PART ONE:

1. Substituted Service as stated by Sec. 8 of Rule 13 and Substituted Service as stated

by Sec. 7 of Rule 14, Rules of Court, distinguished:

1.1 Under Rule 13, Substituted Service covers service of pleadings, motions, notices,
resolutions, orders and other papers to a defendant through another person/
representative, whereas, Substituted Service under Rule 14 specifically pertains
to service of summons to a defendant through another person/representative
in the event that his whereabout is unknown.

1.2 In Substituted Service under Rule 13, pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions,
orders and other papers may be sent via registered mail. While Substituted
Service under Rule 14 states that service of summons shall be done by a court's
sheriff only.

1.3 In Rule 13, Substituted Service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions,

orders and other papers can be done by delivering the copy to the defendant's
counsel, while a counsel's participation to receive the service of summons
under Rule 14 is not stated.

2. Substituted Service of Summons Manual, as provided by the Supreme Court in the

case of Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974.

2.1 A "Valid Substituted Service of Summons" can be made:

2.1.1 by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with

some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or

2.1.2 by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of

business with some competent person in charge thereof.

2.2 Requirements to effect a valid Substituted Service of Summons:

2.2.1 Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service: The party relying on

substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a
"reasonable time".

> Plaintiff - Reasonable Time = no more than 7 days

> Sheriff - Reasonable Time = 15 to 30 days
 2.2.2 Specific Details in the Return: The sheriff must describe in the Return
of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service.

> The date and time of the attempts on personal service,

> the inquiries made to locate the defendant,

> the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of

defendant

> and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant

2.2.3 A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion: If the substituted service will
be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a
person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein.

> who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old)

> must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the
import of the summons,

2.2.4 A Competent Person in Charge: If the substituted service will be done

at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should be
served on a competent person in charge of the place.

> must be the one managing the office or business of defendant

> must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the

defendant in the summons, its importance.

3. Related Cases with Supreme Court's Decisions:

February 8, 2017
G.R. No. 225035
CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs.
RED ROBIN SECURITY AGENCY and MONINA C. SANTOS, Respondents

Facts:

On March 23, 2007, respondent Monina C. Santos (Santos) filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money and Damages against petitioner Carson Realty & Management Corp. (Carson) with
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC). As per the Officer's Return dated April 12,
2007 of Process Server Jechonias F. Pajila, Jr. (Process Server Pajila), a copy of the
Summons dated April 11, 2007, together with the Complaint and its annexes, was served
upon Carson at its business address at Unit 601 Prestige Tower Condominium, Emerald
Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, through its "corporate secretary," Precilla S. Serrano.

Carson moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Summons dated April 11, 2007
was not served on any of the officers and personnel authorized to receive summons under
the Rules of Court.

The RTC denied Carson's Motion to Dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias summons
to be served anew upon the corporation.

Carson filed a Manifestation stating that the alias Summons was again improperly and
invalidly served as his law office was not empowered to receive summons on behalf of
Carson. In relation thereto, Atty. Roxas maintained that substituted service is not allowed if
the party defendant is a corporation. Thus, Atty. Roxas manifested his intention of
returning the alias Summons to the RTC. Carson, in the main, argues that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over its person because the summons was not properly served upon
its officers as mandated under Section 11,17 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Thus, Carson
posits, the RTC improperly declared it in default and should not have allowed Santos to
present her evidence ex-parte.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid service of summons.

Held:
Yes. The Court held that the substituted service of summons is valid. A perusal of the
Officer's Return dated October 28, 2008 detailing the circumstances surrounding the
service of the second alias Summons dated September 9, 2008 shows that the foregoing
requirements for a valid substituted service of summons were substantially complied with.

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January 17, 2018

G.R. No. 203298
INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC. and EDMER Y. LIM, Petitioners
vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EXPRESSIONS STATIONERY SHOP, INC.

and JOSEPHINE LIM BON HUAN, Respondents

Facts:

Petitioner INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES (Interlink) filed before the RTC a complaint for
sum of money and damages against respondents Expressions Stationery Shop, Inc.
(Expressions). Interlink sought from Expressions the recovery of the latter's unpaid rentals
and damages resulting from its alleged breach of their lease contract.

In the Sheriffs Return dated 26 September 2008, Sheriff Benedict R. Muriel (Sheri.ff
Muriel) of the RTC's Branch 167 certified that on 24 September 2008, he served the
summons issued in the subject case, together with the copy of the complaint, on the
respondents at the office of the defendant company's president through a certain Jonalyn
Liwanan (Liwanan). Sheriff Muriel stated that Liwanan undertook to forward the said
documents to her superior.

On 5 January 2009, Interlink filed a motion to declare herein respondents in default for
their failure to file their answer.
Respondent, Expression, filed a motion to dismiss the order alleging that the service of the
summons was defective and, as such, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over them. They
further prayed that Interlink's motion for declaration of default be denied.

Issue:
Wether or not there was a valid service of summons.

Held:

No valid service of summons. The 15 May 2009 sheriff's return reveals that Sheriff Muriel
attempted to serve the second summons personally only once on 11 May 2009. Clearly, the
efforts exerted by Sheriff Muriel were insufficient to establish that it was impossible to
personally serve the summons promptly. Further, Sheriff Muriel failed to cite reasons why
personal service proved ineffectual. He merely stated that Ochotorina told him that Bon
Huan was then attending to business matters, and that he was assured that the summons
would be brought to the attention of Bon Huan.

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September 6, 2017
G.R. No. 202505

EXPRESS PADALA (ITALIA) S.P.A., now BDO REMITTANCE (ITALIA) S.P.A.,

Petitioner
vs.
HELEN M. OCAMPO, Respondent

Facts:

BDO Remittance, a corporation with principal office in Italy, hired respondent Ocampo as
a remittance processor in September 2002. She was dismissed in February 2004 for
misappropriating the sum of €24,035.60 by falsifying invoices of money payments relating
to customers' money transfer orders from February to December 2003. BDO Remittance
filed a criminal complaint against Ocampo for the same acts before the Court of Turin,
Italy. Ocampo pleaded guilty to the offense charged. On April 13, 2005, the Honorable
Court of Turin convicted and sentenced her to suffer imprisonment of six months and a
penalty of €300.00, but granted her the benefit of suspension of the enforcement of
sentence on account of her guilty plea.

On September 22, 2008, BDO Remittance filed a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment7 with the RTC of Mandaluyong City.

On November 21, 2008, the sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons on Ocampo
in her local address alleged in the petition located in San Bernardo Village, Darasa,
Tanauan, Batangas. However, since the address was incomplete, the sheriff sought the help
of barangay officials, who pointed him to the house belonging to Ocampo's father, Nicasio
Ocampo, Victor P. Macahia (Macahia), uncle of Ocampo and present occupant, informed
the sheriff that Ocampo and her family were already in Italy, and that he was only a
caretaker of the house.

Issue:

Whether or not service of summons was validly effected upon respondent, who lives in
Italy, through substituted service.

Held:

No. The substituted service is improper under the facts of this case. Substituted service
presupposes that the place where the summons is being served is the defendant's current
residence or office/regular place of business. Thus, where the defendant neither resides nor
holds office in the address stated in the summons, substituted service cannot be resorted to.

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PART TWO:
1. Class Suit and Representative Suit, distinguished:

1.1 In a Class Suit, the persons instituting the action or suit are the real party in
interest directly injured by the act or omission being complained of, whereas
in Representaive Suit, the persons instituting the suit are merely the
representative(s) of an entire class of persons who have the same interest or
who have suffered the same injury.

1.2 In a Class Suit, there is a common cause of action. The group collective enjoys
the right sought to be enforced, while in Representative Suit, the ones suing
are merely representatives of the entire class.

2. Requisites in a Class Suit, as ruled by the Supreme Court:

2.1 subject matter must be of Common or general interest to many persons;

2.2 parties are so numerous that it is Impracticable to join all parties;

2.3 Sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of

all concerned; and
2.4 Representatives sue or defend for the benefit of all.

3. Related Cases:

G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015

HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL
V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA,
JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE
LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA
LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE
GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG,
RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON,
REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D.
PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q.
RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 207276

REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL
V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA,
JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE
LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA
LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE
GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG,
RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON,
REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D.
PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q.
RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 207282

HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON.
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. RAFAEL
V. MARIANO, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON.
JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH
LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA
CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA
MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSA, RODOLFO
SAMBAJON, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
RAMON JESUS P. PAJE in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, AND REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC.,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 207366

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.

HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL

V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO,
HON EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y.
CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANOGARCIA, NORAIDA
VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA, GREGORIO LLORCA
MAGDARAOG, RUBELHPERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO
SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A.
BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE·LATINAZO, EV
ANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, HON. RAMON
JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND REDONDO PENINSULA
ENERGY, INC., Respondents.

Facts:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental
Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be
implemented by RP Energy.

Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan
against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that
actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that
the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the
issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the
ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating
the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as
well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while the
latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issues:

Whether or not the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan; and
Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Held:
Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan
because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus,
constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary
nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.

Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is
principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that
transcends political and territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must
also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action
re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the
perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

June 7, 2017
G.R. No. 189102

CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Petitioners
vs.
HON. GEORGE E. OMELIO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAVAO CITY,
BRANCH 14, SHERIFF ROBERTO C. ESGUERRA, CECILIO G. ABENION, and
1,842 OTHER PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 95-45, Respondents

Facts:

On August 31, 1993, 4 thousands of banana plantation workers from over 14 countries5
instituted class suits6 for damages in the United States against 11 foreign corporations,
namely: (1) Shell Oil Company; (2) Dow Chemical Company; (3) Occidental Chemical
Corporation; (4) Standard Fruit Company; (5) Standard Fruit and Steamship Co.; (6) Dole
Food Company, Inc.; (7) Dole Fresh Fruit Company; (8) Chiquita Brands, Inc.; (9)
Chiquita Brands International, Inc.; (10) Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.; and (11) Del
Monte Tropical Fruit Co.
The banana plantation workers claimed to have been exposed to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP) in the 1970s up to the 1990s while working in plantations that utilized it. 8 As a
result, these workers suffered serious and permanent injuries to their reproductive systems.

The United States courts dismissed the actions on the ground of forum non conveniens14
and directed the claimants to file actions in their respective home countries. 15

On May 3, 1996, 1,843 16 Filipino claimants filed a complaint for damages against the
same foreign corporations before the Regional Trial Court in Panabo City, Davao del
Norte, Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.

Held:

Yes. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts prohibits "parties from directly resorting to this
Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts."192 This rule is founded upon
judicial economy and practical considerations. On the one hand, it allows this Court to
devote its time and attention to those matters falling within its exclusive jurisdiction.193 It
also "prevent[s] the congestion of th[is] Court's dockets."194 On the other hand, it
"ensure[s] that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and
efficient manner."195 The doctrine on hierarchy of courts was designed to promote order
and efficiency.

Although this Court has the power to issue extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus, it is by no means an exclusive power. 196 "[I]t is shared [concurrently]
with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts."197 However, "[p]arties cannot
randomly select the .. . forum to which their [petitions] will be directed." 198 The doctrine
on hierarchy of courts determines the proper venue or choice of forum where petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus should be filed. 199

Generally, this Court will dismiss petitions that are directly filed before it if relief can be
obtained from the lower courts. Trial courts and the Court of Appeals are "in the best
position to deal with causes in the first instance."200 They not only resolve questions of
law but also determine facts based on the evidence presented before them. 201

Nevertheless, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be justified

"when there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition. "202 Immediate resort
to this Court may be warranted:

(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the
essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when
there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the
petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by
the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy. 203

We may take cognizance of this case "in the interest of judicial economy and
efficiency."204 The records of this case are sufficient for this Court to decide on the issues
raised by the parties.205 Any further delay would unduly prejudice the parties.

4. Modes of Discovery

4.1 Deposition pending action upon oral or written interrogatories

a) by leave of court after jurisdiction obtained over the person or subject.
b) without leave after answer have been served.
To any person whether a party or not at the instance of any party.
Purpose: to get oral or written admissions from a witness.

4.2 Deposition before action

a) by a verified petition in the court of the place of residence of any expected adverse party/
By any person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of another.
Purpose: future action

4.3 Deposition pending appeal

By leave of court if an appeal has been taken or before taking it before expiration period
By appelle or appellant
Purpose: for appeal or future proceedings

4.4 Interrogatories
a) by leave of court after jurisdiction obtained over the person or subject
b) without leave after answer have been served
By and to any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts
Purpose: to elicit material and relevant facts

4.5 Request for Admission

By a written request for admission after issues have been joined
By any party filed and served upon adverse party
Purpose: for admission of:
a) Genuineness of any material documents
b) Truth of material facts

4.6 Production or inspection of documents or things

Upon motion to the court and showing good cause with notice to all
By and to any party for
Purposes:

a) Produce, inspect and copy documents, objects or things not privilege and material
evidence to a case
b) Entry and inspection of place.

4.7 Physical and mental examination

Upon motion to the court and showing good cause with notice to all mental or physical
condition of a party is in controversy.
By any party against the party whose mental or physical condition is in controversy
Purposes: Ascertain the physical or mental condition of a party material to the action

5. Oral Deposition and Written Deposition, distinguished:

 5.1 An oral deposition is a pretrial method of discovery. (witness examination or
testimony given in advance of trial) that is taken out of court, under oath, and
may be admissible as evidence, whereas, a written deposition is written
transcript for later use in court or for discovery purposes.

Prepared and Submitted by: Civil Procedure

Mendenilla, Mark Norman Bonggo Atty. J. Parungo