118

Chapter Three

PRELUDE TO T~ REVOLUTION

THE ABORTIVE CANTON REVOLT

In April 1911 the revolutionaries planned another major

uprising aimed at capturing Canton and making it the base for
fanning out in other parts of the country. The uprising just
failed to make the mark but it turned out to be a prelude to the
revolution \tJhiCh broke out only some six months later in Wuch'ang
and which finally succeeded 1n realizing the aim of the revolu-
tionaries of bringing about the end of the dynasty.
After the difficult times of 1908-10, the revolutionaries
braced themselves for further effort with redoubled vigour. The
preparations started in 1910 with the return of Sun Yat-sen from
America. Sun's ship first anchored in Japan in June 1910 but as
he was still disallowed by the Japanese Government to enter that
country, he went on to penang where he also summoned Huang Hsingt
Hu Han-min and Chao Sheng (P'o-hsien) for a conference onthe
next step.
The failure of the New Army revolt 1n Canton in February
1910 had ~ft Sun's comrades rather dissipirited and financially
the party t-1as bankrupt. But Sun comforted them and pointed out
that the revolutionaries now commanded widespread sympathy and
support and that although they were penniless the revolutionary
consciousness of the Overseas Chinese had been greatly enhanced. (1)
..
Tsao Ya-p'o, Wuch'ang Ko-ming chen-shih (Shanghai, 1930)
ch' 1en-pien, 257-8.
 119

Huang Hsing wanted to make another attempt in Yunnan but Sun

advised against it and, instead, suggested Canton for the
projected revolt. (2) Chao Sheng explained that such a revolt 0

would reqUire a sum of s,ooo dollars immediately and another

100,000 dollars later to have a chance of success. Sun wrote
at once to the Party representatives in South-East Asia and asked
them to meet in Penang to devise plans for the raising o.f the
needed finances. (3)
The Party representatives met in secret conclave on 13
November 1910 at Penang and formulated plans for an uprising
at Canton. (4) This was not to be a small affair but a major
effort to shake the Dragon Throne of the Manchus, and all the
resources of the Party were to be mobilized towards that end.
The Neto1 Army (the Lu-chtin) at Canton would be stirred into action
as also the militia of the secret societies. Arter the fall of
Canton Huang Hsing l'Iould lead the troops to Hunan and Hupei,
while Chao Sheng, l'lho wa~ a native of K1angsu and who as a
former student of the K1angnan military school was on familiar
terms with elements of the New Army there, would march towards
Kiangsi and Nanking. Huang Hs1ng would then lead the revolt in
Yunnan where be bad already gathered some experience as well as
contacts. (5) Finances had to be raised on a fairly large scale
and contributions were fixed for various areas of concentration

(2) Liu K'uei-i, Huang Hsing ch'uan-chi, HHKM, IV, 294.

(3) Tsou Lu, Kuang-chou san-vueh er-shih-chiu ko-ming shih
(Shanghai, 1930, third ed. 1948) 3.
(4) nM·
(5) Tsao Ya-p•o, n. 1, 259.
 120

·of Chinese communities. The British and Dutch colonies were

allocated some so,ooo dollars as their contribution, while the
·.figure for Siam and Annam was fixed at 30,000 dollars. The sum
'to be raised from the American continent was lett unspecified.
An estimated s,ooo dollars were collected on-the-spot at the time
of the meeting. (6)
Because of the restrictions placed by various South,..East
Asian countries Sun Yat-sen did not find it convenient to raise
money in those countries and had to retum to America where he
pushed the fund campaign launched by Feng Tzu-yu. The collection
programme of the revolutionaries did not prove to be an easy task
in South-East Asia. While Sun Yat-sen had confidently stated that
the political consciousness of overseas Chinese had been greatly
developed, they were obviously not as liberal with their purses
as with their words. Hu Han-min repaired to Singapore to raise
funds but the response was so poor that he had to write to Teng
Han-j u, an influential Singapore T 'ung-meng-hu1 member, for help.
Together they called a meeting of the merchants on 25 November
which was attended by over 100 people. Hu Han-min explained the
importance of the uprising and said that this time the projected
revolt was a question of life and death for the Han race. One
of the rich merchants, Cb 1 en Liang-fang, gave a
.
thousand dollars
while another three thousand were collected from the others. (7)
With all the efforts of Hu Han-min and Tang Han-j u, the
1 revolutionaries were still so f'ar short of the target that the

(6) Tsou Lu, n. 3, 3-4.

(7) Tsao Ya-p 'o t 262-3•
 121

entire plan was faced with the threat of foundering on the rocks
/of financial difficulties. The money from the Dutch colonies ''~as

still uncertain, while the British colonies had so far given a

meagre 10,000 dollars. Huang Hsing himself arrived i~ Singapore
in the middle of January 1911 and plunged headlong into the task
of raising the reqUired amounts. Another meeting t..ras called,
followed by another impassioned speech by Huang Hsing. T'an Te-
a
tung,Lrich merchant, forked out a thousand dollars as ~Tell as
contributed goods \'rorth 5,000 dollars. Finally, l>Iith heart-
breaking efforts sufficient funds were raised to enable the party
members to go ahead with their plans. The total collection from
the Dutch colonies came to 32,550 dollars; the contributions from
the British colonies and Saigon and Siam amounted to some so,ooo;
t<~hile the handsome figure of 77 ,ooo was promised from America. (8)
Huang Hsing now headed totr~ards Hongkong where along with
Chao Sheng and Hu Han-min plans were finalized for the coming
battle. A chief planning bureau was set up, headed by Huang
Hsing and with Chao Sheng as second-in-command. Duties were
allocated and responsibilities fiXed. Chao Er-p 1 ing, ,,ho himself'
had belonged to the Lu-chUn but had to leave as a result of parti-
cipation in the 1907 Huang-kang uprising, was entrusted ''~ith the
task or mobilizing the New Army at Canton, while Chao Sheng was
.
to provide the Uaison with other provinces. The job of purchase
and supply of arms as well as contact with th.e militia toras left to
· Hu Yi and the drafting of regulation to Cb'en Tung-ming. (9)

(8) I~id., 263.74.

(9) Tsou Lu, 18; Tsao Ya-p•o, 275.
 122

Liu K1 uei-i a close associate of Huang HSing was deputed

to join forces with Ch 1en Ch'i-mei, Sung Chiao-jan, and T'an Jan-
rang in Shanghai. Accordingly T 'an Jen-feng ~ras sent to Hunan
and Hupei where the Party comrades had made considerable headway
in subverting the loyalty of the Netor Army there. (10) Plans were
thus co-ordinated with comrades in the Liang-Hu area as well as
in Chekiang, Klangsi and Anmrei, with headquarters located in
Shanghai, to respond to the revolt in Canton. Meanwhile, the
revolutionaries also organized a vanguard of "dare-to-die 11
comrades who would start the revolt and occupy the city arsenal
and open the city gates for the New Army. The revolutionary troops
.!were to be distinguished by white bands worn across their sleeves,
(and some women revolutionaries were alloted the task of supplying
these white bands. (11)
one of the secret members of the T 'ung-meng-hu1, Tsou
Lu, (12) who was also in the Canton Provincial Assembly was
charged 't-rith the task of carrying on open propaganda, particularly
with a view to influencing and agitating the army circles and
a paper called K'o-pao was started by him in the beginning of
1911 with considerable support from many members of the Provincial
Assembly. (13) The umbrella of protection thus gained made it
.
difficult for the authorities to take immediate action against the

(10) Liu K'uei-i, n. 2, 295.

(11) Ibid., 295-6.
(12) Tsou Lu subsequently became well-known as party
historian.
(13) Tsou Lu, Huang-hua-kang ch 1 1-1 chi, as in HHKM,
IV, 11.
 123

K'o-pag. Tbe paper proved to be very effective in spreading the

seeds of revolution in Canton and in appealing to the military
personnel but was finally suppressed by the officials. (14)
The preparations of the revolutionaries bad proceeded
apace but were continually hampered by fresh difficulties.
Financial difficulties had been largely overcome but difficulties
of securing adequate arms continued to plague their plans.
Purchase of arms was carried on in Japan, Saigon and HOngkong,
besides what the New Army revolutionaries contributed. A separate
department for the supply of arms was created and some women
revolutionaries were put on the job. The risks of getting caught
either in Hongkong or in Canton were great and various ingenuous
methods were devised for the purpose, including one of starting
a hair company and transporting ammunition in small packages
ostensibly containing hair. On more than one occasion the
- authorities were able to discover the ammunition, one as late as
8 April which put them on the alert and made them doubly strict. (15)
Tbe party members also planned to kill Admiral L1 Chun,
the Naval Commander at Canton, before the uprising. Li Chun bad
been responsible for severe repression after the failure of the
1910 New Army revolt and had executed a number of Party members.
A comrade from South~ast Asia, Wen Sheng-ts'ai pledged to kill
8 .
Li and o~April placed himself in a tea-bouse at the Raster.n
Gate opposite the premises of the Provincial Assembly, trom where
Li and other officials were supposed to pass. When th& offiCial

(14) Ibid., 12.

(15) Tsou Lu, n. a, 35-7.
 124

procession came in view, he fired at a palanquin which he thought

was carrying Li, but actually it was the Tartar General Fu-chi
sitting in it. Fu-ch1 died instanteously and Wen was caught and
hanged. (16) This was, however, a serious tactical mistake on
the part of the revolutionaries. Coming close on the heels of the
projected uprising, the incident for~rarned the Viceroy, Chang
M1ng-ch 1 1, and he hastened to augment his military strength in
the city. The original date of 13 April for the revolt had to be
put off and even when the revolt finally took place Manchu
precautionary measure played an important role in frustrating the
plans of the revolutionaries.
As more and more party men gathered in Canton, tension
rose in the city and rumours about the coming revolt became rife.
Huang Hsing himself arrived in Canton on 23 April and decided to
start the uprising on 27 April. The revolutionaries had to act
swiftly, for the authorities had already got scent of their plot
and were taking strict measures to prevent the outbreak of trouble.
The Viceroy, Chang Ming-ch'i, withdrew the rifles of the New Army
and on 25 April called two Defense battalions (the gendarmerie)
into the city, throwing a spanner into the plans of the revolu-
tionaries. (17) There was now vacillation and indecision among
i their ranks. Hu Yi advised putting off the revolt, in face of the
-J
threat of a sure defeat, and even Chao Er-p 'ing and Ch•en Tung-
ming after a while fall in line with Hu Yi. Huang HSing was
extremely reluctant. He remembered the heart-breaking efforts

(16) Tsao ya-p•o, n. 1, 278-9.

(17) Tsou Lu, n. 3, 37-a_.
 125

with which funds bad been raised and the promise of a vast
uprising made to the overseas Chinese at the time. Finally, in
order to redeem his pledge, he decided that although he woul~

allow his men to go back and preserve their arms and ammunition
/for another effort at a more propitious occasion, he himself
i
Iwould stake his life in a single-handed battle with L1 Chun. (18)
Accordingly, Huang Hsing telegraphed Chao Sheng at Hongkong
that there was an epidemic in the city and that he should not
bring the "children". (19) The first to be sent back lrere the
men under Chao Sheng's command with others following them. But
the following day (26 April) Chao Er-p 1 ing brought the report
that a large number of the homeguards brought into the city ~

owed allegiance to their party as well as the news that the

officials intended to swoop down on the revolutionaries and that
orders for general arrests bad already been issued. Huang Hsing
decided to go ahead with the original plan of)tb.e revolt. A
telegram to that effect was sent to Chao Sheng, but the last boat
having lett for Canton, Chao Sheng and his men could no~ enter
Canton in time for Huang's plans. Chao Sheng wired back asking
that the revolt be postponed by a day. Hu Yi received the
message on the afternoon of 27 April and immediately sent word
to Huang Hsing and himself, in view of the Hongkong wire, held
back his men from entering the city as originally agreed upon. (20)

(18) Liu K'uei-i, n. 2, 216.

(19) Ts'ai Chi-ou, gu-chou hsueh-shih (Shanghai, 1958)
43.
(20) Tsou Lu, n. 3, 37-8.
 126

Huang Hsing, however, refused to change his plan, and

with about a hundred men, marched towards the Viceroy's yamen,
)- thus starting the Canton revolt. But the revolt could not have
been started under worse conditions. A large number of party
members had already been sent back to Hongkong an~ the revolu-
tionary forces had been greviously depleted. The co-ordination
of plans with the New Army sUpporters also failed at this stage
with the consequence that only a small part of the revolutionary
forces still available at Canton took part in the revolt when
it did come: even Hu Yi and his men did not move out as originall.l'
planned because of the telegram from Chao Sheng. This fre·quent
changing of dates played havoc with the plans and created immense
confusion. The revolt was obviously off to a bad start.
Huang Hsing accompanied by Chu Chih-hsin and a hundred
comrades attacked the Viceroyfls yamen, but tha Viceroy, forewarned,
had already escaped. After some fi~hting the yamen was captured
and Huang then led his men outside the palisade gates. They
rrrere met by more Ch'ing troops and severe fighting broke out 1n
which Huang himself was hurt, losing two or his fingers. (21)
In order to break the encirclement, Huang divided his men into
three directions, and himself "rith a group of men proceeded
towards the Ta-nan-men (Great Southern Gate). It was at this
time that Huang Hsing made a fatal mistake of judgement; indeed
1 t ltras more a tragedy of error than anything else. Huang and
his men suddenly confronted the homeguards. These troops were
really their own men but in order to avoid Government suspicion;
 127

they \'Jere not wearing white arm-bands. Huang Hsing and his
comrades took them to be enemy troops and started shooting at
them. (22) This battle between the two groups, in fact belonging
to the same cause, was naturally a costly mistake. \•11 th their
strength thus dispersed, there was little possibility of the
revolutionaries being able to vanquish the superior strength of
the enemy.
One further important reason that contributed to the defeat
of Huang Hsing was trepidation on the part of the New Army
comrades to respond to the revolt. When Huang Hsing led his men
to the Southern gate, if the army revolutionaries had entered
the city through the small northern gate and joined the revolt,
it was still not outside the range of possibility to capture the
city. But the New Army failed at this crucial moment. Chao Er.-
P 'ing, llho was responsible for this failure, gave the excuse that
the army had rifles but no bullets. This ,ras, however, not quite
true because the women revolutionaries on the job had already
supplied him '"ith some a,ooo bullets. (23) In all probability
he became afraid of the strength of the Imperial troops in the
city and had lost hope in the successful outcome of the revolt.
He did not want to make futile and "maimed" sacrifice.
The revolt failed and seventy-two known comrades of ltuang
Hsing lost their lives in the fighting. Huang HSing managed to
escape, with two fingers less, and arrived in Hongkong on 30 April.

(22) lh!S•t 298.

(23) Tsou Lu, n. a, 66•.
 128

The impact of the Canton uprising uas not the same on

those who participated and those party members who were elsewhere.
Many of those who participated lost heart. Chao Sheng, almo~t

eaten away by the regret that he could not reach Canton for the
uprising, became mentally deranged and shortly afterwards died
at Hongkong. Huang Hsing, weighed down by a sense of remorse
that his mistakes had cost a number of lives as well as by the
defeat, became extremely disheartened. (24) · He was put out of
action until stirred once again by the success or the Wuhan
revolt in October. Else~There, however, the valour of the
revolutionaries at Canton inspired and enthused the party
comrades (25) and the memory of the "seventy-ttoTO martyrs 11 became
enshrined. in revolutionary literature. The thread was taken up
by the Hupei and Hunan revolutionaries and the Canton revolt
( proved to be the precursor of the revolution that follo\-red.

THE SZECHUAN RAIIliAY CRISIS

The Manchu government suppressed the Canton revolt only

to get into worse straits over the question of nationalization
of railways. The right of building railroads under Emperor
Kuang-hsu's rule had been, after considerable agitation, granted
to private provincial interests, and the merchants and the

(24) Ts'ai Chi-ou, n. 19, 49.

(25) Tsou Lu, Chung-kuq kuo-min-tang· shih-kaq 4(Shanghai,
1948) 79..
 129

gentry had organized rail,ray companies in Szechuan, Hunan, Hupei

and Kwangtung. Large sums bad been collected with a not incon-
siderable effort, including special levies on the people, although
the progress in the actual building of the railroads was painfully
slow. But, all the same, large sections of the people had come
to have a stake in the matter and consequently any decision with
regard to the rail,orays was of vital importance to them. /
1>n 9 May 1911 an Imperial decree was ·issued in Peking
rnationallzing the trunk Unes all over the country, thus with-
: I
.\
'~raw1ng the right of their construction from the provincial
,I
~erchant-gentry classes. (26) This was "the spark that set the
I

prairie on fire" and a wave of protest swept the country -- in

Szechuan, Hunan, Hupei, Kwangtung which were directly affected
as well as in other parts of the country. There was indignation
all over the country but the storm broke out in Szechuan and
since this became one of the immediate causes of the revolution;.
the discussion here is limited to the events in Szechuan./
The background to the nationalization decree was proVided
by the Imperial decree of 4 May which revealed that the Government
had contracted loans from foreign sources, one million potmds
sterling from the Quadruple Syndicate of Banks of England,
France, America and Germany end one million Japanese dollars
from the Yokohama Bank, for the unification of the currency.- (27)

(26) Text in P 1 eng Fen, H@in-hai sun-ch 1 1ng cheng-pien

fa-wan eM. (1933) as in HHKM, IV, 339-40, hereafter referred to
as P • eng Fen.
(27) ~. ' 339.·
 130

The decree stated that because the currency was not unified,
the people were put to great hardship and industry could not
prosper. Hence the loans to establish one currency for the .
lrhole country. On 9 May the decree of nationalization of railt-Tays
was issued and on 20 l<1ay, Sheng Hsuan-huai, Chairman of the Board
of Communications, formalized arrangement for a loan of 6 million
pounds from the Quadruple Syndicate for railway~ development. (28)
The tl-ro loans toJere thus inter-connected and the first one became
available because of agreement on the second deal.
The decree of nationaUzation spoke of the importance of
railways to the development and security of the whole country,
of the slow progress in the provinces of railroad bUilding, and
the sufferings of the people in this process of railway
construction by provincial interests. (29) On 18 May Tuan-fang
was appointed Director-General of the Canton-Hankow and the
Szechuan-Hankow railways. (30)
The news of railway nationalization was received with
\
great consternation in Szechuan and an emergency meeting of the
shareholders in Ch'engtu t-ras called at the office of the
Szechuan-Hankow Railway Company. The intentions of the Imperial
House concerning repayment of the money already invested in the
railway enterprise were still unknown and so, according to ·
Chao Shan-p'ei, the then Provincial Commissioner for Industries

(28) San-yu shu-shih chu-jen (edit.), Ssu-ch•uan bsueh

(1911), as in HHKM, IV, 393, hereafter referred to as Ssu-ch'uan
hsueh.
(29) P'eng Fen.~ n. 26, 339-40.
(30) Ssu-ch 1 uan hsueh, n. 28, 391..
 131

and subsequently the Provincial Commissioner f'or Justice at

Ch 1engtu, opinion was divided into two groups, one which was
totally opposed to nationalization and the other which was .
willing to reconcile itself to the government decision provided
they could recover their money already ploughed in. (31)
Various T 1 ung-ch1h-hui units (Comrades• Association) sprang up
in different places but as there was still no unanimity these
associations were mostly for studying the issue -- it was only
later that these became a militant organization for the struggle
of' recovery of railways rights and assumed the name of Pao-lu-
t1ung-ch1h-hu1 (Comrades• Association for the Protection of
Railways). (32) The province was being ruled at the time by
Wang Jen-wen, acting Governor-General, who was not unsympathetic
to the local populace on the issue. (33)
According to Kuo Mo-jo, the 't>7ell-lmown leftist scholar-
politician, who has recorded his observations as a yotmg lad in
Ch'engtu at the time, to Lun (34) declared at the meeting of
the shareholders that the life and property of the Szechuanese
people had been sold by Shang Hsuan-huai to foreigners. "We
shall oppose the traitor Sheng Hsuan-huai", he cried in a voice
charged with emotion. At this he broke down and along with him
all those present there wept. He also indicated that they·
wanted to establish a provisional organization to contact the

(31) Chao Shan-p'ei, Hsin-hai ssu-ch•uan cheng-lu ch'in-11

s!l1 (Chungking, 1957) 7.
(32) ..n!Ji. t 9.
(33) See Wang Jan-wen's memorial in HHKM, IV, 415• .
(34) w Lun, also called Wei Lun, was Vice-Chairman of
the Provincial Assembly.
 132

people in Szechuan and their compatriots in other provinces to

oppose Peking's decision of nationalization. (35) This organi-
zation came to be known as Pao-lu-t'ung-ehih-hui.
Chao Shan-pe'i, however, has claimed that it 't.ras Tuan-
fang's telegram, a week later, revealing the government's
intention not to fully reimburse the shareholders all the money
actually invested in the railway enterprise that united the two
groups in opposition to the government's railway policy, (36)
.~An official decree accepting the memorial of the Board of
Communications regarding the methods of payment for taking over
the railways was issued on the 19th of May. In the case of
the K'wangtung railway shares, the government decided to p8J'
60 per cent of their original value and to issue government bonds
without interest for the remaining 40 per cent. On the completion
of the rail't.ray and 't'rhen it had begun to pay, the bondholders
't-rould be allowed to recover the remaining sum in ten annual
instalments. The Hunan railway shares subscribed by merchants
were to be paid in their full value. But in the case of Szechuan,
the government proposed to make good only the sums actually
spent on railroad construction, which was a good deal less than
the subscribed capital,.. :part of which had been lost through
investment in a Shanghai bank 't·Thich failed (for which the
government was partly responsible), so that the actual position

(35) Kuo Mo-ju 9 Fan-Ch'ing ch'ien-huo, as in HHK14, IV.,

450-1.
(36) Chao Shan-p'ei, n. 31, 9.
 133

was that the government would pay only a little over half the
sum actually subscribed. (37).
This decision of the Manchu court was a blunder of the.
first magnitude. It stirred many people in Szechuan as nothing
else could have. They had collected the money with great
sacrifices but 111ere now faced with the prospect of losing a
large sum. There had been inefficiency and even some corruption
in the management of the railway affairs (38) (although it hardly
lay in the mouth of the Peking officials to make an issue of it),
but the money had been collected with very considerable effort,
including special levies on the common people, and could not
therefore, be lightly written ott. The government's decision
ranged against the authorities even those classes who 'f!Tould
normally have been their supporters -- the gentry and the
merchants. It was the economic pinch which turned the tables on
the Manchu Government and the economic struggle got aubmerged
in a political battle against the ruling dynasty.
The same day that the government announced its decision
against full compensation in Szechuan, the same day the people
formally organized the Pao-lu-t•ung-ehih-bpl (generally referred
to as the Railway League) to oppose the foreign loans and the
agreement with foreign banks with regard to nationalization -of
the trunk lines. (39) The c barter of the League declared that
it gathered together "all friends" with the aim of opposing

for
(37) Ssu-ch•uan hsueh, n. 28, 392-3;Lgovernment
responsibility in the loss of money through bank failure see n.53.
(38) See, for instance, the Imperial decree of 22 Maf•
Ibid., 391.
(39) Chao Shan-p •e1, 11.
foreign loans and the agreement with foreign banks regarding
nationalization of trunk lines. The organization was not
limited to the Szeehuanese: all those who were sympathetic t?
the cause could become members by registering their names.
Every ten members elected a council (p'ing-i yuan) and every
five councillors a group leader. The councillors belonging to
Szechuan were to be elected district-wise, t-Ihereas those from
outside were to be elected according to the number of members
regardless of their native places. The League located its
office in the Company's office and also established a propaganda
department to agitate other areas. All decisions of the League
were binding on the members. (40) Representatives were sent
to Kwangtun, Hupei, Hunan, Shanghai and other places to solicit
support and put up a united front for the recovery of railway
rights. (41) The Szechuanese in Peking were no less active.
They held meetings, mobilized the student class, and sent
petitions to the Court for withdrat·ral of the ordinance. (42)
The movement for "rights recovery'•, as it was called, had begun
and so bad the process of the abdication of the Ch'ing dynasty.
It has been claimed by some observers of Chinese
developments that the struggle in Szechuan was in essence a
struggle between the rights of the centre and those of the •

(40) Ssu-ch'uan hsueh, 403-5.

(41) pteng Fen, n. 26, 332.
(42) See also the Imperial decree of 11 September on
their activities. Ku-kung tang-an kuan (Imperial archives),
as in HHKM, IV, 471, hereafter referred to as Ku-kung tang-an
kuan.
 135

provinces, between central authority and provincial autonomy. (43)

The provincial bodies and their leaders were jealous and suspicious
of the encroaching power of Peking and 't-Iere only fighting for.
.·~.their narro'tot provincial interests -- to keep intact their power
I
\against attempts at curtailment by the Imperial Court. This view,
however, accounts only for one facet of the struggle and overlooks
the complicated nature of the issue. There 't>Tas friction between
the authorities and the Szechuan Provincial Assembly over financial
control, and there were also frequent complaints by the Assembly
against district officials about graft and illegal torture. (44)
Above all, the question of nationalization of railways was inter-
linked with Court politics at Peking. The corruption and greed

1
of the Manchu nobility was well-known and rwnours were current
'that they received brokerage for getting foreign loans. (45)
The demands of Prince Ch 1 ing (I-k'uan) for money were endless
and all the provincial assemblies were indignant and wanted to
curb his evil influence. (46)
The Imperial relatives were jockeying for political power
and there was conflict between Tsai-feng, the Regent, and
I·k'uan, the Premier -- the Imperial decree of nationalization
did not have the signatures of the Premier. (47) Sheng Hsuan,.
huai, the Chairman of the Board of Com:nunications, 'tfho consllmmated

(43) P.H. Kent, The Passing of the Manchus (London, 1912)

59.
(44) Parliament, House of Commons Sessional Papers 1 Cd.~.
6148, China No. I, 1912, Correspondence Respecting the Affairs
of China ·(London, 1912) a.
(45) P'eng Fen, n. 26, 332.
(46) China No, I, 1912, n. 44, a.
(47) P'eng Fen, 332.
 136

the railway deal, was himself not exactly known for integrity
and honesty. (48) The belief was widespread that the government
was bartering away vital national interests for the sake of
money and that the railways were being "surrendered" to foreigners
in order to satisfy the private ends of the Court nobility. It
tttas this aspect, reinforced by government decision not to make
full payment to the shareholders in Szechuan, t.Yhich disturbed
and agitated large sections of the populace.
A memorial of the Hopei Provincial Assembly members, for
instance, asserted that building railways with foreign loans
would result in great harm and that even before the lines t·Tere
built, money in the form of capital and interest would start
going out. It pointed out that the elementary condition for a
borrowing country was that it must have the ability to use the
money.. Already the foreign loans amounted to more than one
billion taels. Even if the entire income of the Peking Govern-
ment for ten years was solely used for this purpose, it was still
insufficient to return the full amount. The people, the memorial
said, were already impoverished and t.rere carrying on a heavy
burden. If more loans were taken, how would they be returned?
The memorial was also very critical of the complete absence of
any plans for utilizing the borrowed money for the avowed pQrpose
of unifying the currency, developing industries and building
railways, and suggested that 11 1f the government t<Tere really
genuinely serious about using the money for these purposes 1 tis y
~1ould already have had blueprints for development in these fields."

(48) Kent, n. 43, so.

 137

The memorial asked for a spacial meeting of the Tzu-chang:..yuan

(National Assembly) for considering the whole issue. (49)
The constitutional propriety of Peking's action l!ras a+so
an important issue. In concluding the loans agreements, the
Court had bypassed the Tzu-chang-yuan despite a previous
assurance by the Regent that the National Assembly would be
consulted on all such matters. This could not but arouse the
deepest suspicions of the people. A government which claimed to
be preparing for a constitutional system but which failed to
consult the National Assembly on such an important issue could
hardly be taken for its l..rord. A general demand arose that the
Tzu-chang-yuan be called into session and the issue be submitted
to it for deliberation. (50)
The Board of Directors of the Szechuan Railway Company,
the shareholders and the leaders of public opinion - the gentey
and the merchants - had decided to fight out the issue and not
to submit to the taking over of the Company's assets by govarn.-
ment officials. The Board of Directors appealed to the Governo~

General to suspend the taking-over until a meeting of the share-

holders which had been called for the 8th of September because
it was "a matter of' life and death for the people of Szechuan"•
They said that the Ch•engtu shareholders had met earlier and the
general opinion was that there was no need for nationalization
which would only lead to foreign ownership of the ra11"1ays. (51)

(49) P'eng Pen, 340-4.

(50) See, for instance, • 142.
(51) Text of this communication in pteng Fen, 345.
 138

In another petition the Board or Directors made a ·spirited

reply to the Court's charges or corruption and inefficiency.
They said that in about a dozen years capital to the tune or.
over one million dollars (Chinese) had been collected. The
people had undertaken a heavy burden so that foreign loans did
not have to be taken and in order to let the foreigners know not
to look down upon the strength of the Chinese people. Work,
the Board said, had already started on the railway and interest
was paid on the capital. Regarding corruption, the petition
explained that the Shanghai bank in which money had been invested,
closed down unexpectedly, and that both Chinese and foreign
money had been invested in that bank. It asserted that the
accounts of the Company had twice been examined and checked by
the inspectors elected by a general meeting of the shareholders
'
and that they had also been sent to the Ministry of CommLmications
and the Governor-General's office. The shares, it was claimed,
were sold and the money collected by an e.A.ected committee of
the local gentry in each district and the Company did not
directly receive the money. Finally the petition forceful~y

asserted that in that period of constitutional preparations,

the Manchu court could not just issue an order and ignore public
opinion. (52)
The attitude or the Court t-ras particularly resented
because it was generally held that the Government, as represented
by the Shanghai Taotai and Ta Ch'ing Bank, were mainly responsible

(52) Ibid., 346-9.

 139

for the loss of Szechuan capital in the Shanghai rubber slump of

1910. (53) The people, it was felt, \oJere being made to pay for
the blunders of the Government.
In the meantime Chao Er-feng, younger brother of Chao ·
Er-sun, the influential Viceroy of Manchuria, had been appointed
as Governor-General in place of Wang Jen-l'ten. Chao Er-feng like
his predecessor was m'lare of the depth of feeling aroused by the
court 1 s action and t<Tas apprehensive of the situation. He played
soft and careful and expressed sympathy with the cause of the
Szechuan people. He met frequentlY the leaders of vocal opinion
in the capital -- P'u Tien-i, Chai~an of the Provincial Assembly,
Lo tun, Vice-chairman of the Assembly, Tseng P'ei, Director of
the Railway Company, and others. On the other hand Tuan-fang,
who was a rival to Chao Er-feng and who desired to step into
his shoes, advocated strong measure to put dotiD the railway
movement in Szechuan and used the opportunity to impeach Chao.
Er-feng for inept handling of the situation. (54)
It was Tuan-fang (Director-General of the Szechuan~

Hankow and Canton-Hankow railt~Tays), again, t-rhose telegram

announcing the appointment of L1 Chi-hsun (who had earlier been
removed by the Company's headquarters as Manager at I-ch 1 ang
for disobedience of the directives of the Company) as the General
.
l·tanager of the I-ch'ang Railway Company, brought about a grave
turn in the situation. (55) The telegram arrived on 23 August
and the reaction was quick and immediate -- a general strike in

(53) China No. I, 1912, 6.

(54) P 1 eng Fen, n. 26, 333.
(55) Chao Shan-p'ei, n. 31, 23.
 140

Cb•engta. The shops t'lere closed; the students struck from

schools; and the normal functioning of the city was brought to a
complete standstill. This was the beginning of a prolonged
strike to~hich paralysed life in the province. The traders closed
business; the students jumped into the fray; the bandits ware
soon to get active everywhere; and even the peasantry did not·
remain unaffected by the "rights recoverY' movement. The battle
had bean joined and it was a mere question of time when the storm
would break.
Chao Er-feng was worried over the situation. Opinion in
the Governor-General's entourage "t-Tas divided, with some in favour
of strong measures to suppress the railway movement and some
inclined toward a policy of conciliation in order to maintain
law and order in the province. l-Uang, the Provincial
Treasurer, was impatient and spoiling for a show-down, t·rhile.,
according to his otm statement, Chao Shan-p'ei was opposed to
strong arm measures. (56) Chao Er-feng was duly alarmed and
reported to the Court about the strike situation and complete
suspension of work in the capital, as also about the proposal
of the striking people for non-payment of taxes. He also reported
that a special meeting of the general body of shareholders had
rejected the Board of Communication's decision on nationalization
as illegal and had declared that no foreign loans could be taken
without a decision of the Tzu-cheng-yuan and that the rights of
the province could not be abolished without a consideration by
the Provincial Assembly. (57) In consert l-71th the Manchu

(56) .xw.' 24-8, 31-2.

(57) Text in P tteng Fen, 353•
 141.

Commander Yii-k•un and his Commissioners he sent memorials ·to the

Throne recommending acceptance of the suggestion to refer the
issue to Tzu-cheng-yuan in order to buy time and save the
situation. (58)
Chao Shan-p 1 ei has claimed that the Governor-General gave
evidence of being sympathetic to the local people and desirous
of a pacific solution to the problem. (59) Whatever Chao Br-
feng's personal inclinations, it is apparent from a perusal of
his memorials to the Throne that what really made him hold his
hand was his doubts about the loyalty of the army in Szechuan.
He reported th1$'to the Court as well as to his brother Chao Er-
sun whose intercession he sought in the matter. In a telegram
to Na.tung, Vice-Premier, three days after the general strike
he said that in order to suppress the people he could only use
the troops but that the army was neither sufficient in number,
nor its loyalty absolutely certain. They all belonged to the
province, he said, and often "shed tears" for the difficulties
of their fello1rr-provincial people. The railway affair had gone
to the hearts of the people and they moved about with the tablets
of the ~ate Emperor and thus made it impossible for the palan-
quins to move on. There were many "bandits" in the province,
he said, who wanted to borrow the axcuse of the railway affaii.r
to create trouble. He indicated his um<Tilllngness to use force
because there had been no violent trouble till then, and he was

(58) Chao Shan-p'ei, 26-7.

(59) Ibid., 25-6.
 142

afraid lest the people should get mora agitated as a resu1t of

use of force. (60)
In another telegram the next day (27 August) to Premi~r

I-k 1 wm he .reported that the common people were saying that the
country's sovereignty had been lost and that foreign control
of railways spelt disaster for the future. They suggested that
in accordance with the wishes of the people the Szechuan
railway should be temporarily returned to the merchants and the
question of foreign loans be referred to the Tzu-cheng-yuan.
He strongly appealed to the government to bring about a "tum
in tte situation" in order to avert the crisis. He wat"ne4
that the situation was dangerous and that the troop strength
was inadequate, while troop loyalty l>ras not dependable •.(61)
Chao Er-sun came to the support of his brother and 1n a
telegram to Na-tung on 29 August echoed Chao Er-feng's opinion
that in view of the tmrellab111ty of the army and the police
there t-ras no alternative to "changing the direction of policy'•
Forceful suppression, he said, could not be resorted to, for
it t-rould be like "putting out the fire with more fuel". (62)
Chao Er-feng followed these with further appeals to the Cabinet
to modify the earlier policy and revealed that the British
Consul had sent him a letter suggesting that tbe money inve~ed

1n Szechuan be returned to the Company and the Szechuan railway

(60) K9=kup.g tang-an kuan, n. 42, 457.

( 61) lJU.g. t 458.
(62) Ibid., 469,
 143

line be declared a branch line, thus allowing the merchants to

build it. (63)
At this stage another unexpected turn in the s1 tuatio~
took place. There appeared in the capital city posters containing
· the so-called pledge of the Szechuan people for self-protection
(Ch'uan-jen tzu-pao shang-ch'ueh shu). It began with the state-
ment that the 'Manchu govemment had already agreed to hand over.-
to the foreigners all the important naval ports, trade ports,
mines, customs, shipping, post and communications, etc. There
was a secret agreement among the foreign powers for the division
of China. The government's answer to this situation was, it was
alleged, openly taking bribes and selllng the country. Szechuan
toras a rich and fertile province and there was nothing that it
did not produce, but now the government was robbing the people
of their money and giving it to the foreigner. All the people
in the province, it was claimed, were enraged and with one heart
were attempting to save themselves. It suggested the speeding
up of manufacture of arms, the mining of coal and iron, develop-
ment of railways and industrial enterprises and education, and
blocking those officials who wanted to sell the country, as
essential measures for self-protection by the people ot
Szechuan. (64)
Simultaneously, Chao Er-feng decided to embark upon a
I policy or violent suppression or the movement. Whether it was
the appearance of this poster, which he regarded as an attempt
to declare Szechuan independent, or it was the impeachment by

(63) llli·' 460.

(64) pang Fen, 356-9; also see Chao Shan-p 1 ei,. 30-1•
 144

Tuan-rang (a shot in the struggle for power) which goaded him

on, or whether it was in response to the previous instructions
of the Court, or, still again, whether it was l-Uang who iu!-d
successfully worked upon him, Chao Er-feng took recourse to a
policy which he had himself earlier discarded as impracticable
and umt~ise. (65) On the seventh of September some of the
leading gentry-merchant class representatives - those who totere
also in the forefront of ·the railway struggle -- were lured into
the Viceroy's office, on pretext of receipt of a telegram from
Peking meant for their perusal, and were arrested. (66) As the
na\-rs of the arrests spread in the town, thousands gathered at
the gates of the Governor-General's office to entreat for the
release of the arrested leaders among whom were ptu Tien-i,
to Lun, Ch'ang tan, Jan-chi, Teng Hsiao-ho and others. On
orders of Chao Er-reng the crowds were fired upon and a number
of people died. More came and were similarly fired upon. By

the evening some thirty ttvo people tt~ere reportedly killed. (:67)
This was the signal of the general revolt that now followed.
People gathered from other counties and clashed with the troops
'fiThich had been called out and innumerable persons were killed.

(65) According to Chao Shan-p'ei, on the appearance df

the self-protection posters, I-liang immediately called a
conference of senior officials and pressed for suppression
of the dissidents and was thoroughly annoyed when the Lu-chiin
commander in the city expressed the opinion that the soldiers
could not be relied upon for execution of the policy of force.
Chao Shan-p 1 e1, 31-2.
(66) Ibid., 33.
(67) pteng Fen, 336.
 145

The revolt had spread to the entire province. The fury df the
Szechuanese once provoked knew no bounds and the ensuing conflict
ended only with the and of the Manchu rule in Szechuan.
In reporting the developments to Peking, Chao Er-feng
alleged that the distribution of the pamphlet on self-protection
to1as a move to declare independence and that the 8th or September
had been fixed as the date for an Uprising and that on the 7th
thousands of people violently attacked the Viceroy's office,
indulged in arson, and killed soldiers. By arresting the
leaders and calling out the troops to suppress the rebels, he
claimed that he had foiled the plans of the rebels. (68) He
also appealed for more troop help from Hupei - which was
sanctioned immediately by the Throne, Chao Er-feng's story was,
of course, in the traditional Chinese official style, for, as
it was, the people who gathered before his yamen were unarmed
and were only bearing the tablets of the late Emperor Kuang-
hsii. (69)
Contrary to the general impression, which was even shared
by the British Consul in ChuBking, it was not the Peking Court
\<Thich wanted at this stage to execute the teague leaders and
pursue the course of violent suppression. (70) The Court had
originally advised Chao Br-feng on this course but bad now.
decided to leave room for a compromise, It was Chao Er-feng

( 68) Ku-kung tang-an k,uan, n. 42, 462-3.

(69) That the crowd at the Viceroy's yamen was non-
violent was admitted later by Tuan-fang in a report to Peking
after his investigations in Szechuan. See }{u-kung tang-an k9an,
498-9.
(70) China No, I, 1912, n. 44, 7, 9.
 1450..

who not-7 wanted to kill the arrested leaders and thus terrorise
the people into submission and pacification. But he was
unexpectedly thwarted by the Manchu Commander in the city:.
Since the arrested people belonged to the gentry class, the
latter was not willing to assume responsibility for killing
them without the sanction of the Court, and so refused to permit
their execution unless there was a decree from Peking. (71)
Chao Shan-p 1 ei in his account of the events is completely silent
over this issue although P 1 eng Fen, Chairman of the Board or
Directors of the Szechuan Railway Company, has stated in his
account that the Governor-General's officials were divided over
the issue. While I-llang and another offiCial were 1n favour,
Chao Shan-p •ei was neutral, and Yii, the General, and three other
officials were opposed to sanctioning it. (72) There was no
doubt that Chao Er-feng once having taken the leap beyond the
unknown did not t'1ant to look back but wanted to go the t-rhole hog.
He appealed to the Court to permit him to kill the arrested
leaders, but was frustrated by instruction from the Government
not to kill them, and bitterly protested against it on the plea
that if they were not killed, the cause of future calamity would
remain and that unless those "wicked beasts" t..rere caught and
killed, ~how could he race the Court"? (73)

(71) preng Fen, 336.

(72) Ibig.
(73) Chao El"-feng reported this exchange or telegrams to
his younger brother Chao Er-ts 1 uioKu-kung tang-an kuan, n. 42,
485.
 146

The situation in the province became grave. "Tens of

1 thousands of revolutionaries" gathered outside the city and the
troops from the city battled with them. (74) There were many
casualties, but more people kept coming. The city was under a
state of siege and the telegraph lines were cut. Official
messages had to be sent on horseback to be relayed from other
telegraph stations. There were disturbances in various places
in the province. (75) Since the city was cut off, many rumours
became current including the one that many officials, including
the Manchu Commander, had been killed. Chao Er-feng himself,
although laying the blame on the arrested leaders as the master-
minds behind the trouble, admitted that the whole province was
united. "Women and children shed tears" and although he gave
them "explanations" again and again, it was of no avail. (76)
The Court was by now frightened. Tuan-fang was asked to
hasten bis arrival l>Tith the troops in Szechuan and to report on
the situation. On the 15th of September the Throne asked Ts •·en
Ch'un-hsuan, former Governor-General of KWangtung and Kwangsi
and a native of Szechuan, to go to Szechuan and along with Chao
Er-feng deal with the situation by a double-pronged policy of
suppression and appeasement. (77) This indeed was the beginning
.
of a course of retreat on the railway affair that the Court had
adopted.

(74) See, for instance, the report of1he Customs Taotai

of Chungking, lJ2lA•, 475-6.
(75) Chao Shan-p'ei, n.31, 38; also see Ku-kung tang-an
kuan, 475.
(76) See Chao Er-feng's letter to his brother Chao Er-sun,
Ku-kung tang-an kuan, 484.
~ (77) Ibid., 478-9.
 147

Ts 1en Ch • un-bs uan had no intention of s bowing undue

alacrity in reaching Szechuan. He realized the gravity of the
situation and knew that the minimum condition for restoring
normalcy was to return in full the money of the shareholders.
Ts 1 en sent a mollifying message to the people of Szechuan (78)
and at the same time urged the Court to pay back in full all the
shares taken over in order to pacify the situation. (79) Indeed,
it is doubtful if even this would have calmed the various groups
now fully aroused into action against the government. Ts •en
was delaying arrival in Szechuan by complaining of illness and
by 30 September he had as yet reached only Wuch'ang. The
Governor-General of Hunan ~nd Hupei, Jui-cheng, who was also
an advocate of strong measures to suppress the revolt, reported
to the Throne that he had met Ts •en t-lho was still adamantly of
the view that the arrested leaders should not be killed and that
the money of the shareholders must be fully paid back. He also
revealed that Ts'en would not go to Szechuan unless his demands
were met. Jui-cheng advised the Court not to send Ts'en to
Szechuan because if he went with such a decree, it would heighten
the pride of the Szecbuanese and the trouble would spread to
other provinces. (80)
Ts•en Ch'un-bsuan's appointment as a virtual super-Viceroy
of Szechuan touched off a triangular struggle for power. Neither

(78) Chao Shan-p tei, 39.

(79) See Ts•en Ch'un-hsuan•s telegram of 29 September to
the Board of Communications referring to his earlier communications
on the subject. Ku-kung tang-an kuan, 495-6.
(80) Ibid., 496•
 148

Tuan-fang nor Chao Er-feng could conceal their bitterness· at the

impending arrival of this new rival and both sought to keep him
out, Tuan-fang expressed his keen sense of displeasure in a
telegram to Tsai-tse, who headed the Board of Finance, wondering
what use it l..ras to send Ts •en to Szechuan., for the latter• s
ambition was not confined to Governor-Generalship of Szechuani
he wanted to become Prime Minister, according to Tuan-fang.-
Moreover Ts•ents speeches, Tuan-fang alleged, could only be
welcomed by the public and the press but it had lett the Court
with no legs to stand on, (81)
Chao Er-feng was no less upset and annoyed, He likened
this to a case of three kings for one country. (82) He also
complained to his more powerful brother who in turn again tried
to intercede with Vice-Premier Na-tung. He complained that
since all the troops sent from other places and the New and the
Old army in Szechuan would be under Ts 1 en•s command, Chao Er-
feng would be completely isolated and would have no powers.
Chao Er-sun pleaded with Na-tung that there was no need now to
send Ts'en to Szechuan as Chao Er-reng had the situation under
control, and as, moreover, Tuan-fang had also reached and had
been "welcomed" by the people 1 (83)
The Court had, however, little will left to w1thstan4
the united onslaught of not only the people of Szechuan but
also those of Hunan, Hupei, and Kwangtung. The railway policy

(81) Ibid,, 490.

(82) Ibid, , 485.•
(83) Ibid,, 491-2.
 149

had proved to be an utter failure and bad led from contusion to

chaos and from trouble to calamity. That the Court had decided
to retreat was abundantly·clear from the memorials of Ts'en
Ch' un-hsuan an8: Tuan-fang. Ts ran urged the Board of Communica-
tions to hasten 't~Tith the t<Torking out of details in Una t'11th the
Throne's intention of making concessions. (84) Tuan-fang 1n a
telegram to Tsa1-tse also touched upon the Court's decision to
ma~e peace t..rith the agitated people of Szechuan. Regarding "the
change of line" adoit ed by Peking, he said, he would first explain
to the gentry and the merchants the policy or nationaUzation
and foreign loans and see their reactions, and only then would he
tell them about the "concessions" regarding returning the
11
railways to the merchants. Otherwise, if l'Je disclosed it now",
Tuan-fang said, "and returned the money, they would raise other
demands." (85)
This, however, was again a case of being too late with
the "concessions". The revolution in Wuch•ang broke out at this
stage and the railway revolt in Szechuan got merged into the
broader revolution against the dynasty. The Manchus had committed
blunder after blunder in the railway affair and had only succeeded
in knocking out their own props from underneath and alienating
nearly all sections of the population -- in any case the gentry
and the merchant class was neutralized -- with disastrous results
for the dynasty. The railway movement gave ample scope to the

(84) Ibid., 495-6.

(85) ~., 490.
 150

· revolutionaries to spread their propaganda and influence ·among

wide sections of the population and an opportunity to successfully
launch a revolt against the Manchu Throne. Significantly, hQw-
I
'.ever, it was not the T'ung-meng-hui which started or even led
!
~his movement which was the first mass-scale action on the main-
\

land against the Chting dynasty sinc.e 1900. It highlights both

l
the limitations of the revolutionaries and the fact that China
/:
\vas ripe for revolution.

CRISIS IN THE WUHAN AREA

The railway crisis in Szechuan led to a crisis in Hupei

also. The relationship between Hupei and Szechuan which were
connected by the Yangtse trade had been a close one and events
in one province produced a po\..rerful reaction on the other one
also. While the rail\~Tay policy of the Court left a deep impact
on all parts of the country, the struggle in Szechuan provoked
particularly strong reactions in Hupei. It created widespread
revulsion against the Manchu government, and people were agitated
everywhere. The "social groups" of Hupei sent three gentry
representatives, Liu Hsin-yuan, Mi Ch'ang-wei, and Chang P'o-Ueh
to Peking to plead liT1th the Board of Communications for the ·
11Tithdra\~Tal of the railway poUcy. The three representatives
fasted before the office of the Board of Communications for three
days and nights but the Board would not budge from its policy. (86)

(86) Yang Yii-j u, Hsin-hai ko-ming hsien-chu chi (Peking,

1958) 4~
 151

/
I •
The revolutionaries in Hupei were not Slo't-1 to profit by
this situation and it provided them with an opportunity to break
new ground and win over new converts. They spread their
propaganda everywhere and enlarged upon the connection between
railway rights and national economy and defence which could not
be handed over on a platter to the foreigners. The Hupei
students in Tokyo sent a representative back home to assist in
the work of agitation and the revolutionary organ Ta-k1ang Pao
published sharply critical and provocative articles by T'an
~a-pei and Ho Hai-ming, until the paper incurred the wrath of
Jui-cheng, the Governor-General, and was suppressed and ~ran

and Ho were clamped behind the bars. (87)

Revolutionary activity had reached a feverish pitch and
plans were being perfected for an uprising. The Hupei revolu-
ltionaries had a history of almost a decade of incessant 't-rork in
I ,

'·~rder to reach the stage of being able to launch a revolt trlitb

considerable confidence in their strength. The Wuhan explosion
in October 1911 was not a sudden, unexpected development, a bolt
from the blue, but was the result of .definite and careful
;preparations over a period of years} and in order to understand
,That happened at the close of 1911, it is necessary to follow
the developments 1n the preceding years in those areas.
Revolutionary activity in Hupei dated back to 1900 when
one of the secret society leaders, T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang, in league

(87) ~., 41-2.

 152

with the reformists fomented revolts in the Yangtse area. (88)

The revolts were qUickly put doto~n and for a time attention was
diverted to Kwangtung. But the Yangtse valley comrades did not·
give up the work. Ironically, Chang Chih-tung's decision to
create a New Army (Lu-chUn) in Hupai considerably facilitated the
work of the rebels and the spread or revolutionary ideas.
What distingUished the nature or work of the Hupel
. revolutionaries from that of their comrades elsewhere was the
I
"
earnestness and thoroughness with t-rhich the Hupei revolutionaries
worked among the amy circles and made them the main force of
the revolution. Wbile the need for mobilizing the army t-ras
recognized by revolutionaries everywhere, in most other areas the.ir
main strength still lay in the secret societies, and normallY if
they had won over adherents in the army units, these army groups
were expected to respond to the uprisings by the secret societies;
but in Hupei, particularly in the Wuhan area, the revolutionaries
took an early decision to concentrate on the New Army and to make
the army itself lead the revolt against the Manchus. To some extent
perhaps this was inevitable because the New Army was centred in
Hupei and Ch1h11.
In 1904 some ,or the leading revolutionaries of the area,
Liu Ching-yen, Tsao Ya-p •o, Hu Ying, Chang Nan-hsien, L1 Ta-lin,
Chu Tse-lung, HO Li-ta and others had gathered in Wuch'ang and
after mutual deliberations decided that unless the revolution

(88) See Chang Nan.. hsien, Huoei ko-ming chih-chih lu (SbanRhai ..

1947) 19-26.
 153

spread from the army itself, its success could hardly be ensured. (89)
So, Hu Ying and Chang Nan-hsien infiltrated the Engineers' Corps
and the others managed to smuggle themselves into other New Army
units. (90)
In 1904 they formed the K'o-hsueh-p'u-bsi-so (Institute for
Supplementing StudY of Science) with Li Ta-lin as the Chief of the
Society and Hu Ying, Sung Ch1ao-jen, Tsao Ya-p•o, and Liu Ching..
yen among other office bearers. (91) In the meanttme Huang HSing
and others had organized the Hua-hs~ng-hu1, in Hunan. The Wuhan
revolutionaries forged a common front with their counterparts 1n
Hunan and prepared to respond to the revolt later in Hunan. However,
the Hunan revolt came to grief because of the leakage of plans.
The Hunan governor informed the Governor-General Chang Cbih-tung
about the nature of the E'g-hsueh-p'u-hsi-so and the organization
was suppressed in October 1904. (92)
Hu Ying hid himself in Hanyang while Liu Ch1ng-yen took
refuge in the American Church Mission. Liu managed to smuggle
himself into the Hupei cavalry commanded by Li Yuan-hung, who was
shortly afterwards made commander of the mixed brigade there, and
Liu became his secretary. In 1905 a letter from Huang Hs1ng to
Liu Ching-yen was intercepted and L1 Yuan-hung became suspicious

(89) Chang Kuo-kan, H,sin-hai 1ro-ming shih-llaq (Shanghai,

1958) 2.
(90) JJW!.; Yang Yii-ju, 11.
(91) Hu 1'zu-bsiin, Wuch'ang k'ai-kuo shih-lu 2(Wuch 1 ang,
l.M9) I, 9.
(92) Chang Nan-hsien, n. 88, 56.
 154

of Liu•s activities and forced him to resign and leave. Litt

Cbing-yen became a christian and joined the American Church
Mission and that led to the formation of the next revolutionary
organization - the Jih-chih-hui. (93) In fact originally the
Jih-chih·hui was not intended to be a revolutionary organizations
it was started by the American Church Mission to propagate
christianity but Liu Ching-yen secretly started propagating
revolution (94) and populariz~d Oh 1 en T'ien-hua•s writings such as
11
Meng-hui-t •ou" (Sudden Realization) and "Ching-shih-chung" (Alarm
to \'larn the World). (95) Every Sunday largely-attended meetings
were held and all the radically-inclined students and army elements
came flocking. All those who were in the K'o-hsueh-p'u-bsi-so
joined the Jih-chih-hUi - many of whom became well-known for their
revolutionary liork as well as for their role in the revolution
itself. Among the active worl\.1ars were Ch'a Kuang-fo, tan T'ien-
wei (96), T•sai Chi-min, pteng Ch'~fan, Wu Chao-ling (97), L1
Ya-tung, and Wang Hsien-chang. (98)
.
The Jih-ch1h-hp1 also became affiliated with the T'gng-meng-
lmi and spread its net rar and 't-Tide. In Kiuldang the organization's

(93) Hu Tzu-hsiin, n. 91, 9-10.

(94) n!S·' 10.
(95) Tso Ya-p•o, n. 1, 12.
(96) At the time of Wuch'ang uprising in Oci»ober 1911
Lan T •ien-t-rei was commander or the mixed-brigade at Mukden.
(97) Wu Chao-ling was destined to play a central role on
the fateful night of 10 October when the Wuch 1 ang uprising broke
out. See Chapter 4, Section I.
(98) Hu Tzu-hsiin, n. 91, 10•
 155

workers established a reading library including in its acquisitions

many books containing revolutionary ideas. The students and army-
men, and even many merchants and members of the gentry class cam?
under their influence. They established an office in Huangchow
for printing revolutionary materials which were distributed secretly
among the army and effective use was also made of patriotic song's
popularized among the military circles. They also organized a
school for the armymen and students (Huang-hang-chiin-hsueh-ch1a-
ch1ang-hsi-she) where lectures were delivered on nationalism and
people's rights as well as on provincial autonomy. (99)
This was also the time ltrhen Sun Yat-sen had established
contacts with the French authorities, and the French army was
willing to lend a helping hand. A French army officer was deputed
to inspect the party organization in Hupei and intimation to this
effect was sent to the J1h-ch1h-hui comrades. In the summer ot
1906 (29 Jtme) the French officer arrived in Wuhan and addressed
a meeting of the J1h-chih-hu1, attended by many hundreds of people,
at the Wuch'ang Kao-chia-cbieh. He delivered a fighting speech
about the inevitability or, and the imperative need for, revolution
in China. A government agent had smuggled himself in the
meeting. (100) Some revolutionary accounts have it that this
agent was no tess a person than Chang Piao, Commander of the 8th
division at Wuhan. (101) In any case, the authorities were

-·------
(99) Tsao Ya-p•o, n. 1, 136.
(100) JhiS., 189.
(101) Tzu-ch'uan (Tsung-U ch•uan-ch1) 11; Hu Tzu-hsiin, 11.
 156

apprised of the developments and became extremely watchful of the

activities of the J1h-chih-hu1.
Shortly afterwards came the P'ing-hsiang uprising in 1906
'-rhich greatly affected the fortunes of the Jih-chih-hui. The
officials decided to swoop down upon the organization leaders.
Hu Ying, L1 Ya-tung, Chang Nan-hsien and many others were arrested
and jailed. Liu Ching-yen fled but was betrayed by an agent and
put behind the bars. Despite considerable efforts by the American
missionaries, Liu Ching-yents release could not be secured and
he languished away in prison. (102) The Jih-chih-hui had met with
its end.
An overall organization for the army units ceased to exitt,
though a number of small secret groups continued to lead a perilous
existence. It was in July 1908 that a new unified organization for
the army circles, called Chnn-tui-t'ung-meng-hui (Army-t'gng-meng-
.b.Yi) "to7as set up by Yang Wang-p'eng, Huang Chung-hsiang and other
revolutionaries among the army circles. Government suppression
forced them to adopt a more innocuous name and in December its
name was changed to Ch'tin-chih-hsueh-she. (103) This ,,as in fact
/the first real revolutionary organization of the New Army of Hupei,.
An indication of the new winds blowing among the New Army was the
rapid development of this new organization. The 41st regiment,
.
the 42nd, 32nd and 8th regiments were all successfully infiltrated
and there was a rapid increase in membership. (104) The new

/
•'
(102) Tsao Ya-p•o, 140-62.
(103) Yang Yu-ju, n. 86, 18.
(104) Ibid.
 157

organization was built up by the members from almost entirely

their own resources and the regulations provided that each member
would contribute one tenth of his salary to the funds of the new.
party. (105) The remarkable headway that the new organization had
made, and, one might add, insight into the requirements of a
successful revolution, was evident from the decision that the party
would not be confined to officers but would also be open to all the
ranks. (106) The rank and file, the Chinese "G-1" of the New Army
was thus embraced and thrown into the ttTbirlpool of revolutionary
currents. There is no doubt, that but for their subversion, the
Wuch 1 ang uprising would have met the same fate as the previous
uprisings.
About this time a talented young Hunanese, Chiang Li-l-Tu,
~ho soon rose to be an important revolutionary leader in the N~~
i'
Army, came to Hupei and joined the 41st regiment. He made the
acquaintance of Ch"a Kuang-fo, a member of the Ch'iin-chih-hsueh~she,

and became a leading member of the organization. Together they

started the Shang-wu Pao to carry the message of revolution. (107)
This \'ISS a period of considerable unrest in the South and the
Manchu authorities, therefore, hesitated to have recourse to a
policy of severe repression. The organization escaped immediate
suppression and carried on its work of propaganda and training tor
almost two years without inviting trouble. (108)

(105) D14·
(106) Chang Nan-hsien, n. 921 147.
(107) Chang Kuo-kan, n. 89, 22.
(108) Chang Nen-hsien, 14?.•
 158

In April 1910 thousands of famine-stricken people of llunan

l
demonstrated before the Governor's office and set fire to it as
~ell
f
as to some missionary institutions. The agitation spread
~idely. Tbe Hupei revolutionaries immediately decided to avail
themselves of this opportunity and stage a revolt which, it was
determined, would be started by the 41st regiment. Huang Hsia-lln
was sent to Hunan for assisting the rebels and Lin Cbi-ch'en to
the Szechuanese border for contacting their comrades there. Just
when the preparations were being rounded off came the ne\tTS that the
Hunan revolt had been quelled. The troops could not be called oUtJ
the secret got leaked; and the Manchu authorities clamped a strict
curfew on the city. Huang Chung-hsiang fled to Shanghai and
Li Chi-ch'en to Szechuan. The Shang-wu Pao was suppressed and this
also tt~as the end or the Ch'iin-cbih-hsueh-she. (109)
It was, ho\..rever, not long before the army revolutionaries
were up and about again. In September 1910 Yang Wang-p 1 eng, Chiang
Li..wu and others started another organization named Chen-wu-hsueh-
Ab&· Despite the dissolution of the earlier organization, the old
apparatus was intact and the new organization had representatives
from practically every regiment and battalion. Yang Wang-p'eng
headed the new society and a new paper called Ta-ldang Pao was also
started in Hankow. Once again information reached Li Yuan-hung who
forced Yang to resign from the army and struck out a few other names
too from the rolls. There was strict surveillance in each military
camp and Chen~wu-hsueh-she had to be wound up. (110)

(109) .IW~, 147-8.

(110) Chang Kuo-kan, 26.
 159

.·In early l911 the members met again to revive their

,
activities but decided to change the name of the society to
l
~~Wen-hsueh-she (Institute or Society for the Study of Literature)

~in order to ensure secrecy and avoid the attention of the autho-
rities. The office of the Wen-hsueh-she was located in Chang
T 1 1ng-p'u1 s house at 85 Hsiao-cb 1 ao-ch1eh. Chiang Li-'t'lU was
elected president of the organization and representatives were
selected from various army units. Emissaries were also despatched
to Shanghai, Kiangsu, Anhwe1, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Shantung
and Manchuria to contact their comrades there. (111)
By now the revolutionary organization had representatives
from all the Net-T Army units except the cavalry and, therefore, it
became a major task or the Wen-hsueh-she members to spread their
network in the cavalry. Chang Yu-k'un was entrusted with this _
task and it was reported that very shortly there ware nearly forty
converts from among the cavalry. (112) The influence, and member-
ship, of the nev1 organization rapidly spread and it became a
pov1erful revolutionary organization in the Hupe1 New Army ready to
strike at the roots of governmental authority and power in Wuhan.
By the time of the outbreak or the Szechuan railway crisis the

Wen-hsue~she already had some a,ooo members. (113)

.
In the meantime the Kung-chin-hui was established in Hankow.
.
In october 1908 the main elected members of the 1\ung-chin-hUi in

(111) Hu Tzu-hstin, n. 91, 21.

(112) Chang Nan-hsien, 158.
( 113) Ch • ien Wen-bs ueh-s he.-~ t 'ung-.3 en kung-pi.!. Wuhan Im-
ming t t uan-t '1 wen-hsueh-shih li-sh1h, as in HHKM, v, 5. ·
 160

Tokyo went back to the countY and divided their field of activity.
In January 1909 Chiao Ta-feng arrived in Hankot-1 and discussed with
Sun Wu ways and means of conducting revolutionary activity in Hupei
and Hunan. In April 1909 the headquarters office was established
in the French concession in Hankow, and later with the financial
assistance of two merchants a branch office t-ras estabUshed in
Wuch 1 ang to make it more convenient for the army and student circles
there to meet and carry on their l'Tork. The Ktmg-ch1n-h~ members
got busy to work on the secret societies in the Yangtse provinces,
who as a result of their efforts, l'Tere united into Chtmg-hua-
shan. ( 114) Sun Wu, a graduate of the Hupei mill tary academy and
an important party member, also contacted many local comrades like
Huang Chung-hsiang for pushing party work. (115)
According to Yang Yu-ju, a meeting was held in mid-1910
in Tokyo where it was decided to shirt attention to the Yangtse
region. Cbii Cheng had come back to Tokyo from Burma and Chao Sheng
from South-East Asia and called together other comrades, chiefs of
T'ung-meng-hui branches of eleven provincial regions including Sung
Chiao-jan, for hammering out future.strategy. A sharp discussion
took place on Sung Chiao-jen•s suggestion for continued revolutionary
activity on a regional basis, but Chao Sheng led the opposition by
•
insisting on co-ordinated activity with one area as the base of
operations and suggested that this base could only be the Ch'ang-
kiang (the Yangtze area). Finally, on the advice of T'an Jen-feng
the policy of unifYing decision-making power but dividing regional
responsibility was adopted, and it was also decided to establish

(1141) Chang Nan-hsien, 179.

(115) Hu Tzu-hsii.n, 16.

 161

a central bureau in Shanghai. T'an Jen-reng was asked to investi-

gate the situation in the Ch'ang-kiang area. Following this
meeting the comrades left for their native places one by one and .
T 'an Jen-reng and Sung Chiao-jen headed towards Shanghai where

they conferred with Ch 1 en Ch'i-mei and Chang Mu-11ang on the

strategy for the Ch'ang-kiang. (116)
In February 1911 Chii Cheng came to Hupei as the represen-
tative of the T 'ung-meng-htg in charge of Hupei affairs. Chii Cheng
was both a leading member or the T'une-meng-hUi as well as of the
Kung-chin-hui. Along 'VTith h1m came T •an Jen-reng who had also
visited Hunan just prior to that. By that time Huang Hsing and
Chao Sheng had already made plans for the seizure of Canton and
T tan came to Hunan and Hupei to co-ordinate plans with the Liang-
Hu comrades to get ready to respond to the projected Canton revolt.
T 'an gave 800 dollars to the Wuhan comrades and with this help the

headquarters was established at Pao-shan-11 1n the Russian

concession. (117) Both Kung-ch1n-hu1 and Wen-hsueh-she had made
rapid progress and Hupei and Hunan revolutionaries tt~ere ready to
answer the call from Canton. The Canton rebellion, however, failed
and the Southern revolutionaries suffered heavy losses. The
centre of activity was finally and definitely shifted to Hupei and
Hunan. •

At the time of the defeat in Canton, most of Kung-chin-hu1

members t>~ere in t.,uhan. Chiao Ta-reng, the Hunanese revolutionary
leader, and some of his associates, had also come to Wuch 1 ang for

. .,
(116) Yang Yu-ju, n. as, 31.
(117) Hu Tzu-hsiin, 18.
 162 . .

co-ordinating plans with their Hupei comrades to respond to the

impending revolt in Kwangtung. The news of the disastrous defeat
in Canton had just started coming in and rumour had it that even
Huang Hsing and Hu Han-min had been killed. There was dismay
among the revolutionary ranks and a Kung-chin-hui meeting was
called on 3 May 1911, attended, among others, by Liu Kung, Chu
Cheng, Yang Shih-chien, Liu Ying, Chiao Ta-feng, Yang Yii-ju, Hu
Tzu-hs\in and Ch'a Kuang-ro. Highly emotional speeches were made
in the meeting expressing the determination of the revolutionaries
from Hupei and Hunan to concentrate on revolutionary work in these
two areas to bring about a revolution. "If there were no Kwangtun'g~,

rehtorically asked Chiao Ta-reng, "1rrould there be no revolution"?

Another member shouted in great passion that the central provinces
had no big names to boast of but that it was the turn of these
"nameless0 (wu-ming) revolutionaries to succeed 't-rhen those with
big names had failed. The meeting resolved to make Liang-Hu the
focus of a new effort and to depend upon the New Army in Wuch'ang
to start an uprising in Hupei. It was also decided to seek the
support of Wen-hsueh-she for a joint new attempt at revolution. (118)
Contacts between the Wen-hsueh-she comrades and those or
the K9ng-chin-h~ had been established earlier with the predecessor .
organization Ch'tm.-chih-hSueh-she. In April 1909 when Sun Wu was
in Wuhan developing the Kung-chin-hui organization there, he met
Huang Chung-hsiang or the Ch'un-chih-hsueh-she, and prevailed upon
him to join Kung-chin-hui• (119) Thus some working relationship

\I
( 118) Yang Yii-j u, 35.
(119) Hu Tzu-bsiin, 16~
 163

between the two organizations were established but these relations

were not characterized by close co-operation or mutual confidence.
Mutual rivalry was not infrequent and the two organizations sought
to increase their membership at the expense of each other. (120)
The Kung-chin-hui was a broader organization, for it had membership
both among army and non-army circles, whereas the New Army organi-
zations were confined to the army personnel only. But since the
Kung-chin-hui also assigned a crucial role to the New Army, the
activity of the two was centred on the same field and a spirit of
competition in extending influence and membership often bedevilled
their attitude towards each other. The increasing tempo of
revolutionary activity and the sharpening of the crisis in Wuhan
brought to a head the question of their mutual relations, for a
united effort by the two was an essential condition for the success
of any attempt to overthro't'l the Manchu regime.
There were, however, doubting Thomases on both sides. In
the Kung-ch1n-hU1 Liu Kung was dubious about the utillty of this
unity as the programme of the Wen-h8ueh-she lacked a revolutionary
character (121); while in the latter organization, when the
suggestion for unity was mooted, Chiang Li-wu scoffed at the big,
brilliant people of the Kung-chin-hui. (122) But. the general
opinion in both was strongly in favour of unity and on 14 SepteU)ber
1911 a meeting of the representatives \Jas held to reach accord on

(120) Yang Yii-j u, 30.

(121) lbid., 37.
(122) Ts 'ai Chi-ou, n. 19, 56.
 164

the principles of uniting the t11ro organizations. (1.23) Speakers

from both sides enthusiastically welcomed the decision to unite
forces and expressed their willingness to sink personal and
temperamental differences for the sake of the cause of the revolu-
tion. (124) The joint meeting elected Chiang Li-11ru as the Supreme
Commander of the Revolutionary Army ani Wang Hsien-chang (Deputy
Chief of the Wen-hsueh-she) as Vice-Commander. Sun \'lu was made
Chief of Staff and Chang T 1 1ng-p •u, Ts •ai Chi-min, Liu Fu-chi,
P 1 eng Ch'u-fan, Hsii Ta-ming and others were chosen for looking
after military affairs. The office of the Commander-in-Chief was
located at Wuch'ang Hsiao-ch'ao-chieh, which was the general head-
quarters of the \'len-hsueh-she. (125) For political affairs, the
joint meeting decided to create a Political Preparatory Office
(Cheng-ch1b-ch 1 ao-1ueh-ch 1 u) and elected Liu Kung as the Director
and Sun Wu, Fan Shan-p 'o and Li Tso-ch'en on the standing committee,
while Chu Cheng, Hu Ying, Li Ya-tung, Ch'a Ktmg-fo, L1 Fu-chi,
Yang Yu-j u, Yang Shih-chieh, T tan Ta-pei and ten others were
elected as members of this Office. Its office was located at
Pao-shan-li in the Russian Concession at Hankow -- which was also
the office of the Kung-chin-hqi. (126) The method of selection
makes the intention of the revolutionaries quite clear. The
Wen-hsueh-she was essent~ally a military organization with stmple
and straight-forward understanding and aims, 'trtbile the political
leaders were mostly in the Kung-cbin-h!Q. So the Wen-hsueh-she

\.
(1.23) Yang Yu:.ju, 46-7.
(124) liW!.
( 125) Chang Kuo-kan, n. 89, 60.
(126) ,lW.
 165

chief' was made the Commander-in-Chief', whereas poll tical matters

were\lef't la!'gEt'lY into the hands of' Ktmg-chin-hui members.
The stage was now set for passing over from the phase of
!organization and preparations to that of action. The necessary
v
unity had been achieved and tension was mounting in the Wuhan area.
· The Szechuan railway crisis had gathered momentum and added fuel to
the fire. The preparations of the revolutionaries were complete
but they lacked the finances to start a revolt. The Wuhan revolu-
tionaries did not have a surfeit of well-lmown names and most of'
their organizations, particularly among the army, had been function-
j\ng on their own resources and, consequently, were short of standing
funds. ( 127) The Kung-chin-hui leaders had to address themselves to
the urgent task of collecting money. Fortunately for them L1u Kung
(Chung-wen) had come with s,ooo dollars. Liu Kung belonged to a
rich family and the money had been given so that Liu Kung could go
to Peking and purchase some official post. Liu Kung's fiancee,
who was also a party member, passed on the information to her

comrades and a request was made to Liu Kung to pass on the money to
the party. Liu Kung, of course, had no intention of proceeding to
peking and willingly parted with tho money. (128)
The money having been collected, Chii Cheng and Yang Yii-ju
:were sent to Shanghai to contact Sung Chiao-jan and Ch''en Ch 11-me1
for purchasing arms and ammunition as well as requesting Sung Chiao-
jan, Huang Hsing, T'an Jen-feng and others to coma to Wuhan to take

(127) Yang Yu-ju, 43.

(128) Ts•ai Chi-ou, n. 19, 39-42•
 166

charge of the direction of the impending uprising. (1.29) Both

Sung am Cb 1 en were extremely gratified to learn about the situation
in Wuhan and Ch 1 en tmdertook to procure ammunition for them. Just
at that time came a secret letter from jail from the well-lmown
Hupei revolutionary Hu Ying to Sung Chiao-jen deprecating the very
idea of a successful uprising 1n Hupei. Sung began to have doubts
about the exact state of affairs 1n Wuhan and delayed his departure
to Wuhan. (130) An emissary had also been sent by Chii Cheng to
Huang Hsing apprising him of the plans for the Wuhan uprising and
requesting him to come to Wuhan and lead the revolt. Huang Hsing
sent the unexpected reply that he did not believe the Hupei
revolutionaries could succeed unless there \>7ere simultaneous up-
risings in other provinces too. He suggested putting off the Wuhan
uprising by a month or so in order to allow time for co-ordinating
plans with other provinces. (131) With their mission almost
infructuous, Yang Yii-ju came back to Wuhan on 1 October, leaving
Cht1 Cheng behind in Shanghai to continue his efforts for purchase
ot arms and persuading the leaders to go to Hupei. Yang Yu-ju•s
report on his return amazed and angered his Wuhan comrades. Huang
Hsing knew nothing about the Hupei situation, they argued, and
they were not prepared to accept his advice. (132)
Meanwhile, to meet the mounting railway crisis, the Man~hu

authorities moved some of the New Army troops from Wuhan. Two
battalions from 31st and 32nd regiments of the 16th brigade were

(129) Yang Yii-ju, 46.

(130) ,IW.' 52-3.

(131) See text of Huang Hs1ng 1 s letter in Chang Nan-hsi~n,
n.92, 245-6.
(132) Ts 1 ai Chi-ou, 63-4, 68.
 16?

sent to Szechuan hrith Tuan-fang) and bne battalion of the 41st

regiment was ordered to Yueh-chow on the borders of Hunan and
Hupei. Chiang Li-wu was with that battalion and had to leave \'It:than.
Sun \'lu called a joint meeting of the Kung-chin-hu1 and Wen-hsueh-she
at Hu Tzu-hs\in 1 s house in Wucb'ang on 24 September to decide upon
the new strategy. The meeting was attended by representatives of
various companies of troops including Hsiung Ping-k' un and Ma Jung
of the 8th engineers corps and Ts •ai Chi-min of the 29th regiment
as well as representatives of Kung-ch1n-hu1 and Wen-hsueh-s}\e. (133)
As a gesture of sincerity, Sun Wu proposed the retention of Chiang
Li-'t·7U as their Commandel..·in-Chief. He himself was prepared to
continue as Chief of Starr. The meeting also unanimously decided
to fix the 6th of October as tha day for the uprising. ( 134)
The first salvoes of the revolution were, hot-rever, sounded
the same afternoon when a sergeant and another soldier, belonging
to the revolutionary group, taking leave from their camp and being
entertained to drink by some other comrades were interrupted by
their officer and the dispute developed into a stormy quarrel.
Some of the revolutionaries present wanted to start a mutiny but
t-1ere frustrated by the fact that the ammunition store was closed
and they could not get access to it. They fled and the matter went
up to Commander Chang Piao. Chang Piao ordered the cavalry •
commander Yu Hua-lung to catch the rebels, but his unit had many
party members, and so no one got arrested. (135) But, as a result,

(133) Hu Tzu-hsiin, n. 91, 22.

(134) ~.' 22-3.
(135) Ibid., 23-4~
 168

the authonttes were alerted and there was strict survoilltmee 1n

the citY' as well as in the milltery camps and nobody was allowe4
to enter or lSQVG the camps without permission. Jul-eheng also
took back most of the arms from the New Army un1 t and stored them
at the Cb•u-wang-t •at. ammunition stora 1n the city. (136) According
to one report • !1eh-cbung wanted to station Benner men to guard the
important ammunition store at Cb'u.-weng.t'al 1n the Wuchtang c1ty
but t·1aa opposed by L1 Yuan-hung tJ1ho minimized the strength. of the
revolutioDAries and pointed out the misgivings and m1sundarstend1Jlgs
that such an action might cause among the Chinese troops. At bls
suggestion, the 8th engineers corps was entrusted with the duty ot
protaotlng the Cb'u.-wang-t'a1 ammunition stora. (13?) It this
report is conoot, L1 Yuan-hWlg may be credited with baving unwittingly
aided the revolutionaries in seizing Wucb'ang because it was their
capture of' tbls place t11b1ch gave t~ a valuable initial advantage
S.n successfully launcblng their revolt. '

Tho uprising had been fixed tor the 6th of october but
Cbu Cheng and Sung Ch1ao-3en tuld not arrived and the authorities
/were taking stringest precautions. The date ,1as changed to tbe
9th. (138) On the roqu.est of his comrades Chiang Li-wu cGme back
to tiuoh•ang on th0 9th momillg (139) but tha sama day an 1nc1dent
took place not only egplod1ng a boob in the Kun«-Shin•lml offic~

:_,.-------
'I

(136) Ch1en Nung, )h!hm tm-mlpg shih-me chi

as 1n HHKM, V, 1.70.
Oiin·kYR Pag),

(337) Hsitmg Ping·k•un, l:ZMh'Ane gb't-1 t•an, as in m-mM,

v, 86.
(1.38) Wu f.IS!tng-ban.!. •twuch'ang eb.'l·i san-jlh chi" (q,Men-kug,
mah.:k• ap) t as in H!lro(, v, 78~ .
(139) Ts•at CM-ou, n. 19, 67.
 169

.
in Hankow, but also exploding the vluch'ang uprising. Sun l'lu and
a number of his comrades were testing some ammunition in the! r
office '\olhen through the carelessness of Liu Kung's brother, who .
was smoking, a bomb exploded injuring Sun Wu and sending ott a
terrific noise. Sun Wu was immediately rushed to the hospital
by a back door but a policeman on duty heard t~e noise and hastened
to find out the cause of the noise. The comrades ran halter and
skelter and the membership register, seal, insignia and all the
other documents fell plump into the hands of the policeman. Liu
Kung was in the adjoining building and fled upon the arrival of the
policeman but his wife and brother '\orere taken into custody. (140)
This seizure revealed to the authorities almost everything about
.-r the revolutionary organization and the bigger explosion that
i followed the accidental bomb explosion became ineVitable.

(140) Chang Kuo-kan, n. 89, 63.