Belgica vs.

Executive Secretary
GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013

FACTS:
1. In 1996, the first controversy surrounding the Pork Barrel erupted with former Marikina
City Rep. Candazo blew the lid on the huge sums of gov’t money that regularly went into
the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks, in relation to the cost of public
projects.
2. In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF (Priority Dev’t
Assistance Fund) as enacted in the 2004 GAA (General Appropriations Act). However,
for lack of any pertinent evidentiary support that there was illegal misuse of PDAF
among Congress members, it was dismissed.
3. In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that the government has defrauded
around Php 10B over the past decade by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various gov’t agencies for scores of ghost projects.
4. The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of 6 whistleblowers declaring that
JLN Corporation of Janel Lim Napoles had swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs.
5. On Aug. 16, 2013, COA released the results of a 3-year audit investigation covering the
use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007-2009. Its findings showed questionable utilizations
of PDAF.
6. As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistleblowers alleged that at least Php 900M from
royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.

ISSUES:
Whether the 2013 PDAF and all other similar Congressional Pork Barrel Laws are
unconstitutional.
Whether the Presidential Pork Barrel (Malampaya Funds and Presidential Social Fund) is
likewise unconstitutional.

HELD:
Ponente – Justice Perlas-Bernabe
The questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and
the provisions allowing for their utilization are currently existing and operations; hence, there
exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners. As taxpayers, they possess the requisite
standing to question the validity of the Pork Barrel System under which the taxes they pay have
been and continue to be utilized. Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the
standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is a function
constitutionally assigned and entrusted to the Executive branch. The Legislative branch, much
more its individual members, should not exercise implementation of the nat’l budget. Upon
approval and passage of the GAA, the Congress’ law-making role stops there. Congress’ role
must be confined to mere oversight, or scrutiny and investigation. However, with PDAF,
individual legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify projects, fund
release and realignment. It has been emphasized that the power to appropriate must be exercised
only through legislation as a body.

Further, it is a constitutional infirmity for appropriations to merely provide for a singular lump-
sun amount without specifics or clear purposes. The legislator’s identification of the projects
after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on.

In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System/PDAF and all relevant
legal provisions as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it
operates. To recount, insofar as it has (1) allowed legislators to wield non-oversight, post-
enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; (2) insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation
by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power; (3) insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not
textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment
and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items; (4) insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget
execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the
system has equally impaired public accountability; (5) insofar as it has authorized legislators,
who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, (6)
insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds
under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability. The Court also ruled that all informal practices in
relation to PDAF by legislative members are deemed acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Notes:
Taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that it is wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law

4 Requisites for the Court to still decide on cases otherwise moot & academic:
1. There is grave violation of the Constitution
2. The exception character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved
3. When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review

Res judicata – “matter adjudged”; focal point is the judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if there exists an
identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action
Stare decisis – “follow past precedents”; focal point is the doctrine created, a conclusion reached
in a case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same,
even though the parties are different

Separation of powers – powers of gov’t must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers
in one branch; the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; There is a
violation if one branch unduly encroaches upon the domain of another by interfering with or
assuming another’s functions.

Exceptions to the non-delegation of legislative powers:

Supplementary rule-making – for the limited purpose of filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement
Contingent rule-making – ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation

Checks and Balances – elaborate sys’t to secure coordination in the workings of various
departments of the gov’t that have autonomy and granted discretion in the exercise of their
mandated powers, but not total independence and unrestrained authority to do the same