29 - Dir. Of Lands vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27594, Nov.

28, 1975

G.R. No. L-27594 November 28, 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, and the ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch III,
PARAÑAQUE INVESTMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROMAN C. TAMAYO,
THE COMMISIONER OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-28144 November 28, 1975

ALIPIO ALINSUNURIN, now substituted by PARAÑAQUE INVESTMENT and

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and the ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors-appellants.

ANTONIO, J.

FACTS:

Alipio Alinsunurin claimed ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the late Maria Padilla, and
so he sought registration over a tract of land that was approximately 16,800 hectares inside the
boundary of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.

The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines opposed the
application, claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of
said land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation No.
237.

Later, Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation substituted Alipio, it having acquired all
his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over the property subject matter of the application.

The land in question is largely uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth
of timber of commercial quantities, except for a small area cultivated for vegetation by
homesteaders issued patents by the Director of Lands.

It is claimed that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued
during the Spanish regime in 1895, and upon his death in 1900, he transmitted the ownership and
possession to his daughter and sole heir, Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the
land thru tenants and utilized portions for pasture, until her death sometime in 1944.
The CFI of Nueva Ecija granted the registration in favor of Parañaque Investment and Roman C.
Tamayo. The oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court.

Pending apprroval of the Record on Appeal, Parañaque Investment and Roman C. Tamayo filed a
motion for the issuance of a decree of registration pending appeal. Both motions were opposed by
the Government. The CFI then directed the issuance of a decree of registration over the entire land
in their respective fractions, subject to the final outcome of the appeal.

The Commissioner of Land Registration issued a decree pursuant to this order, and the Register of
Deeds issued the OCT.

The Government then instituted to the SC a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction to nullify the order for the decree of registration and the OCT. The
oppositors also caused the entry of a notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a decree of registration may be issued pending appeal. (NO)

RULING:

“Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with
dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon
reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.

“A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the
explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only
after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said
decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.

“Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.”

——

“In the instant case, as a precaution, oppositors-appellants caused notice of lis pendens to be duly
inscribed in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
thereby keeping the whole land subject matter of the appeal within the power of the court until
the litigation is terminated.

“Such entry of notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled until the final termination of the
litigation. The notice of lis pendens must be carried over in all titles subsequently issued,
which will yield to the ultimate result of the appeal.”

——
Apparently, during the pendency of the appeal, a certain Honofre a. Andrada, et al., filed before the
CFI a complaint against Parañaque Investment and Tamayo for reconveyance of a portion of the
land in question, to which the lower court decided in their favor because PI deeded six lots covered
by the subject land to Andrada and Nemesio Diaz despite the preliminary injunction. The Registry
of Deeds of Nueva Ecija directed to cancel the OCT and to issue transfer certificates without the
notice of lis pendens.

The court decided that the order to cancel the OCT and to issue subsequent titles free from all liens
and encumbrances to be void ab initio.

An action for reconveyance over the subject property is barred by the pendency of the appeal,
and so the court is without jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the OCT and to
issue titles to transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances .” Nor can such order be construed
to authorize the Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens, which was not entered by
virtue of the reconveyance case. Thus, the Register of Deeds was duty bound to carry over the said
notice of lis pendens on all titles subsequently issued.

The removal of the notice of lis pendens in the issuance of subsequent titles constitutes
misfeasance in the performance of his duties for which he may be held civilly and even
criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third parties.

The order of the lower court cannot overrule the injunction, and the notice of lis pendents affects all
subsequent transferees of the title of the land subject of this appeal. It is well-settled that entry of
the notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration
and such entry is notice to all persons of such adverse claim.
 30 - Benin vs. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531, June 28, 1974

No. L-26127. June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3621)

VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ,

ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendantappellant.

No. L-26128. June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3622)

JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA

PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendantappellant.

No. L-26129. June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3623)

DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET

AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.

FACTS:

(Civil Case No. 3621)

Plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of agricultural lands
located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of
Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 278,928 square meters.
They also allege that they inherited the land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited it
from his father Eugenio, and that they had been openly, adversely, and peacefully cultivating the
same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom. In addition, they state that Eugenio
had the lands surveyed and during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands, Sixto and plaintiffs
registered their claims of ownership and declared the same for taxation purposes.

After the outbreak of the last World War (1942), evacuees constructed their houses on the land after
securing permission from the plaintiffs and have been paying monthly rents to them.

(Civil Case No. 3622)

Plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land
located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan, province
of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 148,118 square meters, which they inherited
from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who inherited it from his own father, Juan. They
allege that they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous
possession of the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and exclusively
enjoying said products. They also state that they had registered their claims of ownership during the
cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands and declared it for taxation purposes.
After the outbreak of the last World War (1942), evacuees constructed their houses on the land after
securing permission from the plaintiffs and have been paying monthly rents to them.

(Civil Case No. 3623)

Plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in
the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area
of approximately 62,481 square meters. Same, same, id, id. inherited from predecessors, possessed
owned and occupied since time immemorial.

——

In these three civil cases, the plaintiffs allege that in 1951, J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc. illegally
entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of
plaintiffs' lessees as well as other improvements thereon. Upon inquiry, the plaintiffs discovered that
their lands had been included — fraudulently or erroneously, by direct or constructive fraud — in
Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land
Records of the province of Rizal, in the names of defendants.

They claim that the decisions of the court, the decree of the registration of the lands described in
Parcel No. 1, and subsequent OCT and TCT’s, were all null and void because the technical
descriptions of the lands in the application were allegedly altered after its publication in the Official
Gazette.

Upon the institution of the complaint, only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served
with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with
Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The
other defendants were all declared in default.

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.’s motion to dismiss on three cases were all denied. The trial court rendered
a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. This decision was appealed to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the OCT issued in favor of the defendants were null and void. (NO)

RULING:

All six parcels of land the plaintiffs claim are part of Parcel 1, only a little over 2% of the entirety of
the said parcel. The trial court nullified the OCT for both Parcel 1 and 2, which the defendant had
successfully sought to be registered without any qualification.

Chief of Survey Division was tasked with determining whether the amended plan for the application
of Parcel 1 and 2, which sought to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or of
another registration cause, contained lands or areas not included in the original plan. The Chief
found none. There was therefore no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order to
vest the Court of Land Registration jurisdiction to order the issuance of a decree of registration
upon which the contested OCT was based.

“When the original survey plan is amended, after the publication of the application in order to
include land not previously included in the original survey, a new publication of the amended plan
is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the registration court to order the registration of the
land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan.”

Further, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration
court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or
lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction.
 31 - SM Prime Holdings, Inc. vs. Madayag, 578 SCRA 552, February 12, 2009

G.R. No. 164687. February 12, 2009

SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ANGELA V. MADAYAG, respondent.

NACHURA, J.

FACTS:

Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an
application for registration of a parcel of land located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan. Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438,
approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City.

Later that same year, SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional Survey
Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan because it
apparently encroached on the properties it had recently purchased from several lot owners and was
not notified of the survey that Madayag submitted.

SM Prime then manifested its opposition to the Madayag’s application for registration. The
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo
Visperas also filed their respective oppositions.

On the advice of DENR Assistant Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public
Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, SM Prime filed a petition for cancellation to the DENR. SM Prime
likewise filed a motion to suspend the proceedings to await the decision of the administrative
agency, it being prejudicial to the land registration case, which the RTC granted, the reason being a
survey plan is a necessary requirement in the registration proceedings.

Madayag filed an MR on the order of the RTC granting the motion to suspend proceedings, which
the CA reversed. Thus this petition by SM Prime to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the cancellation of the survey plan is enough reason to suspend the proceedings in
the RTC. (NO)

RULING:

The court has inherent power to stay proceedings in the disposition of cases, but courts should be
mindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case and, thus, should not be too
eager to suspend proceedings of the cases before them.
“Every order suspending proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in
order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments,
confusion between litigants and courts, or when the rights of parties to the second action cannot
be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled. Otherwise, the
suspension will be regarded as an arbitrary exercise of the court’s discretion and can be corrected
only by a petition for certiorari.”

“Without delving into the jurisdiction of the DENR to resolve the petition for cancellation, we hold
that, as an incident to its authority to settle all questions over the title of the subject property,
the land registration court may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property
overlaps the petitioner’s properties without necessarily having to declare the survey plan as
void.”

“Should the court find it difficult to [determine whether a land seeking to be titled is already titled],
the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its determination of the propriety of
the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:

“SEC.  21.  Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection.—The court may
require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not
inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any additional papers.”
 32 - Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36637, July 14, 1978

G.R. No. L-36637 July 14, 1978

GENEROSO MENDOZA, substituted by his wife and administratrix DIEGA DE LEON VDA. DE
MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ and DOLORES MENDOZA,
respondents.

SANTOS, J.

FACTS:

Generoso Mendoza filed with the CFI of Bulacan an application for the registration of two parcels
of land, with a residential house thereon, situated in the Poblacion of Sta. Maria Bulacan. A notice
was issued and duly published setting the initial hearing, and upon no one filing an answer or
opposition, an order of general default was issued and Mendoza proceeded with the presentation of
evidence ex-parte.

From the evidence it was discovered that Generoso and his wife owned the subject parcels of land
and during the pendency of the case, sold the same to the respondents subject to the usufructuary
rights of the vendors, Generoso and his wife. By virtue of the sale, the court rendered a decision
ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the names of the vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz
and Dolores Mendoza, subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors, Generoso Mendoza and
Diega de Leon.

Generoso filed a motion for the issuance of a decree once the decision became final and executory,
causing the issuance of the OCT in the name of private respondents. However, Generoso later filed
an urgent petition for reconsideration praying that the decision, decree, and OCT be set aside due to
private respondents’ failure to pay the purchase price.

The registration court set them aside and ordered the cancellation of the OCT, likewise denying the
private respondents’ MR. Upon elevation to the CA, this decision of setting aside and cancelling the
OCT was reversed. Thus this petition to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the registration court can legally order the registration of the land in the name of the
vendees-respondents who were neither applicants nor the oppositors in the land registration case.

RULING:

Yes, Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land
subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the
land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of
the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the
“buyer” or the “person to whom the property has been conveyed” for the applicant. Neither does it
require that the “buyer” or the “person to whom the property has been conveyed” be a party to the
case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of
the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a
motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be
given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show
that these requirements have been complied with.

“The issue on the breach of contract has to be litigated in the ordinary court.”
 33 - Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 276, July 28, 1997

G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO,
substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed
ABISTADO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, but he died during the pendency of the case, and was
thus substituted by his heirs, represented by their aunt, Josefa Abistado.

The RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but found
the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

The lack of jurisdiction stems from the inability of the applicants to comply with Section 23(1) of
PD 1529, which required them to publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. They only managed to publish it in the Official Gazette.

Upon elevation to the CA, it was ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause
such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. Hence, the
RTC decision was set aside and the registration of the title in the name of Teodor Abistado was
ordered. The MR was denied, and thus the Director of Lands, represented by the SolGen, elevated
the matter to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case is mandatory. (YES)

RULING:

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold
purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to
publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the
opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also
in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable.
As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the
court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the
second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is
indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that
the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale
behind the publication requirement.
 34 - Adviento vs. Heirs of Miguel Alvarez, 562 SCRA 434, August 20, 2008

G.R. No. 150844. August 20, 2008

CEFERINO T. ADVIENTO, petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF MIGUEL ALVAREZ, namely: MARIA P. ALVAREZ, DR. BEDA P. ALVAREZ, JR.,
MIGUEL ALVAREZ, JR., DR. AGUSTINA A. BALUYOT, SEVERINO P. ALVAREZ, ANICIA
LEE, AZUCENA S. HUSHEY, and ALEXANDER P. ALVAREZ; Heirs of Lilia A. Ramos, namely:
DANILO RAMOS, NOEL RAMOS, ROY RAMOS, and LEO MIGUEL RAMOS; and LYDIA
GAYA, respondents.

PUNO, C.J.

FACTS:

Miguel Alvarez, now substituted by his heirs, filed a complaint against Lydia Gaya, petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, for reconveyance involving a parcel of land located in Naga City. He
alleged that he had been in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land including its
buildings, and that Gaya had initiated the subdivision of the subject lot without his knowledge in a
Cadastral Case, and that she willfully failed to notify him of the proceedings as the lawful occupant
and owner. He therefore contends that Gaya committed fraud in obtaining the OCT over the subject
property and because of that, he sustained losses and actual and moral damages.

Gaya, on the other hand, claims that he had not been in possession of the land and that she had been
the one in peaceful and continuous possession of the same. She allegedly had acquired an imperfect
title over it, which was confirmed by the Cadastral Court in accordance with CA 141, causing the
registration of the property in her and her husband’s name. The property was now indefeasible and
the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations.

Miguel died during the trial and so he was substituted, and Ceferino Adviento filed for intervention
alleging that he acquired the subject lot by purchase, and upon tracing his title found his
predecessor in interest to be Gaya.

Adviento adopted the allegations of Lydia Gaya insofar as they contested the ownership over the
controverted land. He further alleged that Miguel Alvarez constructed a concrete building, which
the former discovered was encroaching on his property, which was illegal and unlawful as it
deprived him of enjoying his property.

The RTC ruled in favor of Alvarez’s heirs, which the CA affirmed. Thus this petition to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the OCT issued in favor of Gaya was in accordance with the procedure provided by
the Land Registration Act. (NO)

RULING:
Petitioner contended that the publication of the application for registration of the subject lot was
already enough to serve as notice of the same. However, it is provided in Sec 21 of Act 496 (Land
Registration Act) that applications for registrations is required to contain a notification to all the
occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, and if not known shall state what
search has been made to find them.

Since there was lack of notice to the respondents, which was admitted by petitioner, there is denial
of due process.

Also: The RTC and the CA are not bound by the land registration decree especially when it is
assailed on the ground of fraud.

Section 38 of Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act provides that every decree of registration
shall bind the land, and shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, provided that the right of any person deprived of land or
of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud may file with the CFI a
petition for review within one year after the entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest.

Under section 38 of Act No. 496, the petitioner must show affirmatively that (1) he has an interest
or estate in the land, and (2) he has been deprived of that interest through fraud in the procurement
of the decree of registration. (Salomon v. Bocauto)

Extrinsic fraud: “In the case at bar, respondents pleaded their interest in the land and the fraud
used which defeated such interest. No notice was given to the respondents. The lack of notice was
obviously intended by the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest to prevent contest on the application.
Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest falsely attested to the absence of any adverse claim, including
the absence of any possession of the land. By our rulings, this constitutes extrinsic fraud.”

“The purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties, deprived of land or any interest therein,
through fraud in the registration proceedings, the opportunity to review the decree is to insure
fair and honest dealing in the registration of land. But the action to annul a judgment, upon the
ground of fraud, would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered, Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant ‘outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.’ But intrinsic fraud takes the form
of ‘acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured
testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.’ Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where
the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact
they are, or in applying for and obtaining adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of
land which he knows had not been allotted to him in the partition, or in intentionally concealing
facts, and conniving with the land inspector to include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable
stream, or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims, or in deliberately failing to
notify the party entitled to notice, or in inducing him not to oppose an application, or in
misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to
withdraw his opposition. In all these examples the overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or
from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction
of the court.”

——

Petitioner is not a buyer in good faith because he was already aware of the encumbrance over the
land due to notice of lis pendens and independent knowledge of the contest over the property.
 35 - Republic vs. Lee, G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991

G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA P. LEE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.

FACTS:

Maria P. Lee filed before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan,
an application for registration in her favor of a parcel of land consisting of 6,843 square meters
located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan.

The Director of Lands, representing the RP, filed an opposition contending that she has not acquired
the land under a Spanish title nor in any mode provided by the law, that neither she nor her
predecessors in interest had been possessing the land for at least 30 years before the filing of the
application, and that the lands being sought to be registered belonged to the public domain.

The then CFI ruled in favor or Lee, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Thus this petition to
the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the bare statement of the applicant that the land has been in the n the possession of
her predecessors-in- interest for more than 20 years constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and
"conclusive" evidence required in a land registration proceeding. (NO)

RULING:

“The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered
under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though
there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons. . . . In order that the
petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same registered, and to have
the benefit resulting from the certificate of title finally issued, the burden is upon him to show that
he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple.”

“Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant,
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894 or prior thereto. The doctrine upon which
these rules are based is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.”

“it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more possession of
the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30)
year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in
concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the
Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in
possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's
declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this
nature. Private respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature
of such possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of
owner" by which she described her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest
are mere conclusions of law which require factual support and substantiation.”

“Her bare allegation, without more, did not constitute such preponderant evidence that would
shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.”
 36 - Republic vs. Sayo, G.R. No. L-60413, October 31, 1990

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO
SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO
AND FARM PRODUCTS, INC., respondents.

NARVASA, J.

FACTS:

Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of a tract of land
ormerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva
Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236. Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the
Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others, including the Heirs of Liberato
Bayaua. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a compromise
agreement was entered into by and among all the parties.

This compromise agreement was later approved by respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo, thus
confirming the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. However, the
Solicitor General sought the annulment of respondent judge’s decision for being patently void as the
private respondents were not able to present any competent evidence of ownership over the subject
land of the compromise agreement to substantiate their pretension for ownership.

Moreover, petitioner Solicitor General contended that he was neither a party to the execution of the
compromise agreement nor has he been served with the notice of the decision approving the
compromise.

Meanwhile, the respondents claim that the arguments were premised on the proposition that the
subject land was public land, which it was not.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was competent proof presented which substantiated the claim of ownership by
the respondents. (NO)

RULING:

“In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the
applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their
application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932
(already above mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government’s Estadistica de
Propiedades of Isabela issued in 1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish
system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But, as this Court has
already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document, the Estadistica de Propiedades, cannot be
considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime,
and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. It is an inefficacious document on
which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question.”

It is the intent of the application for the registration of land under the Torrens Act to establish the
fact that the land in question is actually privately owned and is not part of the public domain, even if
there is no adverse claim or opposition.

“The decisoin of the court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But
that compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent
evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the
land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to
prove their ownership of any part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise
agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The
result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any
substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among
themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.”

“The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement
did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private
respondents.”

“As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be pointed out that
under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands,
subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second,
actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later reduced
to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the
informacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie evidence of
possession”

““Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land
registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General.”
 37 - Ong vs. Republic, 548 SCRA 160, March 12, 2008

G.R. No. 175746. March 12, 2008

CHARLES L. ONG, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

Charles L. Ong, in his behalf and as duly authorized representative of his brothers, applied for
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of
five hundred seventy four (574) square meters.

They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive
property having acquired the same by purchase; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession
of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years. The RP, represented by
the OSG, opposed the application.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and his brothers, but this was reversed
in the CA upon elevation, as the latter court found that the subject property was part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain and so the petitioner must prove their possession in
accordance with law, which they failed to do. (June 12, 1945 or earlier, earliest tax declaration
1971)

Thus this petition to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners has properly proven their and their predecessors in interest’s
possession of the subject property in accordance with the requirements of PD 1529. (NO)

RULING:

Petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject property. Even if we were to
tack petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-
interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the
required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the
law requires possession and occupation. Since the petitioner admitted that he and his brothers did
not actually occupy the subject lot after their purchase and no improvements were made thereon,
they failed to establish the acts of ownership to substantiate their claim.
 38 - Republic vs. Guinto-Aldana, 628 SCRA 210, August 11, 2010

G.R. No. 175578. August 11, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA, in her own

behalf as Attorney-in-fact of MA. AURORA GUINTO-COMISO, MA. LUISA GUINTO-
DIONISIO, ALFREDO GUINTO, JR., PACITA R. GUINTO, ERNESTO R. GUINTO,
NATIVIDAD R. GUINTO and ALBERTO R. GUINTO, respondents.

PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

Respondents filed with the RTC an application for registration of two pieces of land in Talango,
Pamplona Uno, Las Piñas City, professing to be co-owners of the lot after acquiring them by
succession from Zenaida’s parents who in turn had acquired the property under a 1969 document
denominated as “Kasulatan sa Pag-hahati ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at
Bilihan.”

They also alleged that until the time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the
concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of
real estate taxation.

To support this, they submitted to the court the blueprint, copies of technical descriptions of each
lot, a certification from the geodetic engineer, pertinent tax declarations, and the receipts of
payment.They admitted that the original tracing cloth plan was previously submitted to the RTC of
Las Piñas City, Branch 255 (Las Piñas RTC) in connection with a previous registration case
involving the subject property which had been dismissed without prejudice.

The RP, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City, opposed the application, stating
that the lots were inalienable lands of the public domain and that tax declarations did not constitute
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or prior possession in the concept of an owner.

The trial court, after weighing the evidence, denied the petition for registration because of failure to
submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan as mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529. Further, the testimonies offered did not establish the nature of the possession.

The CA, upon elevation, reversed the RTC decision. Hence this petition to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement in
registration proceedings in order to establish the exact identity of the property. (YES, but…)

RULING:
PD 1529 denotes that it is imperative in an application for original registration that the applicant
submits to the court, aside from the original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy of
a duly approved survey plan of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as
it provides a reference on the exact identity of the property.

In not so many cases, it has been adjudicated that the non-submission of this cloth plan is fatal as it
supplies the means by which to determine the metes and bounds of the property. Previous
transmission of the same to the LRA does not dispense with the obligation of the applicant to
retrieve the plan and present it in evidence.

Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is
merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of
the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the
boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be
denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied by
pieces of evidence—such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed
technical description of the property—which may likewise substantially and with as much certainty
prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.

Thus, while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original
tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management Services of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), blueprint copies and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification.

Therefore, the blueprint and technical description of the property is substantial compliance with the
legal requirement of ascertaining the identity of the subject lots. There was approximate compliance
to PD 1529.

“no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property. It also announces
his adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may be in conflict with his interest.
More importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to government revenues—an act
that strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership”
 39 - Serra Serra vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482, March 22, 1991

G.R. No. 34080. March 22, 1991

SALVADOR SERRA SERRA, HEIRS OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA, represented by

CARMELO IMAZ, as Special Administrator of the Estate of GREGORIO SERRA SERRA,
MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA, AND FRANCISCO
JOSE SERRA SERRA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. JUDGE
CARLOS ABIERA, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, PRIMITIVO
HERNAEZ, ROGACIANA HERNAEZ AND LUISA HERNAEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 34693. March 22, 1991

SALVADOR SERRA SERRA, HEIRS OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA, represented by

CARMELO IMAZ, as Special Administrator of the Estate of GREGORIO SERRA SERRA,
MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA AND FRANCISCO
JOSE SERRA SERRA, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE NESTOR B. ALAMPAY, in his capacity as
the Presiding Judge of Branch III of Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, FELIPE
GARAYGAY AND NEGROS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (SONEDCO), respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.

FACTS:

Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez (Hernaezes, for brevity) filed with then CFI
of Bacolod City a petition for reconstitution of allegedly lost original certificates of title in the name
of their predecessor-in-interest, Eleuterio Hernaez, located in the province of Negros Occidental.

The petition was supported by a certification from the Register of Deeds, Bacolod, Negros
Occidental, that no certificates of titles had been issued covering the properties.

The petition was granted and the Register of Deeds issued reconstituted original certificates of title,
but were cancelled upon presentation by the Hernaezes of a “declaration of heirship” and in lieu
thereof, TCTs were issued in their names.

Upon learning of the TCT’s Salvador Serra Serra, in behalf of his co-heirs, filed an adverse claim
on the reconstituted certificates of title in the name of the Hernaezes, and moved for the
cancellation of certificates of title on the ground that they had existing certificates of title and actual
possessiono of the properties since before the war.

The trial court of Himamaylan issued a writ of possession prayed for by the Hernaezes, which the
Serras challenged before the CA in a petition for certioari. In giving due course to the petition, the
CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond. The Serras filed a motion for
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction which was granted. The petitioners filed an MR
over the dissolution of the writ, which was denied. It was that denial of the MR that petitioners
brought the petition to the SC (G.R. No. 34080).
While G.R. No. 34080 was pending before the SC, the Serras filed with the CFI of Negros
Occidental a complaint against Felipe Garaygay and SONEDCO Southern Negros Development
Corp. for having cut, hauled, and milled the sugarcanes owned by the plaintiffs, which included
inter alia the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the corporation from issuing the
quedans to Garaygay. The writ was granted.

Felipe Garaygay, who claimed that he obtained from the Hernaezes a contract to harvest and
dispose of the sugar canes produced from the disputed lots, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
and later a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ was later dissolved.

In the same case, Garaygay filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Serras who allegedly harvested and thereafter planted sugarcane on the lots
disputed contrary to the intention of this Court in its previous resolution that the parties maintain the
status quo. This writ was issued agains the Serras, and the MR of the latter was denied.

The Serras challenged both orders before the SC thru G.R. No. L-34693.

Both of the aforementioned cases were consolidated.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction it previously issued. (YES)

RULING:

The issuance of the writ of possession by Judge Abiera after the motion for cancellation of the
reconstituted certificates of title filed by petitioners was dismissed and under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, was not proper. Consequently, the lifting of the previously issued writ of
preliminary injunction by the respondent appellate court, resulting in the enforcement of the writ of
possession issued by the trial court and the dispossession of the petitioners of the subject properties
was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction.

In a land registration case, a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree of
registration in an original land registration proceedings “not only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion
thereof during the proceedings up to the issuance of the decree.” It cannot however, be issued in a
petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate of title. Reconstitution does
not confirm or adjudicate ownership over the property covered by the reconstituted title as in
original land registration proceedings where, in the latter, a writ of possession may be issued to
place the applicant-owner in possession.

A person who seeks a reconstitution of a certificate of title over a property he does not actually
possess cannot, by a mere motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary in
nature, deprive the actual occupants of possession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the
property should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
Moreover, petitioners were not mere possessors of the properties covered by the reconstituted titles.
They are possessors under claim of ownership. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of the property (Article 433, New Civil Code), not summarily through a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession.

“Private respondents argue that the herein petitioners are bound by the order granting reconstitution
because the reconstitution proceedings was heard after notices were sent to alleged boundary
owners and the petition was published in the Official Gazette. However, the petitioner who were in
actual possession of the properties were not notified. Notice by publication is not sufficient as
regards actual possessors of the property. In the case of Alabang Development v. Valenzuela, No.
54094, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 277, We held that in petitions for reconstitution of titles,
actual owners and possessors of the lands involved must be duly served with actual and
personal notice of the petition.”

In reconstitution cases, if no such original title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is a nullity and
the order for its reconstitution does not become final because the court rendering the order has not
acquired jurisdiction. It may be attacked at any time. The same rule applies if in fact there is an
earlier valid certificate of title in the name and in the possession of another person/s.

One way to set aside a final and executory judgment is by a petition for relief from judgment as
provided for by Rule 38, as when the judgment has been entered against a party thru fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, and the petition is filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns
of the judgment and not more than 6 months, after such judgment or order was entered (Rule 38,
Sec. 3, Rules of Court).
 40 - Republic vs. Nillas, 512 SCRA 286, January 23, 2007

G.R. No. 159595. January 23, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, respondent.

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, alleging that he then CFI of Negros Oriental acting as a cadastral
court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named
oppositors who had sufficiently proven that they have been in continuous possession of their
respective lots since time immemorial.

Among them was the subject property which Nillas’s parents, she alleges, acquired by virtue of
Deeds of Absolute Sale. Despite the multiple transfers, the lot has been in open and continuous
possession by the Abierra spouses and no decree of registration has been issued over the subject lot
despite the CFI decision. Nillas then sought the revival of the said decision.

The RTC ruled in favor of the revival of the judgment. The CA denied the appeal of this decision by
the OSG.

ISSUES:

Whether or not prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration
case. (NO)

RULING:

The rule is that “neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land
registration case.”

“There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a
decree. The reason is that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to
be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a
ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or
of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not
prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.”
41 - Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development Corporation, 540 SCRA 304, December 14,
2007

G.R. No. 123346. December 14, 2007

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. CLT
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

G.R. No. 134385. December 14, 2007

ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON,

REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R.
DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA
DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND
ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, respondents.

TINGA, J.

FACTS:

The two petitions cover properties covered by OCT No. 994, encompassing 1,342 hectares of the
Maysilo Estate and stretches over 3 cities. These properties have been beset by controversy due to
fraud, cloudy titles, and shady transfers.

(G.R. No. 123346)

On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from
Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26
of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before the RTC of Caloocan City. The RTC ruled in
favor of CLT, it being established that the Maysilo Estate was registered under Act No. 496
by virtue of which OCT No. 994 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, and it appearing
that the Manotok titles encroached on the property described in CLT’s title.

The Manotoks appealed to the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Thus the
petition to the SC.

(G.R. No. 134385)

On 18 December 1979, Dimson filed with the then CFI of Rizal, Caloocan City a complaint
for recovery of possession and damages against Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.
(Araneta). Dimson alleged that he was the absolute owner of part of the Maysilo Estate in
Malabon covered by TCT No. R-15169 and that Araneta had been illegally occupying the
land. Araneta alleged that Dimson’s title to the subject land was void and hence he had no
cause of action.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dimson, which the CA affirmed on appeal. Thus the petition to
the SC.
The petitions were consolidated, and the RP was allowed to intervene. The SC, in its 2005 decision,
denied both petitions and affirmed in toto the CA decision. The Manotoks and Araneta filed their
respective MRs and oral arguments ensued from which a crucial fact emerged. The date of
registration of the titles were different from the date appearing in the OCT, putting into question the
true date of OCT No. 944.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the titles, sourced from OCT No. 994, are valid. (NO)

RULING:

OCT No. 994, registered on April 19, 1917, does not exist, and only OCT No. 994 registered on
May 3, 1917 does.

“It is elemental to note that assuming said 3 May OCT was somehow flawed because it was based
on Cadastral Case No. 34, it does not mean that the so-called 17 April 1917 OCT No. 994 is valid or
had existed in the first place. Since even the dissent now discounts the existence of the so-called 17
April 1917 OCT No. 994, it should necessarily follow that any title that is sourced from the 17 April
1917 OCT is void. Such conclusion is inescapable whatever questions there may be about the
veracity of the 3 May 1917 OCT based on Cadastral Case No. 34.”

Thus, the subsequent titles sourced from OCT No. 994 is considered void.
 42 - Rufloe vs. Burgos, 577 SCRA 264, January 30, 2009

G.R. No. 143573. January 30, 2009

ADORACION ROSALES RUFLOE, ALFREDO RUFLOE and RODRIGO RUFLOE, petitioners,

vs.
LEONARDA BURGOS, ANITA BURGOS, ANGELITO BURGOS, AMY BURGOS, ELVIRA
DELOS REYES and JULIAN C. TUBIG, respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS:

Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while co-petitioners Alfredo and
Rodrigo are their children. during their marriage, they acquired a 371-square meter parcel of land
located at Barangay Bagbagan, Muntinlupa.

Sometime in 1978, Elvira Delos Reyes forged the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of
Sale to make it appear that the disputed property was sold to her by the spouses Rufloe. Due to this,
Delos Reyes succeeded in obtaining a title over the said property in her name.

The Rufloes filed a complaint for damages against Delos Reyes with the RTC of Pasay City,
alleging that the Deed of Sale was falsified and their signatures forged because Angel Rufloe died 4
years before the alleged sale. While the above case was pending, Delos Reyes sold the property to
the Burgos siblings, who were then issued a new title in their names. The RTC declared the Deed of
Sale to be falsified and concluded that Delos Reyes did not acquire ownership over the subject
property. This decision became final and executory.

Thus, the Rufloes filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa a complaint against the Burgos siblings for
nullity of contract and cancellation of TCTs. The RTC ruled in favor of the Rufloes, but upon
elevation to the CA, the decision was reversed. Thus this petition to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the sales were valid and binding and whether or not the respondents were buyers in
good faith. (NO to both)

RULING:

“It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non
habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more
right than what the seller can transfer legally.13 Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos Reyes
acquired no right over the subject property which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the
transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Delos Reyes are
likewise void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda.”

“An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the
purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.15 The burden of proving the
status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon one who asserts that status. This onus
probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith.”

“When the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of
title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status
of the title of the property in litigation.”
 43 - Pajomayo vs. Manipon, 39 SCRA 676, June 30, 1971

G.R. No. L-33676, June 30, 1971

MARIANO PAJOMAYO, PATRICIO PAJOMAYO, EUSEBIO PAJOMAYO, SOLEDAD

PAJOMAYO assisted by her husband FLORIANO CHITONGCO, DEMETRIO PAJOMAYO,
CRISTITA PAJOMAYO assisted by her husband MANUEL RAMIREZ, PATROCINIO
PAJOMAYO and CRISPO PAJOMAYO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
RODRIGO MANIPON and PERFECTA ZULUETA, defendants-appellants.

ZALDIVAR, J.

FACTS:

Plaintiffs filed in the CFI of Pangasinan a complaint alleging that they are co-owners pro-indiviso
of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 in the name of Diego
Pajomayo, their father, issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. They allege that
they had acquired it as an inheritance and that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in
actual, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of said property in the concept of owners for a period
of more than 70 years until the early part of the year 1956.

Defendants, on the other hand, alleged that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 14043 issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan, the said land having been adjudicated to them in the cadastral proceedings of the
Malasique cadastre. The defendants claim they had acquired the land mentioned in their answer by
inheritance from their deceased father Pioquinto Manipon, and that they and their predecessorsin-
interest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse possession of said land for more than 70 years, to
the exclusion of plaintiffs.

The CFI held that the OCT held by the plaintiffs were issued earlier than the OCT of the defendants,
and thus ruled in the former’s favor.

The defendants brought the appeal to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the earlier title is to be preferred from a later title. (YES)

RULING:

“Necessarily, when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be declared
null and void and should be ordered cancelled. And if a party is declared to be the owner of a parcel
of land pursuant to a valid certificate of title said party is entitled to the possession of the land
covered by said valid title. The decree of registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does not
have the effect of annulling the title that had previously been issued in accordance with the
provisions of the land Registration Law (Act 496).”
“It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the
original parties,, and in of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the
land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who
relies on the second certificate.”