1. People versus Francisco Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987.

FACTS:

On July 15, 1984, Francisco Abarca (accused), who was supposedly travelling
that day to Eastern Samar but for some instances was not able to, went to his
house and caught his wife, Jenny in the act of sexual intercourse with
Khingsley Paul Koh (Khingsley). Apparently, Khingsley and Jenny had an illicit
relationship which started when Jenny was reviewing in Manila for the 1983
bar examinations. The accused ran and went to look for a firearm and
eventually acquired an M-16 rifle. He then went to his house and after finding
out that Khinglsey has fled, he looked for him and found him at the "mah-jong
session", which is the hangout place of Khinglsey. The accused fired three
times at Khinglsey and was hit and eventually died. Because of the shots fired,
the accused also injured Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying the
room adjacent to where Khingsley at.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of murder and double frustrated murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime as
charged instead of conviction under Art. 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code should be
applied in this case.
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. —

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be
exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while
the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or
shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be
entitled to the benefits of this article.
The Court ruled that the elements of Art 247 are present in this case. Art. 247
has the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and
(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter. It is true that an hour has passed between the discovery of the
accused of the act of sexual intercourse and the act of shooting and killing the
paramour, but the law does not state that the offender should have killed any
or both of them instantly thereafter. It is enough that the act of killing is
caused by the result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after the
discovery of the sexual act between his wife and his paramour. The killing
should be the direct by-product of the rage of the accused.
The Court held that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and
provide for a specific crime, but instead grants a privilege or benefit to the
accused. And since the Court ruled that Art. 27 be applied to the accused, he
cannot be held liable with the double murder charged to him for injuring
Arnold and Lina Amparado. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, presupposes
that the act done amounts to a felony. And since Art. 247 does not define a
specific crime, thus the accused is not committing a felony when he shot at
Khinglsey, Art. 48 cannot be applied in this case.
However, the Court held that the accused should still be liable for the injuries
incurred by Arnold and Lina Amparado as a result of the shooting through
negligence. Since Arnold's injuries incapacitated him for one and a half month
while Lina was placed in confinement for ten to fourteen days, the Court
convicted the accused with the crime of less serious physical injuries through
simple imprudence or negligence.

2. People versus Jesus Pacayna, Jr., G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008.

FACTS:

On Nov. 26, 2002, at around 6:30 in the morning, Jesus Paycana Jr.
(appellant), a butcher, came home from the slaughter house. For reasons
known to the appellant alone, he stabbed his wife 14 times while the latter was
preparing their children for school. Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim
and also the witness of the prosecution, said that he went to the appellant's
house upon hearing the screams of her daughter. When Tito arrived at the
house, he saw his daughter lying near the door. He stepped back upon seeing
the appellant armed. Angelina Paycana (Angelina), eldest daughter of the
appellant, also a witness to the prosecution, told Tito by the window that
appellant had held her mother's neck and stabbed her.
As a defense, the appellant claimed that it was self-defense since it was the
victim who first stabbed him. He claimed they had an altercation the night
before the incident happened because he saw a man coming from the side of
their house and his wife just stayed silent when confronted. On the morning of
the incident, he told his wife that they should live separately. On his way out
the door, the victim stabbed him but he was able to wrestle the knife from the
victim and then stabbed her.

The seven-month pregnant victim died of multiple organ failure secondary to

multiple stab wounds; including the unborn child.

The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion

HELD:
Yes. The appeal is dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.

The Court ruled that the appellant is wrong in asserting that the court erred in
not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor. For
self-defence to be properly invoked, the accused admits to the commission of
the crime. The burden of proof lies with the accused to show strong, clear and
convincing evidence that the killing is justified. The first paragraph of Article
11 of the Revised Penal Code requires, in a plea of self-defense: (1) an unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, (2) a reasonable necessity of the means
employed by the accused to prevent or repel it, and (3) the lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is
a condition sine qua non for self defense; without it, there can be no self-
defense.

The Court held that the accused failed to prove self-defense since it was belied
by the testimonies made by Tito and Angelina. Moreover, according to the
testimony of Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a defense witness who attended to the wound
of the appellant, the injuries suffered by the latter were mere superficial
wounds and are possibly self-inflicted. And lastly, the Court held that the
number of stab wounds (14 stab wounds) negates self-defense but indicates a
determined effort to kill the victim.

The Court also held that the Court of Appeals properly convicted appellant of
the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. Under the Revised
Penal Code, the crime of parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The
vital element under this crime is the relationship of the offender to the victim.
To establish their relationship as a married couple, a marriage certificate would
be the best proof, but the Court held that the testimony of the accused of being
married to the victim may be taken as admission against penal interest.

As to the distinction between the crimes of infanticide and unintentional

abortion, what is necessary in the former is that the child be born alive and be
viable, that is capable of independent existence. Whereas, the elements of
unintentional abortion are as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2)
that violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of
the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom. And since, in this case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the
appellant stabbed the victim several times, unintentional abortion was properly
applied.

3. GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, petitioner, versus SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ,
PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B.
PASCUAL, respondents, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008.

FACTS:

Spouses Pedro and Lourdes Aguirre have been the legal guardians of Larry
Aguirre since June 19, 1986 by virtue of an order of the Regional Trial Court
legalizing the same. As Larry was growing up, spouses Aguirre noticed the
former's delayed mental development. This was confirmed in 1989 through a
psychological evaluation done on Larry revealing that he is suffering from a
mild mental deficiency. On November of 2001, Dr. Juvido Agatep (Agatep), a
surgeon, was approached to perform a vasectomy on Larry, who was then 24
years old. Before performing the surgery, Agatep recommended to have Larry
submitted to a psychiatrist in order to confirm whether or not Larry can validly
give his consent to the procedure given his mental deficiency condition. Dr.
Marissa Pascual (Pascual), a psychiatrist performed the evaluation. In her
psychiatric report, she revealed that the tests performed to Larry confirmed his
previous evaluation of having a mild to moderate mental deficiency. She then
recommended, in the mentioned report, that Larry may not understand the
nature of the procedure (vasectomy) in his capacity; thus the responsibility of
decision making may be given to his parent or guardian. Upon the written
consent given by Pedro Aguirre, the bilateral vasectomy was performed on
Larry by Agatep.
On June 11, 2002, Gloria Aguirre (petitioner), Aguirre's eldest child, thus
common law sister of Larry, filed a criminal complaint against Pedro Aguirre,
Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Agatep, Pascual and several John/Jane
Does for violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, both in
relation to RA 7610.

The Assistant City Prosecutor found no probable cause and recommended for
the dismissal of the complaint. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review
before the DOJ assailing the Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor. This
was dismissed by the DOJ which prompted the filing of the petitioner of a
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition to the Court of Appeals;
which the latter also dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter
affirmed the public prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause

HELD:
No. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
The Court, in order to address the issue raised by the petitioner, assessed the
elements of the crimes of falsification and mutilation under the Revised Penal
Code. The crime of falsification under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
states:

Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified

documents. – The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts
of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Moreover, Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of the following

acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
 3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a
copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that
of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
According to the petitioner's complaint, the respondents committed falsification
of a private document for conspiring with one another in keeping Larry in the
dark about the foregoing vasectomy as the same was concealed from him; as
well as for falsely concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be suffering
from Bipolar Mood Disorder. The Court held that based from the elements
under the mentioned articles above, the criticized Psychiatric Report of Pascual
do not fall under any of the circumstances that constitute the offense of
falsification. For Pascual to be liable of falsification, his Report should have
appeared that the proposed medical procedure was explained to Larry and that
he had given his consent to the same. This could not have been the case since
the purpose of the report was to only assess whether or not Larry can validly
give his consent to the procedure and it did not mention that Larry gave his
consent given that the matter is not even under the scope of the procedure.
As to the diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre, Pascual, in her Report, merely cited
findings of her diagnosis; and the same does not constitute falsification. It was
not alleged in the report that it was Pascual who personally diagnosed Lourdes
so she cannot be liable for falsification whether such diagnosis be true or not.
Since Pascual, the maker of the report cannot be liable for falisification, it is
but logical that other respondents could not have been guilty of the same
offense. Thus the Court ruled that the public prosecutor has merit in not
finding probable cause in the complaint.
As to the crime of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 262. Mutilation. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally
 mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some
essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in
its medium and maximum periods.
The Court agreed with the findings of the public prosecutor that the
respondents cannot be charged with the crime of mutilation because bilateral
vasectomy procedure does not fall under the elements of the crime. Mutilation
entails intentionally depriving another, either totally or partially, of some
essential organ for reproduction. In the mentioned procedure, it may,
undeniably deprive him of his power of reproduction; but still no organ was
removed from Larry; thus not depriving him of his reproductive organ for such
organ is indeed will still be physically attached to him after the procedure.