G.R. No.

92161 March 18, 1991

SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES, GREGORIO

ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG
and FULGENCIO MORA,petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.

FELICIANO, J.:

The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of
twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that
of the eastern portion which borders on the national road. Through the years, the western portion would periodically go
under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion,
however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of
the year, that is, from September to December during the rainy season.

The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959, respondent Guillermo
Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land sold was
described in the Deed of Absolute Sale1 as follows:

. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500 hectares, more or
less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National Road; on South by Julian Tumolva
and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of
Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P 750.00. . . .

Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired
the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45
hectares. The second piece of property was more particularly described as follows:

. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000 square meters,
more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R.
Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed at P 440.00, as tax
Declaration No. 3152. . . .2

During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2) parcels of land
belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot
307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and
(b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy
month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not included
in Lot 307.

The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent Manalo shows that the
Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branches—the western and the
eastern branches—and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch
of the river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. The
bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For
about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary
depth, river water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is
susceptible to cultivation.

Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked
very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969. 4
It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822
is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is
separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry
season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo
claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is
adjacent.

Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821. They occupy the outer
edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural
products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer. 5 This situation compelled
respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the
Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo
again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.

On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints 6 before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3
for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of land
he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered
ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that
judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.

Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was then set for trial for failure
of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of facts. 7 On 10 November 1982, the trial
court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the defendants and
in favor of the plaintiff and orders:

1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964
of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;

2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-
964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;

3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821,
Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
and

4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. They filed a motion
for reconsideration, without success.

While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of the Cagayan River, the
Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot
be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up
for the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with
the dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that the
depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River.

It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that they carry even more
weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.9 This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial
court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise
settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. 10 But whether a conclusion drawn from such
findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court. 11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings that periodically
at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial
court held:

The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion (Accretion), for it
appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821,
Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina
Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its
widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by our Supreme Court
that "the owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an
express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408).12

The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:

As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the word since the
eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up during
summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy season especially from
September to November which increases the water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen
due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point would be
inundated with water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water
level is high the whole strip of land would be under water.

In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that —

According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the highest depth of the
waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain during
the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular, common, natural, which
occurs always or most of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule,
order and measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by
Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by
their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground
covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season, that is up to the northeastern boundary
of the two parcels of land in question.

We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the waters of the Cagayan
River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is
the natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream
already in existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still susceptible to cultivation and
uneroded.13

The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands vs.Colegio de San
Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court
applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine
the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or
basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in the
instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.

We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the case at bar:

Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest
floods. (Emphasis supplied)

We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during
the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the
rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially
dries up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the
waters ( i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record.1âwphi1Firstly,
respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot
307.15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred
to as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as
well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the
eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is
separated from the western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but
also what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.

Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as
a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed
becomes visible.16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit
"W-3" which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than
Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward
and very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through
the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to
go down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion.
The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters.17

The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface of the earth.
However, Exhibit "E"18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property standing in the name of Faustina
Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The words "old bed"
enclosed in parentheses—perhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the submerged
portion—is an implied admission of the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by
respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like
slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.

Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the bed
of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba
and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public
dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code states:

The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1) the running
waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds:

La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario considerar en su
relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en todo rio es preciso distinguir 1. esta
agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de
dominio publico, como las aguas?

Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo civil que los rios
son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos que
integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num 1,
donde dice: son de dominion publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que concuerda con lo
que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de
los arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en la
extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas ordinarias.20 (Emphasis supplied)

The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it were alleged and
proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and
Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of
private ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his landholding
obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposed
to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the
right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code.21 It so happened that instead of increasing the size of
Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.

We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers that there was no
evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as
a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a)
that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters
of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
coast).22The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited
on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307
but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.

Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land
to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of
factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the
aver in a slow and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several floods
that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding
is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible
accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.

Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of the strip
of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted
from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45
hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964,
respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that
Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo's contention were accepted, it
would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of
Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes
separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other
things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow
and constant action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.

We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion coupled
with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and
Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge
Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property
and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twice
instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo's
allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed
lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.

If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or
the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she
was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini,
Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the
tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code,
the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is
the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels
compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor
respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of
the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be
determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 141325 July 31, 2006

PELBEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Substituted by Pelagia Beltran, and Virginia

Malolos, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

x-------------------------------x

G.R. No. 141174 July 31, 2006

ALADDIN F. TRINIDAD and AQUILINA C. BONZON,petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY), respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Before us are the consolidated cases of "Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation, Substituted by Pelagia
Beltran, and Virginia Malolos v. Court of Appeals and the Republic of the Philippines" and "Aladdin F.
Trinidad and Aquilina C. Bonzon v. Republic of the Philippines (Laguna Lake Development Authority),"
appealing the Court of Appeals' November 14, 1997 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23592 and
December 22, 1999 Resolution,2 which reversed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC's) Decision3 dated
September 12, 1988 in Land Registration Case No. 243-A. The RTC granted the application of
petitioners Pelagia Beltran, Aladdin F. Trinidad and Virginia Malolos to have the parcels of land
situated in San Juan, Taytay, Rizal, and indicated in Psu-240345 to be registered in their names.

The facts, narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

The original applicants for registration are Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation, Aladdin Trinidad
and Virginia Malolos. The lots sought to be registered are two parcels of land covered by Plan
Psu-240345, the first parcel having an area of 28,181 square meters, more or less and the
second parcel having an area of 2,070 square meters, more or less. Both parcels of land are
situated [in] San Juan, Taytay, Rizal.

The case was set for initial hearing on April 1, 1985 and after fulfillment by the applicants of
the jurisdictional requirements of notice, posting and publication, initial hearing took place as
scheduled. There being no formal opposition on record, an Order of general default was issued
and Applicants were allowed to present evidence ex-parte before the Acting Clerk of Court
who was commissioned to receive evidence.
Earlier on March 28, 1985 however, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed a
Manifestation (Record, pp. 30-31) stating that, as per projections of the subject lots in the
topographic map prepared by the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey using technical
description of the lots approved by the Bureau of Lands, subject lots are situated below the
elevation of 12.50 meters, thus forming part of the bed of the Laguna Lake in accordance with
Sec. 41 (paragraph 11) of Republic Act No. 4850 as amended by P.D. No. 813.

On April 22, 1985, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Opposition (Record, p. 40) alleging
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the applicants' claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish Title or
grant can no longer be availed of for failure to file the appropriate application for registration
within six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892; and that applicant
Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation is disqualified, being a private corporation, to hold lands of
the public domain except by lease pursuant to Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.

On May 3, 1985, a Motion For Substitution of Party Applicant was filed by Pelbel to substitute
Pelagia P. Beltran in its place as applicant with respect to 17,500 square meters of the lot
applied for, which Motion was granted by the lower court (Record, p. 48).

On May 4, 1985, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision (Record, p. 49) adjudicating
the parcels of land applied for in favor of the following: Pelagia Beltran – 17,500 square meters;
Aladdin Trinidad – 2,500 square meters; Virginia Malolos – 10,251 square meters (Appellant's
Brief, p. 3; Rollo, p. 260), based on the following findings:

The aforecited established facts support the application for registration of the two
parcels of land subject of the present application. The applicants have satisfactorily
proven their peaceful, continuous, and public possession of the said parcels of land
for over a period of thirty years and no person or persons had/have disturbed their
possession thereof nor interposed any formal opposition to the instant application. The
subject parcels of land being within the disposable portion of the public domain, the
applicants are therefore entitled to the registration of their titles to the parcels of land
subject of this case. The Provincial Engineer of Rizal attested to the effect that the
subject property will not be affected by any government highway as shown in the
clearance marked as Exh.[s] H and H-1 of the applicant corporation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court confirms and declares the applicants
as the true and absolute owners of the parcels of land subject of this application,
situated [in] San Juan, Taytay, Rizal and let therefore an order be as it is hereby
ordered issued for the registration of the titles to the subject land in the following
proportions in favor and in the names of:

a) 17,500 square meters unto Pelagia Beltran, 60 years old, married to

Geronimo Beltran, Filipino citizen, and a resident of Gen. Segundo St., Pasig,
Metro Manila;

b) 2,500 square meters unto Aladdin F. Trinidad, 54 years old, married to

Perfecta Trinidad, Filipino citizen, and residing at Valle Verde, Pasig, Metro
Manila; and

c) 10,251 square meters unto Virginia Malolos, 50 years old, married to Eliseo
Malolos, Filipino [c]itizen[,] and residing [on] Macopa St., Quezon City.
 as pro-indiviso owners in fee simple of the parcels of land indicated in Psu-1445109
(Exh. G), particularly described in the corresponding technical description (Exh[s]. G-
1 and G-2) upon payment of the required fees therefor.

(Record, pp. 56-57)

A Motion to Amend Order of General Default and Set Aside Decision dated May 4, 1985
(Record, pp. 64-[6]7) was filed by Laguna Lake Development Authority on the ground that
LLDA had already established by preliminary investigations that the lots are below elevation
of 12.50 meters, hence are of public dominion. On June 26, 1985[,] the lower court directed
the Office of the Solicitor General to file comment on the motion.

On August 29, 1985, applicant Aladdin F. Trinidad, in his Motion to Segregate the land applied
for by him from Plan PSU-[240345] stated that the LLDA's position was untenable based on
Supreme Court decisions in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Santos del
Rio, 131 SCRA 532 and Bautista vs. Court of Appeals and Santos del Rio, 131 SCRA 532
which held that parts around Laguna de Bay which become covered with water four to five
months a year, not due to tidal action, but due to rains cannot be considered a part of the bed
or basin of Laguna de Bay nor as a foreshore land. LLDA filed an Opposition stating that in
the aforementioned cases the Supreme Court failed to apply Sec. 41 (paragraph 11) of R.A.
4850 as amended by P.D. 813 in resolving the issue of whether or not subject lots are public
land.

Paragraph 11 of R.A. 4850 as amended states:

(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same
shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at
the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a
datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (m.L.L.W.). Lands located at and
below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake.
(Underlining supplied.)

In his Rejoinder, [Aladdin] Trinidad contended that the enactment of R.A. No. 4850 in 1966 did
not retroact to make the subject lots public.

On September 17, 1985, the OSG filed its Comment supporting the LLDA's position that lakes
and their beds such as the lots sought to be registered are, under Article 502, par. 4 of the
[N]ew Civil Code, considered public domain. Invoking Article XV, Section II of the 1972
Constitution, the OSG further argued that applicant Pelbel, being a corporation, is disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain and that applicants are not entitled to registration for
lack of the requisite number of years of possession before June 12, 1945.

Acting upon LLDA's Motion, the lower court in an Order dated October 3, 1985 reopened the
case to enable the government to present its evidence. On November 25, 1985[,] Geodetic
Engineer Joel G. Merida was presented as government witness. Merida testified that upon
LLDA's verification and actual inspection of the subject lots conducted in November, the
highest observed vertical elevation of the subject lots was determined to be at elevation 12.19
meters.

On October 17, 1988, the OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss applicants-appellees' application on
the ground that there was no valid amendment and republication of the application relative to
the substitution by Beltran as applicant in lieu of Pelbel [C]orporation which the court denied
in an Order dated January 12, 1987, stating:

After going over the above-mentioned arguments set forth by Oppositor Republic of
the Philippines, the Court finds that the ground [set forth] by the Oppositor is devoid of
merit.

The record disclose[d] that acting on a Motion for Substitution of Party-Applicant, dated
April 29, 1985 filed by Applicant Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation, the Court in its
Order dated May 3, 1985 granted the substitution of applicant, Pelbel Manufacturing
Corporation with Applicant Pelagia Beltran.

Being a private person, Applicant is not covered by the constitutional prohibition

invoked by Oppositor Republic of the Philippines which applies only to private
corporation.

On the claim of Oppositor Republic of the Philippines, that the substitution was an
attempt to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against private corporations, the
Court can just add that the applicant Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation in conveying
the property applied for by it has in its favor the disputable presumption that private
transactions have been fair and regular pursuant to the provisions of Rule 131, Section
5, sub par. (p) of the Rules of Court. Said presumption is deemed satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. The record
disclose[d] that no evidence was ever presented to contradict said disputable
presumption in favor of the applicant private corporation.

The alleged failure to notify Oppositor Republic of the Philippines of the substitution of
applicant Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation by Applicant Pelagia Beltran is just a
procedural defect and not a jurisdictional defect which would affect the validity of the
Amended Application.

On the second ground for the dismissal of the Amended Application for failure to
republish the same, the Court agrees with Applicant Trinidad that considering that the
amendment on the application does not affect any increase or alteration of the area of
the property applied for but pertains only to an amendment of the joinder or
discontinuance of the parties, no republication of the Amended Application is
necessary.

(Record, p. 192)

On September 12, 1988[,] the lower court rendered the questioned decision which
substantially affirmed its May 4, 1985 decision.

In this appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General assigns the following as errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOTS 1 & 2 OF PSU
240345 (EXH. G) SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED BY APPELLEES ARE NOT PART
OF LAGUNA LAKE, HENCE, REGISTRABLE.

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT APPELLEES FAILED TO

ADDUCE ADEQUATE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROOF THAT THEY AND THEIR
 PREDECESSORS[-]IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN[,] CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LOTS SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR PRIOR THERETO.

3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INSTANT APPLICATION

FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE.

During the pendency of this appeal, the Spouses Abraham and Aquilina Bonzon filed an
Intervention over Lot No. 2 of PSU-242343 included in the land being applied for in the name
of Virginia Malolos (Rollo, pp. 324-334). The instant case was declared submitted for decision
with intervenors' brief as well as that of Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation.4

On November 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It
dismissed the applications for land registration of petitioners Pelagia Beltran, Aladdin F. Trinidad and
Virginia Malolos.

On December 22, 1999, the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Pelbel
Manufacturing Corporation, as substituted by Pelagia Beltran.

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioners Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation, substituted by Pelagia Beltran, and Virginia Malolos
base their appeal on the following grounds:

I.

THE LOTS IN QUESTION ARE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE5

A. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the lots in question are not alienable and
disposable because of the absence of a certification from the Government that the lots are
alienable and disposable is not supported by the evidence, and is clearly contrary to the
undisputed evidence on record.6

B. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the lots in question are part of the Laguna Lake
is not supported by substantial evidence and negated by applicable law and jurisprudence.7

C. Elementary logic dictates that if the lots with houses and the roads between the subject lots
are alienable and disposable, then the subject lots are alienable and disposable.8

D. The findings and conclusions of the trial [c]ourt are in accord with the facts, the law and the
evidence.9

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REVERSING THE HOLDING

OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PETITIONERS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-
INTEREST HAD BEEN IN OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNERS FOR MORE THAN 30 YEAR IS BASED ON
MERE CONJECTURES[,] SPECULATIONS AND GENERALIZATION.10
 A. The findings of facts of the trial [c]ourt on the credibility of witnesses are binding on the
Court of Appeals.11

B. There are no substantial reasons of the Court of Appeals for reversing the conclusion and
finding of the trial [c]ourt.12

C. The ruling of the trial [c]ourt ought to be re-instated and upheld, as a matter of law and
established jurisprudence.13

On the other hand, petitioners Aladdin F. Trinidad and Aquilina C. Bonzon cite the grounds for their
appeal in the following manner:

FIRST GROUND

Is the Questioned Decision And Resolution Of The Hon. Court Of Appeals Supported By
Evidence And Which Is Contradicted By The Evidence Of The Petitioners In The Record
(Tolentino vs. De Jesus, et al., L-32797, 27 March 1974).

SECOND GROUND

Has The Hon. Court Of Appeals Disregarded The Applicable Laws And Decisions Of The Hon.
Supreme Court in the below cases:

1. Director of Lands vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.[,] G.R. No. L-43105, August 31, 1984.

2. Aurora Bautista, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 43190, August 31, 1984.

in deciding this case which cases interpreted the laws applicable to this case on the basis of
the facts established by the evidence in the records.14

In sum, the two consolidated petitions raise the following issues:

(1) Whether the subject parcels of land are public land; and

(2) If they are not public land, whether applicants-petitioners have registrable title to the land.

We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners, in this case, applied for registration of title to two parcels of land covered by Plan Psu-
240345. Both parcels of land are located in San Juan, Taytay, Rizal, near the shore of Laguna de Bay.
The controlling law in the instant case is Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act. It governs what were used to be known as public agricultural lands, or what
are otherwise known as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Under the Public Land
Act, there is a presumption that the land applied for belongs to the state, and that the occupants and
possessors can only claim an interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open,
and notorious possession thereof15 for a period prescribed by law. This principle is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine, under which the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The
basic doctrine is that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.16 Any applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title has the
burden of proving, by incontrovertible evidence,17 that the (a) land applied for is alienable and
disposable public land; and, (b) the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest had
occupied and possessed the land, in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since June 12, 1945, or earlier.18

We hold that petitioners failed to show that the parcels of land subject of their application are alienable
and disposable. The government, through the Laguna Lake Development Authority, established that
the areas sought to be registered are below the statutory minimum elevation of 12.50 meters, hence
formed part of the bed of Laguna Lake under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended. In a Report
dated November 19, 1985, Laguna Lake Development Authority Geodetic Engineer Joel G. Merida
stated that one-half of the area of Lot 1 and the entire area of Lot 2, Psu-240345, are covered by mud
and lake water at an elevation of 11.77 meters, and the highest observed elevation is 12.19
meters.19 This means that the subject lots form part of the lake bed or basin of Laguna Lake. Sec.
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850 sets the minimum water elevation at 12.50 meters. Lands located at and
below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Art. 502 of the Civil Code
enumerates the bodies of water that are properties of public dominion, as follows:

The following are of public dominion:

(1) Rivers and their natural beds;

(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and
the beds themselves;

(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;

(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands, and their beds;

xxx

(Emphases supplied.)

Petitioners invoke the case of Bautista v. Court of Appeals,20 claiming that the inundation was merely
due to the rains, and that the water elevation should be determined from the highest ordinary depth
during dry season. They cite Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866 which defines the extent of a lake
bed as "the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth," and the case
of Government of the Philippine Islands v. Colegio de San Jose21 which defines the phrase
"highest ordinary depth" as the highest depth of the waters (the Laguna Lake, in this case) during the
dry season, such depth being the regular, common, natural depth which occurs always or most of the
time during the year. It is contended that the measurement of Laguna Lake Development Authority
Geodetic Engineer Merida of 12.19 meters as the highest observed elevation of the subject lots was
made in November,22 which is still rainy season. We disagree for while November is not part of the
summer season, it is not part of the rainy season either. It still is part of the dry season during which
the waters are at their "highest ordinary depth."

Further, we agree with the ruling of the appellate court that the fact that a few of the other estates in
the vicinity had succeeded in being registered, and that there are already existing houses and roads
between Laguna Lake and the subject lots, does not prove that the subject lots are not part of the
Laguna Lake bed. Mr. Ananias Mariano registered 6,993 square meters of land in his name under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 8906 which land appears to be even located farther from the
lake than the subject lots, while Juvencio Ortañez registered 84,238 square meters of land in his name
under OCT No. 55351 which land is situated near the margins of the Laguna Lake. The land titles of
these two individuals only prove that they are the owners in fee simple of the respective real properties
described therein, free from all liens and encumbrances except such as may be expressly noted
thereon or otherwise reserved by law.23 They do not prove petitioners' title to the subject lots. Further,
in Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo,24 this Court held that "simple possession of a certificate of title,
under the Torrens System, does not make the possessor the true owner of all the property described
therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight
land which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of said certificate
alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included." It is basic principle that prescription does not
run against the government. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,25 we held:

When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its own
rights and recover its own property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or
limitation. . .

Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted
to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie
against the State in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State.
The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.

We further uphold the Court of Appeals in ruling that petitioners-applicants presented no substantial
evidence that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the entire area in question, in the concept of owner since June
12, 1945, or prior thereto.

Petitioners presented Pedro Bernardo, their common predecessor-in-interest, as witness. Bernardo

testified, as follows:

Q Before this land was sold to Potenciana Espiritu, how long have you owned this land before
you sold this to Potenciana Espiritu?

A I have been the owner of this property for 25 years.

Q Before the same was sold to Potenciana Espiritu what did you do with the land when you
were still the owner of the land?

A The land is devoted to planting of palay.

Q Do you have a tenant who till[s] the land for you?

A The tenant died.

Q Did he die before you sold the property or after?

A After I sold the property to Potenciana Espiritu, the tenants died, however, he was able to
work as tenant for Potenciana for a period of about 4 or 5 years.

Q When you were in possession of this property for about a period of 25 years do you know
of any other person who have claimed right or interest?

A None that I know.

Q Can you tell us if you were in possession of the property continuously, publicly, adversely to
the whole world?
 A Yes, sir, peaceful because there is no adverse claimant. It is continuous and public and
adverse to the whole world.26

The above-quoted testimony of Pedro Bernardo is clearly insufficient. No other proof was presented
to establish Bernardo's possession and occupation of the more than three (3) hectares of land sought
to be registered. Possession is open when it is visible and apparent to a common
observer.27 Continuous possession consists of uninterrupted acts of nonpermissive possession of
property by the current occupants and their predecessors.28 To be notorious, possession must be so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public29 or at least by the people in the
vicinity of the premises.30 Mere possession of land31 and the making of vague assertions to the public
that a possessor is claiming the land32 are not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of open and
notorious possession. Bernardo failed to show that his alleged possession and occupation were of the
nature and duration required by law. Bare and general allegations, without more, do not amount to
preponderant evidence that would shift the burden to the oppositor, in this case, the
Republic.33 Further, it militates against the claim of actual possession under a claim of ownership since
June 1945, that the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 1980, or five (5)
years before the filing of the application.34

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petitions of Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation, substituted by Pelagia

Beltran, and Virginia Malolos, and Aladdin F. Trinidad and Aquilina C. Bonzon are DENIED. The Court
of Appeals' November 14, 1997 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 23592 and December 22, 1999
Resolution are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17645 October 30, 1962

JULIANA ZAPATA, applicant-appellee,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, opponent-appellant.

Abel de Ocera for applicant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for opponent-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

It appears that Juliana Zapata owns two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Santo Tomas,
province of Pampanga, adjoining a non-navigable and non-floatable river called the Candalaga Creek.
The two parcels are designated as Lot No. 25 and the northern part of Lot No. 16 of the Cadastral
Survey of San Fernando, Pampanga.1 The first lot contains a superficial area of 6,592 square meters
and is registered in her name, as show by transfer certificate of title No. 12907 issued by the Register
of Deeds in and for the province of Pampanga (Exhibit A). Her ownership or title to a part of Lot No.
16 was confirmed by a decree entered on 21 November 1955 by the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga ordering that the "remaining portion of Lot No. 16 with an area of 474 square meters" be
registered "in the name of Juliana Zapata" [(Exhibit A-1]; Cad. case No. 1, G.L. R.O. Cad. Record No.
137).

In 1915, when the cadastral survey of San Fernando was begun, the width of the Candalaga Creek
adjoining the two parcels of land owned by Juliana Zapata was about 90 or to 100 meters. At present,
the width is 15 meters because soil had been accumulated by the water current of the river on the
banks of Lot No. 25 and of that part of Lot No. 16 owned by Juliana Zapata. The accreted land is
delimited in plan Psu-140515 and designated as Lot 1, 2 and 3, the first containing an area of 6,260
square meters, the second, 449 and the third, 2,238 (Exhibit B) and described in the technical
descriptions (Exhibit C).

In a verified petition filed on 16 June 1956 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Juliana Zapata
claims that the aforesaid three lots belong to her by accretion, was provided for in article 457 of the
Civil Code, and prays that the same be registered in her name under the Land Registration Act (Land
Reg. Case No. N-273, L. R. C. rec. No. 1167). On 19 October 1956 on her motion the court entered
an order of general default against all persons except the Director of Lands. On 24 October 1956 the
Director of Lands objected to the petition and prayed that the registration of the three lots in the name
of Jualiana Zapata be denied and that they be declared to form part of the public domain.

After trial, on 26 December 1956 the court rendered judgment, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court, overruling the opposition of the Director of Lands, and confirming
the order of general default herein entered, and the applicant's title to the aforesaid Lots Nos.
1, 2 and 3, referred to in plan Psu-140515, aforecited, hereby orders that the same be
registered in the name of Juliana Zapata, the herein applicant . . . . Once this decision becomes
final, let the corresponding decree issue.

The Court of Appeals certified to this Court the appeal taken by the Director of Lands because only
questions of law are involved.

The appellant contends that article 457 of the Civil Code providing that —

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters,

cannot apply and does not support the appellee's claim that the accretion or deposit of alluvial soil,
which is delimited in plan Psu-140515 and designated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, belongs to her as riparian
owner, because such accretion it "was not due to the natural effect of the current but was artificially
induced on account of the erection of the fish traps on the creek." The contention cannot be sustained.
The appellant does not dispute that the accreted land delimited in plan Psu-140515 and designated
as Lots 1, 2 and 3 adjoining Lot No. 25 and that part of Lot No. 16. both owned by the appellee, had
been formed gradually due to the effect of the water current of the Candalaga Creek, but claims that
the accretion was artificially brought about by the setting up of fish traps, such as salag net,
bunuan (Bamboo trap), sabat (cutting of channels) and fencing that the fishermen had built in the
stream. True, those fish traps might have slowed down the current of the Candalaga Creek and might
have brought about or caused the accretion, but as there is no evidence to show that the setting up or
erection of the fish trap was expressly intended or designed to cause or bring about the accretion, the
appellee may still invoke the benefit of the provisions of Article 457 of the Civil Code to supper her
claim of title thereto. Moreover, the fishermen who since 1894 used to set up fish traps in the creek
(P. 7 t.s.n.), later on secured permit from the Government that auctioned off the right or license to set
up fish traps in the creek (p. 6, t.s.n.), and the setting up of such fish traps stopped or was discontinued
even before 1926 (p. 7 t.s.n.), all go to show that the alluvial accretion was no entirely due to the
setting up of such fish traps.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO

TAPIA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS.
JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS,
HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M.
GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official
and/or private capacities, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHTS OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY; ARTICLE 457; REQUISITES.- In the case of Meneses
vs. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457
of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action
of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place
is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on
alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of
waters.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.- Where the accretion was
formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding petitioner's land, it cannot be
claimed that the accumulation was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or the current of the creek and the river. In Hilario vs. City of
Manila, this Court held that the word current indicates the participation of the body of
water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Not having met the first
and second requirements of the rules of alluvion, petitioners cannot claim the rights
of a riparian owner.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THAT DEPOSIT IS DUE TO THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER,
MANDATORY.- InRepublic vs. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the
deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus,
in Tiongco vs. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the
natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the
consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-
made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In the case at bar, the subject
land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co.
consequent to its sawmill operations.
4. ID.; PUBLIC LANDS; FINDINGS AS SUCH BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS,
RESPECTED.- The mere filing of the Miscellaneous Sales Application constituted an
admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of
a Survey Plan wherein said land was described as an orchard. Furthermore, the
Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed
by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance
with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands.This Court has often
enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not
only respect but even finality. Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court.
5. ID.; PUBLIC LAND LAW; JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC LANDS.- Having
determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well
as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction
over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law. Under Sections 3 and 4
thereof, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over public
lands. Here respondent Palad as Director of Lands, is authorized to exercise
executive control over any form of concession, disposition and management of the
lands of the public domain.He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under
the circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of fact. In the case
of Calibo vs. Ballesteros, this Court held that where, in the disposition of public lands,
the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly
acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one
of judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXHAUSTED IN CASE AT
BAR.- The administrative remedies have been exhausted.Petitioners could not have
intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of respondent Hilario who
was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and
by authority of the Director of Lands." It would be incongruous to appeal the decision
of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau
of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. In any case, respondent
Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the Bureau of
Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration by
affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion as
an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the case ofHamoy
vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this Court held that the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside
the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving
public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to
have acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Manolo L. Tagarda, Sr. for petitioners.
Arturo R. Legaspi for private respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge

the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint
by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for
annulment of the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the
Bureau of Lands regarding a parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted
administrative remedies before having recourse to the courts.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod,
Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-
up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the
subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped
paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment
with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered
against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after
the same became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of
judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed
the same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but
private respondents filed another case for certiorari with prayer for restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally
enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they
occupied.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the
survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released
to the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of
Lands.
In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera,
respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered
a report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-
D (equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled
and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto
Hilario rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of
Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private
respondents who, if qualified, may file public land applications covering their respective
portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio,
Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad
then ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove
whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private
respondents be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners
Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the
RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent
Gillera, report and recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario,
order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of
execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the
Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the
complaint.Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the approval
of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands.Hence, factual findings
made by the Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be
controlling as the preparation and approval of said survey plans belong to the Director of
Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.[1]
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed
by Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same
had been acted upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-
Charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case does not fall within the
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also held that there
was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued and
executed.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
 WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE
MATTER;
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR.,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE DECISION OF
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT FOR
ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.
The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or
not the subject land is public land. Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land
being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which
provides:

"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters."

In the case of Meneses v. CA,[2] this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring
property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1)
that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the
rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current
of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the
above-mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was
formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. [3] It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was
gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila,[4] this Court held
that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow
of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and
second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian
owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped
from denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales
Application MSA (G-6) 571.[5] The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission
that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey Plan
No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which was conducted
as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said
land was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was, however,
controverted by respondent Labis in his investigation report to respondent Hilario based
on the findings of his ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of
Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River.The investigation report also
states that except for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole
area is fully occupied by a part of a big concrete bodega of petitioners and several
residential houses made of light materials, including those of private respondents which
were erected by themselves sometime in the early part of 1978. [6]
Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area
which was formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river,
in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands.[7] This Court
has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but even finality.[8]Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court.[9]
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made
or artificial. In Republic v. CA,[10] this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit
should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable.This excludes from
Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently,
alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et
al.,[11] where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of
the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate
intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public
domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust
by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.[12] Even if this Court
were to take into consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the
result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and
other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his
land,[13] the same would still be part of the public domain.
Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands,
as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have
Jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law.Accordingly, the
court a quo dismissed petitioners' complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been
exhausted.Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the
decision of respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of The Bureau of
Lands.Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Director of Lands." [14] It would
be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands
acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands.
 In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-
Charge" of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion
for reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent's Hilario's decision, he was acting
on said motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the
case of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,[15] This Court held that
the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside
the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving public
lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot therefore, be said to have acted beyond
the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.[16]
As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being
an artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority
and control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law
(C.A. No. 141) which states, thus:

"Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive officer charged
with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands who shall act under his
immediate control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management
of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources."

In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or

capriciousness in the execution order of public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the
Director of Lands. This Court finds otherwise since said decision was based on the
conclusive finding that the subject land was public land. Thus, this Court agrees with the
Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands acted within his rights when he issued the
assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to
vacate the subject land practically changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It
is incorrect for petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the
subject land to private respondents Salasalans and Rayabas as they had not yet been
issued patents or titles over the subject land. The execution order merely directed the
segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject land which was actually being
occupied by private respondents before they were ejected from it. Based on the finding
that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually occupying the
subject land instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in
the exercise of this administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate the subject
land on the ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants
thereof.
While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied
by them, they nevertheless filed their protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous
Sales Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an application as they were
in fact directed to do so.In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely
implements respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that petitioners' own application
still has to be given due course.[17]
As Director of lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control
over any form of concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public
domain.[18] He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances
as long as they are based on the findings of fact.
In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros,[19] this Court held that where, in the disposition of
public lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he
clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is
one of judgment, but not an act or grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus,
except for the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, this Court finds no
reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.