G.R. No.

168512 March 20, 2007

ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style COMMUNITY
DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO,1 Petitioners,
vs.
RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February 27, 2004
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia
liable for gross negligence; and its June 16, 2005 Resolution 4 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

On October 1, 1993, respondent Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the Accounting
Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (the Company). As a prerequisite for regular
employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC).
Garcia who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and
on October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test result 5 indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag: Reactive." The
result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Castro
as pathologist.

When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter
apprised her that the findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus,
based on the medical report6submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranida’s
employment for failing the physical examination.7

When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and
was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramon’s confinement, Ranida underwent
another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result 8 indicated that she is non-reactive. She
informed Sto. Domingo of this development but was told that the test conducted by CDC was more
reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa Method.

Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test conducted
on her indicated a "Negative" result.9

Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa
Method. The result indicated that she was non-reactive. 10

Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive Officer of
the Company who requested her to undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be
considered. Thus, CDC conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which indicated a "Negative"
result.11 Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC, issued a Certification correcting
the initial result and explaining that the examining medical technologist (Garcia) interpreted the
delayed reaction as positive or reactive.12

Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.

On July 25, 1994, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint 13 for damages against petitioner Garcia and a
purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation of
the results of Ranida’s examination, she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and
sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.

On September 26, 1994, respondents amended their complaint 14 by naming Castro as the "unknown
pathologist."

Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the scientific
explanation for the "false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test in his December 7, 1993 letter to the
respondents.15

For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was
referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp
signature.

On September 1, 1997,16 the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to
present sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. It held that respondents should
have presented Sto. Domingo because he was the one who interpreted the test result issued by
CDC. Likewise, respondents should have presented a medical expert to refute the testimonies of
Garcia and Castro regarding the medical explanation behind the conflicting test results on Ranida. 17

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court’s findings, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
ORDERING defendant-appellee Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. to pay plaintiff-appellant Ranida D. Salvador
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.18

The appellate court found Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag
result. On the other hand, it exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of the results.

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant petition.

The main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the trial
court, correctly found petitioner liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an incorrect
HBsAG test result.

Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages, because he followed the
appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated by his training and experience; and that
he did everything within his professional competence to arrive at an objective, impartial and
impersonal result.

At the outset, we note that the issues raised are factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or
not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari which is
limited to reviewing errors of law.19
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, 20 whereby such other person
suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care
provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have
done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; 21 if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.

Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation.

All the elements are present in the case at bar.

Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules
and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by
preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations. 22 Their
business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected
from them.

In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we found the owner of a furniture shop liable for the
destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his failure to
comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we
stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has
happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act of negligence, but also the
proximate cause of the death.23

In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to
do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured
thereby.

Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law,
provides:

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally in-charge of a registered clinical
laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly qualified in laboratory medicine and authorized by
the Secretary of Health, such authorization to be renewed annually.

No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary of Health for the operation and
maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such laboratory is under the administration, direction and
supervision of an authorized physician, as provided for in the preceding paragraph.

Corollarily, Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Administrative Order No. 49-B Series
of 1988, otherwise known as the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration,
Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines, read:

Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory:

9.1 Head of the Clinical Laboratory: The head is that person who assumes technical and
administrative supervision and control of the activities in the laboratory.
For all categories of clinical laboratories, the head shall be a licensed physician certified by the
Philippine Board of Pathology in either Anatomic or Clinical Pathology or both provided that:

(1) This shall be mandatory for all categories of free-standing clinical laboratories; all tertiary
category hospital laboratories and for all secondary category hospital laboratories located in areas
with sufficient available pathologist.

xxxx

Sec. 11. Reporting: All laboratory requests shall be considered as consultations between the
requesting physician and pathologist of the laboratory. As such all laboratory reports on various
examinations of human specimens shall be construed as consultation report and shall bear the
name of the pathologist or his associate. No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a report, orally
or in writing, whole portions thereof without a directive from the pathologist or his authorized
associate and only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative except in
emergencies when the results may be released as authorized by the pathologist.

xxxx

Sec. 25. Violations:

25.1 The license to operate a clinical laboratory may be suspended or revoked by the
Undersecretary of Health for Standards and Regulation upon violation of R.A. 4688 or the rules and
regulations issued in pursuance thereto or the commission of the following acts by the persons
owning or operating a clinical laboratory and the persons under their authority.

(1) Operation of a Clinical Laboratory without a certified pathologist or qualified licensed physician
authorized by the Undersecretary of Health or without employing a registered medical technologist
or a person not registered as a medical technologist in such a position.

And Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise known as The Philippine Medical Technology Act of
1969, reads:

Section 29. Penal Provisions.- Without prejudice to the provision of the Medical Act of 1959, as
amended relating to illegal practice of Medicine, the following shall be punished by a fine of not less
than two thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less than six
months nor more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court:

xxxx

(b) Any medical technologist, even if duly registered, who shall practice medical technology in the
Philippines without the necessary supervision of a qualified pathologist or physician authorized by
the Department of Health;

From the foregoing laws and rules, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed
and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who
is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under
the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the results of any examination
may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the direction
of the laboratory pathologist.
These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard
clinical examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised. The public
demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory examinations
through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.

We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.

First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law,
but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. 24 In the License to Open and Operate
a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Nañagas, M.D.,
Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was
named as the head of CDC.25 However, in his Answer with Counterclaim, he stated:

3. By way of affirmative and special defenses, defendant pathologist further avers and plead as
follows:

Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor an employee of the
same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant pathologist comes to the Community Diagnostic
Center when and where a problem is referred to him. Its employees are licensed under the Medical
Technology Law (Republic Act No. 5527) and are certified by, and registered with, the Professional
Regulation Commission after having passed their Board Examinations. They are competent within
the sphere of their own profession in so far as conducting laboratory examinations and are allowed
to sign for and in behalf of the clinical laboratory. The defendant pathologist, and all pathologists in
general, are hired by laboratories for purposes of complying with the rules and regulations and
orders issued by the Department of Health through the Bureau of Research and Laboratories.
Defendant pathologist does not stay that long period of time at the Community Diagnostic Center but
only periodically or whenever a case is referred to him by the laboratory. Defendant pathologist does
not appoint or select the employees of the laboratory nor does he arrange or approve their
schedules of duty.26

Castro’s infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative
supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory. "Supervision and control" means the
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units. 27

Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that:

[He] does not know, and has never known or met, the plaintiff-patient even up to this time nor has he
personally examined any specimen, blood, urine or any other tissue, from the plaintiff-patient
otherwise his own handwritten signature would have appeared in the result and not merely stamped
as shown in Annex "B" of the Amended Complaint. 28

Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of
defendant-appellee Castro.29

Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the
HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued
for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply with the
mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the
physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously
followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. 30 This was incorporated
by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another has
violated some legal provision.31

We find the Court of Appeals’ award of moral damages reasonable under the circumstances bearing
in mind the mental trauma suffered by respondent Ranida who thought she was afflicted by Hepatitis
B, making her "unfit or unsafe for any type of employment." 32 Having established her right to moral
damages, we see no reason to disturb the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Exemplary damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages,33 and attorney’s fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. 34

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 dated February 27,
2004 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. guilty of gross negligence and liable to pay to
respondents ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00
as attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 130547 October 3, 2000

LEAH ALESNA REYES, ROSE NAHDJA, JOHNNY, and minors LLOYD and KRISTINE, all
surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, LEAH ALESNA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, SISTER ROSE PALACIO, DR. MARVIE BLANES, and DR.
MARLYN RICO, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36551
1

affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IX, Cebu City which dismissed a complaint
for damages filed by petitioners against respondents.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. The other petitioners, namely,
Rose Nahdja, Johnny, Lloyd, and Kristine, all surnamed Reyes, were their children. Five days before
his death on January 8, 1987, Jorge had been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. After he
failed to get relief from some home medication he was taking, which consisted of analgesic,
antipyretic, and antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor.

On January 8, 1987, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his wife. He was attended to by
respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico, resident physician and admitting physician on duty, who gave Jorge a
physical examination and took his medical history. She noted that at the time of his admission, Jorge
was conscious, ambulatory, oriented, coherent, and with respiratory distress. Typhoid fever was then
2

prevalent in the locality, as the clinic had been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid per
month. Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered a Widal Test, a
3

standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge. Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool
examination, and malarial smear were also made. After about an hour, the medical technician
4

submitted the results of the test from which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive for typhoid
fever. As her shift was only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie
Blanes.

Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the evening. She also took Jorge’s history and
gave him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impression was that Jorge had typhoid fever.
Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with
the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. Said test was administered by nurse Josephine
Pagente who also gave the patient a dose of triglobe. As she did not observe any adverse reaction
by the patient to chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the first five hundred milligrams of said antibiotic
to be administered on Jorge at around 9:00 p.m. A second dose was administered on Jorge about
three hours later just before midnight.

At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as Jorge’s temperature rose to 41°C.
The patient also experienced chills and exhibited respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and
convulsions. Dr. Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered
hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patient’s convulsions. When he regained consciousness, the
patient was asked by Dr. Blanes whether he had a previous heart ailment or had suffered from chest
pains in the past. Jorge replied he did not. After about 15 minutes, however, Jorge again started to
5

vomit, showed restlessness, and his convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency
measures taken before and, in addition, valium was administered. Jorge, however, did not respond
to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous
membrane due to deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He was forty
years old. The cause of his death was "Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and
typhoid fever."

On June 3, 1987, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for 6

damages against respondents Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Marvie Blanes, Dr. Marlyn
Rico, and nurse Josephine Pagente. On September 24, 1987, petitioners amended their complaint
to implead respondent Mercy Community Clinic as additional defendant and to drop the name of
Josephine Pagente as defendant since she was no longer connected with respondent hospital. Their
principal contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Instead, his death was due to the
7

wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They contended that had respondent doctors exercised
due care and diligence, they would not have recommended and rushed the performance of the
Widal Test, hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and administered
chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on the patient’s compatibility with said drug.
They charged respondent clinic and its directress, Sister Rose Palacio, with negligence in failing to
provide adequate facilities and in hiring negligent doctors and nurses. 8

Respondents denied the charges. During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to limit the
issues on the following: (1) whether the death of Jorge Reyes was due to or caused by the
negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and lack of skill or foresight on the part of defendants; (2)
whether respondent Mercy Community Clinic was negligent in the hiring of its employees; and (3)
whether either party was entitled to damages. The case was then heard by the trial court during
which, in addition to the testimonies of the parties, the testimonies of doctors as expert witnesses
were presented.

Petitioners offered the testimony of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, Chief Pathologist at the Northern
Mindanao Training Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City. On January 9, 1987, Dr. Vacalares performed an
autopsy on Jorge Reyes to determine the cause of his death. However, he did not open the skull to
examine the brain. His findings showed that the gastro-intestinal tract was normal and without any
9

ulceration or enlargement of the nodules. Dr. Vacalares testified that Jorge did not die of typhoid
fever. He also stated that he had not seen a patient die of typhoid fever within five days from the
onset of the disease.

For their part, respondents offered the testimonies of Dr. Peter Gotiong and Dr. Ibarra Panopio. Dr.
Gotiong is a diplomate in internal medicine whose expertise is microbiology and infectious diseases.
He is also a consultant at the Cebu City Medical Center and an associate professor of medicine at
the South Western University College of Medicine in Cebu City. He had treated over a thousand
cases of typhoid patients. According to Dr. Gotiong, the patient’s history and positive Widal Test
results ratio of 1:320 would make him suspect that the patient had typhoid fever. As to Dr. Vacalares’
observation regarding the absence of ulceration in Jorge’s gastro-intestinal tract, Dr. Gotiong said
that such hyperplasia in the intestines of a typhoid victim may be microscopic. He noted that since
the toxic effect of typhoid fever may lead to meningitis, Dr. Vacalares’ autopsy should have included
an examination of the brain. 10

The other doctor presented was Dr. Ibarra Panopio, a member of the American Board of Pathology,
examiner of the Philippine Board of Pathology from 1978 to 1991, fellow of the Philippine Society of
Pathologist, associate professor of the Cebu Institute of Medicine, and chief pathologist of the
Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Hospital in Toledo City. Dr. Panopio stated that although he was partial
to the use of the culture test for its greater reliability in the diagnosis of typhoid fever, the Widal Test
may also be used. Like Dr. Gotiong, he agreed that the 1:320 ratio in Jorge’s case was already the
maximum by which a conclusion of typhoid fever may be made. No additional information may be
deduced from a higher dilution. He said that Dr. Vacalares’ autopsy on Jorge was incomplete and
11

thus inconclusive.

On September 12, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision absolving respondents from the
charges of negligence and dismissing petitioners’ action for damages. The trial court likewise
dismissed respondents’ counterclaim, holding that, in seeking damages from respondents,
petitioners were impelled by the honest belief that Jorge’s death was due to the latter’s negligence.

Petitioners brought the matter to the Court of Appeals. On July 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence this petition.

Petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN

IT RULED THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN

IT MADE AN UNFOUNDED ASSUMPTION THAT THE LEVEL OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IS
LOWER IN ILIGAN CITY.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED FOR A
LESSER STANDARD OF CARE AND DEGREE OF DILIGENCE FOR MEDICAL PRACTICE
IN ILIGAN CITY WHEN IT APPRECIATE[D] NO DOCTOR’S NEGLIGENCE IN THE
TREATMENT OF JORGE REYES.

Petitioner’s action is for medical malpractice. This is a particular form of negligence which consists in
the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill
which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like
surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that
12

the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. There are
13

thus four elements involved in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate
causation.

In the present case, there is no doubt that a physician-patient relationship existed between
respondent doctors and Jorge Reyes. Respondents were thus duty-bound to use at least the same
level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is breach of this duty which constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of
14

medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert
testimony is essential. Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is
usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. 15

Res Ipsa Loquitur

There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. As held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals: 16

Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure,
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony
is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the
general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the
domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind
which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons
of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated
upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts
of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by
any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the
patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference
of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitor is allowed because there is no other way, under usual
and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a
foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the
body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when
another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the
removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient was under the influence of anesthetic,
during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others. 17

Petitioners asserted in the Court of Appeals that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the
present case because Jorge Reyes was merely experiencing fever and chills for five days and was
fully conscious, coherent, and ambulant when he went to the hospital. Yet, he died after only ten
hours from the time of his admission.

This contention was rejected by the appellate court.

Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur were present,
namely: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.18

The contention is without merit. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the Ramos case,
the question was whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist, and a hospital should be made liable for
the comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. In that case, the patient was
19

given anesthesia prior to her operation. Noting that the patient was neurologically sound at the time
of her operation, the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental brain damage does not
normally occur in a gallblader operation in the absence of negligence of the anesthesiologist. Taking
judicial notice that anesthesia procedures had become so common that even an ordinary person
could tell if it was administered properly, we allowed the testimony of a witness who was not an
expert. In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical
assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death. Prior to
his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the
analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering
from a serious illness and professional medical help came too late for him.

Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a layman so as to
justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by
respondents of the standard of care required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of the
correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.As
held in Ramos:

. . . . Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be
cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge
and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily
have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to
secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service
or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must
be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not
correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. 20

Specific Acts of Negligence

We turn to the question whether petitioners have established specific acts of negligence allegedly
committed by respondent doctors.

Petitioners contend that: (1) Dr. Marlyn Rico hastily and erroneously relied upon the Widal test,
diagnosed Jorge’s illness as typhoid fever, and immediately prescribed the administration of the
antibiotic chloromycetin; and (2) Dr. Marvie Blanes erred in ordering the administration of the
21

second dose of 500 milligrams of chloromycetin barely three hours after the first was
given. Petitioners presented the testimony of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, Chief Pathologist of the
22

Northern Mindanao Training Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who performed an autopsy on the body
of Jorge Reyes. Dr. Vacalares testified that, based on his findings during the autopsy, Jorge Reyes
did not die of typhoid fever but of shock undetermined, which could be due to allergic reaction or
chloromycetin overdose. We are not persuaded.

First. While petitioners presented Dr. Apolinar Vacalares as an expert witness, we do not find him to
be so as he is not a specialist on infectious diseases like typhoid fever. Furthermore, although he
may have had extensive experience in performing autopsies, he admitted that he had yet to do one
on the body of a typhoid victim at the time he conducted the postmortem on Jorge Reyes. It is also
plain from his testimony that he has treated only about three cases of typhoid fever. Thus, he
testified that:
23

ATTY. PASCUAL:

Q Why? Have you not testified earlier that you have never seen a patient who died of typhoid fever?
A In autopsy. But, that was when I was a resident physician yet.

Q But you have not performed an autopsy of a patient who died of typhoid fever?

A I have not seen one.

Q And you testified that you have never seen a patient who died of typhoid fever within five days?

A I have not seen one.

Q How many typhoid fever cases had you seen while you were in the general practice of medicine?

A In our case we had no widal test that time so we cannot consider that the typhoid fever is like this
and like that. And the widal test does not specify the time of the typhoid fever.

Q The question is: how many typhoid fever cases had you seen in your general practice regardless
of the cases now you practice?

A I had only seen three cases.

Q And that was way back in 1964?

A Way back after my training in UP.

Q Clinically?

A Way back before my training.

He is thus not qualified to prove that Dr. Marlyn Rico erred in her diagnosis. Both lower courts were
therefore correct in discarding his testimony, which is really inadmissible.

In Ramos, the defendants presented the testimony of a pulmonologist to prove that brain injury was
due to oxygen deprivation after the patient had bronchospasms triggered by her allergic response to
24

a drug, and not due to faulty intubation by the anesthesiologist. As the issue was whether the
25

intubation was properly performed by an anesthesiologist, we rejected the opinion of the

pulmonologist on the ground that he was not: (1) an anesthesiologist who could enlighten the court
about anesthesia practice, procedure, and their complications; nor (2) an allergologist who could
properly advance expert opinion on allergic mediated processes; nor (3) a pharmacologist who could
explain the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the drug allegedly responsible for the bronchospasms.

Second. On the other hand, the two doctors presented by respondents clearly were experts on the
subject. They vouched for the correctness of Dr. Marlyn Rico’s diagnosis. Dr. Peter Gotiong, a
diplomate whose specialization is infectious diseases and microbiology and an associate professor
at the Southwestern University College of Medicine and the Gullas College of Medicine, testified that
he has already treated over a thousand cases of typhoid fever. According to him, when a case of
26

typhoid fever is suspected, the Widal test is normally used, and if the 1:320 results of the Widal test
27

on Jorge Reyes had been presented to him along with the patient’s history, his impression would
also be that the patient was suffering from typhoid fever. As to the treatment of the disease, he
28

stated that chloromycetin was the drug of choice. He also explained that despite the measures
29

taken by respondent doctors and the intravenous administration of two doses of chloromycetin,
complications of the disease could not be discounted. His testimony is as follows: 30
ATTY. PASCUAL:

Q If with that count with the test of positive for 1 is to 320, what treatment if any would be given?

A If those are the findings that would be presented to me, the first thing I would consider would be
typhoid fever.

Q And presently what are the treatments commonly used?

A Drug of choice of chloramphenical.

Q Doctor, if given the same patient and after you have administered chloramphenical about 3 1/2
hours later, the patient associated with chills, temperature - 41 oC, what could possibly come to your
mind?

A Well, when it is change in the clinical finding, you have to think of complication.

Q And what will you consider on the complication of typhoid?

A One must first understand that typhoid fever is toximia. The problem is complications are caused
by toxins produced by the bacteria . . . whether you have suffered complications to think of -- heart
toxic myocardities; then you can consider a toxic meningitis and other complications and
perforations and bleeding in the ilium.

Q Even that 40-year old married patient who received medication of chloromycetin of 500 milligrams
intravenous, after the skin test, and received a second dose of chloromycetin of 500 miligrams, 3
hours later, the patient developed chills . . . rise in temperature to 41 oC, and then about 40 minutes
later the temperature rose to 100oF, cardiac rate of 150 per minute who appeared to be coherent,
restless, nauseating, with seizures: what significance could you attach to these clinical changes?

A I would then think of toxemia, which was toxic meningitis and probably a toxic meningitis because
of the high cardiac rate.

Q Even if the same patient who, after having given intramuscular valium, became conscious and
coherent about 20 minutes later, have seizure and cyanosis and rolling of eyeballs and vomitting . . .
and death: what significance would you attach to this development?

A We are probably dealing with typhoid to meningitis.

Q In such case, Doctor, what finding if any could you expect on the post-mortem examination?

A No, the finding would be more on the meninges or covering of the brain.

Q And in order to see those changes would it require opening the skull?

A Yes.

As regards Dr. Vacalares’ finding during the autopsy that the deceased’s gastro-intestinal tract was
normal, Dr. Rico explained that, while hyperplasia in the payer’s patches or layers of the small
31
intestines is present in typhoid fever, the same may not always be grossly visible and a microscope
was needed to see the texture of the cells. 32

Respondents also presented the testimony of Dr. Ibarra T. Panopio who is a member of the
Philippine and American Board of Pathology, an examiner of the Philippine Board of Pathology, and
chief pathologist at the MetroCebu Community Hospital, Perpetual Succor Hospital, and the Andres
Soriano Jr. Memorial Medical Center. He stated that, as a clinical pathologist, he recognized that the
Widal test is used for typhoid patients, although he did not encourage its use because a single test
would only give a presumption necessitating that the test be repeated, becoming more conclusive at
the second and third weeks of the disease. He corroborated Dr. Gotiong’s testimony that the danger
33

with typhoid fever is really the possible complications which could develop like perforation,
hemorrhage, as well as liver and cerebral complications. As regards the 1:320 results of the Widal
34

test on Jorge Reyes, Dr. Panopio stated that no additional information could be obtained from a
higher ratio. He also agreed with Dr. Gotiong that hyperplasia in the payer’s patches may be
35

microscopic. 36

Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all known
practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the
reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good physicians. Here, Dr. Marlyn Rico did not
37

depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the due
care required under the circumstances. Though the Widal test is not conclusive, it remains a
standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and, in the present case, greater accuracy through
repeated testing was rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. The results of the
Widal test and the patient’s history of fever with chills for five days, taken with the fact that typhoid
fever was then prevalent as indicated by the fact that the clinic had been getting about 15 to 20
typhoid cases a month, were sufficient to give upon any doctor of reasonable skill the impression
that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever.

Dr. Rico was also justified in recommending the administration of the drug chloromycetin, the drug of
choice for typhoid fever. The burden of proving that Jorge Reyes was suffering from any other illness
rested with the petitioners. As they failed to present expert opinion on this, preponderant evidence to
support their contention is clearly absent.

Third. Petitioners contend that respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes, who took over from Dr. Rico, was
negligent in ordering the intravenous administration of two doses of 500 milligrams of chloromycetin
at an interval of less than three hours. Petitioners claim that Jorge Reyes died of anaphylactic
shock or possibly from overdose as the second dose should have been administered five to six
38

hours after the first, per instruction of Dr. Marlyn Rico. As held by the Court of Appeals, however:

That chloromycetin was likewise a proper prescription is best established by medical authority.
Wilson, et. al., in Harrison’s Principle of Internal Medicine, 12th ed. write that chlorampenicol (which
is the generic of chloromycetin) is the drug of choice for typhoid fever and that no drug has yet
proven better in promoting a favorable clinical response. "Chlorampenicol (Chloromycetin) is
specifically indicated for bacterial meningitis, typhoid fever, rickettsial infections, bacteriodes
infections, etc." (PIMS Annual, 1994, p. 211) The dosage likewise including the first administration of
five hundred milligrams (500 mg.) at around nine o’clock in the evening and the second dose at
around 11:30 the same night was still within medically acceptable limits, since the recommended
dose of chloromycetin is one (1) gram every six (6) hours. (cf. Pediatric Drug Handbook, 1st Ed.,
Philippine Pediatric Society, Committee on Therapeutics and Toxicology, 1996). The intravenous
route is likewise correct. (Mansser, O’Nick, Pharmacology and Therapeutics) Even if the test was not
administered by the physician-on-duty, the evidence introduced that it was Dra. Blanes who
interpreted the results remain uncontroverted. (Decision, pp. 16-17) Once more, this Court rejects
any claim of professional negligence in this regard.

....

As regards anaphylactic shock, the usual way of guarding against it prior to the administration of a
drug, is the skin test of which, however, it has been observed: "Skin testing with haptenic drugs is
generally not reliable. Certain drugs cause nonspecific histamine release, producing a weal-and-flare
reaction in normal individuals. Immunologic activation of mast cells requires a polyvalent allergen, so
a negative skin test to a univalent haptenic drug does not rule out anaphylactic sensitivity to that
drug." (Terr, "Anaphylaxis and Urticaria" in Basic and Clinical Immunology, p. 349) What all this
means legally is that even if the deceased suffered from an anaphylactic shock, this, of itself, would
not yet establish the negligence of the appellee-physicians for all that the law requires of them is that
they perform the standard tests and perform standard procedures. The law cannot require them to
predict every possible reaction to all drugs administered. The onus probandi was on the appellants
to establish, before the trial court, that the appellee-physicians ignored standard medical procedure,
prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of the
competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly situated. 39

Fourth. Petitioners correctly observe that the medical profession is one which, like the business of a
common carrier, is affected with public interest. Moreover, they assert that since the law imposes
upon common carriers the duty of observing extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers, physicians and surgeons should have the same duty toward
40

their patients. They also contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it allegedly assumed that the
41

level of medical practice is lower in Iligan City, thereby reducing the standard of care and degree of
diligence required from physicians and surgeons in Iligan City.

The standard of extraordinary diligence is peculiar to common carriers. The Civil Code provides:

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to the circumstances of each case. . . .

The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. It is a right earned
1âwphi1

through years of education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the state through
professional board examinations. Such license may, at any time and for cause, be revoked by the
government. In addition to state regulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the
Hippocratic Oath, an ancient code of discipline and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon
themselves in recognition and acceptance of their great responsibility to society. Given these
safeguards, there is no need to expressly require of doctors the observance of "extraordinary"
diligence. As it is now, the practice of medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of
diligence. And, as we have already noted, the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the
reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors
or, as the Court of Appeals called it, the reasonable "skill and competence . . . that a physician in the
same or similar locality . . . should apply."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 171127 March 11, 2015

NOEL CASUMPANG, RUBY SANGA-MIRANDA and SAN JUAN DEDIOS HOSPITAL, Petitioners,
vs.
NELSON CORTEJO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 171217

DRA. RUBY SANGA-MIRANDA, Petitioner,

vs.
NELSON CORTEJO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 171228

SAN JUAN DEDIOS HOSPITAL, Petitioner,

vs.
NELSON CORTEJO, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the three (3) consolidated petitions for review on Certiorari involving medical negligence,
1

commonly assailing the October 29, 2004 decision and the January 12, 2006 resolution of the Court
2 3

of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56400. This CA decision affirmed en totothe ruling of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 134, Makati City.

The RTC awarded Nelson Cortejo (respondent) damages in the total amount of ₱595,000.00, for the
wrongful death of his son allegedly due to the medical negligence of the petitioning doctors and the
hospital.

Factual Antecedents

The common factual antecedents are briefly summarized below.

On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the morning, Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old son,
Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to the Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because
of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and fever.
4

Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined Edmer. In her testimony, Mrs.
Cortejo narrated that in the morning of April 20, 1988, Edmer had developed a slight fever that lasted
for one day; a few hours upon discovery, she brought Edmer to their family doctor; and two hours
after administering medications, Edmer’s fever had subsided. 5

After taking Edmer’s medical history, Dr. Livelo took his vital signs, body temperature, and blood
pressure. Based on these initial examinations and the chest x-ray test that followed, Dr. Livelo
6

diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia. " Edmer’s blood was also taken for testing, typing, and
7
for purposes of administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an antibiotic medication
to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.

Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH. She used her Fortune Care card and was referred to
an accredited Fortune Care coordinator, who was then out of town. She was thereafter assigned to
Dr. Noel Casumpang (Dr. Casumpang), a pediatrician also accredited with Fortune Care. 8

At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for the first time examined Edmer in his
room. Using only a stethoscope, he confirmed the initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia." 9

At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor’s diagnosis. She
immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough but 10

Dr. Casumpang merely told her that her son’s "blood pressure is just being active," and remarked
11

that "that’s the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm." Dr. Casumpang next visited and
12

examined Edmer at 9:00 in the morning the following day. Still suspicious about his son’s illness,
13

Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang’s attention and stated that Edmer had a fever, throat
irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the
traces of blood in Edmer’s sputum. Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang
simply nodded, inquired if Edmer has an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer’s illness is
bronchopneumonia. 14

At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood
streak" prompting the respondent (Edmer’s father) to request for a doctor at the nurses’
15

station. Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Miranda-Sanga (Dr. Sanga), one of the resident
16

physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although aware that Edmer had vomited "phlegm with
blood streak," she failed to examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed it away.
She then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for examination.

Thereafter, Dr. Sanga conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer’s head, eyes, nose, throat,
lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes
that were not typical of dengue fever. Her medical findings state:
17

the patient’s rapid breathing and then the lung showed sibilant and the patient’s nose is flaring which
is a sign that the patient is in respiratory distress; the abdomen has negative finding; the patient has
low grade fever and not continuing; and the rashes in the patient’s skin were not

"Herman’s Rash" and not typical of dengue fever. 18

At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon seeing Dr. Sanga, the respondent
showed her Edmer’s blood specimen, and reported that Edmer had complained of severe stomach
pain and difficulty in moving his right leg. 19

Dr. Sanga then examined Edmer’s "sputum with blood" and noted that he was bleeding. Suspecting
that he could be afflicted with dengue, she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the liquid from
his stomach with ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an instruction not to pull out the tube, or
give the patient any oral medication.

Dr. Sanga thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out to be negative. She likewise
20

ordered the monitoring of the patient’s blood pressure and some blood tests. Edmer’s blood
pressure was later found to be normal. 21
At 4:40 in the afternoon, Dr. Sanga called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him about Edmer’s
condition. Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several procedures done including:
22

hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests.

The blood test results came at about 6:00 in the evening.

Dr. Sanga advised Edmer’s parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer was suffering from
"Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer’s room and he
recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent consented.
Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the respondent that they hire a private
nurse. The respondent, however, insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.

After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last time, checked Edmer’s
condition, found that his blood pressure was stable, and noted that he was "comfortable." The
respondent requested for an ambulance but he was informed that the driver was nowhere to be
found. This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him ₱600.00. 23

At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was transferred to
Makati Medical Center.

Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient’s clinical history and laboratory
exam results. Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that
was already in its irreversible stage.

Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988. His Death Certificate indicated the cause of
24

death as "Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."

Believing that Edmer’s death was caused by the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his doctors,
the respondent instituted an action for damages against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr.
Casumpang and Dr. Sanga (collectively referred to as the "petitioners") before the RTC of Makati
City.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a decision dated May 30, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, and awarded actual
25

and moral damages, plus attorney's fees and costs.

In ruling that the petitioning doctors were negligent, the RTC found untenable the petitioning doctors’
contention that Edmer’s initial symptoms did not indicate dengue fever. It faulted them for heavily
relying on the chest x-ray result and for not considering the other manifestations that Edmer’s
parents had relayed. It held that in diagnosing and treating an illness, the physician’s conduct should
be judged not only by what he/she saw and knew, but also by what he/she could have reasonably
seen and known. It also observed that based on Edmer’s signs and symptoms, his medical history
and physical examination, and also the information that the petitioning doctors gathered from his
family members, dengue fever was a reasonably foreseeable illness; yet, the petitioning doctors
failed to take a second look, much less, consider these indicators of dengue.

The trial court also found that aside from their self-serving testimonies, the petitioning doctors did not
present other evidence to prove that they exercised the proper medical attention in diagnosing and
treating the patient, leading it to conclude that they were guilty of negligence. The RTC also held
SJDH solidarily liable with the petitioning doctors for damages based on the following findings of
facts: first, Dr. Casumpang, as consultant, is an ostensible agent of SJDH because before the
hospital engaged his medical services, it scrutinized and determined his fitness, qualifications, and
competence as a medical practitioner; and second, Dr. Sanga, as resident physician, is an employee
of SJDH because like Dr. Casumpang, the hospital, through its screening committee, scrutinized and
determined her qualifications, fitness,and competence before engaging her services; the hospital
also exercised control over her work.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
ordering the latter to pay solidarily and severally plaintiff the following:

(1) Moral damages in the amount of ₱500,000.00;

(2) Costs of burial and funeral in the amount of ₱45,000.00;

(3) Attorney’s fees of ₱50,000.00; and

(4) Cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.

The petitioners appealed the decision to the CA.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its decision dated October 29, 2004, the CA affirmed en toto the RTC’s ruling, finding that SJDH
and its attending physicians failed to exercise the minimum medical care, attention, and treatment
expected of an ordinary doctor under like circumstances.

The CA found the petitioning doctors’ failure to read even the most basic signs of "dengue fever"
expected of an ordinary doctor as medical negligence. The CA also considered the petitioning
doctors’ testimonies as self-serving, noting that they presented no other evidence to prove that they
exercised due diligence in diagnosing Edmer’s illness.

The CA likewise found Dr. Rodolfo Jaudian’s (Dr. Jaudian) testimony admissible. It gave credence to
his opinion that: (1) given the exhibited symptoms of the patient, dengue fever should definitely be
26

considered, and bronchopneumonia could be reasonably ruled out; and (2) dengue fever could have
been detected earlier than 7:30 in the evening of April 23, 1988 because the symptoms were already
evident; and agreed with the RTC that the petitioning doctors should not have solely relied on the
chest-x-ray result, as it was not conclusive.

On SJDH’s solidary liability, the CA ruled that the hospital’s liability is based on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. The CA opined that the control which the hospital exercises over its consultants, the
hospital’s power to hire and terminate their services, all fulfill the employer-employee relationship
requirement under Article 2180.

Lastly, the CA held that SJDH failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the hiring and the supervision of its physicians.
The petitioners separately moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied their motion in its
resolution of January 12, 2006; hence, the present consolidated petitions pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

The Petitions

I. Dr. Casumpang’s Position (G.R. No. 171127)

Dr. Casumpang contends that he gave his patient medical treatment and care to the best of his
abilities, and within the proper standard of care required from physicians under similar
circumstances. He claims that his initial diagnosis of bronchopneumonia was supported by the chest
x-ray result.

Dr. Casumpang also contends that dengue fever occurs only after several days of confinement. He
alleged that when he had suspected that Edmer might be suffering from dengue fever, he
immediately attended and treated him.

Dr. Casumpang likewise raised serious doubts on Dr. Jaudian’s credibility, arguing that the CA erred
in appreciating his testimony as an expert witness since he lacked the necessary training, skills, and
experience as a specialist in dengue fever cases.

II. Dr. Sanga’s Position (G.R. No. 171217)

In her petition, Dr. Sanga faults the CA for holding her responsible for Edmer’s wrong diagnosis,
stressing that the function of making the diagnosis and undertaking the medical treatment devolved
upon Dr. Casumpang, the doctor assigned to Edmer, and who confirmed "bronchopneumonia."

Dr. Sanga also alleged that she exercised prudence in performing her duties as a physician,
underscoring that it was her professional intervention that led to the correct diagnosis of "Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever." Furthermore, Edmer’s Complete Blood Count (CBC) showed leukopenia and
an increase in balance as shown by the differential count, demonstrating that Edmer’s infection,
more or less, is of bacterial and not viral in nature.

Dr. Sanga as well argued that there is no causal relation between the alleged erroneous diagnosis
and medication for "Bronchopneumonia," and Edmer’s death due to "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever."

Lastly, she claimed that Dr. Jaudianis not a qualified expert witness since he never presented any
evidence of formal residency training and fellowship status in Pediatrics.

III. SJDH’s Position (G.R. No. 171228)

SJDH, on the other hand, disclaims liability by asserting that Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Sanga are
mere independent contractors and "consultants" (not employees) of the hospital. SJDH alleges that
since it did not exercise control or supervision over the consultants’ exercise of medical profession,
there is no employer-employee relationship between them, and consequently, Article 2180 of the
Civil Code does not apply.

SJDH likewise anchored the absence of employer-employee relationship on the following

circumstances: (1) SJDH does not hire consultants; it only grants them privileges to admit patients in
the hospital through accreditation; (2) SJDH does not pay the consultants wages similar to an
ordinary employee; (3) the consultants earn their own professional fees directly from their patients;
SJDH does not fire or terminate their services; and (4) SJDH does not control or interfere with the
manner and the means the consultants use in the treatment of their patients. It merely provides them
with adequate space in exchange for rental payment.

Furthermore, SJDH claims that the CA erroneously applied the control test when it treated the
hospital’s practice of accrediting consultants as an exercise of control. It explained that the control
contemplated by law is that which the employer exercises over the: (i) end result; and the (ii) manner
and means to be used to reach this end, and not any kind of control, however significant, in
accrediting the consultants.

SJDH moreover contends that even if the petitioning doctors are considered employees and not
merely consultants of the hospital, SJDH cannot still be held solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code because it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in their selection and
supervision as shown by the following: (1) the adequate measures that the hospital undertakes to
ascertain the petitioning doctors’ qualifications and medical competence; and (2) the documentary
evidence that the petitioning doctors presented to prove their competence in the field of pediatrics. 27

SJDH likewise faults the CA for ruling that the petitioning doctors are its agents, claiming that this
theory, aside from being inconsistent with the CA’s finding of employment relationship, is unfounded
because: first, the petitioning doctors are independent contractors, not agents of SJDH; and second,
as a medical institution, SJDH cannot practice medicine, much more, extend its personality to
physicians to practice medicine on its behalf.

Lastly, SJDH maintains that the petitioning doctors arrived at an intelligently deduced and correct
diagnosis. It claimed that based on Edmer's signs and symptoms at the time of admission (i.e., one
day fever, bacterial infection, and lack of hemorrhagic manifestations ), there was no reasonable
28 29 30

indication yet that he was suffering from dengue fever, and accordingly, their failure to diagnose
dengue fever, does not constitute negligence on their part.

The Case for the Respondent

In his comment, the respondent submits that the issues the petitioners raised are mainly factual in
nature, which a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Courts does not allow.

In any case, he contends that the petitioning doctors were negligent in conducting their medical
examination and diagnosis based on the following: (1) the petitioning doctors failed to timely
diagnose Edmer’s correct illness due to their non-observance of the proper and acceptable standard
of medical examination; (2) the petitioning doctors’ medical examination was not comprehensive, as
they were always in a rush; and (3) the petitioning doctors employed a guessing game in diagnosing
bronchopneumonia.

The respondent also alleges that there is a causal connection between the petitioning doctors’
negligence and Edmer’s untimely death, warranting the claim for damages.

The respondent, too, asserted that SJDH is also negligent because it was not equipped with proper
paging system, has no bronchoscope, and its doctors are not proportionate to the number of its
patients. He also pointed out that out of the seven resident physicians in the hospital, only two
resident physicians were doing rounds at the time of his son’s confinement.

The Issues
The case presents to us the following issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of precaution" in
diagnosing and in treating the patient;

2. Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarily liable with the petitioning doctors;

3. Whether or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners’ negligent

act/omission and the patient’s resulting death; and

4. Whether or not the lower courts erred in considering Dr. Rodolfo Tabangcora Jaudian as
an expert witness.

Our Ruling

We find the petition partly meritorious.

A Petition for Review on Certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is Limited to Questions of Law.

The settled rule is that the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is limited only to the review of pure questions of law. It is not the Court’s function
to inquire on the veracity of the appellate court’s factual findings and conclusions; this Court is not a
trier of facts.
31

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.32

These consolidated petitions before us involve mixed questions of fact and law. As a rule, we do not
resolve questions of fact. However, in determining the legal question of whether the respondent is
entitled to claim damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code for the petitioners’ alleged medical
malpractice, the determination of the factual issues – i.e., whether the petitioning doctors were
grossly negligent in diagnosing the patient’s illness, whether there is causal relation between the
petitioners’ act/omission and the patient’s resulting death, and whether Dr. Jaudian is qualified as an
expert witness– must necessarily be resolved. We resolve these factual questions solely for the
purpose of determining the legal issues raised.

Medical Malpractice Suit as a

Specialized Area of Tort Law

The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors’ negligence in diagnosing and treating the
deceased Edmer, the child of the respondent. It is a medical malpractice suit, an action available to
victims to redress a wrong committed by medical professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the
death of, a patient. As the term is used, the suit is brought whenever a medical practitioner or
33

health care provider fails to meet the standards demanded by his profession, or deviates from this
standard, and causes injury to the patient.

To successfully pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the deceased patient’s
heir) must prove that the doctor either failed to do what a reasonably prudent doctor would have
done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done; and the act or omission had
caused injury to the patient. The patient’s heir/s bears the burden of proving his/her cause of action.
34

The Elements of a Medical Malpractice Suit

The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.

Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions on one's conduct. It requires proof
35

of professional relationship between the physician and the patient. Without the professional
relationship, a physician owes no duty to the patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability.

A physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a physician, and 36

the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient. The establishment of this relationship is
37

consensual, and the acceptance by the physician essential. The mere fact that an individual
38

approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, advice or treatment does not create the duty of care
unless the physician agrees. 39

The consent needed to create the relationship does not always need to be express. In the absence
40

of an express agreement, a physician-patient relationship may be implied from the physician’s

affirmative action to diagnose and/or treat a patient, or in his participation in such diagnosis and/or
treatment. The usual illustration would be the case of a patient who goes to a hospital or a clinic,
41

and is examined and treated by the doctor. In this case, we can infer, based on the established and
customary practice in the medical community that a patient-physician relationship exists.

Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care follows. The doctor
accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard of care that a reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a medical condition under similar circumstances.

Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs his duties under
professional standards. This determination is both factual and legal, and is specific to each individual
case.42

If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured in body or in health, actionable malpractice
is committed, entitling the patient to damages. 43

To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation between the
negligence and the injury. This connection must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury. The injury or damage is proximately caused by the physician’s negligence when it appears,
44

based on the evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in
causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result, or a
reasonably probable consequence of the physician’s negligence. 45

a. The Relationship Between Dr. Casumpang and Edmer

In the present case, the physician-patient relationship between Dr. Casumpang and Edmer was
created when the latter’s parents sought the medical services of Dr. Casumpang, and the latter
knowingly accepted Edmer as a patient. Dr. Casumpang’s acceptance is implied from his affirmative
examination, diagnosis and treatment of Edmer. On the other hand, Edmer’s parents, on their son’s
behalf, manifested their consent by availing of the benefits of their health care plan, and by
accepting the hospital’s assigned doctor without objections.
b. The Relationship Between Dr. Sanga and Edmer

With respect to Dr. Sanga, her professional relationship with Edmer arose when she assumed the
obligation to provide resident supervision over the latter. As second year resident doctor tasked to do
rounds and assist other physicians, Dr. Sanga is deemed to have agreed to the creation of
physician-patient relationship with the hospital’s patients when she participated in the diagnosis and
prescribed a course of treatment for Edmer.

The undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Sanga examined Edmer twice (at around 12:00 and 3:30 in
the afternoon of April 23, 1988),and in both instances, she prescribed treatment and participated in
the diagnosis of Edmer’s medical condition. Her affirmative acts amounted to her acceptance of the
physician-patient relationship, and incidentally, the legal duty of care that went with it.

In Jarcia, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, the Court found the doctors who merely passed by and
46

were requested to attend to the patient, liable for medical malpractice. It held that a physician-patient
relationship was established when they examined the patient, and later assured the mother that
everything was fine.

In the US case of Mead v. Legacy Health System, the Court also considered the rendering of an
47

opinion in the course of the patient’s care as the doctor’s assent to the physician-patient relationship.
It ruled that the relationship was formed because of the doctor’s affirmative action. Likewise, in Wax
v. Johnson, the court found that a physician patient relationship was formed between a physician
48

who "contracts, agrees, undertakes, or otherwise assumes" the obligation to provide resident
supervision at a teaching hospital, and the patient with whom the doctor had no direct or indirect
contract.

Standard of Care and Breach of Duty

A determination of whether or not the petitioning doctors met the required standard of care involves
a question of mixed fact and law; it is factual as medical negligence cases are highly technical in
nature, requiring the presentation of expert witnesses to provide guidance to the court on matters
clearly falling within the domain of medical science, and legal, insofar as the Court, after evaluating
the expert testimonies, and guided by medical literature, learned treatises, and its fund of common
knowledge, ultimately determines whether breach of duty took place. Whether or not Dr. Casumpang
and Dr. Sanga committed a breach of duty is to be measured by the yardstick of professional
standards observed by the other members of the medical profession in good standing under similar
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to
49

establish not only the professional standards observed in the medical community, but also that the
physician’s conduct in the treatment of care falls below such standard. 50

In the present case, expert testimony is crucial in determining first, the standard medical
examinations, tests, and procedures that the attending physicians should have undertaken in the
diagnosis and treatment of dengue fever; and second, the dengue fever signs and symptoms that
the attending physicians should have noticed and considered.

Both the RTC and the CA relied largely on Dr. Jaudian’s expert testimony on dengue diagnosis and
management to support their finding that the petitioning doctors were guilty of breach of duty of care.

Dr. Jaudian testified that Edmer’s rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, fever, and the presence
of blood in his saliva are classic symptoms of dengue fever. According to him, if the patient was
admitted for chest pain, abdominal pain, and difficulty in breathing coupled with fever, dengue fever
should definitely be considered; if the patient spits coffee ground with the presence of blood, and
51
the patient’s platelet count drops to 47,000, it becomes a clear case of dengue fever, and
bronchopneumonia can be reasonably ruled out. 52

Furthermore, the standard of care according to Dr. Jaudian is to administer oxygen inhalation,
analgesic, and fluid infusion or dextrose. If the patient had twice vomited fresh blood and
53

thrombocytopenia has already occurred, the doctor should order blood transfusion, monitoring of the
patient every 30 minutes, hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in breathing. 54

We find that Dr. Casumpang, as Edmer’s attending physician, did not act according to these
standards and, hence, was guilty of breach of duty. We do not find Dr. Sanga liable for the reasons
discussed below.

Dr. Casumpang’s Negligence

a. Negligence in the Diagnosis

At the trial, Dr. Casumpang declared that a doctor’s impression regarding a patient’s illness is 90%
based on the physical examination, the information given by the patient or the latter’s parents, and
the patient’s medical history.55 He testified that he did not consider either dengue fever or dengue
hemorrhagic fever because the patient’s history showed that Edmer had low breath and voluntary
submission, and that he was up and about playing basketball. He based his diagnosis of
56

bronchopneumonia on the following observations: "difficulty in breathing, clearing run nostril, harsh
breath sound, tight air, and sivilant sound." 57

It will be recalled that during Dr. Casumpang’s first and second visits to Edmer, he already had
knowledge of Edmer’s laboratory test result (CBC), medical history, and symptoms (i.e., fever,
rashes, rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, throat irritation, difficulty in breathing, and traces of
blood in the sputum). However, these information did not lead Dr. Casumpang to the possibility that
Edmer could be suffering from either dengue fever, or dengue hemorrhagic fever, as he clung to his
diagnosis of broncho pneumonia. This means that given the symptoms exhibited, Dr. Casumpang
already ruled out the possibility of other diseases like dengue.

In other words, it was lost on Dr. Casumpang that the characteristic symptoms of dengue (as Dr.
Jaudian testified) are: patient’s rapid breathing; chest and stomach pain; fever; and the presence of
blood in his saliva. All these manifestations were present and known to Dr. Casumpang at the time of
his first and second visits to Edmer. While he noted some of these symptoms in confirming
bronchopneumonia, he did not seem to have considered the patient’s other manifestations in ruling
out dengue fever or dengue hemorrhagic fever. To our mind, Dr. Casumpang selectively
58

appreciated some, and not all of the symptoms; worse, he casually ignored the pieces of information
that could have been material in detecting dengue fever. This is evident from the testimony of Mrs.
Cortejo:

TSN, Mrs. Cortejo, November 27, 1990

Q: Now, when Dr. Casumpang visited your son for the first time at 5:30 p.m., what did he do, if any?

A: He examined my son by using stethoscope and after that, he confirmed to me that my son was
suffering from broncho pneumonia.

Q: After he confirmed that your son was suffering broncho pneumonia, what did you say if any?
A: Again, I told Dr. Casumpang, how come it was broncho pneumonia when my son has no cough or
colds.

Q: What was the answer of Dr. Casumpang to your statement?

xxxx

A: And then, Dr. Casumpang answered "THAT’S THE USUAL BRONCHO PNEUMONIA, NO
COLDS, NO PHLEGM."

Q: How long did Dr. Casumpang stay in your son’s room?

A: He stayed for a minute or 2.

xxxx

Q: When Dr. Casumpang arrived at 9:00 o’clock a.m. on April 23, what did you tell him, if any?

xxxx

A: I told Dr. Casumpang… After examining my son using stethoscope and nothing more, I told Dr.
Casumpang about the traces of blood in my son’s sputum and I told him what is all about and he has
throat irritation.

Q: What did he tell you?

A: He just nodded his head but he did not take the initiative of looking at the throat of my son.

Q: So what happened after that?

A: I also told Dr. Casumpang about his chest pain and also stomach pain.

Q: So what did Dr. Casumpang do after you have narrated all these complaints of your son?

A: Nothing. He also noticed the rapid breathing of my son and my son was almost moving because
of rapid breathing and he is swaying in the bed.

Q: Do you know what action was taken by Dr. Casumpang when you told him that your son is
experiencing a rapid breathing?

A: No action. He just asked me if my son has an asthma but I said none.

Q: So how long did Dr. Casumpang stay and attended your son on April 23?

A: More or less two (2) minutes then I followed him up to the door and I repeated about the fever of
my son.

Q: What did he tell you, if any, regarding that information you gave him that your son had a fever?

A: He said, that is broncho pneumonia, It’s only being active now. [Emphasis supplied]
We also find it strange why Dr. Casumpang did not even bother to check Edmer’s throat despite
knowing that as early as 9:00 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer had blood streaks in his
sputum. Neither did Dr. Casumpang order confirmatory tests to confirm the source of bleeding. The
Physician’s Progress Notes stated: "Blood streaks on phlegm can be due to bronchial irritation or
59

congestion," which clearly showed that Dr. Casumpang merely assumed, without confirmatory
physical examination, that bronchopneumonia caused the bleeding.

Dr. Jaudian likewise opined that Dr. Casumpang’s medical examination was not comprehensive
enough to reasonably lead to a correct diagnosis. Dr. Casumpang only used a stethoscope in
60

coming up with the diagnosis that Edmer was suffering from bronchopneumonia; he never confirmed
this finding with the use of a bronchoscope. Furthermore, Dr. Casumpang based his diagnosis
largely on the chest x-ray result that is generally inconclusive.61

Significantly, it was only at around 5:00 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988 (after Edmer’s third episode
of bleeding) that Dr. Casumpang ordered the conduct of hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing, blood
transfusion and tourniquet tests. These tests came too late, as proven by: (1) the blood test results
that came at about 6:00 in the evening, confirming that Edmer’s illness had developed to "Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever;" and (2) Dr. Jaudian’s testimony that "dengue fever could have been detected
earlier than 7:30 in the evening of April 23, 1988 because the symptoms were already evident." 62

In Spouses Flores v. Spouses Pineda, a case involving a medical malpractice suit, the Court ruled
63

that the petitioner doctors were negligent because they failed to immediately order tests to confirm
the patient’s illness. Despite the doctors’ suspicion that the patient could be suffering from diabetes,
the former still proceeded to the D&C operation. In that case, expert testimony showed that tests
should have been ordered immediately on admission to the hospital in view of the symptoms
presented. The Court held:

When a patient exhibits symptoms typical of a particular disease, these symptoms should, at the
very least, alert the physician of the possibility that the patient may be afflicted with the suspected
disease.

The Court also ruled that reasonable prudence would have shown that diabetes and its
complications were foreseeable harm. However, the petitioner doctors failed to take this into
consideration and proceeded with the D&C operation. Thus, the Court ruled that they failed to
comply with their duty to observe the standard of care to be given to hyperglycemic/diabetic patients.

Similarly, in Jarcia, involving the negligence of the doctors in failing to exercise reasonable
64

prudence in ascertaining the extent of the patient’s injuries, this Court declared that:

In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to determine the extent of Roy Jr.’s injuries,
Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were remiss of their duties as members of the medical profession.
Assuming for the sake of argument that they did not have the capacity to make such thorough
evaluation at that stage, they should have referred the patient to another doctor with sufficient
training and experience instead of assuring him and his mother that everything was all right.
[Emphasis supplied]

Even assuming that Edmer’s symptoms completely coincided with the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia (so that this diagnosis could not be considered "wrong"), we still find Dr.
Casumpang guilty of negligence.
First, we emphasize that we do not decide the correctness of a doctor’s diagnosis, or the accuracy of
the medical findings and treatment. Our duty in medical malpractice cases is to decide – based on
the evidence adduced and expert opinion presented– whether a breach of duty took place.

Second, we clarify that a wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical malpractice. Physicians are
65

generally not liable for damages resulting from a bona fide error of judgment. Nonetheless, when the
physician’s erroneous diagnosis was the result of negligent conduct (e.g., neglect of medical history,
failure to order the appropriate tests, failure to recognize symptoms), it becomes an evidence of
medical malpractice.

Third, we also note that medicine is not an exact science; and doctors, or even specialists, are not
66

expected to give a 100% accurate diagnosis in treating patients who come to their clinic for
consultations. Error is possible as the exercise of judgment is called for in considering and reading
the exhibited symptoms, the results of tests, and in arriving at definitive conclusions. But in doing all
these, the doctor must have acted according to acceptable medical practice standards.

In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some and not all of the symptoms
presented, and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his findings. In sum, Dr.
Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which failure, especially when reasonable prudence
would have shown that indications of dengue were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes
negligence.

a. Negligence in the Treatment and Management of Dengue

Apart from failing to promptly detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also failed to promptly undertake
the proper medical management needed for this disease.

As Dr. Jaudian opined, the standard medical procedure once the patient had exhibited the classic
symptoms of dengue fever should have been: oxygen inhalation, use of analgesic, and infusion of
fluids or dextrose; and once the patient had twice vomited fresh blood, the doctor should have
67

ordered: blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes, hemostatic to stop bleeding,
and oxygen if there is difficulty in breathing.
68

Dr. Casumpang failed to measure up to these standards. The evidence strongly suggests that he
ordered a transfusion of platelet concentrate instead of blood transfusion. The tourniquet test was
only conducted after Edmer’s second episode of bleeding, and the medical management (as
reflected in the records) did not include antibiotic therapy and complete physical examination. Dr.
Casumpang’s testimony states:

Q: Now, after entertaining – After considering that the patient Edmer Cortero was already suffering
from dengue hemorrhagic fever, what did you do, if any?

A: We ordered close monitoring of the blood pressure, the cardiac rate and respiratory rate of the
patient.

Q: Now, was your instructions carried on?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was the blood pressure of the patient?

A: During those times, the blood pressure of the patient was even normal during those times.

Q: How about the respiratory rate?

A: The respiratory rate was fast because the patient in the beginning since admission had difficulty in
breathing.

Q: Then, after that, what did you do with the patient? Doctor?

A: We transfused platelet concentrate and at the same time, we monitor [sic] the patient.

Q: Then, who monitor [sic] the patient?

A: The pediatric resident on duty at that time.

Q: Now, what happened after that?

Q: While monitoring the patient, all his vital signs were _____; his blood pressure was normal so we
continued with the supportive management at that time.

Q: Now, after that?

A: In the evening of April 23, 1988, I stayed in the hospital and I was informed by the pediatric
resident on duty at around 11:15 in the evening that the blood pressure of the patient went down to .
60 palpatory.

Q: What did you do upon receipt of that information?

A: I immediately went up to the room of the patient and we changed the IV fluid from the present
fluid which was D5 0.3 sodium chloride to lactated ringers solution.

Q: You mean to say you increased the dengue [sic] of the intervenus [sic] fluid?

A: We changed the IV fluid because lactated ringers was necessary to resume the volume and to
bring back the blood pressure, to increase the blood pressure. [Emphasis supplied]

Although Dr. Casumpang presented the testimonies of Dr. Rodolfo Jagonap and Dr. Ellewelyn
Pasion (Dr. Pasion), Personnel Officer and Medical Director of SJDH, respectively as well as the
testimonies of Dr. Livelo and Dr. Reyes (the radiologist who read Edmer’s chest x-ray result), these
witnesses failed to dispute the standard of action that Dr. Jaudian established in his expert opinion.
We cannot consider them expert witnesses either for the sole reason that they did not testify on the
standard of care in dengue cases. 69

On the whole, after examining the totality of the adduced evidence, we find that the lower courts
correctly did not rely on Dr. Casumpang’s claim that he exercised prudence and due diligence in
handling Edmer’s case. Aside from being self-serving, his claim is not supported by competent
evidence. As the lower courts did, we rely on the uncontroverted fact that he failed, as a medical
professional, to observe the most prudent medical procedure under the circumstances in diagnosing
and treating Edmer.
Dr. Sanga is Not Liable for Negligence

In considering the case of Dr. Sanga, the junior resident physician who was on-duty at the time of
Edmer’s confinement, we see the need to draw distinctions between the responsibilities and
corresponding liability of Dr. Casumpang, as the attending physician, and that of Dr. Sanga.

In his testimony, Dr. Pasion declared that resident applicants are generally doctors of medicine
licensed to practice in the Philippines and who would like to pursue a particular specialty. They are
70

usually the front line doctors responsible for the first contact with the patient. During the scope of the
residency program, resident physicians (or "residents") function under the supervision of attending
71 72

physicians or of the hospital’s teaching staff. Under this arrangement, residents operate merely as
73

subordinates who usually defer to the attending physician on the decision to be made and on the
action to be taken.

The attending physician, on the other hand, is primarily responsible for managing the resident’s
exercise of duties. While attending and resident physicians share the collective responsibility to
deliver safe and appropriate care to the patients, it is the attending physician who assumes the
74

principal responsibility of patient care. Because he/she exercises a supervisory role over the
75

resident, and is ultimately responsible for the diagnosis and treatment of the patient, the standards
applicable to and the liability of the resident for medical malpractice is theoretically less than that of
the attending physician. These relative burdens and distinctions, however, do not translate to
immunity from the legal duty of care for residents, or from the responsibility arising from their own
76

negligent act.

In Jenkins v. Clark, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the applicable standard of care in medical
77

malpractice cases involving first-year residents was that of a reasonably prudent physician and not
that of interns. According to Jenkins:

It is clear that the standard of care required of physicians is not an individualized one but of
physicians in general in the community. In order to establish medical malpractice, it must be shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that a physician did some particular thing or things that a
physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and diligence would not have done under like or similar
conditions or circumstances, or that he failed or omitted to do some particular thing or things that a
physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and diligence would have done under like or similar
conditions or circumstances, and that the inquiry complained of was the direct result of such doing or
failing to do such thing or things.

We note that the standard of instruction given by the court was indeed a proper one. It clearly
informed the jury that the medical care required is that of reasonably careful physicians or hospital
emergency room operators, not of interns or residents. [Emphasis supplied]

A decade later, Centman v. Cobb, affirmed the Jenkins ruling and held that interns and first-year
78

residents are "practitioners of medicine required to exercise the same standard of care applicable to
physicians with unlimited licenses to practice." The Indiana Court held that although a first-year
resident practices under a temporary medical permit, he/she impliedly contracts that he/she has the
reasonable and ordinary qualifications of her profession and that he/she will exercise reasonable
skill, diligence, and care in treating the patient.

We find that Dr. Sanga was not independently negligent. Although she had greater patient exposure,
and was subject to the same standard of care applicable to attending physicians, we believe that a
finding of negligence should also depend on several competing factors, among them, her authority to
make her own diagnosis, the degree of supervision of the attending physician over her, and the
shared responsibility between her and the attending physicians.

In this case, before Dr. Sanga attended to Edmer, both Dr. Livelo and Dr. Casumpang had
diagnosed Edmer with bronchopneumonia. In her testimony, Dr. Sanga admitted that she had been
briefed about Edmer’s condition, his medical history, and initial diagnosis; and based on these
79

pieces of information, she confirmed the finding of bronchopneumonia.

Dr. Sanga likewise duly reported to Dr. Casumpang, who admitted receiving updates regarding
Edmer’s condition. There is also evidence supporting Dr. Sanga’s claim that she extended diligent
80

care to Edmer. In fact, when she suspected – during Edmer’s second episode of bleeding– that
Edmer could be suffering from dengue fever, she wasted no time in conducting the necessary tests,
and promptly notified Dr. Casumpang about the incident. Indubitably, her medical assistance led to
the finding of dengue fever.

We note however, that during Edmer’s second episode of bleeding, Dr. Sanga failed to immediately
81

examine and note the cause of the blood specimen. Like Dr. Casumpang, she merely assumed that
the blood in Edmer’s phlegm was caused by bronchopneumonia. Her testimony states:

TSN, June 8, 1993:

Q: Let us get this clear, you said that the father told you the patient cocked [sic] out phlegm.

A: With blood streak.

Q: Now, you stated specimen, were you not able to examine the specimen?

A: No, sir, I did not because according to the father he wash [sic] his hands.

xxxx

Q: Now, from you knowledge, what does that indicate if the patient expels a phlegm and blood
streak?

A: If a patient cocked [sic] out phlegm then the specimen could have come from the lung
alone. [Emphasis supplied]
82

xxxx

TSN, June 17, 1993:

Q: Now, in the first meeting you had, when that was relayed to you by the father that Edmer Cortejo
had coughed out blood, what medical action did you take?

A: I examined the patient and I thought that, that coughed out phlegm was a product of broncho
pneumonia.

xxxx
Q: So what examination did you specifically conduct to see that there was no internal bleeding? A: At
that time I did not do anything to determine the cause of coughing of the blood because I presumed
that it was a mucous (sic) produced by broncho pneumonia, And besides the patient did not even
show any signs of any other illness at that time.83

Based on her statements we find that Dr. Sanga was not entirely faultless. Nevertheless, her failure
to discern the import of Edmer’s second bleeding does not necessarily amount to negligence as the
respondent himself admitted that Dr. Sanga failed to examine the blood specimen because he wash
edit away. In addition, considering the diagnosis previously made by two doctors, and the
uncontroverted fact that the burden of final diagnosis pertains to the attending physician (in this
case, Dr. Casumpang), we believe that Dr. Sanga’s error was merely an honest mistake of judgment
influenced in no small measure by her status in the hospital hierarchy; hence, she should not be held
liable for medical negligence.

Dr. Jaudian’s Professional Competence and Credibility

One of the critical issues the petitioners raised in the proceedings before the lower court and before
this Court was Dr. Jaudian’s competence and credibility as an expert witness. The petitioners tried to
discredit his expert testimony on the ground that he lacked the proper training and fellowship status
in pediatrics.

● Criteria in Qualifying as an Expert Witness

The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the trial court to decide upon in the exercise of
its discretion. The test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject
matter of the investigation, and the fitness of the expert witness. In our jurisdiction, the criterion
84

remains to be the expert witness’ special knowledge experience and practical training that qualify
him/her to explain highly technical medical matters to the Court.

In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the Court found the expert witness, who is a pulmonologist, not
85

qualified to testify on the field of anesthesiology. Similarly, in Cereno v. Court of Appeals, a 2012
86

case involving medical negligence, the Court excluded the testimony of an expert witness whose
specialty was anesthesiology, and concluded that an anesthesiologist cannot be considered an
expert in the field of surgery or even in surgical practices and diagnosis.

Interestingly in this case, Dr. Jaudian, the expert witness was admittedly not a pediatrician but a
practicing physician who specializes in pathology. He likewise does not possess any formal
87

residency training in pediatrics. Nonetheless, both the lower courts found his knowledge acquired
through study and practical experience sufficient to advance an expert opinion on dengue-related
cases.

We agree with the lower courts.

A close scrutiny of Ramos and Cereno reveals that the Court primarily based the witnesses’
disqualification to testify as an expert on their incapacity to shed light on the standard of care that
must be observed by the defendant-physicians. That the expert witnesses’ specialties do not match
the physicians’ practice area only constituted, at most, one of the considerations that should not be
taken out of context. After all, the sole function of a medical expert witness, regardless of his/her
specialty, is to afford assistance to the courts on medical matters, and to explain the medical facts in
issue.
Furthermore, there was no reasonable indication in Ramos and Cereno that the expert witnesses
possess a sufficient familiarity with the standard of care applicable to the physicians’ specialties. US
jurisprudence on medical malpractice demonstrated the trial courts’ wide latitude of discretion in
allowing a specialist from another field to testify against a defendant specialist.

In Brown v. Sims, a neurosurgeon was found competent to give expert testimony regarding a
88

gynecologist's standard of pre-surgical care. In that case, the court held that since negligence was
not predicated on the gynecologist’s negligent performance of the operation, but primarily on the
claim that the pre-operative histories and physicals were inadequate, the neurosurgeon was
competent to testify as an expert.

Frost v. Mayo Clinic also allowed an orthopedic surgeon to testify against a neurologist in a medical
89

malpractice action. The court considered that the orthopedic surgeon’s opinion on the "immediate
need for decompression" need not come from a specialist in neurosurgery. The court held that:

It is well established that "the testimony of a qualified medical doctor cannot be excluded simply
because he is not a specialist x x x." The matter of "x x x training and specialization of the witness
goes to the weight rather than admissibility x x x."

xxxx

It did not appear to the court that a medical doctor had to be a specialist in neurosurgery to express
the opinions permitted to be expressed by plaintiffs’ doctors, e.g., the immediate need for a
decompression in the light of certain neurological deficits in a post-laminectomy patient. As stated
above, there was no issue as to the proper execution of the neurosurgery. The medical testimony
supported plaintiffs’ theory of negligence and causation. (Citations omitted)

In another case, the court declared that it is the specialist’s knowledge of the requisite subject
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matter, rather than his/her specialty that determines his/her qualification to testify.

Also in Evans v. Ohanesian, the court set a guideline in qualifying an expert witness:
91

To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be shown that the witness (1) has the required
professional knowledge, learning and skill of the subject under inquiry sufficient to qualify him to
speak with authority on the subject; and (2) is familiar with the standard required of a physician
under similar circumstances; where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to
entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the
weight of the evidence than to its admissibility.

xxxx

Nor is it critical whether a medical expert is a general practitioner or a specialist so long as he

exhibits knowledge of the subject. Where a duly licensed and practicing physician has gained
knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a specialty in which he is not directly engaged but as
to which he has an opinion based on education, experience, observation, or association wit that
specialty, his opinion is competent.(Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Brown v. Mladineo adhered to the principle that the witness’ familiarity, and not the
92

classification by title or specialty, which should control issues regarding the expert witness’
qualifications:
The general rule as to expert testimony in medical malpractice actions is that "a specialist in a
particular branch within a profession will not be required." Most courts allow a doctor to testify if they
are satisfied of his familiarity with the standards of a specialty, though he may not practice the
specialty himself. One court explained that "it is the scope of the witness’ knowledge and not the
artificial classification by title that should govern the threshold question of admissibility. (Citations
omitted)

● Application to the Present Case

In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify on the standard
of care in dengue fever cases. 1avvphi1

Although he specializes in pathology, it was established during trial that he had attended not less
than 30 seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in pediatrics, had been practicing
medicine for 16 years, and had handled not less than 50 dengue related cases.

As a licensed medical practitioner specializing in pathology, who had practical and relevant exposure
in pediatrics and dengue related cases, we are convinced that Dr. Jaudian demonstrated sufficient
familiarity with the standard of care to be applied in dengue fever cases. Furthermore, we agree that
he possesses knowledge and experience sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the
subject.

The Causation Between Dr. Casumpang’s

Negligent Act/Omission, and the Patient’s
Resulting Death was Adequately Proven

Dr. Jaudian’s testimony strongly suggests that due to Dr. Casumpang’s failure to timely diagnose
Edmer with dengue, the latter was not immediately given the proper treatment. In fact, even after Dr.
Casumpang had discovered Edmer’s real illness, he still failed to promptly perform the standard
medical procedure. We agree with these findings.

As the respondent had pointed out, dengue fever, if left untreated, could be a life threatening
disease. As in any fatal diseases, it requires immediate medical attention. With the correct and
93

timely diagnosis, coupled with the proper medical management, dengue fever is not a life
threatening disease and could easily be cured. 94

Furthermore, as Dr. Jaudian testified, with adequate intensive care, the mortality rate of dengue
fever should fall to less than 2%. Hence, the survival of the patient is directly related to early and
proper management of the illness. 95

To reiterate, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue fever despite the presence
of its characteristic symptoms; and as a consequence of the delayed diagnosis, he also failed to
promptly manage Edmer’s illness. Had he immediately conducted confirmatory tests, (i.e., tourniquet
tests and series of blood tests)and promptly administered the proper care and management needed
for dengue fever, the risk of complications or even death, could have been substantially reduced.

Furthermore, medical literature on dengue shows that early diagnosis and management of dengue is
critical in reducing the risk of complications and avoiding further spread of the virus. That Edmer
96

later died of "Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock," "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV," a
severe and fatal form of dengue fever, established the causal link between Dr. Casumpang’s
negligence and the injury.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent successfully proved the element of
causation.

Liability of SJDH

We now discuss the liability of the hospital.

The respondent submits that SJDH should not only be held vicariously liable for the petitioning
doctors’ negligence but also for its own negligence. He claims that SJDH fell short of its duty of
providing its patients with the necessary facilities and equipment as shown by the following
circumstances:

(a) SJDH was not equipped with proper paging system;

(b) the number of its doctors is not proportionate to the number of patients;

(c) SJDH was not equipped with a bronchoscope;

(d) when Edmer’s oxygen was removed, the medical staff did not immediately provide him
with portable oxygen;

(e) when Edmer was about to be transferred to another hospital, SJDH’s was not ready and
had no driver; and

(f) despite Edmer’s critical condition, there was no doctor attending to him from 5:30 p.m. of
April 22, to 9:00 a.m. of April 23, 1988.

SJDH on the other hand disclaims liability by claiming that the petitioning doctors are not its
employees but are mere consultants and independent contractors.

We affirm the hospital’s liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on the basis of
the doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel.

There is No Employer-Employee Relationship

Between SJDH and the Petitioning Doctors

In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the following
elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the
power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only the end to be achieved, but the means to
be used in reaching such an end. 97

Control, which is the most crucial among the elements, is not present in this case.

Based on the records, no evidence exists showing that SJDH exercised any degree of control over
the means, methods of procedure and manner by which the petitioning doctors conducted and
performed their medical profession. SJDH did not control their diagnosis and treatment. Likewise, no
evidence was presented to show that SJDH monitored, supervised, or directed the petitioning
doctors in the treatment and management of Edmer’s case. In these lights, the petitioning doctors
were not employees of SJDH, but were mere independent contractors.
SJDH is Solidarily Liable Based
on The Principle of Agency or Doctrine
of Apparent Authority

Despite the absence of employer-employee relationship between SJDH and the petitioning doctors,
SJDH is not free from liability.
98

As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors. However, it may
be found liable if the physician or independent contractor acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital.
This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority." 99

The US case of Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital abrogated the hospitals’ immunity to
100

vicarious liability of independent contractor physicians. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that under the doctrine of apparent authority, hospitals could be found vicariously liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor:

Therefore, we hold that, under the doctrine of apparent authority, a hospital can be held vicariously
liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the
physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the
physician is an independent contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as follows:

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the
acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital
had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of
the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. (Emphasis supplied)

The doctrine was applied in Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center where this Court, through the
101

ponencia of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, discussed the two factors in determining hospital
liability as follows:

The first factor focuses on the hospital’s manifestations and is sometimes described as an inquiry
whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this regard,
the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an
employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied.

xxxx

The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on
whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with
ordinary care and prudence. (Citation omitted)

In sum, a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician (or an
independent contractor) providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two factors: first,
the hospital’s manifestations; and second, the patient’s reliance.

a. Hospital’s manifestations
It involves an inquiry on whether the hospital acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person
to conclude that the individual alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. As
pointed out in Nogales, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the
physician or independent contractor is an employee of the hospital; representation may be general
and implied. 102

In Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital, questions were raised on "what acts by the hospital or its
103

agent are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual was an agent of the
hospital." In ruling that the hospital’s manifestations can be proven without the express
representation by the hospital, the court relied on several cases from other jurisdictions, and held
that:

(1) the hospital, by providing emergency room care and by failing to advise patients that they
were being treated by the hospital’s agent and not its employee, has created the appearance
of agency; and

(2) patients entering the hospital through the emergency room, could properly assume that
the treating doctors and staff of the hospital were acting on its behalf.1âwphi1

In this case, the court considered the act of the hospital of holding itself out as provider of complete
medical care, and considered the hospital to have impliedly created the appearance of authority.

b. Patient’s reliance

It involves an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance on the conduct of the hospital or its
agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. 104

In Pamperin, the court held that the important consideration in determining the patient’s reliance is:
whether the plaintiff is seeking care from the hospital itself or whether the plaintiff is looking to the
hospital merely as a place for his/her personal physician to provide medical care. Thus, this
105

requirement is deemed satisfied if the plaintiff can prove that he/she relied upon the hospital to
provide care and treatment, rather than upon a specific physician. In this case, we shall limit the
determination of the hospital’s apparent authority to Dr. Casumpang, in view of our finding that Dr.
Sanga is not liable for negligence.

SJDH Clothed Dr. Casumpang With Apparent Authority

SJDH impliedly held out and clothed Dr. Casumpang with apparent authority leading the respondent
to believe that he is an employee or agent of the hospital.

Based on the records, the respondent relied on SJDH rather than upon Dr. Casumpang, to care and
treat his son Edmer. His testimony during trial showed that he and his wife did not know any doctors
at SJDH; they also did not know that Dr. Casumpang was an independent contractor. They brought
their son to SJDH for diagnosis because of their family doctor’s referral. The referral did not
specifically point to Dr. Casumpang or even to Dr. Sanga, but to SJDH. Significantly, the respondent
had relied on SJDH’s representation of Dr. Casumpang’s authority. To recall, when Mrs. Cortejo
presented her Fortune Care card, she was initially referred to the Fortune Care coordinator, who was
then out of town. She was thereafter referred to Dr. Casumpang, who is also accredited with Fortune
Care. In both instances, SJDH through its agent failed to advise Mrs. Cortejo that Dr. Casumpang is
an independent contractor.
Mrs. Cortejo accepted Dr. Casumpang’s services on the reasonable belief that such were being
provided by SJDH or its employees, agents, or servants. By referring Dr. Casumpang to care and
treat for Edmer, SJDH impliedly held out Dr. Casumpang, not only as an accredited member of
Fortune Care, but also as a member of its medical staff. SJDH cannot now disclaim liability since
there is no showing that Mrs. Cortejo or the respondent knew, or should have known, that Dr.
Casumpang is only an independent contractor of the hospital. In this case, estoppel has already set
in.

We also stress that Mrs. Cortejo’s use of health care plan (Fortune Care) did not affect SJDH’s
liability. The only effect of the availment of her Fortune Care card benefits is that her choice of
physician is limited only to physicians who are accredited with Fortune Care. Thus, her use of health
care plan in this case only limited the choice of doctors (or coverage of services, amount etc.) and
not the liability of doctors or the hospital.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court PARTLY GRANTS the consolidated petitions. The
Court finds Dr. Noel Casumpang and San Juan de Dios Hospital solidarily liable for negligent
medical practice. We SET ASIDE the finding of liability as to Dr. Ruby Miranda-Sanga. The amounts
of ₱45,000.00 as actual damages and ₱500,000.00 as moral damages should each earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the date of the judgment of the trial
court. The Court AFFIRMS the rest of the Decision dated October 29, 2004 and the Resolution dated
January 12, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56400.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.* JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATT E STATI O N