1) G.R. No.

176394

COL. ORLANDO E. DE LEON, PN (M), Petitioner

vs.
LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., (AFP), and SPECIAL GENERAL COURT
MARTIAL NO. 2, Respondents

x-----------------------x

COL. ARMANDO V. BAÑEZ, PN (M), Petitioner-Intervenor

x-----------------------x

LTC ACHILLES S. SEGUMALIAN, PN (M), Petitioner-Intervenor

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 177033

MAJOR LEOMAR JOSE M. DOCTOLERO O-10124 (INFANTRY) PHILIPPINE ARMY and

CAPTAIN WILLIAM VICTORINO F. UPANO O-11876 (INFANTRY) PHILIPPINE
ARMY, Petitioners
vs.
LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Chief of Staff, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES and theSPECIAL GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NO. 2, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 177304

MAJOR JASON L. AQUINO (INF) PA, Petitioner

vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and appointing and reviewing authority of the Special General Court Martial
Nr. 2 (sic), and THE SPECIAL GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NR. 2, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 177470

1ST LIEUTENANT ERVIN C. DIVINAGRACIA O-12742 (INF), PHILIPPINE ARMY, Petitioner

vs.
LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Chief of Staff, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES and the SPECIAL GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NO. 2, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 177471

CAPTAIN JOEY T FONTIVEROS O-11713 (INFANTRY) PHILIPPINE ARMY, Petitioner
vs.
LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Chief of Staff, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES and the SPECIAL GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NO. 2, Respondents

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

These are consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus seeking:

1. To annul, reverse and set aside the Memorandum1 dated November 17, 2006 of the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. and Letter Order
No. 7582dated November 24, 2006 signed by the Adjutant General of the AFP, Commodore
Paterno Labiano;

2. To prohibit Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. and the Special General Court Martial No. 2 to desist from
further proceeding with the court martial and from otherwise investigating or prosecuting the
petitioners under the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408); and

3. To order Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. and/or Special General Court Martial No. 2 and/or all persons
acting for and in behalf or under their authority to produce petitioners3 Major Doctolero and
Captain Upano, to release them from detention and to forthwith desist from restraining them in
any manner of their liberty.

Petitioners also seek the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction against the respondents and all persons acting for or under their authority to cease and
desist from conducting court martial proceedings and to cease and desist from otherwise
prosecuting, investigating or proceeding in any manner against the petitioners relative to their
alleged violations of the Articles of War.

The Facts

Prior to February 24, 2006, the military received reports that the units of the Philippine Marine
Corps (PMC), First Scout Ranger Regiment and Philippine National Police Special Action Force
(PNP SAF) planned to join the protest march of militant groups, the civil society, political
opposition and religious sector on the commemoration of the EDSA Revolution to call for the
resignation of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The plan culminated in a stand-off on
February 26, 2006 inside the PMC’s headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.4 Petitioners were among the
thirty (30) military officers who joined the stand-off.5

As a result of the stand-off, an Ad Hoc Investigating Committee (AHIC) was created to conduct
an inquiry on the facts and circumstances that led to the February 24-26, 2006 aborted plan. In
an Investigation Report6 dated July 7, 2006, the AHIC recommended that the petitioners, together
with other officers and enlisted personnel, be charged before a General Court Martial for violations
of the applicable Articles of War. Thus:
 NAME Articles of War
COLORLANDO E DE LEON 67, 96 & 97
COLARMANDO V BAÑEZ 68, 96 & 97
LTCOL ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN 67, 96 & 97
MAJ JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO 67, 96 & 97
MAJ JOSE LEOMAR M DOCTOLERO 68, 96 & 97
CPT JOEY T FONTIVEROS 68, 96 & 97
CPT WILLIAM UPANO 68, 96 & 97
1LT ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA 68, 96 & 977

On July 20, 2006, Col. Nemesio I. Dabal, Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate
General’s Office (JAGO), AFP, issued Office Order No. 14-068 constituting a Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel (Panel) which would conduct investigation on the cases of all the petitioners.

Thereafter, JAGO furnished the petitioners the charge sheets and amended charge sheets signed
under oath by Captain Armando P. Paredes as the accuser and gave them time to submit their
respective counteraffidavits.9 They were also arrested and detained at Camp General Mateo
Capinpin, Tanay Rizal. Petitioners were charged with violations of Articles
63,10 65,11 67,12 9613 and 9714 of the Articles of War, as follows:15

NAME Articles of War

COLORLANDO E DE LEON 67 & 96
COLARMANDO V BAÑEZ 67 & 96
LTCOL ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN 67, 96 & 97
MAJ JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO 67 & 96
MAJ JOSE LEOMAR M DOCTOLERO 67 & 96
CPT JOEY T FONTIVEROS 67 & 96
CPT WILLIAM UPANO 67 & 96
1LT ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA 67 & 96

On October 25, 2006, the Panel submitted its Pre-Trial Investigation Report (PTI Report)16 to Lt.
Gen. Esperon, Jr. The Panel recommended that petitioners, except for Bañez, Segumalian and
Divinagracia, be tried before the court-martial for violation of the applicable Articles of War:17

NAME Articles of War

COLORLANDO E DE LEON 96
COLARMANDO V BAÑEZ None
 LTCOL ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN 96 & 97
MAJ JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO 96
MAJ JOSE LEOMAR M DOCTOLERO None
CPT JOEY T FONTIVEROS 96
CPT WILLIAM UPANO 96
1LT ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA None

The PTI Report was referred to Col. Pedro G. Herrera-Davila, Staff Judge Advocate for the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (CSAFP). In his Pre-Trial Advice18 dated November
7, 2006, Col. Davila disapproved the PTI Report and recommended the referral to trial by a
General Court Martial of the 37 AFP Officers, including the petitioners, for violations of Articles 96
(for all of the petitioners) and 97 (only for Segumalian). He also recommended that they be tried
for violations of other offenses considering that the available evidence established a prima
facie case against them. The offenses allegedly committed by the petitioners, as found by Col.
Davila, are as follows:

NAME Articles of War

COLORLANDO E DE LEON 67 & 96
COLARMANDO V BAÑEZ 67 & 96
LTCOL ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN 67, 96 & 97
MAJ JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO 67 & 96
MAJ JOSE LEOMAR M DOCTOLERO 67 & 96
CPT JOEY T FONTIVEROS 67 & 96
CPT WILLIAM UPANO 67 & 96
1LT ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA 67 & 9619

Thereafter, in a Memorandum20 dated November 17, 2006, Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. created and
convened a Special General Court Martial to try petitioners’ cases and other high-ranking
military officers. In Letter Order No. 75821dated November 24, 2006, Commodore Paterno E.
Labiano, the Adjutant General, designated the officers, to be detailed as the President and
members of the Special General Court-Martial No. 2, who will try petitioners’ cases.

Hence, these petitions.

In seeking to nullify the Memorandum dated November 17, 2006 and Letter Order No. 758,
petitioners allege that the creation of Special General Court Martial No. 2 violates their right to
due process under the Constitution and the Articles of War. For one, a Special General Court
Martial is not among those allowed by the Articles of War to be created.22 A special court martial
is different from a general court martial. They have different powers and functions.23 Further,
citing Articles 8,24 9,25 45,26 and 4627 of the Articles of War, the petitioners pointed out that Lt.
Gen. Esperon, Jr. cannot be the accuser, appointing authority, witness, prosecutor and reviewer
of the findings of the Special General Court Martial No. 2 all at the same time.

They also claim that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. already displayed manifest partiality when he openly
declared even before the start of the pre-trial investigation that all the accused should be
prosecuted before a court martial for their attempt to overthrow the government. He also executed
an affidavit against some of the accused officers and expressed his willingness and determination
to testify against them. Moreover, despite the PTI Report and the Pre-Trial Advice absolving the
accused officers of the charge of attempted mutiny, Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. overruled the findings
and proceeded to indict them for mutiny. He then immediately ordered the creation of the court
martial without even stating the factual and legal bases of the charges. Petitioners argue that Lt.
Gen. Esperon, Jr. should have afforded more weight to the PTI Report as the basis for issuing
the said Memorandum, the Panel being considered as a trier of facts.28

In the PTI Report, the Panel already declared that petitioners cannot be prosecuted for Attempting
to Create or Begin a Mutiny under Article 67, but only for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman under Article 96 of the Articles of War, because of clear absence of overt acts which
proximately tended to create an intended or actual collective insubordination.

Thus, petitioners argue that their continuing confinement in a maximum security detention facility
at Camp General Mateo Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal violates Article 7029 of the Articles of War because
they were never charged with any crime or serious offense defined in the Articles of War when
they were placed in confinement in July 2006. Further, they were not restricted to the barracks,
quarters or tent as Article 70 mandates, but were placed in confinement in a maximum security
detention facility.

Respondents counter, among other things, that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. correctly referred petitioners’
charges to Special General Court Martial No. 2 for trial. The ruling of the Panel which
recommended the dismissal of the charge for violation of Article 67 of the Articles of War against
petitioners was merely recommendatory and thus, not binding on Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. Notably,
both the AHIC in its Investigation Report and the Staff Advocate General in his Pre-Trial Advice
recommended the referral of the charges against petitioners to court martial. Thus, there was
a prima facie case against petitioners.30

Respondents also maintain that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr.’s affidavit and alleged statements that
petitioners should be tried before court martial does not make the Memorandum creating Special
General Court Martial No. 2 illegal. Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. is expressly authorized to convene a
courtmartial to try the charges against all petitioners. He is not the judge of the charges against
petitioners. Even if he approves the findings and sentence imposed by the court-martial, this is
still subject to confirmation by the President in certain cases.31 Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. is not the
accuser, prosecutor and the judge of the charges against the petitioners. He did not swear to the
charges against the petitioners and he was not among the designated prosecutors. There is even
no impediment for Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. to act as an accuser or prosecutor on the basis of No. 5,
paragraph 3, Chapter III, of Executive Order No. 178 (A Manual for Courts- Martial, Armed Forces
of the Philippines), which provides in part that: (1) whether the commander who convened the
court is the accuser or the prosecutor is mainly to be determined by his personal feeling or interest
in the matter; and (2) an action by a commander which is merely official and in the strict line of
his duty cannot be regarded as sufficient to disqualify him.
Respondents also argue that the remedies of writs of prohibition and habeas corpus are
unavailing. Under Article 8 of the Articles of War and No. 5, paragraph 5, Chapter III, of
Executive Order No. 178,32 Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. is authorized to create or appoint a court-
martial and to determine the cases to be referred to the court martial for trial. Thus, the Special
General Court Martial No. 2 has jurisdiction over the cases filed against petitioners. Petitioners
were likewise lawfully arrested and confined as a result of the charges against them for
violations of the Articles of War pursuant to Article 70 thereof.33

The Court’s Ruling

We dismiss the petitions on the ground of mootness.

Pending the resolution of this case, Special General Court Martial No. 2 rendered the following
various resolutions finding the petitioners not guilty of the charges against them:

1. Partial Ruling or Resolution34 dated October 16, 2009, cited in the After Trial Report rendered
on the same date, adjudging Divinagracia not guilty;

2. Resolution35 dated March 2, 2010 adjudging Bañez not guilty;

3. Resolution36 dated September 28, 2010 adjudging De Leon, Segumalian, Doctolero, and
Upano not guilty;

4. Resolution37 dated February 14, 2011 adjudging Aquino and Fontiveros not guilty.

Thus, this case has been rendered moot and academic by these various resolutions.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 38 we described a moot and academic case as "one that ceases
to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value"39 and discussed that "[g]enerally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness."40

Any resolution of the petitions to annul the Memorandum dated November 17, 2006 and Letter
Order No. 758, to restrain the Special General Court Martial and to order the release of the
petitioners from confinement would be of no practical value since as early as 2009, Special
General Court Martial No. 2 already absolved the petitioners of the charges under the Articles of
War, Special General Court Martial No. 2 has long been dissolved and the petitioners were
already released from confinement.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.
2) Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA
6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits
courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her
office. Despite the usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court,” the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part
of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in
so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-
making authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was
created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral
and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the
proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional
injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the
constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no
provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or
findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should
squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they
“cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over
issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the
existence of the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition,
including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed,
the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which
case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take
cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court

has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.

3).

LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO G.R. No. 174975

MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-
BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR
MONTAER-DALUPAN,
Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
SHARIA JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI
CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER,
Respondents.
Promulgated:

JANUARY 20, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:
 This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia
District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006[1] and
September 21, 2006.[2]

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer,
Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.[3]Petitioners Alejandro Montaer,
Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children.[4] On May
26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.[5]

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling
S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia
District Court.[6] The said complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M.
Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer,
Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed
as Special Civil Action No. 7-05.[7] In the said complaint, private respondents made the following
allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a
Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of
the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the
estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent. [8] Private
respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the
partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate
of the decedent.[9]

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the
Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because
he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees;
and (3) private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation
between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family
Code.[10]
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint.
The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends
only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.[11]

On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[12] On

December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging
that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.[13] On January 17, 2006, the Sharia
District Court denied petitioners opposition.[14]Despite finding that the said motion for
reconsideration lacked notice of hearing, the district court held that such defect was cured as
petitioners were notified of the existence of the pleading, and it took cognizance of the said
motion.[15] The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.[16]

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered its
order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.[17] The district court allowed private respondents to
adduce further evidence.[18] In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia
District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence,
and pre-trial conference.[19]

Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS

JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND
NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE

JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE
ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL
PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION

OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST
PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING
FEES.
 IV.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING
DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A
NOTICE OF HEARING.

V.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT
PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER
SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE
OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER,
SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia District
Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is
a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.[20]

Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is dependent
on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this
argument is the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a question
of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the
decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving
this issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over:

xxxx
 (b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and
character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition.[21] The designation given by parties to
their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said
designation. Rather than rely on a falsa descriptio or defective caption, courts are guided by the
substantive averments of the pleadings.[22]

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court
as a Complaint for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, [23] such as the
fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition
also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private
respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very
properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal
that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the
decedent.[24] These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the
decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that
Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject
matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer[25] or a motion to
dismiss.[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant[27] or result in
having a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
stratagem.[28] Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact
does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction.[29]
 The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.[30] In the case at bar,
the Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a
defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the
authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires
an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court
determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction.

Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before the
Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous
understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed
to the proceeding before the Sharia District Court, where the parties were designated either as
plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that
the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the
Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the
rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.[31] In a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants
seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the
decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement
and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.[32] Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact
of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S.
Montaer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action[33] applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the
estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a
special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special
proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong[34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. [35] On
the other hand, a special proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a
particular fact,[36] has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right,
or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the
estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the
purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate,[37] pay its liabilities,[38] and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.[39]

Docket Fees

Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of
docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents petition in the proceeding
before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate as the basis
for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners
argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the
docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees
vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.[40] If the party filing the case paid less
than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk
of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of
court.[41] In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because
of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees. [42] As every
citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties
knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the case cannot be
penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment.[43] However, the party concerned will
be required to pay the deficiency.[44]

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket
fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of
whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration before
the Sharia District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique
circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require
every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to
all parties concerned.[45] The Rules also provide that no written motion set for hearing shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.[46] However, the Rules allow a liberal
construction of its provisions in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[47] Moreover, this Court has upheld a
liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where a rigid application
will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows
that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face
or from the recitals contained therein.[48] In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that no
party can even claim a vested right in technicalities, and for this reason, cases should, as much
as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.[49]

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an
opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate
of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its
process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because
of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing,
because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to
the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not
affected.[50] The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,[51] for
the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules
do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.[52] In probate proceedings, what the
law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard.[53] In the case at bar, as evident from the Sharia District Courts order
dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in
question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said
motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District Court reset the hearing
for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity
to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the
purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.

Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet determined
whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship,
including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the
said proceeding.[54] The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who
are the heirs of the decedent.[55] In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent
depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Sharia District Court has
jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court,
dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioners. SO ORDERED.

4) G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner,

vs.
FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA, represented by his father
Hadji Kalam T. Mala, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a
Muslim.

This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to set aside the Fifth (5th) Shari'a District Court's decision 1 dated June 11,
2008 and order2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200.
The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as follows:

On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in
Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. On March 3,
1996, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s
name.3 At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land.4

By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land
Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land.5

On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report, Geodetic Engineer
Dennis P. Dacup found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s certificate
of title.6

To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation proceedings
before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing
to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of
the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court.7

In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the
lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property,
depriving him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court order Vivencio to vacate his property.8

Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio.
However, despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved
that he be allowed to present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court granted in its order9 dated January 30, 2008.10

In its decision11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as
registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate
the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay ₱10,000.00 as moderate damages and ₱5,000.00
as attorney’s fees.

On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a Distict Court issued the notice of writ of
execution12 to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to comply with the decision.
He received a copy of the notice on December 16, 2008.13

On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction.14 In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155,
paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a
District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims.
Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of
land. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court set aside the decision dated June 11,
2008 on the ground of mistake.16

Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio "intentionally [waived] his right to
defend himself."17 It noted that he was duly served with summons and had notice of the following:
Roldan’s motion to present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision
dated June 11, 2008, and the writ of execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he
lost his right to assail the decision via certiorari."18

According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio cited the wrong provision of law.
Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to the
jurisdiction of Shari’a Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District Courts.19 It ruled that it had jurisdiction
over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his
rights were not prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court decided the case applying
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.20

Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s
petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its order directing the issuance of a
writ of execution of the decision dated June 11, 2008.

Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for relief from judgment on June 17,
2009.22

On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order with this court.23

In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted
without jurisdiction in rendering the decision dated June 11, 2008. Under Article 143, paragraph
(2)(b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, 24 Shari’a District Courts may only
take cognizance of real actions where the parties involved are Muslims. Reiterating that he is not
a Muslim, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Roldan’s action. Thus, all the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court, including the decision dated June 11, 2008, are void.25

In the resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan to comment on Vivencio’s
petition for certiorari. This court subsequently issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of the writ of execution against Vivencio.27

On September 21, 2011, Roldan filed his comment28 on the petition for certiorari. He allegedly
filed the action for recovery of possession with the Shari’a District Court where "a more speedy
disposition of the case would be obtained":29

1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title…) was duly filed with the Fifth (5th)
Shariah District Court, Cotabato City at the option of herein private respondent (petitioner
below) who believed that a more speedy disposition of the case would be obtained when
the action is filed with the Shariah District Court than in the Regional Trial Courts
considering the voluminous pending cases at the Regional Trial Courts[.]30

On Vivencio’s claim that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to
decide the action for recovery of possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan argued
that no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines prohibited non-
Muslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings, especially in actions where the
Shari’a court applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Thus, respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court validly took cognizance of his action:
 2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively for muslim litigants. No
provision in the Code on Muslim Personal Laws which expressly prohibits non-muslim to
participate in the proceedings in the Shariah Courts, especially in actions which applies
the civil code and not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws;

3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action for quieting of title filed by a
muslim litigant since the nature of the action involved mere removal of cloud of doubt upon
one’s Certificate of Title. The laws applied in this case is the Civil Code and other related
laws, and not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws[.]31

Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction to decide the action for
recovery of possession, Roldan argued that the proceedings before it were valid.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio
upon service on him of summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he "effectively
waived his right to participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a District
Court]"32 and he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced:

4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent below) was properly served
with summons, notices and other court processes when the SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200
was filed and heard in the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City, but petitioner
(respondent below) intentionally or without known reason, ignore the proceedings;

5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is whether or not herein petitioner
(respondent below) has effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings below
and had lost his right to appeal via Certiorari; and the issue on whether or not the Fifth
(5th) Shariah District Court has jurisdiction over an action where one of the parties is a
non-muslim;

6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City acquired jurisdiction over the
case and that the same Court had correctly ruled that herein petitioner (respondent)
intentionally waived his right to defend himself including his right to appeal via certiorari;

7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District Court took cognizance of an
action under its concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law rules applied
is not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws but the Civil Code of the Philippines and the
Revised Rules of Procedure, hence the same would not prejudice the right of herein
petitioner (respondent below)[.]33

In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered Vivencio to reply to Roldan’s
comment. On February 3, 2012, Vivencio filed his manifestation,34 stating that he would no longer
file a reply to the comment as he had "exhaustively discussed the issue presented for resolution
in [his petition for certiorari]."35

The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a
real action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.

We also resolve the following issues:

 1. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where
one of the parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and

2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action filed by
a Muslim against a non-Muslim if the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons.

We rule for petitioner Vivencio.

Respondent Fifth Shari’a District

Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class
to which the proceedings in question belong."36 This power is conferred by law,37 which may either
be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot
choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes.38 If a court
hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
judgment rendered, are void.39

To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are examined.40

The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from
customary contracts41 wherein the parties involved are Muslims:

ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x

(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction
over:

xxxx

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d)42 wherein the parties
involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and

xxxx

When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and
enjoy it.43 If the owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of action to
recover its possession from the dispossessor.44 When the property involved is real,45 such as
land, the action to recover it is a real action;46otherwise, the action is a personal action.47 In such
actions, the parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance
of them.

In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession did not state that
Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a
Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim.

When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the
pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action
is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldan’s action
because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case
No. 07-200 are void.

Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District Court, instead of filing the action with the
regular courts, to obtain "a more speedy disposition of the case."48 This would have been a valid
argument had all the parties involved in this case been Muslims. Under Article 143 of the Muslim
Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary
contracts is concurrent with that of existing civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over
real actions "is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims"49 as this court ruled in Tomawis
v. Hon. Balindong.50 When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the
regular courts.

The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim
Code, customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law.51 Hence, Shari’a District
Courts apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from customary contracts.

In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a
District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily
apply the laws of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines,
regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action. This is the reason why the original
jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is
concurrent with that of regular courts.

However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved are Muslims.
Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings
before it are void, regardless of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines in resolving the action.
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly prohibits
non-Muslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when
provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim
Code,52 provisions of the Code on marriage and divorce apply to the female party in a marriage
solemnized according to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under Article 93,
paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code,54 a person of a different religion is disqualified from inheriting
from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by operation of law and regardless of Muslim law to the
contrary, the decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim "shall be entitled to one-third of
what he or she would have received without such disqualification."56 In these instances, non-
Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57

Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited instances. This case involves
an action for recovery of possession of real property. As a matter of law, Shari’a District Courts
may only take cognizance of a real action "wherein the parties involved are
Muslims."58 Considering that one of the parties involved in this case is not a Muslim, respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of
possession of real property. The judgment against Vivencio is void for respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction
of a court or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. 59 The
reason is that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court
to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action."60

In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio Figueroa was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The trial court
convicted Figueroa as charged. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Figueroa raised for the first
time the issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to decide the case. Ruling that the
Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal
case despite the fact that Figueroa objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction only on appeal.

In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny Pastorin filed a complaint for constructive
dismissal against Metromedia Times Corporation. Metromedia Times Corporation actively
participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. When the Labor Arbiter ruled against
Metromedia Times, it appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, arguing for the first
time that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. According to Metromedia Times,
the case involved a grievance issue "properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator."63 This court
set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter despite the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal.

There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction
of the court to decide a case. In the 1968 case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 64 the Spouses Tijam
sued the Spouses Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
recover ₱1,908.00. At that time, the court with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear civil actions
in which the amount demanded does not exceed ₱2,000.00 was the court of justices of the peace
and municipal courts in chartered cities under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of
attachment against the Spouses Sibonghanoy. However, the latter filed a counter-bond issued by
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court of First Instance dissolved the writ of
attachment.

After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the Spouses Tijam. When the writ of
execution returned unsatisfied, the Spouses Tijam moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
against Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s bond. The Court of First Instance granted the motion.
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. moved to quash the writ of execution, which motion the Court
of First Instance denied. Thus, the surety company appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance’s decision. Five days after receiving
the Court of Appeals’ decision, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing for the first time that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this court for resolution.

This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance on the ground of estoppel by laches. Parties may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter of the action if it took them an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to object to the court’s jurisdiction.65 This is to discourage the deliberate practice of
parties in invoking the jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief, only to repudiate the court’s
jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief sought.66 In such cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter is overlooked in favor of the public policy of discouraging such inequitable
and unfair conduct.67

In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before assailing the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance. As early as 1948, the surety company became a party to the case
when it issued the counter-bond to the writ of attachment. During trial, it invoked the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance by seeking several affirmative reliefs, including a motion to quash
the writ of execution. The surety company only assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance in 1963 when the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. This court said:

x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We
would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their Calvary once more.

The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.68

After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court observed that the "non-waivability
of objection to jurisdiction"69 has been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine has become more the
general rule than the exception.

In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous
to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. x x x.71
Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted"72 rule that objections to a court’s
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
This is because jurisdiction over the subject matter is a "matter of law" 73 and "may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties."74

In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied with great
care;"76 otherwise, the doctrine "may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of
injustice":77

x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely —
only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with
great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel
may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. x x x a judgment rendered
without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. x x x. No laches will even attach when the
judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction x x x.78

In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do not exist. Vivencio never invoked
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief. He filed the petition
for relief from judgment precisely to assail the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
over Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession.

Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court over the action for recovery of possession for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Roldan’s action.

II

That respondent Fifth Shari’a

District Court served summons on
petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner Vivencio

Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court were valid since the
latter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio. When Vivencio was served with summons,
he failed to file his answer and waived his right to participate in the proceedings before respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court. Since Vivencio waived his right to participate in the proceedings, he
cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced.

Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a personal judgment or to subject
the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action."79 A
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff once he or she files the initiatory
pleading.80 As for the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his or her person either by
his or her voluntary appearance in court81 or a valid service on him or her of summons.82

Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam83 or actions based on a party’s
personal liability.84Since actions in personam "are directed against specific persons and seek
personal judgments,"85 it is necessary that the parties to the action "are properly impleaded and
duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard."86 With respect to the defendant, he or she must
have been duly served with summons to be considered properly impleaded; otherwise, the
proceedings in personam, including the judgment rendered, are void.87

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a court to validly try and decide
actions in rem.88Actions in rem are "directed against the thing or property or status of a person
and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world."89 In actions in rem, the
court trying the case must have jurisdiction over the res, or the thing under litigation, to validly try
and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective."90 In actions in rem, summons must still be served on the defendant but only to satisfy
due process requirements.91

Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, objections to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the court’s jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is deemed waived. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived."

In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property,
restore to him the possession of his property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his
property.92 Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery of possession is an action in personam. As this
court explained in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and Santiago,93 an action to recover the title to or
possession of a parcel of land "is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible thing."94 Also, in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,95 this court said
that "a judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam. It
is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action."96

This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person.

However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before
respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.

III

The Shari’a Appellate Court and the

Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic
law must now be organized to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in the Philippines

We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition for certiorari of respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court’s decision. Under the judicial system in Republic Act No. 9054,97 the Shari’a
Appellate Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the
Shari’a District Courts. He should have filed his petition for certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate
Court.
However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be organized.1âwphi1 Thus, we call for the
organization of the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce the
Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system – a legal system complete
with its own civil, criminal, commercial, political, international, and religious laws 98 – is part of the
law of the land,99 and Shari’a courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.100

Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines shall continue to discharge their duties.101 All cases tried in Shari’a Circuit
Courts shall be appealable to Shari’a District Courts.[[102]

The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari’a District Courts. 103 It shall also exercise original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.104 The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate
Court shall be final and executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of
this court.105

This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such time that the Shari’a Appellate
Court shall have been organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be appealable to
the Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the
[Court of Appeals] stations preferably composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals]
Justices."108 However, considering that To m a w i s was not yet promulgated when Vivencio filed
his petition for certiorari on August 6, 2009, we take cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari
in the exercise of our original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.109

Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A
Jurisconsult in Islamic law or "Mufti" is an officer with authority to render legal opinions or
"fatawa"110 on any questions relating to Muslim law.111 These legal opinions should be based on
recognized authorities112 and "must be rendered in precise accordance with precedent."113 In the
Philippines where only Muslim personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the Qur’an
and Hadiths is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari’a court judges in resolving disputes
not involving Muslim personal laws.

All told, Shari’a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only when the parties involved
are Muslims. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of Roldan E. Mala’s action for recovery of possession considering that Vivencio B.
Villagracia is not a Muslim. Accordingly, the proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No.
07-200, including the judgment rendered, are void.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s
decision dated June 11, 2008 and order dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case
No. 07-200 are SET ASIDE without prejudice to the filing of respondent Roldan E. Mala of an
action with the proper court.

SO ORDERED.
5)

HEIRS OF CANDIDO DEL ROSARIOand HEIRS G.R. No. 181548

OF GIL DEL ROSARIO, Promulgated:

Petitioners, June 20, 2012

- versus -

MONICA DEL ROSARIO,

Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Nature of the Petition

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the
Heirs of Candido Del Rosario and the Heirs of Gil Del Rosario (petitioners), assailing
the Decision[1] dated January 21, 2008 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
85483.

The Antecedent Facts

This involves a parcel of land with an area of 9,536 square meters situated
in Barangay Caingin, Bocaue, Bulacan. The subject land was formerly owned by Pedro G. Lazaro
and tenanted by the spouses Jose Del Rosario and Florentina De Guzman (Spouses Del
Rosario).

Spouses Del Rosario had three children: Monica Del Rosario (Monica), Candido Del
Rosario (Candido) and Gil Del Rosario (Gil). The petitioners claimed that when Spouses Del
Rosario died, only they continued to tenant and actually till the subject land.

Sometime in February 1991, Monica and Gil agreed that the latter would facilitate the
application for an Emancipation Patent over the subject land in the name of the former. In
exchange, Monica agreed to cede to Gil one-third of the said land after the Emancipation Patent
had been issued to her.

On May 29, 1998, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued to Monica
Emancipation Patent No. 00733146 over the land. Subsequently, on October 22, 1998, the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. EP-
257-M in the name of Monica.

The petitioners claimed that Monica, despite repeated demands, refused to cede to Gil
the one-third portion of the subject land pursuant to their agreement. Thus, on April 17, 2000, the
petitioners filed with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in Malolos,
Bulacan a complaint against Monica for amendment of TCT No. EP-257-M and partition of the
subject land.

For her part, Monica claimed that their father entrusted to her the cultivation of the subject
land after the latter became ill and incapacitated sometime in 1950. Gil and Candido, in turn, were
entrusted with the cultivation of other parcels of land tenanted by Spouses Del Rosario. Further,
after Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) took effect, Monica claimed that she was the one
listed in the files of the DAR as the tenant-beneficiary of the subject land and that she was the
one who was paying the amortizations over the same.

The PARADs Decision

On May 22, 2002, PARAD Provincial Adjudicator Toribio E. Ilao, Jr. (PA Ilao) rendered a
Decision[2] the decretal portion of which, in part, reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the

following manner:

1). Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel TCT/EP No.

257(M)/00733146 containing an area of 9,536 square meters, more or less, issued
to Monica del Rosario and partitioned (sic) the covered lot among the heirs of the
late spouses Jose del Rosario and Florentina de Guzman;

2). Ordering the respondent to cede the ONE THIRD (1/3) portion of the
9,536 square meters, equivalent to 3,178 square meters of the subject agricultural
land in favor of the heirs of the late Gil Del Rosario in compliance with their
agreement;

3). Ordering the remaining portion of 6,358 square meters to be subdivided

into four (4) equal shares: to the surviving heirs of the late spouses Jose del
Rosario and Florentina de Guzman as follows, to wit:

a. Respondent Monica del Rosario 1,589 square meters;

b. Heirs of Candido del Rosario represented by his children 1,589
square meters;
c. Heirs of Gil del Rosario represented by his children 1,589 square
meters; and
d. Consolacion del Rosario 1,589 square meters.

4). Directing the PARO of Bulacan thru the Operations Division and all DAR
personnel concerned to generate and issue EPs/titles in the name of the parties
concerned with the corresponding area of tillage as indicated above, in accordance
with the DAR existing rules and regulations, and cause the registration of the new
EPs/titles with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.[3]
 PA Ilao found that Monica was not the bona fide tenant-farmer of the subject land and that
she had continuously failed to cultivate or develop the same.

Unperturbed, Monica appealed from the foregoing disposition of PA Ilao to the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

The DARABs Decision

On January 8, 2004, the DARAB rendered a Decision,[4] which reversed and set aside the
Decision dated May 22, 2002 of PA Ilao. The DARAB held that:

[Monica] and her siblings are not co-heirs to the landholding in

question. The said land was not a part of the inheritance of their late parents. This
conclusion is based on the simple reason that tenants are not the owners of the
landholding they cultivate. Under the law, inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death x x x. In
the case of a tenant, what he may transfer to his successor upon his death is
merely the right to cultivate the landholding. Such transfer of right to cultivate,
however, cannot be applied in the instant case. The right to cultivate the subject
landholding was being exercised by [Monicas] father until he became incapacitated
(due to high blood pressure) to till the land, at which time, he passed the
responsibility of cultivation to his eldest child, [Monica]. x x x The records show that
the parents of [Monica] gave her the right to till the property of Pedro Lazaro. This
is corroborated by the fact that Pedro Lazaro has recognized [Monica] as the only
registered tenant of the subject property as evidenced by their Kasunduan Sa
Pamumuwisan dated 25 September 1973 x x x.[5]

Further, the DARAB ruled that the agreement between Monica and Gil that one-third of
the subject land would be ceded to the latter after the same had been registered under Monicas
name is contrary to law as P.D. No. 27 prohibits the transfer of parcels of land given to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries other than by hereditary succession or to the government.

The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated January 8, 2004, but it was
denied by the DARAB in its Resolution[6] dated July 8, 2004.

Subsequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review[7] with the CA alleging that the
DARAB erred in ruling that they and Monica are not co-owners of the subject land.

The CAs Decision

 On January 21, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision denying the petition
for review filed by the petitioners. The CA held that the PARAD and the DARAB had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the petitioners complaint for amendment of the Emancipation Patent and
partition of the subject land, there being no agrarian dispute or tenancy relations between the
parties. Thus:

While it is true that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP),
which include those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs)
which are registered with the Land Registration Authority, however, for the DARAB
to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between
the parties, which does not obtain in the petition at bench.

The jurisdiction of a tribunal or quasi-judicial body over the subject matter

is determined by the averments of the complaint/petition and the law extant at the
time of the commencement of the suit/complaint/petition. All proceedings before a
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency bereft of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action are null and void.[8] (Citations omitted)

Nevertheless, the CA also held that the petitioners are bound by the decision of the
DARAB declaring Monica as the bona fide holder of TCT No. EP-257-M since they participated
in the proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB without raising any objection thereto.

Issues

In the instant petition, the petitioners submit the following issues for this Courts resolution:

[I]

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION ON [THE] PART OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB).

[II]

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS ARE BOUND
BY THE DECISION OF THE DARAB DECLARING MONICA DEL ROSARIO AS
BONA FIDE TCT/EP HOLDER, THAT THEY ARE NOT CO-HEIRS TO THE
SUBJECT LANDHOLDING, THAT THE AGREEMENT THAT ONE THIRD (1/3)
 OF THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING SHALL BE GIVEN TO GIL DEL ROSARIO IS
NULL AND VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY [TO] AGRARIAN LAWS AND
ORDERING THEM NOT TO INTERFERE WITH MONICA DEL ROSARIOS
CULTIVATION OF SUBJECT LANDHOLDING.[9]

Simply put, the issues for this Courts resolution are the following: first, whether the PARAD
and the DARAB have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petitioners complaint for amendment
and partition; and second, if the PARAD and the DARAB have no jurisdiction over the complaint
for amendment and partition, whether the petitioners are bound by their respective dispositions.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue: Jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB

Contrary to the CAs disposition, the petitioners insist that the PARAD and the DARAB
have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of their complaint for amendment of the Emancipation
Patent and partition of the subject land notwithstanding the absence of tenancy relationship
between them and Monica. They assert that the complaint below essentially involves a
determination of the actual tenant and eventual rightful beneficiary of the subject land.

On the other hand, Monica asserts that the CA did not err in declaring that the PARAD
and the DARAB have no jurisdiction over the said complaint for amendment and partition since
there was simply no tenancy relationship alleged therein.

The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is

limited only to all agrarian disputes and matters
or incidents involving the implementation of the
CARP.

In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A created the DARAB
to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform matters.[10]

At the time the complaint for amendment and partition was filed by the petitioners, the
proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB were governed by the DARAB New Rules of
Procedures, which were adopted and promulgated on May 30, 1994, and came into effect on
June 21, 1994 after publication (1994 DARAB Rules). The 1994 DARAB Rules identified the
cases over which the DARAB shall have jurisdiction, to wit:
 RULE II

JURISDICTION OF THE ADJUDICATION BOARD

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate

Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under
Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, and 129-A, Republic Act No.
3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such
jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:

a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or

juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;

b) The valuation of land, and the preliminary determination and

payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar
disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP);

c) The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of

sale or their amendments involving lands under the administration
and disposition of the DAR or LBP;

d) Those case arising from, or connected with membership or

representation in compact farms, farmers cooperatives and other
registered farmers associations or organizations, related to lands
covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;

e) Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure,

pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the
coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws;

f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of

Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation
Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority;

g) Those cases previously falling under the original and

exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations
 under Section 12 of Presidential No. 946, except sub-paragraph (Q)
thereof and Presidential Decree No. 815.

It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or

petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.

Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of

Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARP) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as
enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of
and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or

concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.

SECTION 2. Jurisdiction of the Regional and Provincial Adjudicator. The

RARAD and the PARAD shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board
to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents
in connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

Specifically, the PARAD and the DARAB have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No. 9700, E.O. Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844
as amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their Implementing Rules
and Regulations.[11]

Thus, the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving
agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. Section
3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this wise:

(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial

arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
 to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee.

The petitioners complaint for amendment and

partition is beyond the jurisdiction of the PARAD
and the DARAB.

Where a question of jurisdiction between the DARAB and the RTC is at the core of a
dispute, basic jurisprudential tenets come into play. It is the rule that the jurisdiction of a tribunal,
including a quasi-judicial office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a
petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the
relief prayed for irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
reliefs.[12]

Accordingly, we turn to the petitioners complaint for amendment and partition, wherein they
alleged that:

2. The subject agricultural land identified as Lot No. C, Psd-03-091057 (AR)

consisting of an area of 9,536 square meters more or less situated
at Brgy. Caingin, Bocaue, Bulacan, was formerly owned by Pedro Lazaro and was
tenanted by SPOUSES JOSE DEL ROSARIO AND FLORENTINA DE GUZMAN,
the late grandparents of herein petitioners, as the registered tenant-farmers over
the subject agricultural land devoted to planting of palay;

3. When the late grandparents of herein petitioners died, the children of the
former, specifically, brothers CANDIDO DEL ROSARIO and GIL DEL ROSARIO,
predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners, continued in the tillage of the subject
agricultural land;

xxxx

6. The EP was issued by the DAR to the respondent with the help of her
brother Gil Del Rosario who, aside from shouldering all expenses relative thereto,
lodged the petition in Monica del Rosarios name for the issuance of EP over the
subject agricultural land being tilled by them, including the co-tenant farmers that
are adjacent and adjoining in that area;
 7. The respondent, after receiving the EP over the subject agricultural
land, refused to give the shares of her brothers (predecessors-in-interest of
herein petitioners) and subdivide equally the subject land among them, they
being surviving heirs of their late parents who first tilled the subject
agricultural land despite persistent demand;

xxxx

10. An agreement was likewise entered into by the respondent and

the other tenant farmers of the adjoining lots, with the late Gil del Rosario
dated February 1991, committing themselves that after the issuance of their
EPs by the DAR, the ONE THIRD (1/3) portion of their tillage will be
segregated and given to her brother Gil del Rosario in consideration of the
assistance of the latter, x x x;

xxxx

12. The petitioners are seeking the assistance of this Honorable Board
to amend and partition the EP issued to the respondent and the subject
agricultural land be divided equally among the respondent and the
predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners;[13] (Emphasis supplied)

Based on these allegations, the petitioners sought the following reliefs:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it [is] most respectfully prayed of this

Honorable Board that after due hearing, judgment be rendered in the above-
entitled petition as follows:

(a) Ordering respondent to partition or subdivide equally

among the respondent and herein petitioners, in representation of their
respective predecessors-in-interest, the subject agricultural land;

(b) Ordering respondent to stop collecting lease rentals from the

herein petitioners relative to their establishments and those erected by their
predecessors-in-interest;

(c) Ordering respondent to stop cutting [of] trees and other

improvements thereon established by the herein petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest;

(d) Ordering respondent to allow the petitioners to plant palay or

vegetable plants (sic) over the agricultural land occupied by them;
 (e) Ordering respondent to pay attorneys fees of [P]50,000.00 to
petitioners and costs of litigation.[14] (Emphasis supplied)

A perusal of the foregoing will readily show that the complaint essentially sought the
following: first, the enforcement of the agreement entered into by and between Gil and Monica
wherein the latter promised to cede to the former one-third portion of the subject land upon the
issuance of the emancipation patent over the same; and second, the recovery of petitioners
purported hereditary share over the subject land, in representation of Gil and Candido.

Indubitably, the said complaint for amendment and partition does not involve any agrarian
dispute, nor does it involve any incident arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. The
petitioners and Monica have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that will
bring this controversy within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB. Since the PARAD
and the DARAB have no jurisdiction over the present controversy, they should not have taken
cognizance of the petitioners complaint for amendment of the Emancipation Patent and partition.

Further, the instant case does not involve an incident arising from the implementation of
agrarian laws as would place it within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB. Admittedly,
the petitioners alleged that it was Gil and Candido who continued the tillage of the subject land
after the death of Spouses Del Rosario. While the foregoing allegation seems to raise a challenge
to Monicas qualification as a farmer-beneficiary of the subject land, we nevertheless find the same
insufficient to clothe the PARAD and the DARAB with jurisdiction over the complaint.

While ostensibly assailing Monicas qualification as a farmer-beneficiary, the petitioners

did not seek the nullification of the emancipation patent issued to Monica and the issuance of a
new one in their names. Instead, the petitioners merely sought that the subject land be equally
partitioned among the surviving heirs of Spouses Del Rosario, including Monica. Verily, by merely
asking for the recovery of their alleged hereditary share in the subject land, the petitioners
implicitly recognized the validity of the issuance of the emancipation patent over the subject land
in favor of Monica.

Second Issue: Effect of the DARABs Decision

Despite its finding that the PARAD and the DARAB lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the petitioners complaint for amendment and partition, the CA nevertheless ruled that the
petitioners were bound by the DARABs Decision dated January 8, 2004. Thus:

However, considering that petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the DARAB

Provincial Adjudicator by opposing Monicas motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that said Adjudicator has no jurisdiction over the case, they are, therefore,
 bound by the Decision of the DARAB declaring Monica as the bona fide TCT/EP
holder; that they are not co-heirs to the subject landholding; and that the
agreement that one third (1/3) of the subject landholding shall be given to Gil del
Rosario is null and void for being contrary to agrarian laws; and ordering them not
to interfere with Monicas cultivation of her landholding. Settled is the rule that
participation by certain parties in the administrative proceedings without raising
any objection thereto, bars them from any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse
decision is rendered against them.[15] (Citation omitted)

We do not agree with the foregoing ratiocination of the CA. The Decision dated January 8, 2004
of the DARAB is null and void and, thus, produced no effect whatsoever, the DARAB having no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petitioners complaint for amendment and partition.

On this point, our disquisition in Spouses Atuel v. Spouses Valdez[16] is instructive, thus:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived

by, any act or omission of the parties. The active participation of the parties
in the proceedings before the DARAB does not vest jurisdiction on the
DARAB, as jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The courts or the parties
cannot disregard the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction. Likewise, estoppel
does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause
of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does
not prevent this Court from addressing the issue, as the DARABs lack of
jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint. Issues of jurisdiction are not
subject to the whims of the parties.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an

order or decision rendered by a tribunal or agency without jurisdiction is a
total nullity. Accordingly, we rule that the decision of the DARAB in the instant
case is null and void. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the DARAB is likewise invalid. This Court finds no compelling
reason to rule on the other issues raised by the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano.[17] (Citations omitted and emphases supplied)

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Decision dated January 21,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85483 is hereby REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicators Decision dated May 22, 2002, and
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boards Decision dated January 8, 2004 and
Resolution dated July 8, 2004, are declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. SO
ORDERED.

8) ESTELITO V. REMOLONA
6) G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA,
respondents.

Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO

INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES
TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. — Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the
offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the
control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of
petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to
offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate
of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES

SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME
COURT; REASON. — However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING

COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. — Thus, the
Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as
the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal
complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS
PERSONNEL; REASON. — The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter,
as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the
foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us is this:
should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before
him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with,
much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

DECISION

NOCON, J p:

The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for
the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming
that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.

In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified
his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew
that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his
certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989;
and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of
ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.

Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this
Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the
decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official
duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme
Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against
him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman
cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or
to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his
affidavit-complaint. 4

The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the
question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time
to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had
not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve
the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to
this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of
their administrative duties.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same
to this Court for appropriate action. SO ORDERED.
 7) [G.R. No. 90591. November 21, 1990.]

GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL C. DOMINGO, in his

capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and PC/INP/CIS , Respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICE; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; ACT OR OMISSION

THAT MAY BE INVESTIGATED, NOT REQUIRED TO BE RELATED TO, CONNECTED WITH,
OR ARISE FROM, THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY. — As protector of the people,
the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate . . . any act or
omission of any public official . . . when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient." (Sec. 13 [1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned,"
in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official . . . and to
recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13 [3]). The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not
qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish,
neither should we. The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and
for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles
of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the
prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence,
quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public
officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal
complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained
of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act
makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
The murder of three persons, is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly committed
by the petitioner as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the
Ombudsman’s investigative authority.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; VESTED WITH PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER CASE COGNIZABLE BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN; MURDER CHARGE INCLUDED THEREIN. — The Ombudsman Act of 1989
which took effect on December 7, 1989 (Sec. 15, R.A. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense is
higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the
petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction to investigate it. Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that
created the Ombudsman as a special body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted
if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising from,
or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that
spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is in the investigation of the latter
where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman,
is greatest.

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

By this petition for certiorari and prohibition Governor Amor D. Deloso of Zambales seeks to stop
respondent Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, from conducting a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him of multiple murder in IBP Case No. OSP-88-01770, entitled
"PC/INP/CIS v. Governor Amor Deloso," on the grounds that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate the murder charge against the petitioner for
its jurisdiction is confined to the investigation only of acts or omissions that are connected with
the performance of his duties as governor; and

2. For the same reason, the Tanodbayan (Special Prosecutor) has no jurisdiction to prosecute
the murder case against the petitioner.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on November 7, 1989
(p. 49, Rollo).chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The case began in the evening of April 22, 1988, when Governor Deloso attended a basketball
victory party in Cabangan, Zambales. From the party, he proceeded to a pre-wedding celebration
in Danacbunga, Botolan, Zambales. He left Danacbunga at 1:30 A.M., April 23, 1988, on board
his service car, and accompanied by his security force of military/police/civilian escorts on board
two other motor vehicles.

While travelling on the barangay road a few kilometers from the venue of the pre-wedding
celebration, the convoy of three (3) motor vehicles, with the governor’s car in the middle, was
allegedly ambushed. Governor Deloso jumped out of his car and took cover behind it. During a
lull in the shooting, he was allegedly rushed home by his official staff. Later, he learned that three
supposed ambushers — Patrolman Alberto Dullas, Jr., Don Dullas, and Edgar Vinco, Jr. — were
killed. His own group suffered no casualties.

Based, however, on the testimonies of eyewitnesses, the PC/INP/CIS investigators reported that
the Governor’s group was not ambushed, but was the ambusher. The report
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This case was prefaced by the report of Governor Amor Deloso of Zambales that on the morning
of April 23, 1988, at about 1:30 o’clock in the morning, he and his escorts were ambushed by the
group of Pat. Alberto Dullas, Jr. along the Provincial Road of Danacbunga, Botolan, Zambales.
However, in the course of the investigation, it was established, through the testimonies of
eyewitnesses, that it was the group of Pat. Dullas, Don Dullas and Edgar Vinco, Jr., then riding in
a Toyota Corolla car with Plate No. CAG 419, who were ambushed by the group of Governor
Deloso and his escorts, numbering more or less fifteen (15). Initial witnesses positively identified
the military/police escorts of Governor Deloso as CIC Pacifico Uy, CIC Leonito Bandala PC, Cpl
Cesar Madoh PC, Cpl Elpidio Manding PC, Pat Pedro Dolojan INP and Pat Florante Dimaguibo
INP. The above-named escorts were already charged of Multiple Murder before the Regional Staff
Judge Advocate (RSJA), Regional Command (RECOM) No. 3, on May 5, 1988, pursuant to PD
1850. Said witnesses further identified the civilian escorts/companions of Governor Deloso at the
time of the incident as Eto Epan, Dennis Reyes, Arthur Menes and Jaime Detona, Et Al., who
were, likewise, charged of the same offense before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Zambales
on May 6, 1988, docketed under I.S. No. 88-100-1.

"Follow-up investigation of this case further established the identities of the other military/police
escorts of Governor Deloso who were also implicated in the said shooting incident, namely: Pat
Warlito Quinto, Mario Dial, Jr., Crisostomo Diomino, Jr., Sarito Dedicatoria, Ernesto Isidoro, Delfin
Deliquina, Ramon Pangilinan, Alex de Leon and Carlos Yabut. Consequently, these personalities
had already been included as respondents in the original complaint earlier filed with RSJA, Recom
3, on June 27, 1988.

"Relevantly, the testimonies of additional witnesses, particularly those of the spouses Honorio
and Araceli Dullas strongly inculpated Governor Amor Deloso of Zambales in the commission of
the crime. On the other hand, Governor Deloso, when invited to give his version of the incident,
opted instead in submitting a nineteen (19) page photocopy of his letter dated May 30, 1988 to
Justice Secretary Sedfrey Ordonez." (pp. 63-64, Rollo.)

The military servicemen in the Governor’s security force were charged with murder in the Judge
Advocate General’s Office, while his civilian security men were investigated by the Provincial
Fiscal of Zambales. The Governor was charged with multiple murder before the Special
Prosecutor, Raul M. Gonzales, who, without a referral from the Ombudsman, supposedly
handpicked prosecutor Juan Templonuevo to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.

On February 20, 1989, Governor Deloso filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) The Office of the Special Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case;

2) The said office is without authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; and

3) The preliminary investigation of Governor Deloso was prohibited by law in view of the Barangay
Elections scheduled on 28 March 1989.

Albeit reluctantly, it may be imagined, Special Prosecutor Gonzales referred the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation.

On June 19, 1989, respondent Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an
order denying Governor Deloso’s motion to dismiss because "the Constitution empowers the
Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any public official . . . without any qualification
that said act or omission must have been committed or incurred in relation to his office." (p. 8,
Rollo)

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Governor Deloso filed this petition for certiorari,
reiterating the grounds of his motion to dismiss.

After careful consideration, the Court finds the petition to be without merit.
Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

"SEC. 13. The office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employees, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.

"x x x"

(Emphasis supplied; pp. 9-10, Rollo.)

The petitioner admits that "the office of the Ombudsman was created under the authority of the
Constitution and was mandated to act as a champion of the citizens, the watchdog of the people,
the official critic of public officials and the government mobilizer." (p. 9, Rollo.) But he theorizes
that "the framers of our Constitution . . . intended to limit the powers of the Ombudsman to crimes
related to or connected with an official’s discharge of his public functions." (p. 15, Rollo.) Hence,
the lone issue presented by the petition is whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to
investigate the charge of multiple murder allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial
governor. The answer is yes.

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to
"investigate . . . any act or omission of any public official . . . when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13 [1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to
"direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action
against a public official . . . and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13 [3]).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any
crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or
omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not
require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance
of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of
broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that
are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring
public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or
dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was
deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints
against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related
to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly
clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).

The murder of three persons, is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly committed
by the petitioner as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the
Ombudsman’s investigative authority.

The Ombudsman Act of 1989 which took effect on December 7, 1989 (Sec. 15, R.A. 6770) vests
in the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

"SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases." (p. 74, Rollo.)

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D.
1606). The murder charge against the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.

Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special
body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the
investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office,
but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and
prerogatives, for it is in the investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless,
and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

8) [G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001]

ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The present petition seeks to review and set aside the Decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals dated July 31, 1998[1] upholding the decision of the Civil Service Commission which
ordered the dismissal of petitioner Estelito V. Remolona (Remolona) from the government service
for dishonesty, and the Resolution dated February 5, 1999[2] denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
 Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office
Service in Infanta, Quezon, while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary
School.
In a letter[3] dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the
Department of Education, Culture & Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) as to the status of the civil service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly
got a rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for Teachers. [4] Mr.
America likewise disclosed that he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning for
a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher's board examinations.
On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas issued an Order directing
CSC Region IV Director Bella Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona's
eligibility, after verification from the Register of Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel
Records revealed "that Remolona's name is not in the list of passing and failing examinees, and
that the list of examinees for December 10, 1989 does not include the name of
Remolona. Furthermore, Examination No. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belongs to
a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who took the examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of
65.00%."[5]
During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G. Pasion, Director II, Civil Service
Field Office, Lucena City, Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written
statement of facts[6] regarding the issuance of the questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolona,
which is summarized in the Memorandum[7] submitted by Director Pasion as follows:

"3.1 That sometime in the first week of September, 1990, while riding in a Kapalaran Transit Bus
from Sta. Cruz, Laguna on his way to San Pablo City, he met one Atty. Hadji Salupadin (this is
how it sounded) who happened to be sitting beside him;

3.2 That a conversation broke out between them until he was able to confide his problem to Atty.
Salupadin about his wife having difficulty in acquiring an eligibility;

3.3 That Atty. Salupadin who represented himself as working at the Batasan, offered his help for
a fee of P3,000.00;

3.4 That the following day they met at the Batasan where he gave the amount of P2,000.00,
requirements, application form and picture of his wife;

3.5 That the following week, Thursday, at around 1:00 P.M., they met again at the Batasan where
he handed to Atty. Salupadin the amount of P1,000.00 plus P500.00 bonus who in turn handed
to him the Report of Rating of one Nery C. Remolona with a passing grade, then they parted;

3.6 That sometime in the last week of September, he showed the Report of Rating to the District
Supervisor, Francisco America who informed her (sic) that there was no vacancy;

3.7 That he went to Lucena City and complained to Dr. Magsino in writing x x x that Mr. America
is asking for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife but failed to make good his
promise. He attached the corroborating affidavits of Mesdames Carmelinda Pradillada and
Rosemarie P. Romantico and Nery C. Remolona x x x;
3.8 That from 1986 to 1988, Mr. America was able to get six (6) checks at P2,600.00 each plus
bonus of Nery C. Remolona;

3.9 That Mr. America got mad at them. And when he felt that Mr. America would verify the
authenticity of his wife's Report of Rating, he burned the original."

Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake
eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to
be together. Based on the foregoing, Director Pasion recommended the filing of the appropriate
administrative action against Remolona but absolved Mrs. Nery Remolona from any liability since
it has not been shown that she willfully participated in the commission of the offense.
Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against petitioner Remolona,
Nery C. Remolona, and Atty. Hadji Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and
dishonesty.[8] A formal hearing ensued wherein the parties presented their respective
evidence. Thereafter, CSC Regional Director Bella A. Amilhasan issued a Memorandum dated
February 14, 1995[9] recommending that the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona be found guilty
as charged and be meted the corresponding penalty.
Said recommendation was adopted by the CSC which issued Resolution No. 95-2908 on
April 20, 1995, finding the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing
the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. The case against Atty. Hadji Salupadin
was held in abeyance pending proof of his identity.[10] In its Resolution No. 965510[11] dated
August 27, 1996, the CSC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses
Remolona, absolved Nery Remolona from liability and held that:

"Further, a review of the records and of the arguments presented fails to persuade this
Commission to reconsider its earlier resolution insofar as Estelito Remolona's culpability is
concerned. The evidence is substantial enough to effect his conviction. His act of securing a fake
eligibility for his wife is proved by substantial evidence. However, in the case of Nery Remolona,
the Commission finds her innocent of the offense charged, for there is no evidence to show that
she has used the fake eligibility to support an appointment or promotion. In fact, Nery Remolona
did not indicate in her Personal Data Sheet that she possesses any eligibility. It must be pointed
out that it was her husband who unilaterally worked to secure a fake eligibility for her.

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied insofar as respondent
Estelito Remolona is concerned. However, Resolution No. 95-2908 is modified in the sense that
respondent Nery Remolona is exonerated of the charges. Accordingly, Nery Remolona is
automatically reinstated to her former position as Teacher with back salaries and other benefits."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision dismissing the petition for
review filed by herein petitioner Remolona. His motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was
likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred:

1. in denying petitioner's motion for new trial;

2. in holding that petitioner is liable for dishonesty; and

3. in sustaining the dismissal of the petitioner for an offense not work connected in relation to his
official position in the government service.

The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed
from the government service for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected
with the performance of his official duty. Remolona likewise imputes a violation of his right to due
process during the preliminary investigation because he was not assisted by counsel. He claims
that the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him is inadmissible because he was merely
made to sign a blank form. He also avers that his motion for new trial should be granted on the
ground that the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case before the
Regional Office of the CSC was not forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Finally, he pleads that the
penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits is too harsh considering the nature of the offense
for which he was convicted, the length of his service in government, that this is his first offense,
and the fact that no damage was caused to the government.
The submission of Remolona that his alleged extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
because he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12
paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a
criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of
such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.[12]
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII
of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph
2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987).Thus, the right to counsel is not always
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the
hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.[13]
In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted
by the CSC field office. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts
and whether there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable
by the CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty thereof and should be
administratively charged.Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such investigation
may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.
The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extra-judicial admission and that he
merely signed a blank form cannot be given credence. Remolona occupies a high position in
government as Postmaster at Infanta, Quezon and, as such, he is expected to be circumspect in
his actions specially where he is being administratively charged with a grave offense which carries
the penalty of dismissal from service.
Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due process under Section
2(3), Article XI (B) of the Constitution which provides that no officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause. Although the offense of dishonesty is
punishable under the Civil Service law, Remolona opines that such act must have been committed
in the performance of his function and duty as Postmaster. Considering that the charge of
dishonesty involves the falsification of the certificate of rating of his wife Nery Remolona, the same
has no bearing on his office and hence, he is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This
proposition is untenable.
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal
for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292.And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be
committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the
rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right
to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he
performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given
more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against
offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason
of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of
his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to
counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated
from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to
continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.[14]
The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the publics faith and confidence in the government.[15]
The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by
substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding
on this Court.[16] It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency on the sufficiency of evidence.[17] Thus, when confronted with conflicting versions of
factual matters, it is for the administrative agency concerned in the exercise of discretion to
determine which party deserves credence on the basis of the evidence received. [18] The rule,
therefore, is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear
showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted
in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess of
jurisdiction.[19]
We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason
to deviate from the findings of the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The written admission of
Remolona is replete with details that could have been known only to him. No ill-motive or bad
faith was ever imputed to Director Pasion who conducted the investigation. The presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed remains unrebutted.
 The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the formal hearing before
the CSC is entirely a matter of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of this Court clearly states that in resolving appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies, it is within the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the original records of
the proceedings under review transmitted to it.[20] Verily, the Court of Appeals decided the merits
of the case on the bases of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the pleadings
filed by the parties.
We likewise find no merit in the contention of Remolona that the penalty of dismissal is too
harsh considering that there was no damage caused to the government since the certificate of
rating was never used to get an appointment for his wife, Nery Remolona. Although no pecuniary
damage was incurred by the government, there was still falsification of an official document that
constitutes gross dishonesty which cannot be countenanced, considering that he was an
accountable officer and occupied a sensitive position.[21] The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.[22]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
9) [G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998]

TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as

ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J:

Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order"
issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the
motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative charges for inter
alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
I
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G.
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was
the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which
he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.
Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the
FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner
into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondents
gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his
office.
Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner
tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic
Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges
referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral
conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private
respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid
resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the
penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration,
respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close
associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F.
Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order
of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989)[1] pertinently provides that -

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an
administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits
that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its
aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of
this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it
"necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it
creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is
empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can
"(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as
may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on law.

xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of
procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.

xxx

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall
be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with the due process. x x x

xxx

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman
are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be
filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:

xxx

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice
may require.

Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority,
petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman
governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with respect to the availabity or non-
avalability of appeal in administrative cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely
prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy
under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action
for certiorariunder Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision of this Court applying Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 vis--vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed
out by public respondents, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al.[3] and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
et al.[4] were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.[5] was
commenced by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et
al.,[6] Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., [7] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[8] and Jao, et al. vs.
Vasquez,[9] which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et
al.[10] was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or
Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon.
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al.[11] which was a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which
will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the
parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal
or as the basis of a special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or
alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements
in Yabuts and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay
down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be
taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for
judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does
appear to have been seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could
fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus,
the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770
and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in
administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995,
while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the
proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may
have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic
and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both
for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o
law shall be passed increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect
on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the
case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the
government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or
disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute trangresses the
authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the
statute, governs in a case before them for judgement.[12]
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the
pleadings,[13] the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from
inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a
statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no
jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily
follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.[14]
Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it
may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion.[15] The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance
of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where the fact is developed. [16] The court has a clearly
recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.[17]
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be further
heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14,
1998, the material parts stating as follows:

The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)'
issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst.
Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved the latter from the administrative
charges for grave misconduct, among other."

It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its
Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that
R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all
administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into account or
discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section
30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advise and consent."

The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs.
The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions
of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.

In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved and in this case, and
the foregoing legal consideration appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said
appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be
first resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their position and arguments on
the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from
notice hereof.

IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement,
hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner
espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal
by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman is not violative of
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law
"increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate
jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e),
Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said
Section 27 does not increase this Court may provide," said section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate
jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45,
then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has of which this
Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over
the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and
instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the appellate
court.[18] Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence
whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be
reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in
the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such
provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because
they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil
Procedure[19] preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal
by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:

SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth.
(Italics ours).

This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court
of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative
or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of
law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by
recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only
from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments
and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies[20] are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies .[21]
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial
agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason
for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact
that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter
is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court
of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable
feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like
those coming from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better
prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by
Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65
since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions.*
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction
contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not of
acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already
discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed
out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now
under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional
question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is
correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional
question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need
for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of
the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is
obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. [22]
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing upon;
the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must
reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating
him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but
that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this
administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the
validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some
statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues,
hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, el
al. [23] was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court [24]
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First
Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual
settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the
adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper
correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the
Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what
would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of
Representatives.[25] The Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2,
1989 [26] and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the
procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of
Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and
the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction,
and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:

INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI

xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the
Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
which requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara
informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that
the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review,
adding that they should be appeals on certiorari.[27] There is no showing that even up to its enactment,
Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent .[28]
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down
as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction
which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power,
especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however,
where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a
proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the
question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In
fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that
what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.[30] It is not, however,
an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.[31] If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an existing right then the
rule deals merely with procedure.[32]
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction
thereover, relates to procedure only.[33] This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party
which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to
be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular
remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in
rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.[34]
Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case
is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to
subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider
such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal
to administer that remedy.[35]
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to
another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the
time the statute went into effect[36] or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even
from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the
Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman),
and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are
hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition,
with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule
43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and
additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima JJ., concur.

11) [ GR No. 196231, Jan 28, 2014 ]

EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES +

DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Office of the President's (OP's) motion for reconsideration of our September 4,
2012 Decision[1] which ruled on the petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III
and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Their petitions challenged the constitutionality
of Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.[2]

In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty
of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii)
imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.

Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary
proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to
disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her
after upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.

The fallo of our assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No.
10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered
REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective
immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation
in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the
continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit
for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a
betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.[3]

In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

We briefly narrate the facts that preceded the filing of the petitions and the present motion for
reconsideration.

I. ANTECEDENTS

A. Gonzales' petition (G.R. No. 196231)

a. Factual antecedents

On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police
Internal Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor's Office against Manila
Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery,
grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury.[4]

On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an administrative
charge for grave misconduct with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO
against Mendoza, et al. based on the same allegations made by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS.[5]

On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement
Officers (MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendoza's case to his
office. The Office of the Regional Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied on July 24,
2008.[6] Mendoza, et al. filed their position papers with Gonzales, in compliance with his
Order. [7]

Pending Gonzales' action on Mendoza, et al.'s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaw's complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to
substantiate his allegations.[8] Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw's failure
to prosecute.[9]

On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.'s case, Gonzales
forwarded the entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her
review.[10] In his draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and
imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service.[11]

Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsman's decision that approved Gonzales'
recommendation on October 30, 2009. Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration[12] on
November 5, 2009, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.[13]

On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.'s case records
to the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December
14, 2009, the case was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer(GIPO) Dennis
Garcia for review and recommendation.[14]

GIPO Garcia released a draft order[15] to his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, for
appropriate action on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded the draft order to
Gonzales' office on April 27, 2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft and endorsed the order,
together with the case records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval by the Ombudsman.[16]

On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.'s case,
Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour
assistants on board as hostages. While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully
resolve the hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several
others on board the hijacked bus.

In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the
Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the
incident. The two departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).

In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales
accountable for their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against
Mendoza."[17] The IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales' failure to promptly resolve
Mendoza's motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx
"precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking."[18] The IIRC recommended the referral of
its findings to the OP for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the
initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.[19]

Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross
Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in
Office.[20]

b. The OP ruling

On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from the
service.[21] According to the OP, "the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of
[Mendoza's] Motion for Reconsideration ['that spanned for nine (9) long months'] xxx amounted
to gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the Ombudsman's
own Rules of Procedure."[22]
c. The Petition

Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.

On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on
April 27, 2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and
transmitted it to the Office of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft order on
Mendoza's motion for reconsideration had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and
approval, the period it took to resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted
on the draft order only within nine (9) calendars days from his receipt of the order.[23]

B. Sulit's petition (G.R. No. 196232)

In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and
several others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7,
2007, Garcia filed an Urgent Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The
Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the
strength of the prosecution's evidence against Garcia.

On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff,
entered into a plea bargaining agreement (Agreement) with Garcia.[24] Garcia thereby agreed
to: (i) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of plunder and enter a plea of guilty to the
lesser offense of indirect bribery; and (ii) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of money
laundering and enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense of facilitating money laundering. In
exchange, he would convey to the government his ownership, rights and other interests over the
real and personal properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank deposits alleged in the
information.[25]

The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 2010[26] based on the parties'
submitted Joint Motion for Approval.[27]

The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted the
Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public
hearings, the Committee found that Sulit, her deputies and assistants committed culpable
violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust grounds for removal under Section 8(2)
of RA No. 6770.[28] The Committee recommended to the President the dismissal from the
service of Sulit and the filing of appropriate charges against her deputies and assistants before
the appropriate government office.

Accordingly, the OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Sulit.[29] On

March 24, 2011, Sulit filed her Written Explanation, questioning the OP's jurisdiction.[30] The
question of jurisdiction notwithstanding, the OP set the case for preliminary investigation on
April 15, 2011, prompting Sulit to seek relief from this Court.

II. COURT'S RULING

On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales' petition
and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the
Ombudsman. (As the full explanation of the Court's vote describes below, this conclusion does
not apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely with respect to the Office of the
Ombudsman which does not include the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Constitution.
The prevailing ruling on this latter point is embodied in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of
J. Marvic Mario Victor Leonen).

A. Preliminary considerations:

a. Absence of motion for reconsideration

on the part of the petitioners

At the outset, the Court notes that Gonzales and Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of
the Court's September 4, 2012 Decision; only the OP, through the OSG, moved for the
reconsideration of our ruling reinstating Gonzales.

This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court's review of its ruling on the whole case
since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for
the validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not have any
constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the
first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP's decision on the merits will be an
empty one.

In other words, since the validity of the OP's decision on the merits of the dismissal is
inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case
including the constitutional issue remains alive for the Court's consideration on motion for
reconsideration.

b. The justiciability of the constitutional

issue raised in the petitions

We clarify, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the
Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political question. A justiciable question is one which is
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law,[31] as where the court
finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a
political branch of the government.[32]

In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress' choice to grant
concurrent disciplinary authority to the President. Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory
grant violates the Constitution, particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 violates the
core constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman as expressed
in Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution.

To be sure, neither the Executive nor the Legislative can create the power that Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770 grants where the Constitution confers none. When exercised authority is drawn
from a vacuum, more so when the authority runs counter to a core constitutional principle and
constitutional intents, the Court is duty-bound to intervene under the powers and duties granted
and imposed on it by Article VIII of the Constitution.

B. The Deputy Ombudsman: Constitutional Issue

a. The Philippine Ombudsman

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to
serve as the people's medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and
misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their
objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their
function as government critic.[33]

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became
a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political independence and adequate powers to
enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the
Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate,
on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was
reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to
the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information,
and control the prosecution of these cases.[34]

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by
constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and
constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article
II[35] and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions read:

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive
and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is
envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.[36] This constitutional
vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to
directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to
Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to
further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members
of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. [emphasis ours, italics supplied]
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman,"[37] the Court has upheld its
actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and
by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent
with the law and the Constitution.[38]

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and
key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution
saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of
officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent"
office. Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of
the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each
for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may
likewise be appointed. [emphasis ours]

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful
government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling
investigative bodies."[39] It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are
commensurate with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.[40]

b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies

vis-a-vis the Ombudsman's independence

Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as
"independent."[41] The extent of the independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies
however varies and is to be interpreted with two significant considerations in mind: first, the
functions performed or the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any
allowable interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and balances.

Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal
autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent"
bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence"
would result in the impairment of their core functions.

In Bengzon v. Drilon,[42] involving the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, we ruled against the
interference that the President may bring and maintained that the independence and the
flexibility of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the
Ombudsman are crucial to our legal system.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme
Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based.

The constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for

independence. In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935
Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one
created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from
the tentacles of politics.[43] In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards
insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure.[44]

Notably, the Constitution also created an "independent" Commission on Human Rights, although
it enjoys a lesser degree of independence since it is not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner
fiscal autonomy is granted to the constitutional commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy
notwithstanding, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly expressed their desire to keep
the Commission independent from the executive branch and other political leaders:

MR. MONSOD. We see the merits of the arguments of Commissioner Rodrigo. If we explain to
him our concept, he can advise us on how to reconcile his position with ours. The position of the
committee is that we need a body that would be able to work and cooperate with the executive
because the Commissioner is right. Many of the services needed by this commission would need
not only the cooperation of the executive branch of the government but also of the judicial branch
of government. This is going to be a permanent constitutional commission over time. We also
want a commission to function even under the worst circumstance when the executive
may not be very cooperative. However, the question in our mind is: Can it still function during
that time? Hence, we are willing to accept suggestions from Commissioner Rodrigo on how to
reconcile this. We realize the need for coordination and cooperation. We also would like to build
in some safeguards that it will not be rendered useless by an uncooperative executive.

xxxx

MR. GARCIA. xxx Very often, when international commissions or organizations on human rights
go to a country, the most credible organizations are independent human rights bodies. Very often
these are private organizations, many of which are prosecuted, such as those we find in many
countries in Latin America. In fact, what we are proposing is an independent body on human
rights, which would provide governments with credibility precisely because it is
independent of the present administration. Whatever it says on the human rights situation will
be credible because it is not subject to pressure or control from the present political leadership.

Secondly, we all know how political fortunes come and go. Those who are in power yesterday are
in opposition today and those who are in power today may be in the opposition
tomorrow. Therefore, if we have a Commission on Human Rights that would investigate and
make sure that the rights of each one is protected, then we shall have a body that could
stand up to any power, to defend the rights of individuals against arrest, unfair trial, and
so on.[45]
These deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional
commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive
control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies
are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these
bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac,[46] we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have
been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the
President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as
unconstitutional the President's act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting
Chairman of the Comelec "however well-meaning"[47] it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga,[48] the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the
commissioners of the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the
discretionary power of the President:

Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and
created by the Constitution to be independent as the Commission on Human Rights and
vested with the delicate and vital functions of investigating violations of human rights,
pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures
therefore, can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in office
of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the President.
Executive Order No. 163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of independence for
the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared unconstitutional.

Again, in Atty. Macalintal v. Comelec,[49] the Court considered even the mere review of the rules
of the Commission on Elections by Congress a "trampling" of the constitutional mandate of
independence of this body. Obviously, the mere review of rules places considerably less
pressure on a constitutional body than the Executive's power to discipline and remove key
officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, yet the Court struck down the law as unconstitutional.

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior
but is similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution
to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a
republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.[50]

c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting

disciplinary authority in the President
over the Deputy Ombudsman violates
the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is thus
unconstitutional

Our discussions, particularly the Court's expressed caution against presidential interference with
the constitutional commissions, on one hand, and those expressed by the framers of the 1987
Constitution, on the other, in protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions,
speak for themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 for
violating the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously
place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to
support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the
constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so
doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees
to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that
the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies
who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who
are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls
external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a
young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the
government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President
may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the independence of the Ombudsman

fully support this position. Commissioner Florenz Regalado of the Constitutional Commission
expressed his apprehension that any form of presidential control over the Office of the
Ombudsman would diminish its independence.[51] The following exchanges between
Commissioners Blas Ople and Christian Monsod further reveal the constitutional intent to keep
the Office of the Ombudsman independent from the President:

MR. OPLE. xxx

May I direct a question to the Committee? xxx [W]ill the Committee consider later an
amendment xxx, by way of designating the office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional arm for
good government, efficiency of the public service and the integrity of the President of the
Philippines, instead of creating another agency in a kind of administrative limbo which would be
accountable to no one on the pretext that it is a constitutional body?

MR. MONSOD. The Committee discussed that during our committee deliberations and when we
prepared the report, it was the opinion of the Committee and I believe it still is that it may not
contribute to the effectiveness of this office of the Ombudsman precisely because many of the
culprits in inefficiency, injustice and impropriety are in the executive department. Therefore, as
we saw the wrong implementation of the Tanodbayan which was under the tremendous
influence of the President, it was an ineffectual body and was reduced to the function of a
special fiscal. The whole purpose of our proposal is precisely to separate those functions and to
produce a vehicle that will give true meaning to the concept of Ombudsman. Therefore, we
regret that we cannot accept the proposition.[52]

The statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the
Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman,
or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the
Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence
of the very persons who can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the
impression that would be given to the public if the rule were otherwise. A complainant with a
grievance against a high-ranking official of the Executive, who appears to enjoy the President's
favor, would be discouraged from approaching the Ombudsman with his complaint; the
complainant's impression (even if misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be susceptible to
political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an impression would erode the
constitutional intent of creating an Office of the Ombudsman as champion of the people against
corruption and bureaucracy.

d. The mutual-protection argument for

crafting Section 8(2)of RA No. 6770

In crafting Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, Congress apparently addressed the concern that a lack
of an external check against the Deputy Ombudsman would result in mutual protection between
the Ombudsman and her Deputies.

While the preceding discussion already suffices to address this concern, it should be added that
this concern stands on shaky grounds since it ignores the existing checks and balances already
in place. On the one hand, the Ombudsman's Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman
because she is subject to the impeachment power of Congress. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman's attempt to cover up the misdeeds of her Deputies can be questioned before the
Court on appeal or certiorari. The same attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.

The judicial recourse available is only consistent with the nature of the Supreme Court as a non-
political independent body mandated by the Constitution to settle judicial and quasi-judicial
disputes, whose judges and employees are not subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman and whose neutrality would be less questionable. The Members of the Court
themselves may be subjected to the impeachment power of Congress.

In these lights, the appeal, if any, of the mutual protection argument becomes distinctly
implausible. At the same time, the Court remains consistent with its established rulings - that the
independence granted to the Constitutional Commissions bars any undue interference from
either the Executive or Congress and is in full accord with constitutional intent.

e. Congress' power determines the

manner and causes for the removal
of non-impeachable officers is not
a carte blanch authority

Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,[53] Congress is empowered to determine the
modes of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the
second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more
stringent rule of "removal only by impeachment" to favored public officers.[54] Understandably
so, impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from
office. It is, by its nature, a sui generis politico-legal process[55] that signals the need for a
judicious and careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the
proceeding;[56] the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation;[57] the limited grounds for
impeachment;[58] the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases;[59] and
the number of votes required for a finding of guilt.[60] All these argue against the extension of
this removal mechanism beyond those mentioned in the Constitution.

On the practical side, our nation has witnessed the complications and problems an
impeachment proceeding entails, thus justifying its limited application only to the officials
occupying the highest echelons of responsibility in our government. To name a few, some of
the negative practical effects of impeachment are: it stalls legislative work; it is an expensive
process in terms of the cost of prosecution alone; and, more importantly, it is inherently divisive
of the nation.[61] Thus, in a cost-benefit analysis of adopting impeachment as a mechanism,
limiting Congress' power to otherwise legislate on the matter is far more advantageous to the
country.

It is in these lights that the second sentence in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
should be read. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be
regarded as blanket authority for Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems
fit. While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must
still be consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural
and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of
separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances.[62]

In short, the authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and
cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can
ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution.

In the same manner, the congressional determination of the identity of the disciplinary authority
is not a blanket authority for Congress to repose it on whomsoever Congress chooses without
running afoul of the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and without
disrupting the delicate check and balance mechanism under the Constitution. Properly viewed
from this perspective, the core constitutional principle of independence is observed and any
possible absurdity resulting from a contrary interpretation is avoided. In other words, while the
Constitution itself vested Congress with the power to determine the manner and cause of
removal of all non-impeachable officials, this power must be interpreted consistent with the core
constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Our observation in
Macalintal v. Comelec[63] is apt:

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."

While one may argue that the grounds for impeachment under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is
intended as a measure of protection for the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor since
these grounds are not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of
judgment - this argument seriously overlooks the erosion of the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman that it creates. The mere fact that a statutorily-created sword of Damocles
hangs over the Deputy Ombudsman's head, by itself, opens up all the channels for external
pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics. The fear of external reprisal from
the very office he is to check for excesses and abuses defeats the very purpose of granting
independence to the Office of the Ombudsman.

That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals that do not conform to the high
standard required in determining whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an impeachable
offense) and that the President's power of removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally
inadequate when balanced with the constitutional principle of independence. The mere filing
of an administrative case against the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
before the OP can already result in their suspension and can interrupt the performance
of their functions, in violation of Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. With only one term
allowed under Section 11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable by the
President, can be reduced to the very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the
framers had foreseen and carefully tried to avoid by making these offices independent
constitutional bodies.

At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman,
its decision finding Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust is patently erroneous. The OP's decision perfectly illustrates why the
requirement of impeachment-grounds in Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 cannot be considered,
even at a minimum, a measure of protection of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

C. The Deputy Ombudsman: The Dismissal Issue

a. The Office of the President's

finding of gross negligence has
no legal and factual leg to
stand on

The OP's decision found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of Grave Misconduct.
The assailed Decision of the OP reads:

Upon consideration of the First Report, the evidence and allegations of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman himself, and other documentary evidence gathered, this Office finds that the
inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of Captain Mendoza's Motion for
Reconsideration timely filed on 5 November 2009 xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty and/or
inefficiency in the performance of official duty.[64]

b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency

Let us again briefly recall the facts.

1. November 5, 2009 - Mendoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the
Ombudsman,[65] which was followed by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration;[66]
2. December 14, 2009[67] - GIPO Garcia, who was assigned to review these motions and
make his recommendation for the appropriate action, received the records of the case;
3. April 5, 2010 GIPO Garcia released a draft order to be reviewed by his immediate
superior, Dir. Cecilio;[68]
 4. April 27, 2010 Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded to Gonzales this draft order;[69]
5. May 6, 2010 (or nine days after the records were forwarded to Gonzales) Gonzales
endorsed the draft order for the final approval of the Ombudsman.[70]

Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case
were already pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.

Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may
be affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable.[71]

Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the
case forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP[72] relied on Section
8, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on
Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration within five days:

Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds Whenever allowable, a motion

for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from
receipt of the decision or order by the party on the basis of any of the following grounds:

a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the
interest of the movant.

Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing
Officer shall resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for
resolution. [emphasis and underscore ours]

Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to
Gonzales since he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not
simply a Hearing Officer tasked with the initial resolution of the motion. In Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 7 on the resolution of the case and submission of the proposed
decision, the period for resolving the case does not cover the period within which it should be
reviewed:

Section 6. Rendition of decision. Not later than thirty (30) days after the case is declared
submitted for resolution, the Hearing Officer shall submit a proposed decision containing his
findings and recommendation for the approval of the Ombudsman. Said proposed decision
shall be reviewed by the Directors, Assistant Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen
concerned. With respect to low ranking public officials, the Deputy Ombudsman
concerned shall be the approving authority.Upon approval, copies thereof shall be served
upon the parties and the head of the office or agency of which the respondent is an official or
employee for his information and compliance with the appropriate directive contained
therein. [italics and emphases supplied]

Thus, the OP's ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of
five days, to review a case was totally baseless.

c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates

The OP's claims that Gonzales could have supervised his subordinates to promptly act on
Mendoza's motion and apprised the Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving the same are
similarly groundless.

The Office of the Ombudsman is not a corner office in our bureaucracy. It handles numerous
cases that involve the potential loss of employment of many other public employees. We
cannot conclusively state, as the OP appears to suggest, that Mendoza's case should have
been prioritized over other similar cases. The Court has already taken judicial notice of the
steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the Ombudsman.[73] This consideration certainly
militates against the OSG's observation that there was "a grossly inordinate and inexcusable
delay"[74] on the part of Gonzales.

Equally important, the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases" before, among
others, quasi-judicial bodies,[75] like the Office of the Ombudsman, is itself
a relative concept.[76] Thus, the delay, if any, must be measured in this objective constitutional
sense. Unfortunately, because of the very statutory grounds relied upon by the OP in
dismissing Gonzales, the political and, perhaps, "practical" considerations got the better of what
is legal and constitutional.

The facts do not show that Gonzales' subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in
their work. While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three
months, it is noteworthy that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to review
the case for the first time.[77] Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for acting on a
case within four months, given the amount of cases that her office handles.

The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the
records, research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and
discretion. If this Court rules that these periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, the
Ombudsman's constitutional mandate to prosecute all the erring officials of this country would
be subjected to an unreasonable and overwhelming constraint. Similarly, if the Court rules that
these periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, then we must be prepared to reconcile this
with the established concept of the right of speedy disposition of cases something the Court
may be hard put to justify.

d. No undue interest

The OP also found Gonzales guilty of showing undue interest in Mendoza's case by having the
case endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and by resolving it against Mendoza on the
basis of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim, Kalaw.

The fact that Gonzales had Mendoza's case endorsed to his office lies within his mandate, even
if it were based merely on the request of the alleged victim's father. The Constitution empowers
the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against any public official or employee of the government.[78] This provision is echoed by
Section 13 of RA No. 6770,[79] and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of
1990, as amended.[80]

Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the
unverified affidavit of Kalaw. Based on the prosecution officer's recommendations, the finding
of guilt on the part of Mendoza, et al. was based on their admissions as well. Mendoza, et al.
admitted that they had arrested Kalaw based on two traffic violations and allowed him to stay
the whole night until the following morning in the police precinct. The next morning, Kalaw was
allowed to leave the precinct despite his failure to show a valid license and based merely on his
promise to return with the proper documents.[81] These admissions led Gonzales and his staff to
conclude that Mendoza, et al. irregularly acted in apprehending Kalaw, since the proper
procedure for the apprehension of traffic violators would be to give them a ticket and to file a
case, when appropriate.[82]

Lastly, we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales' decision differs from the
decision of the PNP-IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza). To be sure, we
cannot tie the hands of any judicial or quasi-judicial body by ruling that it should always concur
with the decisions of other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies which may have also taken
cognizance of the case. To do so in the case of a Deputy Ombudsman would be repugnant to
the independence that our Constitution has specifically granted to this office and would nullify
the very purpose for which it was created.

e. Penalty of dismissal totally

incommensurate with established
facts

Given the lack of factual basis for the charges against Gonzales, the penalty of removal
imposed by the OP necessarily suffers grave infirmity. Basic strictures of fair play dictate
that we can only be held liable for our own misdeeds; we can be made to account only
for lapses in our responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales who
took the least time nine days followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia the writer of
the draft took less than four months, and the Ombudsman, less than four months until
the kidnapping incident rendered Mendoza's motion moot.

In these lights, the decision of the OP is clearly and patently wrong. This conclusion, however,
does not preclude the Ombudsman from looking into any other possible administrative liability of
Gonzales under existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.

D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue

The 1987 Constitution created a new, independent Office of the Ombudsman. The existing
Tanodbayan at the time[83] became the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the 1987
Constitution. While the composition of the independent Office of the Ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution does not textually include the Special Prosecutor, the weight of the foregoing
discussions on the unconstitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 should equally apply to
the Special Prosecutor on the basis of the legislative history of the Office of the Ombudsman as
expounded in jurisprudence.

Under the 1973 Constitution,[84] the legislature was mandated to create the Office of the
Ombudsman, known as the Tanodbayan, with investigative and prosecutorial powers.
Accordingly, on June 11, 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted PD No. 1487.[85]

Under PD No. 1486,[86] however, the "Chief Special Prosecutor" (CSP) was given the "exclusive
authority" to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute cases that are within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[87] PD No. 1486 expressly gave the Secretary of Justice
the power of control and supervision over the Special Prosecutor.[88] Consistent with this
grant of power, the law also authorized the Secretary of Justice to appoint or detail to the Office
of the CSP "any officer or employee of Department of Justice or any Bureau or Office under the
executive supervision thereof" to assist the Office of the CSP.

In December 1978, PD No. 1607[89] practically gave back to the Tanodbayan the powers taken
away from it by the Office of the CSP. The law "created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an
Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor" under the Tanodbayan's control,[90] with the exclusive
authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Unlike the earlier decree, the law also empowered the Tanodbayan to appoint
Special Investigators and subordinate personnel and/or to detail to the Office of the CSP any
public officer or employees who "shall be under the supervision and control of the Chief Special
Prosecutor."[91] In 1979, PD No. 1630 further amended the earlier decrees by transferring the
powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor directly to the Tanodbayan
himself.[92]

This was the state of the law at the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified. Under the 1987
Constitution, an "independent Office of the Ombudsman" is created.[93] The existing
Tanodbayan is made the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "who shall continue to function
and exercise its powers as now[94] or hereafter may be provided by law."[95]

Other than the Ombudsman's Deputies, the Ombudsman shall appoint all other officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman.[96] Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Ombudsman may exercise "such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law." Pursuant to this constitutional command, Congress enacted
RA No. 6770 to provide for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the extent of its disciplinary authority.

In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the composition of the Office of the
Ombudsman, including in this Office not only the offices of the several Deputy Ombudsmen but
the Office of the Special Prosecutor as well. In terms of appointment, the law gave the
President the authority to appoint the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor,
from a list of nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. In case of vacancy in these
positions, the law requires that the vacancy be filled within three (3) months from occurrence.[97]

The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same qualifications it imposes on the
Ombudsman himself/herself and his/her deputies.[98] Their terms of office,[99] prohibitions and
qualifications,[100] rank and salary are likewise the same.[101] The requirement on
disclosure[102] is imposed on the Ombudsman, the Deputies and the Special Prosecutor as well.
In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role
of Acting Ombudsman; the President may designate any of the Deputies or the Special
Prosecutor as Acting Ombudsman.[103] The power of the Ombudsman and his or her deputies
to require other government agencies to render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman is
likewise enjoyed by the Special Prosecutor.[104]
Given this legislative history, the present overall legal structure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
both under the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770, militates against an interpretation that would
insulate the Deputy Ombudsman from the disciplinary authority of the OP and yet expose the
Special Prosecutor to the same ills that a grant of independence to the Office of the
Ombudsman was designed for.

Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the
Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by making the Office of the Special Prosecutor an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman control
and supervision over that office.[105] This power of control and supervision includes vesting the
Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor as he/she
may deem fit. Thus, by constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an
ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the
exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the
Executive Department.

Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor handles the prosecution of criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial authority includes high-
ranking executive officials. For emphasis, subjecting the Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and
removal powers of the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously
place the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.

Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition
of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office
militates against a differential treatment between the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one hand,
and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must
be equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office
who act directly as agents of the Ombudsmanherself in the performance of her duties.

In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,[106] the Court was confronted with an argument that, at
bottom, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, in fact, separate and distinct from the latter. In debunking that argument,
the Court said:

Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue Commissioner Romulo's statement as authority to

advocate that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of
the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the President. xxx

In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing
Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to
function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored
phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent
amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the
Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. N0. 1630 or grant it other powers,
except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such
other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then
that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of
the Ombudsman.[107]

Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be
at par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is
concerned, and must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the Constitution.

III. SUMMARY OF VOTING

In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,[108] the Court resolved to reverse its
September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No.
196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary
jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

However, by another vote of 8-7,[109] the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the
Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not
entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section

8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the
Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible
administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Abad, Perez, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, JJ., joins J. Bernabe's opinion.
Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur with J. Bernabe's opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., pls. see concurring & dissenting opinion.
Leonen, J. see separate and dissenting opinion.
 2) G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE

OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND
JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and

immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015
by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the
Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S.
Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order)
preventively suspending him and several other public officers and employees of the
City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the
Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.

Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary
injunction8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further enjoined the
implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to
file a supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.

The Facts

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and
Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay,
Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).13

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of

Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation
report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special
Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special
Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them
with six (6) administrative cases17for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal
cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).19

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous
activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of the
Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms
as City Mayor of Makati:

Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase
III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation
(Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required publication and the lack
of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following
amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;25 (2)
P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 on February 25,
2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;28 (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3,
2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of
the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the
corresponding contract32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required publication and
the lack of architectural design,34 and approved the release of funds therefor in the
following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11;35 (2)
P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12,
2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on
October 1, 2012;39

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase V of
the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the
corresponding contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required publication
and the lack of architectural design,43 and approved the release of the funds
therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and P30,582,629.3045 on December
20, 2012;� and

Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for
the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's for Phase
V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97;47 and

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining
balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for
the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project in
the amount of P429,011.48.49
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators
to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB
Cases (2nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel
issued separate orders51 for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to
file their respective counter-affidavits.52

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon
the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject
preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension
for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of
a public officer are present,54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s
guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and
Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the
Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the
publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts
showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively
charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal
from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access
to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their
continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases
filed against them.55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II
(Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.56

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the
Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s
staff.57

The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension
order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5)
phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati
for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor,
if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.61In
any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension
order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is
strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported
irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that
he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide
vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine,
as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension
from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person
they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the
implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG National
Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who
posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to personally
serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were
closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista
administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Pe�a, Jr.
(Pe�a, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.64

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015),
granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of
duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.67Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v.
CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of
the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering
that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against
Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation
doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively
charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for certiorari .70

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state what
act was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had
already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.72

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,73� docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the
Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA,
thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the administration of
justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima
were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of
the amended and supplemental petition for contempt75 (petition for contempt) on
March 19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other
respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA
against the preventive suspension order.77

In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-

G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without necessarily
giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the
Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.79 The cases were set for hearing of oral
arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80
 The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the
Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March
16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment on
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.81 The Ombudsman
claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,
citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that
no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless
there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's
jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay,
Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman
is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt
proceedings.84

In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to review acts of
any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the
Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued
the preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay, Jr. posits that it was
incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised of the condonation
doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining whether there was
strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order.87 In
this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation
of the preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public
office, and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of
the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a
condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his
previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his
petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an
impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be removed from office except by way of
impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and
imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact
that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its
inherent power to punish contempt.89

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral
arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which
further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so
ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the
condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the
Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that
his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability
arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project
from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts
which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term � namely, the
alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the
services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively
liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor
Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court
although the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the
payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-
election.97 To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s
participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.98

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015
Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this Court,
arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders.
The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a
matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the
administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because
Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in
2013.100

On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments
of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file their respective
memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her
Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum the
following day.104

Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to
comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG to comment on the
Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's
memoranda.106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu
of Comment,107 simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of
the Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its
"institutional position."108 In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s
Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon
the condonation doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.chanrobleslaw

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments
conducted before this Court, the main issues to be resolved in seriatim are as
follows:

I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for

reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy;cralawlawlibrary

II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453;cralawlawlibrary
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO
and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman;cralawlawlibrary
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO
and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
based on the condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is
improper and illegal.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.chanrobleslaw

I.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition
taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxxx

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the
lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition
since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite
is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.110

Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of
all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that
must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is
plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency,
x x x."111

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior
motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which
exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order
is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or
of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.113

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend

since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA - and of this Court,
for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order
issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests the
constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government
institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the
Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that
demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally
important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation
doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative
liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before
this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the
assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before
the CA, is justified.chanrobleslaw

II.

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,114 it is
nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view
of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.115 Hence, it
should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction
over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity
of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that
Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,116 as
he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the
Ombudsman's Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable
objection against ruling on this issue.

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her
interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in
full:

Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is
a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court
(except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking,
"[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to
do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a
provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action."120 Considering the
textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a suspension of an action while the
main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph
could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of
a provisional injunctive relief.

The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that
the subject matter of the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office
of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies,
with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any
serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain
administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or
administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.123

On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that
no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of
law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that
the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is
supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of
its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the
phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not
specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the
same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the
relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.

"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature
should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found[,] it
should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful
import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to
ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what
the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was
meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put
into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this
construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great
respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is
not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive."124

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of

the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt
as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during
the legislative deliberations may be adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the
interpretation of the law.126

A. The Senate deliberations cited by the

Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770,
particularly on the matter of judicial review of her office's decisions or findings, is
supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations:127

Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the
phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in lieu thereof, insert the
word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman
would only be taken not on a petition for review, but on certiorari.

The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will
it be more difficult to reverse the decision under review?

Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the
findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be almost conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily
clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict
appeal procedure.

xxxx

Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if
there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent, the respondent himself
has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.

Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to
the Supreme Court only on certiorari ?

Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.

Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he
is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if there is f
no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his
administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate
action?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the
administrative law principle that before one can go to court, he must exhaust all
administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks judicial
review.

xxxx

Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in

changing the method of appeal from one of a petition for review to a
petition for certiorari?

Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision

here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts of the Ombudsman is
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer
to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the appeal is more
difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the
court, whether to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is
that not correct, Mr. President?

Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President

Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to

whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted without jurisdiction and
has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Is that not the consequence, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the
Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial review, but should be
limited only to cases that I have enumerated.

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a
distinction between a petition for review and a petition for certiorari ; because
before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the
COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the Constitution it is now
by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the court exercising
judicial review will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we will not
go deeply by way of review into the evidence on record but its authority will be
limited to a determination of whether the administrative agency acted without, or in
excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I assume that
that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.

Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is
very well stated, Mr. President.

xxxx

The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to

render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be the Supreme
Court?

Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr.

President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to make the final
determination.

The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a
reservation to introduce an appropriate change during the period of Individual
Amendments.

xxxx

The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the
word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is
approved.128

Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however,

unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the
Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator
Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase "petition for
review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the "review or appeal
from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for
review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between Senators Gonzales and
Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing the method of review from one of a
petition for review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x
more difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition
for review" to "petition for certiorari" was approved.

Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition
for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it
was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does
not indicate what specific procedural remedy one should take in assailing a decision
or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that the remedy be taken to this
Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon
during the oral arguments of this case129 that there was no debate or clarification
made on the current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
per the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the
above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the
Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.

On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations
refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is
because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested
amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his comment on
the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by
substantial evidence (third paragraph):

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.� (1) All provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive
or decision;cralawlawlibrary

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of
the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary
shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of

the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as
the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating
that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules.
However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was passed way back in
1989130and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At
that time, the governing 1964 Rules of Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA
6770, referred to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus
possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the provision's
final approved version:

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal

by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the Supreme
Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or
of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the
same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing fee. The petition
shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of
Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

B. Construing the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory construction can apply to
ascertain the meaning of the provision.

To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court
shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question
of law."��� ;cralawlawlibrary

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole
range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a)
an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any
application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To
clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded provision,
and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any
remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the
maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be
understood in a general sense.134 By the same principle, the word "findings," which
is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore
refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except
a decision.

The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule.
While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible
that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable
remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal,
for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on
"pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

xxxx

Section 2. Contents of Petition. � The petition shall contain a concise statement of

the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the court below, and the
reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied
with a true copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed, together with twelve (12)
copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's brief as filed in the
Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and
denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the
petition.

Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set
forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the clerk of the
Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of
Appeals the elevation of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal

by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek
the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules
of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic
procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not
errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions
of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no
procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition
on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that
the lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the establishment of
conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render
legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and
unintelligibility.135 There should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum,
the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies
against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the
above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.

C. Validity of the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited
restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within the
sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken
against final decisions or orders of lower courts,136 and not against "findings" of
quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere
with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so
as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More
significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes
away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of
the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction,
without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is,
in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-
cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as
unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with
Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-
intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or
other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the
Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's
ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:

The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O.
No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of
appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770
(and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the
Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the
decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held
that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence in
violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides
that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of
"judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized
by law." We pointedly said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of
Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against
"decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to
the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts to effectively increase
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence,143 it
is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and
perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely
apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that
they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of
judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly
determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over the main
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative
thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to
resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146). This procedure, as was
similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:

The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must

be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not
an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other
departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions,
the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance
evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority vested
in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and
not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are
not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain
exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or
compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on
which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court
has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it
has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of
the statute.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in

the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or
that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any
time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take
cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction
in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.

In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed
by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension order
issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.149

In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions
for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman should be filed
before the CA, and not directly before this Court:

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive

suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was - similar to this case
- assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before
the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant
incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."152

In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65

petition for certiorariassailing a final and unappealable order of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner
employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it stated that while "a
special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with
the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further,
the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that
the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman
in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was
reached in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770,
the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject
matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That being said,
the Court now examines the objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the
CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the
preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.

III.

From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that
the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office
to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence
under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further
ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the
courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct
harassment or political pressure would."159

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the

Office of the Ombudsman:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,

composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and
at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy
for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)

In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the
historical underpinnings of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like

agencies to serve as the people's medium for airing grievances and for direct
redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however,
these agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the political
independence necessary for the effective performance of their function as
government critic.

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a
constitutionally-mandated office to give it political independence and adequate
powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President
Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD
No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio,
any administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was
reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were
transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file
the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was
created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its
independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives
are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the standard of
accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
These provisions read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and
take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all
times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.161 (Emphasis supplied)
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's mandate,
and in correlation, the impetus behind its independence:

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman
is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and
corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action
bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to
make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills,
abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize
the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has
upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted
[to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in
line with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including
Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support
these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the
Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent"
office, x x x.

xxxx

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very
powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other
grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and
statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing
accountability of public officers.162 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's
independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies.
Pertinently, the Court observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the
Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of
the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated
from political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would
result in the impairment of their core functions"163;cralawlawlibrary

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional
duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon
which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based";164 and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need

for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates
amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil
Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the
effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of
politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past
Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political
pressure."165

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent
bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive
Department:

[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by

the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any
form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned,
jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these
bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we
emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been characterized
under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the
President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court
declared as unconstitutional the President's act of temporarily appointing the
respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the [Commission on Elections]
"however well-meaning" it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically
stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the independent Commission on
Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the
President.
xxxx

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot
be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to the independence similarly
guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these
offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its
existence and proper functioning.166 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides
that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the
President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and
after due process," partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the Deputy
Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President for violating the principle
of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained
insofar as the Office of the Special Prosecutor was concerned since said office was
not considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is,
hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.167

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of
Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be
abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed,
altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment
thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed
from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the
political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that
those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the
Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the
"insidious tentacles of politics."169

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked
as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested
unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial
tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can
be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of
injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's
rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence

notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any
investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o
writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes
that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.170 As support, she cites the
following Senate deliberations:

Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is

necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record whether below the
Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against
the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special
paragraph for that?

Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent
an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued.

Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of
the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this only to certiorari to the
Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course,
in order but no lower courts should be allowed to interfere. We had a very
bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no injunction is
supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions
are issued right and left by RTC judges all over the country.

The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?

Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.

The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the
Supreme Court.

Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is
approved.171

Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including interlocutory orders, are
subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme
Court may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of
its power of judicial review over matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to
differ.172
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts, except this
Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman
investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this case
has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its constitutionality was
properly raised and presented during the course of these proceedings.173 More
importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to the complete disposition of this
case.174

In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral

Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial
departments of the government."176 The constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as the principle of
separation of powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the
Court held that "there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one
branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another."178 In
particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a)
interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions."179

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated
to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower
courts may be established by laws passed by Congress.� Thus, through the
passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals,181 the Regional Trial
Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts183 were established. Later, through the passage of RA
1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185 the Court of Tax Appeals, and
the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.

In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of

the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat it may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5186 of the same
Article:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

x x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the

subject matter of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v. Commission on
Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court and defines its powers.'"

Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter
jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the aforementioned constitutional limitations),
the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as
amended.

In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s
main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of
BP 129, as amended:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,

habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]

Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but
also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of
BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed.
In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:

[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties

seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals.189

When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred
unto it by law, said court may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that
case, which is called judicial power.

Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established
by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court exercises when it
assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."190 Under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial
power under the 1987 Constitution:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.192

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the

jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits
and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court.
In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is
exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court elucidated that
"[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed
before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change
that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be
fully and justly exercised.� To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not
exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean
that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter."194

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution

of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935196 and 1973
Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old
provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the
rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line
with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more
independent judiciary."199

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would

show200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-making
powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert
the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said
rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right after the phrase
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged^" in the
enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S.
Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was
reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's
proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the
phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were
approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any
form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article
VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the
Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."201

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement

rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with
the Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of
procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying
the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of
every court's judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus provided.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute

temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by
nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the
result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole objectof a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo203 until the merits of the case can be
heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a
substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act
or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury
or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the
merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for the
protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in
itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory
processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the
parties.

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional
remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined under Section
1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its
issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207 thereof, a TRO may be issued as a
precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain
procedural parameters.

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with
its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means
necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule
135 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is

conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer;
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law
or rules.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory

power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs
in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that said power "should coexist
with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the
final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over
the acts of the latter:"212

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power

necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will preserve
the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the
decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to
the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when
necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere
with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before
it.213 (Emphasis supplied)

In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with
subject matter jurisdiction:

[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which
are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should
be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court
must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress
any abuses of its process and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of such
process.

x x x x�cralawlawlibrary

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied
from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on
them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the
ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and
suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to
maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched
constitutional principle, articulated way back in the 1936 case of Angara, that
"where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred."215

In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by
which the courts deal with diverse matters over which they are thought to have
intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping.
To justify the invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a court must show that the
powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the specific purpose for which
the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish
its constitutionally mandated functions."216

In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a

statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of a revocation
order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,218 the Supreme Court of
Kentucky held:

[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is

reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of
their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power and
the judicial power to be one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power
[rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries with it, as a
necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the
administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)

Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive

relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this end, stated that any
attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally
impermissible:

It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language
framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and for all make
clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an
incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all things
reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case before it. In the
exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or
preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and
to make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction
in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.

The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the
injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm of the courts. As
such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the
power nor is it within the purview of the legislature to shape or fashion
circumstances under which this inherently judicial power may be or may
not be granted or denied.
This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of
the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the performance of constitutionally
granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x

xxxx

We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained
jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to its general jurisdiction,
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the administration of
justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the inherent power to issue
injunctions. (Emphases supplied)

Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to
appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it could control the appellate
judicial proceeding:

However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not
give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally granted powers of the
judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal
arises the legislature is void of any right to control a subsequent appellate
judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have
preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied)

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts
their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority.
Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs
created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of
procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed
the means of implementing an existing right220 since it only provided for temporary
reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated
during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,211 it was stated
that:

If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right
such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise
of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re:
Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket
Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees;223 and (c) Baguio
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-
Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative enactments exempting government
owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus,
effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was,
nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish
new rules of procedure225 solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of
the legislative and executive branches of government. On this score, the
Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and
procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional
independence."226

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article
VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra,
does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit
operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and
distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress
creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its
jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-
vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,227 because it does not define,
prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act
on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands
under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed.
Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy
that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of
procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court's
exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription,
as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus,
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting

provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does
not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically
dilutes a court's ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a
particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no
provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the
same. Accordingly, the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its
judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially
under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to
regulate what occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when
jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a
court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial
power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly
promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by
statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever
variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court
given its sole prerogative over the same.

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
(Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor
General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Rule 58, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be
mistaken under the rubric of what is called provisional remedies, our resident
expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So
provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of
the Constitution, if you have a copy of the Constitution, can you please read that
provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly
read that provision?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts..."

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. This is the power, the competence, the jurisdiction of what
constitutional organ?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

The Supreme Court, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've
already been discussed with you by my other colleagues, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that
not correct?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not
correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part
of litigation in an ordinary case?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it
will not be rendered moot and academic, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

No, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x
x.

JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to
issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular [s]? It cannot, because
that's part of procedure...

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

That is true.

JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a
court that was created by Congress. In the absence of jurisdiction... (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a
special agrarian court it has all procedures with it but it does not attach particularly
to that particular court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It
was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an]
ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)

In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court instructed that
"[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are
established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among
the several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which
all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.230

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the
Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus,
pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole
prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare
as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from
issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it
remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the
exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1),
Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused
its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 against the
preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of said
injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court first provides the context of the
assailed injunctive writs.

A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension

order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a

preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the Court
explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be
suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his
office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may
be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as

preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the
purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends
sought to be achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step

in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is
to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with
records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If
after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended,
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section

24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in
office but is considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is
not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same
Rule XIV provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed
under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty
of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.232(Emphases
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in
Section 24, RA 6770:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may

preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office
of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when
the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to
the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such
delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to
justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation,
namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first

requirement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him.233ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show
that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24,
RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed
TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA234 (Governor Garcia,
Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the
acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during
petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no
longer be administratively charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the
application of the condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case,
that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very
least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the
issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during the pendency
of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the
assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo
v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the
Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that
his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability
arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project
from 2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts
which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the
alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding to the services of
Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor
based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v.
Mojica,241 wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied by the Court although the
payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that the payments were
merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.242

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered
the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been
raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary
proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded
from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according
provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr.,
which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was
duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not
err in passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that
the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453,245it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation
doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive
suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in
the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of
the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term,
then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively
charged. In other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an
exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to
determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose
of issuing the subject injunctive writs.

With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein
laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely abused its
discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.

C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or

implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if
there had been no offense."246

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete

extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on
statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija,247 (Pascual), which
was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected to the same
position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting
Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial
functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December
18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable
for the acts charged against him since they were committed during his previous
term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his second
term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on
appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or
not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him
during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court,
in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the
matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and
constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to
the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior
misconduct."248Without going into the variables of these conflicting views
and cases, it proceeded to state that:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the
right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term,
to which we fully subscribe.249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there
is really no established weight of authority in the United States (US) favoring the
doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's
re-election denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a
prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least
seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The
Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as
literature published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not
uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:

(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public
officer from his current term or office for misconduct which he allegedly committed
in a prior term of office is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional
provision applicable to the facts of a particular case (see In Re Removal of Member
of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly
allows removal only for an act committed during a present term: "no officer shall be
prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his
election to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of commission,
omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding
term of office" (see State v. Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where the
removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon the
interpretation of the phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio
strictly construed a removal statute containing the phrase "misfeasance of
malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear legislative
language making, the word "office" must be limited to the single term during which
the offense charged against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v.
Probate Court of Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state
constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of removal, so that an
officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the taking of
the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was construed in the
Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that an officer's inability to hold an
office resulted from the commission of certain offenses, and at once rendered him
unfit to continue in office, adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did
not condone or purge the offense (see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in
the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court
construed the words "in office" to refer not to a particular term of office but to an
entire tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the
statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-making
body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one term for
misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257

(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a
successor in the same office for which he has been administratively charged. The
"own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States as an exception to
condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected
incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, but rather, regarded as one
continuous term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are
grounds for removal because a re-elected incumbent has no prior term to speak
of258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common
Council of Grand Rapids;261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263

(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of
an offense in cases where the condonation doctrine was invoked. In State ex rel.
Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with malversation of public
funds was denied the defense of condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
observing that "the large sums of money illegally collected during the previous
years are still retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme
Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no necessity" of applying the condonation
doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the present term of office[;] [thus]
there was a duty upon defendant to restore this money on demand of the county
commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive prices are
concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to
make restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and
neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."

Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion

in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on the condonation
doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted
for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an outright
adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been proper.

At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this
Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides
of interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the
condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases
after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare
decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in
the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are
powerful countervailing considerations against its application.268 In other words,
stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude
reversal of standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman correctly points out,
jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic
creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it
thrives.270 In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can
decide, we can undecide."271

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was
decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case
decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the
experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore,
the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the
condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-
examination.

D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the
public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held
not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the
constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend
beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for
the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248,
citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d.
418; People ex rel.Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of
Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re
Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous

misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous

misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am.
Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS)
553.273(emphasis supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the
life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:

As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So.
559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 �
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people.274 (Emphases supplied)

The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:

(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the
condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated passages from Pascual in
verbatim.

(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified
that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. It was
explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in that the
former involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong
to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace of the constituency
he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the President who
may pardon a criminal offense.

(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under
the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was applied in favor of
then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely
supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.

(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the
Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that the same is
justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation
prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by administrative cases filed by
his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend himself "to
the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative
liability condoned by re-election covered the execution of the contract and the
incidents related therewith.279

(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the
benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who
was administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the
supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4) days before the upcoming
elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the timing of the contract's
execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the petitioner's background
and character, including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was
deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the Court held
that the determinative time element in applying the condonation doctrine should be
the time when the contract was perfected; this meant that as long as the
contract was entered into during a prior term, acts which were done to
implement the same, even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate
the application of the condonation doctrine in favor of the elective official.

(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23,
2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal innovations in
the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the
doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative
complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and
even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections,
respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the
administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during
the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further
distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's
culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.282 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the
condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to
them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.

(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the
Court remarked that it would have been prudent for the appellate court therein to
have issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of the condonation
doctrine.

A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima,

Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to justify its March 16,
2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive
writs - would show that the basis for condonation under the prevailing
constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. What remains
apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as
jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-cited postulates
of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply
supported by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative
cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election
cuts qff the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a
prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because
the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms. As in the
US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal
foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an
examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the
continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law
of the land;284 thus, the unbending rule is that every statute should be read in light
of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable
government; hence, its interpretation must take into account the complexities,
realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government.286

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was

decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to
public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The
provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is
Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil service."287 Perhaps owing to the 1935
Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of
jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy
considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in
adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at
that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public
officers underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire
article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof
positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a
public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with
the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and
shall remain accountable to the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and
adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt
public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the
integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State
policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what
has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to
be accountable to the people at all times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
timesbe accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every
instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters
of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x
x.289 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of
the Civil Service Commission,290 and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.291
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or
remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of
Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of
1991" (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January
1, 1992:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the r following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;cralawlawlibrary
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;cralawlawlibrary
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of
duty;cralawlawlibrary
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable
by at least prision mayor;cralawlawlibrary
(e) Abuse of authority;cralawlawlibrary
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the
case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod,
sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;cralawlawlibrary
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of
an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court.

Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall
be disqualified from running for any elective local position:

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:

xxxx

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of
dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office:

Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility,

forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from
 holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service
examinations.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall
not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to
his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and
its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the
administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.

xxxx

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall
said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as
he meets the qualifications required for the office.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now
leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft
of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under
the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can
be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction
to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of
any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned
bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may
be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By
the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it
would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases
from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following
petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically
excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason
can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less
serious than criminal offenses.

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for
discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local
official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact,
Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective
local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an
elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In
similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal
from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State

jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability was
supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an
officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous
term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond
the term in which the official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the
absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section
40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it
was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy under their
constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present
Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was even one case
where the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a
party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in the
official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior
irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed
to be incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of
these cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation
doctrine under our existing laws.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of
suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior term,
and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar
to People ex rel Bagshaw v. Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited
in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a
misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing
in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's administrative liability is
extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision
actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the
courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if
condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the
process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public
office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election
automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every
democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If
condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be
allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under
our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by
no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or
statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it
cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local
official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or
procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate
would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly
points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in
secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective
official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the
electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation
presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be
condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton304 decided by the New
Jersey Supreme Court:

Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal
for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the theory of
condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as
it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can
be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was
a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of
touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In
consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that
originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such
as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied
upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation

doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority
to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its
interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.306

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to
them.307

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a
general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently,
the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this
matter is People v. Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:

[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting

the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines."
But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to
Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex
prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests
rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and
hence, is unconstitutional.310ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from
hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think
that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our
jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, under a new
membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.

E. Consequence of ruling.

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with

grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave
abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the
issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the
condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the
issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while
the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on
the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia,
Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which
at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above.
Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was
correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the
main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However,
considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr.
administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the
present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have
been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an
ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the
Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce,
dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the
instant administrative case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the
issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case
does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment
of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic
principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the
Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its
infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued
application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices
of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public
trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has

persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the
first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus,
this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve.
Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting
public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the
years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The
issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles,
but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and
the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its
reasons for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of
public office.

And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective
local officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a
sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July
2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from
the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one
and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions
such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were
placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial
powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition
and must therefore, not evade review.

In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the
Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore,
pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion
moot.chanrobleslaw

V.

With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now
rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's Resolution316 dated March 20,
2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer,

she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt317 because this action is
criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal
from office.318 However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does
not show that she has already been subjected to contempt proceedings. This
issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the
Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to
Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for
Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are hereby
DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition for
Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of three (3) days
from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment,
wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt proceedings by
virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt
petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication that
the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then be
premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on
this score is perforce denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this

Decision, the Court resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of
provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph
of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the same as
part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment

is PROSPECTIVE in effect;cralawlawlibrary

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S.
Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of
the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated
October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6)
administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059,
OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063;
and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment,
the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
139504 with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary