1

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the
Decision[2] dated August 28, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated February 10,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211, which
affirmed the Judgment[4] dated September 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-87386 finding
petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar (Melgar) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,[5] otherwise known as
the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004."

The Facts

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation
Section 5 of RA 9262, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial
support, with deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of economic
abuse against one [AAA,[6]] and her minor son, [BBB] (12 years old), by
depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or emotional
anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against
him, he and AAA entered into a compromise agreement[8] on the civil
aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of the compromise agreement
on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally
dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on June
24, 2011, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement
and to revive the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the
property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-
arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise
agreement. Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case
and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence.[9]
 2

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with
Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar
freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the latter's
Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing Melgar
with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the
latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one
(1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a case
for support, which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar
still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained
to file the instant criminal case against Melgar.[10]

To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to

provide support of P8,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle
with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled in.
On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at and she spends the amount
of P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which she asked Melgar for
P8,000.00 as support.[11]

For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce
evidence due to his repeated failure to appear during trial.[12]

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment[13] dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and,
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.[14]

The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and
their son, BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the
property which was supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from
2001 to 2010.[15]

Melgar moved for reconsideration,[16] which was, however, denied in an

Order[17] dated May 9, 2013 of the RTC. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed[18] to
the CA.
 3

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[19] dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's

conviction. It held that Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB.[20] As such,
when he deliberately and with evident bad faith deprived BBB of support,
he committed economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. In this
regard, the CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal case was
prompted by Melgar's evident refusal to comply with the judgment based
on compromise agreement, particularly, in providing support to his son;
and worse, in conveying to another person the parcel of land which was
supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son
from 2001 to 2010.[21] Lastly, the CA ruled that Melgar's acts "has clearly
caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to
[AAA] and her child[, BBB]."[22]

Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration,[23] which was, however,

denied in a Resolution[24] dated February 10, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and

criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband, former husband,
or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
the woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in, inter alia, economic abuse.[25] The said law defines economic
abuse as follows:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x.

 4

xxxx

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman

financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in

any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right

to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the

conjugal money or properties.

xxxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the
deprivation of support of a common child of the man-accused and the
woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not.[26] This
specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent portions of
which read:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of
the following acts:

xxxx
Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage
in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or
to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
(e) child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other hann, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement
 5

or conduct:
xxxx
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
(2) financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a
(3)
legal right;
xxxx
Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the
child is considered an act of violence against women and
children.[27] Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying support to a
child is a continuing offense.[28]

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of
violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that:
(a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth;
(b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had
failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and
(d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold
to a third party his property which was supposed to answer for, among
others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no reason to
deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as
there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was
in the best position to assess and detennine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties and, hence, due deference should be accorded to
the same.[29]

In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar

argues, inter alia, that he was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA
9262 as the Information alleged that the acts complained of "caused mental
or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her son[,
BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation of
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.[30]

Melgar's contention is untenable.

Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,[31] punishes the

act of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
 6

repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial

support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's
child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of
violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused
on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the
damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological
violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts.
And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this
party."[32] Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the
accused's denial thereof - which is, by itself, already a form of economic
abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the woman-victim
and/or to their common child.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed
deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that
such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional
anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i)
of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration the
variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime
proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime
charged[33] - the courts a quocorrectly convicted Melgar of violation of
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself
and even without the additional element of psychological violence, is
already specifically penalized therein.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262

provides that violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia,
prision correccional. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special
penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v.
People,[34] the Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of
prescribed penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No.
4103,[35] otherwise known as the Indetenninate Sentence Law, viz.:

Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate

Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished
under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of the
 7

indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the special law

prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark mling
of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)] that
the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special
law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the
RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of
penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the
speciallaw.[36]
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the
penalties under the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence
will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the
RPC.[37]

Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on
Melgar the penalty of imprisonment for an indetenninate period of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, Melgar is also
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, to undergo a
mandatory psycholo ical counselling or psychiatric treatment, and report
compliance to the court.[38]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated

August 28, 2015 and the Resolution dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L.
Melgar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of
Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004," are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Celso
M.F.L. Melgar: (a) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum; (b)
to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and (c) to undergo a
mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment and report
compliance to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6.

SO ORDERED.
 8

November 20, 2017

G.R. No. 205576

MIGUEL D. ESCOBAR, EUGENE L. ALZATE, PERLA C. MAGLINTE, CESAR M. CAGANG, and

VIVENCIA S. TELESFORO, Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted, the rule of conclusiveness of judgment has no
application in criminal law proceedings. For criminal procedure, it is not res judicata under Rule 39,
Section 47 of the Rules of Court, but res judicata in prison grey as double jeopardy, under Rule 117,
Section 7.

This is a Consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the August 22, 2012 Decision2 and
January 8, 2013 Resolution3 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28293. The Sandiganbayan
found petitioners Perla C. Maglinte (Maglinte), Eugene L. Alzate (Alzate), together with Amelia
Carmela C. Zoleta (Zoleta), guilty of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents,
and petitioners Miguel D. Escobar (Escobar), Vivencia S. Telesforo (Telesforo), and Cesar M.
Cagang (Cagang), guilty of malversation.4

An Information filed before the Sandiganbayan against petitioners read:

That on May 27, 2002, or prior or subsequent thereto in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused public officers Miguel Draculan Escobar and Felipe
Katu Constantino, being then the Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of the Province of
Sarangani, Margie Purisima Rudes and Eugene Lariza Alzate, Provincial Board Members, Perla
Cabilin Maglinte, Provincial Administrator, Cesar Matas Cagang, Provincial Treasurer, Vivencia
Sasam Telesforo, Management and Audit Analyst III, and Amelia Carmela Constantino Zoleta, and
Executive Assistant, all accountable public officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by
reason of the duties of their office[s], conspiring and confederating with one another, while
committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert, and misappropriate the amount of
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱300,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public funds under
their custody, and for which they are accountable, by falsifying or causing to be falsified the
corresponding Disbursement Voucher dated May 27, 2002 and its supporting documents, making it
appear that financial assistance had been sought by Nema Tamayo, the alleged Team Leader of
Malungon Market Vendors Association, Malungon, Sarangani, when in truth and in fact, the accused
knew fully well that no financial assistance had been requested by N ema Tamayo and her
association, nor did said Nema Tamayo and her association receive the aforementioned amount,
thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱300,000.00), through the encashment by the accused of
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Check No. 282390 dated May 27, 2002, which amount
they subsequently misappropriated to their personal use and benefit, and despite demand, the said
accused failed to return the said amount to the damage and prejudice of the government and the
public interest in the aforesaid sum.

CONTRARY TO LA W.5
 9

During arraignment, petitioners Cagang, Telesforo, Escobar, Alzate, and Maglinte, and their co-
accused Felipe Katu Constantino (Constantino) and Zoleta pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.6 Co-accused Board Member Margie P. Rudes (Rudes) was still-at-large.7 Constantino
passed away on April 25, 2006; thus, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to dismiss his case.8

After pre-trial,9 trial commenced.

The prosecution's version of the events was as follows:

Commission on Audit State Auditor IV Helen M. Cailing (Auditor Cailing), the Team Leader of a
Special Audit Team in Sarangani Province, discovered irregularities in Sarangani Province's grant of
financial assistance, violating COA Circular No. 96-003 dated February 27, 1996.10 An Audit and
Observation Memorandum dated June 26, 2003 containing the team's findings was sent to then
Sarangani Governor Escobar, Provincial Accountant Maria D. Camanay, Provincial Treasurer
Cagang, Provincial Engineer Mahmod Panayaman, and Provincial Agriculturist Romeo Miole.
Cagang replied that the transaction was treated as a cash advance; thus, the issuance of official
receipt by the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and People's Organizations (POs) was
unnecessary.11 The team found that the supporting documents for financial assistance to the
Malungon Market Vendors Association lacked the approval of Governor Escobar, in violation of COA
Circular No. 96-003. However, Governor Escobar certified on the disbursement voucher that the
expense was "necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision."12 Also on the
disbursement voucher was a certification from Telesforo that the supporting documents were
complete, and from Provincial Treasurer Cagang that there were available funds. The team also
found that the disbursement voucher was not received by the Malungon Market Vendors
Association.13 It was signed received by a "Tita P. Sariño," for whom the team searched, but failed to
locate, in Barangay Malungon.14 This was in violation of COA Circular No. 96-003 because it should
have been deposited to the account of the Malungon Market Vendors Association. Further, Auditor
Cailing testified that upon verification with the bank, she was told that the check had been deposited
to the account of the beneficiary but that the amount was withdrawn the next day.15 The funds for the
financial assistance were sourced from the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF), which was
intended for livelihood projects of Sarangani province.16

Juanilio V. Vegafria (Vegafria) testified that he was the President of the Malungon Market Vendors
Association from 2001 to 2004.17 With the help of the vice-mayor and the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, he was able to obtain financial assistance from the municipal government
of Malungon for their recovery from a fire that burned down the Malungon public market in 2001.18 He
received Commission on Audit's letter dated July 15, 2003, addressed to "Tita P. Sarifio, Treasurer
of the Market Vendors Association of Malungon," seeking verification on the financial assistance of
₱300,000.00 for the association.19 He executed an affidavit that their association did not receive this
amount. He stated that he received the letter as it was addressed to the association but there was
no officer or member by that name. When he was shown a document dated May 20, 2002 and a
Project Proposal, both signed by a "Nema Tamayo," purportedly a team leader of the Malungon
Market Vendors Association, Vegafria testified that there was no association member or officer by
that name.20

Mary Ann G. Gadian (Gadian) testified that she was employed in the Office of then Vice Governor
Constantino as a Computer Operator and was supervised by Vice Governor Constantino's daughter,
Amelia Carmela Zoleta (Zoleta). Zoleta had her make fake documents, requests, and proposals to
make money.21 In May 2002, she received instructions from Vice Governor Constantino, Board
Member Juanito Purisima, and Zoleta to prepare supporting documents for the disbursement of
funds to be used for the wedding of Board Member Alzate,22 and to use the name "Tita P. Sarifio" in
the fictitious documents.23 Thus, Zoleta told her to go to the office of Provincial Administrator Maglinte
 10

who, upon Gadian's arrival, immediately told her to ask Zoleta whether or not "another ₱l0,000.00 for
the ... department heads could be added to the amount to be disbursed."24 Upon hearing this, Zoleta
instructed Gadian to "double the amount so that the processing will be expedited."25 Thereafter,
Maglinte told Gadian to source the ₱300,000.00 from the ₱l,000,000.00 CDF ofMalungon.26 Thus,
Gadian prepared the fictitious letter dated May 20, 2002 and the fictitious Project Proposal under the
fictitious name of "Nema Tamayo."27 She asked her coworker Eleanor Tablani (Tablani) to sign
above the name "Nema Tamayo."28 After Zoleta reviewed the fictitious documents, she submitted
them to Maglinte, who reviewed them and immediately affixed her initials under the name of
Governor Escobar. She and Maglinte then delivered the disbursement voucher and supporting
documents to the office of Governor Escobar. Gadian waited outside. When Maglinte emerged from
Governor Escobar's office, she handed Gadian the disbursement voucher bearing Governor
Escobar's signature and they returned to Maglinte's office.29 Maglinte imprinted the rubber stamp
signature of Governor Escobar in the duplicate copies of the voucher30then gave the documents to a
clerk at the office of the Provincial Accountant for logging and processing. Since Provincial
Accountant Maria Camanay (Camanay) was in General Santos City, Telesforo signed over the
former's name in the disbursement voucher and in the Journal Entry Voucher. Thereafter, Maglinte
handed the documents to a clerk in the office of the Provincial Treasurer who wrote
"RCI#l/TFMAY2002" on the voucher and then went to the room of Provincial Treasurer Cagang.
While Provincial Treasurer Cagang reviewed the documents, "he looked at her shaking his
head."31 He signed the voucher. Then, Gadian went to the cashier, who prepared the check.
Thereafter, she presented the check to Cagang, who signed it. She went back to the office of
1âwphi1

Maglinte, who also signed it. Then, Gadian returned all the documents to the Provincial Treasurer's
Office. She called Sheryl Desiree Jane Tangan, also known as Joy Tangan (Tangan), of the Office
of the Vice Governor to advise the status of the transaction and to receive further instructions from
Zoleta. Pursuant to Zoleta's instructions, Tangan accompanied a woman, who acted as a "dummy,"
to claim the check from the office of the Provincial Treasurer and to encash it at the bank. Tangan
gave Gadian the ₱300,000.00, which she delivered to Zoleta. Zoleta gave Gadian ₱l00,000.00 and
called Alzate to go to her office.32 When Alzate arrived, Tatang Purisima (Purisima) gave him
₱200,000.00 for the wedding. Gadian placed the ₱l00,000.00 from Zoleta in five (5) envelopes with
₱20,000.00 each and brought them to the office of Maglinte, where she saw Camanay, Lea Dubay
Lungsod, Mariter Saison, Sitiwa Maruhom Sali, and Rose Concon, who were awaiting their shares.

Tangan testified that in 2002, she worked as Local Legislative Assistant Staff I at the Office of then
Vice Governor Constantino.33 She corroborated Gadian's testimony.34

The version of the defense was as follows:

Cagang testified that when the disbursement voucher was brought to his office by Gadian, it was
already signed by Provincial Governor Escobar, "certif[ying] that the expenses or cash advances
covered by the voucher were necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision," and by
Telesforo, signifying the completeness of the supporting documents.35

Maglinte denied Gadian's allegations regarding her participation in the facilitation of the transaction.
She testified that she had no participation in the falsification of the letter request or the Project
Proposal, or that they had been forwarded to her office. She claimed that Vice Governor Constantino
had informed her over the phone that these documents from the Malungon Market Vendors
Association would be brought to her office. She verified the letter request and Project Proposal
before signing the disbursement voucher. Thereafter, separate investigations were initiated for the
reported anomaly. While the transactions were being investigated, former Sarangani Governor
Priscilla Chiongbian ordered for her to come to her residence, where Maglinte met Congressman
Erwin Chiongbian (Congressman Chiongbian). They discussed the issue of the anomalous financial
assistance that had been granted to several People's Organizations in Sarangani, but Maglinte said
she had no knowledge of them. This enraged Congressman Chiongbian, who said that she would
 11

suffer the consequences of withholding the situation from him.36She said she was not aware of COA
Circular No. 96-003 and was not furnished with a copy of the COA Audit Observation Memorandum,
as it was not addressed to her.37

Renante L. Dialawi, a casual clerk at the office of Board Member Rudes, testified that Gadian also
used to be a staff in that office and that Gadian was in the office of Board Member Rudes in the
morning of May 27, 2002,38 and did not leave the whole afternoon.39

Escobar denied knowledge of and participation in the crime.40 His only participation in the transaction
was signing the disbursement voucher. However, after he learned of the anomalies when it was
discussed on a radio show, he created a Fact Finding or Investigation Committee, whose report was
included in the report of the Commission on Audit Special Audit Team. He did not receive any notice
of disallowance or demand to return the ₱300,000.00 and was not asked to explain why he signed
the disbursement voucher before the case against him was instituted.41

Telesforo testified that she signed the disbursement voucher only after verifying that the supporting
documents were complete and in order:42

[S]he affixed her signature on the voucher after she has verified that the attachments consisting of-
(1) the Certificate of Registration issued by the Cooperative Development Authority, (2) machine
copy of the Certificate of Accreditation issued by the Provincial Board of Sarangani, (3) the Letter
Request of the Malungon Market Vendors Association, (4) Project Proposal of the Malungon Market
Vendors Association, (5) machine copy of the memorandum of agreement executed by and between
the Province of Sarangani and the Malungon Market Vendors Association, and (6) the Board
Resolution issued by the Malungon Market Vendors Association authorizing its treasurer to receive
and encash the check, were complete and in order; that since some of the attached documents were
photo/machine copies, she called Ms. Banderado to go to the office of the Governor to check the
originals of the photo/machine copied documents; and that it was only after Ms. Banderado informed
her that the original documents are on file in the office of the Governor that she affixed her signature
in Box B of the Disbursement Voucher[.]43

Alzate denied receiving ₱200,000.00 from Zoleta and having participation in the anomalous
transaction.44 He said that the day the check was encashed was on May 29, 2002 and not on May
27, 2002, as shown by the machine validation on the check. He claimed that on May 29, 2002, he
was in Cebu City for the Second Quarter National Board Meeting of the Provincial Board Members
League of the Philippines, held from May 28, 2002 to May 31, 2002.45 His attendance in this event
was attested to by the Agenda of the League, the Allotment and Obligation Slip for his travel
expenses reimbursement, the disbursement voucher for his reimbursement, his plane tickets, and
the Certificate of Appearance issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Additionally, the Minutes of the First Special Session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani
on May 29, 2002 indicated that he was absent on official business.46 He claimed that the case was
politically motivated because he refused the late Congressman James Chiongbian's offer to run as
the Vice Governor of a certain Governor Dominguez against former Vice Governor Constantino and
Governor Escobar.47 His wedding expenses were defrayed by his relatives, not by the illegal
disbursement.48 During additional direct examination, Alzate testified that his observation on the date
of the machine validation of the check was confirmed by a Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) Teller. He also stated that he sent a letter dated April 30, 2009 to the DBP General Santos
City Branch requesting a certification on the encashment date of the check, but the bank refused to
issue one without a subpoena.49
 12

Zoleta denied Gadian's testimony against her.50 She denied seeing Alzate in their office on May 27,
2002.51 She testified that she did not participate in preparing disbursement vouchers because the
budget of the Office of the Vice Governor was controlled by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz.52

In its assailed Decision, the Sandiganbayan found that the documents had been falsified which led
to the disbursement of public funds, supposedly to be given as financial assistance for the Malungon
Market Vendors Association, which neither prepared the documents nor received the financial
assistance. It found that all the accused were public officers at the time material to the case and that
Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang had custody of the funds which constituted the source of the
financial assistance granted to the Malungon Market Vendors Association.53 The funds were public
since they were withdrawn from the account of the Province of Sarangani.54Escobar, Telesforo, and
Cagang signed the disbursement voucher and the funds were received by the payee.55 The
Sandiganbayan found that Zoleta, Maglinte, and Alzate acted in conspiracy in the falsification of the
letter request dated May 20, 2002 and the Project Proposal, which were the supporting documents
for the disbursement voucher.56 These falsified documents "led to the malversation of public funds."57

The Sandiganbayan held that petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang approved the
disbursement voucher despite the fact that it lacked the documentation required under COA Circular
No. 96-003 dated February 27, 1996:

However, COA Auditor Cailing stated that the said accused approved the disbursement despite the
lack of the needed documentation as provided in COA Circular No. 96-003 dated February 27, 1996,
because - (1) the disbursement was not included in the work and financial plan of the provincial
government of Sarangani; (2) the market vendors association was not accredited by the provincial
government of Sarangani; (3) there was no memorandum of agreement between the market vendors
association and the provincial government of Sarangani; (4) the beneficiary did not submit its
financial statement for a period of at least three (3) years and Certificate of Registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); (5) the letter request for the grant dated May 20, 2002,
and the accompanying Project Proposal were not approved by the provincial Governor; (6) DBP
Check No. 282390 dated May 27, 2002, was issued in the name of the alleged Treasurer Tita P.
Sarifio instead of the Malungon Market Vendors Association and it was encashed when it should
have been for deposit only; (7) there was no official receipt attached to the voucher evidencing
receipt by the payee or recipient of the payment; and (8) there was no listing of the officials and
members of the association who will benefit from the financial assistance. Auditor Cailing testified
that the only documents attached to the voucher were the said letter request dated May 20, 2002,
and the Project Proposal that was signed by Nema Tamayo which did not bear the approval of the
Provincial Governor; and that because of said violations, the financial assistance given to the
Malungon Market Vendors Association was illegally and fraudulently made.58

The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang should have asked for
documents to show the members' names who would avail of financial assistance and the authority of
"Tita P. Sarifio" to act as the treasurer of Malungon Market Vendors Association.59 Further, they
allowed the misappropriation considering that when the Commission on Audit Special Audit Team
conducted its audit, petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang "failed to account or liquidate the
disbursement or to give reasonable explanation of its disappearance."60 Having failed to observe the
necessary care under the circumstances, they were criminally negligent and liable for malversation.61

On the issue of conclusiveness of judgment, the Sandiganbayan held that the issue in Criminal Case
No. 28331 was different from the issue in this case. The issue there was the malversation of
₱375,000.00 as financial assistance to the Kanlaong Fishermen's Group and covered by
Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-7-10376 and DBP Check No. 11521401.62
 13

The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan Decision read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows -

1. finding accused PERLA C. MAGLINTE, AMELIA CARMELA C. ZOLETA, and EUGENE ALZATE,
GUILTY as principals of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents
defined and penalized under the provisions of Articles 315 and 1 71 in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law sentencing each of them to
suffer indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years as minimum, to eleven (11) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay a fine of
PhP5,000.00;

2. finding accused MIGUEL D. ESCOBAR, VIVENCIA S. TELESFORO and CESAR M. CAGANG

GUILTY of malversation and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law sentencing each of them to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay
a fine of PhP300,000.00 and the penalty of perpetual special disqualification to hold public office and
other accessory penalties provided by law; and

3. ordering all the accused, jointly and severally, to indemnify the Provincial Government of
Sarangani the defrauded/malversed amount of PhP300,000.00, and to pay the cost.

As for accused MARGIE P. RUDES, who is at-large and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, this
case is ordered ARCHIVED.

SO ORDERED.63 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its January 8, 2013 Resolution. The dispositive portion of the Resolution read:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the respective Motions for Reconsideration of accused-
movants Zoleta, Maglinte, Escobar, Telesforo and Cagang, and the Motion for New Trial of accused-
movant Alzate, are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the original)

Thus, petitioners filed this petition on March 14, 201365 before this Court. On June 20, 2013,
respondent, through the Office of the Ombudsman, filed its Comment.66 On March 3, 2014,
petitioners filed their Reply. On July 7, 2017, petitioner Maglinte filed a Motion to Travel, which this
Court denied.

Petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners Maglinte and Alzate of the
crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, considering that it was not shown that
they acquired juridical possession of the money subject of the case.67 Even assuming they acquired
juridical possession, it was not received "in trust, or on commission or for administration or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same."68 Likewise, there was
no prior demand made upon petitioners Maglinte or Alzate.69

Respondent argues that all the accused were charged with conspiracy to commit malversation of
public funds through falsification of public documents. However, since the accountable public
officials were convicted only of malversation through negligence, those who were not accountable
 14

for the funds were liable for estafa through falsification of public documents, a charge that is
"necessarily included in a charge of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents."70

There was no proof that petitioners Maglinte and Alzate participated in the falsification of the
fictitious documents.71The Sandiganbayan misinterpreted Gadian's testimony when she said
petitioner Maglinte "advised Gadian in the preparation of the voucher and the falsified supporting
documents."72 Gadian did not testify that she informed Maglinte that she was about to falsify the
fictitious documents, or that Maglinte told her to falsify them, or agreed to the falsification. It was only
conjecture on the part of Gadian that Maglinte was aware of the falsification.73Petitioners quote
Gadian's testimony:

ATTY. LARGO:

Q: Now, be candid to the Court, Ms. Witness. Prior to the giving of instruction to you by accused
Zoleta, you have no knowledge at all of whether accused Zoleta had any discussion with any of the
accused her[ e] with respect to this transaction?

A: I am no longer concerned with that, sir, but I am just told what to do.

Q: Am I correct to say that your answer to my last question is ''yes"?

That you had no knowledge at all if they had any conversation, discussion with respect to this
transaction?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Prior to Zoleta's giving of instruction to you?

A: Yes, sir. That is none of my business.74

Similarly, there was no testimony showing that petitioner Alzate was aware of the falsification.
Tangan testified regarding petitioner Alzate's participation:

Q - What did Mary Ann Gadian do with the money that you gave her?

A - She separated the ₱200,000.00, then the ₱l00,000.00, then the

₱200,000.00 was given to Amelia Carmela Zoleta, Ma'am.

Q - After Ms. Gadian gave the ₱200,000.00 to Amelia Carmela Zoleta, what happened to that
amount?

A - She gave it to her father. Then Amelia Carmela Zoleta called up Board Member Alzate that the
money is ready. Then Board Member Alzate went to our office, Ma'am.

Q - You stated that after receiving the ₱200,000.00 from Mary Ann Gadian, Ms. Zoleta gave this
₱200,000.00 to the Vice Governor, her father?

A - Yes[,] Ma'am.
 15

Q - And after she gave the ₱200,000.00 to the Vice Governor, she then made a phone call to Board
Member Alzate. What happened after she made this phone call to Board Member Alzate?

A - Board Member Alzate went to our office, Ma'am.

Q - What happened when Board Member Alzate arrived in that office?

A - Sinabihan sya ni Vice Governor, "To, akin na ang kwarta mo, To."

INTERPRETATION:

He was told by the Vice Governor, "To ... (discontinued)["]

WITNESS:

This is your money.

INTERPRETATION:

To, this is your money, To.

PROSEC. HIDALGO:

Q - After the Vice Governor informed Board Member Alzate that this money was there, what was the
Board Member's response?

A - He said thank you, smiled and went out, Ma'am.75

Petitioner's claim on Gadian's testimony conflicts with this:

Q - What did you do with the money given to you by Joy Tangan?

A - I gave it to Amelia Carmela Zoleta.

Q - You gave the money to Amelia Carmela Zoleta in the amount of?

A – ₱300,000.00. She placed it in her drawer first.

Q- What happened after Amelia Carmela Zoleta placed the cash of ₱300,000.00 in her drawer?

A - She gave me a bundle of ₱l00,000.00.

Q - What happened to the other ₱200,000.00?

A - She called through the intercom Eugene Alzate to come up.

Q - After accused Zoleta called up accused Alzate to go up to her office, what happened afterwards,
if any?

A - Eugene Alzate arrived with Tatang Purisima.

 16

Q - What did both of them do afterwards, if any?

A - They entered the computer room.

Q - What transpired inside [the] computer room?

A - Tatang gave the money to Eugene.

Q - What is that money that Tatang gave to Eugene?

A - The amount of ₱200,000.00 for wedding expenses.

Q - Why do you know that, that incident transpired in the computer room?

A - Because the place is very near and you can see what they are doing.76

Petitioners argue that to be considered a conspirator, an accused must have performed an overt act
that contributed to the execution of the crime.77 There must be evidence of actual cooperation in the
crime and approval of an illegal act is not sufficient to establish conspiracy.78 Respondent contends
that petitioner Maglinte's complicity to the crime is evident from her conduct before, during, and after
its commission.79 She instructed Gadian to ask Zoleta whether or not a total of ₱l0,000.00 could be
added to the amount to be disbursed for distribution to several provincial employees and to source
the fund from the CDF allocated to the municipality of Malungon.80 Both Maglinte and Alzate shared
in the proceeds.81 After the encashment of the check issued pursuant to the falsified documents,
Alzate quickly arrived to receive the ₱200,000.00 from Constantino after being informed by Zoleta
that the money was ready.82

Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners based on the
uncorroborated testimonies of witnesses who participated in the crime, appeared to be the most
guilty,83 and were motivated to lie by their desire to be made state witnesses.84 Respondent argues
that petitioners are the ones who controlled and directed the commission of the crime.85 Petitioners
claim that petitioner Alzate's constitutional rights were violated when the Sandiganbayan denied his
motion for new trial and motion to allow him to present additional witnesses.86Respondent points out
that petitioner Alzate was still not ready to present evidence in his defense despite having four (4)
years to prepare for it.87 He only asked for the opportunity to present additional evidence via a motion
for reconsideration after the Sandiganbayan had already admitted all the formal offers of evidence of
the petitioners.88His Motion to Allow Accused Alzate to Present Additional Witnesses or Motion to
Allow Accused Alzate to Enter into Stipulation of Facts with the Prosecution was filed two (2) years
after he testified. It was also a year and a half after manifesting that he was not presenting any
additional evidence, and a year and two (2) months after the Sandiganbayan had already ruled on
the admissibility of his exhibits.89

Petitioners also argue that petitioners Escobar and Telesforo are not accountable officers under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.90 To be accountable officers, they must receive, by reason of
their office, government funds or property over which they acquire custody and for which they are
held responsible.91 Under the Local Government Code, only the Provincial Treasurer is accountable
for the funds of a province in relation to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.92 Further, petitioners
insist that based on the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and Arriola and
Radan v. Sandiganbayan,93 what dictates whether or not officers are accountable are their duties and
functions which allow them to receive public property for which they are required to
account.94 Respondent argues that the funds were in the nature of a trust fund, which was in "the
possession of the local government as trustee and for the management of the local government
 17

officials as administrators."95 As a trust fund in their possession, petitioner "Escobar had ... to certify
and approve the validity, propriety and legality of expenditures to be charged [to the fund]."96 As a
trust fund, petitioner Telesforo also had to certify and approve the completeness and propriety of the
supporting documents.97

In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,98 this Court held that a head of office can rely on their subordinates to a
reasonable extent, and there has to be some reason shown why any particular voucher must be
examined in detail. Petitioners argue that this case can be invoked to refute negligence on the part
of petitioner Escobar, who relied in good faith that his subordinates would perform their functions in
accordance with the law.99 The voucher presented to petitioner Escobar for signature appeared to
have been prepared with regularity, and nobody called his attention to any anomalies in the request
for fund assistance. Gadian made sure that her falsification of the fictitious documents would be
undetectable.100 Likewise, in Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,101 this Court held that if there is no evidence
of conspiracy, the head of an office is not negligent for relying on misplaced good faith on a
subordinate primarily responsible for a particular matter.102 Respondent argues that the cases
of Arias and Magsuci do not apply, considering there were reasons for petitioner Escobar to closely
examine the transaction. The letter request and Project Proposal were signed by "Nema Tamayo,"
yet the disbursement voucher was payable to "Tita P. Sarifio/Treasurer Market Vendors
Assoc."103 Escobar did not make any attempt to ensure the implementation and completion of the
project for which the funds were disbursed, monitor the funds after it was released, make an attempt
to accredit the organization, or enter into a Memorandum of Agreement. This was reckless
imprudence on his part. Petitioner Escobar disputes this and says there was no discrepancy, as both
the check and the disbursement voucher were payable to "Tita P. Sarifio/Treasurer Market Vendors
Association."104 Petitioners further argue that the duty to accredit and enter into a Memorandum of
Agreement does not belong to petitioner Escobar, but generally, to the government office
concerned.105 Moreover, when the transaction was being investigated, petitioner Escobar lost his bid
for governor and stepped down in 2004. He lost track of the investigation, which he later learned had
been discontinued by the elected officials of Sarangani province.106

In Criminal Case No. 28331, which arose from the same COA Audit Report and Ombudsman
Resolution dated August 11, 2004,107 the Sandiganbayan relied on the testimonies of Gadian and
Cailing108 and held that petitioner Escobar is not an accountable officer for purposes of Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code.109 It also held that there is nothing that shows that petitioner Escobar was
aware of the anomalies in the transaction or that he participated in the falsification of the fictitious
documents.110 The Sandiganbayan also found that petitioner Escobar could not be liable based only
on signing the disbursement voucher and the project proposal after petitioner Maglinte certified the
legal assistance as legitimate and lawful.111 Thus, as quoted by petitioners, the Sandiganbayan held:

As for accused Escobar, the prosecution evidence does not even attempt to link him to the
anomalous transaction. There is absolutely nothing that would show knowledge on his part about it.
The most that the prosecution did was to rely merely on his signatures appearing in the project
proposal and the disbursement voucher. However, this alone would not suffice, especially taking into
consideration his testimony, which the court similarly observes, that the documents, taken at face
value, do not show any irregularity. Moreover, the initials of accused Provincial Administrator
Maglinte, as the prior reviewing authority, appear in the disbursement voucher, which is an accepted
common practice or control measure before the approving authority affixes his signature and
expresses his conformity. What is more is that accused Escobar did not even sign the check. And
finally, as Provincial Governor, he does not have custody of the funds, and neither is he accountable
therefor. Instead, as pointed out above, it is accused Cagang, as the Provincial Treasurer, who has
custody and who is accountable for the public funds of the province.

Accordingly, except for the fact that accused Escobar is a public officer, none of the elements
essential to support a charge for malversation are present. Neither is there anything to connect him
 18

to the fabrication or falsification of the supporting documents submitted to justify the release of the
funds. Similarly, therefore, there is no legal and factual basis to sustain the position of the
prosecution as to his alleged guilt. Again, unless it can be shown that there was conspiracy, and
there is none on record, such essential elements cannot be deemed to have been established with
respect to accused Escobar.112

Petitioners argue that conclusiveness of judgment bars these determinations of the Sandiganbayan
on material facts from being litigated again.113 Respondent argues that the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable because this case is not a continuation of Criminal Case
No. 28331.114 Petitioners rely on Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. v. Chavez115 to argue that the rule can be
raised under different claims or causes of action and that it only requires identity of parties and
issues to be invoked.116

Petitioners argue that COA Circular No. 96-003 does not apply to fund assistance to NGOs or POs
funded out of a CDF of a congressman117 and that it was not sufficiently established that the
supporting documents for the disbursement were deficient or incomplete.118 According to petitioners,
the disposition of a trust fund is subject to the provisions of the Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO), and not the COA Circular No. 96-003.119

Respondent argues that COA Circular No. 96-003 applies to all releases of fund as financial
assistance to NGOs or POs, based on its text:

1. The subject of the circular is described as a restatement of COA Circular No. 95-003 prescribing
accounting and auditing guidelines on the release of fund assistance to NGOs/POs.

2. In its definition of terms, it defines fund assistance as "government funds entrusted to the
NGO/PO to cover the implementation of a project which is included in the Work and Financial Plan
(WFP) and Budget of the GO release of which is not necessarily limited to Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MODE), 'Grants, Subsid[i]es and Contributions (3-10-000).' This may be in the
form of training packages, livelihood projects, interest-free loans, etc."

3. In its guidelines, it states that ". . . if the fund assistance will be charged to savings or trust receipts
received for the purpose, such utilization shall be approved by proper authorities."120

This Court resolves the following issues:

First, whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners Eugene L. Alzate and Perla
C. Maglinte of estafa through conspiracy;

Second, whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the case of Arias v.
Sandiganbayan121 to find that petitioner Miguel D. Escobar properly relied on good faith that his
subordinates would perform their functions in accordance with the law;

Third, whether or not the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Eugene L. Alzate due process when it
denied his motion for new trial and did not allow his presentation of additional witnesses based on
technicalities;

Fourth, whether or not petitioners Miguel D. Escobar and Vivencia S. Telesforo are accountable
public officers;
 19

Fifth, whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Miguel D. Escobar, Eugene L. Alzate,
Perla C. Maglinte, Cesar M. Cagang, and Vivencia S. Telesforo based primarily on the testimony of
participants in the commission of the crime; and

Finally, whether or not the principle of conclusiveness of judgment in Criminal Case No. 28331 binds
the Sandiganbayan in this case.

This Court denies the Petition.

Although not expressly stated by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners Alzate, Maglinte, and co-accused
Zoleta were convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), and not l(b) of the Revised Penal
Code as claimed by petitioners. Article 315, paragraph 2(a) provides that estafa may be committed:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

Thus, the elements of estafa by means of deceit are:

a. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.

b. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.

c. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.

d. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.122 (Emphasis in the original)

The elements of the crime were proved. That the documents were falsified was amply established by
the evidence. The documents were falsified before the disbursement, which was allowed based on
the falsified documents.

The conspiracy among petitioners Alzate, Maglinte, and co-accused Zoleta to commit the crime was
also sufficiently established. Under the Revised Penal Code, there is a conspiracy "when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it."123

It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,124

Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of
the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and from the secrecy of the crime,
usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
 20

doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, then a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved.
Thus, the proof of conspiracy, which is essentially hatched under cover and out of view of others
than those directly concerned, is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances only.125 (Citations omitted)

In People v. Romualdez,126 this Court explained:

It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common accord in
the commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can seldom be proved
except by circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are the
acts of all. (U.S. vs. Phil, 27 Phil., 530.)

"The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, from the secrecy of
the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that
two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved.
Evidence of actual participation, rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of
acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of others is relevant to show the criminal intention of the
passive party, and generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act
or words of one against the others." (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by the
evidence.127

Petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan only surmised petitioner Maglinte's involvement based on
her advising witness Gadian to source the funds from the CDF of then Congressman
Chiongbian.128 To the contrary, the records amply support the conclusion that petitioner Maglinte
conspired in the scheme in ways in addition to the instruction regarding the CDF of then
Congressman Chiongbian. Gadian testified that Maglinte instructed for additional money to be
requested and given to other officials, called "suso," to facilitate the approval of the request:

A Madame Perla told me to add ₱10,000.00 each for the "suso".

Q When she said that, what did you reply to her, if any?

A "Okey, I wil[l] tell Ate Beng."

Q Having given that answer, what did you do afterwards?

A I went back to Ate Beng and informed her that Mam Perla requested for additional amount of
₱l0,000.00 each for the "suso".

Q What was the answer of accused Zoleta, if any?

A "Make it double so that the processing will be expedited."129

 21

Gadian's testimony also shows that petitioner Maglinte checked and reviewed the falsified
documents, then accompanied witness Gadian to bring the falsified documents to the office of the
Vice Governor,130 and that after the disbursed check was signed by Cagang,131 it was brought to
Maglinte's office.132

Likewise, petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan only surmised petitioner Alzate's participation
because he received most of the illegally disbursed funds.133 To the contrary, the Sandiganbayan's
finding was based on the fact that the illegal disbursement was set into motion specifically for
Alzate's wedding:

Q You mentioned you make fictitious documents, could you inform us why you made those fake
letter requests, fake proposals and fake disbursement vouchers?

A Because I was called by Tatang Purisima to go inside the room where Felipe Constantino, Juanito
Purisima including Amelia Carmela Zoleta were. When I entered the room, Tatang Purisima said,
"anak, magprepare ka ng documents para sa kasal ni Eugene."

Q Who is this "Eugene" that you mentioned?

A Eugene, the ex-board member of the province, mam."134

Further, Alzate received the ₱200,000.00 without hesitation:

[W]hile there is no direct evidence to show that accused Alzate participated in the preparation and
planning of the illegal/fictitious disbursement, the records, however, showed that when accused
Zoleta called up and informed accused Alzate of the availability of the money, the latter immediately
proceeded to the vice governor's office and there and then, without any hesitation, received the
PhP200,000.00 from the late Vice Governor Constantino, in the presence of Gadian, Tangan,
accused Zoleta and Board Member Purisima. This act of accused Alzate receiving his share in the
misappropriation, is a clear indication that, true to the plan of the late vice governor, he was part of
the conspiracy in the anomalous transaction for the purpose of financing accused Alzate's
forthcoming wedding and hence, the "biggest" beneficiary thereof.135

As for Zoleta, the prosecution established that she regularly instructed Gadian to make fictitious
documents136 and that she directed Gadian and Tangan to falsify the documents.137 She gave
instructions throughout the process of obtaining the disbursed cash, such as directing that the
amounts to be given to the other officials or "suso" be doubled for faster processing of the
disbursement.138 She reviewed the falsified documents before they were given to Maglinte.139 She
instructed Tangan to accompany a dummy payee to receive and encash the disbursed check.140Once
the cash was obtained, Zoleta received it from Gadian.141

The foregoing is sufficient to establish the participation of petitioners Alzate and Maglinte in the
conspiracy.

II

Where there are circumstances that should have alerted heads of offices to exercise more diligence
in the performance of their duties, they cannot escape liability by claiming that they relied on good
faith on the submissions of their subordinates. In such cases, this Court's ruling in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan does not apply. In Rivera v. People,142 this Court held:
 22

Arias v. Sandiganbayan is not

applicable in the present case

Perez invokes the Arias doctrine which states that "[a]ll heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable
extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or
enter into negotiations." He contends that he merely relied on the vouchers and reports prepared by
his subordinates and released the payments in good faith.

To clarify, the Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule. It is not a magic cloak that can be used as a
cover by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates and necessarily
escape liability. Thus, this ruling cannot be applied to exculpate the petitioners in view of the peculiar
circumstances in this case which should have prompted them, as heads of offices, to exercise a
higher degree of circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared.
The case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan carved out an exception to the Arias doctrine, stating that:

Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional circumstance which should
have prodded petitioner, if he were out to protect the interest of the municipality he swore to serve,
to be curious and go beyond what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine, the added
reason contemplated in Arias which would have put petitioner on his guard and examine the check/s
and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before signing the same was obtaining in this
case.143 (Citations omitted)

In Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,144 discrepancy between the names indicated in the checks and in the
disbursement vouchers should have alerted petitioner:

We refer to the unusual fact that the checks issued as payment for construction materials purchased
by the municipality were not made payable to the supplier, Kelly Lumber, but to petitioner himself
even as the disbursement vouchers attached thereto were in the name of Kelly Lumber. The
discrepancy between the names indicated in the checks, on one hand, and those in the
disbursement vouchers, on the other, should have alerted petitioner - if he were conscientious of his
duties as he purports to be - that something was definitely amiss. The fact that the checks for the
municipality's purchases were made payable upon his order should, without more, have prompted
petitioner to examine the same further together with the supporting documents attached to them,
and not rely heavily on the recommendations of his subordinates.145

Here, there were discrepancies in the voucher and the check, which should have prodded petitioners
Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang to examine the supporting documents for the fund disbursement.
Thus, as properly held by the Sandiganbayan, Arias is not applicable, and petitioners Escobar,
Telesforo, and Cagang were properly found guilty of malversation through negligence.

III

This Court has repeatedly held that the essence of due process is an opportum.t y to be heard.146

As pointed out by respondent, petitioner Alzate had four (4) years to prepare to present evidence,
yet he only asked for the opportunity to present additional evidence via a motion for reconsideration
after the Sandiganbayan had already admitted all the formal offers of evidence of the
accused.147 Thus, the Sandiganbayan properly held:

It should be pointed out that inasmuch as accused-movant Alzate invoked the significance of said
entry and even testified and marked it as his Exhibit "2-A", the burden of proof is shifted to him to
establish the interpretation thereof that he wants to be appreciated by the Court through the
 23

presentation of the said DBP lady teller. Thusly, his failure to present said DBP lady teller as his
witness through the compulsory process of subpoena, during all the time that he testified for his
defense from September 6, 2010, until March 7, 2011, or for a period of six (6) months, militates
against his prayer for a new trial just to present and produce evidence relating to the date of subject
check's encashment. While the records show that accused-movant Alzate filed a Motion to Allow
Accused Alzate to Present Additional Witnesses (With Request for Issuance of Subpoena or Motion
to Allow Accused Alzate to Enter into Stipulation of Facts with the Prosecution) dated September 16,
2011, this motion was, however, denied by the Court in its Resolution of October 17, 2011, on the
ground that the motion failed to comply with the requirement under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court on notice and hearing of motions because the motion was not set for hearing.

Moreover, the said machine validated entry appearing on the subject check, marked as Exhibit "Q",
is not a newly discovered evidence considering that said evidence was already presented by the
prosecution and accused-movant Alzate, at the time he took the witness stand, was already aware
of the existence thereof and even marked it as his Exhibit "2-A" and hence, he is not entitled to the
remedy of a new trial pursuant to the provision of Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of [C]ourt which
provides as follows-

"SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. - The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantive rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change its judgment."148

Petitioners do not refute the foregoing circumstances and fail to establish that petitioner Alzate was
not afforded ample opportunity to be heard. Thus, the claim that the Sandiganbayan violated his
constitutional right to due process has no legal or factual basis and must be rejected.

IV

The Local Government Code provides that local officials, other than those considered accountable
officers by reason of their duties, may be held accountable for local government funds:

Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. - Any officer of the local
government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government
funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the
provisions of this Title. Other local officers who, though not accountable by the nature of their duties,
may likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local government funds through their
participation in the use or application thereof.

Thus, local government officials, such as petitioners Escobar and Telesforo, may become
accountable officers by reason of their participation in the application of public funds.

Petitioners claim that to be accountable officers, they must receive and acquire custody or control
over government funds or property by reason of their office and they must be required to account for
them.149 Thus, only the Provincial Treasurer is an accountable officer over the funds disbursed under
the Local Government Code. However, this argument is unmeritorious. In Zoleta v.
Sandiganbayan,150 this Court applied Section 340 of the Local Government Code and held officials
whose signatures were necessary for disbursement of funds as accountable officers:
 24

Third, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were accountable public officers. Under the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable public officer is a public officer who,
by reason of his office, is accountable for public funds or property. The Local Government Code
expanded this definition with regard to local government officials. Section 340 of the [Local
Government Code] reads:

Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. - Any officer of the local
government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government
funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the
provisions of this title. Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of their duties, may
likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local government funds through their
participation in the use or application thereof. (Emphasis ours.)

Local government officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the nature of
their functions; or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds.

As a required standard procedure, the signatures of, among others, the Vice-Governor and the
Provincial Accountant are needed before any disbursement of public funds can be made. No checks
can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a disbursement
voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, any disbursement and release of public funds
require their approval. Thus, Constantino and Camanay, in their capacities as Vice-Governor and
Provincial Accountant, had control and responsibility over the subject funds.151 (Citation omitted)

In this case, as in Zoleta, as part of standard procedure, it was required that petitioner Telesforo
certify that the supporting documents were complete, and that petitioner Escobar sign them before a
check could be approved for disbursement. Thus, as in Zoleta, petitioners Escobar and Telesforo
are accountable officers.

Well aware of the possibility that the testimonies of Gadian and Tangan would be impugned, the
Sandiganbayan took it upon itself to exercise extreme caution in evaluating them. Thus, this Court
quotes with affirmation the finding of the Sandiganbayan:

Of course, cognizant that the versions threshed out by the admissions made by Gadian and Tangan
who were particeps criminis or participants in the commission of the crime charged may be said to
emanate from polluted sources, the Court, extra-careful and exercising extreme caution in assaying
their stories, finds no reason to shun or set aside the said admissions as wholly unbelievable. In fact,
their candor in coming forward to own their complicity in the commission of the crime here charged
is, in a way, a guarantee of their truthfulness. Thus, in People v. Bayona[,] it was stated that -

" ... As a matter of fact, the candid admission of an accused, of his participation in a crime, is a
guaranty that if he will testify in court he will testify truthfully; so that even if an accused actually
participated in the offense charged in the information, he may still be made a witness. Individuals
who are candid enough to admit their guilt are expected to testify truthfully and it is from that
circumstance that all the facts involved shall be expected to be truthfully disclosed by him."

Moreover, the fact that Gadian and Tangan had participated in the commission of the crime charged
in the information and as such equally guilty thereof, does not disqualify them to testify in the
proceeding or to render their testimony ineffectual if competent and admissible. Apropos is the ruling
of the Supreme Court in People v. Binsol, et al. -
 25

"The fact that a person has not been previously charged or included in the information even if he
appears to have taken part in the commission of the crime does not, and cannot, prevent the
government prosecutor from utilizing him as a witness if he believes that he is the best witness that
can testify as to the commission of the crime. In the discharge of his duties, a government
prosecutor is free to choose the witness or witnesses he deems more qualified or competent to
testify for the prosecution and there is nothing either in the law or in the rules that would require him
to first include him in the information and then later secure his discharge before he could present him
as a government witness. The rule therefore relative to the right of the government prosecutor to
utilize a person who has participated in the commission of a crime as a witness for the prosecution,
is as follows: (1) when an offense is committed by more than one person, it is the duty of the fiscal to
include all of them in the complaint or information ... (2) if the fiscal desires to utilize one of those
charged with the offense as a government witness, the fiscal may ask the court to discharge one of
them after complying with the conditions prescribed by law ... (3) there is nothing in the rule from
which it can be inferred that before a person can be presented as a government witness in the
information that he be first included as a co-accused in the information, for the fiscal is free to
produce as a witness anyone whom he believes can testify to the truth of the crime charged ... and
(4) the failure to follow the requirements of the rule relative to the use of a person, himself
a particeps criminis, as a government witness does not violate the due process clause of the
[C]onstitution, nor render his testimony ineffectual if otherwise competent and
admissible[.]"152 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Petitioners have not presented any cogent reason to reverse the Sandiganbayan's appreciation of
Gadian's and Tangan's testimonies. In any case, the issue of the credibility of witnesses Gadian and
Tangan are matters of evidence, not proper for a petition for review on certiorari.

VI

The principle of conclusiveness has no application in criminal cases such as this.

This Court has held that conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of issues already litigated
and settled in litigation between identical parties in different causes of action,153 and on occasion, has
applied this principle in criminal cases.154 However, this Court takes this occasion to reiterate that the
concept of res judicata is a civil law doctrine, not to be applied in criminal proceedings, except with
respect to civil cases impliedly instituted. This is not novel.

In Tecson v. Sandiganbayan,155 the petitioner maintained that considering the rule prohibiting the
relitigation of matters resolved by competent judicial authority, the dismissal of an administrative
case against him was conclusive and binding upon the parties. This Court rejected this contention:

[R]es judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or
employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission.
This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a
wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public
officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal
sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to
suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is
separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case
does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were
the subject of the administrative complaint.156
 26

In Asistio y Cansino v. People,157 the petitioner invoked res judicata as a bar for her from being
prosecuted for violation of Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6938, or the Liability of Directors, Officers
and Committee Members, because she had been previously acquitted in a criminal case for
falsification of a private document. This Court held:

The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the prosecution of her case before
the RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is barred by res
judicatabecause the MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a Resolution dated August 13, 2012, granted her
demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in
Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR. In support of her flawed argument, petitioner points out that the
private complainants [officers and directors of the Cooperative] and the subject matter [unreported
sales profits of Coca-Cola products] of both cases are the same, and that the case for violation of
Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually and necessarily included in the case for falsification of private
documents.

At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings. At any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally related to double jeopardy which
embraces a prohibition against being tried for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.158 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

Likewise, in Trinidad v. Marcelo,159 this Court reiterated that res judicata is a civil law doctrine and has
no application in criminal proceedings. In that case, this Court rejected the argument that since the
Ombudsman had twice found there was no sufficient basis to indict petitioner in earlier, similar
cases, res judicata barred the reinvestigation.

It may be argued that these cases are not on all fours with the case at hand. Nonetheless, except
with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted, res judicata is not applicable in criminal proceedings.
This Court has expressly stated this rule multiple times. At most, the applicable concept of res
judicata is that of res judicata in prison grey as double jeopardy under Rule 117, Section 7, which is
not in question here.

Indeed, if this Court accepts the argument that conclusiveness of judgment bars this case
considering that the Sandiganbayan already found that Escobar is not an accountable officer, which
was an error of law in light of Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, it will lead to an absurd effect. Once a
person has been acquitted of a crime, despite the ground being a question of law resolved
erroneously, once that decision is final, that person can commit the exact same crime against the
same party with impunity, under the claim that even where the subject matter differs, the erroneous
application of the law is forever binding on those parties. Thus, this argument cannot be
countenanced.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan August 22,
2012 Decision and January 8, 2013 Resolution in Criminal Case No. 28293 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

November 6, 2017
 27

G.R. No. 223210

WILSON T. LIM, Petitioner

vs.
P/S INSP. EUSTIQUIO FUENTES, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated June 5, 2015 and Resolution2 dated January 29, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), Cagayan de Oro City, in CA-G.R. SP No. 04764-MIN, which affirmed the
Joint Order3 dated September 7, 2011 and Order4 dated March 31, 2011 of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) in OMB-P-A-05-1283-K,
which in turn, reversed its previous Decision5 dated February 24, 2009.

The factual antecedents are as follows.

Petitioner Wilson T. Lim and Rex Lazo were engaged in the business of buying and selling second-
hand motor vehicles in Iloilo City under the business name "Wheels to go." Sometime in March
2003, Lim learned from his neighbour of a car agent based in Iligan City named Raquim Salvo who
sold vehicles at cheap prices.6Consequently, Lazo went to meet Salvo who personally assured him
that the units were properly documented and cleared by the Iligan Traffic Management Group
(TMG). Salvo then introduced Lazo to the supposed owners of the vehicles and showed him original
copies of Certificates of Registration (CRs) and Motor Vehicle Registration Renewal (MVRR) Official
Receipts (ORs) issued by Rex Pangandag, Head of Land Transportation Office (LTO) Tubod
Extension Office, Iligan.7 Salvo also brought Lazo to the office of TMG Iligan City headed by
respondent Philippine National Police (PNP) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Eustiquio Fuentes who
issued PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificates (MVCC), one of the LTO requirements for the
transfer of ownership over motor vehicles from the seller to the buyer. On the basis of the CRS and
ORs issued by Pangandag and MVCCs issued by respondent Fuentes, Lim and Lazo purchased
thirteen (13) second-hand vehicles from Salvo in the total purchase price of ₱6,075,000.00 which
they later sold to different buyers at their car shop in Iloilo City.8

However, in June 2003, they decided to stop buying from Salvo when the TMG of Iloilo City informed
them that one unit Isuzu Crosswind purchased therefrom was a stolen/carnapped vehicle.
Thereafter, in September 2004, they were further notified by the buyers of their vehicles that their
purchased units were seized and impounded in Camp Delgado by TMG Iloilo City on the ground that
they were "hot cars."9 They tried to contact Salvo and his cohorts to confront them of the incident but
to no avail. Consequently, to protect their name and preserve their reputation as legitimate
businessmen, they refunded payments to the buyers on instalment basis. Nevertheless, the TMG of
Iloilo City filed criminal complaints against Lim and Lazo for Carnapping, Anti-Fencing, Estafa, and
Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) 1730. The Prosecutor's Office, however, found that they acted
in good faith and dismissed the complaints against them.

Claiming to have been defrauded by Salvo because of the false pretenses and falsification of
documents by respondent Fuentes and Pangandag, Lim and Lazo filed a complaint for violation of
Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 and Estafa Thru Falsification as well as the instant
administrative complaint against respondent Fuentes and Pangandag for Violation of Section 7 (a) of
RA No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees and for Grave Misconduct before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
 28

MOLEO.10 According to Lim and Lazo, Pangandag issued falsified CRs and ORs while Fuentes
issued falsified MVCCs making it appear that the vehicles they purchased from Salvo were not in the
list of stolen vehicles and had passed the macro-etching examination (MEE) conducted by the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service despite the fact that they had actually been reported as stolen in the Motor
Vehicle Management Information System (MVMIS).11 Thus, they allege that it is because of this
conspiracy among Salvo and respondent Fuentes and Pangandag that they were tricked into buying
the stolen vehicles.

In his Counter-Affidavit, Fuentes admitted that he had issued an MVCC on June 17, 2003 for a
Mitsubishi Pajero Wagon owned by a certain Adela Marobong but had no participation in the
issuance of MVCCs for the other vehicles.12 According to Fuentes, the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service certified that the engine and chassis numbers of the subject vehicle were not tampered and
that as of June 18, 2003, said vehicle was not included in the list of stolen or wanted motor
vehicles.13 Hence, he should not be faulted for the issuance of the MVCC for he merely approved the
same based on the findings of SPO4 Asari and the PNP Crime Laboratory and not on an alleged
conspiracy with Salvo and his cohorts.14

On February 24, 2009, the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Julius Java of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO, Diliman, Quezon City, with concurrence of Director Eulogio
Cecilio, and approval of Emilio Gonzalez III, Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO, and Mark
Jalandoni, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, rendered a Decision finding both respondent Fuentes and
Pangandag guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed them from service.15 According to said Office,
the evidence imputed against Fuentes shows that he admittedly issued an MVCC for the subject
vehicle stating that "it was not in the list of stolen vehicles" despite the fact that the vehicle was
reported in Camp Crame, Quezon City as stolen vehicle as of January 29, 2003 and as reflected in
the computerized MVMIS. Said issuance is therefore a manifestation of bad faith. As for Pangandag,
the same Office found that his specimen signatures matched those appearing in the Certificates of
Registration and Official Receipts he alleged to be a forgery.16

On March 31, 2011, however, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Yvette Evaristo of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO, Diliman, Quezon City with concurrence of Director
Eulogio Cecilio, and approval of Emilio Gonzalez III, Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO, and Ma.
Merceditas Gutierrez, Tanodbayan, reversed its previous order and dismissed the complaint but only
insofar as respondent Fuentes is concerned.17 The Office held that the issuance of an MVCC is
purely a ministerial function of Fuentes. Once the PNP Crime Laboratory made such certification, he
had no power to look into the veracity of the same but to immediately issue the MVCC.18Hence,
Fuentes cannot be faulted.

In a Joint Order dated September 7, 2011, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Lyn L.
Llamansares, with the concurrence of Director Dennis L. Garcia, and approval of Assistant
Ombudsman Eulogio S. Cecilio and Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, affirmed the
March 31, 2011 Order dismissing the complaint against respondent Fuentes. On the procedural
issues alleged by Lim and Lazo that Fuentes filed his Motion for Reconsideration beyond the
reglementary period and that the same failed to specify the grounds upon which the same is based,
said Office held that litigations must be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.19 On
the substantive, it ruled that Fuentes could not be faulted for issuing the MVCC. This is because
since the macro-etching certificate states that the engine and chassis numbers on the subject
vehicle were not tampered, Fuentes had no reason to doubt the findings of his subordinate officer
SPO3 Asari that the vehicle was not in the list of wanted/stolen vehicles. Thus, bad faith cannot be
presumed.20
 29

On June 5, 2015, the CA affirmed the September 7, 2011 Joint Order of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for MOLEO on the ground that factual findings of administrative bodies are generally
accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence.21 Thereafter, in its Resolution dated
January 29, 2016, the CA denied Lim and Lazo's Motion for Reconsideration. It held and reiterated
the fact that the motor and chassis numbers of the subject vehicle covered by the MVCC do not
match the motor and chassis numbers of the vehicle listed in the MVMIS. Hence, respondent should
not be held liable for relying thereon for as far as he is concerned, at the time he issued the
clearance certificate, the subject vehicle was not in the list of wanted/stolen vehicles.

Aggrieved, petitioner Lim filed the instant petition on March 30, 2016 raising the following arguments:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSABLE ERROR OF LAW IN

AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (MOLEO) WHICH WERE
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES AND PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN

AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (MOLEO) WHICH WERE
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS, LAWS, AND JURISPRUDENCE.22

Petitioner maintains that respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration before the Ombudsman,
failed to specify the ground upon which the same is based as required by Rule III, Section 8, Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. He also points out that it is highly irregular that the
Decision dated February 24, 2009 finding respondent guilty of misconduct was signed by Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III but the Order dated March 31, 2011 which reversed the
February 24, 2009 Decision was not. Instead, it was merely approved by Acting Ombudsman
Orlando C. Casimiro.

Moreover, petitioner posits that he was able to establish the guilt of respondent with substantial
evidence as required in administrative cases. According to petitioner, the records show that the
subject vehicle was reported stolen at the TMG Camp Crame Quezon City as early as January 29,
2003 which was before Fuentes issued the subject MVCC on June 18, 2003. Thus, respondent
cannot claim good faith for he knew or should have known that on the date that he approved the
MVCC, the subject vehicle was already listed as stolen. Moreover, the duty of Fuentes in issuing
MVCCs is not ministerial in light of prevailing rules which require that the physical examination of
vehicles before an MVCC is issued shall be conducted jointly by TMG personnel and CL technicians.
Thus, respondent has the discretion and final say on whether to issue the clearance or not.

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, the Court finds no error when the appellate court set aside procedural infirmities and
affirmed the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman which took cognizance of the Motion for
Reconsideration despite the fact that it failed to specify the ground upon which the same is based.
After all, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.23 Moreover,
the fact that the Order reversing the Decision finding respondent guilty of misconduct was merely
approved by Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro does not strip it off of its official character nor
does it. nullify the same. As far as the Court is concerned, it was still issued upon the Acting
Ombudsman's authority. Besides, petitioner cannot be allowed to raise such argument for the first
 30

time before the Court. Settled is the rule that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to
the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered
by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on
appeal is barred by estoppel.24

Nevertheless, the Court does not agree with the CA in affirming the dismissal of the administrative
charge of grave misconduct against respondent. It must first be noted, however, that in petitions filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. This is because the Court
is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to review evidence on record and assess the probative
weight thereof.25 The task of the Court, therefore, is limited to the review of errors of law that the
appellate court might have committed. Hence, the issue before Us is whether the CA correctly found
that there exists no substantial evidence to hold respondent Fuentes administratively liable for grave
misconduct.

Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. While substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence
beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases, it should be enough for a reasonable mind
to support a conclusion.26 In the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that there exists such
reasonable ground that would support the finding that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
charged herein.

In this relation, misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior.27 It is an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior.28 To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.29

Guided by the foregoing principles, the Court, therefore, finds respondent administratively liable for
grave misconduct. In the proper discharge of his official functions, respondent is governed by the
mandate of Memorandum Circular No. 2002-012, Re: Amending, Memorandum Circular 2001-011
Streamlining the PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Procedure, which pertinently provides that motor
vehicles applying for MVCC shall undergo physical examination jointly conducted by the TMG
personnel and crime laboratory technicians, that the physical examination and macro-etching result
shall be used only where the MVCC is to be secured and shall be' conducted at the TMG designated
area, and that the clearance officer, respondent in this case, is likewise responsible for the effective
implementation of the motor vehicle clearance system. As such, respondent was bound by law to
ensure that MVCCs may only be issued after careful determination that the vehicle covered thereby
was acquired by legal means. If a vehicle that is issued an MVCC turns out to be a stolen unit, such
as the subject Mitsubishi Pajero Wagon in this case, respondent, as the clearance officer, must be
held accountable for his blatant disregard as it means that the system was not faithfully
implemented, in contravention with the mandate of the circular.

Moreover, the argument that respondent should not be held liable because the issuance of an
MVCC is purely a ministerial function is untenable. According to respondent, he merely relies on the
 31

findings of his subordinates SPO4 Asari that the vehicle is not part of the stolen vehicles list and the
PNP Crime Laboratory that the vehicle has not been tampered with. Thus, once the PNP Crime
Laboratory makes such certification, he has no power to look into the veracity of the same but to
immediately issue the MVCC. But as specifically stipulated in the rules, respondent, as clearance
officer, is responsible for the effective implementation of the motor vehicle clearance system,
necessarily calling for his cautious exercise of discretion. This is the clear import of Our recent ruling
in Lim v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Offices
(MOLEO) and P/S Insp. Eustiquio Fuentes,30 wherein the Court was confronted with the criminal
aspect of the instant case involving the same parties and the same set of facts. There, the Court
found that there exists probable cause against respondent for the crimes of Violation of Section 3(e),
R.A. 3019 and Estafa Through Falsification. It was held that there is reasonable ground to believe
that Fuentes made false pretenses or fraudulent misrepresentations to Lim and Lazo that the subject
vehicles were legally acquired. Relying on the ORs, CRs, and MVCCs which Pangandag and
Fuentes issued, Lim and Lazo decided to buy said motor vehicles thinking that they were free from
any legal encumbrance or liability.31Moreover, facts abound pointing to respondent, head of Iligan
TMG, as probably guilty of having acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence in issuing the MVCCs in question which caused undue injury to Lim and
Lazo, and gave Salvo and the other car agents unwarranted benefits or advantage in the discharge
of his functions, and therefore should be held for trial. We quote the pertinent portions of said
Decision:

The Deputy Ombudsman explained in its assailed Orders that the issuance of an MVCC is a purely
ministerial function. As such, Fuentes did not actually exercise discretion or judgment. He relied
1âwphi1

primarily on the Macro Etching Examination conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory and the latter's
certification that the chassis and motor numbers of the vehicle submitted for clearance had not been
tampered with. Also, Fuentes would have no way of knowing if the subject Pajero with Plate No.
UEH-951 was a stolen or carnapped vehicle because then its details would already have been
modified and thus, would not match the original details of the car reported as stolen. However, under
Memorandum Circular No. 2002-012, motor vehicles applying for MVCC shall undergo physical
examination jointly conducted by the TMG personnel and crime laboratory technicians. The physical
examination and macro-etching result shall be used only where the MVCC is to be secured and shall
be conducted at the TMG designated area. The clearance officer, Fuentes in this case, is
likewise responsible for the effective implementation of the motor vehicle clearance system.
Therefore, as the clearance officer, Fuentes is accountable in a situation where a person was
able to obtain clearance for a stolen vehicle from the Iligan TMG since then the system could
not be considered as having been effectively and faithfully implemented. Indubitably,
Fuentes's function was not purely ministerial as he, in fact, had to exercise good judgment in
issuing vehicle clearances.

Moreover, it is this necessary exercise of prudence that respondent should have implemented in his
issuance of the subject MVCC. Respondent claims that since the macro-etching examination
revealed that the subject vehicle was not tampered and since his subordinate reported that said
vehicle was not in the stolen or wanted vehicle list, he should not be held liable for there was no
other means by which he could have determined that the vehicle was in fact stolen. Hence, he acted
in good faith. But as the Court further held in the aforementioned case, respondent, as head of the
TMG of Iligan City, the very office charged with the purpose of issuing motor vehicle clearances,
could have exercised better judgment in determining whether the subject vehicle was stolen.

Notably, the plate number of the subject vehicle is clearly indicated in the Macro-Etching Certificate
(Certificate) dated June 17, 2003 issued by respondent's subordinates.32 Respondent could have
easily ascertained the true status of the subject vehicle had he merely perused the Certificate in its
entirety and utilized the plate number stated on its face for verification purposes. He could have used
the vehicle's plate number and checked whether the same was part of the list provided under the
 32

MVMIS. In fact, this was actually how the TMG of Iloilo discovered that the vehicle was the subject of
illegality. Thus:

Moreover, there is no truth to Fuentes's asseveration that there was no other means of
determining whether the Pajero with Plate No. UEH-951 was stolen or carnapped. His office
could have simply utilized the plate number, as what the TMG Iloilo did, to trace and identify
the car as stolen based on the computerized Vehicle Management Information System. It thus
becomes clear that the Deputy Ombudsman erroneously failed to consider significant pieces of
evidence which should not have been casually ignored. The Deputy Ombudsman should have, at
the very least, explained its reasons as to why the aforesaid Memorandum Circular was not
followed in this case.

The Deputy Ombudsman likewise contends that Fuentes acted in good faith in relying upon the
certification of his subordinates. Hence, he could not have acted with evident bad faith and
defrauded Lim and Lazo by means of deceit or abuse of confidence. It further held that to drag
Fuentes into a criminal conspiracy simply because he did not personally examine every single detail
and go beyond the certified macro-etching result would be to set a bad precedent. However, as
head of the office responsible for the issuance of motor vehicle clearances, Fuentes must be
held liable for any act committed in violation of the purpose for which the office was made.
Had it not been for the clearances issued by Fuentes declaring that the cars being sold were
indeed acquired through legitimate means, Lim and Lazo would not have parted with their
hard-earned money. It must be stressed that the TMG clearance is specifically intended to
protect the buyer from buying stolen/carnapped vehicles. To uphold the Deputy
Ombudsman's ruling would defeat the very purpose why a motor vehicle clearance is issued
arid the public could no longer rely on the clearance issued by the TMG.

xxxx

Considering the mandate of Memorandum Circular No. 2002-012, which both Fuentes and the
Deputy Ombudsman have clearly disregarded, the Court believes, therefore, that all the
elements of the crimes charged are, in all reasonable likelihood, present with respect to
Fuentes's participation in the case at bar and that the Deputy Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion when it dismissed the criminal charges against him.

While it is true that the Certificate concludes that "the engine and chassis numbers of the [subject
vehicle] [are] found NOT TAMPERED", it is equally true that the subject vehicle's plate number is
also clearly stated therein.33 The conclusion of respondent's subordinates anent the engine and
chassis numbers is but a portion of the Certificate submitted for respondent's perusal. Respondent's
failure to utilize the information appearing on the face of the Certificate to verify the status of the
subject vehicle constitutes gross inexcusable negligence. In this light, the Court finds that
respondent must be held liable for this negligent issuance of the motor vehicle clearance, clearly
disregarding the mandate of Memorandum Circular No. 2002-012 that requires him to faithfully
implement the motor vehicle clearance system.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent must be held liable for his negligent
issuance of the motor vehicle clearance, clearly disregarding the mandate of Memorandum Circular
No. 2002-012 that requires him to faithfully implement the motor vehicle clearance system. To
repeat, the standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe
that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.34 As We have recently held in Lim v. MOLEO and P/S Insp.
Eustiquio Fuentes,35 had it not been for respondent's gross inexcusable recklessness, petitioner
would not have parted with his hard-earned money. Otherwise put, if respondent only exercised due
 33

care and prudence in determining whether the subject vehicle came from legitimate sources,
whether through the diligent exercise of the macro-etching examination, by counter-checking
whether its engine and chassis number are part of the list of the computerized vehicle management
information system, or even by using its plate number instead, petitioner would not have suffered
such an expensive loss and undue injury to the advantage of Salvo and his cohorts. This is because
as clearance officer and head of TMG Iligan City, respondent's role was simply to ensure that the
motor vehicle clearance system was truthfully implemented. It was incumbent on him to employ
effective and reasonable means to determine whether motor vehicles had been the subject of any
sort of crime. Thus, had he faithfully performed the duties of his office, respondent could have easily
discovered that the subject vehicle was in fact stolen. It is therefore this flagrant disregard of the
mandate of Memorandum Circular No. 2002-012 that leads Us to conclude that respondent must be
held liable for grave misconduct.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 5,
2015 and Resolution dated January 29, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 04764-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated February 24,
2009 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices
is REINSTATED. Respondent P/S Insp. Eustiquio Fuentes is hereby DISMISSED from service.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 34

MARTIRES, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] dated 6 March 2015, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 01092-MIN, which affirmed in totothe
Decision,[2] dated 8 October 2012, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No.
FC-2009-643, finding herein accused-appellant Gloria Nangcas (Nangcas)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Section 4 in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No.
9208,[3] committed against AAA,[4] BBB,[5] CCC,[6] and Judith Singane
(Judith), and imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000.000.00).

THE FACTS

Accused-appellant was charged for Violation of Republic Act No. 9208 or

the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" per the Information, dated 24
September 2009, which reads:[7]

"That on 22 March 2009 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and

thereafter, commencing in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully recruit, transport, transfer, harbor and
provide four (4) women, namely, fourteen (14) year-old [AAA], thirteen (13)
year-old [BBB], seventeen (17) year-old [CCC] and nineteen (19) year-old
Judith Singane, by means of fraud, deception, or taking advantage of the
vulnerability of said victims for the purpose of offering and selling said
victims for forced labor, slavery or involuntary servitude, that is, by
promising them local employment (as househelpers in Camella Homes,
Upper Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City) with a monthly salary of PhP1,500.00
each and that they could go home every Sunday, but instead, said accused
brought them to Marawi City and sold them for PhP1,600.00 each to their
great damage and prejudice.

Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 4, in relation to Section 6, of

Republic Act No. 9208.
 35

By virtue of the Warrant dated 18 December 2009,[8] Nangcas was arrested

and committed to the jurisdiction of the court a quo on 13 January
2010.[9] With the assistance of her counsel, Nangcas pleaded "not guilty" to
the offense charged.[10]

The Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Judith, AAA, BBB, P/Insp. Exodio Vidal, and
Enerio Singane (Enerio) as witnesses. Their testimonies, taken together,
tended to establish the following:

On 22 March 2009, at around three o'clock in the afternoon, Judith was

with AAA at xxx when they saw her uncle Junjun Singane and aunt Marites
Simene with Nangcas. The latter approached them and asked if they
wanted to work.[11] Judith, being interested, brought Nangcas to her house
to ask permission from her parents. Nangcas informed Judith's parents
that the latter would be working as a house helper at Camella Homes in
Cagayan de Oro City, with a salary of P1,500.00 per month and with a rest
day every Sunday. Judith's father, Enerio, was adamant at first, but Judith
insisted because of the salary Nangcas offered and the location of the
employer was nearby at Camella Homes; hence, Enerio gave his
consent.[12] Thereafter, Judith had her things all ready and went with
Nangcas. Nangcas, on the other hand, left her cellphone number with
Enerio.[13]

Since AAA, who was only fourteen (14) years old then,[14] showed interest in
Nangcas' proposition, the latter then proceeded to AAA's residence to meet
her parents. There, Nangcas also met CCC, AAA's sister, who was only
seventeen years old at that time. CCC also expressed her interest to work as
a house helper. Nangcas explained to AAA and CCC's parents that both
would be working as house helpers at Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro,
with a salary of P1,500.00 each. The father of the two girls rejected the idea
since he could still manage to support them. Their mother was also
apprehensive that her daughters might be brought to Marawi. However,
since AAA and CCC were very much interested and Nangcas assured their
parents that they would only work at Camella Homes, the parents
eventually agreed, thinking that both their daughters would be within each
other's reach as they would both be working at Camella
Homes.[15] Thereafter, Judith, AAA, CCC, and Nangcas proceeded to the
house of BBB, a cousin of AAA and CCC, to inform her of the job offer.[16]
 36

BBB was home attending to her younger sibling when Judith, AAA, CCC,
and Nangcas arrived. After Nangcas told her of work available at Camella
Homes, BBB agreed thinking that her mother could just visit her there.[17]

All the recruits resided at xxx, Cagayan de Oro City.

After the girls had packed their things, Nangcas brought them to Camella
Homes. The alleged employer was not there, so Nangcas informed them
that they had to go to Cogon. When they were already in Cogon, Nangcas
instructed them to board a van as they would proceed to Iligan City where
the employer was. Though hesitant and doubtful, the girls followed
Nangcas' instructions. Judith, however, noticed that they were already
travelling far and tried to talk to Nangcas but to naught, as the latter slept
during the trip.[18] Upon reaching their destination, it was only then that
Nangcas told them that they would be working as house helpers in Marawi.
The girls complained that their agreement was only to work at Camella
Homes in Cagayan de Oro. But Nangcas informed them that their alleged
employer in Iligan was no longer looking for helpers; and that it was in
Marawi where they were needed. The girls wanted to go home but they
didn't have any money for their fare going back to Cagayan de Oro.[19] They
had no other choice but to stay in Marawi. They were then brought to the
house of one Baby Abas (Baby) where they slept for the night.

The following day, Nangcas brought Judith and BBB to the house of Baby's
sister, Cairon Abantas (Cairon), while AAA and CCC remained to work for
Baby. Nangcas went back to Cagayan de Oro.

The recruits worked in Marawi for more than a month. They were not paid
their salaries as, according to their employers, Nangcas had already
collected P1,600.00 for each of them. They were also made to eat leftover
rice with only "pulaka" (mixed ginger, chili and onion) as their
viand.[20] Furthermore, they were threatened not to go out or attempt to
escape or else, the soldiers would kill them since they were Christians.

Since Judith failed to go home on her scheduled day-off on Sunday, Enerio

called up Nangcas to ask about his daughter. The latter told him that Judith
was with her just the other day and that she could go home only after two
(2) months.
 37

On 14 April 2009, Judith asked permission to go home since it was her

birthday, but she was denied Subsequently, with the help of the
"kasambahay" of the neighboring house who lent them her cellphone,
Judith was able to call her father informing him of her
whereabouts.[21] Alarmed by the news from his daughter, Enerio went to the
Lumbia Police Station to report the incident and seek assistance to rescue
her daughter and three (3) other minors.

P/Insp. Exodio Vidal then assisted Enerio in looking for Nangcas. They
went to Nangcas' house but only her children were there. They left a
message inviting Nangcas to their station but she did not respond.[22] On 5
May 2009, P/Insp. Vidal received orders to proceed to Marawi City to
retrieve the girls. The girls' parents and a couple of Muslims accompanied
the police officers. Enerio Singane called the cellphone number used by
Judith to contact him and he was able to talk to the cellphone's owner. The
latter gave him the directions to the house of Judith's employer.[23] The
police officers successfully rescued the four (4) girls. The parents of the
recruited girls filed the instant action against Nangcas.

The Version of the Defense

Nangcas and Cairon testified for the defense.

Nangcas denied the accusation against her. She claimed that her friend Joni
Mohamad (Joni) was looking for two (2) house helpers to work for him at
Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro, and two (2) others for his mother who
lived in Iligan City.[24] She went to xxx to look for interested applicants and
there met a couple who told her that their neighbor was interested. The
couple took her to Judith who expressed interest so she decided to meet her
parents to ask for their permission. She informed the parents that Judith
would be working at Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro, with a salary of
P1,500.00.[25] She then went to the parents of AAA and CCC and made the
same offer. The girls' parents gave their consent provided that the siblings
would work in the same house.[26] After the girls had packed their things,
she brought them to Camella Homes.

Nangcas alleged that while they were at the terminal, she chanced upon
BBB, a cousin of AAA and CCC. The former requested to accompany them
to Camella Homes so that she would know where to visit her cousins on her
day-off.[27] She agreed; hence, BBB went with them to Camella Homes.
 38

When they arrived at Camella Homes, she introduced the girls to Joni.
However, Joni only needed two (2) helpers and chose Judith and CCC to
work for him but the latter refused because she wanted to work as a house
helper with her sister AAA. Joni then called his mother to inform her about
the house helpers. The latter instructed him to send them to Iligan and that
she would pay for their fare.[28] Nangcas took the four (4) girls with her to
Cogon and boarded a van going to Iligan. However, before they could reach
Iligan, Joni's mother called her and informed her that she was no longer
hiring the helpers as her current helper decided not to go home
anymore.[29] She asked the driver if he could take them back to Cagayan de
Oro but the latter asked for an additional charge. When she replied that she
had no money left, Judith immediately suggested that they proceed to
Marawi where she has an uncle. However, Judith could not contact her
uncle, hence she asked the girls if it was okay for them to go to Marawi and
they all agreed. She then contacted her friend Baby Abas (Baby) in Marawi
and the latter lent her money to pay the van driver.[30] They stayed in Baby's
house for the night. When Baby asked the girls if they were willing to work
as house helpers, they said yes.

Nangcas furthermore alleged that on the following day, AAA and CCC
remained with Baby while she brought Judith and BBB to the house of
Baby's sister, Cairon, to work as house helpers with P1,500.00 salary each.
Before she left for Cagayan de Oro, Baby gave her P500.00 while Cairon
gave her P1,600.00 for providing them the helpers;[31] Nangcas added that
Judith specifically asked her not to tell their parents about their
whereabouts as they would call to inform them themselves.[32]

Nangcas finally alleged that by the end of March 2009, she went back to
Marawi to follow up on the girls and there learned that Judith failed to
inform their parents of their whereabouts. Nevertheless, all the girls
assured her that they were fine. On 5 May 2009, she was supposed to fetch
Judith, who was scheduled to go home for her birthday but she failed to do
so because she had to attend to her husband who was hospitalized for
pneumonia. On 7 May 2009, Judith's father called and informed her that
he had already fetched his daughter and the other girls.

Cairon also h stified and professed that she came to know Nangcas only
when she brought the girls to work for her. She recalled offering to pay the
girls a salary of P1,500.00 to which the girls agreed. She claimed that she
even asked for Enerio's number to inform him that his daughter was in
 39

good hands.[33] She further claimed that Nangcas did not ask for money but
she volunteered to reimburse Nangcas' expenses incurred in bringing the
girls. Finally, Cairon alleged that she paid the girls their salaries and she
was surprised when their parents came to her house to get them.[34]

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its decision,[35] the RTC[36] found Nangcas guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

The RTC ratiocinated that Nangcas' deception was apparent in the manner
with which she dealt with Enerio, Judith, and three other private
complainants: that they were made to believe that the victims would be
working as house helpers at Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro City; and
that Nangcas never bothered to call the girls' parents to inform them of
their children's whereabouts. The RTC also reasoned that Nangcas further
deceived Enerio when she told him during the last week of March that
Judith and the other girls were at Camella Homes when she fully knew that
they were in Marawi; that she employed the same deception when she
brought the girls from one place to another until they reached Marawi; that
the girls were left penniless and thus had no fare to go back home, thus,
leaving no choice but to work against their will. Finally, The RTC declared
that if there was truth to the claim of Nangcas, she should have presented
Joni Mohamad and his mother; that Nangcas had also admitted previously
providing helpers to others, and that the incident on 22 March 2009 was
not the only occasion he did so. The fallo reads:

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused Gloria

Nangcas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons and for which the Court hereby imposes upon
GLORIA NANGCAS the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).

IT IS SO ORDERED.[37]
Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the RTC, Nangcas appealed to the
Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.[38]

The Assailed CA Decision

The CA, through its Twenty-Second Division, accorded respect to the

 40

findings of fact of the trial court in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence that the latter ignored facts and circumstances which, if
considered on appeal, would have reversed or modified the outcome of the
case. The CA found no merit in the arguments raised by Nangcas, to wit:

First, there is no doubt that the accused-appellant recruited and

transported the private complainants to their supposed employer in
Marawi. These are well within the acts that may constitute trafficking, to
wit: recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring. This meets the first
elements of the offense. Second, we are convinced that the accused-
appellant employed fraud and deceit and took advantage of the victims'
vulnerability to successfully recruit them. These means satisfy the second
element. Lastly, the foregoing acts and means resulted in the victims' forced
labor and slavery.[39]
The CA disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed. The October 8, 2012 Decision of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case
No. 2009-643 for qualified trafficking in persons is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[40]
Hence, this appeal.

The Present Appeal

On 19 August 2015, the Court issued a Resolution notifying the parties that
they could file their respective supplemental briefs.[41]However, both
Nangcas and the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for plaintiff-
appellee People of the Philippines, manifested that they would no longer
file supplemental briefs, as their respective briefs filed with the CA
sufficiently addressed their particular arguments.[42]

Based on the arguments raised in Nangcas' brief before the CA, the Court is
called upon to resolve the following assignment of errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND
 41

REASONABLE DOUBT.[43]

II. THERE WAS NO FRAUD, DECEPTION OR TAKING

ADVANTAGE OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THE ALLEGED
VICTIMS.[44]

III. THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WERE NOT OFFERED OR SOLD FOR

FORCED LABOR, SLAVERY OR INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.[45]

IV. INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE

COMPLAINANTS.[46]

The Arguments of the Accused

Nangcas argues that there was no deception in this case. She maintained
that she did not deceive any of the private complainants nor their parents
when their daughters were hired as house helpers. She also maintained that
in bringing the alleged victims to Iligan City, she had no idea that the
mother of Joni would no longer be needing house helpers; hence, with no
money to pay for the fare, she had no other choice but to stay with Baby
Abas in Marawi City.

Nangcas further argues that contrary to the findings of the court, she did
not recruit the victims under the pretext of domestic employment for the
purpose of forced labor, slavery or involuntary servitude. She averred that
the alleged victims worked as house helpers as previously agreed upon, that
they were not forced to work contrary to their agreement. She also averred
that the alleged victims were not enticed to work with a high salary and the
amount offered was not that big to entice anyone to leave one's home and
work for someone else.

Nangcas finally argues that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of

the private complainants in the following manner: that Judith testified that
she and BBB were brought to the house of Cairon Abantas, the sister of
Baby; while AAA testified that it was she and BBB who stayed with Baby
while Judith and CCC were brought to Cairon.

THE COURT'S RULING

 42

We affirm accused-appellant Nangcas' conviction

Accused-appellant's guilt was established beyond reasonable

doubt.

Nangcas was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in persons

under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b),
and (d) of R.A. No. 9208, which read:

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any

person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by

any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

xxxx

(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.

Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It
is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group;
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:

(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation,

transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat
or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
 43

prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or

services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for

the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in
persons" even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.

(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is
over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

xxxx

(d) Forced Labor and Slavery - refer to the extraction of work or services
from any person by means of enticement, violence, intimidation or threat,
use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of
authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception.
Under Republic Act No. 10364,[47] the elements of trafficking m persons
have been expanded to include the following acts:

(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,

transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with
or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders;"

(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person."

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution

of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." (emphasis supplied)
The information filed against Nangcas sufficiently alleged the recruitment
and transportation of Judith and three (3) other minor victims for forced
labor or services, with Nangcas taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
young girls through her assurance and promises of good salary, accessibility
 44

of place of work to their respective residences, and weekly dayoff. Pursuant

to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Nangcas was
qualified trafficking, as it was committed in a large scale and three (3) of
her victims were under 18 years of age.

The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution

witnesses who testified during the trial. The testimonies of Judith and three
(3) other minor victims established that Nangcas employed deception and
fraud in gaining both the victims and their parents' trust and confidence.

In the instant case, we concur with the trial court's decision, to wit:

"Deception was apparent in the manner with which accused dealt with
Enerio, Judith and the three other private complainants. Enerio was made
to believe that Judith and company will be working as house helpers at
Camella Homes in Cagayan De Oro City. Through the haze with which the
private complainants were transported from Cagayan de Oro City to
Marawi City, what is clear is that Nangcas has Enerio's number but she
never called him to inform him they were proceeding to Marawi City. Much
worse, she deceived Enerio anew when she told him sometime in the last
week of March 2009 that Judith and her friends were in Camella when she
fully knew they were made to work in Marawi City."[48]
The testimonies of the victims and Enerio gave a clear picture as to how the
victims were deceived by Nangcas into going with her, and how she
orchestrated the entire trip pretending to take them first to Cagayan De Oro
City, then to Iligan, and finally to Marawi City, so as to be sure that the
victims have no other choice but to go to Marawi City and serve as house
helpers. The prosecution has aptly shown that the victims would not have
agreed or would not have been allowed by their parents if Nangcas would
directly offer them work at Marawi City; that she deliberately fabricated a
story to delude her victims and their parents.

All told, the prosecution has adequately proved Nangcas' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense as defined in Section 4 of R.A No. 9208.

Nangkas employed fraud and deception in order to bring the

victims to Marawi City.

Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or

conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which
 45

should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive

another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury;[49]while fraud is every
kind of deception whether in the form of insidious machinations,
manipulations, concealments or misrepresentations, for the purpose of
leading another party into error and thus execute a particular act.[50]

From the factual milieu, it is clear that actual fraud and deception are
present in this case, such as when Nangcas induced and coaxed the victims
to go with her. She promised the victims and their parents that their
daughters would be working within Cagayan De Oro City, with an enticing
salary of P1,500.00 per month.

At the outset, the intent of Nangcas was obvious. She specifically employed
several deceptive tactics to lure the victims and their parents into agreeing
to take the victims, who were mostly minors, and bring them allegedly to
Camella Homes in Cagayan De Oro City, to serve as house helpers. Nangcas
represented to Judith and her parents that Judith would be employed as a
house helper, would be allowed to go home once a week, and would be paid
P1,500.00 monthly. After having convinced Judith and her parents,
Nangcas used Judith to entice some more of her friends to go with her as
house helpers in Cagayan De Oro City. After recruiting Judith and the three
other minor victims, Nangcas immediately boarded them in a jeepney to
Cagayan De Oro City supposedly to bring Judith and her friends to their
employer at Camella Homes.

The record shows that Nangcas' decision to bring the victims to Marawi
City was planned, contrary to her defense that she only took them there
after the supposed employer in Iligan changed her mind to accept them as
her house helpers. It was sufficiently established that in Marawi City,
Nangcas already had Baby and Cairon ready and waiting for her to bring
the recruits to them and collect her fees. Nangcas' failure to notify the
victims' parents of their whereabouts bolsters the allegation that it was
really her intention to conceal the fact that the work was actually in Marawi
City and not in Cagayan de Oro; her acts thus constitute deceit and fraud as
defined by law.

The victims were sold for forced labor, slavery or involuntary

servitude.

Nangcas alleges that the victims were not sold to slavery as they knew that
 46

they would be working as house helpers; as such, there was no slavery or

involuntary servitude. Her argument is completely unfounded.

Slavery is defined as the extraction of work or services from any person by

enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion,
including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy,
debt bondage or deception.[51] In this case, Judith and the three (3) other
minor victims were enticed to work as house helpers after Nangcas had told
them of their supposed salary and where they would be working; only to
discover that they were brought to another place without their consent. In
Marawi, the victims were constrained to work with the intention to save
money for their fare going back home; however, when they asked for their
salary they were told that it had already been given to Nangcas.

Alleged inconsistencies are minor and do not affect the

credibility of the witnesses.

Nangcas still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution

witnesses' testimonies were conflicting and improbable. Such alleged
inconsistencies pertained to the testimonies of Judith and the other minor
victims as to who was employed by whom. These inconsistencies, however,
are of no consequence to the fact that Judith and the three minor victims
were taken by appellant to Marawi City against their will and were made to
work as house helpers without pay. It is evident that the supposed
inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies pertained to minor details
that, in any case, could not negate Nangcas' unlawful activity and violation
of R.A. No. 9208. Moreover, the Court has ruled time and again that factual
findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on
these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the
Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the trial
court and affirmed by the CA.[52]

Given the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse Nangcas'
conviction for qualified trafficking under R.A. No. 9208. The RTC and the
CA correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P2,000,000.00, applying Section 10(c) of R.A. No. 9208, to wit:

Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and

 47

sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:

xxxx

(e) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two
million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 6 March
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01092 for Qualified
Trafficking in Persons is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.