1. JESUS C. GARCIA versus THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T.

DRILON,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.

FACTS:

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (respondent) filed a verified petition with Civil Case No.
06-797 for herself and in behalf of her minor children for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against Jesus Garcia (petitioner), her
husband pursuant to RA. 9262; claiming to be physically, emotionally,
psychologically abused. Also, she claims to be a victim of economic abuse
because of petitioner's infidelity. Finding reasonable ground, the RTC issued a
TPO on March 24, 2006 effective for 30 days. Upon motion of the respondent,
the amended TPO was granted and was further extended when the petitioner
failed to comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO.

While Civil Case No. 06-797 was pending, the petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition before the CA challenging the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clause and the validity of the
modified TPO.

CA dismissed the petition for failure to raise the constitutional issue in his trial
court in the civil case.

ISSUE(s):

I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the reason

that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity
II. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause
III. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter
to the due process clause of the Constitution
IV. Whether or not RA 9262 is invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay officials

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: The Court held that the petitioner should have raised the issue
of constitutionality at the earliest opportunity and his argument that he failed
to do so because family courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
with issue of constitutionality is not proper. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. Family courts are
special courts of the same level as Regional Trial Courts, thus it still possesses
the authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds
of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is also possessed with
the authority to hear and determine issues of constitutionality as embraced in
the general definition of judicial power to determine what the valid and binding
laws are by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law as vested
by the Constitution.

SECOND ISSUE: No. The Court ruled that RA 9262 does not violate the equal
protection clause under the Constitution. Equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed; and not a guaranty of equality in
the application of laws upon all citizens. All that is required is that the
classification be reasonable; that it should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class. And as to RA 9262, the Court held
that it is not violative of equal protection clause for favouring women over men
since it is based on valid classification and rests on substantial distinctions.
Traditions, history, and studies show the unequal power relationship between
men and women; that the latter are the usual and most likely victim of
violence.

THIRD ISSUE: The Court held that RA. 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The petitioner specifically assails the issuance of the
Protective Orders (PO) as violative of the due process clause since it stripped
away from the husband his life, job, property, etc without allowing him any
opportunity to respond. The Court held that in cases of VAMC, time is of the
essence for what is in line is the safety of persons especially children from any
form or risk of violence they may incur. It was stressed that ordinary
requirements for procedural due process shall yield to the necessities of
protecting life.

FOURTH ISSUE: There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay

officials. The duty of the Barangay to issue Barangay Protection Orders (BPO)
is purely executive in nature pursuant to its function to enforce all laws and
ordinances and to maintain public order in the barangay as provided for under
the Local Government Code. Specifically, the Barangay merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
and (b) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.

2. People versus Marivic Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004.
FACTS:

Marivic Genosa (appellant) was charged with the crime of parricide in Crim.
Case No. 5016-0 with the aggravating circumstance of treachery for wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacking, hitting and wounding, thereby killing her
husband Ben Genosa (Ben) with the use of a hard deadly weapon.

Marivic and Ben were married in Ormoc City on November 19, 1983. Their
marriage was doing good in their first year of marriage; but got sour as the
years pass on. The couple would quarrel often which eventually turned into
violent ones. Ben, a habitual drinker, in their fights would provoke her, slap
her, pin her down to the bed and beat her. In those times, Marivic would run to
her parents. She tried to leave her husband at least five times but Ben would
always go after her and eventually reconcile.

Marivic, at that time the killing happened, was eight months pregnant. They
got into an argument where Ben beat her earlier that night. She was able to
run to her child's bedroom and hide. After some time, Marivic went to their
bedroom and saw Ben sleeping. Frightened that Ben would hurt her and her
unborn baby, she admitted to have killed Ben, while being asleep, with the use
of a gun.

The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of
parricide with treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance.

ISSUE(s):
I. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding as a fact that Ben and
Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore liable
for parricide
II. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the cause of death to be
by beating with a pipe
III. Whether or not the appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of
her fetus
IV. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No. The Court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben and the
appellant were legally married despite the absence of the presentation of a
marriage contract. Based from previous jurisprudence, a marriage certificate is
indeed the best proof, but absence thereof, oral evidence of the fact of marriage
may be considered if the same is not objected to. In this case, the mother and
brother of the victim attested in court of the fact of marriage of Ben and the
appellant. The appellant herself, made a judicial admission of her marriage to
Ben. Also, the defense presented no proof that such admission was made
through a palpable mistake.

SECOND ISSUE: No. The Court did not err in finding the cause of death to be
by beating with a pipe because the specific cause of death is immaterial and
has no legal consequence. What is material is the fact of killing of her husband
which was admitted by the accused. Cause of death is dispositive of the guilt or
defense of the appellant.

THIRD ISSUE: No. The Court ruled in the negative.

In invoking self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to
the defense. The defense raised the theory of the battered wife syndrome (BWS)
in claiming self-defense. A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who
is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a
man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern
for her rights" and one is considered a battered woman if she goes through the
battering cycle at least twice.

In this case, the Court ruled that the defense failed to prove that the appellant,
based from the presented evidence, became afflicted with the battered wife
syndrome because of the absence of the essential characteristics and all three
phases of the cycle of violence of the syndrome manifested by the appellant.
The Court held that indeed there were acute battering incidents and such
served as the tension-building phase of the cycle, however the defense failed to
prove that the appellant had gone through at least another battering episode,
in a similar pattern, in the past. A woman, to be considered as a battered one
should go through the battering cycle at least twice.

As to BWS as self-defense, what is essential is the state of mind of the battered

woman at the time of the offense; that she must have actually feared imminent
harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to
save her life. In this case, the Court believed that the time when Ben was
killed, he no longer pose a threat to the appellant since there has already been
a sufficient time interval between the actual physical assault and at the time of
the killing. The appellant has escaped the violence of the abuser and was able
to hide in her children's bedroom. Ben did not pursue her that time, unlike on
previous incidents. Hence, unlawful aggression, which is an important element
in self-defense, is not present in this case; and absence of the same, self-
defense cannot be invoked.

FOURTH ISSUE: No. Treachery was not attended in the killing of Ben.
Treachery is present if the offender, in committing any of the crimes against
persons, employed means or methods that pose no risk to oneself arising from
the defense that the offended party might take. In this case, the prosecution's
evidence is not sufficient in proving that the method of assault used by the
appellant was deliberately chosen in order for her to accomplish the act of
killing without any threat from any defense that the victim might employ.