Loucks v. Standard Oil Co(p.

410)
Brief Fact Summary: Loucks was killed in Massachusetts when he was run down
by an employee of Standard Oil (Defendant). His administrator (Plaintiff) brought
a wrongful death suit in New York based on the Massachusetts wrongful death
statute.
Synopsis of Rule of Law: A right of action created by the law of a neighboring state
is enforceable in any other state unless the law is penal in the international sense
or enforcement of the right would violate the strong public policy of the forum.
Facts: Loucks was killed when a negligent driver employed by Standard Oil
(Defendant) ran him down. The accident took place in Massachusetts, but he was
a resident of New York, and his administrator (Plaintiff) brought a suit for
wrongful death in New York. The suit was based on the Massachusetts wrongful
death statute, which provided a minimum recovery of $500 and a maximum
recovery of $10,000 with the amount of damages awarded to be based on the
degree of fault of the defendant. Standard Oil (Defendant) moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the Massachusetts Statute was penal in nature and
therefore unenforceable in New York.
Issue: May a right created by statute in one state be enforceable in another state
if the enforcement of the right would not violate the public policy of the forum
and the underlying statute is not penal in nature?
Held: Yes. One state’s penal laws are not enforceable in any other state.
Whether a statute is penal depends on the type of liability it creates. Where the
penalty is awarded to the state or a member of the public is suing in the interest
of the whole community to right a public wrong, the statute and/or recovery is
penal. While this statute is penal in the sense that damages are awarded on the
basis of the defendant’s conduct rather than the plaintiff’s measure of damages,
the right to recover is private and therefore the statute is not penal in the
international sense. The public policy of New York is not violated by the
enforcement of the right, as New York recognizes the right of survivors to recover
for wrongful death. The fact that the Massachusetts Statute is different in the
way it is enforced does not make the Massachusetts Statute wrong. The forum
may refuse to enforce a right based on a foreign statute only where enforcement
would violate an express strong public policy of the forum. That is not the case
here and since the Statute is not penal in the international sense, there is no bar
to its being enforced in New York. Judgment reversed and order of the Special
Term affirmed.
Discussion: Note that the forum has much wider latitude in applying its own
public policy to deny relief where the original action is being brought and where it
is not a suit on a judgment obtained somewhere else.

GODARD vs. GRAY(p. 530)

Facts: Plaintiffs Godar are Frenchmen sued the defendants, who are Englishmen,
on a charter party made atSunderland, which charter party contained the
following clause: "Penalty for non-performance of this agreement,estimated
amount of freight." The French Court below, treating this clause as fixing the
amount of liquidated dam-ages, gave judgment against the defendants for the
amount of freight on two voyages. On appeal, the superior Courtreduced the
amount to the estimated freight of one voyage, giving as their reason that the
charter party itself and thetribunal proceeds to observe that the amount thus
decreed was after all more than sufficient to cover all the plaintiffs'loss. All parties
in France seem to have taken the word for granted in the charter party which is to
be understood intheir natural meaning,
However in English law is accurately expressed that passage been brought to
the notice of the French tribunal,it would have known that in an English charter
party, as is there stated, "Such a clause is not the absolute limit of damages on
either side; the party may, if he thinks fit, ground his action upon the other
clauses or covenants, andmay, in such action, recover damages beyond
the amount of the penalty, if in justice they shall be found to exceed it.On the
other hand, if the party sue on such a penal clause, he cannot, in effect, recover
more than the damageactually sustained." But it was not brought to the notice of
the French tribunal that according to the interpretation putby the English law on
such a contract, a penal clause of this sort was in fact idle and inoperative. If it
had been, theywould, probably, have interpreted the English contract made in
England according to the English construction.

ISSUE: whether this is a bar to the action brought in England to enforce that
judgment.
HELD:"It is not an admitted principle of the law of nations that a State is bound to
enforce within its territories the judgment of a foreign tribunal. Several of the
continental nations (including France) do not enforce the judgments of other
countries, unless where there are reciprocal treaties to that effect.However in
England and in those States which are governed by the common Iaw, such
judgments are enforced,not byvirtue of any treaty, nor by virtue of any statute,
but upon a principle very well stated by Parke, B., inWilliamsv. Jones: "Where a
Court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from one
person to another, alegal obligation aribes to pay the sum, on which an action of
debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained. It is inthis way that the
judgments of foreign and colonial Courts are supported and enforced."
A judgment in personam of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction cannot be
questioned by the parties on themerits when recognition or enforcement of
the judgment is sought in England, notwithstanding that it may have beenwrong
either in fact or law. This derived from the mode of pleading an action on a
foreign judgment in debt, and notmerely as evidence of the obligation to pay the
underlying liability

HILTON VS. GUYOT (p. 3)

Brief Fact Summary: Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff) appealed from a
federal district court holding that a French court judgment against them for
amounts allegedly owed to a French firm was enforceable without retrial on the
merits.
Synopsis of Rule of Law: No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits
of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived.
Facts: Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff), New York citizens trading in Paris,
were sued in France by Guyot (Defendant), the administrator of a French firm, for
sums allegedly owed to that firm. The Plaintiffs appeared and litigated the merits
in the French proceeding. The French court rendered a judgment against them
that was affirmed by a higher court and became final. Defendant then sought to
enforce that judgment in federal district court in New York. That court held the
judgment enforceable without retrial on the merits. The Plaintiffs then appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Issue: Do laws have any effect, of their own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived?
Held: No. No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived. No sovereign is bound, unless by
special compact, to execute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the
tribunals of another state, and if execution be sought by suit upon the judgment
or otherwise, the tribunal in which the suit is brought, or from which execution is
sought, is, on principle, at liberty to examine into the merits of such judgment,
and to give effect to it or not, as may be found just and equitable. However, the
general comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among most civilized states, by which the final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into execution, under certain
regulations and restrictions, which differ in different countries. Additionally,
judgments rendered in France, or in any foreign country, by the laws of which our
own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and
conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence
only of the justice of the plaintiffs’ claim. Reversed.
Discussion: The Court’s decision in Hilton v. Guyot reflects the traditional rule of
reciprocity. According to this concept, foreign nation judgments were granted the
same or comparable treatment as American judgments were given by the
judgment nation. Since the Court in Hilton found that French courts would not
have enforced or executed a judgment rendered in this country, it therefore held
that the French judgment at issue should be nonconclusive here.

Phil. Aluminum Wheels inc. vs. FASGI Enterprises

Facts: In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of California, USA, entered into a contract with Philippine
Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a Philippine corporation, whereby the latter
agrees to deliver 8,594 wheels to FASGI. FASGI received the wheels and so it paid
PAWI $216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that the wheels are defective
and did not comply with certain US standards. So in 1979, FASGI sued PAWI in a
California court. In 1980, a settlement was reached but PAWI failed to comply
with the terms of the agreement. A second agreement was made but PAWI was
again remiss in its obligation. The agreement basically provides that PAWI shall
return the purchase price in installment and conversely, FASGI shall return the
wheel in installment. PAWI was only able to make two installments (which were
actually made beyond the scheduled date). FASGI also returned the
corresponding number of wheels. Eventually in 1982, FASGI sought the
enforcement of the agreement and it received a favorable judgment from the
California court. PAWI is then ordered to pay an equivalent of P252k plus
damages but FASGI was not ordered to return the remaining wheels. PAWI was
not able to comply with the court order in the US. So in 1983, FASGI filed a
complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment with RTC-Makati. Hearings
were made and in 1990, the trial judge ruled against FASGI on the ground that
the foreign judgment is tainted with fraud because FASGI was not ordered to
return the remaining wheels (unjust enrichment) and that PAWI’s American
lawyer entered into the agreements without the consent of PAWI. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced here in the
Philippines.
HELD: Yes. The judgment is valid. A valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal
may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of
action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction;
that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely
to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to
indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be
valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on
the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum.
In this case, PAWI was very well represented in the California court. PAWI’s
insistence that its American lawyer colluded with FASGI; that he entered into the
compromise agreement without PAWI’s authority is belied by the fact that PAWI
initially complied with the agreement. It did not disclaim the agreement. It sent
two installments (though belatedly) but failed to comply on the rest. It cannot
now aver that the agreement is without its authority. Further, it is just but fair for
the California court not to order FASGI to return the remaining wheels because of
PAWI’s arrears

PHILSEC INVESMENT CORP. vs. CA

FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala
International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC),
secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.In order to facilitate the payment of
the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private
respondent Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation under an Agreement, whereby
1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to
petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while
PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the
purchase price. The balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note
executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of
the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his
indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession
belonging to Ducat.As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the
entire amount covered by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly,
private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in
the United States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach of
contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the
marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the
Agreement.While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed
a complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary
Attachment” against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint
reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the
Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private
respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more
than its true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1)
litispendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and
(3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducat’s MTD, stating that “the evidentiary requirements of
the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litispendentia
in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens,” even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the
principle of litispendentia and forum non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on
the ground of litispendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S.
court?
HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati. NO
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in
several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence
of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary. Rule 39, §50 provides:
Sec. 50.Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or
conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court
were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished
copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented
thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being
litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the
judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable
under the principle of forum non conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include
forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter
of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are established,
to determine whether special circumstances” require the court’s desistance.

Klaxon Co. vs.Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.

Brief Fact Summary: Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. (Plaintiff) received judgment for
breach of contract based on Klaxon’s (Defendant) failure to manufacture and sell
particular goods. Defendant appeals that part of the order allowing interest on
the damages from when the suit was filed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law: Federal district courts are required to apply the conflict
of law rules of the state where the court sits when deciding a case based upon
diversity jurisdiction.
Facts: Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. (Plaintiff) transferred its entire business to Klaxon Co.
(Defendant) in 1918 in return for a contractual promise by Defendant to use best
efforts to promote the sale of particular items Stentor (Plaintiff) retained patent
rights for. Plaintiff was a New York corporation, Defendant a Delaware
corporation, and the agreement was executed and partially performed in New
York. Plaintiff, suing in diversity jurisdiction, brought suit against Defendant in
federal district court in Delaware in 1929 for breach of the agreement. A
judgment of $100,000 was rendered in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff then moved to
modify the judgment to add interest at the rate of six percent from the date the
action was commenced. The motion was based on a New York statute and was
granted by the district court on the grounds the issue was substantive and that
New York law governed the dispute. Defendant appealed the motion, claiming
that the district court was bound to follow the substantive law of Delaware in
diversity actions. The circuit court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the New
York rule was the “better view.”
Issue: Must federal district courts apply the conflict of law rules prevailing in the
state where the court sits when deciding a case based upon diversity jurisdiction?
Held: Yes. Federal courts cannot make independent determinations of what the
law in the state where the court sits should be, but are required to apply the
conflicts rules of the state when deciding diversity jurisdiction cases. An
independent general law of conflicts does not exist. Each state in the federal
system is free to determine whether a specified matter is to be governed by the
law of the forum or some other law. There must, therefore, be uniformity within
each state in order to avoid forum shopping between state and federal courts
within each state. The proper function of the federal courts is to determine what
the state law is, rather than what the law should be. Any other decision would
lead to a disruption of the equal administration of justice in state and federal
courts that sit in the same state and apply the same state law. Reversed and
remanded.
Discussion: The Klaxon case expands the Erie rule to include the state conflict of
law rules where they apply to outcome determinative issues. On remand, the
circuit court found that the Delaware conflicts rules referred the issue to New
York law, and so the decision remained the same through the use of differing
rules.

BORTHWICK vs. CASTRO BARTOLOME(p.543)

FACTS: Petitioner William Borthwick, an American citizen living in the Philippines,
owned real property interests in Hawaii. Inhis business dealings with private
respondent, Joseph Scallon, Borthwick issued the promissory notes now sued
upon,but failed to pay the sums owing upon maturity and despite demands. The
promissory notes provided that upondefault, action may be brought for collection
in Los Angeles, California, or at Scallon's option, in Manila or Honolulu.Borthwick
was served with summons when he was in California, pursuant to Hawaiian law
allowing service of processon a person outside the territorial confines of the
State. Because Borthwick ignored the summons, a judgment bydefault was
entered against him.However, Scallon's attempt to have the judgment executed
in Hawaii and California failed because Borthwick had noassets in those states.
Scallon then came to the Philippines and brought suit against Borthwick seeking
enforcementof the default judgment of the Hawaii court. Again, after due
proceedings, judgment by default was rendered againsthim, ordering Borthwick
to pay Scallon the amount prayed for.The court issued an amendatory order and
upon receipt by Borthwick, he moved for a new trial, alleging that thepromissory
notes did not arise from business dealings in Hawaii, nor did he own real
estate therein. He contended thatthe judgment of the court of Hawaii is
unenforceable in the Philippines because it was invalid for want of
jurisdictionover the cause of action and over his person. The motion was denied,
hence this petition.]
RULING
"It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely "presumptive
evidence of a right as between theparties," and rejection thereof may be justified,
among others, by "evidence of a want of jurisdiction" of the issuingauthority,
under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court of Hawaii hingedentirely on the existence of either of two facts in
accordance with its State laws, i.e., either Borthwick owned realproperty in
Hawaii, or the promissory notes' sued upon resulted from his business
transactions therein. Scallon'scomplaint clearly alleged both facts. Borthwick was
accorded opportunity to answer the complaint and impugn thosefacts, but he
failed to appear and was in consequence declared in default. There thus exists no
evidence in the recordof the Hawaii case upon which to lay a conclusion of lack of
jurisdiction, as Borthwick now urges.The opportunity to negate the foreign court's
competence by proving the non-existence of said jurisdictional factsestablished in
the original action was again afforded to Borthwick in the Court of First Instance
of MF kati, whereenforcement of the Hawaii judgment was sought. This time
it was the summons of the domestic court which Borthwickchose to ignore, but
with the same result: he was declared in default. And in the default judgment
subsequentlypromulgated, the Court aquodecreed enforcement of die judgment
affirming among others the jurisdictional facts,that Borthwick owned real
property in Hawaii and transacted business therein.In the light of these
antecedents, it is plain that what Borthwick seeks in essence is one more
opportunity,a third,tochallenge the jurisdiction of the Hawaii Court and the merits
of the cause of action which that Court had adjudged tohave been established
against him. This he may obtain only if he succeeds in showing that the
declaration of hisdefault was incorrect. He has unfortunately not been able to do
that; hence, the verdict must go against him."

KOSTER VS. AUTOMARK INDUSTRIES, Inc.

FACTS: Koster, a citizen of Netherlands obtained default judgement for breach of
contract in a Dutch Court against Automark, a corporation doing business in
Illinois. The case involves a contract executed in Italy for the production of goods
in Switzerland. There are no other allegations that Automark had any relationship
with the Netherlands beyond letters, telegram and telephone call involved on its
business contact with Koster.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgement is enforceable in the U.S. court.
RULING: No. The court find out that Automark did not have sufficient contact with
the Netherlands to vest that country's courts with personal jurisdiction over
Automark so as to permit enforcement of the default judgment in United States
courts. As established there are no other allegations that Automark had any
relationship with the Netherlands beyond letters, telegram and telephone call
involved on its business contact with Koster. Such does not amount to minimum
contacts to vest jurisdiction. Therefore, the default judgement cannot be
enforced.
QUERUBIN V. QUERUBIN(p.549, 557)
FACTS: In the Superior Court in Los Angeles, California, an interlocutory
judgement of divorce between plaintiff and defendant awarded custody of their
child to the plaintiff. It was established that the divorce was caused by the
infidelity of plaintiff (the wife) who now has her own children with another man.
Defendant (the husband) brought the child here in the Philippines. Hence the
plaintiff seeks to enforce the interlocutory judgement here in the Philippines.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the interlocutory judgement can be enforced here in the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the interlocutory judgement can be enforced on the basis of
reciprocity and international comity.
RULING: No. The rule is of common knowledge that the definitive judgment of a
court of another state between the same parties on the same cause of action, on
the merits of the case is conclusive, but it must be a definitive judgment on the
merits only. Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of
the question by the court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the
rights of the parties. Because an interlocutory decree does not constitute final
decision, it cannot therefore be enforced in the Philippines.
No. Under the Divorce Act No. 2710, the guilty spouse is not entitled to the
custody of minor children. The current legislation, morality and public order
interest advise that the child should be out of the care of a mother who has
violated the oath of fidelity to her husband. The judgments of foreign courts may
not be into force in the Philippines if they are contrary to the laws, customs and
public order. If such decisions, for the simple theory of reciprocity and
international comity are enough for our courts to decide on the basis of the same
base then our courts would be in poor position of having to dictate decisions
contrary to our laws, customs and public order. We believe that this Court should
not enforce a decision given by a foreign court decree that violates our laws and
sound principles of morality that inform our social structure on family
relationships.

Philippine International Shipping vs. CA

Scherk vs. Albert-Culver Co.
Summary: Scherk, a German citizen, and Alberto-Culver, a US company, entered
into a contract for the transfer of the ownership of Scherk's enterprises to
Alberto-Culver, along with all rights held by these enterprises to trademarks in
cosmetic goods. The contract contained an arbitration agreement which provided
for International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration in Paris. Alberto-
Culver commenced an action for damages and other relief in Federal District
Court in Illinois. In response, Scherk, filed a motion inter alia to stay the action
pending arbitration in Paris pursuant to the agreement of the parties. The District
Court granted a preliminary order enjoining Scherk from proceeding with
arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Scherk filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, found
that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and remanded the case to lower
courts. In so holding, the Court found that the United States’ adoption and
ratification of the NYC and its Article II(1) NYC provide strong evidence of
congressional policy to enforce international arbitration agreements. It further
held that the agreement of the parties to arbitrate any dispute arising out of their
international commercial transaction was to be respected and enforced by the
federal courts in accordance with the explicit provisions of the Federal Arbitration
Act.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS BERHAD VSCOURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:In 1985, the High Court of Malaysia ordered the PhilippineNational
Construction Corporation (PNCC) to pay $5.1 millionto Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad. This was the resultof a recovery suit filed by Asiavest against PNCC in
Malaysiafor PNCC’s failure to complete a construction project theredespite due
payment from Asiavest. Despite demand, PNCCfailed to comply with the
judgment in Malaysia hence Asiavestfiled a complaint for the enforcement of the
Malaysian rulingagainst PNCC in the Philippines. The case was filed with thePasig
RTC which eventually denied the complaint. The Courtof Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that the
foreign judgment cannot be enforced here because of want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to PNCC, collusion and/or fraud,and there is a clear
mistake of law or fact. Asiavest assailedthe arguments of PNCC on the ground that
PNCC’s counselparticipated in all the proceedings in the Malaysian Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment shouldbe enforced against
PNCC in the Philippines.
HELD:Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bareallegations of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice, collusionand/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On the
contrary, Asiavestwas able to present evidence as to the validity of
theproceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest presentedthe certified
and authenticated copies of the judgment and theorder issued by the Malaysian
Court. It also presentedcorrespondences between Asiavest’s lawyers and
PNCC’slawyers in and out of court which belied PNCC’sallegation thatthe
Malaysian court never acquired jurisdiction over it. PNCC’s
allegation of fraud is not sufficient too, further, it never invokedthe same in the
Malaysian Court.The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment theparty
must present evidence of want of jurisdiction, want ofnotice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law orfact. Otherwise, the judgment enjoys
the presumption ofvalidity so long as it was duly certified and authenticated.
Inthis case, PNCC failed to present the required evidence.

Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. V. CA (p. 535)

FACTS:
 Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp & Company (C.F.), through
its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency
Agreement, whereby the Northwest authorized the C.F. to sell its air
transportation tickets.
 March 25, 1980: Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket
sales, Northwest sued C.F. in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted
proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages
 April 11, 1980: writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department,
Tokyo District Court of Japan
 The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because Mr. Dinozo
was in Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980
  April 24, 1980: Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F. Office to serve the summons but
he refused to receive claiming that he no longer an employee
 After the 2 attempts of service were unsuccessful, Supreme Court of Japan
sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Japan> Japanese Embassy in Manila>Ministry (now
Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines>Executive Judge of the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila who ordered
Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit>C.F. Main Office
 August 28, 1980: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the
writ of summons but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
 January 29, 1981: Tokyo Court rendered judgment ordering the C.F. to
pay 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum
from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed
 March 24, 1981: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the
judgment. C.F. did not appeal so it became final and executory
 May 20, 1983: Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment a
RTC
 July 16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese Court sought to be enforced is
null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered
without due and proper notice and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon
a clear mistake of law and fact. The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court
sought in this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant considering that this is an action in personam. The
process of the Court in Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside
Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in the
case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar
 CA sustained RTC: Court agrees that if the C.F. in a foreign court is a
resident in the court of that foreign court such court could acquire
jurisdiction over the person of C.F. but it must be served in the territorial
jurisdiction of the foreign court
ISSUE: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F.
HELD: YES. instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is
AFFIRMED insofar as it denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and exemplary damages
 Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign judgment has the burden
of overcoming the presumption of its validity
 Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of
summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must
stand.
 Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with
the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, service may be made:
(1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose,
or,
(2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by
law to that effect; or
(3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
 If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the
designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives
the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him.
 Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the
government official designated by law, to wit:
o the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance
company
o the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking
corporation
o the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign
corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or
official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other
legal proccess to the corporation at its home or principal office. The
sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service.
  The service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code
 Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign
corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic
corporations
 We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a
discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject
its property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has
complied not only with every requirement of law made specially of foreign
corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made of
domestic corporations
 In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its
four duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was
filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be
deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction
of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said
courts' lawful methods of serving process.
 Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese
Court was valid not only under the processual presumption but also
because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

Priscilla Mijares et al. vs. Hon. Santiago

Facts:Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered
human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their
favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly 1.9
Billion U.S. Dollars in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous
violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final
Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying Php 410.00 as docket
and filing fees based on Rule 141, Section 7(b) where the value of the subject
matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed
a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial
Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was
capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign
court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee
was 472 Million Philippine pesos, which Petitioners had not paid.

Issue:Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee?

Ruling:Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same

amount required for “other actions not involving property”. The Regional Trial
Court of Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the
basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The
Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly
based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the
Petitioners erred in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary
estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might
lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have
jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under BatasangPambansa 129, such
courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of BatasangPambansa 129
refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an
assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter
is the foreign judgment itself. Section 16 of BatasangPambansa 129 reveals that
the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary
estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the
Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against
an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What
governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the
enforcement of foreign judgments is Section7(b)(3), involving “other actions not
involving property.”

Bachchan vs. India Abroad Publications Inc.

http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/tojmedlp13&div=5
2&id=&page=
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/tulicl1&div=15&id
=&page=
Bridgeway Corp. Vs. Citibank
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over entry of a final judgment from
Liberia.
FACTS: Bridgeway (P) got a final judgment from the Supreme Court of Liberia. In
that action, Citibank (D) maintained a branch in Monrovia, Liberia. It closed that
branch in 1992 and withdrew from the country in 1995. Before withdrawing, D
formulated a liquidation plan, which was approved by the National Bank of
Liberia. That plan was completed successfully. P had an account with D with a
balance of $189.376.66 and brought suit against D claiming that it was obligated
to pay P in US dollars and not Liberian currency. The trial court ruled in favor of D;
a person may not refuse to accept Liberian dollars unless there is an express
agreement to the contrary and that D had the right under the P-D contract to
decide what currency to pay P with. The Liberian Supreme Court reversed and
entered judgment for P. P then file suit in New York to enforce the judgment and
D removed to federal court. P moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied that motion and suasponte granted summary judgment for D. It found
that as a matter of law, the court of Liberia did not constitute a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice. P contends
that D voluntarily participated in the litigation in Liberia and thus was estopped
from challenging the impartiality of those courts.

Siedler vs. Jacobson