Pangasinan, Inc. vs Public Service Commission (Gr. No.

47065, June 26, 1940)

FACTS:
PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is applying to
operate additional buses with the Public Service Commission (PSC) has been engaged
in transporting passengers in certain provinces by means of public transportation utility.
Patranc applied for authorization to operate 10 additional trucks. The PSC granted the
application but added several conditions for PANTRANCO’s compliance. One is that the
service can be acquired by government upon payment of the cost price less depreciation,
and that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSC can impose said conditions. If so, wouldn’t this power of the PSC
constitute undue delegation of powers?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that there was valid delegation of powers.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action at
the same time forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of
powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. But due to the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation and
the increased difficulty of administering laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation.”
All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving
the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in
addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

Belgica vs. Ochoa (710 SCRA 1, November 19, 2013)

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from
the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder,
and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials
of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition
With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied
in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress

ISSUES:
[if !supportLists]1. [endif]Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-
delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
[if !supportLists]2. [endif]Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD
116
910, relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
[if !supportLists]1. [endif]Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-
enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation
and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

[if !supportLists]2. [endif]Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared
constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY
OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR
RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was
declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY
TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO
DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A
DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND
HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE
SAME.

Facts:
Yanglay, a thirty-year old married man residing at Cavite City, after leaving the plant at
three o’clock in the afternoon of April 22, 1972, was apprehended by Patrolman E. Reyes
of the Manila Police Department outside the company compound. Yanglay was carrying
a bagful of drugs. He admitted that he was caught in possession of the said drugs which
he had bought from his coworkers and which had been given to them free of charge so
as to keep them in the “pink of health”.
At the investigation on June 27, Yanglay denied that he was trafficking illegally in drugs
of the company. He said that he bought the drugs from his coworkers in the same way
that some workers bought the rice rations of their coworkers.
On the basis of that investigation, Yanglay was dismissed on July 19, 1972. At the
meeting of the union and management panels on September 22, 1972 to thresh out

Yanglay filed a complaint with the NLRC alleging that there was no evidence to justify his
dismissal, that the truth was that he owned the medicines in question and that he was
dismissed because of his union activities.
As such, the mediator recommended Yanglay’s reinstatement with backwages, and the
NLRC adopted the same.
The San Miguel Corporation moved for the reconsideration of the decision on the ground
that it was premature because section 14 of the NLRC’s Rules and Regulations requires
that the mediator’s fact finding report be passed upon by an arbitrator. The motion was
treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Labor. However MR was denied thereafter, the
company, instituted this certiorari proceeding.
Yanglay raised a jurisdictional question which was not brought up by respondent public
officials. He contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the
NLRC and the Secretary of Labor “under the principle of separation of powers” and that
judicial review is not provided for in Presidential Decree No. 21.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court has a jurisdiction over the decision of the NLRC and the
Secretary of labor under the “Principle of Separation of powers” and judicial review is not
provided under Presidential Decree 21 (Creating a National Labor Relations Commission)
Held:
The Court has jurisdiction over the case.
It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or
legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions, It is part of
the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls
arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of
law, fraud or collusion.
The courts may declare an action or resolution of an administrative authority to be illegal
(1) because it violates or fails to comply with some mandatory provision of the law or (2)
because it is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious.
Issue:
Whether or not Yanglay’s dismissal is proper.
Held:
No. Yanglay’s dismissal is not proper.
That was the first time he was caught trafficking in company-supplied drugs. He
confessed that necessity forced him to buy the drugs. He promised not to do it again. His
impression was that, like the rice rations whose sale was tolerated by the company
officials, he could engage in the buy-and-sell of the drugs. He argued that his co-workers,
who gave or sold to him the drugs, were equally culpable in sabotaging the company’s
practice of rendering free medical assistance to its employees.
The misconduct of employees or workers in misrepresenting to the company that they
needed medicines when in fact their purpose was to sell the same should not be tolerated.
For such misrepresentations or deceptions, appropriate disciplinary action should be
taken against them. On the other hand, in view of the high cost of living and the difficulties
of supporting a family it is not surprising that members of the wage-earning class would
do anything possible to augment their small income.
Taking into account the circumstances of the case, particularly Yanglay’s initial attitude
of confessing that his error was dictated by necessity and his promise not to repeat the
same mistake, we are of the opinion that his dismissal was a drastic punishment. He
should be reinstated but without back wages because the company acted in good faith in
dismissing him. He has been sufficiently penalized by the loss of his wages from July 19,
1972 up to this time.