PROJECT PHASE V 1

Project Phase V: The Consequences of Inaction

Full Name

HRMN 467

December 15, 2017

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If the Virtual Criminal Justice Alliance’s plan is not fully implemented, the Virtual

Security Force (VSF) is unlikely to face any repercussions of significance absent a violation of

the mandate provided to it by the Virtual Commercial Merchants Association if the latter

includes a component directly oriented at the Very Bad Bike Club (VBBC). Because the

principal-agent relation governing private security is one in which the VSF is only accountable to

its contracting partner, it faces absolutely no reputational risk if does not attack the VBBC in a

context wherein this is not emphasized by the Merchant’s Association. More broadly however,

the VBBC may be harmed by VSF efforts, within the plan put forth by the Virtual Criminal

Justice Alliance, absent VSF intervention, because of the gang’s diminished ability to congregate

at the Association’s properties. Ultimately then, the consequences of VSF inaction rest entirely

on the shoulders of the Merchant’s Association.

Fundamentally, private security companies are judged on whether they accomplish the

mandate that is provided to them by their contracting party. Given that significant variation can

exist in relation to the mandates provided to private security contractors, running the gamut from

militaristic kinetic convoy protection in war zones to simple entry control in private facilities,

private security companies need do nothing more than actually complete the mandates provided

to them by their contracting parties if they are to maintain their reputations. Indeed, and because

the principal-agent model governs relationships between private security firms and their

contracting partners, they are governed by nothing more than the contract that lays out their

function (Stober, 2007).

With the degree to which the Virtual Commercial Merchants Association remains

focused on the protection of its own property and infrastructure rather than on the actual

dismantling of the VBBC in mind, it is highly unlikely that the VSF will actually engage in any
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fundamental attempts to do more than interdict VSF activities taking place on the properties of

the Merchant Association. As such, the consequence of inaction in this case is one where

Merchant Association properties will be free of VBBC disruption but wherein the broader

Criminal Justice Alliance’s plan will fail due to low levels of cooperation between the VSF and

mainstream law enforcement entities.

While private security is designed to augment security, it does so in relation to a

particular referent object. Because private security is a commodity that is purchased as

something of an insurance policy, private security purveyors must thus acts on the basis of the

principal-agent model discussed above. These obligations and the budgetary implications

associated with them, themselves predicated on the need for a private security company to make

profit, serve to hinder long-term investigations and cooperation with law enforcement

(Chesterman & Fisher, 2009).

While the VBBC may be a priority for the Merchant’s Association, its prioritization of

the issue is one that exists in relation to its properties rather than Virtual City more broadly. As

such, the action of the VSF will likely eradicate any VBBC criminal presence from its properties.

This said, and if this interdiction is not associated with broader cooperation with law

enforcement within the Task Force, something that is unlikely to occur based on the literature

reviewed above, inaction will be the norm in relation to the broader goals associated with the

Alliance’s targeting of the VBBC.

In the end, it is thus the Merchant’s Association that will be responsible for any inaction

on the part of VSF as it is the contracting party determining VSF’s mandated within the

principal-agent relation. With sub-optimal cooperation with law enforcement likely leading to a

mitigation of VBBC activities on Merchant Association properties alone, it is the task of the
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Association to determine to enhance the mission of the VSF if it wishes to truly eradicate the

VBBC.
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References

Chesterman, S., & Fisher, A. (2009). Private security, public order: the outsourcing of public

services and its limits (Vol. 2). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Stöber, Jan. (2007). Contracting in the fog of war... Private security providers in Iraq: A

principal-agent analysis. In T. Jager & G. Kummel (Eds.), Private Military and Security

Companies (pp. 121-134). New York, NY: Routledge.