JUDICIARY (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified
ng in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs
1. Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC),
et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J .:
I. THE FACTS
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of
the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in
Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot
validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of
the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose
actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects,
consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or
placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court
decision.
II. THE ISSUES
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development
Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI)
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on
May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA
scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their
land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or
not?
be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
III. THE RULING
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents
PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court
thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified
FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY
directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid
or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the
administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall
of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It
is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences
that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The
majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5,
2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain
the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also
given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI
or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the
issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of
acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no
ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there
was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue
of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s
SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the
SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court
is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this
should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from
 subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco
that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions
of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily
result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders
its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded
per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the
proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and
considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement
of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall
determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been
acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial
Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the
government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The
Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-
hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to
the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November
21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs
were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise,
these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution
scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is
akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention
of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s
revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation
that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify
this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to
the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land
valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian
court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657
has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or
conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or
certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet
been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not
even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the
placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be
immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all
efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these
lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain
control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The
Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even
if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is
unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic]
50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the
formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is
295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI
share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall
short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
2. Malaga v Penachos
Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995 03 September 1992
Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988
issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro
Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of
pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received
and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best
Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in
the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on
December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their
documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the
officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-
inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12,
1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had
already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending
resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the
restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot
and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was
an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD
1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory
Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter,
and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This
term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state.
(Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it
was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the
Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state
college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government
are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been
appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter
that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the
General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the
said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the
injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of
Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
3. Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of
Education 95 Phil. 806 – Political Law – Civic Efficiency
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality
of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws
sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws
that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be
granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of
Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It
also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being
used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to
the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary
must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts
to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show
that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers
granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates
certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino
morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.
4. Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118627 07 March 1995
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers,
assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Another petition which
contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a
senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati
violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds
with technical descriptions
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section
7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate
existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms
as allowed by the Constitution
Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which
shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area
over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City
of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of
Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change
even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be
noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the
establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of
becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by
the city government of the City of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the
occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not
happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case
or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are
not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be
comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As
thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.
5. Police General Levy Macasiano Task Force On Demolition V. National Housing
Authority
G.R. No. 107921
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic
Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He
predicates his locus standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of
Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after
his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a
taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a
ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of
illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of
illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past."[1] As a taxpayer,
he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and
lawfully disbursed."[2]
Republic Act No. 7279 was approved on 24 March 1992 and published in the 4 May 1992
issue of the Official Gazette.[3] The challenged provisions therein read as follows:
"SEC. 28. Eviction and Demolition. -- Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be
discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless
citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the affected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of
eviction or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of resettlement with the duly designated
representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas
where they are to be relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or
demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to
Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and
of concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first
line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases
of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless
citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the
National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five
(45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said
order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the
said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily
wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local
government unit concerned.
The Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to carry out the above provision.
xxx
SEC. 44. Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition. -- There shall be a moratorium on the
eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for
a period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the moratorium shall
not apply to those persons who have constructed their structures after the effectivity of this Act
and for cases enumerated in Section 28 hereof."
Petitioner maintains that the said provisions are unconstitutional because:
"(a) They deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property
without due process of law and without compensation;
(b) They reward, instead of punish, what this Honorable Court has categorically declared as
unlawful acts;
(c) They violate the prohibition against legislation that takes away one's property to be given
to plain interlopers;
(d) They sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and
(e) They encroach upon the judicial power to execute its valid judgments and orders."[4]
On 10 December 1992, we required the respondents to comment on the petition.
In its Comment[5] filed on 15 January 1993; respondent National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority alleges that the implementation of the assailed sections of the Act does
not belong to or fall within its jurisdiction. It disagrees with the petitioner's stand that the said
sections are unconstitutional and avers that Section 28 merely provides for the "humanitarian
approach" towards the less privileged citizens and does not in fact prohibit but merely
discourages eviction or demolition, while Section 44 only covers program beneficiaries.
On 15 January 1993, the Realty Owners Association of the Philippines, Inc. filed a motion to
intervene[6] alleging that it has a legal interest in the success of the petition and is in full
accord with it. This Court required the parties to comment thereon.
On 16 February 1993, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) filed a
comment[7] for the respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) informing this Court that "in
a letter of respondent NHA addressed to the office of the undersigned counsel, dated 29
January 1993, x x x, the former categorically expressed as its official stand on the instant
petition that Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 are indeed unconstitutional," and
that "after a circumspect evaluation of the petition We find no cogent reason not to support the
position heretofore taken by respondent NHA." Said office then prays that the instant petition
be given due course.
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that the
instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the
exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that
there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests,
that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper
party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and
that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He
argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionally infirm.
Up to this time, no comment has been submitted by the parties on the motion to intervene.
Considering, however, that the issues are clear and simple enough, this Court dispenses with
the need for a comment on the said motion, denies the same and, after deliberating on the
issues raised and the arguments adduced by the parties in the petition and comments,
declares this petition to be without merit.
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.[8] To reiterate, the essential requisites
for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.[9] A proper party is one
who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of.[10]
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are
absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or
both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from
performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of
the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants."[11]
In reality, his petition is one for declaratory relief as he prays therein that "his rights as well as
those of private landowners be clearly defined and his duties under the Constitution and the
pertinent laws be clearly stated with respect to the demolition of illegal structures on public
and private lands."[12] Even so, it is still not viable since among the essential requisites of a
petition for declaratory relief are that: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy, (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse and (c) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.[13] Furthermore, an action for
declaratory relief does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only
questions of law are involved.[14] True, we have said that such a petition may be treated as
one for prohibition[15] or mandamus[16] if it has far-reaching implications and raises
questions that need to be resolved; but the exercise of such discretion presupposes, at the
outset, that the petition is otherwise viable or meritorious.
The petitioner is not likewise a "proper party." As a consultant of the DPWH under the
"Contract for Consultancy x x x," he is not vested with any authority to demolish obstructions
and encroachments on properties of the public domain, much less on private lands. The
consultancy contract limits his duties to the following: "(a) to organize and train selected
DPWH personnel for the different Engineering Districts in the NCR in the techniques and
methods of removing/demolishing illegal structures/stalls, etc., as well as in crowd control,
self-defense and security procedures x x x; (b) to provide advice to the Secretary and other
DPWH officials regarding prioritization of areas to be cleared of obstructions and
encroachments; (c) to conduct field inspection from time to time of areas recommended for
clearing; (d) to provide advice in developing appropriate standards and techniques in cost
effective implementation of the removal and demolition of obstructions and encroachments x x
x; and (e) to develop operational procedures that will institutionalize demolition
processes."[17] Moreover, the consultancy contract expired on 31 December 1992 and the
petitioner has not manifested that he obtained a renewal or extension thereof.
Nor does the petitioner claim that he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and
use would be affected by the challenged provisions of R.A. No. 7279.
Although the petitioner likewise anchors his locus standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it
does not mean, however, that in each and every instance where such a ground is invoked,
this Court is left with no alternative except to hear the parties. In Tan vs. Macapagal,[18] we
clarified that "as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as
to whether or not it should be entertained."
We do not, as well, find an indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge. As this Court
said through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Garcia vs. Executive Secretary:[19]
"On the merits, We find that the constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show
that there is an indubitable ground for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it. The policy of
the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted."
We cannot end this resolution without a few words on the comment of the OGCC for public
respondent National Housing Authority wherein the OGCC merely adopted the stand of the
officer-in-charge of the Legal Department of the said Authority that the challenged sections of
R.A. No. 7279 are unconstitutional. On its own, the OGCC did not even attempt to reason out
why this petition should be granted or denied. It has obviously treated this case without the
circumspection and seriousness expected of it especially in the light of the functions, duties
and responsibilities of the NHA under the challenged Act. The OGCC should not have
cursorily adopted the opinion of the officer-in-charge who acted on his own and who,
apparently, did not even refer his opinion to the Board of Directors of the NHA.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
6. Joya vs Presidential Commission on Good Governance GR No 96541
24 August 1993
Facts: The PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President Corazon
Aquino regarding the scheduled sale between the Republic of the Philippines and Christie’s of
82 Old Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of antique
silverware in the custody of Central Bank. This was approved on 14 August 1990 and the
consignment was signed the following day. On 26 October 1990 the Commission on Audit
submitted audit findings to the President – the assets subject of auction were historical relics
and had cultural significance and thereby prohibited by law. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al contended that they have legal personality to restrain
respondent from acting contrary to preserving artistic creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article
XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
Decision: Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal standing
means a personal and substantial interest ion the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
paintings legally belongs to the foundation or the members of thereof and the silverware are
gifts to the Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration was toppled and the said objects
were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation. If these were already acquired, any defect in the acquisition must be raised by
the true owners. Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the said objects
that have become publicly owned.
7. Legaspi v CSC
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondent.
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi
against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request
for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil
service eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution,
access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"
The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those
affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular
public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of
public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or
not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first
addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as
already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that
the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same
has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to
dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous
position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review
1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government
agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be
compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern
of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied
only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people
even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to
confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the
Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not,
civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the
civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service
eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be
civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being
of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
8. Bankers Association Of Philippines v COMELEC
G.R. No. 206794
BRION, J.:
The petitioners, Bankers Association of the Philippines and Perry L. Pe, assail the
constitutionality and legality of the respondent Commission on Elections' (Comelec's)
Resolution No. 9688[1] dated May 7, 2013, entitled "In the Matter of Implementing a Money
Ban to Deter and Prevent Vote-Buying in Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections" (Money Ban Resolution).[2] The petitioners included a prayer for the
issuance of a status quo ante/temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin its implementation.
THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION
Under the Money Ban Resolution, the Comelec resolved:
1. To prohibit the withdrawal of cash, encashment of checks and conversion of any monetary
instrument into cash from May 8 to 13, 2013 exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency, per day in banks, finance companies,
quasi-banks, pawnshops, remittance companies and institutions performing similar functions.
However, all other non-cash transactions are not covered.
For this purpose, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the
government are hereby deputized to implement with utmost dispatch and ensure strict
compliance with this resolution without violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 , as
amended, and Republic Act No. 6426[.]
2. To prohibit the possession, transportation and/or carrying of cash exceeding Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency from May 8 to May
13, 2013. For this purpose, all cash being transported and carried exceeding such amount
shall be presumed for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud in violation of the money
ban. xxx.
3. All withdrawals of cash or encashment of checks or series of withdrawals or encashment of
checks in cash involving a total amount exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) within one (1) banking day from date of the publication of this resolution until
May 13, 2013 shall be presumed to be for the purpose of accumulating funds for vote-buying
and election fraud and shall therefore be treated as a "suspicious transaction" under Republic
Act No. 9160 or the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001" as amended by Republic Act No.
9194. For this purpose, the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) is hereby deputized to
monitor and initiate investigations, and if necessary, inquire into and examine the deposit and
related accounts involved in the suspected transaction pursuant to procedure and
requirements of Republic Act No. 10167.[3]
The Comelec's Resolution No. 9688-A,[4] issued on May 9, 2013, amended the Money Ban
Resolution by:
exempting withdrawals that are routine, regular and made in the ordinary course of business
of the withdrawing client on the basis of the prevailing "Know-Your-Client/Customer" policy of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), which requires banks "not only to establish the identity
of their clients but also to have background knowledge of their normal business
transactions,"[5] and
presuming that the possession or transportation of cash in excess of P500,000.00 from May 8
to 13, 2013 was for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud when the same was
without tenable justification or whenever attended by genuine reason engendering belief that
the money would be used for vote-buying.
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9688-A on the same day that the petitioners filed the
present petition.
On May 10, 2013, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order,[6] enjoining the parties to
maintain the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the Money Ban Resolution.
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
The petitioners invoke the Court's power of judicial review to strike down the Money Ban
Resolution.
They contend that the Comelec's Money Ban Resolution was issued without jurisdiction since
the Comelec's power to supervise and regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or
permits under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution does not extend to the BSP which is
not a holder of any special privilege from the government. The BSP's power to regulate and
supervise banking operations stems from its mandate under the Constitution[7] and Republic
Act (RA) No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000).[8] Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution states
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and
other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. [emphasis ours]
They thus conclude that the Comelec's power of supervision and regulation cannot be
exercised over the BSP and the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) as they can exercise
authority only over public transportation and communication entities given special privileges
by the government.
The petitioners also posit that the Comelec's power to deputize extends only to law
enforcement agencies and only if the President concurs. Section 2(4), Article IX-C of the
Constitution states:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
[emphasis ours]
They argue that the BSP and the AMLC are not law enforcement agencies unlike the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police. Assuming they may be considered
as such, the Comelec failed to secure the concurrence of the President to the deputation.
The petitioners note that paragraph 3 of the Money Ban Resolution effectively amended RA
No. 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 or AMLA) by treating the withdrawal of cash or
encashment of checks exceeding P500,000.00 within one banking day from May 8 to 13,
2013 as a "suspicious transaction," thus authorizing the AMLC to monitor, initiate
investigations, inquire into and examine the deposit. This type of transaction, however, is not
among those enumerated as suspicious under Section 3(b) of the AMLA. As an administrative
issuance, the Money Ban Resolution cannot amend a law enacted by Congress.
The petitioners also claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates a number of constitutional
rights.
The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property
without due process of law.[9] The Money Ban Resolution violates an individual's due process
rights because it unduly and unreasonably restricts and prohibits the withdrawal, possession,
and transportation of cash. The prohibition effectively curtails a range of legitimate activities,
and hampers and prejudices property rights. Though the intent (i.e., to curb vote-buying and
selling) is laudable, the means employed is not reasonably necessary and is oppressive on an
individual's rights. The limitation on withdrawal also goes against the non-impairment clause
because the prohibitions and restrictions impair the banks' contractual obligations with their
depositors.
Finally, the petitioners claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates the constitutional
presumption of innocence because it declares that "all cash being transported and carried
exceeding [P500,000.00] shall be presumed for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud
in violation of the money ban."[10] There is no logical connection between the proven fact of
possession and transportation of an amount in excess of P500,000.00 and the presumed act
of vote-buying because there are many other legitimate reasons for the proven fact.
The Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on the petition,
insisting on the validity of the Money Ban Resolution and its amendment.
The Comelec argues that it has the constitutional authority to supervise and regulate banks
and other financial entities, citing Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. It alleges that its
power to regulate covers banks and other finance companies, since these entities operate
under an "authority" granted by the BSP under Section 6 of RA No. 8791. This authority is of
the same nature as "grants, special privileges, or concessions" under Section 4, Article IX-C of
the Constitution; thus, it may be validly regulated by the Comelec.
The Comelec also claims that it may validly deputize the BSP, since the latter is a government
instrumentality covered by Section 2(4), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Contrary to the
petitioners' claim, the Comelec's power to deputize is not limited to law enforcement agencies,
but extends to instrumentalities of the government. The constitutional intent is to give the
Comelec unrestricted access to the full machinery of the State to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
The Comelec further contends that Presidential concurrence with the exercise of the
Comelec's deputation power is required only if it involves agencies and instrumentalities within
the Executive Department, of which the BSP is not a part. Even assuming that Presidential
concurrence is required, this has been secured through Memorandum Order No. 52,[11] s.
2013, where the President gave his blanket concurrence to the deputation of all "law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government[.]"[12]
That the BSP is constitutionally and statutorily tasked to provide "policy direction in the areas
of money, banking, and credit," and vested with "supervision over the operations of bank,"
does not preclude the Comelec from exercising its power to supervise and regulate banks
during the election period. Notably, the Comelec's power is limited in terms of purpose and
duration, and should prevail in this specific instance.
If the Comelec deems the supervision and regulation of banks necessary to curb vote-buying,
this is a political question that the Court may not inquire into. The choice of the measures that
the Comelec may undertake to ensure the conduct of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible election is a policy question beyond the scope of judicial review.
The Comelec lastly defends the Money Ban Resolution as a reasonable measure that is not
unduly oppressive on individuals. It merely limits transactions involving cash (withdrawal,
encashment, possession, etc.), but does not affect other non-cash transactions such as those
involving checks and credit cards. Hence, only the medium or instrument of the transaction is
affected; the transaction may proceed using non-cash medium or instrument. There is,
therefore, no impairment of rights and contracts that would invalidate the Money Ban
Resolution.
THE COURT'S RULING
We resolve to dismiss the petition for being moot and academic.
By its express terms, the Money Ban Resolution was effective only for a specific and limited
time during the May 13, 2013 elections, i.e., from May 8 to 13, 2013. The Court issued a
Status Quo Ante Order on May 10, 2013; thus, the Money Ban Resolution was not in force
during the most critical period of the elections from May 10, 2013 to actual election day. With
the May 13, 2013 elections over, the Money Ban Resolution no longer finds any application so
that the issues raised have become moot and academic.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. The Court, as a rule,
will decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case and proceed to dismiss it when the issues
posed have been mooted by supervening events. Mootness intervenes when a ruling from
the Court no longer has any practical value and, from this perspective, effectively ceases to be
a justiciable controversy.[13] "[W]ithout a justiciable controversy, the [petition would] become
a [plea] for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction."[14]
While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the "moot and academic" principle,
these exceptions relate only to situations where: (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is
involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.[15]
In the present case, we find it unnecessary to consider the presence of the first, second and
third requirements when nothing in the facts and surrounding circumstances indicate the
presence of the fourth requirement, i.e., the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
We note that the Comelec did not make any parallel move on or about the May 13, 2013
elections to address the evil that its Money Ban Resolution sought to avoid and, in fact, it did
not issue a similar resolution for the October 28, 2013 barangay elections. If the May 13,
2013 elections had come and gone without any need for the measures the assailed
Resolution put in place and if no such measure was necessary in the elections that
immediately followed (i.e., the October 28, 2013 barangay elections), we believe that it is now
premature for the Court to assume that a similar Money Ban Resolution would be issued in
the succeeding elections such that we now have to consider the legality of the Comelec
measure that is presently assailed.
We consider it significant that the BSP and the Monetary Board continue to possess full and
sufficient authority to address the Comelec's concerns and to limit banking transactions to
legitimate purposes without need for any formal Comelec resolution if and when the need
arises. Congress, too, at this point, should have taken note of this case and has the plenary
authority, through its lawmaking powers, to address the circumstances and evils the Money
Ban Resolution sought to address. In other words, Congress can very well act to consider the
required measures for future elections, thus rendering unnecessary further action on the
merits of the assailed Money Ban Resolution at this point.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for having become moot and academic. The
Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on May 10, 2013, having been rendered functus
oficio by the May 13, 2013 elections, is hereby formally LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
9. Kilosbayan v Guingona
Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious
moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of
R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the
executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have
no standing to maintain the instant suit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.
RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural
technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy
on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association
of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the
validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies
or instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in
question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not
be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the
parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est
anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby
declared contrary to law and invalid.
10. Tatad v Garcia
Facts:
DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA (EDSA LRT III) to provide a
mass transit system and alleviate the congestion and growing transportation problem in the
metropolis. RA 6957 was enacted allowing for the financing, construction and operation of
government projects through private initiative and investment. Accordingly, prequalification
and bidding was made and EDSA LRT Corporation (organized under HK laws) was
recommended to be awarded with the contract. The President approved the awarding of the
contract. Petitioners are senators praying for the prohibition of respondents from further
implementing and enforcing the contract.
Issue:
Whether or not the EDSA LRT III, a public utility, can be owned by a foreign corporation.
Ruling: YES.
The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility.
However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a
public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.
In law, there is a clear distinction between the “operation” of a public utility and the ownership
of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. Ownership is defined as a relation in
law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in
everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. The exercise of
the rights encompassed in ownership is limited by law so that a property cannot be operated
and used to serve the public as a public utility unless the operator has a franchise. The
operation of a rail system as a public utility includes the transportation of passengers from one
point to another point, their loading and unloading at designated places and the movement of
the trains at pre-scheduled times.
In sum, private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding
public. It will have no dealings with the public and the public will have no right to demand any
services from it. Even the mere formation of a public utility corporation does not ipso facto
characterize the corporation as one operating a public utility. The moment for determining the
requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other
form of authorization for that purpose.
11. Oposa v Factoran
12. Kilosbayan v Morato
Facts:
GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract
violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint venture.
Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment
and accessories on January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an
annual rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
Rent is computed bi-weekly.
Term is 8 years.
PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
It is the same as the old contract of lease.
It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President
and it is not most advantageous to the government.
PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.
Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is
a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues
were actually involved.
LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the
present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona,
Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The parties are the
same but the cases are not.
RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An issue actually and
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any
future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does
not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the
second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form
separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second
proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner’s standing.
Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real parties of interest’.
Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are
bound either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract.
Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of
public contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all losses because the
operation of the system is completely in its hands.
Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not
inclined to review.
Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is
discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state that this
would allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the
claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction of statutes, the resumption is that in
making contracts, the government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of
abuse is not a reason for denying power.
It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any
contract which would involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for
the holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from
investing in any activities that would compete in their own activities.
It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own
activities. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that
the transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association
with the PGMC.
O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies,
materials and equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only
for privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government owned buildings
or spaces for private use.
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for reconsideration of
petitioners is DENIED with finality.
13. Lozano v Nograles G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009
FACTS:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens
and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution
Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals
to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of
Congress.” In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would
warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the
procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do petitioners have legal standing?
RULING:
No. In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is
grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or
hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only
resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of
proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet
transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal
has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet
taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an
uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur
at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from
this Court.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting
the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case
as of yet.
14. League of Cities v COMELEC
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of
the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),
which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the
words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate
again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was
passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates
from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters
in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 2.
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation
of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent
a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing
no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
15. Inonog v Ibay
FACTS: The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Venancio P.
Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Francisco B.
Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority.
The complaint involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which
respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked his
superior's vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent judge.
Respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the delay in the
promulgation of the decision in 4 criminal cases scheduled at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005
because the latter had a hard time looking for another parking space. That same day,
respondent judge issued another order, finding complainant guilty of contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross abuse of authority.
RULING: YES.The Supreme Court held that power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration
of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they
exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power
judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.
Respondent judge's act of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence
of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark of
judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of
every judge. Respondent judge himself has characterized this incident as a "petty
disturbance" and he should not have allowed himself to be annoyed to a point that he would
even waste valuable court time and resources on a trivial matter.
Respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay was found guilty of grave abuse of authority. He was
ordered to pay a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).
16. Biraogo v PTC
17. Macalintal v Presidential Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 191618 June 7, 2011
Nachura, J.
Issue:
whether or not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the
creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET); whether or not the PET violates Section
12, Article VIII of the Constitution
Held:
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by
which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme
Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court
to “promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
 The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the
full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
Next, petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its members
violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not
be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.” Consistent with our presidential system of
government, the function of “dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts
involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable” is
apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was
expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The power was expanded, but it remained
absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power .
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over
election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial
courts, respectively.
At the higher levels — city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and
senatorial — exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of
Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals,which are not, strictly and literally
speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to
resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of
the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC)
and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their
decisions are still subject to judicial review — via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper
party — if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential
or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and
vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power
wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law ,
expressly provided in the Constitution.
Note:
The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institutionindependent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
18. Bengzon v Drilon
19. Limketkai v CA
FACTS:
Philippine Remnants was the owner of a piece of land which it then entrusted to BPI. Pedro
Revilla was authorized by BPI to sell the lot for PHP1000/sqm. Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim
who agreed to buy the land. Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai went to BPI and were
entertained by VP Albano and Asst. VP Aromin. BPI set the price at 1,100 while Limketkai
haggled to 900. They subsequently agreed on Php1,000 on cash basis. Alfonso Lim asked if it
was possible to pay on terms and BPI officials said there was no harm in trying to ask for
payment in terms but if disapproved, the price would have to be paid in cash. Limketkai paid
the initial 10% with the remaining 90% to follow. Two or three days later, Alfonso Lim found out
that their offer had been frozen and then went to BPI to tender full payment of 33M to Albano
but was refused by both Albano & Bona.
Issue:
W/N there was a perfected contract of sale
Held:
1995 decision
–> Perfection of the contract took place when Aromin and Albano, acting for BPI, agreed to
sell and Alfonso Lim & Albino Limketkai, agreed to buy the lot at Php1000/sqm. A consensual
contract is perfected upon mere meeting of the minds and although the deed of sale had yet
to be notarized, it does not mean that no contract was perfected.
1996 decision
—> Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and acceptance upon the thing, and the
cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and aceptance absolute.
Limketkai’s acceptance was qualified and therefore, was actually a counter offer.
20. Drilon v Lim
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government
Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer)
declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with
the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.
RTC’s Ruling:
1. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec
187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over
LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.
Petitioner’s Argument:
1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the
enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been
observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy
of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure
a. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code
b. Not published
c. Not translated to tagalog
Supreme Court’s Argument:
1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinance. What he found only was that it was illegal. That act is not control but supervision.
2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act undone or
re-done. Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed.
3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra
vires provisions (2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its enactment but were
followed.
The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public investment
programs of LGU not to tax ordinances.
21. Larranaga v CA
FACTS;On September 15, 1997, some members of the Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation Group (PNP CIG)went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon City to arrest
petitioner, albeit without warrant. Petitioner resisted the arrest andimmediately phoned his
sister and brother-in-law. Petitioner’s sister sought the aid of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit.
Atty.Armovit, over the phone, dissuaded the police officers from carrying out the warrantless
arrest and proposed to meet with themat the CIG headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
The police officers yielded and returned to the CIG headquarters.Petitioner, together with his
sister and brother-in-law also went to the CIG headquarters aboard their own vehicle. Atty.
Armovitquestioned the legality of the warrantless arrest before CIG Legal Officer Ruben
Zacarias. After consulting with his superiors,Legal Officer Zacarias ordered to stop the arrest
and allowed petitioner to go home. Atty. Armovit made an undertaking inwriting that he and
petitioner would appear before the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 17, 1997 for
preliminaryinvestigation. Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention before the RTC ofCebu City. He was arrested and was detained
without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioneralleged that
he must be released and be subject to a preliminary investigation. However p e n d i n g t h er
esolutionoftheCourtforthepetitionforcertiorari,prohibition
and mandamus with writs ofpreliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by the
petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to thepetitioner.
ISSUE:WON the arrest of Petitioner Larraga without a warrant was legal?
RULING:No. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not arrested either by a peace
officer or a private person. To be sure,even if petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG
personnel, such arrest would still be illegal because of the absence of a warrant.It does not
appear in the case at bar that petitioner has just committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit anoffense when the police officers tried to arrest him on September 15,
1997. In fact, petitioner was attending classes at the Centerfor Culinary Arts at that time.
22. First Lepanto v CA
Facts:
1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular,
1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of
cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).
2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor
tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI
decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor
appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for
review with CA.
4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its
own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any
preliminary injunction.
5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA
does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
6. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-
91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of
Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein
runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of
the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
7. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between
B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been
resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27,
1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly
with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
23. Aruelo v CA
Facts: Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the
respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to
the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when
Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for
bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day
period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.
Issue: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the
five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Held:
No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose
proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall
apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings
brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto
cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided
that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo
warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
24. Javellana v DILG
FACTS: Javellana is an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of
Bago City, and a lawyer by profession who has continuously engaged in the practice of law
without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local
Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58.
· As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession shall
always be subject to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all
cases, the practice of any profession should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian
concerned as a body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the case
may be.
· c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession or engagement in
private employment and the official duties of the concerned official shall arise thereby;
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160)
was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are
members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or
any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
HELD: Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is
completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's
power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code
and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials
to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private
practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
25. GSIS Petition
FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22,
Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The said provision states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local
government corporations and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. xx
The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and
maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this
Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their
employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and
increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly,
notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals
thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or
duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked
and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered
paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence
contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and
rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. xx
Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should be
denied. On this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and
recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According
to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal
basis.
ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs
and local government units?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from the
payment of legal fees imposed under Sec 22 of Rule 141 of the ROC on GOCCs and LGUs is
hereby DENIED .
NO
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its
rule-making powers under Sec 5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
xxxxxxxx
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the ROC is an integral part of
the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional
requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Executive.
NOTES:
-The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in
support of its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from
that of its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers
and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members.
-Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal
fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s
independence — fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the
Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule
141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the
SAJF[33] expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” Legal fees
therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also
comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the
payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations
and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such
situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and
erodes its independence.
-Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced
the history of the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and
development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice:
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for
it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13,
Article VIII provides:
Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In
re Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court
regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946
up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that “x x x the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment – a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not
the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
question.” The venerable jurist further ruled: “It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license.” By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the
power of Congress to “repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the
1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court “to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x.” More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article
X provided:
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed,
altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of
the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxxxxxxx
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
26. Maceda v Vasquez
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil
and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner
Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his
certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for
serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to
the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into
the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’
and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.
27. Raquiza v Castaneda
FACTS: The cases involves a petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from
the sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castañeda to another branch and administrative
complaint against the same judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) rendering
decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal (3) extortion by means of oppression; and (4)
bribery. The court refers the administrative complaint to Justice Bautista of CA for
investigation. After the conduct of the investigation, Justice Bautista recommends the
dismissal of the charges against the respondent judge for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON there is basis on the recommendation of the investigator to dismiss the
complaint of the petitioner.
RULING: The court reviewed the records, testimonies of the witnesses, and other evidences
submitted by the parties and find the recommendation of the investigator as fully supported
with enough evidence to merit the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent judge.
The court held that a ground for removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond
reasonable doubt most especially if it involves misconduct, corruption and incompetence.
28. Nitafan v CIR
FACTS: Petitioners Nitafan, Polo and Savellano are judges presiding over branches in the
RTC of the NCJR Manila who seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. According to them, said tax
deductions constitute a diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not salaries of the members of the Judiciary are subject to income tax.
RULING: YES. The salaries of the members of the Judiciary is subject to general income tax
applicable to all taxpayers. The clear intent of the ConComm was to delete the proposed
express grant of exemption from payment of income tax, so as to give substance to equality
among the three branches of Government. Though this intent was not clearly set forth in the
final text of the Constitution, the Court since then has authorised the deduction of the
withholding tax from the salaries of said members.
29. Dela Llana v Alba
FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition,
seeking ti enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and
the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act,
would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency
that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of
tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the justices and
judges in this case?
RULING: It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation
of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have
ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made
in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is
in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise.
30. People v Gacott
Facts: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge
Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent
judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of
the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively
discipline respondent judge
Held: To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a
conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was
also a member.
The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are
actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that
disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the
Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be
heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court
en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the
administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en
banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a
judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of
any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative
matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a
congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in
administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require
action by the Court en banc.
31. In re Manzano
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS
NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
FACTS:
Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, an Executive Judge in RTC in Bangui, Ilocos Norte was
appointed as a member of Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential
EO 856. Petitioner requested the Court to allow him to accept the appointment and to
consider his membership in the committee as neither violative to his judicial function. He also
added that his membership in the said Committee is still part of the primary functions of an
Executive Judge.
Upon examination of EO 856 reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created
to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor
and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among
the functions of the Committee are—
3.3 RECEIVE COMPLAINTS AGAINST ANY APPREHENDING OFFICER, JAIL WARDEN,
FINAL OR JUDGE WHO MAY BE FOUND TO HAVE COMMITTED ABUSES IN THE
DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTIES AND REFER THE SAME TO PROPER AUTHORITY FOR
APPROPRIATE ACTION;
3.5 RECOMMEND REVISION OF ANY LAW OR REGULATION WHICH IS BELIEVED
PREJUDICIAL TO THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
ISSUE:
Whether the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee
discharges as administrative functions and will be in violation of the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Provincial Committee on Justice
involves the exercise of administrative functions, hence, it will be in violation of the
Constitution.
Petition is denied.
32. Nicos v CA
FACTS:
(1) The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the
aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the Constitution. The
petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly
explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners complain that there was no
analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining
itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction
over the derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the
decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals.
(2) January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from
private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a
real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was
foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July
11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction
was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.
(3) CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while
leaving much to be desired, substantially complies with the rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s decision is unconstitutional
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack
of basis. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10,
for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably to the
requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if
desired, in accordance with law.
RATIO:
(1) The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the
letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.
(2) It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of
how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X
and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in
the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
(3) Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for
substance. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits,
the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.
(4) Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the
other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less
unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of words,
arrives at the factual findings reaches the legal conclusions renders its ruling and having
done so ends.
33. Komatsu v CA
FACTS:
National Investment and Development Corp. (NIDC) granted Komatsu Industries
(Phils.), Inc. (KIPI) a direct loan of P8,000,000 and a P2,000,000guarantee to secure PNB. As
security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by KIPI in favour of NIDC
covering a parcel of land with all its improvements embraced in TCT No. 469737. KIPI then
executed an Amendment of Mortgage Deed covering the same parcel of land regardingletters
of credit by PNB in favour of KIPI with foreign suppliers worth US$1,564,826. Upon full
payment of KIPI’s account with NIDC and the 2,000,000credit line with PNB, NIDC executed a
Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage. By virtue of this release, NIDC returned the
owner’s copy of theTCT to KIPI and registered the Deed of Release with the Registry of Deed.
However, PNB requested the return of the TCT due to unsettled accountsbased on the
subsequent amendment of the mortgage. The return was made but after a year, PNB filed for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the property. KIPIcontests the foreclosure saying that the release
by NIDC had the effect of releasing the real estate mortgage.
Petitioner KIPI filed a petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision of
respondent CA. However, it was denied by this Court for failure to sufficiently show that
respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgement (see above).
Hence, in its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner tried a different approach by
assailing the minute resolutions are in violation of the constitution.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
“No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressingthereinclearlyand distinctly the
factsand the law on which it is based.”
HELD:
Yes. “Resolutions” are not “decisions” within the above constitutional requirements; they
merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained. And the petition to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision. The constitutional mandate is
applicable only in cases “submitted for decision,” i.e., given due course and after the filing of
briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course,
with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Supreme Court,
after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the
petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the
respondent court’s decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
34. Prudential Bank v CA

FACTS:
Prudential Bank instituted an administrative case seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Benjamin
Grecia in connection with his actuations in a civil case where the latter represented the
plaintiff. Grecia filed a petition for redress and exoneration and for voluntary inhibition.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not a constitutional provision has been disregarded in the Court’s Minute
Resolution dated 12 Jan 1988.
HELD:
NO. It bears repeating that this is an administrative case so the constitutional mandate that
“no…motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Court shall be…denied without stating the
legal basis therefor” is inapplicable.
35. Oil and Natural Gas v CA
FACTS:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the
Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent,
PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation
owned and controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a private
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the
respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already
received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then informed the
private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their
contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner
setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a
Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the
arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but
foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the
required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and
several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to
pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao
City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid
cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the
RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties,
thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Memorandum Decisions are violative of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution
HELD:
No. The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not
preclude the validity of “memorandum decisions” which adopt by reference the findings of fact
and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.Even in this jurisdiction,
incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the
decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is
particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough
discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at.
36. Odchigue-Bondoc v Tan Tiong Bio
Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its
Corporate Secretary, herein respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations.
The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice,
motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible
error.
The CA set aside the DOJ Secretary’s resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondent’s petition for review without therein
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of
Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based).
Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec.
14, Art. VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of “courts of justice”, and it does not
extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ.
Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends
to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted
by these tribunals.
Issue:
Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power.
Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor
does not determine the guilt of innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the
determination whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused.
No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or
petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a
quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions
issued by the DOJ Secretary.
The evidence revealed that the possession of Fabella was illegal from the start and not merely
tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that Fabella started to occupy the lot and
then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of Valdez and before them,
their mother.
Clearly, Fabella's entry into the land was without the knowledge of the owners, consequently,
it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. Tolerance must be present
right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as
one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry.

37. Valdez v CA There was nothing said on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started. There was also no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of Valdez
Facts: to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer was fatal. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer,
Valdez was the owner of a parcel of land where Fabella consructed a house without any color the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.
of title whatsoever. Valdez orally asked Fabella several times to vacate the property but the
latter stubbornly refused.

The parties were not able to settle the dispute amicably, which lead to the filing of a complaint
for unlawful detainer by Valdez against Fabella.

The MTC ruled in favor of Valdez, which was affirmed by the RTC. The CA, on the other
hand, reversed the decision. It held that Valdez failed to make a case for unlawful detainer
because they failed to show that they had given Fabella the right to occupy the premises or
that they had tolerated the possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful
detainer cases.

Issue:

Whether or not the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a case for unlawful detainer.

Held:

No, the allegations of the complaint did not clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the tolerance must be present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper
remedy.

The allegations in the complaint did not contain any fact that would substantiate the claim of
Valdez that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Fabella. The
complaint contained only bare allegations that Fabella without any color of title whatsoever
occupied the land by building their house in the said land thereby depriving Valdez the
possession thereof. Nothing had been said on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties.