A.

HOMICIDE
PEOPLE vs. CASAS
People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Casas y Vintulan
G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015

FACTS:

The accused Casas went to a certain taho factory looking for a certain Jesus. Failing to find Jesus, he
brandished a knife and stuck it into a pail used for making taho.
As a result, Eligio, an employee of the factory confronted Casas and told him to get rid of the knife.
Thereafter, Eligio and Casas had a fistfight. Consequently, Casas was able to regain the knife
and stabbed Eligio twice while the latter was fleeing. While Casas was in pursuit of Eligio, he ran into Joel
who tried to help Eligio with the use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped and lay prostrate on the
floor. There and then, Casas stabbed him twice who eventually died.
Accused-appellant interpose self-defense to justify his actions of stabbing both Joel and Eligio alleging
that Joel challenged him to a fight and that he stabbed Eligio to protect himself.

ISSUE:

Is the conviction of Casas for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide proper?

RULING:

YES and NO. The Court affirmed the accused-appellant’s conviction of Attempted Homicide but found
the charge of Murder improper. The accused should only be guilty of the crime of Homicide on the
killing of Joel.

The Court first rules on the existence of criminal liability. There can be no self-defense unless the victim
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. It was Casas who was
actually the aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel
as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing.

The Court, however, disagrees that Casas should be convicted of the crime of Murder with respect to
the death of Joel due to the prosecution’s failure to prove the existence of treachery. The essence of
treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest
provocation on the latter’s part.

Hence, Accused-appellant Casas was charged with the crime of Murder and Attempted Homicide under
Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC and the CA

convicted him of the crimes charged.

B. MURDER

HILARIO B. ALILING, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 230991, SECOND DIVISION, June 11, 2018, Caguioa, J.

FACTS:

Jerry Tumbagan y Marasigan (private complainant) testified that at around 10:00 pm, when he was
about to board his motorcycle, he was shot at the back and when he looked back, he recognized
accused Hilario Aliling (accused) as the one firing. Jesus Marasigan y Camson, uncle of private
complainant, testified that he saw the latter ride his motorcycle and then suddenly, accused Hilario
Aliling arrived and fired twice at the private complainant.
For the defense, on the other hand, accused testified that on April 18, 2010, they were campaigning for
a certain Apacible. According to the accused, they finished campaigning at around 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of the same day and waited for the start of the miting de avance. They left the miting de avance
at around 12:00 midnight and proceeded to the house of Annie, their coordinator, at Barangay
Matingain and arrived there at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning. Thereafter, he took his motorcycle
and went home. The accused arrived at his house at around 1:30 o'clock. His testimony was
corroborated by Adrian Carl Atienza who testified that on April 18, 2010, from 8:00 o'clock in the
morning up to 1:00 o'clock of the following day, he was with the accused, together with several others,
at Barangay Masalisi, and Michael Perez Bathan who testified that he heard gunshots and saw private
complainant run and fall to the ground but did not see the accused when the shooting happened and
instead saw an unidentified gunman.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of frustrated murder. (NO)

RULING:
In criminal prosecutions, a person who stands charged of a crime enjoys the presumption of innocence,
as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. He is designated as the accused precisely because the allegations
against him have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Positive testimony is generally given more
weight than the defenses of denial and alibi which are held to be inherently weak defenses because they
can be easily fabricated. However, the defenses of denial and alibi should not be so easily dismissed by
the Court as untrue. While, indeed, the defense of denial or alibi can be easily fabricated, the same can
be said of untruthful accusations, in that they can be as easily concocted.

Therefore, the inconsistency in the statements of the prosecution witnesses on material points
significantly erodes the credibility of their testimonies, juxtaposed against the forthright and consistent
testimonies of the defense witnesses. With the probative value of the prosecution witnesses' testimony
greatly diminished, the alibi of the accused is given credence. In the instant case, the prosecution failed
to overcome the burden of proving the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acquittal, therefore, is
in order.
C. PARRICIDE

People vs. Brusola (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABENIR BRUSOLA

G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017

LEONEN, J.:

Facts: In the Information, appellant Abenir was charged with the killing of his wife, Delia Brusola as
follows, that accused, being the husband of DELIA BRUSOLA, with intent to kill and with the use of ball
hammer, feloniously hit his said wife, with the said ball hammer on her head, thereby causing fatal
injury to the latter which directly caused her death.

For his defense, appellant claimed that on the night of the incident, Abenir came home. While he was
preparing things, Delia went outside. She appeared to be waiting for somebody. After taking a bath, she
fixed her face. When Abenir asked if Delia was going somewhere, she said it was none of his business.
Abenir went to the bathroom for his personal effects. While inside, he heard people talking outside and
looked out through a crack in the plywood wall. He saw a man and a woman kiss and identified the
woman as Delia, who told the man, "Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan pa siya." The man embraced her,
and groped her breast and private parts. Abenir picked up the maso, went outside, and approached
them, who were surprised to see him. Abenir attacked the man who used Delia as a shield and pushed
her toward Abenir. He asserted that he planned to attack the man whom he saw was with his wife but
accidentally hit Delia instead.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of parricide.

Ruling: Yes. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide.

Here, there was no dispute as to the relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim. As for
the act of killing, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that she suddenly saw her father hit the head of
her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's straightforward and candid narration of the incident is
regarded as positive and credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused.

D. INFANTICIDE

EN BANC

G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSEFINA BANDIAN, Defendant-
Appellant.

Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

Facts:

At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw
the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of
nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes
later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front
and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid
and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house
and placed her in her own bed.

Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno,
president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and
found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the
bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the
appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the
thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had
theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with whom she had
previously had amorous relations.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant is guilty of infanticide.

Ruling:

Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the
corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said
sentence alleging that the trial court erred:

I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had
thrown away her newborn babe, and chanrobles virtual law library

II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion
perpetua, with costs.

E. RAPE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEJANDRO VIOLEJA Y ASARTIN

G.R. No. 177140, October 17, 2012

Ponente: Leonardo- De Castro

Facts:

Version of the Prosecution: The trial court found Alejandro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Statutory Rape as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the RPC. The rape involved in this case was
committed before the amendment of Art. 335 of the RPC by R.A. No. 8353 or the Anti- Rape Law of
1997. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. Evidence of the prosecution
shows that private complainant Vea was only 10 years old when the incident took place. Accused was
the common law husband of the mother of Vea. The victim narrated that appellant forced to insert her
penis to her vagina and sometimes appellant entered the room and instructed Vea to suck on his penis.
It was also recalled by the victim that every time her mother is leaving the house for town accused
would enter their room and have carnal knowledge with her. Accused appellant however admitted to
the mother that he repeatedly molested her child. From then Vea run away from home, after which the
victim and her mother lodged a complaint to the barangay and police authorities. Victim was examined
by Dr. Pang and testified that there are indeed lacerations.

Version of the defense: Appellant invoke alibi in his defense. Instead he testified that he once saw a man
on top of Vel, Vea’s mother and saw Vea playing outside the house with his kids and that near Vea was a
naked man lying down face and because of the incident he saw he turned away from home. And when
he decided to go home he was arrested and mauled by Barangay official causing his consciousness and it
was only in the municipal jail that he had regained the same.

Despite the trial court convicted him of the crime charged.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in not giving credence to the accused defense of alibi and in giving
credence to the testimonies of the Prosecution’s witnesses.

Ruling:

No. Since it is a settled jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused maybe convicted solely
on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature
and the normal course of things. The court affirms the ruling of the lower courts that the elements of
rape are indeed present in the case at bar. The victims clear and credible testimony coupled with the
corroboration made by the medical findings of Dr. Pangs point positively to the conclusion that
appellant indeed committed the crime of rape attributed to him. The defense of alibi is not likewise
proper because he must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission
of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within the
immediate vicinity. Appellant failed to established to established the distance between the corn
plantation where he is working and the house where the rape occurred.

F. DEATH UNDER TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY

DEATH CAUSED IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY (ART. 251)PEOPLE vs. UNLAGADA (G.R. NO. 141080)

Facts:

ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE alias ” Lapad " was charged and subsequentlyconvicted by thecourta
quoand sentenced toreclusion perpetuaand ordered to pay the heirsof thevictim P100,000.00 as moral
damages,P50,000.00 as temperate damages, andanotherP50,000.00 as exemplary damages.In the
evening Danilo Laurel left his house togetherwithEdwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a
public dance at Rizal St., Mag-asawangTaytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or
around 11:00 o'clockthatevening, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to
theirpersonalnecessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink andbought
two(2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.Not long after, Danilo, halfway onhis first bottle, left
to look for a place to relievehim. According to Edwin, he was only aboutthree (3) meters from Danilo
who was relievinghimself when a short, dark bearded manwalked past him, approached Danilo and
stabbed himat the side. Danilo retaliated by strikinghis assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost
simulitaneously, a group of mennumbering about seven, ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted
weapons, i.e., bamboopoles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who waspetrified, could only watch
helplessly asDanilo was being mauled and overpowered by hisassailants. Danilo fell to the ground and
diedbefore he could be given any medical assistance.

Issue:

Whether the testimony of prosecution witness was credible; andWhether the lowercourt is right in
convicting the accused of murder qualified by treachery andnot death in atumultuous affray.

Ruling:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, notcomposinggroups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each otherreciprocally,quarrel and
assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in thecourse of theaffray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed thedeceased, but theperson or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified,such person orpersons shall be punished byprision
mayor. Verily, the attack was qualified bytreachery. Thedeceased was relieving himself, fully unaware of
any danger to his person whensuddenly theaccused walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the
victim and stabbedhim at theside. There was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the attack
wascompletely withoutwarning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put upany
defense. Thepenalty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Codeisreclusiontemporal in
itsmaximum period to death. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance,the penaltyshould be
imposed in its medium period which, as correctly imposed by the court aquo, isreclusion perpetua.

G. DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 97961. September 5, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIMMY TALISIC y VILLAMOR, Accused-Appellant.

Testifying for his defense, accused-appellant declared that between the hours of 3:00 and 4:00 in the
early morning of May 8, 1988, she (sic) was requested by his wife to fetch water from a well as they had
earlier (planned) to go to the city together. As requested, he then fetched water from a well about 200
meters away from their house which took him about 30 minutes to do so. When he came back from the
well and while climbing up the stairs, he was surprised to see a man lying on top of his wife. He tried to
draw his bolo and stabbed the man who, however, was able to run away. He tried to run after him but
did not overtake him. He came back to their house but only to be met by a stabbing thrust from his wife
using a chisel. He was not hit as he was able to parry the blow, thus prompting him to grab the chisel
from his wife. He lost his temper and stabbed her to death.

Issue

In his brief, appellant contends:

The trial court erred in not finding that accused-appellant had killed his wife under exceptional
circumstances and in not applying the provision of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

The crucial question in this appeal is whether the totality of the evidence presented before the trial
court justifies the application of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Courts Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Applicability of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code

However, he argues that he killed his wife under the exceptional circumstance provided in Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person
who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall
kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment there is no penalty imposed.11 Article 247 is an example of an absolutory cause. Explaining
the rationale for this, the Court held:

H. ABORTION
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 4795. November 23, 1908. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIANO BOSTON, Defendant-Appellant.

Ortigas & Fisher, for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Harvey, for Appellee.

1. ABORTION; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. — Held, That the facts proven by the prosecution and set out in
the decision constitute prima facie proof of the guilt of the defendant, and that, the defendant having
failed to controvert or satisfactorily explain these facts, he was properly convicted of the crime with
which he was charged.

The accused in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan of the
crime of abortion as defined and penalized in paragraph 3 of article 410 of the Penal Code.

The guilt of appellant is conclusively established by the evidence of record, the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution leaving no room for reasonable doubt, despite the fact that there are
some inconsistencies and discrepancies in their statements. Counsel for appellant insists that the
evidence does not conclusively establish the fact that he intentionally caused the abortion, because
there is no evidence in the record disclosing the character and medicinal qualities of the potion which
the accused gave to the mother whose child was aborted. The evidence clearly discloses that the child
was born three months in advance of the full period of gestation; that the appellant, either believing or
pretending to believe that the child in the womb of the woman was a sort of a fish-demon (which he
called a balat), gave to her a potion composed of herbs, for the purpose of relieving her of this alleged
fish-demon; that two hours thereafter she gave premature birth to a child, having been taken with the
pains of child birth almost immediately after drinking the herb potion given her by the appellant; that
after the birth of the child the appellant, still believing or pretending to believe that the child as a fish-
demon which had taken upon itself human form, with the permission and aid of the husband and the
brother of the infant child, destroyed it by fire in order to prevent its doing the mischief which the
appellant believed or affected to believe it was capable o f doing. These facts constitute, in our opinion,
prima facie proof of the intent of the accused in giving the herb potion to the mother of the child, and
also of the further fact that the herb potion so administered to her was the cause of its premature birth.
The defense wholly failed to rebut this testimony of the prosecution and we are of opinion, therefore,
that the trial court properly found the defendant guilty of the crime with which he was charged beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The sentence imposed is in strict accord with the penalty provided by the code, and should be and is
hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. So ordered.