MOISES, CHELLEA DHANE O.

BSC-3E

U.S. v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 9, 1910 (Mistake of Fact)

Facts: The defendant Ah Chong worked as a cook in Rizal with his roommate Pascual Gualberta, who is
also a house boy. The two of them were joined a room with a door without a permanent lock, as a security
measure they just put a small hook and a small chair obstructing the door. Because of many reporting
robberies at their workplace, Ah chong hid a knife under his pillow for personal protection. Ah Chong
and Pascual discussed that whoever goes home to them should knock first and introduce themselves
before entering the room. Around 10 pm, Ah Chong who was sleeping woke up because someone is
trying to open the door. Twice he called whoever it was but no one answered. Fearing that the intruder
was a thief, Ah Chong warned and said that "When you enter the room, I will kill you. Because of
confusion and the darkness, Ah chong thought that the chair hit him because someone was trying to open
the door. He quickly took the knife under his pillow and stabbed the said intruder and Ah chong didn't
think that it was Pascual who was pranking. He hurriedly called his boss and ran back to his room to get
bandages and help Pascual in his wounds.

Issue: Whether the defendant by reason of mistake of facts is criminally liable.

Ruling: No. The Court held that there is no criminal liability when one commits an offense or act due to
ignorance of facts provided that it was not due to negligence or bad faith. Such ignorance of the fact is
sufficient to negative the particular intent which under the law, is an essential element to the crime of
murder charged cancels the presumption of intent and works for an acquittal. In the case, the defendant
struck the fatal blow on the belief that the intruder was a robber, on which his life and property was in
danger. It is clear that he acted in good faith without negligence and without any criminal intent in
exercising his right to self-defense. There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. The
author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various
crimes and misdemeanors. It is a principle that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without
which it cannot exist. In other words, punishment is the sequence of wickedness, without which it cannot
be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or moral sentiment would any people in any
age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. This doctrine confirmed by the
maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea in which the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his
intention were so. Thus, the Court held that the defendant should be acquitted.
People vs. Bayambao, G.R. No. 29481, October 3, 1928 (Mistake of Fact)

Facts: Pambaya Bayambao was charged with the crime of murder, was found guilty thereof by the Court
of First Instance of Lanao and sentenced to twenty years cadena temporal the accessories of law, costs
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000. He did not claim responsibility for the
deceased's death. He admitted he did it by accident, mistaking the malefactor who attacked him in the
dark. He claimed that while his wife was cooking, she shouted and call him because someone has thrown
a stone at their house. As a result, he grabbed his handgun and went down. Pambaya was ready to go
upstairs after going beneath the house and around but seeing no one when he heard a disturbance and saw
a black figure run at him with his fists raised as if to attack him. Pambaya was frightened and fired at it.
He didn't have time to yell, so he shot him, fearing a kampilan or dagger that will attack him. His wife
screamed that there were evildoers below, he assumed his brother-in-law was an outlaw considering
that here are many outlaws in the area, and they dislike Pambaya because he helps the government collect
taxes.

Morid, the victim's wife, told a different story of what happened. She stated that the accused questioned
the deceased if the chickens there belonged to him, and that the latter urged the appellant to shine his light
there in order to gather all the hens together, and that the appellant shot the deceased at that time. Morid
looked through the open door to see what had happened. She also overheard the deceased informing
Pambaya that he had been injured. She confronted Pambaya, telling him he had done wrong and
questioning why he had shot her husband; however, the appellat turned on her, ordering her to shut up or
he would shoot her as well.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of murder.

Ruling: No. Morid, the deceased's widow, is the only witness who can testify to these facts. Her claim is
uncorroborated. Constabulary Lieutenant Cramer, who arrived at the scene a few moments before said
justice of the peace, affirms that the deceased could no longer speak. As a result, he couldn't possibly
have made the purported statement. Of course, it looks like Urunaga, rather than the deceased, wrote it on
a typewriter. It does not appear that the dead read it or had it read to him, nor does it appear that he
acknowledged it as his own declaration. This proof of identity is required for an ante-mortem declaration
to be admissible as evidence.

The accused, on the other hand, appears to be telling the truth. And because it is corroborated not only by
his wife's testimony, but also on some points by Lieutenant Cramer and Sergeant Tumindog, to the effect
that the accused went to the commanding officer of the place immediately after the occurrence to give an
account of the incident and to request prompt medical help for his unknowingly victim, it cannot help but
produce in the mind a conviction that what happened to the unfortunate Mangutara was an accident
without fault or guilt on the part of the herein appellant.
The appellant, on that occasion, acted from the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an ill that is at least
equal in gravity, believing that the deceased was a malefactor who attacked him with a dagger in hand,
and for this reason, he is exempt from criminal liability.

Furthermore, his ignorance or error of fact was not related to negligence or bad faith, which invalidates
the presumption of malice in the act of murder. The appealed judgment is revoked, and the appellant is
acquitted.
People vs. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990 (Frustrated Rape)

Facts: In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates
had just brought her home from a party. Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of
her boarding house. All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then
recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder.

His left arm was wrapped around her neck, and his right hand was thrusting the Batangas knife into her
neck as she was pulled inside the house up the stairs. He pulled her inside her room and she smacked her
head against the wall. He stripped right away, still holding the knife in one hand, and told her to do the
same. He then mounted her after ordering her to lie down on the floor. While still probing her with the
knife, he asked her to hold his penis and insert it into her vagina.
She followed, but in such a position, the appellant was unable to fully penetrate her. He then lay down on
his back and demanded that she mount him, but he was unable to fully penetrate her. The complainant
escaped naked while Orita's hands were lying flat on the floor. As appellant pursued her, she went from
room to room until she jumped out a window. She walked to a nearby municipal building and knocked on
the back door, but no one answered. The officers inside the building noticed her crying and naked when
the door opened. The first police officer who noticed her handed her a jacket to cover her up.

The cops rushed to her boarding house but were unable to catch the suspect. She was sent to the hospital
for a physical exam. Her PE indicated that she is still a virgin, as evidenced by abrasions on her left
breast, left and right knees, and many pinpoint markings on her back, among other things. The accused
was found guilty of frustrated rape by the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the accused conviction for frustrated rape is proper.

Ruling: No. The accused claims that frustrated rape is not a crime. The trial court erred in dismissing the
substantial contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, and in declaring that the accused committed
the crime of frustrated rape.  He was not able to fully penetrate in her.  The prosecution's inability to bring
any witnesses to substantiate the claims in the complaint is also questioned by the accused. The accused
cited Article 266 of the RPC to demonstrate that he is not guilty of frustrated rape, as well as Article 6 to
emphasize the distinction between consummated, frustrated, and attempted offenses.

The decision of the RTC is hereby modified. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape [consummated] and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.

The law states that complete penetration isn't required for rape consummation. Any male organ invasion
of the female organ is sufficient. Entry of the female organ's labia or lips without hymen rupture or
vaginal laceration is sufficient to support guilt.
People vs. Likiran, G.R. No. 201858, 04 June 2014 (Art. 4, RPC)

Facts: The accused Jenny Likiran was convicted of the crime of Murder and responsible for the death of
Rolando Sareno, Sr. A dance was being conducted at the basketball court on the eve of the town fiesta.
Celso Dagangon, Prescado Mercado, and Constancio Goloceno, all prosecution witnesses, stated that they
were at the dance with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m. on the night in question. While Mercado and Goloceno
were inside the dance area, the accused-brother, appellant's Jerome Likiran, hit Mercado in the mouth.
Goloceno was about to help Mercado when he noticed Jerome was carrying a hunting knife while the
accused-appellant was holding a small pistol. Outside the dance area, Dagangon and Sareno heard the
disturbance. Jerome then approached Sareno and shot him multiple times. The accused-appellant stabbed
Sareno in the back after he had fallen. Dagangon was the one who witnessed the occurrence firsthand
because he was only three meters away from Sareno. After Jerome and the accused-appellant had left,
Dagangon was able to get Sareno to the hospital, but he was already dead. Sareno was shot multiple times
and has a stab wound to the left scapular. The accused-appellant, on the other hand, denied any
participation in the crime. He admitted to being at the dance, but he did not venture outside when the
disturbance occurred. He and Jerome remained in the area of the sound machine, hearing only the
gunshots from outside. Other witnesses testified in the accused-defense, appellant's including Edgar
Indanon, who stated that he witnessed the stabbing incident and that the perpetrator was someone other
than the accused-appellant; and Eleuterio Quiopa, who stated that he was inside the dance hall with the
accused-appellant and Jerome at the time the commotion occurred. The prosecution was able to establish
the accused-guilt, appellant's according to the RTC. The RTC found that prosecution witness Dagangon's
positive identification of the accused-appellant was adequate to convict him of murder. The accused-
denial appellant's defense was similarly rejected by the RTC because it was not supported by evidence. It
further found that the accused-alibi appellants cannot be used against him since he failed to show that he
could not have been at the crime site on March 19, 2007.

Issue: Whether or not treachery is attendant to the crime committed.

Ruling: No. The Court, on the other hand, cannot agree with the RTC and CA that Sareno's death was
preceded by treachery, elevating the offense to murder. Treachery is not present when the killing is not
premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just
triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim,
or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses in this
case all lead to the notion that Sareno's shooting and stabbing was a spur-of-the-moment occurrence,
resulting from a brawl that occurred during the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to establish that the
accused-appellant and his brother Jerome planned the means by which they would harm Sareno on
purpose. In fact, the prosecution evidence proved that Sareno was an innocent bystander who was
unwittingly drawn into the accused-and appellant's Jerome's spree. As a result, the accused-appellant
should only face charges of homicide, which is a lesser offense. The accused-appellant Jenny Likiran
alias "Loloy" is hereby found guilty of the lesser crime of homicide.
Dela Cruz vs. Viano, G.R. No. 219649, July 26, 2017 (Proximate cause)

Facts: About 9:00 p.m. Respondent Captain Renato Octaviano, a military dentist assigned to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines' Office of the Chief Dental Service, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, and
respondent Wilma Octaviano, Renato's mother, and Renato's sister, Janet Octaviano, rode a tricycle
driven by Eduardo Y. Padilla on April 1, 1999. Wilma and Janet were riding in the vehicle's sidecar,
while Renato rode on the back of the tricycle driver. They then headed to Naga Road, where CAA and BF
Homes were located. Renato was asking his mother for a change so he could pay his P10.00 bill when he
noticed a light from an oncoming car driving too quickly. Petitioner's automobile collided into the back
end of Renato's tricycle. The impact forced the trike to turn around and crash near the gutter on the
pavement. Renato was thrown from the tricycle and fell around two meters away on the gutter. Renato
went unconscious after experiencing extreme pain in his lower limbs, and when he awoke, he heard his
sister yelling for help. A man approached, followed by others. The first man who responded to Janet's
appeal for assistance shouted to another man who was standing nearby. Renato was dragged from the
gutter and brought to the automobile. Petitioner drove them to his house, where they stayed for two to
three minutes before being sent to a clinic. Renato insisted on being taken to the hospital because he was
aware of his injuries' seriousness. Renato, his mother, and Janet were taken to Perpetual Help Medical
Center, where Renato's leg was amputated below the knee the same evening. Renato was transferred to
the AFP Medical Center at V. Luna General Hospital after his treatment at Perpetual Help Medical Center
and stayed there for nine months for rehabilitation. He had a bone infection shortly before his discharge
from V. Luna. He was taken to Fort Bonifacio Hospital, where he underwent three operations for a bone
infection. He was then treated for six months at the same facility.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is negligent in driving his car.

Ruling: Yes. The petitioner was found to be negligent by the Supreme Court. Negligence is the failure to
exercise the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand for the
protection of another person's interests, resulting in injury to that other person. Articles 2176 and 20 of the
Civil Code establish liability for carelessness. The petitioner was negligent, and the Court of Appeals
appropriately recognized the respondents' evidence. There is no doubt that the plaintiffs were injured or
suffered damage as a result of the April 1, 1999 incident. Plaintiff Renato Octaviano's right leg was
crushed when defendant Dela Cruz's Honda Civic collided with the tricycle on which the Octavianos were
traveling, and Renato's right leg was severed as a result. According to the evidence presented to the trial
court, plaintiff Wilma Octaviano experienced severe injuries/hematoma on various portions of her body.
Preponderant evidence was used to substantiate the damages or injuries. In the case of the improper
conduct or omission attributed to defendant Al Dela Cruz's negligence, we hold that the trial court missed
the obvious fact that defendant Dela Cruz was negligent.
People vs. Ulep, G.R. No. L-36858, June 20, 1988 (Accelerating cause)

Facts: The accused Macario A. Ulep, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, her wife Asuncion Pablo Ulep. On May 21, 197, The wife died as a
result of physical injuries inflicted upon her on that very day by her husband. The Chief of Police of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte received a report of the said death of Asuncion who allegedly died of a heart attack.
The Chief of Police and the Rural Health Officer went to the house of the deceased and there they saw the
body on a bamboo bed surrounded by relatives, friends, and the husband of the deceased. The Chief of
Police suggested that an autopsy be conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. However, the
daughter of the deceased by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to decide on her preference.

Two weeks after the burial, two constabulary sergeants investigated the accused. A statement was
prepared and signed by the accused and was subsequently sworn to before Fiscal Cesar Abaya. He
admitted that he caused the death of his wife by elbowing her because his wife was then drunk and was
uttering indecent words. The following day, PC sergeant Damian Bautista, conducted another
investigation of accused. His statement was reduced to writing and then subscribed to before Fiscal
Abaya. He reiterated that the cause of death of his wife was his elbowing her on her breast.

Ulep narrated at their home at 5:30 in the afternoon. She vomitted and then went to bed. The accused then
left for the fields and returned at around 9:00 in the evening and found his wife dead on her bed. He
reported this death to their barrio captain. Despite these statements, admitting his guilt, Ulep retracted his
statement in court by narrating that more than a year before that, and while his wife went to have their
palay milled, their bullcart loaded with sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her
breast. With the pain in her chest, she was treated by a country quack doctor or albularyo.

The cause of death of the deceased in this case is cardiac arrest and primary shock induced by the severe
pressure applied to the upper front chest bone, according to all observations, results, and an in-depth
examination of the necropsy report. The aggressor's man-size strikes to a thin-framed woman from his
elbow can only have fatal consequences.

Issue: Whether or not Ulep’s acts were the proximate cause of the death of his wife and is liable for the
death.

Ruling:  Yes. Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or
tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused — (a) is the efficient cause of death; or (b) accelerated
his death; or (c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability.

"He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused," is the rationale in Article 4 of the R
which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Thus, even though a blow with the fist or
a kick does not cause any external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and
peritonitis and cause death, and even though the victim may have been previously affected by some
internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist or foot accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is
responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted.
Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Corporation G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2015 (Efficient intervening
cause)

Facts: This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death of a
participant in an organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the race. The issues
revolve on whether the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were guilty of negligence, and, if so,
was their negligence the proximate cause of the death of the participant; on whether the negligence of the
driver of the passenger jeepney was an efficient intervening cause; on whether the doctrine of assumption
of risk was applicable to the fatality; and on whether the heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss
of earning capacity of the latter who, being then a minor, had no gainful employment.

By this appeal, the parents of deceased Rommel Abrogar, a marathon runner, seek the review and reversal
of the decision promulgated on March 10, 2004 finding and declaring respondents Cosmos Bottling
Company, a domestic soft-drinks company whose products included Pop Cola, and Intergames, Inc., also
a domestic corporation organizing and supervising the “1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15,
1980 in Quezon City, solitarily liable for damages arising from the untimely death of Rommel, then a
minor 18 years of age, after being bumped by a recklessly driven passenger.

All parties appealed to the CA. The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in not awarding damages for
loss of earning capacity on the part of Rommel for the reason that such damages were not recoverable due
to Rommel not yet having finished his schooling; and that it would be premature to award such damages
upon the assumption that he would finish college and be gainfully employed. The CA reduced the issues
to four, namely:

1. Whether or not appellant Intergames was negligent in its conduct of the "1st Pop Cola Junior
Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 and if so, whether its negligence was the proximate cause of the death
of Rommel Abrogar.
2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarity liable with appellant Intergames for
the death of Rommel Abrogar, assuming that appellant Intergames is found to have been negligent in the
conduct of the Pop Cola marathon and such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel
Abrogar.
3. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to be compensated for the "loss of earning capacity"
of their son Rommel.
4. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to the actual, moral, and exemplary damages granted
to them by the Trial Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that respondent
Intergames was not negligent considering that:

A. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the conduct of
the marathon in that it did not block off from traffic the marathon route; and
B. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number of marshals during the
marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the happening of the injury to its participants.

2. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that the doctrine
of assumption of risk finds application to the case at bar even though getting hit or run over by a vehicle
is not an inherent risk in a marathon race. Even assuming arguendo that deceased Abrogar made such
waiver as claimed, still there can be no valid waiver of one's right to life and limb for being against public
policy.
3. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision (and) in absolving respondent
Cosmos from liability to petitioners on the sole ground that respondent Cosmos' contract with respondent
Intergames contained a stipulation exempting the former from liability.
4. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision and consequently holding
respondents free from liability, (and) in not awarding petitioners with actual, moral and exemplary
damages for the death of their child, Rommel Abrogar.

Ruling:

1. Yes. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time
and of the place. The Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.
2. Yes. The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious,
known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom. It rests on the fact
that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and
to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and whether the former has exercised proper caution or
not is immaterial. In other words, it is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of
a known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's
negligence, but one does not ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and
appreciate. As a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the concurrence of three
elements, namely; the plaintiff must know that the risk is present; he must further understand its nature;
and his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary. Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an
effective form of express or implied consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk. There is
ample authority, cited in Prosser, to the effect that a person does not comprehend the risk involved in a
known situation because of his youth, or lack of information or experience, and thus will not be taken to
consent to assume the risk. Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply to bar recovery by
the petitioners.
3. No. The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the race. Cosmos did nothing
beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the preparations for the actual conduct of the race. This
verity was expressly confirmed by Intergames, through Castro, Jr.
4. Yes. Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
People vs. Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943 (Error in personae)

Facts: In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, received from Major Guido a
telegram about information received from escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan to get him dead or alive. Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked
that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio
Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector
where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a
picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas. The same instruction was given to the chief
of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked
whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name.
Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the
constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he
volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal Street leading to the house
where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one
Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida
trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her
paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with
their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded,
and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the
entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal
Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The
Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the
deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter
brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds
inflicted by 32 and 45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants are criminally liable for the death of Serapio Tecson.

Ruling: Yes. If a person made an honest mistake of fact while performing his official duties, he is not
criminally liable. The maxim ignorantia facti excusat, however, only applies when the mistake is made
without blame or negligence. The defendants in this case identified no conditions that would force them
to take urgent action, as the person in the room was asleep at the time, giving them adequate time and
chance to determine his identity.

They were also told not to kill Balagtas on sight, but rather to arrest him and take him alive or dead only
if he offered resistance or aggressiveness. As a result, the defendants' act was more than just criminal
negligence, as the death was premeditated and not accidental.

The Court found that the defendants committed the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstance of
alevosia, but that they may be entitled to an incomplete justifying circumstance under Article 11, No. 5 of
the Revised Penal Code. There are two requirements for a circumstance to be considered justifiable: (a)
the offender acted in the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) the injury or
offense committed was a necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or lawful exercise
of such right or office. Only the first requirement is met in this instance. As a result, the defendants were
granted a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides
for a sentence that is one or two degrees lower than that prescribed by law if the offense committed is not
entirely excusable.
Talampas vs. People, G.R. No. 180219, November 23, 2011 (Abberatio ictus)

Facts: Virgilio Talampas seeks the review of the affirmance of his conviction for homicide for the killing
of Ernesto Matic y Masinloc and pleas of self-defense and accident and had declared him guilty of the
felony under the judgment rendered on June 22, 2004.

Jose Sevillo who allegedly witnessed the incident in question, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he
together with Eduardo Matic and Ernesto Matic were in front of his house, repairing his tricycle when he
noticed Virgilio Talampas who was riding on a bicycle passed by and stopped. The latter alighted at about
three meters away from him, walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a revolver, and poked the
same to Eduardo and fired it hitting Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. The appellant again fired
his gun three times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing Ernesto to fall on the
ground with his face down. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back. Virgilio
Talampas ran away, while Jose and his neighbors brought the victims to the hospital.

Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had been Eduardo Matic and
not the victim Ernesto Matic. Eduardo who was then with Ernesto at the time of the incident, had hit him
with a monkey wrench, but he had parried the blow. Talampas and Eduardo had then grappled for the
monkey wrench. While they had grappled, he had notice that Eduardo had held a revolver and he had thus
struggled with Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had accidentally fired and hit Ernesto during
their struggling with each other and the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh. He had then
seized the revolver and shot Eduardo in the head. That is the time that he had then fled the scene when
people had started swarming around.

Issue: Whether or not Talampas is guilty of the crime homicide, considering his real target was Eduardo
not Ernesto.

Ruling: Yes. Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in defending himself. In the nature of
self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The established circumstances
indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who had initiated the attack only against
Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a target of Talampas’ attack, he having only happened
to be present at the scene of the attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any
unlawful aggression against Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from
the victim (Ernesto), thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted. Secondly, Talampas could
not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense. Under Article 12 paragraph 4of
the Revised Penal Code, the legal provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a situation where a person
is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the
process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor – an
accidental result flowing out of a legal act. Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the sway of
our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly
foreseeable consequences. In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.
People vs. Cagoco, G.R. No. L-38511, October 6, 1933 (Praeter intentionem)

Facts: It appears from the evidence that about 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee,
father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk at the corner of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets in the
District of San Nicolas. Yu Lon was standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the
street. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu
Yee was about to take leave of his father, the man that had been passing back the fourth behind Yu Lon
approached him from behind and suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back part
of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of
his body fell on the sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued him through San
Fernando, Camba, and Jaboneros Streets, and then lost sight of him. Two others Chinese, Chin Sam and
Yee Fung, who were walking along Calle Mestizos, saw the incident and joined him in the pursuit of Yu
Lon's assailant. The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, were he died about
midnight. A post-mortem examination was made the next day by Dr. Anastacia Villegas, who found that
the deceased had sustained a lacerated wound and fracture of the skull in the occipital region, and that he
had died from cerebral hemorrhage; that he had tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage, and a
tumor in the left kidney.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should only be charged with a slight physical injury rather than murder.

Ruling: No. Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended; but in order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that
which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a)
That a felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct
consequence of the crime committed by the offender.

Under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death
was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. If the defendant had
not committed the assault in a treacherous manner, he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide,
although he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime with
treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Intod vs. CA, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1922 (Impossible Crime)

Facts: On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with
them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be
killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four men,
otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of the game day, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all
armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan’s bedroom. Thereafter,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room
when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed
in toto the trial court’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not Intod is guilty of attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Article 4.

Ruling: Yes, Intod is guilty of attempted murder. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense
was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the
actor’s will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an
act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment." In that case, all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense
will be treated as an accident independent of the actor’s will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felo

The petition is hereby granted, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of
Attempted Murder is hereby modified. The Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the
social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay
the costs.
Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009 (Impossible Crime)

Facts: That on or about the month of July 1997, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Gemma T. Jacinto, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by
JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside the foresaid establishment, with grave
abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of
₱10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. 

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft.

Ruling: NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only. The requisites of an
impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that
the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.

Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega
Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced,
she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due
to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be
absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the
cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.

Petition granted. Decision is MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of

an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and
to pay the costs.
 
Valenzuela vs. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007 (Frustrated Theft)

Facts: Petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon charging with the crime of theft. On 19 May
1994, at around 4:30 p.m., Valenzuela and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a
supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security
guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner,
who was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a
push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an
open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and
after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to
the same area in the open parking space. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise,
petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow
security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen
merchandise recovered. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted
of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely
dispose of the articles stolen.

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed is frustrated or theft.

Ruling: No. It is consummated theft. Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three
alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed. In the present discussion,
we need to concern ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it that the prosecution of
the accused was undertaken and sustained. On the face of the definition, there is only one operative act of
execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the
provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the
descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence
against or intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of the property.

Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs
to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent
of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things.

With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft
cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
People vs. Veloso G.R. No. L-38551- 53, 27 February 1987

Facts: Three young and innocent girls went to the park on a Sunday evening to relax and enjoy each
other’s company. Before the night was over, they would be brutally attacked and deflowered and seared
with ugly memories that will probably outrage them for the rest of their lives These unfortunate girls were
Rosita Rubio, fifteen years old, Constancia de los Reyes, fourteen, and Rosanna Rodriguez, who was only
twelve at the time.

At about seven o’clock in the evening of June 22, 1972, while they were seated near the fountain at a
public park in Lucena City, they were approached by a group of men composed of Claudio Veloso, Julio
Dalumpienes, Renato Torres, Israel Rapote, Rey Torres, one Gerry, and a seventh who remains
unidentified to date. Gerry introduced himself to Rosanna and then the men left. At 10 o’clock of the
same evening, the same group was to return to the three girls in the park, but this time with a more
malevolent purpose. This time there were no amenities. The men surrounded the girls. Veloso held the
hand of Constancia, who pushed him to the ground. His bolo fell. Constancia ran but Dalumpienes caught
and detained her. The three girls were then pulled by the group to the Capitol Building, their mouths
covered to prevent them from shouting for help. As it happened, the lights in the park temporarily went
out at that precise time, and nobody saw or succored them.

Upon reaching the second floor of the building, Veloso and Renato Torres dragged Rosita to a dark
corner, where they raped her in succession. Veloso threatened her with his bolo. Meanwhile, about seven
meters away, Constancia was struggling with Dalumpienes, who subdued and violated her while she was
being held by his two companions, who thereafter also satisfied their lust on her while also held by the
others in turn. Nearby, Rosanna met a similar fate from the seventh man in the group. After ravishing
them, the men called a jeep to take the girls home but instead they proceeded directly to the police station,
where they reported their harrowing experiences. Constancia was then taken by a policeman to the
railroad station, where she saw and pointed to Veloso as one of her assailants. Veloso was arrested. After
investigation, he signed an extrajudicial confession.

Issue: Whether or not Veloso is responsible also for the other rapes because he was a co-conspirator along
with his six other companions.

Ruling: Yes. The conspiracy among them has been amply established by the facts that they together
approached the three girls earlier that night as one of them introduced himself; that they returned about
three hours later and without much ado dragged the three girls into the Capitol Building; that they
successively raped their hapless victims, helping each other as each forced himself upon a victim; and that
they later released the girls after they had satisfied their lust and sent them home in a jeep they had
flagged. In a conspiracy, the guilt of one is the guilt of all.  Therefore, Veloso is responsible not only for
the rape he committed against Rosita but for all the other rapes committed by his companions, with whom
he had conspired.  In other words, he is liable also for the rape of Rosita by Renato Torres, of Constancia
by Dalumpienes and two others, and of Rosanna by another of the conspirators, or a total of six rapes,
including the one he actually committed.

With the above aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the applicable penalty is
death, to be imposed not for each of the three victims but for each of the six rapes committed on them by
Veloso personally and his companions. Fortunately for him, however, these six death penalties will now
each have to be reduced to life imprisonment in accordance with Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution.
This decision affects only Claudio Veloso because Julio Dalumpienes, who was convicted with him, did
not appeal. As for the others, we note that they have not been arrested and tried, allegedly because of the
protection and immunity they are enjoying from the police of Lucena City. WHEREFORE, the appealed
judgment as above modified is AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-appellant. It is so ordered.
People vs. Sarino, G.R NOS. 94992-93 April 7, 1993

Facts: On February 25, 1988 at past 9:00 p.m., Jolito Rosel was in his house at Isla Puting Bato, Navotas,
Metro Manila. He was with his wife Nympha, his mother Encarnacion and sister Ceferina. They had just
arrived from the nearby house of Ceferina where they had a sort of reunion occasioned by the arrival of
Encarnacion from Cebu. Jolito, who sat at the bench in the front portion of the house, asked for coffee
from his wife and had taken one sip thereof only when all of a sudden accused Oscar Flora, together with
Charlito Ramirez Sarino, arrived Oscar grabbed Encarnacion by the hair and her head struck against (sic)
a gun held by Oscar. The latter said 'you are good for only one bullet' to Encarnacion Charlito confronted
Ceferina, who is the wife of his brother Bienvenido, held her by the hair also and pointed a long bolo at
her neck. Charlito told Ceferina not to move. At this point, accused Benjamin Ramirez Sarino, brother of
Charlito, entered the place. He came from his nearby house where he, Charlito and Oscar were earlier
drinking beer. Benjamin shouted 'putang ina ninyo' and immediately stabbed Jolito with a knife who was
hit in the right side of the abdomen and Nympha shouted for help, saying her husband was stabbed. At
this point, Benjamin also stabbed her at the right side of the stomach Nympha was then two months
pregnant. Soon after Jolito and Nympha were stabbed by Benjamin with a knife, the latter urged his
companions to ran (sic) away and all of them did. Jolito and Nympha were rushed to the Tondo Medical
Center where Nympha was operated on to prevent her death. Jolito died and the cause of his death was:
`shock, traumatic, due to a stab wound that lacerated the abdominal aorta and the bladder.

The case for the prosecution having found favor with the lower court, on March 7, 1990 it rendered
judgment containing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Benjamin
Ramirez Sarino and Oscar Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder, for the death of
Jolito Rosel, and Frustrated Murder, for the stabbing of Nympha Rosel, and they are each hereby
sentenced to two prison terms.

Appellant Sarino avers that the lower court erred in holding that he was the one who stabbed the spouses
Jolito and Nympha Rosel despite the clear, truthful and unbiased testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the
incident pinpointing Oscar Flora as the perpetrator of the acts; having favorably appreciated the evidence
of the prosecution instead of having favorably appreciated his evidence; convicting him of the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder as charged in the information rather than of the lower offenses of homicide
and frustrated homicide, assuming but without admitting that he was the assailant; and convicting instead
of acquitting him on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant Flora, on the other hand, substantially asserts that the court a quo erred in finding the existence
of a conspiracy among appellants; finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged; and
not acquitting him thereof.

Issue: Whether or not there is existence of conspiracy and treachery in these cases

Ruling: Yes. Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony It is not participation in all the details
of the execution of the crime. It need not be proved by direct evidence, but can be inferred from the acts
of the accused. We have repeatedly held that when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments,
the court will be justified in concluding that said accused were engaged in a conspiracy.

The attack was also very synchronal, sudden and unexpected. The deceased was relaxing on a bench,
sipping a cup of coffee when the three malefactors suddenly barged into the premises of his dwelling.
Nothing could best be indicative of treachery than the mode or manner of attack chosen by the
conspirators which insured the accomplishment of the crime with impunity since the victim was not
afforded a chance to raise any form of defense. Although the stabbing was frontal, treachery was still
present as said victim was also not in a position to offer any effective defense.

Conspiracy and treachery were similarly attendant in the stabbing of Nympha Rosel. Although appellants
did not principally plan to kill her, their actions nonetheless reveal that they agreed to harm anyone who
would give resistance or hinder their plan of killing the deceased. This can be inferred from the fact that,
upon entering the house, appellant Flora and accused Charlito Ramirez Sarino respectively threatened the
deceased's mother and sister with a gun and a bolo. Nympha Rosel's act of shouting for help was a form
of resistance which provoked appellant Sarino to immediately stab her. This attack was decidedly
treacherous as the victim had no chance to either repel the attack or escape from the scene.

However, we are satisfied that there was a conspiratorial concord among the accused. Unlike evident
premeditation, wherein a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation
and reflection and for the perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences of his intended deed, conspiracy
arises on the very instant when the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith decide to pursue it. Once this assent is established, each and every one of the conspirators is
criminally liable for the crime committed by anyone of them.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the following MODIFICATIONS, viz.: (1) In Criminal Case No. 6200-MN for murder, the phrase "life
imprisonment" in the dispositive portion of the judgment therein is hereby deleted and the correct
terminology of reclusion perpetua is maintained; (2) in Criminal Case No. 6201-MN for frustrated
murder, accused-appellants Benjamin Ramirez Sarino and Oscar Flora are sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (3) the death indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the
deceased is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with current jurisprudential policy.
SO, ORDERED.