CASES DIGESTs #2

GR NO. 128827
1. G.R. No. 128827 August 18, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO CAYAGO y REYES,
Accused-appellant.

FACTS

For killing his own wife through strangulation and with evident premeditation, appellant was indicted for parricide.
He was tried and subsequently sentenced to die and ordered to pay damages to the victim's heirs. The lower court
judge, after making a twelve page summary of the testimonies of the witnesses, arrived at a conclusion that appellant
is guilty of parricide, in just one short paragraph, which reads:

Culled from the evidence on record are the following facts which was condensed in the Appellee's Brief, to wit: At
about 1:25 o'clock in the afternoon of August 2, 1995, SPO2 Belino Zinampan, Jr. was at the police headquarters at
Pasig City where he received the report of Rolando Cayago that he saw the decomposing body of his wife at the
abandoned barangay hall of Santolan, Pasig City. Zinampan, SPO2 Antonio Paulite, a police photographer and
Cayago proceeded to the said abandoned barangay hall to verify the report. Thereat, the group saw the dead and
decomposing body of a woman. Zinampan requested Cayago to identify the body and on recognizing the shoes worn
by the deceased, let out a loud cry and thereafter lost consciousness for about five minutes. Thereafter, Cayago, in
answer to Zinampan's question, answered that he does not know who killed his wife. Zinampan and Cayago then
returned to the police headquarters where the latter's statement was taken by the former.

On August 3, 1995, when Cayago was about to be brought to Camp Crame for a polygraph test, he requested
permission to go to the nearby church. Cayago requested that he be accompanied by SPO2 Delos Reyes, who
agreed. Thereat, Cayago admitted to SPO2 Delos Reyes that he killed his wife Myra Cayago and was willing to give
his statement relative to said killing. SPO2 Delos Reyes and Cayago returned to the police station and upon such
information, Sr. Inspector Pajota instructed Zinampan to secure a lawyer to assist Cayago. Zinampan then requested
Atty. Reynario Campanilla, who agreed to assist Cayago. Atty. Campanilla conferred with Cayago at the Office of
the Investigation Division. After apprising Cayago of his constitutional rights, Cayago admitted that he killed his
wife. Atty. Campanilla then advised Cayago to personally write down his confession which Cayago did for about an
hour in the presence of Atty. Campanilla. Thereafter, with the aid of a tape recorder, requested Cayago to read his
admission. After informing Cayago of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination, SPO2 Delos Reyes started
taking down Cayago's extra-judicial confession again in the presence of Atty. Campanilla and who signed said
statement together with Cayago.

The gravamen of the felony of parricide is the killing of any of the persons enumerated in Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Its elements are:

1. a person is killed;
2. the deceased is killed by the accused;
3. The deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant
or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

In the case at bar, it is clear that appellant strangulated his wife resulting to her death. This is supported by
appellant's own testimony, his confession to the police and the medical findings corroborating that she died of
asphyxia by strangulation. In his testimony, appellant claims that he embraced his wife so tight but did not notice
she had stopped breathing due to the tightness of the embrace. If it were true, however, that his intention of
embracing her was to stop her from pushing him, he would have wrapped his arms around her body including her
hands. Yet the medical findings revealed injuries on the neck which is shown by the presence of fracture on the
victim's windpipe and hemorrhage inside the windpipe. The examining physician explained his findings on the
victim's cadaver which was already in an advanced state of decomposition at the time it was recovered two (2) days
after the killing. He admitted that in an attempt to confuse authorities as to the true cause of his wife's death,
appellant removed all her clothing including her panty and bra to make it appear that she was raped. This shows the
probability that the victim sustained injuries in her vaginal opening and lacerations in her uterus, as found in the
autopsy report.

There is no question that the victim is appellant's lawful spouse. They were married before a judge in San Carlos
City, Pangasinan on April 18, 1991 as shown by their marriage contract. A marriage certificate/contract is the best
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased in cases of parricide of a spouse. In appellant's
testimony, he referred to the deceased as his wife. This constitutes a declaration of a party as to a relevant fact which
may be given in evidence against him pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES

1. Whether the lower court judge, in imposing the death penalty, failed to mention his basis for imposing the
higher penalty, which violates the constitutional, requirement, reiterated in the Rules of Court, that every
decision must distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based?
2. Whether the trial judge failed to award the civil indemnity in his judgment of conviction?
3. Whether the appellant’s contention that the statement he gave to the police is inadmissible in evidence because
it was given without affording him the right counsel guaranteed by the Constitution has no merit?
4. Whether the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place, the appellant obviously sought the
time and place of the incident?
RULINGS

Parricide is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. The higher penalty of death may be imposed only if there is
an aggravating circumstance that concurs in the commission of the crime. Yet, the lower court judge, in imposing
the death penalty, did not mention his basis for imposing the higher penalty. This violates the constitutional,
requirement, reiterated in the Rules of Court, that every decision must distinctly state the facts and the law on which
it is based. When the decision of the trial court does not state the specific factual bases for the conclusion of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt reached therein but merely makes sweeping generalizations, the same does not strictly
follow the standards set by the rules of criminal procedure.

Further, the trial judge's failure to award the civil indemnity in his judgment of conviction all more confirms his
nonchalant attitude to the mandate of Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which states: If it is of
conviction, the judgment shall state

(a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any;
(b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact;
(c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
(d) The civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or
waived.

A strict compliance with the mandate of the said provision is imperative in the writing of every decision. Otherwise,
the rule would simply become a tool for speculations, which this Court will not countenance specially in criminal
cases involving the possible deprivation of human life.

Appellant’s contention that the statement he gave to the police is inadmissible in evidence because it was given
without affording him the right counsel guaranteed by the Constitution has no merit. It is undisputed that appellant
was not arrested because the authorities were not yet aware of the crime. It was he himself who reported the incident
to the police after he went to the abandoned barangay hall two days later and discovered that his wife's body was
still there. Appellant himself admitted that since he did not know what to do after seeing his wife's relatives whom
he feared for reprisal, he decided to report the matter to the Pasig police.

The right to counsel is afforded by Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution only to "person(s) under
investigation for the commission of an offense." After appellant admitted to the police officer that he killed his wife,
the officer told him that he will be provided with a lawyer to assist him. In any case, during the subsequent events —
the investigation in the precinct — appellant was assisted by a lawyer, namely, Atty. Campanilla. At the trial, the
latter testified that he talked to appellant, advised him of his constitutional rights and was present when the latter
wrote his extrajudicial statement admitting that he killed his wife.

On the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place, the Solicitor-General posits that appellant
obviously sought the time and place of the incident, which was about midnight in an abandoned barangay hall in
Santolan, Pasig City, to consummate the crime, thus, justifying the imposition of the death penalty. However,
nocturnity is not aggravating when other than the time, there is nothing in the record and even in the testimonies of
the witnesses from which it may be inferred, whether directly or indirectly, that appellant particularly took
advantage of the darkness of the night to facilitate his criminal design. Likewise, uninhabited place cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance when there is no proof that "the place of commission affords a
reasonable possibility for the victim to receive some help." All that was mentioned is that both appellant and his
wife went to his aunt at about 11 o'clock in the evening to borrow money, but was ashamed to wake her up because
it was already too late in the night. Unable to get money, the victim started pushing the appellant asking him to
produce money. He invited her to the abandoned barangay hall to talk. There she kept on pushing him. He embraced
her so tight that she suddenly died. The foregoing may prove that he indeed killed her, but it does not in any case
show that he purposely sought the night and the place to kill her.

Aggravating circumstances must be established with the same quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt as fully as
the crime itself and any doubt as to their existence must be resolved in favor of then accused. The Court fails to see
any logical connection in the Solicitor-General's argument that appellant's reporting that his wife was missing to the
police the next day strengthens the view that the two aggravating circumstances concurred in the killing. Such
reporting may have been done to divert attention from his culpability and create in the mind of the authorities a
doubt as to why he would report a missing wife when all the while he knew where she was, but certainly not to show
that he took advantage of nighttime and the uninhabited place.

Accordingly, the Court does not agree with the trial court's imposition of the death penalty and the Solicitor
General's recommendation for its affirmance. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty
provided for by the law are two indivisible penalties and there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
the lower penalty shall be imposed. Forthwith, the death penalty imposed by the court a quo must be reduced to the
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As for the civil aspect, the judgment of civil liability in favor of the heirs of the deceased is in consonance with
Article 100 of the RPC which provides that "Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable." The award of the
civil indemnity for cases not calling for the application of the death penalty is fixed by current jurisprudence at
P50,000.00, no other proof is necessary other than the fact of the death of the victim and the accused's responsibility
therefor. Moral damages can be awarded only when the same is supported by evidence in the records. There is
nothing in the testimony of the victim's sister showing that she or her heirs are entitled to that damages.

WHEREFORE, appellant's conviction for parricide is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the penalty
is reduced to reclusion perpetua. He is also ORDERED TO PAY P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the children of the
victim, in addition to the award of P26,000.00 as actual damages. The award of moral damages is deleted for lack of
evidence. SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. L-46310. October 31, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCIANO GONZALES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Eduvigio E. Antona; for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Zulueta; for Appellee.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; HUSBAND WHO DID NOT SURPRISE HIS WIFE IN THE VERY ACT
OF ADULTERY, BUT THEREAFTER; PARRICIDE. — Even if the accused caught his wife rising up and I.
already standing and buttoning his drawers, the accused cannot invoke the privilege of article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code, because he did not surprise the supposed offenders in the very act of committing adultery, but
thereafter, if the respective positions of the woman and the man were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they
had committed the carnal act. (3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 96; People VS. Marquez, 53 Phil., 260.)

FACTS

Marciano Gonzales appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas which found him guilty of
parricide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with is the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Sixta Quilason, in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

At the trial, the appellant testified that at midday on June 2, 1938, on returning to his house from the woods, he
surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act of adultery, the latter having escaped by jumping
through the door of the house. He scolded his wife for such act, told her that the man was the very one who used to
ask rice and food from them, and counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife, promised him not to
do the act again. Thereafter — the accused continued testifying — he left the house and went towards the South to
see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house at about five o’clock in the afternoon, and not finding his wife there,
he looked for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a place covered with underbush. When he
saw them, his wife was rising up, while Isabelo, who was standing and buttoning his drawers, immediately took to
his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake him, he returned to where his wife was and,
completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and
took her dead body to his house.

ISSUES

Whether the appellant’s contention that, having surprised his wife, in the afternoon of the date in question, under
circumstances indicative that she had carnal intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to the privilege afforded by
article 247 of the Revised Penal Code providing: "Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill either of them or both of them in the actor
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro?

RULINGS

The Court did not believe that the accused can avail himself of the aforesaid article, because the privilege there
granted is conditioned on the requirement that the spouse surprise the husband or the wife in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, the accused did not surprise his wife in the very act of carnal intercourse, but
after the act, if any such there was, because from the fact that she was rising up and the man was buttoning his
drawers, it does not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had committed the carnal act.

It cannot, therefore, be entirely accepted the defense sought to be established by the accused: First, because his
testimony is improbable. It is not conceivable that the accused had only mildly counseled his wife not to repeat
committing adultery with Isabelo, instead of taking harsher measures as is natural in such circumstances. If it were
true that he had surprised the two offenders in the act of adultery on returning to his house at midday on the date in
question. Neither is it likely that a woman thirty years of age, like Sixta Quilason, and twenty-five-year-old Isabelo
Evangelio, both of sound judgment as is to be supposed, had dared to have carnal intercourse near the toilet of the
offended party’s house, a place which is naturally frequented by some persons. The circumstance that the place was
covered by weeds, does not authorize the conclusion that the offenders could lay concealed under the weeds because
the latter do not usually grow to such height as to conceal or cover two persons committing the guilty act. It seems
that under the circumstances it is unnatural that they would execute the act in a place uncovered and open. It was not
supposed that the sexual passion of two persons would border on madness. Secondly, because even assuming that
the accused caught his wife rising up and Isabelo already standing and buttoning his drawers, the accused cannot
invoke the privilege of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did not surprise the supposed offenders in
the very act of committing adultery, but thereafter, if the respective positions of the woman and the man were
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they had committed the carnal act. (3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 96; People v.
Marquez, 53 Phil., 260).

Taking into account the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention on the part of the accused to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed upon the person of the deceased, and of his lack of instruction, the appealed judgment is
modified, and the accused is sentenced to the penalty of twelve years and one day to twenty years of reclusion
temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, with the costs. So ordered.