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‘THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO FOUCAULT English translation by Forest Williams, “Dream, Imagination, and Exi- tence," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 19, (1984~ 198sh: 29-78. Frangois Ewald, “Anatomie et cops poltigus,” 1239. In this too he is remarkably close tothe ater Sarre, who saw the pos: bility of “touaization without a totalizer” a8 the question about the meaning of history. Interview with Frangols Ewald, "Le Souci dela wri,” 18. ‘See my "Truth and Subjectivation inthe Later Foucault,” §31~40. For a development ofthis argument, see my “Foucault and Historical [Nominalism,” in H.A. Durfee nd D.ET. Rodier, eds, Phenomenology and Beyond: The Self and Its Language, x34~47. Portions of this essay hhave been included here with permission, ‘An extended discussion ofthis topic occurs in my “Foucault and the (Career ofthe Historical Event,” Dauenbaue, ed, At the Nexus of Phi osophy and History, 78-200. Portions ofthis piece have been used here with permission See my "Foucault and the Spaces of History,” 165-86. See Derek Attidge etal, eds, Post-Stucturalism and the Question of “History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Foucault, in fact, observes: “While I see clearly that bind what was known at structuralism, there was a certain problem — broadly speaking, chat of the subject and the recasting ofthe subject 1 do not understand what kind of problem is eommon tothe people we call post modem or post: srueuralise” (PPC, 34) Paul Veyne, Writing History, trans, Mina Moore Rinvolues (Middle- town, Cons: Wesleyan Universiey Pres, 1984), 43. See Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Postmodem Conditions: A Report on Knowledge, tans. Geof Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: ‘University of Minnesota Press, 198,10. See, for example, Richard J, Bemstein, ed, Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge: MIT Pres, 198s). See, for example, Jacques Proust et al, “Entretiens sur Foucault,” Le Pensée 137 [February 1968) 4~37) a8 well as Gary Gutting, Michel Fou cault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason 175-79. Flynn, “Foucault and the Spaces of History,” 1 ‘These and similar objections are developed at length in Prul Ricoeu, ‘Time and Narrative, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984-88), and in David Care, Time, Noratve, and History (Blooming ton: Indiana University Press, 19861 2 Foucault and the history of madness "1am not a professional historian; nobody i perfect.” ‘Michel Foucaule Foucault’s work always had an ambivalent relation to established ‘academic disciplines, but almost all his books are at least superfi- cially classifiable as histories. His first major work, in particular, ‘seems to proclaim its status in the title: Histoire de la folie d Tage classique.* One plausible way of trying to understand and evaluate this seminal book is by assessing its status as a work of history ‘The reactions of professional historians to Histoire de la foile seem, at frst reading, sharply polarized.» There are many acknowl ‘edgments of its seminal role, beginning with Robert Mandrou's early review in Annales, characterizing it as a “beautiful book” that will be “of central importance for our understanding of the Classical period.”+ Twenty years later, Michael MacDonald confirmed Man- ‘drou's prophecy: “Anyone who writes about the history of insanity in early modern Europe must travel in the spreading wake of Michel Foucault's famous book, Madness and Civilization.”s Later endorse- ‘ments have been even stronger, Jan Goldstein: “For both their em- pirical content and their powerful theoretical perspectives, the ‘works of Michel Foucault occupy a special and central place in the historiography of psychiatry.”* Roy Porter: "Time has proved Mad- 47 48 THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO FOUCAULT ness and Civilization far the most penetrating work ever written on the history of madness."* More specifically, Foucault has recently been heralded as a prophet of “the new cultural histoy.”* ‘But criticism has also been widespread and often bitter. Consider H.C. Eric Midelfort’s conclusion from his very influential assess: ‘ment of Foucault’ historical claims: "What we have discovered in looking at Madness and Civilization is that many of its arguments fly in the face of empirical evidence, and that many of its broadest ‘generalizations are oversimplifications. Indeed, in his quest forthe ‘essence of an age, its episteme, Foucault seems simply to indulge in 1a whim for arbitrary and witty assertion so often that one wonders ‘why so much attention and praise continue to fall his way.”» Many of Midelfort’s criticisms, if not always his overall assessment, have been widely endorsed by, for example, Peter Sedgwick, Lawrence Stone, lan Hacking, and Dominick LaCapra.* ‘From the above juxtaposition of texts, it would seem that histori- ans are sharply split in their view of the value of Foucault's work. But the division pretty much disappears on closer scrutiny. Those who applaud Foucault have primarily in mind what we may call his meta-level claims about how madness should be approached as 1 historiographical topic. They are impressed by his view of mad- ness as a variable social construct, not an ahistorical scientific siven, and of the history of madness as an essential part of the history of reason. These views are now generally accepted by histo- rians of psychiatry! and Foucault was one of the first to put them forward. In this sense he is a widely and properly revered father of the new history of psychiatry. But on the “object-level” of specific historical facts and interpretations, the consensus of even favorably disposed historians is that Foucault's work is seriously wanting. ‘Andrew Scull, whose own work shares much of the general sprit of Foucault's, nonetheless endorses what he rightly says is “the ver: dict of most Anglo-American specialists: that Madness and Civil zation isa provocative and dazzlingly written prose poem, but one resting on the shakiest of scholarly foundations and riddled with ‘errors of fact and interpretation.” Similarly, Patricia O'Brien, in an article expressing great enthusiasm for Foucault's work, agrees ‘ff “historians who are willing to admit that Foucault was writing history find it bad history, too general, too unsubstantiated, too ‘mechanisti."» Foucault and the history of madness 49 Even historians who havea more favorable view of Foucault's spe- cific historical claimsarereluceant to acept him as amember oftheir tribe fan Goldstein, after maintaining tat "Foueaul sed historical ‘material wo great advantage” and that his historical sense wat extra ordinarily acute,” goes on to note that “Foucault always considered / imselfaleastasmuchaphilosopheras ahistorian, whose epstemo: logical and political project required that he challenge the ordinary canons of history wating" Consequently as she remarks in a e- ‘ew of Discipline and Punish, "the sual entra of historia cho trship cannot be used to assess” Foucault's works MacDonald is simlaly ambivalent: "Much of what Foucault has to aay eeems to ame tobe correc, in pit of his ejection ofthe prevaling standards of histrial discourse a) Allan Mel goeseven further Form, nat only does Foucault's workfall ouside the discipline of history, “els andliscplinar, standing outside all dsiplines and drawing fom them only inthe hope of undermining them. At least one Foucaultian, Colin Gordon, has opposed this consen- sus, arguing tha historians have rejected Foucault conclusion be Cause they have not propedy understood him. The difcultes of Histoire dela fli and, especialy, che greatly abridged nature ofits English translation have led to misinformed criticism. “Histoire de 1a fli has ben largely unread or misead book." The suggest, we read Foucault's fll text with cae, we wil ind most ofthe Standard riticisms tobe misplaced and recognize his work asa ich source of detailed historia night. We have, then, three suggestions regarding Foucault's istry of sadness. The consensus of working historians i that tis bad hi tory To this Calin Gordon responds tha tis god history for, at leat that there ate not yet sufitent grounds for thinking tis ad ‘And, questioning the presupposition of both these views, i the elaitn of Goldstein and Mepil that it sno story tall. Gordon is clearly right that many of the standard historical criti- cioms of Histoire de la folie are misdirected. Midclfo., because of his wide influence is the beat example. He ays chat considered istry, Focal’ atument rests o four basi contentions ‘he Bin. athe forsale between the medletal oto of ep rosy andthe modem notion of madness Sean Foal’ conten ‘on ht inthe ate Middle Age and ently Renainance the ade ny dering madnes having tee ecgnsed a pat of uch. The 50 THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO FOUCAULT third major contention... is that this openness [ofthe Middle Ages and Renaissance to madness] disappeared in the Age ofthe Great Confinement, beginning in the mid-seventeenth century... The fourth and final conten: ‘ion posits a transition to madness as mental illness, ia which Foucault examines the work of the reformers, Tuke and Pinel, and concludes that they “invented” mental illness. ‘The reader of Foucault's book is immediately struck by the oddity ‘of claiming that these are its “basic contentions.” Although Fou: ‘cault explicitly offered a history of madness in the Classical Age, it seems that ehree of his four central elaims are about other periods. In fact, neither of the first ewo contentions is centzal to Foucault's argument. He begins his book by suggesting that leprosy in the Mid- dle Ages bore some striking functional parallels to madness in the ‘Classical Age: both lepers and the mad were objects of fear and repulsion; both were isolated in houses designed more for separation from society than for cures; both were used as joint signs of divine justice and mercy; and in some cases funds and institutions origi- nally meant for lepers came to be used for the mad. There is, Fou- cault thinks, a nice parallel between the two phenomena, a parallel hhe uses as a thetoricaly effective opening of his book. But as far as historical substance goes, the leprosy discussion is entirely nones- sential. Leave it out and the core of Foucault's argument about the nature of Classical madness and its relation to modem psychiatry is unaffected, ‘To some extent, the same is true ofthe contrast Foucault sets up between the integration of madness into medieval and Renaissance existence and its exclusion by the Classical Age. The main point is that exclusion and confinement were distinctive features ofthe Clas- sical Age's attitude toward madness. Foucault sketches an ingenious and provocative story about the medieval and Renaissance view- points, but no central argument depends on this account. The need- ful point is merely that exclusion and confinement distinguish the Classical Age in a fundamental way from the preceding centuries. Beyond this, Foucault's hypotheses as to what went on in the Middle ‘Ages and the Renaissance are just intriguing marginal, In any case, the specific objections Midelfort raises to Foucault's

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