Southeastern College Inc vs CA (torts)

Facts:

After a typhoon a complaint of culpa aquiliana was filed against the School for the reason that
one of their buildings was considered a structural hazard and the reason of inhabitability of the
nearby houses .The complaint is rooted to the claim that the school has a defective roofing
structure and that they have been remiss on the maintenance of such building. The school
(petitioner) averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and
other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not
been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school
children, faculty members, and employees, is "in tip-top condition"; and furthermore, typhoon
"Saling" was "an act of God and therefore beyond human control" such that petitioner cannot be
answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.

Issue:
Whether or not the destruction of the nearby houses was caused by a fortuitous event.

Held:
It was held that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction
and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon "Saling" was the proximate
cause of the damage suffered by private respondents' house.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs REYES Case Digest

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. “AMAY
BISAYA”

2005 Feb 28

G.R. No. 154259

FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,
respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday
of the hotel’s manager. During the party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table,
he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the
party. Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was
herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out of her
party. Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the
ignominious circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly.
Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the
respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet table with no other guests in the immediate
vicinity. She asked him to leave the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave,
the latter screamed and made a big scene. Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant
to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party. Respondent filed an action for actual, moral
and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The lower court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently imposing upon
Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for review.

ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in
asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether
or not Hotel Nikko, as the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.

RULING: The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts. There was no proof
of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and
shame. Mr. Reyes’ version of the story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back
his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he
was not invited, cannot be made liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that
of its employees. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Article 21 states that any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage. Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms.
Lim’s act cannot amount to abusive conduct. The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted
injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger.

Pantaleon vs American Express

Posted by kaye lee on 11:30 PM

G.R. No. 174269, May 8 2009 [Credit Transaction]

FACTS:

After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving the delay of American Express Card to
approve his credit card purchases worth US$13,826.00 at the Coster store, Pantaleon
commenced a complaint for moral and exemplary damages before the RTC against American
Express. He said that he and his family experienced inconvenience and humiliation due to the
delays in credit authorization. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Pantaleon. CA reversed the
award of damages in favor of Pantaleon, holding that AmEx had not breached its obligations to
Pantaleon, as the purchase at Coster deviated from Pantaleon's established charge purchase
pattern.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not AmEx had committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon.

2. Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages.

RULING:

1. Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved “within seconds,” there
really is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for a credit
card company to approve or disapprove a customer’s purchase, much less one specifically
contracted upon by the parties. One hour appears to be patently unreasonable length of time to
approve or disapprove a credit card purchase.

The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioner’s purchase, but
the more elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even
assuming that AmEx’s credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a
judgment, we see no reason why it could not have promptly informed Pantaleon the reason for
the delay, and duly advised him that resolving the same could take some time.

2. Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmEx incurred
delay, but because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular
injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The
somewhat unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster – that there was a
deadline for the completion of that purchase by petitioner before any delay would redound to the
injury of his several traveling companions – gave rise to the moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by Pantaleon, as concluded
by the RTC.

Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan vs Mariano Medina

Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina from
Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving fast and when he applied the
brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers were
able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the
help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the
conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the
overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers
trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by
reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.

HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the
negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised by Medina
to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The
torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the
villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which did
not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could
have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about
said fact to the villagers.

WHAT IS “PROXIMATE CAUSE”?

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.

And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.

Picart v. Smith

Facts:
Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union
when the defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew his horn to give warning.
Plaintiff moved the horse to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no
sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and when he
had gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened that it turned his
body across the bridge. His limb was broken and the rider was thrown off and got injured. The
horse died. An action for damages was filed against the defendant.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty
of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

Held:

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider
would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived
that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature
of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away;
and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run
down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely
to the defendant.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover
which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.