LAND TITLE CASE DIGESTS - ROMAN NUMERAL I

#1

Casimiro Dev’t. Corp. vs Mateo

Facts:

The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land (property) with an area of 6,693 square meters,
more or less, located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City, that was originally owned by Isaias Lara,2
the respondent’s maternal grandfather. Upon the death of Isaias Lara in 1930, the property passed on to
his children, namely: Miguela, Perfecta and Felicidad, and a grandson, Rosauro (son of Perfecta who had
predeceased Isaias in 1920). In 1962, the co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive
ownership to Felicidad (whose married surname was Lara-Mateo) under an agreement denominated as
Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng Hukuman.

Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five children, namely: Laura, respondent Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and
Leonardo. With the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property was
executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967, applied for land registration. After the application was granted,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Laura’s sole name.

In due course, the property now covered by OCT No. 6386 was used as collateral to secure a succession
of loans. The first loan was obtained from Bacoor Rural Bank (Bacoor Bank). To repay the loan to Bacoor
Bank and secure the release of the mortgage, Laura borrowed funds from Parmenas Perez (Perez), who,
however, required that the title be meanwhile transferred to his name. Thus, OCT No. 6386 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 438959 was issued in the name of Perez.
Subsequently, Laura recovered the property by repaying the obligation with the proceeds of another loan
obtained from Rodolfo Pe (Pe), resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 438595, and in the issuance of
TCT No. S-91595 in Laura’s name. She later executed a deed of sale in favor of Pe, leading to the
issuance of TCT No. S-91738 in the name of Pe, who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in
favor of China Banking Corporation (China Bank) as security for a loan. In the end, China Bank
foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of the property in 1985 after Pe failed to
redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the name of China Bank.

In 1988, CDC and China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the purchase of the property,
with China Bank executing a deed of conditional sale for the purpose. On March 4, 1993, CDC and China
Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property. Resultantly, on March 29, 1993, CDC was
issued TCT No. T-34640 in its own name.

In the meanwhile, on February 28, 1991, Felicidad died intestate.

On June 6, 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in
Las Piñas City against the respondent’s siblings, namely: Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, and the
other occupants of the property. Therein, the defendants maintained that the MeTC did not have
jurisdiction over the action because the land was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction belonged
to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they had been in continuous and
open possession of the land even before World War II and had presumed themselves entitled to a
government grant of the land; and that CDC’s title was invalid, considering that the land had been
registered before its being declared alienable.
Issues:

Whether or not that CDC was an innocent purchaser for value

Whether or not that an innocent purchaser of an object can claim the property he buys.

Ruling:

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all,
which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system
and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even
more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens
system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued there under once the conditions laid down
by the law are satisfied.

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has
a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could
convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari; set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 71696; dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 94-2045; and declare Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-34640 in the name of Casimiro Development Corporation valid and subsisting.

#2

Sps. Cabarrus vs Sps. Po

Facts:

Facts: This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City, This parcel of land
originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno. On 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno. This property included two (2) lots: Lot No. 2807 and the land subject of
this case, Lot No. 2835. In 1978, Ciriaco sold the two (2) lots to Victoria Po (Victoria). The parties
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. In 1990, Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco "had executed a
quitclaim dated August 7, 1989 renouncing [his] interest over Lot [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner]
Roberto." In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was "the declared owner of Lot [Nos.] 2835 and 2807."
The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a
Memorandum of Agreement in which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid
by the Spouses Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po
were left with after the quitclaim. However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto. The
Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of absolute sale in favor of Roberto.25 On
April 19, 1993, Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835 with the Mandaue City
Regional Trial Court, acting as land registration court. The trial court granted the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with portions
sold to Ernesto and Jose.

On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title
with damages. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Po in its Decision. The decision was appealed
by the Sps. Aboitiz.

CA Decision.

The Court of Appeals, partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful
owner of the land. However, it ruled that the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should
be respected.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Land Title acquired by Sps. Aboitiz entitled them the rights over the subject land
and barred Sps. Po to reconvey the land.

2. Whether or not respondents Jose, Ernesto and Isabel are innocent purchasers for value.

Held:

1. No. The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate to vest ownership
upon her of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or
vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper
from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one
to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it
may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner. Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the
Torrens title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its
trueowners. Thus, its issuance does not foreclose the possibility of having a different owner, and it cannot
be used against the true owner as a shield for fraud.

2. Yes. The Spouses Po cannot recover the property. Respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are
innocent purchasers for value. An innocent purchaser for value refers to the buyer of the property who
pays for its full and fair price without or before notice of another person’s right or interest in it. He or she
buys the property believing that “the [seller] [i]s the owner and could [transfer] the title to the property.
However, if a property is registered, the buyer of a parcel of land is not obliged to look beyond the transfer
certificate of title to be considered a purchaser in good faith for value.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land and to put a stop to any
question of legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title at the time
of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto. Every registered owner and every subsequent
purchaser for value in good faith holds the title to the property free from all encumbrances except those
noted in the certificate. Hence, a purchaser is not required to explore further what the Torrens title on its
face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto.Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued,
acquire rights over the property the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of
the certificate. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. Even if a decree in a registration proceeding is infected with
nullity, still an innocent purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title issued in pursuance thereof is
protected.

#3

Sps. Peralta vs Heirs of Abalon

Facts:

A consolidated petition for review involving a parcel of land registered under the name of Bernardina
Abalon represented by her heirs and was fraudulently transferred to Restituto Rellama and thus turn
subdivided and sold to the Peraltas and the Andals who averred that they were buyers in good faith and
sought protection accorded to them under the law. The RTC and CA rendered a decision in favor of the
Abalon and ordered the restoration of the CTC and the cancellation of the titles issued to the Peraltas on
the ground that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the subject property showed badges of fraud or
forgery against Rellama considering the Spouses Peralta as buyers in bad faith but accorded the Andals
the presumption of good faith, finding no evidence that would rebut this presumption. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent
purchaser.

Held: Petition is denied and affirm the ruling of the CA.

We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the CA because it is supported by the evidence of
record.

It is a well-settled that “a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and inconvertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system
of land registration is to quiet title to land and to stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title.”
The system was intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration,
but the system cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land.
It merely confirms ownership and does not create it and cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their
title for the purpose of transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed
or recognized by law. Thus, the Torrens system cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner
or to shield the commission or fraud or to enrich oneself at the expense of another.

#4

Imperial vs Armes

Facts:

Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 178842, is filed by Rene H. Imperial (Imperial) and NIDSLAND
Resources and Development Corporation (NIDSLAND) against Alfonso B. Cruz, Jr. (Cruz). It seeks the
reversal of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 6, 2007 and July 3, 2007,
respectively. The second petition, G.R. No. 195509, filed by Cruz against Imperial and NIDSLAND, seeks
the reversal of the Decision of the CA dated September 13, 2010.

On September 24, 1993, Julian C. Napal (Napal) and Imperial entered into a Memorandum of
1
Agreement to organize a domestic corporation to be named NIDSLAND. Under the Memorandum of
Agreement, Napal and Imperial agreed to engage in the real estate business. For his capital contribution
to the corporation, Napal undertook to convey to NIDSLAND a tract of land consisting of four lots (the
Property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 37737, 37738, 37739 and 21026, and to
Imperial a two hectare portion of the Property situated in Taysan, Legazpi City. 2 Napal and Imperial
intended to develop this land into a subdivision. Imperial, on the other hand, as his contribution to
NIDSLAND, committed to perform the following obligations: to settle Napal's obligation to the Rural Bank
of Ligao, Inc., which was about to foreclose its mortgage on the Property; pay Napal's tax liabilities to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) which encumbered with a tax lien the largest portion of the Property;
fund NIDSLAND's initial operating capital; and provide for Napal's personal drawings in an amount not
3
exceeding ₱l,200,000.

While Imperial faithfully complied with his obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement, Napal failed
to convey to NIDSLAND a certain portion of the Property, in particular Lot 15-C covered by TCT No.
21026 (the Subject Property).4 On July 24, 1996, Napal sold the Subject Property to Cruz as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale. 5While the Deed of Absolute Sale between Napal and Cruz bore the date
July 24, 1996, the sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Legazpi City only on August 27, 1996. 6

As Napal continued to refuse to convey the Subject Property to NIDSLAND under the Memorandum of
Agreement, Imperial filed on July 30, 1996, for himself and in representation of NIDSLAND, a derivative
suit (SEC Petition) before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 7 This was filed after the sale
to Cruz but before its registration. The case was docketed as SEC LEO Case No. 96-0004 (SEC
Case).8 On the same day, Imperial also filed a notice of lis pendens for the SEC Case with the Registry of
9 10
Deeds of Legazpi City. This was annotated on TCT No. 21026 as Entry No. 99956/99957.

Since the annotation of the lis pendens occurred after the sale of the Subject Property to Cruz but before
its registration with the Registry of Deeds, the notice of lis pendens was carried over to the new TCT No.
4393611 issued in Cruz's name. 12 Meanwhile, the SEC Case proceeded without the participation of Cruz
who had possession of the new TCT covering the Subject Property during the continuation of the
hearings.

On August 8, 1997 and during the pendency of the SEC Case, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed an action for
annulment of sale against Cruz (Annulment of Sale Action) before the Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City
(RTC Legazpi City). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 9419. 13 On August 14, 1997, the R TC Legazpi
City dismissed the action and held that it should have been filed in the original case where the decree of
14
registration was entered. Imperial and NIDSLAND elevated the case to the CA through an
15 16
appeal. The CA affirmed the RTC Legazpi City's ruling.

On November 10, 1998, SEC Hearing Officer Santer G. Gonzales (SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales)
17
rendered a Decision in favor of Imperial and NIDSLAND (SEC Decision). The Decision declared the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Napal and Cruz void ab initio as the SEC found that the sale was
simulated and was intentionally made to appear to have been perfected prior to the filing of the notice
of lis pendens. Thus, the SEC ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Cruz. Further, the SEC
directed Napal to execute the proper deed of conveyance of the Subject Property in favor of NIDSLAND.
18
The SEC also mandated Napal to deliver the possession of the Subject Property to NIDSLAND.

Since Napal did not appeal the SEC Decision, it became final and executory and was enforced on
19
January 13, 1999. As ordered in the SEC Decision, a Deed of Conveyance was issued on the same
date, transferring the Subject Property to NIDSLAND. TCT No. 43936 in the name of Cruz was cancelled
and a new TCT No. 49730 was issued in the name of NIDSLAND on January 19, 1999. 20

On February 18, 1999, Napal filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 4 7 of
the Rules of Court (Annulment of Judgment Action). This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
21
51258. Napal sought the nullification of the SEC Decision as well as the orders and writs issued
pursuant to it. Napal argued that the SEC has no jurisdiction over the SEC Case as it did not involve any
intra-corporate controversy. On April 15, 1999, Cruz filed in the Annulment of Judgment Action a Motion
to Join as Party-Petitioner.22 In his motion, Cruz claimed that he is a transferee pendente lite of the
Subject Property.23

The CA promulgated a Decision24 on August 31, 1999 dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
The CA explained that Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is not available to annul the judgment of the SEC.
According to the CA, the proper remedy in this case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
None of the parties appealed the CA Decision. Thus, entry of judgment was made on November 16,
2000.25

26
On January 22, 2001, Cruz filed a pleading denominated as a "Petition" before RTC Legazpi City (RTC
Petition),27which sought to nullify the SEC Decision. This was docketed as Civil Case No. SR-09 and
raffled to Branch 4 of RTC Legazpi City.

Presiding Judge Gregorio A. Consulta, without issuing summons, dismissed the Petition motu
proprio.30He justified his dismissal on the ground that regional trial courts have no jurisdiction over the
SEC and as such, an action assailing the decision of the SEC should be brought before the CA. As his
motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied, 31 Cruz elevated the case to the CA by way of a
special civil action for certiorari. This was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 65720.32 In a Decision33 dated
October 28, 2002, the CA held that R TC Legazpi City acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the Petition, and therefore ordered that the case be remanded to RTC Legazpi City to be given due
course.34

In accordance with the Decision of the CA, the RTC Petition was re-docketed as Civil Case No. 10325
and was reraffled to Branch 3 of the RTC Legazpi City. 35 However, even before summons could be
issued, Presiding Judge Henry B. Basilla issued an Order36 dated April 15, 2004 dismissing the Petition.
The Order stated that the RTC Petition failed to comply with the reglementary period and other procedural
requirements under Rule 65 for the proper filing of a special civil action for certiorari.

However, upon Cruz's motion for reconsideration, Judge Basilla reversed his ruling in an Order 37 dated
38
May 7, 2004. Thus, RTC Legazpi City summoned Imperial and NIDSLAND on July 1, 2004. On July 30,
2004, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by Judge Basilla.40
39

Imperial and NIDSLAND then failed to file their answer and were declared in default. 41 Thus, Cruz was
allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Judge Basilla eventually set aside the order of default upon motion
42
of Imperial and NIDSLAND. Judge Basilla subsequently voluntarily inhibited himself, and the RTC
Petition was reraffled to Branch 4 presided by Respondent Judge Edgar L. Armes (Respondent Judge
Armes).43

After trial, the parties to the RTC Petition submitted their respective memoranda. In Imperial and
NIDSLAND's memorandum and supplemental memorandum, they again sought the dismissal of the RTC
Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Judge Armes refused the dismissal. 44

On August 22, 2006, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed an Omnibus Motion. This was followed by a
Supplemental Motion filed on September 7, 2006.45 In the two motions, Imperial and NIDSLAND once
again prayed for the dismissal of the RTC Petition.
Respondent Judge Armes denied the Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Motion in an Order dated
47
September 21, 2006. According to the Order, the issues raised by Imperial and NIDSLAND have
already been settled by the CA in the certiorari case filed by Cruz. The Order held that the CA ruled that
the RTC Legazpi City has jurisdiction over the case and even directed the latter to give due course to the
RTC Petition.

Imperial and NIDSLAND filed a motion for reconsideration of this RTC Order on October 6, 2006. 48 In this
motion, Imperial and NIDSLAND argued that the ruling of the CA pertained to an entirely different
jurisdictional issue from that raised in their Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Omnibus
49 50
Motion. Respondent Judge Armes denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order dated November
23, 2006. This Order reiterated that the CA's directive that the RTC Legazpi City give due course to the
RTC Petition was unqualified and unconditional. Further, the Order explained that Imperial and
NIDSLAND's arguments had no merit.

Issue:

The core issue is whether RTC Legazpi City has jurisdiction to declare the nullity of the Decision of the
SEC. To resolve this issue, we once again clarify the apparent clash of jurisdiction between the SEC and
the ordinary courts in cases involving Presidential Decree No. 902-A61 (PD 902-A).

Ruling:

The SEC do not have jurisdiction on the case.

In 1976, PD 902-A vested the SEC with the quasi-judicial power over intra-corporate disputes. While this
jurisdiction was eventually transferred to regional trial courts designated as special commercial courts by
The Securities Regulation Code in 2000, the SEC had the authority over intra-corporate disputes at the
time relevant to this case.

In this case, the SEC, in rendering the decision, disregarded established law and jurisprudence on the
jurisdiction of the SEC. Further, it adjudicated on the rights of Cruz, cancelled the deed of sale, and took
away his property without giving him the opportunity to be heard. It is a breach of the basic requirements
of due process.

The SEC Decision went further and ordered the cancellation of Cruz's TCT. This did not take into
consideration the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. While this is not a question that we seek to resolve in
these consolidated cases, we emphasize that a proper adjudication of this matter requires, at the very
least, an analysis of the effect of the notice of lis pendens, the rights of a transferee pendente lite, and the
propriety of a collateral attack on a certificate of title. Clearly, the SEC is not the appropriate forum to
delve into these civil law concepts.

The SEC also does not possess the expertise to go into the reception of evidence and the conduct of
hearings geared for the purpose of resolving issues proper for a civil action. The resolution of a civil
action requires preponderance of evidence as a burden of proof. On the other hand, cases before quasi-
judicial bodies require only substantial evidence. Hence, the propriety of annulling a sale and cancelling a
Torrens title-which are in the nature of a civil action-on the basis merely of substantial evidence
determined by an administrative body raises due process concerns.

Hence, because the SEC Decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion and is therefore void, all
acts emanating from it have no force and effect. Thus, the Deed of Conveyance issued pursuant to it has
no legal effect.
Nevertheless, while the certificates of title issued in the name of NIDSLAND arose from a void judgment,
this Court cannot nullify them in these proceedings. The indefeasibility of a Torrens title prevents us from
doing so. Further, we are bound by rules on jurisdiction and the nature of the proceedings before us.

Our Torrens system serves a very important purpose. As a general rule, a Torrens certificate of title is
conclusive proof of ownership. Thus, provided that the requirements of law are met, a certificate of title
under the Torrens system of registration is indefeasible. The value of this rule finds real meaning when
viewed in practical terms. A registration under the Torrens system confirms that the person whose name
appears as owner of the land is indeed the true owner. Except for specific circumstances allowed by law,
a person who registers his or her ownership over a piece of land makes his or her title indefeasible
because the law does not allow any other person to attack or challenge it. Because the title is
indefeasible, third persons interested in the registered land can simply look at the certificate of title and
rely on the information stated in it. This creates stability in our system of registration. This rule is so
zealously protected that our laws even prohibit a collateral attack of a void certificate of title.

The 2 consolidated petitions were dismissed.

#5

Sps. Abrigo vs De Vera

#6

Abobon vs Abobon

Facts:

Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon, who were the registered owners, filed for the
recovery of possession of a parcel of land against petitioner Numeriano Abobon, their first cousin. The
parcel of land is a 4,668 sq.m unirrigated riceland covered by TCT No. 201367. The respondents averred
that they had allowed Numeriano the free use of the land out of benevolence. They demanded that
Numeriano should vacate and return it to them but the latter had refused. In his answer, Numeriano
asserted that the respondents did not have a valid cause of action against him because he had inherited
a portion of 3,000 sq.m. from his parents; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had also continuously,
publicly and adversely and in the concept of owner possessed the parcel of land for more than 59 years;
that his grandfather Emilio, the original owner, had granted that 3,000 sq. m. portion to his father Rafael
by means of a donation propter nuptias; and that since then his parents had possessed and tilled the
land.

MCTC ruled in favor of the respondents finding that the respondents’ parents had purchased the
property from Emilio and successfully registered their title and ownership. The property was later sold to
another person but was repurchased by the parents of the respondents. The respondents had inherited
the land upon the death of their parents and registered the land in their own names.

The RTC dismissed Numeriano’s appeal concluding that the land in question was separate and
distinct from the property donated to his parents. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC holding that the
respondents were in possession of a certificate of title that enjoyed the conclusive presumption of validity,
and that his impugning the validity of the respondents’ TCT partook of the nature of an impermissible
collateral attack against the TCT, considering that the validity of a Torrens title could be challenged only
directly through an action instituted for that purpose.
Issue:

1. Whether respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon are the owners of the subject land by virtue of the
certificate of title issued in their names.

2. Whether petitioner Numeriano’s collateral attack against the TCT permissible.

Ruling:

1. Yes, Felicitas and Gelima Abobon are the real owners of the subject land. A fundamental principle in
land registration under the Torrens system is that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
The certificate of title thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land; hence, anyone who
deals with property registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond the
title.

2. No. In order for him to properly assail the validity of the respondents’ TCT, he must himself bring an
action for that purpose. Such manner of attack was disallowed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 (The Property Registration Decree).

#7

Laburada vs LRA

#8

Heirs of Pedro Lopez et. al. v Honesto C. de Castro

Facts:

The petitioners filed an application for registration of parcel of land located in Tagaytay City with
the CFI in Cavite. The Municipality of Silang, Cavite files an opposition alleging that the land is its
patrimonial property. The petitioners claim that the land is a part of the whole tract of land as their
inheritance sought to be registered in Cavite but was excluded from their application upon
recommendation of the chief surveyor of the Land Reg. Office because the land is located in
the Province of Laguna. The court denied the motion of the Municipality of Silang due to lack of merit on
ground that the municipality has no personality to intervene because the lot was outside its territorial
limits. And even if it is a communal property of both municipalities, the incorporation of Cavite to the city
of Tagaytay makes it a property of the latter. Thus, the right to action accrues to
the municipality of Tagaytay.

Upon deliberation, the Clerk of Court recommended to grant the application, disclosing that the
De Los Reyes family owned and possessed the land and sold it to the father of the applicant, Pedro
Lopez who later took over the ownership and possession of the land. Upon his death, his heirs
succeeded over the property and subsequently partitioned it. The court thus approved the application and
ordered the registration of the land in favor of the petitioner.

However, upon examination, it was found out that the land was already registered in favor of the
respondents Honesto de Castro. Apparently, de Castro filed the registration of land in the CFI of Cavite in
its Branch IV in Tagaytay City and a decision was promulgated to issue the decree of registration in his
favor. The said land was allegedly owned by Hermogenes Orte who sold it to the father of the respondent
by virtue of a deed of sale that was destroyed during Japanese occupation. His father continued
possession and occupation of the land until his death and his wife and children continued the possession
thereof and finally registered it in their name. 7 years later, the petitioner files a complaint for the
execution of the judgment rendered in their favor by the court and cancellation of title of the respondents
and order the respondents to vacate the property. In their counterclaim, the respondents interpose the
defense of latches, prescription and estoppel against the petitioners and asserting the indefeasibility of
their title under the Torrens System.

Lower court held that it could not enforce the judgment against the respondents considering they
were not made parties to the case. Nor can it order the register of deeds of Tagaytay City to cancel the
title of respondents since it was not also made a party to the case thus the court does not acquire
jurisdiction over it. Further, the court held that the action brought by the petitioners would be tantamount
to the nature of collaterally attacking the validity of the title of the respondents.

Court of appeals held that upon appeal to the CA, it re-affirms the lower court’s decision with
emphasis on the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title while citing the Civil Code provisions on Article 1544
on sale of property to different vendees where in case the land has been registered in the name of two
different persons, the earlier in date of registration shall prevail.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can question the validity of the title of the respondents over the property in
dispute?

Ruling:

The Court held that a land registration is an in rem proceeding which involves a constructive notice
against all persons including the state which is effective through the publication of the application for land
registration. The court held that when more than one certificate of title is issued over the land, the person
holding the prior certificate of title is entitled to a better right against the person who relies on the
subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not on the date of filing the
application for registration of title. In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to
take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule
that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. The publication made with respect to the
application of the respondents served as a constructive notice against the whole world; thus the court
upheld the validity of their title and its indefeasibility against collateral attack from the petitioners.

Granting that the petitioners did not have actual knowledge about the respondent’s application to the
land, they waited for seven more years after knowing that the property was already registered in the
name of the respondents to demand for the execution of judgment and cancellation of the respondent’s
title. Therefore, the SC finds them guilty of latches. Petitioner’s petition was denied.

#9

Republic vs Herbieto

Facts:

• PETITION for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the CA in granting the
application for land registration of the respondents.
• Respondents, Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a
single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu. They claimed to be the owners of the land which they purchased from their parents.
(Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan)

• Herbieto brothers submitted pertinent documents to prove their claim and with emphasis on the
Certification by the CENRO of the DENR on its finding that the Lots are alienable and disposable with
virtue of the Forestry Admin Order No. 4-1063.

• Petitioner, Republic, filed an Opposition to the respondents’ application for registration of the Subject
Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject
Lots required by law; (2) Respondents’ muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots
were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.

• The MTC set the initial hearing on Sept 3, 1999 and notices were sent to all owners of the land. The
Notice was also published in the Official Gazette.

• MTC granted the application for registration of the parcels of land or Jeremias and David. Republic
appealed the judgment. CA affirmed the decision of the MTC assailing that the subject property, being
alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, and herein appellees have been
possessing the subject land in open, continues and in the concept of an owner for 35 years. Thus,
susceptible of private ownership.

• Republic filed the present Petition for the review contending that 1) MTC had no jurisdiction since there
was a procedural defect in filing of a single application for two parcels of land; 2) Respondents failed to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Issue:

WON the Subject Lots are part of the public domain and thus cannot be subject to private appropriation

Held:

The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of
25 June 1963. As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person
claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law.

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands,
friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State. It explicitly enumerates the means by
which public lands may be disposed, as follows:

1. For homestead settlement;

2. By sale;

3. By lease;
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

a) By judicial legalization; or

b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12
June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on
25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as
alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.

Respondents failed to comply with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially
confirmed or legalized.

Wherefore, the petition is granted and reversed the decision of CA.

#10

Secretary of DENR vs Yap

Facts: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves
under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that
Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of
man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the
Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, “PD
1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration
but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that
the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions

Issue: WON private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

Held: Petitions denied. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which
has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such
classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such
presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the
land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
They call for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest,
or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No.
1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.