Cequena vs Bolante G.R No.

137944

Facts: Prior to 1954, a land located in the Province of Rizal, having an area of 1,728 sq. m. was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE. In 1930, Sinforoso Mendoza died. Margarito Mendoza was the
brother of Sinforosao Mendoza and also the father of petitioners FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA
and RUPERTA MENDOZA, LIRIO. After Sinforosa Mendoza died, Margarito Mendoza took
possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. On the basis of an affidavit,
Margarito Mendoza caused the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza on the contested lot and subsequently declared it in his name. Later, Margarito
Mendoza also passed away. The occupant of the land however, since 1985, was BOLANTE, the
only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza. Earlier, in 1979, BOLANTE and Miguel Mendoza, another
brother of CEQUENA and LIRIO, during the cadastral survey had a dispute on the ownership of
the land. The trial court declared that the land, which was covered by a tax declaration in favor
of Margarito Mendoza belonged to him and his heirs, petitioners CEQUENA and LIRIO. BOLANTE
was also ordered to vacate the premises. The Court of Appeals however, reversed the trial court
decision and ruled that the affidavit allegedly signed by the BOLANTE and her mother had not
been sufficiently established. The notary public, nor any witness and expert testimony ever
attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. It also ruled BOLANTE’s mother, never
having attended school, could neither read nor write and that BOLANTE was referred to as
“Leonor” in the affidavit, which was a name she had never been called. Hence, it concluded that
although tax declarations were presented by CEQUENA and LIRIO, it could not overthrow
BOLANTE’s proof of ownership of the disputed parcel by actual, physical, exclusive and
continuous possession since 1985, which indeed gave her a better title under Article 538 of the
Civil Code.

Hence, this appeal. CEQUENA and LIRIO contended that BOLANTE could not have been the preferred
possessor since she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUES: 1.Whether or not BOLANTE was a preferred possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code
because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985.

2. ISSUE Whether or not CEQUENA and LIRIO acquired possession of the land in the concept of an owner
so as to acquire it by prescription.

3. Whether of not BOLANTE could be obliged to show or prove such .

HELD: 1. YES she was the preferred possessor under Article 538. The court held that despite their
dispossession in 1985 by BOLANTE, CEQUENA and LIRIO did not lose legal possession because
possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even
if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession,
regardless of its character, may recover such possession. However, despite so, the possession by
CEQUENA and LIRIO did not prevail over that of the BOLANTE. Possession by the former before 1985
was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the CEQUENA and
LIRIO's father and brother, as well as the BOLANTE and her mother were simultaneously in adverse
possession of the land. Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the Sinforoso,
BOLANTE's father. When Sinforoso died in 1930, MARGARITO took possession of the land and cultivated
it with his son Miguel. At the same time, BOLANTE and her mother continued residing on the lot. When
BOLANTE came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. Margarito declared the lot
for taxation in his name in 1953 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. When he died, Miguel
continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, BOLANTE and her mother were living on the land,
which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent. Based on
Article 538 of the Civil Code, BOLANTE was the preferred possessor because, benefiting from her
father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer
period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.

2. NO. It was BOLANTE who had acquired ownership over the land by prescription, prior to the
possession of CEQUENA and LIRIO. Under Art. 540 of the Civil Code, "Only the possession acquired and
enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring dominion." Although CEQUENA and
LIRIO farmed the property for 32 years, they could not have acquired ownership over it through
prescription. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with
the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title
by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, CEQUENA and LIRIO could not claim that their
possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired
ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for 32 years (1953-
1985), this supposed ownership could extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the
portion that they actually farmed. It was BOLANTE who had acquired the land by prescription. Being the
sole heir of her father, BOLANTE showed through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the
land for more than 10 years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there
with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot
for their livelihood. BOLANTE's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when CEQUENA and LIRIO’S
father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner -- public,
peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her
father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the
basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.

3. YES. She should be obliged to show or prove such title because she was also claiming to have
acquired the property through prescription. The prohibition against burdening a possessor in the
concept of an owner to show or prove his possession with just title only applies when there is
an adverse claim over the property. In the present case however, both parties claimed possession
in the concept of an owner. After CEQUENA and LIRIO had proved their claim over the property,
it was up to BOLANTE to controvert their contentions through adducing evidence in her favor.

Titong vs CA G.R. No. 111141

Facts: In 1960, petitioner MARIO TITONG sold a 5.5-hectare parcel of land to Conception Verano
vda. de Cabug. He was able to purchase the said land though in 1962. After 4 days, he sold it
to Pablo Espinosa, who had it declared under his name for taxation purposes. When Espinosa
died, it became a part of the estate of Segundia Liao, Espinosa’s late wife. In 1981, her heirs
sold the property to private respondent VICTORICO LAURIO for P5,000. Thereafter, a tax
declaration was issued in the name of LAURIO. In all these conveyances, the area and
boundaries of the property remained exactly the same. Later, TITONG filed an action for quieting
of title against private respondents VICTORICO and ANGELES LAURIO. He alleged that he was the
owner of a 3.2800-hectare parcel of unregistered, which he declared for taxation purposes in his
name. He claimed that on 3 separate occasions in 1983, the LAURIOs, with their hired laborers,
forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately 2 hectares, and began
plowing the same under pretext of ownership. TITONG identified Espinosa as his adjoining
owner. He asserted that no controversy had sprouted between them for 20 years until the latter
sold said lot to VICTORICO LAURIO. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what
remained of TITONG's property was the old Bugsayon river. When TITONG employed Bienvenido
Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and direct
the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion of TITONG's property, thus converting
the old river into a riceland. The LAURIOs denied this allegation and averred that the disputed
property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased in 1981 from
their predecessor-ininterest, Pablo Espinosa. It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo
that two (2) surveys were made of the disputed property. The first survey was made for
TITONG, while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated,
certain discrepancies between the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to TITONG's allegation in
his complaint that he was the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789
hectares. On the other hand, the lot pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841
hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by TITONG to him. LAURIO testified that TITONG was
one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of
Estate of the deceased Leonida Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6-hectare
property of the deceased. However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share
in the extrajudicial settlement TITONG's share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It was therefore
appeared to LAURIO that TITONG encroached upon his property and declared it a part of his
inheritance. LAURIO LAURIO accordingly denied that TITONG had diverted the course of the
Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from Conception Verano vda. de Cabug
because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly thereafter. In short, TITONG, in bad
faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey
of his land which extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and
natural and common boundary between the properties. Moreover, during the hearing of the
case, TITONG proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing what he
considered as the boundary of his property which LAURIO perceived as actually encroaching on
their property. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of LAURIO, declaring him as the
true and absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering TITONG to respect private
LAURIOs' title and ownership over the property and to pay attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
costs and moral damages. The same was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether of not TITONG possessed the property with a just title in his favor.

HELD: NO. He had no just title in his favor. Ordinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Hence, a prescriptive title
to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period
of ten years unless such possession was acquired with color of title and good faith. The good
faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received
the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription,
there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one
of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. TITONGs had not satisfactorily met
the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's
admitted acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter
claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and
therefore "tantamount to bad faith." To allow TITONG to benefit from his own wrong would run
counter to the maxim no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing.