INTRODUCTION TO LAW

CASE DIGESTS

PREPARED BY: MARY JANE A. YONZON

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

FACTS: In procuring the enforcement of public duty, Tañada Sarmiento & movement
of attorneys for brotherhood integrity & nationalism, INC (MABINI) sought petition that
seeks a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/ or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential decrees, letters of
instruction, among others. There is a need for publication of laws in order to
strengthen its binding force & effect, however Official Gazette does not domain
publications of administrative & executive orders that affects only particular class of
persons.

As art 2 of Civil Code expressly recognized that the rule as to laws take affects after
15 days unless it is otherwise following the completion of the publication in the Official
Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is essential to provide publications of law for it to be in

enforceable and in full effect.

HELD: Respondents where granted petition to publish all unpublished issuances in

the Official Gazette, serving response to ignorance of the law excuses no on from
compliance therewith.
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
G. R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

FACTS: Motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not. So
when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES: Whether the publication is still required in light of the clause “unless
otherwise provided”

HELD: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Art. 2 of the Civil Code refer to
the date of effectivity & not to the requirement.

The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity. The Publication must be full or no publication at all since
its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.
ASKAY, plaintiff-appellant, VS.
FERNANDO A. COSALAN, defendant-appellee.
G. R. No. 21943 September 15, 1924

FACTS: Askay, an illiterate Igorrote between 70 and 80 years of age, residing in the
municipal district of Tublay, Benguet, obtained a title to the Pet Kel Mineral Claim on
1907. On Nov. 23,1914, Askay sold this claim to Cosalan, the municipal president of
Tublay and his nephew by marriage.

Nine years later, in 1923, Askay instituted action in the Court of First Instance of
Benguet to have the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim adhered null, to secure
possession of the mineral claim, and to obtain damages from the defendant in the
amount of P10,500. Following the presentation of various pleadings including the
answer of the defendant, and following trial before Judge of First Instance Harvey,
judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint and absolving the defendant from
the same, with costs against the plaintiff.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not Judge George R. Harvey had jurisdiction to try the case.
2. ) Whether or not the sale must be deemed null.

HELD: 1.) YES. Final section of Act No. 3107 provides that "This Act shall take effect
on its approval." The Act was approved on March 17, 1923. Therefore, there being a
special provision in Act No. 3107, it applies to the exclusion of the general provision
contained in the Administrative Code. Judge Harvey was authorized to hold court at
Baguio, beginning with May 2, 1923, appellant's argument along this line is found to
be without persuasive merit.

2.) NO. Fraud must be both alleged and proved.

GIL BALBUNA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-14283 November 29, 1960

FACTS: Members of the "Jehovah's Witnesses" appealed against the Secretary of

Education and the other respondents was brought to enjoin the enforcement of
Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating
rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools,
as provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners appellants assail the validity of the
above Department Order, for it allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of
speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; that it denies them due process of law and
the equal protection of the laws; and that it unduly restricts their rights in the
upbringing of their children. Since the brief for the petitioners-appellants assails
Republic Act No. 1265 only as construed and applied, the issue ultimately boils down
the validity of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955 as it was not published in the Official
Gazette. They also contend that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void
for being an undue delegations of legislative power.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not Department Order No. 8 is valid

HELD: YES. Department Order No 8 is valid as ‘Administrative rules and regulations,

issued to implement a law, have the force of law’. .

Moreover, Republic Act No. 1265 is constitutional as Sections 1 and 2 of the Act read
as follows:

Section 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth, observed daily flag ceremony,
which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the
Philippine National Anthem.

Section 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or

cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony
herein provide.

The requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity

and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem. That the
Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the
validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and
policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency.
JOSE ZULUETA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCA ZULUETA, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. 428 April 30, 1902

FACTS: Heirs of the late Don Clemente Zulueta, Don Jose Zulueta and his sister,
Doña Francisca Zulueta nominated auditors for each of the parties respectively and a
separate one as auditor umpire. The two auditors nominated by the two heirs failed to
agree with each other and filed separate reports. The auditor umpire had his side with
the auditor of the plaintiff, Don Jose. The opposition was filed by the defendant, Dona
Francisca. The court directed actions to be followed and forwarded to Doña Francisca
for her to create her demands due to disagreements of both parties. On May 7, on
plaintiff’s demand, to change the 15 days to a 7 days within which she must express
her demands. The defendant filed another petition to suspend the proceedings until
the new Code of Procedure takes effect on June 5, citing it is more advantageous on
her rights. The court denied the petition as the term for filing has expired. Reason
cited by defendant is her mistake as to the term prescribed which prevented her from
filing an opposition for auto of June 22.

ISSUE: Whether or not Doña Francisca is entitled to relief against the consequences
of her failure to interpose her appeal against the auto of June 22 within the period
fixed by the law.

HELD: No. Petition was DENIED. It is shown that the appellant acted with mistake of
law and ignorance and misconception of the provisions of the law regarding to the
time within which the appeal should be submitted. Doctrine of ”Ignoratia legis non
excusat” was ruled.
VIVENCIO CERRANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TAN CHUCO, defendant-appellant.
H. R. No. L-12907 August 1, 1918

FACTS: On January, 1916, Tan Chuco owner of casco (square-ended boat) No. 1033
rented it to Vivencio Cerrano for P70/month payable at the end of each month. No
duration was stipulated. Some time on May, 1916, Tan notified Cerrano that it was
necessary to repair it at Malabon. Cerrano declared to be interested in renting it after
the repair but Tan told him that it would already be for P80/month. Cerrano left his
equipment in the casco while his employed patron, named J. Santos stayed with the
Casco during the time it was docked at Malabon. A week before the end of the repair,
Tan sold it to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. The plaintiff appealed for damages alleged to
have been caused by the breach of a contract for the hiring of a casco formerly owned
by the defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chuco is liable to Cerrano for damages.

HELD: YES. Judgement of the lower court is reversed and it is adjudged and decreed
that the plaintiff recover from defendant P50 as damages, and his costs in the Court of
First Instance.

Article 1581 of the Civil Code provides that when no definite agreement has been
made regarding its duration, the lease of a house is deemed to have been made from
day to day, from month to month, or from year to year, according to whether a daily,
monthly, or yearly rent is to be paid.

Consequently, Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective
profits may be recovered as damages
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner,
vs.
A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
G. R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940
recommended the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario
St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12
pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a
period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was
subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of
police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer had brought the petition of
writ of prohibition and questioned the resolution’s constitutionality.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of
Public Works infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice

HELD: No. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is
neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

Social justice, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner, Ladlad LGBT Party is a national organization which represents the lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to
public respondent, COMELEC, which denied the accreditation. Public respondent cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. Petitioner argued that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not
have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds.It also argued that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.

HELD: YES. The crucial element in RA 7941 is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position
that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage
the moral fabric of society
PACIENTE TAMAYO, father of the minor, Brualio Tamayo, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS GSELL, defendant-appellant.
H. R. No. 10765 December 22, 1916

FACTS: Braulio Tamayo, whose age neither he nor his father, Paciente Tamayo, knows, nor does it
appear of record, but which, in the opinion of the court, is about eleven or twelve years, was one of
the workmen employed in the match factory in Santa Ana, Manila, and owned by the defendant,
Carlos Gsell. On the 13th of March, 1914, the boy met with an accident which consisted of an injury
caused by the knife of one of the machines of the factory which cut the little ring fingers on the right
hand, the latter of which was severed. the accident arose by reason of his being assigned by
Eugenio Murcia, one of the foremen employed in the factory, to perform work to which he was not
accustomed.He was thereupon taken to the General Hospital, where he received medical treatment
until he was released.
The defendant appealed the sum of P400, without costs, except P25 fees for the attorney of the
Bureau of Labor

ISSUE: Whether or not the injury was the approximate result of the negligence and thus entitling the
plaintiff to damages.

HELD: YES. The plaintiff’s son suffered pain and permanent disfigurement of one hand. He lost two
fingers and that part of the hand immediately below or behind them. His power to lift and handle
things is interfered with and lessened. In some stations or businesses his earning power or ability to
perform his duties would not be interfered with at all; in others it would be materially. What his future
will demand of him cannot be foretold. As a mechanical blacksmith his ability to do work, handle
things, is impaired.

Act No. 1874 should be liberally construed in favor of employees. The main purpose of the Act, as its
title indicates, was to extend the liability of employers and to render them liable in damages for
certain classes of personal injuries for which they are not liable under the Civil Code. And one of
these classes of cases is that where injuries are cause to employees through the negligence of the
master's "superintendent," although the master may have used due care in the selection of his
superintendent.
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
G. R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon C. Aquino as chairman of the
COMELEC. Cayetano questioned the appointment for Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Bar, respondent
worked in his father’s law office for a short while, then worked as an Operations Officer in the World
Bank Group for about 2 years, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries,
negotiating loans, and coordinating legal, economic and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to
the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief Executive Officer of an
investment bank and has subsequently worked either as Chief Executive Officer or Consultant of
various companies.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC.

3. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in

confirming Monsod’s appointment.

HELD: 1.) YES. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional
license fees as lawyer for more than 10 years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

2.) NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the
president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the
discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its
corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

FACTS: Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes
`A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements are champertous, unethical, demeaning of
the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice
of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession.

That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by
ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified
by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but
not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

2. ) Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression.

HELD: 1.) NO. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position
that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to
any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred
right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case

2.) YES. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those
who voted for it, holds no water.
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR,respondents.
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against
the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following
day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission act in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

HELD: NO. The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the
election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in
any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.
TEODORO ABUEVA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
LEONARD WOOD, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-21327 January 14, 1924

FACTS: By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing
appropriation of one million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular
Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to defray the expenses of the Independence Commission,
including publicity and all other expenses in connection with the performance of its duties; that said
appropriation shall be considered as included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and the
House of Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act
hereafter approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso that
no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be necessary to
make the payment or payments authorized by said act

Petitioners affirm that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally obliged to
prevent the funds from being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in
open contravention of the purposes of the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested the
respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to the
expenditures and payments made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the Independence
Commission. Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from
examining said vouchers and documentary proofs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can compel the respondents to address the claims of the
petitioners.

HELD: NO. As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because
section 24 of the Jones Law provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over
accounts, whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be
exclusive”. Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive
department of the Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of the courts.
Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission, are mere
agents of the Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts.
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in
his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

FACTS: Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with a certain
Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
District (FMED).

Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to
terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case
against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano
Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus
Guerrero.

The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed
the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of
the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.