CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION AND

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

Constitution, Definition and Characteristics

a. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS
dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter,
but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.

RULING:

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-
executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice
to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is
not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of
a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If
the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which
is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

b. Lopez v. De los Reyes 55 Phil. 186, 188

c. Alfredo M. de Leon v. Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987

acts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the
other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal
in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act
of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null
and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have
been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the
one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987
designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer
rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

II. General Principles of Constitutional Construction

a. Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938

b. Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not
yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter
of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.

c. Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)

FACTS:

Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed
the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:

Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison,
without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the
consent and confirmation of the CoA.

2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;

3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;

4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Categories: 156 SCRA 549, Constitutional Law 1

Aids to Construction
a. Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275 (1975)
b. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing
cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive
department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional
compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII
prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment.
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor
General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless
otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII,
section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet
member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. ISSUE:
Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self
enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section
13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to
the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies
only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice
as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and
void.

c. Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990)

Facts: Petitioner Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business. It seeks to nullify
Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 in so far as they apply to livestock and poultry business.

Held: Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional in so far as they include lands devoted to
raising livestock, swine and poultry within its coverage. The use of land is incidental to but not the
principal factor or consideration of productivity in this industry. The Supreme Court held that: The
transcripts of deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program
of the government. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section
166 of RA 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds,
fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11). The Supreme
Court noted that the intention of the Committee to limit the application of the word "agriculture" is further
shown by the proposal of Commissioner Jamir to insert the word "arable" to distinguish this kind of
agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties. The
proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are
limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands (Record, CONCOM, 7 August 1986, Vol. III, p. 30). Moreover, in his answer to
Commissioner Regalado's interpellation, Commissioner Tadeo clarified that the term "farmworker" was
used instead of "agricultural worker" in order to exclude therein piggery, poultry and livestock workers
(Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

d. Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946)

Facts of the Case:

The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report
regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism
and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in
said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.

During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering
that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the
16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on
Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the
protest filed against their election.

Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution,
praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties.
Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.

Issues of the Case:

Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast
in the said provinces are valid.

Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections.

Held:

The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case
was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be
admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was
political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts

The case is therefore dismissed

e. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil.
596 (1957)

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator vs. LRC(J. Felix; 20 December 1957)FactsRodis executed a
deed of sale over a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administratorof Davao, a
corporation sole, with Msgr. Thibault, a Canadian Citizen, as the actual incumbent. When the
RomanCatholic Administrator presented the deed of sale for registration at the Register of Deeds of
Davao, the latterrequired that the corporation sole prepare an affidavit declaring that 60% of the members
were Filipino citizens.In spite of assurance by the corporation sole that the totality of the Catholic
population of Davao
would become the owner of the property, the Register of Deeds still had some doubts as to the registerabil
ity of thedocument, and referred the matter to the Land Registration Commissioner.The Land Registration
Commissioner found that the corporation sole was not qualified to acquire privatelands in the Philippines
because of the requirement that 60% of the corporation was actually owned or controlled byFilipino
citizens; as the present incumbent of the corporation was a Canadian citizen, the LRC found that
thecorporation sole was not compliant.Consequently the corporation sole instituted an action for

mandamus
 with the Supreme Court alleging thatthe sale in favor is in favor of the Catholic Church, which is
qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for theestablishment and maintenance of places of worship,
and prayed that the registration be recognized.IssueWhether or not the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc. is entitled to acquire private propertiesHeldYesRatioIn a corporation sole,
the bishops or archbishops who sit as the incumbent are merely administrators of thechurch properties,
and they only hold these in trust for the church. Consequently, upon the death of the incumbent ofthe
corporation sole, the church properties acquired will pass on to his successor in office.The Court also
finds that here is no provision of law that confers ownership of the church properties on tothe Pope, or
even to the corporation sole or heads of the corporation sole who are mere administrators of
said properties; rather, ownership of these properties fall and develop upon the congregation.While the
Catholic congregation does follow the guidance of the Pope, there cannot be said to be a mergerof
personalities between the Pope and the Catholic Church, and it cannot be said that the political and civil
rights ofthe Catholics are affected by their relationship with the Pope; the fact that the clergy derive their
authorities from theVatican does not mean that the Pope bestows his own citizenship to each priest. To
allow the theory that all of theChurches around the world would follow the citizenship of the Pope would
lead to the absurdity that each memberof the Catholic Church would be a citizen of the Vatican or of
Italy. As such, it cannot be said that the citizenship ofthe corporation sole, as created under Philippine
laws, is altered by the citizenship of whoever is the incumbent head.The Corporation Law recognized that
corporation soles as those which are organized and composed of asingle individual for the administration
of the properties not used exclusively for religious worship of the church.The successor in office will
become the corporation on ascension to office. Furthermore, the Corporation Law alsorecognized that the
corporation sole can purchase real property, although there are restrictions as to the power to sellor
mortgage depending on the rules, regulations and discipline of the church concerned. As such, the Court
finds itabsurd that the corporation sole can purchase properties but would not be able to register properties
in its name.While the Constitution prohibits foreigners from taking, acquiring, exploiting or developing
the naturalresources of the country, the Court finds that the provisions relating to these are not applicable
to corporation
soles because they are merely administrators of the properties titled in their name. Furthermore, the admin
istration ofthese properties is for the benefit of the members of the congregation, which is
overwhelmingly comprised ofFilipinos.As the acquisition of the properties is for the benefit of the
congregation, the Roman Catholic ApostolicAdministrator of Davao cannot be deprived of the right to
acquire by purchase or donation real properties forcharitable, benevolent and educational purposes, nor of
the right to register these properties in its name in theRegister of Deeds of Davao

f. Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957)

103 Phil. 1051 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Political Question Defined – Members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party.
Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its
members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3
justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party.
But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the
minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did
Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member
of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a
political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the
Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts
but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada
to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the
elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a
separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members)
must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already
appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting)
concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such
rules comply with the Constitution.

g. Chiongbian v. De Leon, 82 Phil. 771 (1949)

FACTS: Herein petitioner is a son of a Chinese citizen who has been elected into office before the
adoption of the Constitution, wherein said petitioner was still a minor. Respondents seeks to cancel
petitioner’s registration certificates of vessels and rescind the sale of vessels from the same on the ground
that the latter is allegedly not a Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified to operate and own vessels of
Philippine registry.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD: Yes, because the petitioner, aside from the fact that he was a minor at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, follows the citizenship of his father who having been elected to public office before the
adoption of the said Constitution became a Filipino citizen as provided by the same (Art. IV, 1987
Constitution).

h. Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985)

IV. Ordinary Sense vs. Technical Sense

a. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970

FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by petitioner
and 2 others. Lands were to be divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it be declared unconstitutional
because violative of equal protection clause since statute applies only to Tatalon estate.

HELD: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is included within its terms. Those
adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least
discrimination that finds no support in reason. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection.
Occupants believe in gf that veterans subdivision is the real owner. Only when the place vastly improved
with building of roads, infrastructure did petitioner claimed for the first time that they are the owners.

b. Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1992)

Ordillo v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990

Gutierrez, J.

FACTS-

January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for anOrganic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the provinces of Benguet,Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votesin a plebiscite.- Results of plebiscite:
approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 inthe rest provinces and city. The
province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population,and as such has the second smallest number
of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act forthe Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast
only in the provinceof Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for
the President reiteratingCOMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province which
voted favorably –then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.”- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted
Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugaoon first Monday of March 1991.-
Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 amemorandum
granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board andCordillera Regional
Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative
Order No. 160 declaring among othersthat the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional
Assembly and all offices underExecutive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of
Organic Act.- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province
as theConstitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of morethan one
constituent unit.- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:a.declare null and void COMELEC resolution
No. 2259, the
memorandum of theSecretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 andpr
ohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending publicfunds for the
purposeb.declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and theCordillera
Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until anotherorganic law for the
Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and thesame is duly ratified by the voters in the
constituent units.

ISSUE

WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for thecreation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute suchregion.

HELD

- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.a.The keyword
ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities,municipalities and geographical
areas connote that “region” is to be made up of morethan one constituent unit. The term “region” used in
its ordinary sense means two ormore provinces.- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the
language of the Constitution,as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use
and thatthe words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaningexcept where
technical terms are employed.

b.The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region isinfused with
provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting theRegion.- It can be gleaned that
Congress never intended that a single province may constitutethe autonomous region.- If this were so, we
would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising theirexecutive and legislative powers over exactly the same
small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and
2; Art V,sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional
Government for its initial organizationalrequirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and
small province [Art XXIsec 13(B)(c)]- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from
different provinces andcities” in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the
development of a commonregional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)-
Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate theletter and
intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical andillogical.
c. Marcos v. Chief of Staff, 89 Phil. 239 (1951)
d. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 (1946)
e. Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947)

V. Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing

a. Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017
b. Grace Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
c. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS
dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter,
but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.

RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-
executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice
to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is
not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of
a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If
the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which
is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

d. Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities
for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a
“free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution
was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of
our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is
not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it
is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as
autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise
is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said
agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the
political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO
remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

e. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 10183, July 30, 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection
by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in
allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

f. Pamatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 200

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the
intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate
of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or
capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention
the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution
(Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the
Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of
the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

VI. Mandatory vs. Directory

a. Tanada v. Cuenco

Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate
was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The
lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to
the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was
a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a
decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is
provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3
senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the
other two SET members supposed to come from the minority
were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the
Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the
SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member
of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election
contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP)
averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the
issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the
power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate
alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to
raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before
the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD:

No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue
is a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The

Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the
official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was
whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are
valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a
separate and independent body from the Senate which does not
perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the
supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from
the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the
minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the
SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the
Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations
like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

21 SCRA 774 – Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution – Political Question vs

Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that
the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held
(November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as
they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the
people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in
the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up
with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and
other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the
courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the
contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state.
That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing
so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act.
 Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the
final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special
election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that
the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the
previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in
special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances
then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a
special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should
be able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.

c. Rep. Edcel Lagman, et al. v. Executive Secretary Medialdea, G.R. No.

231658, July 4, 2017

VII. Prospective vs. Retroactive

a. Hagonoy Water Distirct v. NLRC, 165 SCRA 272 (1988)