fair indemnity for
such loss. To arrive at this fair indemnity, the interests of the public
and of the owner and all the circumstances of the particular
appropriation should be taken into consideration. 54 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted) ETHIDa

In Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, 55 this Court held that where the
issue is determining the amount of just compensation in an expropriation
suit, a trial before the commissioners 56 is indispensable. Trial with the aid of
commissioners gives the parties the opportunity to present evidence on the
issue of just compensation. As such, it is a substantial right that may not be
whimsically waived. 57
However, while the appointment of commissioners is mandatory in
resolving the issue of just compensation, courts are not bound by their
findings. 58 Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 8. Action upon Commissioners' Report. — Upon the
expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding
section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the
interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their
statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing,
accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or,
for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for
further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new
commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in
part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall
secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his
right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the
property so taken. (Emphasis supplied)
The determination of just compensation remains a judicial function to
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 be performed by courts. 59 Courts may render judgment that secures just
compensation for the defendant and the expropriated property for the
plaintiff. Courts may substitute their estimate of the value, as long as it is
supported by the evidence on record. 60
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform , 61 this Court explained the import of Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay 62 on the court's function of determining just
compensation:
EPZA v. Dulay resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated
by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property
under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property
by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner,
whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the
Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation
under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution
is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the
court technically would still have the power to determine
the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either
by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary
consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in
the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since
it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had
before the actual taking. However, the strict application of
the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing
short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only
to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of
the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower
of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or
independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a
grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar
as the determination of constitutional just compensation
is concerned. cSEDTC

xxx xxx xxx

In the present petition, we are once again
confronted with the same question of whether the courts
under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision
on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still
have the power and authority to determine just
compensation, independent of what is stated by the
decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for
such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
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 xxx xxx xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the
opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the
basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have
actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after
all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated. 63
(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner's assertion on the property's classification indicated in Tax
Declaration No. C-015-04245, as it is allegedly in accord with the local
government's power to prescribe zoning classifications, is erroneous.
Insisting that the trial court solely rely on this encroaches on its judicial
power to determine just compensation. Courts are mandated to evaluate and
consider competent evidence in determining just compensation. Not one (1)
factor shall prevail over the other, especially that which was determined by
public officers in the performance of their official functions. 64
Furthermore, petitioner did not substantiate any of its allegations.
Proof of its zoning classification, the alleged tax declaration, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue zonal valuation, the Commissioners' Report, among other
relevant documents, do not appear on record despite having been
repeatedly cited by petitioner.
Thus, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals, which stated:
Contrary to the City Government of Valenzuela's claim, the RTC
did not solely rely on the BIR zonal valuation when it fixed the just
compensation at P6,000.00 per square meter. Evidentiary records
disclose that the RTC evaluated the Commissioners' Report dated
August 10, 2011. In the said report, it is very evident that the
commissioners' recommendation of P7,500.00 per square meter was
not merely based on the zonal valuation made by the BIR. The
commissioners recommended said amount after taking into
consideration the factors set forth under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
8974. This can be gleaned from the following pertinent portion:
"Considering that the zonal valuation of the subject
property as determined by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, which is Pesos: Five Thousand Three Hundred
(P5,300.00) per square meter, and the prevalent market
value of neighboring developed properties which are
today being sold at Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P12,500.00), we decided to propose that the subject
property be valued at Seven Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P7,500.00) per square meter. This is a more
realistic value of the subject property taking into account
the development in the vicinity and its neighboring areas.
In our ocular inspection, we observed that the subject
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 property is indeed located in a busy and highly
commercialized area. . . ."
The RTC likewise considered that the City Government of
Valenzuela purchased a 3,000-square meter property within the
same vicinity as the subject property at a value of P5,000.00 per
square meter. Said transaction was done sometime in August 2001. It
further considered that in 2003, the BIR has valued the properties in
the same zone or area at P5,300.00 per square meter. SDAaTC

Verily, the RTC had carefully studied the expropriated property

when it fixed the just compensation at P6,000.00 per square meter.
Inasmuch as the determination of just compensation is a judicial
function, We see no plausible reason to disturb the RTC's findings as
to the valuation of the subject property. 65 (Citations omitted)
Notably, petitioner's invocation of Republic of the Philippines is
misplaced and does not support its cause.
I n Republic of the Philippines, the expropriation was for a national
government infrastructure project, governed by Republic Act No. 8974.
Among the requirements for authorizing the government's immediate entry
in expropriation proceedings is the payment of 100% of the property's value
based on the current Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation. There, the
petitioner questioned the expropriated properties' classification, which would
be used to determine the 100% value of the property based on the current
Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation. In disposing the issue, this Court
ruled:
Inasmuch as what is involved in this case is the payment of the
amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the
current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, we must distinguish the
same from just compensation. In Capitol Steel Corporation v.
PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, we ruled:
To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs
from the payment of just compensation for the
expropriated property. While the provisional value is
based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just
compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value
of the property. As the appellate court explained:
The first refers to the preliminary or
provisional determination of the value of the
property. It serves a double-purpose of pre-payment
if the property is fully expropriated, and of an
indemnity for damages if the proceedings are
dismissed. It is not a final determination of just
compensation and may not necessarily be
equivalent to the prevailing fair market value of the
property. Of course, it may be a factor to be
considered in the determination of just
compensation.
Just compensation, on the other hand, is the
final determination of the fair market value of the
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 property. It has been described as "the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of
the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of
the expropriation." Market values, has also been
described in a variety of ways as the "price fixed by
the buyer and seller in the open market in the usual
and ordinary course of legal trade and competition;
the price and value of the article established as
shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary way
of business; the fair value of the property between
one who desires to purchase and one who desires
to sell; the current price; the general or ordinary
price for which property may be sold in that
locality.["]
As the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of
the property equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based
on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, said amount serves
a double purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated,
and of indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed. Said
provisional value must be paid to the owner of the land before a writ
of possession may be issued. The issuance of a certificate of
availability of funds will not suffice for the purpose of issuance of a
writ of possession.
After payment of the provisional amount, the court may now
proceed to determine the amount of just compensation. Petitioner
can now present its evidence relative to the properties' fair market
value as provided in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974. 66 (Citations
omitted)
In stark contrast, at issue here is the amount of just compensation.
Moreover, this Court deemed that the more important issue in Republic
of the Philippines was if "the courts, in the first instance, [were] the proper
venue in which to resolve any dispute involving the classification of lands[.]"
67 This Court ruled in the negative. While the power of a local government to

reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance was recognized, this
Court explained that courts must refrain from resolving judicial questions
that "demand the special competence of administrative agencies[.]" Such is
the case here, where the issue of land classification is raised. acEHCD

Similarly, Land Bank of the Philippines, which involved an expropriated

property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, does not apply
here. The just distribution of agricultural lands, as mandated by the
Constitution, 68 is primarily governed by Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Court of Appeals August 30, 2013 Decision and February 7,
2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 98581 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

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 (SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 3-22-A.

2. Id. at 29-35. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
(now an Associate Justice of this Court), and concurred in by Associate
Justices Mario V. Lopez and Socorro B. Inting of the Ninth Division, Court of
Appeals, Manila.
3. Id. at 36. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now
an Associate Justice of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices
Mario V. Lopez and Socorro B. Inting of the Former Ninth Division, Court of
Appeals, Manila.

4. Id. at 35.
5. Id. at 38, Comment/Opposition to Petition for Review on Certiorari.
6. Id. at 30.
7. Id. at 5.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 30.

10. Id.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 30-31.

13. Id. at 31.

14. Id.

15. Id.

16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id. at 29.

20. Id. at 31.

21. Id. at 29-35.

22. Id. at 34-35.

23. Id. at 35.

24. Id. at 23-28.

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 25. Id. at 36.

26. Id. at 3-22-A.

27. Id. at 10.

28. Id. at 9.

29. Id. at 12.

30. Id. at 14-15. Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Far East Enterprises,
Inc. (613 Phil. 436 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]).
31. Id. at 13.
32. Id. at 10.

33. Id. at 37.

34. Id. at 38-41.

35. Id. at 40.

36. Id. at 48-48-A.

37. Id. at 52-56.

38. 645 Phil. 337 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

39. Rollo , p. 53.

40. Id. at 53-54.

41. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:

  SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional
remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
pendency. (Emphasis supplied)

42. Westmont Investment Corporation v. Francia, Jr., 678 Phil. 180, 191 (2011) [Per
J. Mendoza, Third Division].
43. Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas , 711 Phil. 576, 586 (2013) [Per J. Brion,
Second Division].

44. Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
45. Id. at 169.

46. Rollo , p. 10.

47. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform , 256 Phil. 777, 809 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
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 48. National Power Corporation v. Posada , 755 Phil. 613, 637 (2015) [Per J. Leonen,
Second Division].

49. LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 19 provides:

  SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That
the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of
the taking of the property.
50. Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 354 Phil. 684, 692 (1998)
[Per J. Panganiban, First Division].

51. 755 Phil. 613 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

52. Id. at 624.

53. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform , 256 Phil. 777, 812 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
54. City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208, 233-234 (1913) [Per J. Trent, First
Division].

55. 283 Phil. 90 (1992) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division].

56. RULES OF COURT, Rule 67, secs. 5 and 6 partly provide:

  SECTION 5. Ascertainment of Compensation. — Upon the rendition of the
order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first
session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time
within which their report shall be submitted to the court.

xxx xxx xxx

  SECTION 6. Proceedings by Commissioners. — . . . Evidence may be

introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to
administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall,
unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to
attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its
surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party may, by
himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the
consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the
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 owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of
its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property.
57. Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, 283 Phil. 90, 101 (1992) [Per J. Medialdea,
First Division].

58. See Republic v. Santos, 225 Phil. 29 (1986) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].
59. See Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
60. Republic v. Santos, 225 Phil. 29, 34-35 (1986) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].
61. 256 Phil. 777 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

62. 233 Phil. 313 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].

63. Id. at 814-815.

64. Republic Act No. 8424 (1997), Title I, sec. 6 (E) provides:

  SECTION 6. Power of the Commissioner to Make Assessments and Prescribe

Additional Requirements for Tax Administration and Enforcement. —
xxx xxx xxx

  (E) Authority of the Commissioner to Prescribe Real Property Values. — The

Commissioner is hereby authorized to divide the Philippines into different
zones or areas and shall, upon consultation with competent appraisers both
from the private and public sectors, determine the fair market value of real
properties located in each zone or area. For purposes of computing any
internal revenue tax, the value of the property shall be, whichever is the
higher of:

  (1) the fair market value as determined by the Commissioner; or

  (2) the fair market value as shown in the schedule of values of the Provincial
and City Assessors. (Emphasis supplied)

65. Rollo , pp. 34-35.

66. 613 Phil. 436, 472-473 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

67. Republic of the Philippines v. Far East Enterprises, Inc., 613 Phil. 436, 465
(2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
68. CONST., art. XIII, sec. 4 provides:

  SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program

founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
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 sharing.

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