Land Titles

1 Land Titles for Atty.
Abano by Jason Arteche
Traders Royal Bank vs CA

Facts
Sps. Capay (respondents) took out a loan from Traders Royal Bank (TRB) that was secured by the
Capay’s Property X. The Capay’s defaulted and TRB extrajudicially foreclosed Property X. The
Capay’s challenged the foreclosure in court and caused to be annotated in the Property X’s title the
notice of lis pendens. The foreclosure still proceeded and TRB acquired Property X in the auction. A
new title to Property X was issued in TRB’s favor but without the notice of lis pendens. The Capay’s
filed a case to recover Property X.
While the case was still pending TRB sold Property X to a 3rd person. The 3rd person sold Property X
to a 4th person and so on. All the subsequent titles issued in favor of the non-bank buyers had no
notice of lis pendens. The lower courts ruled in the Capay’s favor and ordered Property X returned to
the Capay’s. However, Property X couldn’t be returned because of its subsequent transfers. The
Capay’s filed another case to recover Property X but the lower court ruled in favor of the non-bank
respondents.
Issue
Who has the better right to Property X? Capay’s or the 3rd person, 4th person, and so on?
Held
The 3rd person, 4th person, and so on.
The certificate of title issued in TRB’s favor contained no notice of lis pendens. The subsequent titles
issued in the non-bank buyers’ favor also didn’t contain such notice. The non-bank buyers had the
right to rely on the title of their predecessors and weren’t bound to go beyond the same. There was
nothing to arouse their suspicion that said property was under litigation.
Next, the non-bank buyers exercised extraordinary diligence when they physically inspected Property
X and inquired from the Register of Deeds for any defect in title.
Further, between 2 innocents persons the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done will bear
the loss. Here, the Capay’s slept on their right when they could have easily inspected the title issued in
TRB’s favor to determine if their claim was annotated on it.
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2 Land Titles for Atty. Abano by Jason Arteche
Tan vs Phil. Banking

Facts
The Sps. Aguinaldo took out a loan from Phil. Banking secured by the former’s Property X. The Sps.
Aguinaldo failed to pay back the loan and the Bank moved to foreclose Property X. The Bank
acquired Property X in the subsequent auction.
The Sps. Aguinaldo filed a case to nullify the foreclosure proceedings that they won in the RTC. The
Sps. Aguinaldo then sold Property X to Tan. The Sps. Aguinaldo’s title indicated no claims,
encumbrances, or mortgages.
The Bank appealed the case to the CA and impleaded Tan as a nominal party and eventually won a
decision to reclaim Property X. The Register of Deeds was ordered to cancel Tan’s title and issue one
in the Bank’s favor.
Issue
Who has the better right to Property X? Tan or the Bank?
Held
Tan.
Tan wasn’t even a party to the action between the Sps. Aguinaldo and the Bank in the CA case. Tan
was merely impleaded in his nominal capacity as the newly registered owner of Property X.
Next, Tan’s title over Property X was regularly issued after buying it from the Sps. Aguinaldo. Tan
relied on the Sps. Aguinaldo’s title that was free from any claims, encumbrances, or mortgages. Tan’s
title can only be challenged in a direct action and can’t be the subject of a collateral attack.
Republic vs Guzman 2/23/2000

Facts
After a public bidding the Board of Liquidators awarded Property X to Eusebio. Eusebio transferred
her rights to Property X to Guzman. Guzman afterwards sold Property X to his daughter and her
husband. The daughter and husband eventually mortgaged Property X in favor of Hoescht Phil
(Hoescht).
The daughter and her husband failed to settle their obligation and Hoescht foreclosed Property X.
Hoescht acquired it in the ensuing sale. The Government filed a case against Guzman to reclaim
Property X alleging Guzman acquired it through fraudulent means. The Government also further
alleged the daughter and husband weren’t innocent purchasers for value.
Issue
Does the Director of Lands still have authority over Property X?
Held
Yes.
The Director of Lands doesn’t lose authority over land the moment an original certificate of title is
issued covering the same. The Director of Lands has the duty to investigate patents and titles
allegedly secured fraudulently. An indefeasible title is no bar to the Director of Lands from
investigating how title was acquired if the investigation’s purpose is to determine the existence of
fraud, even after 1 year from the time the title was issued.
Next, Guzman fraudulently acquired Property X because he failed the requirement to take possession
of and improve the land. Further, his daughter and husband aren’t innocent purchasers for value
because they knew of Guzman’s fraud and the fact another person was occupying Property X.
Sherwill Corp. vs Sitio Sto. Nino Inc.

Facts
Sherwill Corp. owns Land X as evidenced by a certificate of title in its name. Sherwill filed a case
against Sitio Inc. to quiet title and prevent the Land Management Bureau from hearing the case Sitio
Inc. filed with the Bureau challenging Sherwill Corp.’s titles.
Issue
Can Sherwill Corp. petition the court to prevent the LMB from hearing the case Sitio Inc. filed before
it?
Held
No.
The courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters falling in the Land Management Bureaus’s
powers and should defer jurisdiction on the matter to the Director of Lands. The Director of Lands is
the officer charged with carrying out the Public Land Act’s provisions and has control over the
concession, disposition and management of public lands. The case should remain with him for final
adjudication.
Next, the Director of Land doesn’t lose authority over the land even if an original certificate of title
over the same is issued. It is the Director of Land’s duty to investigate alleged fraud in securing titles.
A title’s indefeasibility doesn’t bar the Director of Lands from investigating how such title was
acquired if the purpose is to determine if there has been fraud.
Republic vs Rosenoor Mining

Facts
Rosenoor Mining found a huge cache of marble deposits in a mountain in the province. Rosenoor
Mining then applied with the Bureau of Mines for a mining license to exploit the marble deposits.
After some time, Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed the new DENR minister. Maceda cancelled
Rosenoor Mining’s license.
Issue
Is the mining license's revocation valid?
Held
Yes.
The mining license violated the law under which it was granted by exceeding the 100 hectare limit.
Further a mining license, any license to exploit natural resources for that matter, is a privilege granted
by the State that can be revoked at any time in the interest of public welfare.
All natural resources belong to the State and the Constitution states such resources are under the
State's full control and supervision.
Republic vs Guzman
Facts
Norma Almanzor and Guzman filed conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title over
Land X. Almanzor occupied Land X since 1928 and she applied for confirmation of title in 1991.
Before 1965, Land X was classified as forestland. After 1965, Land X was classified as agricultural
land.
Issue
Who should own Land X?
Held
Guzman.
Prior to Land X’s declaration as alienable land, any occupation can’t be considered in counting the
30-year prescriptive period. As such, the counting should start only from the time the land was
classified as agricultural land.
In this case, even starting from 1965 Norma Almanzor would still be short 4 years of the required 30-
year prescriptive period.
Pagkatipunan vs CA
Facts
Pagkatipunan filed an application for judicial confirmation and registration of title to Land X. The
court granted the application. Afterwards, the Government challenged Land X’s registration arguing
Land X was classified as forestland at the time Land X was registered. Therefore, said land was
inalienable and can’t be registered.
Issue
Does Pagkatipunan have a better right to Land X against the Government?
Held
No.
Unless it’s shown the State has reclassified or alienated public land to a private person it remains part
of the inalienable public domain. Occupation, no matter how long, can’t ripen into ownership.
The Regalian doctrine states that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and all lands not
appearing to be privately owned are presumed to belong to the State. The classifications of lands
describe not its physical status but rather its legal status.
In this case, Pagkatipunan applied for title while Land X was classified as forestland. No evidence
shows Land X has been reclassified as alienable land by any positive act of Government.
Collado vs CA
Facts
Collado filed an application to register Land X. Land X’s technical description states it’s inside the
Mariquina Watershed. Collado and co-petitioners alleges their private rights have vested in Land X in
1902, 2 years before Land X was made part of the Mariquina Watershed.
Issue
Does Collado have registrable title over the lot?
Held
No.
A Watershed is a natural resource because it helps provide one of the most basic human needs, water.
Land X became inalienable public land after being made part of the Mariquina Watershed. A land
once classified is presumed to continue as so until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.
In asserting ownership over land, the applicant bears the burden of proving he meets all the
requirements to register such land. In this case, Collado failed to prove he acquired ownership over
Land X before 1904, the time when Land X became part of the Watershed. Further, the time of
occupancy after 1904 can no longer be counted in Collado’s favor because the Public Land Act
applies only to alienable land.
An exception to this case is if Collado acquired private rights over Land X before it was declared part
of the Watershed. Private rights here meaning ownership that can ripen into title.
Spouses Laburada vs LRA

Facts
The Sps. Laburada applied to register Land X that the RTC granted. The decision became final and
the RTC issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
However, the LRA refused the order because Land X was already covered by another Torrens title.
The Sps. Laburada then filed this action for mandamus to compel the LRA to issue the decree.
Issue
Can the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue the corresponding decree?
Held
No.
First, the judgment isn’t executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law.
Consequently, the Sps. Laburada don’t have any clear legal right to implement it. A judgement of
registration doesn’t become executory until after the expiration of 1 year after entry of the final decree
of registration.
Second, it’s possible the RTC’s judgment is void and the LRA’s refusal to issue the corresponding
decree is reasonable. The RTC has no jurisdiction to issue a Torrens title over registered land. The
LRA is mandated to refer to the RTC any doubt it may have in issuing the corresponding decree. In
this sense, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as court officers, and their act is the
court’s act. The LRA is specifically called upon to ‘extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings.’
Third, issuing the corresponding decree is part of the court’s judicial function and isn’t a mere
ministerial act which can be compelled through mandamus. Such act involves exercising discretion.
Fourth, the instant action takes the form of a prohibited collateral attack against the 1st Torrens title.
A Torrens title must be attacked in a proceeding for that purpose.
Heirs of Tan Buto vs Luy

Facts
In 1953, Luy bought Land X from Leyva and had a Torrens title issued in Luy's name. In 1954, Buto
also applied to register Land X. Buto claims his family has possessed Land X in the concept of an
owner long before the end of the Spanish regime. Luy opposes on the ground he's the true owner. The
Government opposes on the ground Land X is part of the public domain.
Issue
Who has the better right to Land X?
Held
Luy.
After 1 year from issuing the decree of registration, the certificate of title serves as an indefeasible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon. A Land Registration Court
has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in an earlier Land Registration
Case. Such second decree is null and void.
The 1st registration is indefeasible because it's binding on the whole world. Further, it promotes the
Torrens system's purpose that is to quiet title and guarantees its indefeasibility.
Bracewell vs CA
Facts
Bracewell owns Land X. In 1963, Bracewell filed an action for confirmation of imperfect title under
the Public Land Act. Bracewell argues he has a right to Land X because he and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of Land X
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1908. The Government argues Land X was classified as
alienable land only in 1972 and the 30-year possession wasn’t met.
Issue
Does Bracewell have a right to Land X under the Public Land Act?
Held
No.
The Public Land Act requires the applicant to prove:

1. The land applied for is alienable public land
2. His open, continues, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
Once these conditions are complied with, the applicant acquires by operation of law a governmental
grant without necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
In this case, the Government proved Land X was classified as alienable land only in 1972; 9 years
after Bracewell filed his application. Under the Public Land Act, there can be no imperfect title to be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as alienable. At the time Bracewell filed for confirmation of
title under the Public Land Act, Land X wasn’t alienable land.
Calecdan vs Cendana
Facts
In 1947, Calecdan’s mother executed a deed of donation over Land X in favor of Calecdan’s brother,
Cendana. Cendana took possession of Land X and lived there until 1998. In 1992, Calecdan filed a
complaint to recover Land X alleging the donation is void. Cendana argues he has already possessed
the land for 45 years.
Issue
Who has the better right to Land X?
Held
Cendana.
Cendana acquired Land X through extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Prescription is another

mode for acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It involves the lapse of
time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription
over real property requires possession and lapse of time of 30 years. Possession must be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted.
In this case, the disputed land was unregistered land. Candena has possessed Land X for 45 years,
satisfying the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive prescription. The following proves
Candena’s possession of Land X:
1. He built his house and lived on Land X
2. He paid taxes on Land X
3. He acquired Land X under the claim of donation, even if the donation is void.
Del Rosario-Igtiben vs Republic of the Philippines

Facts
In 1998, Del Rosario-Igtiben filed an application to register Land X under the Property Registration
Decree. Del Rosario-Igtiben alleges he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of Land X in the concept of an owner
for more than 30 years. Tracing Land X’s history, Del Rosario-Igtiben and his predecessors-in-
interest have indeed possessed Land X from 1958 to 1998.
Issue
Does Del Rosario-Igtiben have a right to Land X?
Held
No.
Del Rosario-Igtiben claims ownership under the Property Registration Decree but his pleadings
establish he’s applying for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act.
Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and Public Land Act are:
1. Against the whole world
2. Judicial proceedings
3. The decree of registration is conclusive and final
4. Have the same goal, namely a Torrens title.
The confirmation of imperfect titles may be done two ways under the Public Land Act namely:
1. Administrative legalization or free patents
2. Judicial legalization.
Application for free patents requires a prescriptive period of 30-years possession. Meanwhile, for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title the possession of land by applicants, either by themselves or
through, their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This requirement conforms to
the Property Registration Decree.
In this case, Land X is alienable public land and the only dispute is the period of possession. Del
Rosario-Igtiben and his predecessors-in-interest have occupied Land X at the earliest only in 1958, 13
years short of the requirement in both the Public Land Act and Property Registration Decree.
Republic vs Manna properties

Facts
Manna properties applied to register Land X. The Government opposed on the ground the
Constitution prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of public domain except by
lease.
Issue
Has Manna properties or its predecessors-in-interest sufficiently established possession of Land X for
the period required by law converting the same into private land?
Held
No.
The Public Land Act requires the applicants to have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Once the Public Land Act’s requirements are
fulfilled, the disputed land is converted into private land by operation of law.
In this case, Manna Properties or its predecessors-in-interest has failed to prove they satisfy the
requirements under the Public Land Act. Consequently, said land is still alienable land of the public
domain.
Manna Properties presented a tax declaration issued in 1950 that allegedly replaced one issued in
1945. However, the 1950 tax declaration fails to state if the 1945 tax declaration was issued before or
after 12 June 1945. Further, the 1950 tax declaration itself is marred by irregularities. At most, Manna
Properties can prove possession only since 1952, 7 years short of the requirement.
Republic of the Philippines vs Hanover World

Facts
Hanover World applied to register Land X under the Property Registration Decree. The application
states Hanover World acquired Land X in fee simple as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. The
Government opposed the application arguing Hanover World and its predecessors-in-interest haven’t
fulfilled the required period of possession under the Property Registration Decree.
Issue
Does Hanover World have a right to Land X?
Held
No.
In applying to judicially confirm imperfect title over alienable land of the public domain under the
Public Land Act and Property Registration Decree, the applicant must have possessed the disputed
land since 12 July 1945 or earlier. Further, the burden of proof in land registration cases rests with the
applicant who must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he satisfies the law’s requirements
for registration.
In this case, Hanover World and its predecessors-in-interest have proved through evidence possession
of Land X only from 1965 onwards. Further, Hanover World failed to provide evidence the DENR
Secretary has declared Land X as alienable and disposable. Hanover World’s CENRO certification
isn’t enough proof to certify Land X as alienable and disposable.
Spouses Llanes vs Republic

Facts
Eugenia possessed Land X since 1930. In 1965 Servillano bought Land X from Eugenia. In 1995
Spouses Llanes bought Land X from Servillano. Eugenia, Servillano, and the Spouses Llanes all
belong to the same family.
In 1996, Spouses Llanes sold Land X to ICTSI Warehousing (ICTSI). ICTSI filed an application
under the Property Registration Decree to register Land X. However, the sale between ICTSI and
Spouses Llanes didn’t push through. ICTSI amended the application substituting the applicants as the
Spouses Llanes. The Government opposed the application.
Issue
Do Spouses Llanes have a right to Land X?
Held
Yes.
Under the Property Registration Decree the applicant must prove:

1. The disputed property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain
2. The applicant or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continues, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation
3. Such possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier
In this case, the Spouses Llanes proved Land X was declared alienable and disposable on 26 March
1928 through the DENR and CENRO certification. Further, the Spouses Llanes proved they and their
predecessors-in-interest have possessed Land X from 1930 onwards, well before 12 June 1945.
Lastly, generations of the Llanes family have declared Land X under their names and paid real
property taxes on it, giving evidence of possession in the concept of an owner.
Heirs of Roxas vs CA
Facts
Respondent Maguesun Corp. filed an application to register 2 parcels of unregistered land. The case
was filed before the RTC and in support of its application Maguesun Corp. presented a Deed of
Absolute Sale in its favor with Melliza as vendor. Allegedly, Melliza acquired the properties from
plaintiff Trinidad Roxas 2 months earlier evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
The Land Registration Authority sent notices of the initial hearing to interested person that didn't
include Trinidad because she wasn't named as an adjoining owner, occupant, or adverse claimant.
Publication was made in the Official Gazette and Record Newsweekly. While the RTC was hearing
Maguesun's application for registration, the LRA reported the properties were already the subject of a
Land Registration Case by Trinidad but no decision was rendered yet.
Eventually, the RTC granted Maguesun's application for registration and ordered Trinidad's
registration case dismissed. Trinidad learned only of the sale and registration in Maguesun's name
when she was asked to vacate the property. Trinidad filed a case before the RTC to set aside the
decree of registration on the ground Maguesun Corp. committed actual fraud.
Issue
Is Maguesun Corp. guilty of actual fraud?
Held
Yes.
Adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case doesn't become final and incontrovertible until
the expiration of 1 year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree. The law recognizes actual
fraud as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. Such petition
however must be filed within 1 year from the date of entry of said decree, the petitioner has a real and
dominical right over the property, and such property hasn't been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
Actual fraud proceeds from an intentional deception through misrepresentation or concealment of a

material fact. A type of actual fraud is extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud prevents a party from having a
trial, from presenting his entire case to the court, or operates upon matters pertaining to the manner in
which judgment is procured.
In this case, Maguesun Corp. committed actual fraud in obtaining its decree of registration. Maguesun
Corp. knew of Trinidad's ownership over the property because Trinidad is the grandaunt of Maguesun
Corp's president. Further, Maguesun Corp. failed to produce Melliza at trial to prove the sale's
legitimacy. Also, it's reasonable to expect Maguesun Corp. would've inspected the property prior to
the sale with Melliza and discovered Trinidad's caretaker occupying the property.
Maguesun Corp. may have referenced Trinidad during the registration proceedings but this isn't
sufficient compliance with the law. Disclosure of Trinidad's adverse interest must be made at the
appropriate time, namely at the time of application for registration.
Further, the notice of hearing was published in the OG but not in a newspaper of general circulation.
Admittedly, publication in the OG is sufficient to confer jurisdiction but omitting to publish in such
newspaper is relevant in assessing the applicant's right to the land.
Republic vs Herbieto
Facts
The Herbieto brothers filed before the MTC an application to register 2 parcels of land located in
Cebu. They claimed to be the owners in fee simple of the subject lots, which they purchased from
their parents. Along with their application, they filed the necessary documents. The Government
opposed the brothers’ application to register the lands.
The MTC set the initial hearing, notices were sent to the adjoining owners, notice posted in
conspicuous places on the lands themselves as well as the municipal building, and published in the
OG and newspaper ‘The Freeman Banat News.’ The MTC issued an order of special default with only
the Government opposing the application.
Later, the MTC promulgated its judgment granting the application and directed the LRA to issue the
decree of registration. The Government appealed and hence this case.
Issue
Did the brothers’ comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration
Decree thereby vesting the MTC with jurisdiction?
Held
No.
The Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the OG shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. But the SC still affirms its declaration that
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to
validly confirm and register the applicant’s title. The notice’s publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is essential and must be strictly complied with.
In this case, the initial hearing was on September 3. The notice was published in the OG on August 10
but it was published in a newspaper of general circulation only on December 19, 3 months after the
actual date of hearing. Such publication is ineffective and deprived adverse claimants of due process.
It’s as if there was no publication at all.
Vergel vs CA
Facts
Vergel and co-petitioners filed an application to register a piece of land in the Laguna RTC. Only the
Government represented by the Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application.
Consequently, the RTC issued an order of general default against the whole world except the
Government.
Afterwards, respondent Gonzales filed with the RTC an ‘Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of
General Default’ alleging in her affidavit that she’s claiming the land in question as an owner. The
RTC denied Gonzales’ motion but the CA reversed settings aside the RTC’s decision.
Issue
Did the CA err in setting aside the RTC’s decision without making a specific finding of fraud,
negligence, accident, or excusable mistake but relying on its view that substantial justice and speedy
determination of the controversy would be better attained in reversing the RTC?
Held
Yes.
In this case, the CA arbitrarily set aside the RTC’s order of general default without factual basis save
for its own gut feeling. Gonzales’ reason she failed to timely file an opposition because she missed
reading the OG and newspaper that contained the notice of hearing can’t be considered excusable
negligence.
Gonzales alleges petitioners are aware of her claim of ownership over the disputed property and the
latter were in bad faith, having filed the application surreptitiously and without notice to her.
However, the CA didn’t make any specific finding on this.
Hence, the case is remanded to the CA in order to make findings of fact constituting fraud, accident or
excusable neglect sufficient to reverse the order of general default in the land registration case.
Heirs of Lopez vs Enriquez

Facts
Sandoval and Ozaeta filed an application to register title before the Pasig RTC. The RTC issued an
order of general default and hearings on the application followed. In May 1966, the RTC granted the
application and in March 1991 the decision became final and executory with the RTC issuing a
certificate of finality. In October 1997, the LRA issued the corresponding decrees. In August 1998,
the Register of Deeds issued the corresponding OCT.
In 1997, the heirs herein filed a motion alleging Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the land to them on
September 1970. Petitioners prayed the RTC issue a decree of registration in their names taking into
consideration the Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. The RTC gave due course to the motion and
conducted hearings.
In November 1998, the heirs filed another motion to declare the decree and OCT void but the LRA
denied the request. The heirs then applied before the Register of Deeds to annotate the OCT with a
notice of lis pendens on the ground they filed a motion to declare the OCT void before the RTC. The
Register of Deeds and LRA denied the request to annotate.
Issue
Do the heirs have standing to file a motion to annotate lis pendens on the OCT and declare void the
registration decrees the LRA issued to the applicant?
Held
No.
A party declared in default loses his standing in court and he can’t appear in court, adduce evidence,
be heard, or be entitled to notice. Such party can’t even appeal from the judgement rendered by the
court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided in the Rules
of Civil Procedure.
In this case, the heirs filed their motion to have the decree and OCT declared void long after the RTC
decision in the land registration case became final and executory. The heirs didn’t present their claim
while the case was still pending. The heirs’ motion before the RTC which the latter gave due course is
insufficient to give them standing for filing an application of a notice of lis pendens. The heirs have
no standing due to the order of general default.
However, contrary to the LRA’s assertion, the heirs didn’t need to file a motion to lift the order of
general default because such order should be filed before entry of final judgement. Any motion to lift
the order of general default would be set aside because it was filed out of time.
SSS vs Chavez
Facts
Respondent Sps. Obedencio filed a civil case for specific performance at the RTC praying the SSS be
ordered to:
1. Cancel the mortgage on their properties
2. To release the documents covering said properties
3. And pay damages. SSS replied saying the spouses had an unpaid obligation to it.
The RTC set a pre-trial but it was cancelled because the judge was indisposed and the pre-trial was
reset. At the 2nd pre-trial, SSS’ counsel failed to attend because he was on an official mission
involving SSS cases. The RTC judge, on motion of the spouses’ counsel, declared SSS in default and
allowed the spouses to present their evidence ex-parte. SSS appealed and hence this case.
Issue
Did the RTC judge err in declaring SSS in default for failure to appear at pre-trial?
Held
No.
In this case, the records reveal SSS failed not only to appear at pre-trial but failed to comply with the
requirements concerning the motion for reconsideration to lift the default order. SSS motion for
reconsideration was fatally flawed because it lacked verification, notice of hearing, and affidavit of
merit.
Procedural rules aren’t to be dismissed simply because their non-observance would prejudice a
party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they’re to be followed except only for the most persuasive
reasons can they be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. SSS failed to provide a
persuasive reason why it should be exempt from abiding by the rules.
However, a judgment of default doesn’t imply a waiver of all their rights, except the right to be heard
and to present evidence to support their allegations. The non-defaulting party is still required to
substantiate their allegations in the complaint. Consequently, the spouses still have to prove they
already fully paid their obligation to SSS.
Del Rosario vs Republic

Facts
In 1997, Del Rosario filed an application to register a parcel of land. He alleges that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since 1920 or earlier. He presented numerous documents and a witness to prove his
claim.
Issue
Should the land be registered in Del Rosario’s name?
Held
No.
First, submitting in evidence the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in
applications for original registration land is a mandatory requirement. Failure to comply with such
requirement is fatal to an application to register. Del Rosario’s claim he’s excused because he
submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the clerk of court, who then forwarded it to the LRA is
without merit. He should’ve retrieved the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and presented it as
evidence in court. Also, the advance survey plan isn’t sufficient to comply with the law’s requirement.
Second, the court proceedings can’t be reopened for Del Rosario to present the original tracing cloth
plan in evidence. For this to happen it requires:
1. Evidence was discovered after trial
2. Such evidence couldn’t have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable diligence
3. The evidence is of such weight that it will probable change judgment.
In this case, the original tracing plan can’t be considered new evidence because it was available when
the application to register was filed. Further, Del Rosario failed to exercise reasonable diligence by
failing to retrieve the plan from the LRA. He can’t even offer the ‘sepia copy’ of the cloth plan
because he should’ve submitted it in evidence during trial.
Third, the mere planting of bamboo trees isn’t sufficient to prove possession because such trees don’t
need much tending. Further, it’s doubtful if mango trees were even actually planted on the land. Even
if the mango and bamboo trees did exist, such would constitute mere casual cultivation and not
possession under claim of ownership.
Fourth, the land was declared for taxation purposes only in 1997, and taxes due covered only from
1988-1997. Tax declarations aren’t conclusive evidence of ownership but good indicia of a claim of
ownership. Further, the land was classified into alienable and disposable only in 1971 and 1983
respectively (land was divided into 2 portions). Meaning, Del Rosario’s period of occupation for
purposes of the 30-year prescriptive period is only 26 years at most.
Spouses Recto vs Republic

Facts
The Spouses Recto filed an application to register a parcel of land located in Batangas under the
Property Registration Decree or in the alternative under the Public Land Act. The Rectos’ allege they
purchased the land from the sisters Guevarra and Torres who in turn inherited it from their parents.
Torres declared their parents owned the land since 1945 and possessed it in the concept of an owner
since 1930. Guevarra corroborated Torres’ testimony testifying their parents owned the land since
1935. The Spouses Recto also showed additional evidence showing the land was classified as
alienable and disposable since Dec. 31, 1925 pursuant to the CENRO and DENR certification.
The RTC granted the application but the CA reversed on the sole ground the Rectos’ failed to offer as
evidence the original tracing cloth plan.
Issue
Should the application be granted?
Held
Yes.
In this case, the Rectors’ predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land well before 1945 as shown
by the sisters’ testimony. Further, the fact the earliest tax declaration was only in 1948 doesn’t
militate against the Rectos’ because that doesn’t necessarily mean possession didn’t commence in
1945 or earlier. Also, said tax declaration actually cancelled a prior tax declaration. The land was also
sufficiently proven as alienable and disposable since Dec. 31 1925 through a CENRO and DENR
certification.
As to the absence of the original tracing cloth plan, the submission of the original tracing cloth is a
mandatory requirement for registration. However, while the best evidence to identify a piece of land
for registration is the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, blue print copies and other
evidence could also provide sufficient identification. A blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with
the lot’s technical description duly certified by the Bureau of Lands is sufficient to identify the land
applied for registration.
In this case, the land was sufficiently identified by the plan’s blueprint copy and technical description
both approved by the DENR.
Santiago vs CA
Facts
The MWSS filed an application to register title under the Torrens system 11 parcels of land located in
Rizal. Long before WWII, MWSS buried a steel aqueduct pipeline under the disputed lands. Later,
MWSS filed an amended petition alleging ownership over the lands because it and its predecessors-
in-interests, NAWASA and MWD, have been in open continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
The following oppositors appeared alleging ownership over a portion of the disputed lands:
Heirs of Modesto Manahan; evidence are TCT, related papers, and documents
Heirs of Vicente Manah; evidence is an OCT
Carmelino Santiago; evidence is a TCT
Issue
Should the application be granted?
Held
Yes.
A Torrens title covers only the land described therein together with improvements existing thereon, if
any, and nothing more.
In this case, the documents proving ownership such as TCT and OCT are the legs on which the
oppositors claim stands. However, the titles themselves show ownership over the adjoining parcels of
land, not of the lands claimed. Such titles defeat, rather than support, their claim.
Further, MWSS presented tax declarations to buttress its ownership over the land. Tax declarations
don’t prove ownership but are strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a
period sufficient for prescription.
Also, if its true the oppositors merely tolerated MWSS' occupation of the land, they would have taken
steps to register title to it. 60 years is too long a time to not do so, they slept on their rights.
Consequently, MWSS acquired the lands prescription because it possessed said lands for more than
30 years.
Ranola vs CA
Facts
The respondents are the heirs of Alforque and they inherited from Alforque 2 parcels of lands. Later,
the heirs mortgaged the 2 lands to the Rural Bank of Talisay to secure a loan. The heirs failed to pay
the loan and the bank foreclosed the mortgaged property. The Bank sold the foreclosed property to
defendant Ranola. The sold property was 285 sq. meters big. Ranola however couldn’t take
possession of it because one of the heirs, Angeles, claims the house built on it wasn’t part of the
property sold to Ranola. Ranola then filed an ejectment suit against Angeles but they entered into a
compromise agreement with the latter agreeing to vacate the premises and the house given to Ranola.
Later, the lands were cadastrally surveyed and the heirs received a survey notification showing their
property and declaring as adjoining owner Ranola with a property 285 sq. meters big. Ranola also
received a survey notification but this one included the property being claimed by the heirs. Ranolas
‘property in her version of the survey was 500 sq. meters big. Pursuant to his survey notification,
Ranola had a sketch plan prepared.
Consequently, the heirs filed an action to quiet title against Ranola praying they be declared the true
owners of the land in excess of Ranola’s 285 sq. meters.
Issue
Who has the better right to the disputed property?
Held
The heirs.
While tax receipts and tax declarations aren’t conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
credible proof of a claim of title over property.
In this case, the property the heirs are claiming is distinct from the lot Ranola bought from the Bank.
This is clearly shown by the tax declarations covering the claimed lot from year 1950 until 1980. All
these tax declarations show the claimed land was formerly owned by Alforque and later by his heirs.
Coupled with Alforque’s actual possession of the property since 1947, the tax declarations become
strong evidence of ownership.
Also, it’s undisputed the Bank only sold to Ranola a lot 285 sq. meters big as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale. Further, the lot’s tax declarations described it as only 285 sq. meters big. Ranoles
himself admitted in the ejectment suit that the lot he bought was only 285 sq. meters big.
Consequently, the tax declarations coupled with the deed of absolute sale and Ranoles’ judicial
admission proves Ranoles’ lot is only 285 sq. meters big.
Santiago vs SBMA
Facts
Plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez is the sole heir of Hermogenes Rodriguez. During the lifetime of
Hermogenes, he owned Land A registered in his name under a Certificate of Title denominated as
‘Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree.’
Later, Victoria leased the Land A to Santiago and Mateo. However, SBMA is claiming possessory
and proprietary rights over Land A and demanded Santiago and Mateo vacate Land A. Further, it’s
actually using Land A for commercial and other purposes. Victoria then filed a complaint to recover
possession of Land A from SBMA.
Issue
Can Spanish Title still be considered evidence of ownership over real property?
Held
No.
Spanish titles have been divested of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over real property.
The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish
Titles and grants should register their lands under the Land Registration Act. Otherwise, non-
compliance will result in their lands being classified as unregistered.
In this case, Victoria and co-petitioners anchor their right to recover possession of Land A on a claim
of ownership by Victoria being the sole heir of the named grantee, Hermogenes, in the Spanish Title.
However, since Spanish Titles no longer have any evidentiary value, Victoria and co-petitioners have
no legal or equitable title to Land A.
Vencilao vs Vano
Facts
The heirs of Reyes filed an application to registers parcels of land the former allegedly inherited from
Reyes. The application was granted and an OCT issued.
Later, Vencilao filed a complaint for reconveyance of real properties before the CFI. Vencilao alleges
he’s the lawful owner of the parcels of land including the improvements thereon either by purchase or
inheritance, and they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession publicly,
continuously...for more than 30 years. However, the parcels of land were included in the heirs’
application either by mistake or fraud. Vencilao discovered the registration in the heirs’ name when
the latter attempted to enter the parcels of land claiming ownership.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of res judicata. Further, the RTC issued writs of
possession against Vencilao. However, Vencilao refused to comply with the writ of possession and
the RTC cited Vencilao and co-petitioners in contempt upon Vano’s motion.
Later, the RTC likewise issued a writ of demolition upon Vano’s motion even while the 2nd case was
on appeal.
Issue
Is Vano’s petition barred by res judicata? Was the writ of possession and demolition properly issued?
Held
Res judicata: Yes || Writ of Possession: Yes || Writ of Demolition: Yes
Res Judicata
The principle of res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration and
cadastral proceedings. Res judicata makes judgment in one case conclusive in another case provided
the requisites are met.
There are 4 requisites namely:

1. A former judgment which became final
2. Such judgment was rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties
3. It must be a judgment on the merits
4. There is between the 1st and 2nd action: identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.
a. Identity of parties: parties in the 2nd case must be the same parties in the 1st case, or
at least, must be successors in interest or heirs.
Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when notified he doesn’t want to
participate, and only after the property has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding title has
been issued does he file an action for reconveyance, to give due course to such action is to nullify the
registration proceedings and defeat the law’s purpose.
In this case, all the requisites for res judicata are present:
1. A final former judgment: The CFI’s judgment granting the application became final
2. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter and parties: The CFI had jurisdiction
3. Judgment on the merits: The CFI’s judgment was on the merits.
4. Identity
a. Parties: The petitioners in the 2nd case are children of the oppositors in the case
b. Subject-matter: The lands subject of the 2nd case are part of the lands adjudicated in
the 1st case
c. Cause of action: ownership over parcel of lands although the forms of action are
different. Namely one is an ordinary land registration while the other is reconveyance
Writ of possession
In a registration case, the judgment confirming applicant’s title and ordering its registration in his
name necessarily carries with it delivery of possession. Existing laws sanction the issuance of the writ
of possession. Such writ of possession may be issued not only against the person defeated in the
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully occupying the land during the land registration
proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.
The Writ of possession directs the sheriff to deliver possession of the property to the rightful owner.
In the process, the sheriff can eject the losing party from the property. It’s the sheriff alone who has
the duty to enforce the writ.
Hence, Vencilao’s admission they occupied the lands long before the 1st case was filed worked
against them. It proved they unlawfully occupied the lands during the land registration proceedings.
However, Vencilao isn’t guilty of contempt. A person can be cited for contempt only when after being
ejected from the property, he enters it again or disturbs the rightful owner’s possession. Vencilao has
nothing to do with the delivery of possession and he couldn’t have prevented the sheriff from
enforcing the writ if the latter knew how to perform his job.
Writ of demolition
In this case, the writ of demolition was properly issued pending resolution of the case.
A writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of land
to the rightful owner. A writ of demolition must likewise issue especially considering the writ of
demolition is but a complement of the writ of possession.
Alba vs CA
Facts
Respondent Lachica filed an application for title to Land X claiming he bought Land X from a certain
Raz. At the initial hearing, Alba and 2 other oppositors, Braulio and Raz, opposed the application.
The oppositors oppose the application on the ground they are the rightful owners of a portion of Land
X.
Later, the RTC ruled in Lachica’s favor and dismissed the opposition.
Issue
Is Lachica entitled to confirm his ownership in fee simple over Land X worth 4.8 thousand sq.
meters?
Held
No.
In this case, with the exception of 620 sq. meters, there is no satisfactory showing how Lachica
acquired the remainder of Land X. Lachica alleges he acquired the parcels of land making up Land X
from 3 sources namely:
1. Sale from Martirez covering 840 sq. meters
2. Sale from Raz covering 300 sq. meters
3. And the rest through a Sale from Eugrocino Alba.
Alba doesn’t challenge the sale from Martirez but only the other 2 purchases from Raz and
Eugrocino.
The story goes Regado originally owned Land X. Regado then sold 1.3 thousand sq. meters to Raz
and 2.9 thousand sq. meters to Eugrocino. Later, Raz conveyed 840 sq. meters to Martirez and 240 sq.
meters to Braulio. Later, the heirs of Eugrocino sold 676 sq. meters to Alba.
Based on the foregoing transaction, Lachica failed to produce documents to prove the sale from Raz
and Eugrocino in his favor. He relied merely on secondary evidence to prove the sale. Further, there
are glaring variances in the identity and technical description (adjacent owners, tax declarations, land
description, size).
Also, the tax declaration Lachica presented is unreliable because it wasn’t satisfactorily explained
how it ballooned from 620 sq. meters to 4.8 thousand sq. meters. All the previous tax declarations
going back to 1947 merely declared 620 sq. meters and then suddenly in 1956 the latest tax
declaration declared 4.8 thousand sq. meters. Further, the sudden increase happened right before the
application for registration was filed. These circumstances raise doubts on Lachica’s ownership over
the 4.8 thousand sq. meters of land.
On the other hand, Alba and co-petitioners have provided overwhelming evidence to ownership over
the lands they claim. The evidence clearly indicates Lachica owns only 620 sq. meters. They were
able to clearly trace the transfer of ownership from Regado all the way to them through the Deeds of
Sale.
Tumibay vs Soro
Facts
This case centers on Land X, originally titled under an OCT in Sacdal’s name, Soro’s grandmother.
Later, the OCT was cancelled and TCT issued in Tumibay’s name through a ‘Bilihang Tuluyan ng
Lupa.’ Tumibay subsequently sold Land X to his co-petitioners in this case and TCT issued in the
latter’s name. Later, Soro filed an action to annul and recover ownership over Land X against
Tumibay.
The RTC ruled in Soro’s favor ordering Tumibay and co-petitioners return the land to Soro. The
decision however didn’t expressly order the removal of improvements thereon and later became final.
Soro then filed a motion to be restored possession over Land X and to demolish the improvements
thereon. The RTC denied the motion but the CA reversed ordering the RTC to fix the time for
petitioners to remove the improvements on Land X.
Issue
Did the CA err in declaring void the RTC’s denial of Soro’s motion?
Held
No.
A judgment isn’t confined to what appears on the decision’s face, but extends to those necessarily
included therein. Further, the writ of execution to enforce such judgment must conform strictly to
such judgment.
Under the RoC Rule 39 Sec. 10: removing the improvements placed by the obligor on the property
subject of execution requires a special court order upon the obligee’s motion after due hearing and
after the obligor has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
In this case, a judgment of delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the
prevailing party in possession of the property. If the obligor refuses to surrender possession, the
sheriff has the authority to oust him and an express order to this effect doesn’t need to be stated in the
decision. As to removing improvements on the land, such authority is deemed read into the decision,
subject only to the issuance of a special court order to remove the improvements.
Gomez vs CA
Facts
Jose Gomez filed an application to register several lots. The lots were originally part of Land X that
the SC adjudicated to Consolacion in another case, Government of the Philippines Islands vs Abran.
Jose is the heir of Teodoro Gomez, Consolacion’s son. Jose inherited the lands after Consolacion and
Teodoro died and when Consolacion’s other son, Teodoro Gomez, executed a quitclaim in his favor.
Land X was further divided and such division duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. The divided
lands are the subjects of this application.
The RTC issued an order of general default and granted the application. It promulgated judgment
expressly ordering the proper Government officer to issue the corresponding decrees of registration.
The judgment became final.
Later, respondent Perez, Chief of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
submitted a report to the RTC stating homestead patents already covered some of the lands. Perez
recommended the RTC set aside its judgment. The RTC set aside its decision.
Issue
Did the RTC err in settings aside its earlier order on account of Perez’ report?
Held
No.
Judgment in a cadastral or land registration proceeding doesn’t become final until after the expiration
of 1-year after the entry of final decree of registration. Before the 1-year period expires, the title isn’t
finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the court’s
control and sound discretion. Here, the decree of registration hasn’t been even entered yet.
Further, the duty of land registration officials to render reports isn’t limited to the period before the
court’s decision becomes final, but even after its finality until before the expiration of the 1-year
period. Here, there’s nothing wrong with Perez submitting the report in the manner he did to the RTC.
Also, Jose can’t use the Abran case to his advantage because the Abran case didn’t adjudicate to
Consolacion the lots covered by the homestead patent. The homestead patents were registered in 1928
while the Abran case was decided 1931. A homestead patent, once duly registered, becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title.
CSC vs Asensi
Facts
The CSC dismissed Asensi from the Bureau of Internal Revenue after an investigation revealed the
latter falsified information relative to her personal background. The CA set aside the CSC resolution
dismissing Asensi. The OSG then filed a motion to extend the deadline for filing a petition for review
of the CA decision. The SC granted such motion.
Meanwhile, CSC, unaware of the OSG actions, filed its own petition for certiorari before the SC. The
OSG, surprised by the CSC's moves, didn't file a petition for review anymore and allowed the CSC to
actively pursue its own case.
Asensi moved to dismiss the certiorari petition on the ground it's an improper remedy, it should've
been a petition for review. Further, the period to file a petition for review had already elapsed.
Issue
Should the petition be dismissed?
Held
Yes.
In this case, the proper remedy is a petition for review and not a certiorari petition. The OSG was
aware of the proper procedure of appeal and took the necessary steps to file the petition for review. If
the CSC had only relied on its counsel, instead of going by its lonesome, it would've avoided this
predicament.
As a general rule, the OSG is primarily responsible for representing the Government in appellate
proceedings. The exception is if the OSG takes a position adverse to that of the pertinent government
office. Here, there's no showing the OSG took a position contrary to the CSC's.
Further, even if the CSC were allowed to represent itself, the instant petition would still be dismissed
because it's an improper remedy. With the period for filing a petition for review already elapsed, CSC
is now barred from challenging the CA decision.
Vda. De Barroga vs Albano

Facts
In a Cadastral Proceeding, the CFI rendered a decision adjudicating a parcel of land in Delfina’s
favor. One of the oppositors was Ruperta, declared in default. However, the decree of registration
didn’t issue until after 14 years and an OCT issued in Delfina’s name only after 24 years.
After the registration decree was issued but before the OCT, Ruperta’s heirs, petitioner Barroga, filed
suit against Delfina’s heirs alleging possession of the land since 1941 and they were the real owners
thereof. Further, Delfina’s title encroached upon Cesar’s land and so the latter intervened in the case.
The lower court dismissed Barroga’s complaint and granted Cesar’s petition.
Delfina’s heirs motioned for a writ of possession that Barroga opposed. The lower court granted the
writ of possession and Barroga appealed.
Issue
Can a writ of possession still issue despite the considerable lapse of time?
Held
Yes.
Res Judicata applies in Barroga’s case to recover the land due to the earlier decision in the cadastral
proceeding affirming Delfina’s ownership over the land. The judgment in the cadastral proceeding is
in rem and binding against the whole world. The 2 judgments taken together satisfy the requirements
of res judicata.
Delfina’s heirs are entitled to a writ of possession against Ruperta’s heir, Ruperta herself being a party
to the original cadastral proceeding, and despite the lapse of time because the right to a writ of
possession is imprescriptible.
Valisno vs Plan
Facts
Sps. Valisno purchased from Blanco a parcel of land. Later, Valisno declared the land in their names
for taxation purposes and installed a caretaker on it. Later, respondent Cayaba ousted the caretaker
and took possession of the land. Cayaba claims he’s the land’s owner by virtue of a deed of sale
executed in his favor by a certain Verano.
Valisno filed suit against Cayaba to recover possession but the courts ruled in Cayaba’s favor. Cayaba
then filed an application to register in his name the title to the land that Valsino opposed. Cayaba filed
a motion to dismiss on the groud of res judicata against Valsino that the lower court granted. Valsino
appealed and hence this case.
Issue
Is the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata allowed in land registration proceedings?
Held
Yes.
The RoC applies in a suppletory character to land registration proceedings when practicable and
convenient. Answers in a cadastral proceeding partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are
involved therein. Further, res judicata applies in a cadastral case to defeat the alleged rights of another
claimant.
Here, res judicata applies:

1. A prior final judgment - the earlier case for action reinvidicatoria became final
2. Court with jurisdiction – satisfied
3. Judgment on the merits – satisfied
4. Identity of parties, subject matter, cause of action
a. Same parties are involved
b. Same land
c. Issue is ownership over the land
Consequently, Cayaba can successfully have Valisno’s opposition dismissed because the latter is
already barred by prior judgment.
Heirs of Labrada vs Monsanto

Facts
This case involves a land covered by the Catbalogan cadastral survey contested by petitioners and
respondents.
The Heirs of Labrada claim their grandparents and parents have possessed the land since 1932 when
the answer was filed in 1984. Further, they have continued to possess the land until the present.
However, the lower court ruled in favor of Monsanto. Within 2 days from receipt of the adverse
decision, the Heirs filed their appeal by filing a notice of appeal with prayer for records to be elevated
to the IAC. Meanwhile, Monsanto filed a motion for the issuance of a decree arguing the Heirs failed
to perfect their appeal in failing to file a record on appeal. The lower court granted the motion and
issued the decree.
Issue
Can an appeal by a conflicting claimant to a lot in cadastral survey proceedings be taken by filing a
simple notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period? Or must an appeal still be filed by
filing a record on appeal within the 30-day period provided?
Held
A notice of appeal will suffice.
The general rule applies in this case where simply filing a notice of appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period can suffice. The exceptions, which apply to special proceedings and cases where
multiple appeals are allowed must be strictly construed.
The exception applies in cases where the original record has to remain with the original court in
connection with other pending matters. This isn’t the case in a cadastral proceeding because after
judgment the court can elevate the records of the case referring to the lots covered by its judgment,
while retaining records of the lots not covered by its judgment.
Here, the court can readily elevate the records of the disputed lot subject of judgment and appeal.
Eslaban vs Onorio
Facts
Onorio owns Land X on which Eslaban, as Project Manager of the National Irrigation Administration
(NIA), approved an irrigation canal’s construction. Onorio agreed to the construction but he should be
properly compensated for the portions of Land X affected.
Later, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between NIA and Onorio. The same year, Eslaban
offered P35 thousand as compensation Onorio refused demanding a higher compensation from
Eslaban but the latter refused.
Issue
Does the Irrigation Canal constitute a valid encumbrance on Land X despite not appearing on the
Torrens title?
Held
No.
Here, Land X is covered by a TCT duly registered and originally covered by an OCT.
True, the Land Registration Act provides as an exception to the ‘noted in said certificate’ requirement
the following:
Any public...or any government irrigation canal...where the certificate of title doesn’t state
the boundaries of such...irrigation canal..have been determined.
However, such exception doesn’t apply in this case because it applies only when the easement has
been pre-existing at the time the land was registered. If the easement was built only after the land was
registered, then proper expropriation proceedings and just compensation are in order.
Here, the irrigation canal was constructed after Land X was registered. Consequently, the exception
doesn’t apply.
NIA vs CA
Facts
Vicente Manglapus received a free patent over 3 hectares of Land X and registered under an OCT.
The grant was subject to the following proviso:
‘and subject finally to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and
prescribed by law especially those mentioned in CA 141 Sec. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and
114.’
Later, respondent Dick Manglapus acquired Land X from Vicente and had a new TCT issued in his
name. Afterwards, NIA entered into a contract with Villamar Development Corp. The contract
stipulated that NIA was to build canals and NIA entered a portion of Dick’s land to make diggings.
Dick then filed suit against NIA.
Issue
Should NIA pay Dick just compensation for taking a portion of Land X for use as easement of a right
of way?
Held
No.
Here, both the OCT and TCT covering Land X contained a reservation granting the government a
right of way over Land X.
The TCT itself states the Title shall be ‘subject further to such conditions contained in the original
title as may be subsisting.’ Under the OCT, there was a reservation under CA 141 Sec. 112 that
provides ‘...subject to a right of way not exceeding 20 meters in width for...irrigation ditches...’ Such
reservation isn’t limited by any time period and therefore is a subsisting condition.
The canal NIA constructed was only 11 meters in width.
Republic vs Orfinada
Facts
This case is a complaint for annulment of title against the Sps. Orfinada. The Republic alleges the
Sps. Orfinada obtained their TCT by making it appear that it originated from an OCT in Guillermo’s
name. However, the OCT was actually issued in Paulino’s name. Paulino’s OCT was issued pursuant
to a Free Patent covering Land X that the Governor General issued in 1932.
Meanwhile, Guillermo’s OCT was based on a Free Patent covering Land Y that the Philippine
President granted in 1935. However, the Free Patent was issued under the Public Land Act that took
effect only in 1936.
In their defense, the Sps. Orfinada claim that Guillermo’s Free Patent was actually issued in 1937.
Further, they bought the land from Guillermo in 1955 under a Deed of Absolute Sale duly registered
with the Registry of Deeds. Later, they sold the land to Insurance Savings and Investment Agency
(ISIA).
Issue
Is the Sps. Orfinada’s TCT spurious due to the alleged conflicting OCTs?
Held
No.
The Republic itself admitted that only the Free Patent is on file with the Registry of Deeds while
Paulino’s OCT itself is no longer available. While the Governor General may have issued a Free
Patent in Paulino’s name, it doesn’t follow an OCT was actually issued as well.
Further, fraud isn’t immediately presumed just because there are 2 conflicting copies of the same
OCT. This is because the Free Patents that are the basis of the 2 OCTs respectively cover 2 different
lands, namely Land X and Land Y. In other words, there’s no overlapping of boundaries.
Also, Republic’s allegation that Guillermo’s Free Patent was defective because the same was issued
in 1935 while the Public Land Act was passed only in 1936 is untenable. The Sps. Orfinada’s TCT
itself stipulates the Free Patent was issued in 1937.
Lastly, even assuming Guillermo’s OCT was defective, the Sps. Orfinada are buyers in good faith and
have acquired rights over Land Y.
A Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred therein, and a strong
presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is
incontrovertible against any other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the
Torrens title. Moreover, a person dealing with property covered by a Torrens title isn’t required to go
beyond what appears on its face provided he has no knowledge of any circumstance which would
raise the suspicion of a reasonable man.
Spouses Laburada vs LRA

Facts
The Sps. Laburada applied to register Land X that the RTC granted. The decision became final and
the RTC issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
However, the LRA refused the order because Land X was already covered by another Torrens title.
The Sps. Laburada then filed this action for mandamus to compel the LRA to issue the decree.
Issue
Can the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue the corresponding decree?
Held
No.
First, the judgement isn’t executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law.
Consequently, the Sps. Laburada don’t have any clear legal right to implement it. A judgement of
registration doesn’t become executory until after the expiration of 1 year after entry of the final decree
of registration.
Second, it’s possible the RTC’s judgement is void and the LRA’s refusal to issue the corresponding
decree is reasonable. The RTC has no jurisdiction to issue a Torrens title over registered land. The
LRA is mandated to refer to the RTC any doubt it may have in issuing the corresponding decree. In
this sense, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as court officers, and their act is the
court’s act. The LRA is specifically called upon to ‘extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings.’
Third, issuing the corresponding decree is part of the court’s judicial function and isn’t a mere
ministerial act which can be compelled through mandamus. Such act involves exercising discretion.
Fourth, the instant action takes the form of a prohibited collateral attack against the 1st Torrens title.
A Torrens title must be attacked in a proceeding for that purpose.
De Pedro vs Romasan
Facts
The Sps. Pedro filed a complaint for damages against respondent Romasan. The complaint alleges the
Sps. Pedro own Land X evidenced by an OCT in their name. Later, Romasan installed fences on the
perimeter of the adjacent property and during construction the Sps. Pedro’s farm house and
plantations were destroyed. Further, Romasan claimed a portion of Land X and prevented the Sps.
Pedro from entering such portion.
Meanwhile, Romasan defended itself by presenting a TCT in its name that includes the disputed
portion.
A relocation survey on Property X was conducted which revealed that the disputed portion was
indeed part of the OCT. However, the TCT’s technical description also included the disputed portion.
In short, there is an overlapping of boundaries.
Issue
Who really owns Land X? Sps. Pedro through their OCT or Romasan through its TCT?
Held
Undetermined || The case is a prohibited collateral attack on a Torrens title.
Here, resolving the issue will involve altering, correcting, or modifying either the OCT or TCT. If the
property belongs to the Sps. Pedro, Romasan’s TCT technical description will have to be corrected. If
it’s the other way around, then the property covered by the Sps. Pedro’s OCT will have to be
corrected instead.
However, the correction of both titles can be made only through an action for said purpose because a
Torrens title isn’t subject to a collateral attack. It can’t be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The Sps. Pedro’s action is one to recover possession of Land X and damages. However, such action is
a collateral attack of the TCT. Even Romasan collaterally attacked the OCT by setting up as defense
the fact Land X was already covered by the TCT.
Leyson vs Nanciansino Bontuyan

Facts
Calixto owns Land X that was later divided into X-1 and X-2. Calxito then sold both Lands to Tabal
who in turn sold them to Noval and in turn sold them to Leyson. But the Tax Declarations for both
Lands remained in Noval’s name.
Gregorio Bontuyan, Noval’s father-in-law, then filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for a
free patent over both Lands. The Bureau of Lands granted the application and Free Patents were
issued leading to an OCT over both Lands registered in Gregorio’s name. Gregorio then sold both
Lands to Nanciansino Bontuyan and TCT for both Lands were issued in Nanciansino’s name.
Later, Nanciansino discovered Leyson living on the Lands and demanded he vacate the property.
Leyson refused causing Nanciansino to file suit against Leyson to quiet title and damages.
Issue
Can Leyson demand the OCT and TCT of respondents be nullified and the Lands reconveyed to him?
Held
Yes.
Here, Nanciansino had the burden of proving Gregorio owned the Lands and the latter acquired the
property in good faith and for valuable consideration. However, Nanciansino failed to discharge this
burden.
The evidence shows un unbroken line of sale starting from Calixto ending in Leyson. At no point
were the Lands sold to Gregorio. Consequently, Gregorio, not being the Lands owner, can’t sell the
same to Nanciansino. Gregorio can’t feign ignorance of Noval’s ownership over the Lands because:
1. Noval was his son-in-law
2. He received the Tax Declarations covering the Lands issued in Noval’s name.
In short, Gregorio was in bad faith when he acquired the Lands.
In contrast, Leyson produced in evidence Tax Declarations issued since 1945 as well as the Deeds of
Absolute Sale tracing ownership from Calixto to him.
Next, Leyson directly attacked the OCT over Land X-1 because in Leyson’s answer to the complaint,
he inserted a counterclaim alleging Gregorio secured the OCT through fraud and deceit and prayed
for its nullification.
An action is an attack on title if the object is to nullify the same thus challenging the proceeding
pursuant to which title was decreed. The attack is direct when the action’s object is to annul or set
aside the proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, an attack is collateral when the
action is to obtain a different relief, and the attack on the proceeding is merely an incident thereof.
Such direct attack on a Torrens title may be in an original action or a counterclaim. A counterclaim is
considered a new suit where the 2 parties, plaintiff & defendant, switch places. It’s as if it were an
independent action. Here, Leyson’s counterclaim constitutes a direct attack because the action’s
object is to annul the OCT alleging fraud on Gregorio’s part.
Herce vs Cabuyao
Facts
Juanita Carpena applied to judicially register Land X consisting 44 parcels of land. The RTC granted
the application and directed the decree of registration be issued for Land X. However, only 42 of 44
parcels of land were issued decrees of registration. Parcel 43 was subjected to a Cadastral proceeding.
Herce opposed in the Cadastral proceeding claiming ownership over Parcel 43, arguing he purchased
the same from Jose Carpena, Juanita’s predecessor-in-interest. The RTC awarded Parcel 43 to Herce
but the decree of registration couldn’t be issued because it was previously included in in the judicial
registration case.
Herce then filed a petition to modify the decision in the judicial registration case to exclude Parcel 43
that the RTC granted. With no more legal impediments, a decree of registration was issued in Herce’s
favor. However, the Municipality of Cubao petitioned to reopen the decree of registration issued in
Herce’s favor claiming a decree of registration over Parcel 43 was issued in its name since 1911. The
RTC granted Cubao’s petition and set aside the decree of registration in Herce’s favor.
Issue
Is Cubao precluded from reopening the decree of registration?
Held
No.
Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration proceedings. Once a
decree of registration is issued and the 1-year period from date of record has passed, Title is perfected
and can’t be collaterally attacked later on.
Here, the evidence shows a decree of registration was issued in Cubao’s name since 1911 and
therefore has become indefeasible. Cubao’s claim of ownership is based on the entry in the Ordinary
Decree Book that is a public document and is prima facie proof of the entires appearing therein.
Consequently, it’s presumed the decree of registration was regularly issued in the absence of contrary
proof. Herce’s decree of registration was issued in 1997 and clearly, more than 1 year has elapsed
since Cubao’s decree of registration was issued.
Further, Parcel 43 isn’t susceptible to prescription because the same is registered land. Also, estoppel
or laches isn’t a defense against the Government asserting its own rights or recovering its own
property.
Finally, land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration proceeding can’t again be the
subject of adjudication. Cubao rightfully owns Parcel 43.
Araneta Foundation vs RTC

Facts
The Government expropriated Gonzales’ estate with the understanding the estate would be sold to the
occupants. However, the Government failed to sell the estate causing the occupants and tenants to file
suit to compel the sale. In this suit, Araneta Foundation intervened on the ground it and the tenants
entered into a ‘Kasunduan’ with the latter conveying to the former the priority rights to purchasing the
estate.
On the basis of this Kasunduan, a Compromise Agreement (Agreement) was reached. The Agreement
included Lots 1 & 2, originally awarded to Gregorio. On the basis of the Kasunduan, Araneta was
able to secure in its name a TCT for both lots. However, it turned out the Kasunduan was forged and
subsequently declared void. The Heirs of Gregorio then filed a motion to nullify Araneta’s TCT over
Lots 1 & 2 and have the same reconveyed to them. The RTC granted the motion canceling Araneta’s
TCT and issuing another TCT for Lots 1 & 2 in Gregorio’s name.
Araneta then filed suit alleging the RTC’s orders nullifying its TCT and issuing another in Gregorio’s
name was a prohibited collateral attack.
Issue
Is the nullification of Araneta’s TCT a prohibited collateral attack?
Held
No.
True, the civil case was originally an action for specific performance and damages; nonetheless the
case can’t constitute a collateral attack that to begin with was illegally issued.
Here, the evidence shows the Kasunduan was forged leading to the Agreement’s nullification.
Further, Araneta’s TCT was issued pursuant only to such void Agreement.
The rule that a Torrens title is presumed valid doesn’t apply where the very certificate itself is faulty
as to its purported origin. Consequently, no presumption of authenticity applies to Araneta’s TCT and
isn’t indefeasible because it was secured by fraud and misrepresentation.1
Next, the RTC had jurisdiction to annul Araneta’s TCT because it was Araneta who voluntarily
intervened in the civil case and submitted the Kasunduan which became the Agreement’s basis.
Further, Araneta filed numerous petitions concerning the validity and enforceability of the Agreement
as well as its TCT. Araneta can’t back out now simply because of an adverse decision to it.
1
The TCT was issued because of a Compromise Agreement in the case but was subsequently cancelled in the
same case because the Compromise Agreement was void. That’s why it isn’t a collateral attack.
Heirs of Roxas vs Garcia

Facts
The Bureau of Lands surveyed and approved Land X for the Heirs of Baldomero Roxas.
Later, Land Y was also surveyed for Martin Landicho and an OCT was issued in his name in 1953.
Martin then sold Land Y to Porfirio and then to Taal Development Corp. Taal Development Corp.
mortgaged Land Y to the Republic Planters Bank (RPB) and the Bank eventually acquired it through
a foreclosure sale.
In 1962, Vicente Singson, representing the Heirs of Baldomero Roxas, filed an application to register
Land X that the court granted. However, the LRC refused to issue the decree because Land X
overlapped Land Y. Vicente died and the Heirs substituted him. The court recalled the order issuing
the decree and dismissed the case. The Heirs then filed suit against RPB to annul its title insofar as it
overlaps with Land X.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Heirs then filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA. The CA dismissed petition on a technicality, on the ground the RTC’s order dismissing the
complaint is final, not an interlocutory order, hence a subject of appeal, not certiorari.
Issue
What is the aggrieved party’s remedy for a trial court’s order dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit? Certiorari or Appeal?
Held
Appeal.
An order dismissing a complaint is final, not an interlocutory order, hence a proper subject of appeal.
Further, such appeal must be filed within 15 days from the time the party received notice of judgment.
Here, the Heirs committed 2 mistakes namely:

1. Filing a certiorari when it should’ve been appeal
2. Filing out of time by 16 days.
Next, a trial court has the authority and discretion to grant a motion for summary judgment. Even if
the trial court errs, such decision may not be set aside by a petition for certiorari, but by appeal.
Further, the rule on summary judgment applies to all kinds of actions.
A person who establishes ownership over a property, but which property has been wrongfully
registered through fraud or mistake in another’s name is, after the lapse of 1-year from the date of
issuance of the questioned decree, remedy isn’t to set aside the decree, but to institute an ordinary
action for reconveyance in court.
However, if the property has already passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, then
the remedy is to file an action for damages against the person who registered the property through
fraud or mistake, or if such party is insolvent or the action is barred by prescription, to file an action
for recovery against the Assurance Fund within 6 years from the time the right of action accrues.
Heirs of Nagano vs CA
Facts
Respondents filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of OCT issued pursuant to a Free Patent in
Petitioners name covering Land X. The Respondents allege the issuance of title was done with
Petitioners committing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. Respondents even filed an information
for perjury against Petitioners who unlawfully attested that Land X wasn’t occupied or being claimed
by other persons.
Respondents allege that part of Land X was owned by their predecessors-in-interest and possessed the
same since 1920. Recently, they discovered Land X was registered in Petitioners name. Respondents
demanded Petitioners convey to them the portion of Land X they claim but the latter refused.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground the Solicitor General should’ve filed the same, the
action being reversion of Land X to the Government. The CA reversed.
Issue
Was the RTC’s order dismissing the complaint on the ground the Solicitor General should’ve filed the
same correct?
Held
No.
The allegations in the complaint show Respondents claim ownership over a portion of Land X having
adversely possessed the same in the concept of an owner since 1920. The claim asserts the disputed
portion is private land, or even assuming it was public land, it subsequently became private land by
operation of law through the Public Land Act.
Consequently, the disputed portion is outside the Director of Bureau of Lands jurisdiction and
couldn’t be the subject of a Free Patent. It wasn’t necessary, in fact shouldn’t, for the Solicitor
General to file the case.
Lacsamana vs CA
Facts
Leon and Amparo are the registered owners of Land X in equal shares. Later, Amparo sold her share
to El Dorado. Meanwhile, Leon died in 1969 but a Deed of Absolute Sale bearing Leon’s signature
was somehow executed in 1971 selling his share to Nestor, Nestor then sold the same to LBJ
Development Corp. El Dorado then sold its share to LBJ making the latter Land X’s absolute owner.
TCT was issued in LBJ’s name as sole owner.
Afterwards, the Heirs of Leon filed suit to recover Leon’s share in Land X alleging Leon’s signature
was forged considering he was already dead at the time of the alleged sale.
Issue
Has the action prescribed considering it was filed in 1983 and the alleged sale took place in 1971?
Held
No.
Here, the Heirs' action is imprescriptible because the right to file an action for reconveyance on the
ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an
action for declaration of nullity, which is imprescriptible.
Next, LBJ isn’t a buyer in good faith as the following circumstances show:2
1. LBJ didn’t even bother to inquire how Nestor acquired Leon’s share in Land X.
2. El Dorado, LBJ’s sister company, had a co-owners duplicate copy of the TCT which
conflicted with the TCT Nestor presented.
3. The Deed of Absolute Sale in Nestor’s favor was registered only 8 years after the transaction.
2
If LBJ was a buyer in good faith, the Heirs can’t legally compel LBJ to compel Leon’s share to them.
Benigna Secuya vs Gerarda Selma

Facts
Maximo owns Land X and he later entered into an Agreement of Partition adjudicating 1/3 of Land X
to Paciencia. Paciencia then sold 3,000 sq. meter portion of Land X to Dalmacio. Dalmacio then took
possession of his share of Land X and later allowed his niece and husband to possess the same.
Later, Gerarda Selma bought a 1,000 sq. meter portion of Land X and later bought a bigger portion of
Land X amounting to 9,000 sq. meters. Gerarda then filed suit against Dalmacio’s predecessor-in-
interest, Benigna, asserting ownership over the portion Benigna inherited from Dalmacio.
Issue
Has Benigna proved the twin requisites for an action to quiet title?
Held
No.
In an action to quiet title, the complainant must demonstrate legal or equitable title to the disputed
property and the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their title
is in fact invalid despite its prima facie appearance of validity.
Here, Benigna alleges Gerarda’ TCT is a cloud on her title. But did Benigna show legal or equitable
title to the disputed property? Benigna anchors her ownership on the Agreement of Partition between
Maximo and Paciencia and the Deed of Sale between Paciencia and Dalmacio.
However, these 2 Documents are insufficient to prove Benigna’s ownership over the disputed
property. First, the Agreement of Partition isn’t really a partition but merely an Express Trust.
Second, the Deed of Sale was never presented in court. Only Paciencia’s her, Ramon, confirmed the
existence of such sale, but such confirmation is of questionable value. Lastly, Benigna failed to
exercise acts of ownership over the disputed property.
Guzman vs National Treasurer

Facts
The Sps. Malimbing bought Land X from Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. (Lucia) Then the
Sps. went to Europe and entrusted the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Title, still in Lucia’s name, to
Marilyn. Marilyn volunteered to register the sale and transfer the title in the Sps. names. Later,
Marilyn committed to bring the Title to the Sps. but the former failed to do so causing the Sps. to
inquire from the Office of the Register of Deeds. The Sps. discovered that a Certificate of Title was
indeed issued in their names but was subsequently cancelled and Title transferred to Guzman.
Apparently, a couple impersonated the Sps. and sold Land X, with the help of real estate broker
Natividad, to Guzman. The impostor-couple possessed the owner’s duplicate copy of certificate of
title and convinced Guzman to buy Land X.
The Sps. then filed suit.
Issue
Can Guzman recover from the Assurance Fund?
Held
No.
A person can recover from the Assurance Fund provided:

1. A person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions:
a. There was no negligence on his part
b. The loss or damage sustained was through any error of court personnel or Registry
employees in the performance of their official duties
2. Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein under the following
conditions
a. There was no negligence on his part:
b. He was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of is land or interest therein under
the provisions of the Property Registration Decree, or by the registration by any other
person as owner of such land, or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any
certificate of owner’s duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or
other official book or by any cancellation
c. That he’s barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action to recover such
land or interest therein
Here, Guzman doesn’t fall under the 1st case because:

1. He was negligent in not ascertaining if the seller were really the Sps.
2. There was no error on the part of court personnel or Registry employees
Guzman also doesn’t also fall under the 2nd case.
The Assurance Fund was established to relieve innocent persons of the harshness of the doctrine that a
Certificate of Title is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible Title to Land. In this case, Guzman
didn’t suffer any prejudice due to this doctrine. In fact, he himself was trying to avail the benefits of
such doctrine by registering Land X under the Torrens system.
Republic vs Heirs of Alejaga

Facts
Felipe Alejaga filed a Free Patent Application covering Land X with the Roxas District Land Office.
Strangely, Land Inspector Efren Recio submitted a report of his investigation and verification of Land
X a day before the application was filed. Later, the Roxas District Land Office approved the
application and a Free Patent was issued to Felipe. Then, an OCT over Land X was issued in Felipe’s
favor.
1 year after the Free Patent Application was filed, the Heirs of Ignacio Arrobang complained to the
Director of Lands to investigate the Roxas District Land Office for irregularities in the issuing of
Felipe’s title. The investigation recommended the Free Patent and OCT in Felipe’s favor be cancelled.
The Republic then filed suit to annul/cancel the Patent and Title and reversion of Land X to the
Republic.
Meanwhile, Felipe already mortgaged Land X in PNB’s favor as security for a loan.
Issue
Can the Republic still recover Land X despite the lapse of the 1-year period?
Held
Yes.
The evidence shows Felipe acquired the Patent fraudulently.
Now, the question is can the State still recover Land X even after the 1-year period?
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding Torrens title issued, the land covered becomes
private property. Further, the Torrens title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year
from the latter’s issuance. However, this indefeasibility of title doesn’t attach to titles secured by
fraud and misrepresentation.
Consequently, under the public land act, the State, even after the lapse of 1-year, can still bring an
action for reversion to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. Further, such indefeasibility can’t bar the State from investigating how title has been
acquired provided the investigation’s purpose is to determine if fraud was committed to secure title.
Here, Felipe acquired the Torrens title by virtue of the Patent through fraud. Therefore, prescription
and laches won’t bar the State from filing an action to recover Land X.
Heirs of Tuazon vs CA
Facts
The Heirs of Tuazon filed a case for the issuance of a 2nd owner’s duplicate copy of OCT over Land
X in lieu of the lost copy, which was granted causing an OCT to be issued in the Heirs’ name. Later,
Respondents filed a case for Quieting of Title and Nullification and Cancellation of Title to cancel the
OCT issued in Petitioners’ favor.
The Respondents allege Nazario de Guzman originally owned Land X and his surviving spouse later
sold it to Alejandro. Alejandro then sold the same to the Sps. Jacinto, then to Gabriel, then to Isidro,
then to the Respondents. In all these transactions, the seller’s Torrens title was cancelled and a new
one issued in the buyer’s name. As it stands, the Respondents hold a TCT over Land X.
Simply put, the Heirs of Tuazon knew their predecessor already sold Land X to a 3rd person but still
fraudulently procured an OCT over Land X claiming the original was lost, when in fact it was
cancelled due to it being sold.
Issue
Is the Respondents action to Quiet Title correct?
Held
Yes.
Here, the Respondents action is to remove cloud on their title and affirm their ownership over Land
X. In the process, Respondents pray that the Heirs’ OCT be cancelled.
The instant case isn’t one merely to annul a court’s final order, but rather to Quiet Title, and
nullification and cancellation of title.
Sps. Santiago vs CA
Facts
Paula Arcega owned Land X evidenced by a TCT. Later, Paula executed a deed of conditional sale
over Land X in the Petitioners’ favor. The buyers would make a down payment and upon full
payment of the balance, the seller would execute and deliver to the former the absolute deed of sale.
Later, the Petitioners paid the balance and Paula executed the deed of absolute sale over Land X in
Petitioners’ favor. The TCT in Paula’s name was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in Petitioners’
name. Paula then died leaving as heirs 2 brothers, including Respondent Quirico Arcega.
Incidentally, before Paula died she continued living together with Petitioners in Land X despite the
sale. Quirico then filed suit to nullify the sale on the ground the same was fictitious.
Issue
Can Quirico recover Land X despite the lapse of 14 years from the time the sale was executed?
Held
Yes.
The evidence shows the sale is void because there was never intent to convey property from Paula to
Petitioners for valuable consideration. Rather, the transaction was merely used so Petitioners can take
out a loan from SSS using Land X as collateral. In short, there was merely accommodation.
However, is Quirico barred from recovering Land X considering the instant case was filed 14 years
after the sale was executed?
No, an action to declare a contract void doesn’t prescribe. Further, even laches won’t apply if the
contract is void.3
3
An action to recover land based on a void contract is neither susceptible to prescription nor laches. Except if
the land has passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
Heirs of Toribio Waga vs Sacabia

Facts
Toribio Waga filed a Free Patent Application for Land X. The Free Patent and OCT was issued
covering Land X in the Heirs of Toribio Waga’s name. Later, Sacabin filed a protest before the
DENR against the Patent contending his lot, Land Y, was erroneously included. The DENR
investigated and recommended the Director of Lands annul the Patent and OCT to segregate Land X
from Land Y.
The Director of Lands failed to act on the recommendation causing Sacabia to file suit.
Issue
Can Sacabia recover Land Y despite the lapse of 17 years from the time the OCT was registered?
Held
Yes.
The evidence shows Sacabia has possessed Land Y in an open, continuous, peaceful, and adverse
manner since 1940. Therefore, Land Y is already private land not subject to a Free Patent
Next, the instant case is an action for reconveyance of Land Y. An action for reconveyance based on a
constructive trust is the proper remedy for an aggrieved party whose property had been erroneously
registered in another’s name. The prescriptive period is 10 years from the time the Certificate of Title
was issued. However, the 10-year prescriptive period doesn’t run when the complainant actually
possesses the disputed land because such action is actually one to quiet title that is imprescriptible.
Here, Sacabin actually possessed Land Y since 1940 and therefore his action to recover Land Y is
imprescriptible.
Mananzan vs Delos Reyes

Facts
Respondents co-own Land Y while Mananzan is Respondents’ tenant. Later, Macaria Villanueva sold
Land Y to Victoriano Manangan, Mananzan’s father. 2 years after the sale, cadastral proceedings
were initiated over Land Y, and Land Y was registered in the names of Macaria Villanueva, Cirilio,
and Fransciso. An OCT was issued in their names but they later died and were survived by
Respondents.
Respondents then filed suit to recover possession of Land Y. Mananzan in his answer prayed for
reconveyance of Land Y.
Issue
Can Mananzan recover Land Y despite the lapse of 38 years from the time the OCT was issued?
Held
No.
Mananzan slept on his right for 38 years starting from the time the OCT was issued in the names of
Macaria, Cirilio, and Fransciso. He sought reconveyance only when he filed his amended answer to
Respondents’ complaint. Further, Mananzan’s action is barred by laches.4
4
The case is silent if Mananzan actually possessed Land Y, because if so possessed his action isn’t barred by
either prescription or laches. Further, the case says Mananzan is Respondents’ tenant that means that if
Mananzan even actually possessed the same, prescription would still run. Because the possession the law
contemplates to stop prescription is possession in the concept of an owner, not mere tenancy.
Sps. Exequiel Lopez vs Sps. Eduardo Lopez

Facts
The Sps. Eduardo own Land X that they acquired by donation inter vivos from Maria Alvarado and
Agatona Caparas, in whose names the lot was previously declared for taxation purposes.
Later, the Sps. Eduardo discovered that Victor Villadares was granted a Free Patent over Land Y,
which included Land X. An OCT was issued in Victor’s name. Then, Victor divided Land Y into 3
parcels, Land A,B,C. Land A, which included Land X, was sold to the Sps. Exequiel and TCT was
issued in the Sps. Exequiel’s name.
The Sps. Eduardo then filed suit.
Issue
Can the Sps. Eduardo recover Land X after the same was erroneously included in Land Y?
Held
Yes.
The evidence shows the Sps. Eduardo are the rightful owners of Land X. Also, Land X was
erroneously included in the Certificate of Title of the Sps. Exequiel and Villadares. Further, the Sps.
Exequiel aren’t innocent purchasers for value because they’re neighbors of the Sps. Eduardo. The
Sps. Exequiel would’ve known that the Sps. Eduardo actually occupied Land X.
Therefore, the Sps. Exequiel never acquired title over Land X even with a TCT issued in their names
covering the same. Reconveyance of Land X is warranted.
Here, the action for reconveyance seeks only to amend the TCT by excluding Land X from Land Y.
However, the CA went beyond the prayer by declaring the entire deed of sale void for being
simulated. Therefore, the Sps. Exequiel’s title would be completely revoked, not only the part
covering Land X.
But the evidence shows the deed of sale isn’t simulated. The Sps. Exequiel and Villadares executed
acts showing transfer of ownership and intent to be bound by the sale.
Consequently, the deed of sale is valid subject to the Sps. Eduardo’s right to Land X.5
5
If the Sps. Exequiel were innocent purchasers for value, then the Sps. Eduardo would have no right to
reconveyance, but only damages against Villadares.
Araneta Institute vs Dimson

Doctrine
Eland Phils. vs Garcia

Facts
Garcia and co-respondents filed suit for Quieting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
Eland Phils. Garcia claims they are the owners of Land X by occupation and possession under the
Pubic Land Act. Garcia avers they weren’t aware of anyone else claiming interest of Land X until
they requested Land X be declared for taxation purposes in their names. Upon request, Garcia found
out that Land X was already the subject of a land registration proceeding and a decree already issued
in Eland’s name.
Garcia avers they weren’t notified of the land registration case due to misrepresentation amounting to
actual fraud.
Issue
Did Garcia avail of the proper remedy?
Held
No || Should’ve been petition for review
An action to quiet title has 2 requisites namely:

1. The complainant has a legal or equitable interest in the disputed real property
2. The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title is
invalid despite its prima facie appearance of validity.
Here, Garcia satisfied the 1st requisite by claiming ownership over Land X under the Public Land
Act. The 2nd requisite is also fulfilled with Garcia enumerating several facts that tend to provide the
invalidity of Eland’s claim.
Next, the evidence shows Eland’s OCT was issued in August 1997 while the complaint for Quieting
of Title was filed on March 1998. Therefore, the action was filed within the 1-year period before the
Torrens title became indefeasible. Meaning Garcia also had the remedy of petition for review.
A petition for review is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new trial or relief from
judgement and isn’t affected by the court’s denial of such motion regardless of the grounds upon
which they may have been presented.
Now, did Garcia avail the proper remedy?
No, a court can reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when the aggrieved
party filed a petition for review within 1-year from the issuance of the decree of registration.
However, the aggrieved party’s basis must be anchored on actual fraud. Here, Garcia filed the instant
action before the 1-year period expired and she specifically alleged actual fraud as basis.
Consequently, Garcia’s proper remedy was to file a petition for review.6
6
It seems a Petition for Review takes precedence over Quieting of Title.
Romero vs CA
Facts
Eugenio bought Land X from the Sps. Jaug & Macan. Land X was then public land and Eugenio
applied for a homestead patent over the same. But the Bureau of Lands disapproved the application
because Eugenio already applied for a homestead patent for 24 hectares and was disqualified from
owning Land X, which is 12 hectares big.
Eugenio then placed the application in the name of his eldest son, Eutiquio, allegedly in trust for all
his children. The application was subsequently transferred from Euitiquio to Lutero, then to Ricardo.
Later, Eugenio died and Land X was divided among his children. Later, Lutero was allegedly forced
by the Mayor, his mother, and his sisters to sell Land X to his sisters. Lutero refused on the ground
the 5-year prohibition hasn’t elapsed but the Mayor prevailed on him. The Mayor told him his sisters
will get Land X after 5 years and if the sisters don’t pay, he’ll get Land X back.
Further, Land X is titled in Lutero’s name after the homestead patent was issued in his favor.
Issue
Is the sale of Land X valid despite the sale occurring during the 5-year prohibited period for
alienations and encumbrances?
Held
No.
The sale of Land X is void because CA 141 Sec. 118 prohibits the alienation of a homestead within 5
years from the issuance of the patent and grant.
The conveyance of a homestead patent before the expiration of the 5-year prohibitory period
following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and void and can’t be enforced. Here, the sale
was made 2 years after the homestead patent was issued, well within the 5-year prohibitory period.
Abejeron vs Nabasa
Facts
Abejeron possessed and occupied Land X, unregistered land. Later, Nabasa fraudulently procured a
homestead patent over Land X and OCT was issued in Nabasa’s name. Abejeron then filed suit to
cancel Nabasa’s title.7
Issue
Is Abejeron the proper party to file suit?
Held
No.
Abejeron isn’t the proper party to file the suit because he failed to prove title in himself. Abejeron
failed to prove he satisfied the requisites under the Public Land Act in order to claim ownership over
Land X, thereby converting the same from public land to private land.
If Abejeron proved ownership in him under the Public Land Act, he would’ve been the proper party.
Further, Nabasa’s title would’ve been void because the State has no right to dispose private land by
means of patent. But as it stands, the case must be dismissed.
Consequently, the proper party to file suit is the Government, through the Solicitor General, because
the action is one of reversion. It’s the State who granted title, and it’s the State that has the right to
recover the same, if title was issued fraudulently.
7
Shortened version of the Facts, but this is the gist of it.
Republic vs CA
Facts
Irene Bullungan applied for a Free Patent covering Land X. The application was granted and OCT
issued in Irene’s name. In her application, Irene claimed that Land X was neither claimed nor
occupied by any other person and that it was public land which she had continuously occupied and
cultivated since 1925.
Later, Vicente Carrabacan filed a protest, alleging Land X, and by extension the Free Patent,
overlapped Land Y, which he was occupying.
The State investigated the matter and found that Vicente had been actually occupying and cultivating
Land Y since 1947. The State then filed a complaint to cancel the Free Patent and OCT on the ground
of fraud and misrepresentation.8
Issue
Can the State still file an action for reversion despite the lapse of 1-year from the time the patent was
issued?
Held
Yes.
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be
part of the pubic domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands no longer
has control or jurisdiction. The Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent or homestead patent
becomes as indefeasible as one that was judicially secured upon the expiration of 1-year from the date
of issuance of patent.
However, even after the lapse of 1-year, the State may still bring an action for the reversion to the
public domain of lands that have been fraudulently granted to private individuals.
Here, Irene’s failure to disclose that Vicente possessed Land Y, which is part of Land X, constitutes
fraud and is a ground for annulling her title.
8
Shortened version of the Facts, but this is the gist of it.
Heirs of Simplicio Santiago vs Heirs of Mariano Santiago

Facts
Petitioners initiated a complaint for accion publiciana against the Respondents. Petitioners allege that
Simplicio acquired Land X in a sale and before he died, he applied for a Free Patent over the same.
The Free Patent was granted and OCT issued in his name. Later, Mariano, through stealth and evident
bad faith, constructed a house on Land X and refused to vacate despite demand.
Issue
Is Simplicio’s Free Patent over Land X valid?9
Held
No.
A free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever.
Private ownership of land isn’t affected by the issuance of a Free Patent over the same land, because
the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain.
Here, it is undisputed Land X is the Santiago clan’s private property. Mariano and Respondents have
possessed Land X in such a manner as to fulfill the requisites of the Public Land Act, granting them
title over Land X. Land X was thus segregated from the public domain and the Director of Lands had
no authority to issue a patent. The Free Patent covering the same, as well as certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto, are void.
Next, Simplicio fraudulently acquired the Free Patent over Land X, knowing that he already sold the
same to Mariano at the time he applied for such Patent.
Consequently, the Free Patent is void because it was both fraudulently acquired and Land X is private
land at the time of application.
9
Other issues in the case involve:
1. Prescription: Respondents possessed Land X and therefore their action is imprescriptible, being in the nature
of quieting of title
2. Collateral Attack: Respondent presented a counter-claim, which can be considered a direct attack.
3. Party-in-interest: Land X is private land with Respondents proving title thereto, the State isn’t the proper
party to file suit.
Sps Morandarte vs CA
Facts
The Sps. Morandarte filed a Free Patent application over Land X that was approved, and OCT issued
in their names. Later, the Sps. Morandarte divided Land X into 2 parcels, X-1 and X-2, and then
mortgaged X-1 to DBP as security for a loan.
Later, the State filed suit to annul the Sps. Morandarte’s title over Land X alleging Land X covered a
river, consequently can’t be registered. The State alleged the Sps. Morandarte employed fraud and
misrepresentation in order to conceal the River when applying for the Free Patent.
Issue
In the absence of fraud, should the entire Title of the Sps. Morandarte be nullified or only the portion
covering the River?
Held
Only the portion covering the River.
A complaint for reversion involves question of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the
State and seeks the return of the disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the original
certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer certificate
of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and
misrepresentation.
The State has the burden of proving fraud and misrepresentation. Further, fraud and misrepresentation
are never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Here, the State failed to prove that fraud and misrepresentation attended the application for free
patent. Though the Sps. Morandarte admitted that reversion is warranted due to the inalienability of
the River and essentially agreed to a reconveyance of the portion covering the River. Such admission
can’t be considered proof that fraud and misrepresentation attended the application for free
patent. This fact, standing alone, does not prove fraud and misrepresentation.
Next, the Bureau of Lands previously concluded that Morandarte is a qualified applicant and
recommended that a free patent be granted to him. This error culminated in the erroneous grant of a
free patent covering the River. Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the
BOL in this regard can’t be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public
domain. It has been said that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents. Property of the public domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title
nullifies that title.
The present controversy involves a portion of the public domain that was merely erroneously included
in the free patent. A different rule would apply where fraud is convincingly shown. The absence of
clear evidence of fraud will not invalidate the entire title of the Morandarte spouses. Accordingly,
only the portion covering the River should be reconveyed back to the State while the rest of the Title
remains valid.
Heirs of Garnos vs Frando

Facts
Frando possessed Land X since 1925 and in 1952 he filed a Sales Application over Land X. At the
auction sale, Frando won and the Director of Lands awarded Land X to him but refused to issue the
Sales Patent. Frando and his heirs continued possessing Land X, cultivated the same, and built their
house thereon.
Unknown to Frando however, Land X was subject to a cadastral survey and a Free Patent was issued
in the name of Garnos. The Free Patent became the basis of an OCT in Garnos’ name and in 1981
Garnos took possession of Land X.
Frando then filed suit challenging the validity of the Free Patent and OCT issued pursuant thereto.
Issue
Has Frando acquired Title over Land X despite the fact the Bureau of Lands refused to issue the Sales
Patent in his name?
Held
Yes.
Here, the evidence shows that Frando claim of ownership is based the Director of Lands awarding
him Land X in the auction sale. Such award is called a Sales Patent.
Next, Frando complied with all the requirements imposed by Law to acquire Title in Land X. He paid
the full purchase price and cultivated the same within the statutory period of 5 years. True, the Bureau
of Lands refused to issue the Sales Patent, but such refusal was unjustified and therefore equitable
Title was vested in Frando. Further boosting Frando’s claim of equitable Title is his continuous and
exclusive possession of Land X. After the lapse of 30 years, Land X became private land by operation
of law.
Frando’s application for a Sales Patent, coupled with his 30-year possession, is for all purposes
equivalent to a patent already perfected and granted.
Consequently, when the cadastral survey done over Land X, the same was already private land. The
Director of Lands had no authority to grant a Free Patent over the same. Thus, the Free Patent in the
name of Garnos, insofar as it encroached the portion already granted to Frando, had no legal basis at
all.
Flores vs Bagaoisan
Facts
This case involves Land X, in the name of Flores, with OCT issued pursuant to a Homestead Patent
given in 1973. In 1976, Flores executed a Deed of Confirmation & Quitclaim in Lazo’s favor
agreeing to convey Land X to Lazo. Later, Marciano bought Land X from Lazo in a sale.
Flores then executed an Affidavit confirming the conveyance of Land X to Lazo and Lazo’s
possession of the same. Further, Flores stipulated that Land X was mistakenly included in his
Homestead Patent application.
Bagaoisan then filed suit to quiet title and be declared the lawful owners of Land X.
Issue
Is the Deed of Confirmation & Quitclaim valid despite being executed within 3 years after the
Homestead Patent was granted?
Held
No.
Here, Flores’ Deed of Confirmation & Quitclaim in Lazo’s favor is void because it violated the 5-year
prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired through homestead patent. Using the words
“confirmation” and “quitclaim” in the document’s title was an obvious attempt to circumvent the
prohibition imposed by law. Labeling the deed as a confirmation of non-ownership or as a quitclaim
of rights would actually make no difference, as the effect would still be the alienation or conveyance
of the property. The act of conveyance would still fall within the ambit of the prohibition.
The conveyance of a homestead before the expiration of the 5-year prohibitory period from the
issuance of the homestead patent is null and void and cannot be enforced. There is, therefore, no
doubt that the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim, which was executed three years after the
homestead patent was issued, is void and cannot be enforced.
In closing, the execution of the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim within the 5-year prohibitory
period also makes the homestead patent susceptible to cancellation, and Land X being reverted to the
public domain. It is the Solicitor General, on the government’s behalf, who is by law mandated to
institute an action for reversion.
Heirs of Ragua vs CA
Facts
??
Issue
Is the Petitioners judicially reconstituted OCT valid despite the fact they failed to comply with the
publishing and notice requirement the law prescribes?
Held
No.
Here, Petitioners didn’t comply with the requirements the Law imposed in reconstituting Titles
namely:
1. The nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to
the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements,
2. The names and addresses of the occupants of the adjoining property and of all persons who
may have any interest in the property and
3. That no deeds or other instrument affecting the property have been presented for registration.
Neither do these data appear in the notice of hearing. Besides, Petitioners also didn't comply with the
notice and publication requirement under Section 13 because the order directed that the notice be
posted at the Caloocan City Hall, not in Quezon City, where the land is situated.
Failing to comply with the required publication and posting of notices is fatal to the court’s
jurisdiction. Hence, non-compliance with the jurisdictional requirements renders its decision
approving the reconstitution of OCT No. 632 and all proceedings therein utterly null and void.
Next, the Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence justifying the reconstitution of Title. None of
the source documents presented were reliable.10
10
See case for actual evidence presented
Stillianopulos vs Legazpi City

Facts
The City of Legaspi filed a Petition for the judicial reconstitution of its titles to 20 parcels of land, the
certificates of which had allegedly been lost or destroyed during World War II. The trial court ordered
the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the Original Certificates of Title over these lots.
Later, the City filed a Complaint for quieting of title over 1 of the 20 parcels of land against Carlos
Stilianopulos. While this case was pending, Carlos Stilianopulos died. As a consequence, TCT that
was registered under his name was cancelled, and TCT was issued in the name of his son, petitioner
herein. The trial court declared petitioner as the lawful owner of the disputed property. The CA
reversed the RTC and the SC affirmed the CA.
Undaunted, petitioner filed an action for the cancellation of OCT that the trial court subsequently
dismissed on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court, reasoning that
petitioner’s action was “an action for annulment of the order” of the reconstitution of OCT and was
therefore not cognizable by the trial court.
Refusing to accept defeat, petitioner again filed before the Court of Appeals a new action for
annulment of the Order based on three grounds:
1. That the Respondent City of Legaspi procured OCT fraudulently;
2. That the original certificate of title that was judicially reconstituted was non-existent: and
3. That the court which ordered the reconstitution lack[ed] jurisdiction.”
Issue
Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the reconstitution of the OCT despite the fact no notice was sent
to the occupants of Land X?
Held
No.
Here, the RTC had no jurisdiction to reconstitute the OCT because Respondents failed to send notice
to the occupants of Land X, the land covered by the OCT to be reconstituted. Such notice is
mandatory and jurisdictional.
If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on the possessor or anyone else
having interest in the property involved, the order of reconstitution is null and void.
Second, reconstitution of title is simply reissuing a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition. Thus, it arises from the loss or destruction of the owner’s
copy of the certificate. In this case, the title to Land X wasn’t lost or destroyed. It remained in the
possession of the Petitioner’s father and was eventually passed on to him. If a certificate of title has
not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void and
the court that rendered the Decision had no jurisdiction.11
11
Respondents were guilty of extrinsic fraud and lack of notice, but they still won because Petitioners were
guilty of laches and res judicata. The case was filed 20 years after learning of the reconstitution of the OCT and
a prior quieting of title case was already decided in Respondents’ favor.
Veterans Federation vs CA
Facts
The object of the instant controversy is a parcel of land situated near the public market of San Pablo
City. The then owner, Manila Railroad Company of the Philippine Islands (now known as the
Philippine National Railways or PNR) sold the subject property to the Veterans Federation of the
Philippines (VFP for brevity). The parties executed the Absolute Deed of Sale and said document
was registered at the Office of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City.
Consequently, T.C.T. was issued in favor of the VFP. However, the technical description that was
inscribed in the certificate of title was different from what was stated in the deed of sale.
Meanwhile, the VFP proceeded to clear and fence the property, following the boundaries as stated in
the certificate of title, not realizing that the technical descriptions appearing in the deed of sale and the
certificate of title did not match on almost all points. Some eighteen (18) years thereafter, the VFP
decided to erect a building on the subject property to serve as its headquarters. This plan did not
materialize when upon inspection of the subject property, it was discovered that the fence had long
been dismantled and that there were now several permanent structures standing thereon. The VFP
then learned that the residents had been leasing portions of the subject property from the PNR
unbeknownst to VFP.
When the residents refused to heed the VFP’s demand to vacate the premises, the matter was brought
before the Barangay authorities, but no settlement was reached thereat.
Issue
Can Veterans’ TCT be cancelled because the technical description contained therein didn’t match the
deed of sale which was the basis for Veterans’ TCT? Can a new TCT be issued in Veterans’ name
matching the technical description in the deed of sale?
Held
Yes || Yes
Here, the technical descriptions appearing in the deed of sale and the TCT vary on almost all
points. The property described in the TCT isn’t the same property as that intended by the parties to be
the object of their sales agreement under the deed of sale.
Stated bluntly, the technical description in the TCT is erroneous. The RTC therefore correctly ordered
the TCT's cancellation and the issuance of a new TCT in Veterans’ name reflecting the true technical
description as appearing in the deed of sale
Errors in the Torrens Title that relate to the technical description and location can't just be disregarded
as mere clerical aberrations that are harmless in character, but must be treated seriously so as not to
jeopardize the integrity and efficacy of the Torrens System of registration of real rights to
property. Thus, when the technical description appearing in the title is clearly erroneous, the courts
have no other recourse but to order its cancellation and cause the issuance of a new one that would
conform to the mutual agreement of the buyer and seller as laid down in the deed of sale.
Next, simply possessing a certificate of title isn’t necessarily conclusive of the holder’s true
ownership of all the property described therein for said holder doesn’t by virtue of said Torrens Title
alone become the owner of what has been either illegally or erroneously included.
Veterans’ can only claim right of ownership over the land covered by the deed of sale and nothing
else. Hence, the RTC was correct in canceling the TCT and in directing the Register of Deeds to issue
a new one, with the correct technical description as embodied in the deed of sale.
In a litigation such as the one at bar, the court may decree that the Torrens Title be cancelled and a
correct one issued in the buyer’s favor, without having to require the seller to execute in favor of the
buyer an instrument to effect the sale and transfer of the property.
Republic vs Planes
Puzon vs Sta. Lucia Realty
Premiere Bank vs CA

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1 Land Titles for Atty.

Abano by Jason Arteche

Traders Royal Bank vs CA

Tan vs Phil. Banking

Republic vs Guzman 2/23/2000

Sherwill Corp. vs Sitio Sto. Nino Inc.

Republic vs Rosenoor Mining

Spouses Laburada vs LRA

Heirs of Tan Buto vs Luy

The Public Land Act requires the applicant to prove:

Cendana acquired Land X through extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Prescription is another

Del Rosario-Igtiben vs Republic of the Philippines

Republic vs Manna properties

Republic of the Philippines vs Hanover World

Spouses Llanes vs Republic

Under the Property Registration Decree the applicant must prove:

Actual fraud proceeds from an intentional deception through misrepresentation or concealment of a

Heirs of Lopez vs Enriquez

Del Rosario vs Republic

Spouses Recto vs Republic

There are 4 requisites namely:

Vda. De Barroga vs Albano

Here, res judicata applies:

Heirs of Labrada vs Monsanto

The canal NIA constructed was only 11 meters in width.

Spouses Laburada vs LRA

Leyson vs Nanciansino Bontuyan

In short, Gregorio was in bad faith when he acquired the Lands.

Araneta Foundation vs RTC

Heirs of Roxas vs Garcia

Here, the Heirs committed 2 mistakes namely:

Benigna Secuya vs Gerarda Selma

Guzman vs National Treasurer

The Sps. then filed suit.

A person can recover from the Assurance Fund provided:

Here, Guzman doesn’t fall under the 1st case because:

Guzman also doesn’t also fall under the 2nd case.

Republic vs Heirs of Alejaga

The evidence shows Felipe acquired the Patent fraudulently.

Heirs of Toribio Waga vs Sacabia

Mananzan vs Delos Reyes

Sps. Exequiel Lopez vs Sps. Eduardo Lopez

The Sps. Eduardo then filed suit.

Araneta Institute vs Dimson

Eland Phils. vs Garcia

An action to quiet title has 2 requisites namely:

Now, did Garcia avail the proper remedy?

Consequently, Garcia’s proper remedy was to file a petition for review.6

Heirs of Simplicio Santiago vs Heirs of Mariano Santiago

Heirs of Garnos vs Frando

Stillianopulos vs Legazpi City

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