PART ONE:

1. Substituted Service as stated by Sec. 8 of Rule 13 and Substituted Service as stated by

Sec. 7 of Rule 14, Rules of Court, distinguished:

1.1 Under Rule 13, Substituted Service covers service of pleadings, motions, notices,
resolutions, orders and other papers to a defendant through another person/ representative,
whereas, Substituted Service under Rule 14 specifically pertains to service of summons to a
defendant through another person/representative in the event that his whereabout is unknown.

1.2 In Substituted Service under Rule 13, pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions,
orders and other papers may be sent via registered mail. While Substituted Service under Rule
14 states that service of summons shall be done by a court's sheriff only.

1.3 In Rule 13, Substituted Service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders
and other papers can be done by delivering the copy to the defendant's counsel, while a
counsel's participation to receive the service of summons under Rule 14 is not stated.

2. Substituted Service of Summons Manual, as provided by the Supreme Court in the case
of Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974.

2.1 A "Valid Substituted Service of Summons" can be made:

2.1.1 by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with

some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or

2.1.2 by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of

business with some competent person in charge thereof.

2.2 Requirements to effect a valid Substituted Service of Summons:

2.2.1 Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service: The party relying on

substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant
cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service
within a "reasonable time".

> Plaintiff - Reasonable Time = no more than 7 days

> Sheriff - Reasonable Time = 15 to 30 days

2.2.2 Specific Details in the Return: The sheriff must describe in the Return
of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service.
 > The date and time of the attempts on personal service,
> the inquiries made to locate the defendant,
> the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of
defendant
> and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant

2.2.3 A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion: If the substituted service will
be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left
with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein.

> who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old)
> must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the
import of the summons,

2.2.4 A Competent Person in Charge: If the substituted service will be done

at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should
be served on a competent person in charge of the place.

> must be the one managing the office or business of defendant

> must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the
defendant in the summons, its importance.

3. Related Cases with Supreme Court's Decisions:

February 8, 2017
G.R. No. 225035
CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs.
RED ROBIN SECURITY AGENCY and MONINA C. SANTOS, Respondents

Facts:
On March 23, 2007, respondent Monina C. Santos (Santos) filed a Complaint for Sum of Money
and Damages against petitioner Carson Realty & Management Corp. (Carson) with the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court (RTC). As per the Officer's Return dated April 12, 2007 of Process Server
Jechonias F. Pajila, Jr. (Process Server Pajila), a copy of the Summons dated April 11, 2007,
together with the Complaint and its annexes, was served upon Carson at its business address at
Unit 601 Prestige Tower Condominium, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, through its
"corporate secretary," Precilla S. Serrano.

Carson moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Summons dated April 11, 2007 was not
served on any of the officers and personnel authorized to receive summons under the Rules of
Court.

The RTC denied Carson's Motion to Dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias summons to be
served anew upon the corporation.

Carson filed a Manifestation stating that the alias Summons was again improperly and invalidly
served as his law office was not empowered to receive summons on behalf of Carson. In relation
thereto, Atty. Roxas maintained that substituted service is not allowed if the party defendant is a
corporation. Thus, Atty. Roxas manifested his intention of returning the alias Summons to the
RTC. Carson, in the main, argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person
because the summons was not properly served upon its officers as mandated under Section
11,17 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Thus, Carson posits, the RTC improperly declared it in
default and should not have allowed Santos to present her evidence ex-parte.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid service of summons.

Held:
Yes. The Court held that the substituted service of summons is valid. A perusal of the Officer's
Return dated October 28, 2008 detailing the circumstances surrounding the service of the
second alias Summons dated September 9, 2008 shows that the foregoing requirements for a
valid substituted service of summons were substantially complied with.

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January 17, 2018

G.R. No. 203298
INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC. and EDMER Y. LIM, Petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EXPRESSIONS STATIONERY SHOP, INC. and JOSEPHINE LIM
BON HUAN, Respondents

Facts:
Petitioner INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES (Interlink) filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of
money and damages against respondents Expressions Stationery Shop, Inc. (Expressions).
Interlink sought from Expressions the recovery of the latter's unpaid rentals and damages
resulting from its alleged breach of their lease contract.

In the Sheriffs Return dated 26 September 2008, Sheriff Benedict R. Muriel (Sheri.ff Muriel) of
the RTC's Branch 167 certified that on 24 September 2008, he served the summons issued in the
subject case, together with the copy of the complaint, on the respondents at the office of the
defendant company's president through a certain Jonalyn Liwanan (Liwanan). Sheriff Muriel
stated that Liwanan undertook to forward the said documents to her superior.

On 5 January 2009, Interlink filed a motion to declare herein respondents in default for their
failure to file their answer.

Respondent, Expression, filed a motion to dismiss the order alleging that the service of the
summons was defective and, as such, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over them. They
further prayed that Interlink's motion for declaration of default be denied.

Issue:
Wether or not there was a valid service of summons.

Held:
No valid service of summons. The 15 May 2009 sheriff's return reveals that Sheriff Muriel
attempted to serve the second summons personally only once on 11 May 2009. Clearly, the
efforts exerted by Sheriff Muriel were insufficient to establish that it was impossible to
personally serve the summons promptly. Further, Sheriff Muriel failed to cite reasons why
personal service proved ineffectual. He merely stated that Ochotorina told him that Bon Huan
was then attending to business matters, and that he was assured that the summons would be
brought to the attention of Bon Huan.

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September 6, 2017
G.R. No. 202505
EXPRESS PADALA (ITALIA) S.P.A., now BDO REMITTANCE (ITALIA) S.P.A., Petitioner
vs.
HELEN M. OCAMPO, Respondent

Facts:
BDO Remittance, a corporation with principal office in Italy, hired respondent Ocampo as a
remittance processor in September 2002. She was dismissed in February 2004 for
misappropriating the sum of €24,035.60 by falsifying invoices of money payments relating to
customers' money transfer orders from February to December 2003. BDO Remittance filed a
criminal complaint against Ocampo for the same acts before the Court of Turin, Italy. Ocampo
pleaded guilty to the offense charged. On April 13, 2005, the Honorable Court of Turin convicted
and sentenced her to suffer imprisonment of six months and a penalty of €300.00, but granted
her the benefit of suspension of the enforcement of sentence on account of her guilty plea.

On September 22, 2008, BDO Remittance filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment7
with the RTC of Mandaluyong City.

On November 21, 2008, the sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons on Ocampo in
her local address alleged in the petition located in San Bernardo Village, Darasa, Tanauan,
Batangas. However, since the address was incomplete, the sheriff sought the help of barangay
officials, who pointed him to the house belonging to Ocampo's father, Nicasio Ocampo, Victor P.
Macahia (Macahia), uncle of Ocampo and present occupant, informed the sheriff that Ocampo
and her family were already in Italy, and that he was only a caretaker of the house.

Issue:
Whether or not service of summons was validly effected upon respondent, who lives in Italy,
through substituted service.

Held:
No. The substituted service is improper under the facts of this case. Substituted service
presupposes that the place where the summons is being served is the defendant's current
residence or office/regular place of business. Thus, where the defendant neither resides nor
holds office in the address stated in the summons, substituted service cannot be resorted to.

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PART TWO:

1. Class Suit and Representative Suit, distinguished:

1.1 In a Class Suit, the persons instituting the action or suit are the real party in
interest directly injured by the act or omission being complained of,
whereas in Representaive Suit, the persons instituting the suit are merely
the representative(s) of an entire class of persons who have the
same interest or who have suffered the same injury.

1.2 In a Class Suit, there is a common cause of action. The group collective enjoys
the right sought to be enforced, while in Representative Suit, the ones
suing are merely representatives of the entire class.

2. Requisites in a Class Suit, as ruled by the Supreme Court:

2.1 subject matter must be of Common or general interest to many persons;

2.2 parties are so numerous that it is Impracticable to join all parties;
2.3 Sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of
 all concerned; and
2.4 Representatives sue or defend for the benefit of all.

3. Related Cases:

G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015

HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON.
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON.
EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH
LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS,
CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY,
OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO
DELOS REYES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 207276

REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON.
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON.
EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH
LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS,
CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY,
OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO
DELOS REYES, RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 207282

HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS,
CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON.
EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH
LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS,
CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
HERMOSA, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
RAMON JESUS P. PAJE in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, AND REDONDO
PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 207366

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON.
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE
LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANOGARCIA,
NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG,
RUBELHPERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO
GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE·LATINAZO,
EV ANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
AND REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Respondents.

Facts:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental Compliance
Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP
Energy.

Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP
energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual
environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the
respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of
an ECC and amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both
the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its
amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its
amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that
it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issues:
Whether or not the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan; and
Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Held:
Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan
because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus,
constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature
of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is
principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that
transcends political and territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance
of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a
causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the
petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due
regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted
relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.

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June 7, 2017
G.R. No. 189102
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners
vs.
HON. GEORGE E. OMELIO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 14, SHERIFF
ROBERTO C. ESGUERRA, CECILIO G. ABENION, and 1,842 OTHER PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO.
95-45, Respondents

Facts:

On August 31, 1993, 4 thousands of banana plantation workers from over 14 countries5
instituted class suits6 for damages in the United States against 11 foreign corporations, namely:
(1) Shell Oil Company; (2) Dow Chemical Company; (3) Occidental Chemical Corporation; (4)
Standard Fruit Company; (5) Standard Fruit and Steamship Co.; (6) Dole Food Company, Inc.; (7)
Dole Fresh Fruit Company; (8) Chiquita Brands, Inc.; (9) Chiquita Brands International, Inc.; (10)
Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.; and (11) Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co.
The banana plantation workers claimed to have been exposed to dibromochloropropane (DBCP)
in the 1970s up to the 1990s while working in plantations that utilized it. 8 As a result, these
workers suffered serious and permanent injuries to their reproductive systems.

The United States courts dismissed the actions on the ground of forum non conveniens14 and
directed the claimants to file actions in their respective home countries. 15

On May 3, 1996, 1,843 16 Filipino claimants filed a complaint for damages against the same
foreign corporations before the Regional Trial Court in Panabo City, Davao del Norte, Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.

Held:

Yes. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts prohibits "parties from directly resorting to this Court
when relief may be obtained before the lower courts."192 This rule is founded upon judicial
economy and practical considerations. On the one hand, it allows this Court to devote its time
and attention to those matters falling within its exclusive jurisdiction.193 It also "prevent[s] the
congestion of th[is] Court's dockets."194 On the other hand, it "ensure[s] that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner."195 The doctrine on
hierarchy of courts was designed to promote order and efficiency.

Although this Court has the power to issue extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, it is by no means an exclusive power. 196 "[I]t is shared [concurrently] with the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts."197 However, "[p]arties cannot randomly select
the .. . forum to which their [petitions] will be directed." 198 The doctrine on hierarchy of courts
determines the proper venue or choice of forum where petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus should be filed. 199

Generally, this Court will dismiss petitions that are directly filed before it if relief can be obtained
from the lower courts. Trial courts and the Court of Appeals are "in the best position to deal with
causes in the first instance."200 They not only resolve questions of law but also determine facts
based on the evidence presented before them. 201

Nevertheless, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be justified "when there
are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition. "202 Immediate resort to this Court may
be warranted:

(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2)
when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6)
when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other
plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes
questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy. 203

We may take cognizance of this case "in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency."204 The
records of this case are sufficient for this Court to decide on the issues raised by the parties.205
Any further delay would unduly prejudice the parties.

4. Modes of Discovery

4.1 Deposition pending action upon oral or written interrogatories

a) by leave of court after jurisdiction obtained over the person or subject.
b) without leave after answer have been served.
To any person whether a party or not at the instance of any party.
Purpose: to get oral or written admissions from a witness.

4.2 Deposition before action

a) by a verified petition in the court of the place of residence of any expected adverse party/
By any person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of another.
Purpose: future action

4.3 Deposition pending appeal

By leave of court if an appeal has been taken or before taking it before expiration period
By appelle or appellant
Purpose: for appeal or future proceedings

4.4 Interrogatories
a) by leave of court after jurisdiction obtained over the person or subject
b) without leave after answer have been served
By and to any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts
Purpose: to elicit material and relevant facts

4.5 Request for Admission

By a written request for admission after issues have been joined
By any party filed and served upon adverse party
Purpose: for admission of:
a) Genuineness of any material documents
b) Truth of material facts

4.6 Production or inspection of documents or things

Upon motion to the court and showing good cause with notice to all
By and to any party for
Purposes:
a) Produce, inspect and copy documents, objects or things not privilege and material evidence to
a case
b) Entry and inspection of place.

4.7 Physical and mental examination

Upon motion to the court and showing good cause with notice to all mental or physical
condition of a party is in controversy.
By any party against the party whose mental or physical condition is in controversy
Purposes: Ascertain the physical or mental condition of a party material to the action

5. Oral Deposition and Written Deposition, distinguished:

5.1 An oral deposition is a pretrial method of discovery. (witness examination or

testimony given in advance of trial) that is taken out of court, under
oath, and may be admissible as evidence, whereas, a written deposition is written
transcript for later use in court or for discovery purposes.

______________________________________________________________________________
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Atty. J Parungo