Tecson vs COMELEC
Considering that the
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of
candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
forthcoming national elections.  In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to
be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a
petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate
of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-
born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and
his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. 
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which
the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the
death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe,
who in turn was the father of private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on
September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated
to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was
also his residence before death.
allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with
proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been
benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no
doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since
the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed
under 1935 Constitution, which constitution
considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe,
Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines regardless of whether or not he is
legitimate or illegitimate. 
Tecson vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s
disqualification in the presidential elections for
having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his
(Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he
is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition,
holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners
assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending
that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had
jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.)   The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions
regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections
are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal"  in
connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President"
or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the
Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before
the elections.
2.)   Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in
holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing
fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." 
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen.
His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of
84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the
absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of
residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to
be the place of residence prior his death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en
masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship
would have extended to his son, Allan---
respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s
son to Bessie, though an American citizen,  was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The
1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and
the allegation that respondent was born only before
the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s
citizenship in view of the established paternal
filiation evidenced by the public documents
presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Maquiling VS COMELEC
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one
can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer
on the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.
Facts:
Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen
who lost his citizenship upon his naturalization as a
citizen as a citizen of the United States.
Subsequently, he availed of the benefits of RA 9225,
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003 and ran as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in the 2010 local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado,
contending that Arnado is a foreigner. It turned out
that Arnado has been using his US Passport in
entering and departing the Philippines.
The Commission on Elections First Division
annulled the proclamation of Arnado and
consequently directed that the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of
1991 be followed. It ruled that Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport after renouncing
his US citizenship negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling),
another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the
2010 elections, intervened in the case. Maquiling
argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Maquiling claims that due to
the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of the latter’s proclamation, he should
be proclaimed as the winner.
Issues:
1. Is the use of foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affect one’s
qualification to run for the public office?
2. Is the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code applicable to this case?
Held:
The act of using a foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnado’s bid for public office
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, Arnado was
deemed to be solely a Filipino citizenship, regardless
of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of
the foreign country. However, this legal presumption
does not operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the
citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one
of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No.
63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.
The Court agrees with the OCMELEC En Banc that
such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily
and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual
citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
Thus by the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and previleges of Filipino and American
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the
express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run
for a local elective position.
The rule on succession under Local Government
Code will not apply.
The lectorate’s awareness of the candidate’s
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the
candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of
a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before
a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the
first-placer among the qualified candidates.
The disqualifying circumstances surrounding
Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does
not involve the commission of election offenses as
provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office.
With Amado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void ab initio.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his
favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION
GR # L-21289, October 4, 1971 [Naturalization -
Qualification and Disqualification; CA 473]
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter
the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February
1961. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter
the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to
visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March
1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was
allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February
1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage
with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of
Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an
action for injunction. At the hearing which took
place one and a half years after her arrival, it was
admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and
speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few
words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor,
with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not
know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-
law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of
Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.
Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became
a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to
undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is
a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the
widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino,
who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to
be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely
no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat
them differently. As the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no
such procedure (a substitute for naturalization
proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine
citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship
settled and established so that she may not have to
be called upon to prove it every time she has to
perform an act or enter into a transaction or business
or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but
such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as
of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition
of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is
that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Every time the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as
to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen
Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy
Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
REPUBLIC vs. CHULE Y. LIM
G.R. No. 153883.  January 13, 2004
FACTS:
Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction
of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court with
the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. She
claimed that she was born on 29 October 1954 in
Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record
of birth to Iligan City. the Court finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance ordered the
publication of the hearing of the petition.
During the hearing, Lim testifies that:
1. Her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has
been using "Yu" in all her school records and in her
marriage certificate.She presented a clearance from
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
further showthe consistency in her use of the
surname "Yu".
2. She claims that her father’s name in her birth record
was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it
should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
3. Her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should
have been Filipinoconsidering that her father and
mother never got married. Only her deceased father
was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She
claims that her being a registered voter attests to the
fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
4. It was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate
that she was a legitimate child when she should have
been described as illegitimate considering that her
parents were never married. She also presented a
certification attested by officials of the local civil
registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte that there is no record of marriage between
Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the
present.
The RTC granted the petition and directed the
civil register of Iligan City to make the following
corrections in the birth records of Lim:
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO
TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by
changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question
"LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
Petitioner Republic appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Petitioner claims that Lim never complied
with the legal requirement in electing her
citizenship. Petitioner also assails the Court
ofAppeals’ decision in allowing respondent to use
her father’s surname despite its finding that she is
illegitimate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lim complied with the legal
requirement in electing her citizenship
2. Whether the CA erred in allowing Lim to to use
her father’s surname despite its finding that she is
illegitimate.
HELD:
1. The Republic avers that respondent did not
comply with the constitutional requirement of
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the
age of majority.  It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of
the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the
provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
625, that legitimate children born
of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship
by expressing such intention “in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry.  The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.”
Plainly, the above constitutional and
statutory requirements of electing Filipinocitizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply
in the case of respondent who was concededly an
illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese
father and Filipino mother were never married.  As
such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become
a Filipino citizen.  By being an illegitimate child of
a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became
a Filipino upon birth.  Stated differently, she is
a Filipino since birth without having to
elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age
of majority.
This notwithstanding, the records show that
respondent elected Filipinocitizenship when she
reached the age of majority.  She registered as a
voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
2. The Republic’s submission is misleading.  The
Court of Appeals did not allowrespondent to use her
father’s surname.  What it did allow was the
correction of her father’s misspelled surname which
she has been using ever since she can remember.  In
this regard, respondent does not need a court
pronouncement for her to use her father’s surname.
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old.  To
bar her at this time from using her father’s surname
which she has used for four decades without any
known objection from anybody, would only sow
confusion.  Concededly, one of the reasons allowed
for changing one’s name or surname is to avoid
confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person is
allowed to use a name “by which he has been known
since childhood.”
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed
the same issue.  In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils., we
held: Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142,
which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to
use a name “by which he has been known since
childhood” (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil.
795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic
v. Tañada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot
enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from
using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84
Phil. 222).
While judicial authority is required for a change of
name or surname, there is no such requirement for
the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as
would give the false impression of family
relationship remains valid but only to the extent that
the proposed change of name would in great
probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the
family whose surname it is that is involved or to the
community in general. In this case, the Republic has
not shown that the Yu family in China would
probably be prejudiced or be the object of future
mischief.  In respondent’s case, the change in the
surname that she has been using for 40 years would
even avoid confusion to her community in general.
CA decision is affirmed. 
LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al.
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016
elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence
up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and
11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn
infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS
SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the
US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American
citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines
due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005.
She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to
the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter
and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes
Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny
or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural born Filipino citizen since she was a
FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot
be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en
banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she
is in want of citizenship and residence requirements
and that she committed misrepresentation in her
COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME
COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6
that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a
natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year
residency requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born
Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos
may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact
that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that
residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial
evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the
Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a
class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention,
wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred
with the natural-born citizenship as to the country
where they are being found, as covered and
supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the

10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to
remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines,
Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under
RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.