20.

Javier vs Concepcion

Facts:

Lim Chua et al filed for the reconveyance of the disputed Lot 12 with improvements thereon
against Javier et al. The questioned property was allegedly part of a big parcel of land, registered in the
name of Chua et al. However, the spouses Javier claimed that they acquired the property by prescription
because they have been in possession of the same adversely, publicly, continuously, peacefully, and in
the concept of owners against the whole world since the Spanish time up to the present.

Issue:

WoN the Sps. Javier can acquire title to a registered land by prescription or adverse possession.

Held:

No, adverse, notorious and continuous possession under claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is
ineffective against a Torrens title, and it is likewise settled that the right to secure possession under a
decree of registration does not prescribe.

Section 46, Act No. 496 provides “x x x Nor could title to that land in derogation of that of plaintiff, the
registered owner, be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.”

Thus, the petition is DENIED.

21. Madrid vs Sps Martinez

Facts:

Martinez, the owner of a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila, filed an accion pauliana for recovery of
possession against Miranda, Bernardo and Madrid. The lateer contended that they acquired the property
by oral sale from the original owner of the land. However, RTC ruled in favor of Martinez upholding the
Torrens title in favor of such party. Madrid appealed the decision to CA but to no avail. henece, he
brought the case before SC contending that the acquisition of Martinez of lsuch land was attended by
fraud.

Issue:

WON the Torrens system renders a title immune from collateral attack.

Held:

No. Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it
indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral
attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident
of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to
be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main
objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to
seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. To permit a collateral attack
on respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a
Torrens title.

The petitioners-defendants' attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs' title, by claiming that fraud
attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend
their possession of the properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a direct action whose main objective is
to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. This is the attack that possession of a Torrens
Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot entertain much less accord credit to, the petitioners-
defendants ‘claim of fraud to impugn the validity of the respondents-plaintiffs' title to their property.

22. Carbonilla vs Abiera

Facts:

Petitioner Carbonilla filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents Marcelo Abiera and Maricris
Abiera Paredes with MTCC, Maasin City, alleging that he is the registered owner of the parcel of land and
that the respondent occupied the building by mere tolerance of the previous owners. Petitioner asserted
that he intends to use the property as his residence and thus sent a demand letter to respondents asking
them to leave the premises within 15 days from receipt of letter but to no avail. Respondents asserted
that they occupied the building as owners having inherited the same from their parents and grandparents
but it has not been declared for taxation purposes.

MTCC: decided the case in favor of respondents. It opined that petitioner’s claim of ownership over the
subject parcel of land was not successfully rebutted by respondents; hence, petitioner’s ownership of the
same was deemed established.

RTC: reversed the MTCC decision. RTC held that, either way — whether the building was constructed
before or after petitioner acquired ownership of the land —petitioner, as owner of the land, would have
every right to evict respondents from the land

Court of Appeals: reversed the RTC decision and ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.

Issue:

WON the petitioner sufficiently established his ownership of the subject properties

Held: No. While petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there can be no other piece of
evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to
substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the building. SC cannot accept the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership
executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building.There is no
showing that the Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over it.

23. Aranda vs Republic

Facts:
Subject of a petition for original registration before the RTC is a parcel of land situated in San Andres,
Malvar, Batangas. The petition was originally filed by ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI-WI). The Republic
through the OSG filed its opposition on grounds that the land applied for is part of the public domain and
the applicant has not acquired a registrable title thereto under the provisions of C.A. 141 as amended by
R.A. 6940. The trial court admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title, this time filed in the
name of Ramon Aranda (petitioner) the seller for the suppose contract of sale with ICTSI-WI and prayed
that should the Land Registration Act be not applicable to this case, he invokes the liberal provisions of
Section 48 of C.A. 141, as amended, having been in continuous possession of the subject land in the
concept of owner, publicly, openly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application. The trial court rendered its Decision granting the application and ordering the issuance of a
decree of registration in favor of petitioner.

The Republic appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the trial court. The CA held that
petitioner’s evidence does not satisfactorily establish the character and duration of possession required
by law, as petitioner failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession by his
predecessors-in-interest.

Issue:

Whether or not Aranda is entitled with the ownership of the subject land for complying with the required
30 years of open, exclusive, public and adverse possession in the concept of owner.

Ruling:

We deny the petition. Under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) a petition
may be granted upon compliance with the following requisites: (a) that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Also under the Regalian doctrine all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of lands. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

We have held that a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing
evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of
the oppositors. Since petitioner failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law, the CA was correct in
reversing the trial court and dismissing his application for judicial confirmation of title.

24. Chavez vs PEA

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not IPRA which grants indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) the right to have native title and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands
since time immemorial violates the regalian doctrine embodied in the Constitution.

Ruling:

No, because ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private
land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. The ownership given to the ICCs/IPs
is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title. The
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title shall be recognized and
respected. Like a Torrens title, a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) is an evidence of private
ownership of land by native title. Hence, domains and lands held under native title are presumed to have
never been public lands and are private.

25. Cruz vs Secretary

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not IPRA which grants indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) the right to have native title and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands
since time immemorial violates the regalian doctrine embodied in the Constitution.

Ruling:

No, because ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private
land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. The ownership given to the ICCs/IPs
is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title. The
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title shall be recognized and
respected. Like a Torrens title, a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) is an evidence of private
ownership of land by native title. Hence, domains and lands held under native title are presumed to have
never been public lands and are private.

26. Heirs of Dicman vs Cariño

Facts:

This is an action for the recovery of land in Baguio City. Within this site, a sawmill and other buildings had
been constructed by H.C. Heald. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cariño, son of Mateo Cariño and
grandfather of private respondent Jose Cariño. Sioco Cariño then took possession of the buildings and
the land on which the buildings were situated.

Ting-el Dicman, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had been employed by Sioco Cariño as his
cattle herder. On the advice of his lawyers, Sioco Cariño named the land under Ting-el Dicman. Ting-el
Dicman executed a Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land in favor Sioco
Cariño and his heirs. Thereafter he had been in possession of the property since 1916.

In 1938 Sioco Cariño sold the property to his son, Guzman Cariño. The lots were divided into 76-A and
76-B. Guzman filed a Free Patent Application over the land and it was given due course but he later
withdrew it when the Heirs of Dicman filed a petition to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B.
RTC confirmed that Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el Dicman, there having been no adverse
claim and further hearing for Lot 76-B. The decision was invalidated by virtue of RA No. 931 and the
petition was dismissed. Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his possession of the subject property
until his death on 1982. Respondent Jose Sioco C. Cariño, continued possession of the subject property.

Petitioners revived the recovery of possession with damages involving the subject property with the RTC.
Jose Cariño filed for the dismissal of the case; that he has been in possession of the subject property for
55 years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner and therefore perfected title over the same
through acquisitive prescription. RTC granted said motion.

Cariño filed its Complaint-in-Intervention, praying for quieting of title among the adverse claimants. RTC
rendered its decision in favor of private respondent. petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal, CA
dismissed the petition

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant acquired ownership over the land in question through acquisitive
prescription

Held:

Yes. Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest are
nonetheless guilty of laches. Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right,
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse
party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage
to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or
parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a
stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.
There is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el Dicman or his successors-in-interest ever filed any action to
question the validity of the Deed of Conveyance. The Court has on several occasions held in particular
that despite the judicial pronouncement that the sale of real property by illiterate ethnic minorities is null
and void for lack of approval of competent authorities, the right to recover possession has nonetheless
been barred through the operation of the equitable doctrine of laches

Wherefore, the decision of CA is affirmed.

27. Republic vs CA and Naguit

Facts:

Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect
title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest
have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a
decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial
after filing his formal opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the
Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a
bona fide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only on
October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Issue: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

Ruling:

Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. There are three requirements for
registration of title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and
their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and occupation,
and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. There must
be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable.
However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize
the property and the possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through
acquisitive prescription. To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1)
would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of
public domain which were not declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the said provision as it decides
to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable. The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it
having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but
confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply
for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land
since 1945.

28. Heirs of Lacamen vs Heirs of Laruan

Facts:

The Petitioners-appellants in this case are the surviving heirs of BatiogLacamen, while respondents-
appellants are the heirs of Laruan. Laruan executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Batiog Lacamen. Laruan
delivered the certificate of title to Lacamen. Thereupon, Lacamen entered in possession and occupancy
of the land without first securing the corresponding transfer certificate of title in his name. He introduced
various improvements and paid the proper taxes. His possession was open, continuous, peaceful, and
adverse likewise his heirs unmolested for nearly 30 years.

Later on, after the death of Lacamen, his heirs discovered that Laruan’s heirs were able to obtain a new
owner’s certificate of title alleging that their copy has been lost or destroyed. Hence, they sued Laruan’s
heirs for reconveyance. The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Laruan whose
decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

WON estoppel by laches applies to the Laruan’s?

Ruling:

Yes. Notwithstanding the invalidity of the sale, the fact that when the Lacamens succeeded to the estate
of their father, the Laruans kept silent, never claiming that the lot is their own. Even granting that no
prescription lies against their father’s record title, their inaction for almost 30 years commands the
imposition of laches. Hence, the Lacamens were declared as the owners of the land.