Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SIEGFRIED J. SCHMIDT
This paper deals with epistemological and discourse-theoretical aspects of a theory of fiction-
ality which tries to realize research principles like interdisciplinarity, discourse-orientation, and
empiricity. Presupposing H.R. Maturanas biology of cognition it is argued that there is neither
such a thing as “the” reality nor such a thing as “the” meaning as ontological givens. Instead a
theory of fictionality must realize that people construe their world-models and their meaning-
syndroms according to their biological equipment, their processes of socialization, and their
biographical preconditions as well. Consequently fictionality must be treated as a phenomenon
of conventional acting conditions on the level of discourses. ‘Fictionality’ names a relation
between semantic units (like discourse elements and discourses as a whole) and the state of the
world-model a linguistic agent holds to be true in his social group at a certain time. The prob-
lem solving perspectives of such fundamental assumptions with regards to common topics in the
debate on tictionality is demonstrated in the rest of the paper.
In a recent paper Ihwe and Rieser advocate interdisciplinary efforts in the field of
language-oriented research: “Without extensive collaboration between logicians, lin-
guists, language philosophers, and literary theorists no real progress can [. . .] be
expected with respect to semantical problems of fictional discourse” (1979 : 69).
Perhaps some critics may interpret this plea for interdisciplinary cooperation as
a utopian strategy of some younger scholars, especially in West-Germany. But I
think it is the inevitable result of a series of experiences with compler problem-
situations which obviously require interdisciplinary efforts in order to become clear
as problems even if they cannot be solved this way. This insight into the need of
interdisciplinary cooperation in the fields of language philosophy, logics, linguistics,
and the study of literature as well does not appear to be as widespread in other
countries, including the USA, as it is in Europe.
Besides interdisciplinarity, discourse-orientation seems to be the second indis-
pensable prerequisite for successful research on fictional&y. This insight, too, does
not appear to be sufficiently widespread. As Ihwe and Rieser emphasize: “Most
* Paper contrbuted to the Colloquium on ‘Fiction: Logical and Semiotic Perspectives’, Victoria
University, Toronto, June 20-21,198O.
525
526 S.J. Schmidt / Fictionality in literary and non-literary discourse
logicians don’t yet seem to have discovered the notion of discourse at all. A descrip-
tively adequate logic of fiction seems possible only if the reconstruction of dis-
courses makes progress” (1979: 83).
My third point of departure, my plea for empiric@, is also touched upon by
Ihwe and Rieser: “. . . we have to investigate more seriously the exact nature of
the processes taking place when we read a work of fiction and which lead us to
label it as such. Clearly, these must be dynamic processes” (1979: 73). This means
that we need empirically confirmed insights into the nature of reception processes
in order to be able to build up a valid theory of fictionality.
For the time being no such empirical theory is available, as far as I can see. In
this state of research, scholars interested in the problem of fictional@ could pur-
sue the following strategy:
My own contribution will be centered on the first task for the simple reason
that I am convinced that any (partial) theory of fictional@ urgently demands a
clarification of basic concepts such as ‘world’, ‘perception’, ‘reception’, ‘literature’
etc. and that it should clarify the fundamental presuppositions governing the
researcher’s intuition and his feeling foi evidence. Many of the following considera-
tions are still speculative; this cannot be surprising in view of the fact that theories
of fictionality thus far must be characterized as “preparadigmatic” (in Th.S. Kuhn’s
sense of the term). In such a metatheoretical situation we need speculation as an
indispensable heuristic device. Although I characterize the majority of the following
considerations as “speculative” - measured against the metatheoretical value of
empiricity - I shall try to avoid empty speculations by using basic concepts or
“theory elements” (in J.D. Sneed’s sense) which have already undergone empirical
tests. That is to say, I try to provide some basic heuristic devices for further
research on the problem of ficitionality as a relevant social problem without claim-
ing more than plausibility and partial fruitfulness for my ideas. Consequently my
paper does not intend to treat formal or technical problems of a theory of fiction-
ality. This does, of course, not mean that I deny their relevance.
The contributions in Woods and Pave1 (1979) instructively reflect the state of the
discussion about fictionality. Ihwe and Rieser, in their contribution, have already
[l] As far as I know two stepsin this direction havebeen undertakenup to now: Wildekampet
al. 1980;and Hintzenberget al. 1980.
S.J. Schmidt / Fictionality in literary and non-literary discourse 521
given a thorough survey of the different problems and approaches. Thus I can refer
to their work and restrict myself to a short reference of those problems which, in
my opinion, must be dealt with in theories of fictionality:
(2) This hypothesis clearly holds for all those problems which are centered on
“ontological” and ‘creference-semantical” questions, e.g.
(3) The above mentioned hypothesis also applies to the relation between fiction
and literature. This debate, too, cannot be brought a step further without a
‘proper clarification of the framework in which the reality-fictionality-relation
is considered.
(2) In their paper of 1980 Wildekamp et al. offer the following definition of ‘fic-
tional&y’: “ . . . we will speak of ‘fictionality’ if and only if a person X within
his or her world version Y attributes null denotation to a label Z” (1980: 549).
This definition stresses the point that agents attribute fictional@ to labels, i.e.
that the fictionality of something can only be dealt with in regarding the activ-
[2] For severe critics of speech-act theoretical theories of fiction see Ihwe and Rieser 1979; and
Wildekamp et al. 1980.
S.J. Schmidt/ Fictionalityin literary and non-literary discourse 529
(3) As I already tried to argue in two recent papers (1975, 1976) we should talk of
world-models instead of “the world” or “the reality” in order to be able to
take account of the findings of epistemology and recent biological and psycho-
logical theories of cognition (see below). Talking about world-models obliges
us to clarify the epistemological and ontological state of the pretended world-
models in order to be able to define what sort of relation holds true between
different world-models and fictionalizing operations of speech agents.
The following epistemological considerations are based upon the research work of
H. Maturana (and his research group), H. von Foerster, E. von Glasersfeld, N.R.
Hanson, W.T. Powers, and others; research work that has led to a radical construc-
tivist position in psychology and the theory of cognition. The most important hy
potheses of this position can be summed up as follows:
(1) From a biological point of view men are living systems interacting with other
systems, and - by means of their neuronal equipment - with themselves, too.
These systems are autopoietical as regards their structure, and they are homeo-
statically organized; they are dynamic and closed. The cognitive domain of
these systems is enclosed in the living system itself. What we call abstract
thinking is a sort of recursive interaction of the nervous system with its own
internal states. Self-observation of the system leads to self-conciousness by
means of producing representations of the systems’ interaction (i.e. the system
is able to act as its observer).
(4) One of the most important tasks of socialization consists in adjusting and
assimilating the world models of the different members of a social group or
society by cooperation and consensual communication, by punishment and
reward. Normally this process works without fundamental conflicts such that
most individuals intuitively think their own personal model to be an objective
and adequate picture of “the reality”.
(5) By means of signals (signal systems) one living system is able to orientate other
systems towards certain orientational processes inside the system. Systems do
not communicate information; but they instruct (by means of physical stimuli)
one another to change their internal domain of cognition. The systems
addressed produce information in themselves, using the messages offered to
them by other systems. As far as interaction by natural lanpges is concerned
this process of analogous and parallel production of information inside differ-
ent systems in a communicational situation is supported by (normally) analo-
gous linguistic socialization, by stimuli from the situation, by commonly
shared frames or systems of reference which contribute to the process of
“understanding” [3 1.
(6) The most important consequences of this theory of cognition for a theory of
communication and semantics are the following:
(a) Language is not primarily a system of signs in order to refer to objects; but
language is an instrument for instruction: fustly to orientate a system in
his own cognitive domain; and secondly to orientate other systems in their
[3] For details see Maturana 1970; Hejl et al. 1978; von Glasersfeld 1974, 1977, 1978; von
Foerster 1981.
532 S.J. Schmidt / Fictionality in literary and non-literary discourse
cognitive domains. (It should be noted that, owing to the symbolic nature
of language, the kind of orientation is independent of the kind of the
orientational interaction.) Consequently communication is not a transmis-
sion or exchange of information between systems Sl and S2, but a sort of
instructional interaction between Sl and S2: Sl tries to activate S2 to pro-
duce in S2’s cognitive domain information of the type Sl wants S2 to pro-
duce. The crucial presupposition of human communication consists in Sl’s
conviction that S2 equals Sl .
0) The most important consequence for any semantic theory consists in that
meaning can only be defined as an at least four-place predicate: X means 01
to system S in a communication situation CS. S must be taken seriously as
a living system determined by its needs, abilities, interests, motivations,
and intentions: a system that acts in the framework of his political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural acting preconditions which determine his bio-
graphical situation. A second consequence is that instruments of communi-
cation do not have meanings; instead, communicating systems (communi-
cators) assign meanings to communicational instruments which they have
learnt to manage. In order to clarify these rather complex hypotheses I
propose to introduce a distinction between TEXT and ICOMMUNIKAT.In
the following discussion I shall use these two German terms (defined in
Schmidt 1980) written with capital letters to indicate that they are theo-
retical terms which ought not to be confused with the many different text-
concepts used in linguistics [4]. ‘TEXTS’ are defined as physical objects
(accoustic or graphematic) which communicators have learnt to produce
and to receive as instruments or means of communication. Communicators
expect that they are able to assign cognitive representations to objects
which they recognize as items of a natural language L,, by applying the
rules and conventions which they have learnt during their linguistic sociali-
zation. According to these rules and conventions a communicator (= living
system) Sl transforms the physical stimuli of a TEXT into neuronal signals
adapted to his system-conditions and - by internal operations - assigns an
emotionally charged cognitive structure to this set of stimuli. This cog
nitive representation (which is always emotionally loaded) whose value for
Sl’s biographical situation is automatically checked by Sl, I shall call the
KOMMUNIKAT which Sl assigns to a given TEXT. Sl normally expects
that a TEXT offered to him in a normal situation allows him to construct
a coherent KOMMUNIKAT. People who continuously frustrate this
expectation of “sense-Constance” (cf. Harmann 1976) have to expect
severe sanctions. In assigning a cognitive structure (= KOMMUNIKAT) to a
[4] In his translation of Schmidt 1980, de Beaugrande uses the terms ‘surface text’ (for TEXT)
and ‘communicative text’ (for KOMMUNKAT).
S.J. Schmidt / Fictionality in literary and non-literary discourse 533
TEXT, Sl makes use, of course, of the devices he has learnt during the
process of verbal socialization; e.g. the productive operations like per-
ceiving, disambiguating, and evaluating follow a number of rules such as:
From these presuppositions it follows that any definition of ‘fictionality’ must con-
tain a reference to the world-model and to the cognitive activity of the agent.
Descriptions, assertions, objects or states of affair are not fictional themselves but
they are judged or declared to be fictional by people according to the relation of
their cognitive representation of the objects to their WM, at the time of that decla-
ration. This basic assumption coincides with the position which Wildekamp et aL
have formulated as follows: “Strictly speaking, ‘fictionality’ is thus to be defined in
terms of labels, having null denotation and NOT in terms of ‘non-existing objects’.
S.J. Schmidt / Fictionality in literary and non-literary discourse 535
This engenders two important consequences: first, we avoid highly complicated and
seemingly endless ontological discussions. Secondly, we will have to abolish the
notion ‘fictivity’: defining ‘fictionality’ in terms of labels having null denotation,
and not in terms of non-existing - read: ‘fictive’ - objects, leaves no place for its
entry into our vocabulary” (1980: 549).
Accepting this definition of ‘fictionality’ (,c . . . we will speak of ‘fictionality’ if
and only if a person X within his or her world version Y attributes null denotation
to a label Z”) I propose the following explication of ‘fictionality’: a person Sr
holds an assertion or description to be fictional if his WM, does not contain an
extralinguistic referent for it, but S1 is nevertheless capable to imagine such a refer-
ent or to assign a coherent intensional interpretation to Z using contents and mech-
anisms of WM,.
This concept demands the clarification of two problems:
Among the list of problems dealt with in the fictionality debate there figure
three which have direct impact to an answer to question (A), namely: the problems
of inference, contradictions, and vagueness in fictional discourses. How can we cope
with these problems in the framework of the approach outlined so far?
In reading or receiving a so-called “fictional TEXT” and reading or receiving a
“non-fictional TEXT” we make use of the same receptional operations, e.g. :
That means that we construct a coherent KOMMUNIKAT over the given TEXT.
As I said before, the construction of a coherent KOMMUNIKAT is normally sup-
ported by information provided by the communicational situation, by frames,
acquired previously, and by knowledge stored about topics of the TEXT, etc. Infor-
mation of this type may be more or less missing in reading/receiving a “fictional
TEXT”. Let us regard a literary example: in reading “Burtleby the Scrivener” by
H. Melville I construe my KOMMUNIKAT by means of the information I gather
from the story plus the encyclopedic knowledge about human behavior, large cities,
bureaus, etc. stored in my memory. Insofar the difference between receptional
strategies applied in receiving “non-fictional” or “fictional” discourses is a differ-
Many authors in the debate on fictionality have argued in favor of the existence of
“fictive textual indicators” or “fictive illocutionary indicators”; but, as Wildekamp
et al convincingly show in their paper, the existence of these or comparable con-
textual indicators (theater, genre-indicator, erc.) does not at dlgh~~~t~fe~ that both
author and reader treat the TEXT as a fictional one. In addition, such indicators are
[6] For this reason 1 hold Searle’s ‘paradox’ to be nonsensical: “1.. .] how it be the case in
‘Little Red Riding Hood’ both that ‘red’ means red and yet that the rules correlating ‘red’ with
red are not in force?” (1975: 319).
538 S.J. Schmidt / Fictionality in literary and non-literary discourse
(a) The fictional discourse presupposes at least two actors, where S, intends to
produce a TEXT that can be judged by Sz as ‘fictional’.
(b) Sz must recognize Sr’s intention (by means of whatever indicators) or he must
act us if S1 had (had) the intention of entering a fictional discourse.
(c) Sz must agree to behave as he has learnt to behave in fictional discourses, i.e.
he must apply the “fictionality convention” (see below).
(d) Sz must consider the final result of the discourse to be fictional.
(3) Performing an illocutionary act such as “assertion” the speaker and hearer
expect that it is (in principle) possible to decide whether the assertion is true or
false in w. If a receiver Sz treats an utterance or a whole TEXT as fictional,
he replaces this convention by the fictionality convention: “In agreement with
this convention, the receiver believes that the producer consciously abstains
from conveying his true feelings, opinions, needs, and the like. Consequently,
the receiver does not consider requests or commands to be made and he/she
does no accept assertions as factual informations supplied to him/her. It is this
fictionality convention that enables us to account for the fictionality not just
of assertions but also of requests, questions, commands, and all the other
speech acts” (1980: 555).
Let me now come back to the question of why people take part in fictive dis-
SJ. Schmidt / Fictionality in literary and non-literary discourse 539
courses, before I try to redefine the up to now used defmition of fictionality and
contrast it with other pertinent linguistic phenomena. I suppose that people engage
in fictional discourses for several reasons. First of all, we have to differentiate
between fictional discourses in the system called LITERATURE (in the sense of my
theory of LITERATURE developed in Schmidt 1980) and outside this system. In
non-LITERARY fictional discourses the reasons are often expressed, implied, or at
least hinted at by formulas opening fictional discourses, e.g. “imagine that . . . “;
“taken for granted that . . . “; “ let me play the advocatus diaboli for a while. . . “,
erc. These and similar expressions show that situations like “brain-storming”, “imag-
inatory plays”, “entertainment “, “play of the phantasy”, etc. are invoked: fictional
discourses exercise what R. Musil once called the “Mijglichkeitssimt” (sensitivity for
possibilities), the “as if’, the “change of roles”, without suspending of forgetting
their genuine feelings and opinions. (For LlTERATURE see below.)
(a) Not only sentences but whole TEXTE can be deemed fictional.
(b) Not only assertive speech acts but all kinds of speech acts can be deemed tic-
tional.
(c) Fictionality is not a quality of TEXTE but a quality attributed to KOMMUNI-
KATE.
(d) Fictionality is attributed to KOMMUNIKATE by judgments of agents accord-
ing to conventions regulating fictional discourses.
(e) The fictionality of extensionally interpretable elements of KOMMUNIKATE
is judged in WM, of Sr .
In this section I shall try to indicate how some of the problems in the fictionality
debate hinted at in section 2 can be treated in the above mentioned discourse-
oriented framework.
Ihwe and Rieser remark that the problem of “alternative worlds” in fictional dis-
course has been overlooked by most theoreticians. I think it can be quite easily
treated in general in my concept of fictional&y. The starting point of my argument
is provided by the above model of reception where reception is described as the
construction of a KOMMUNIKAT over a TEXT. If the KOMMUNIKAT contains
reports on agents (A), the recipient must try to construct the world-model pre-
S.J. Schmidt / Fictionality in literary and non-literary discourse 541
supposed by the way of acting (in the broadest sense of this word) or inferable
from these actions. In this process the recipient must invest all the knowledge of his
WM, stored in his memory into the construction of A’s ortho-world-model AWM,.
Compared with this AWM, the KOMMUNIKAT may contain WM,‘s that are judged
to be fictional by A. (E.g., a unicorn in a world of unicorns in which only white
unicorns exist reports that he (it?) dreamt of a red unicorn and evaluates this dream
as “mere fiction”.) Equally, descriptions or assertions in fictional discourses may be
judged as true or false, as irreal or as a lie according to the relation between the
world-models of the different agents in the fictional discourse itself, i.e. according
to the conditions of truth-proving conventions in the different worlds. This case
clearly reveals the world- and judgment-sensitivity of the predicate-assignment “X is
fictional”.
(2) Proper names in fictional discourse and the problem of ‘guest appearances’
In this section I shall only give the first part of an answer; the second is given in sec-
tion 9 in the context of a short report of my theory of LITERATURE. If a text
contains proper names of persons that really exist(ed) and whose actions and per-
sonal characteristics are more or less known to the recipient, this knowledge consti-
tutes a part of his complex system of acting preconditions. This knowledge is - in
one way or another - involved in the KOMMUNIKAT the recipient assigns to the
TEXT containing such proper names. It does not matter whether he is engaged in a
fictional or in a non-fictional discourse. If the elements of the KOMh4UNIKAT K
assigned to a proper name N in a TEXT T are compatible or coincide with the
recipient’s R knowledge about N no problem arises. If it is incompatible or conflicts
with R’s knowledge then R will normally behave differently in fictional and in non-
fictional discourses. Incompatibilities in non-fictional discourses will lead to a rejec-
tion of the speaker’s or writer’s utterances; incompatibilities in fictional discourses
will be asked for possible functions intended by the author of T (e.g. as a means of
irony, “Verfremdung”, etc.). The compatibility-condition equally holds for cases of
so-called “guest appearances”: Jerry Cotton must remain more or less identically
characterized in the different issues of the series so that he can be identified as “the
same”. If these attributes are changed without plausible reasons and without a
recognizable function of this change (e.g. in a parody of Jerry Cotton) then the
reader will consider those attributions to be false with regard to the world-model he
has assigned to Jerry Cotton.
I deliberately chose an incorrect title for this section because I think the title
reflects a popular version of the problem implied and because I think that this prob-
lem is incorrect and misleading.
A more promising treatment has to start from changed presuppositions concern-
ing the concept of fictional@ and the concept of literariness. I shall not repeat the
long and controversal history of this problem; instead I shall sketch my own pro-
posal. The fust part of this task has already been achieved by the outline of a dis-
course-oriented theory of fictional&y. The second part includes a similar rough
outline of a theory of LITERATURE.
The decisive difference between traditional concepts of ‘literature’ and my con-
cept consists in the definition of the research domain appropriate to an empirical
study of LITERATURE (for all details see Schmidt 1980). Whereas most tradi-
tional concepts primarily (or even exclusively) focus on the “literary work of art”,
I am convinced that a theory-of LITERATURE must consider the totality of social
activities oriented towards so-called literary works; for the reason that not TEXTE
but KOMMUNIKATE are judged by agents to be literary according to their aes-
thetic norms and values. This is to say that TEXTE, KOMMWIKATE, meanings,
values, etc. are inseparably bound to the activities of agents - a connection which
has to be considered by any empirical theory of LITERATURE insofar that we
must realize that any analysis of isolated texts is a highly abstract operation. If this
hypothesis is correct, then a concept of LITERATURE or LITERARINESS must
be based upon he factual behavior of agents oriented towards (what they consider
co be) literary works. In Schmidt 1980, I have proposed to call this complex of
social activities focussing’on objects that are held to be literary by agents, the social
system of LITERATURE.
LITERATURE can be described as a system (in a sense close to N. Luhmann’s
concept of ‘system’ in 1970) because it has a certain structure, a so-called in-out-
differentiation (Aussen-Innen-Differenzierung), is accepted as an institution by
society, and fulfills functions which no other system in our society can equally
fulfill or actually fulfdls. The structure of the social system called LITERATURE is
defined by temporal and causal relations between the four roles of actions that are
fundamental and elementary for this system: the roles of producing, mediating,
receiving, and processing literary objects. The in-out-differentiation of the LITERA-
S.J. Schmidt / Fictionality in literav and non-literary discourse 543
TUBEsystem is mainly achieved by two conventions which I call the aesthetic con-
vention and the convention of polyvalence [7]. The aesthetic convention (A-con-
vention) dominates another convention which is governing all the other social sys-
tems except that of LITERATURE (or aesthetic communication in general): the
so-called fact-convention (F-convention). The empirical hypothesis expressed by
the term F-convention can be formulated as follows: all communicational partners
in our society S mutually impute to each other the knowledge that in communica-
tive actions KOMMUNIKATE and their components that have referents must be
relatable WM, in order that we can fmd out whether the assertions attributed to the
KOMMUNIKAT hold true in m, or what practical advantage they may have with
regard to subsequent actions in S. The empirical hypothesis expressed by the term
A-convention can be formulated in this way: all communicational partners in our
society S, who intend to realize (= construct in their cognitive domain) literary
KOMMUNIKATE, mutually impute to each other the knowledge that in S they
must be willing and in a position
I have talked about this convention in some detail because it will turn out to be
relevant for the tictionality-debate. The second convention, relevant for defining
the system of LITERATURE, increases the recipients’ possibilities to assign mean-
ingful and personally relevant KOMhWNIKATE to literary objects. It optimizes the
reception processes by combining different modes of experiencing in one and the
same reception process (experiencing the KOMMUNIKAT at the same time in cog-
nitive, emotive, and normative domains). By interpreting these conventions in
socio-cultural contexts in terms of poetic norms and values opinion leaders and peer
groups decide first of all which objects are treated and valued as “literary works”;
they then rank the works on scales from good to bad, from serious to trivial, etc.
[8] cf. Wildekamp et al. (1980: 558-9): “We considerthis limitation of ‘fictionality’, [s.j.s.] to
‘literary’ utterances to be at least artiflciai. ‘Fictionality’, in our conception, also applies to
utterances and texts other than purely ‘literary’ and indeed to semiotic systems other than
verbal”. Wildekamp et al. cite examples in grammars, commercials, utopians, children’s game&
jokes and the like. “These examples all got to show that:
(1) Fictionality is a general social phenomenon that occurs far and wide in our society, in
science, art, and every day life,
(2) tictionality occurs in oral as well as in written texts.”
S.J. Schmidt/ Fictionalityin literary and non-literarydiscourse 545
not at all exclude the existence of WM,-true parts in literary works, because they
normally do not entirely consist of fictional discourse-elements. So-called realistic
novels contain descriptions of persons, landscapes, cities, erc. which are true in our
WM,. This fact does not render such novels to a non-literary status, because WM,-
truth is not excluded but only dominated by poetic norms in LITERATURE.
Here, too, we must distinguish two cases (and thereby answer the second half of
the question concerning proper names in fictional discourses):
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Siegfried J. Schmtit was professor of text theory (since 1971), and professor of theory of liter-
ature (since 1973) at the University of Bielefeld. Since 1979 he is professor of German Litera-
ture and AIIgemeine Literaturwissenschaft at the University of Siegen. He has published several
books and articles on philosophy of language, text theory, aesthetics, theory of literature, con-
crete and conceptual poetry. Among his recent publications is Grundriss der Empirischen Liter-
aturwissenschafi (1980).