Aviation's Golden Age - Portraits From The 1920s and 1930s (Gnv64)

Edited by William M.
Leary
The years between the two world wars were a

time of high adventure and romance, a golden
age of aviation. This period saw new technol
ogy struggling to become an accepted part of
the nation's transportation system. Americans
applauded and adored aviation heroes like
Lindbergh, Earhart, Maitland, Macready, and all
the other fliers who challenged destiny as they
challenged the skies. Few people, then or now,
were aware of the pivotal contributions to
aeronautical development that were made by
many individuals who rarely ventured off the
ground.
The essays in this volume, all written by leading

scholars in aviation history, tell the story of
these unsung heroes. William Leary and Richard
Hallion show how Henry Ford and the Gug
genheims led aviation out of the doldrums of
the 1920s, even before Lindbergh's trans
Atlantic flight. Nick Komons and Roger Bilstein
discuss the skilled leadership William Mac
Cracken and Edward Pearson Wamer provided
for civil aviation during its formative period.
In addition, John Shiner and Wm. Armstrong

demonstrate how Benjamin Foulois and Wil
liam Moffett laid the foundations for the great
American army and naval air forces of World
War II. Few people recognize the name of
George Lewis, but as James Hansen shows,
this engineer-bureaucrat played a key role in
America's technological development. And
David Lee gives Herbert Hoover the recogni
tion he deserves for placing aviation on a
sound legal and administrative footing.
A V I A T I 0 N'S G 0 L D E N A G E
•
G 0 L D E G E
PORTRAITS FROM THE
19205 AND 19305
E DI T E D B Y W I L L I A M M. L E A R Y
University of Iowa Press Iowa City

University of Iowa Press, Iowa City 52242
Copyright© 1989 by the University of Iowa
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
First edition. 1989
Design by Richard Hendel
Typesetting by G & S Typesetters, Austin, Texas
Printing and binding by Thomson-Shore,
Dexter, Michigan
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying
and recording, without permission in
writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Aviation's golden age: portraits from the 1920s and 1930s/
edited by William M. Leary.-1st ed.
p. em.
Bibliography: p .
Includes index.
ISBN 0-87745-242-3
l. Aeronautics-United States-Biography. 2. Aeronautics-United States-History.
I. Leary, William M. (William Matthew), l934-
TL539.A95 1989 89-4753
629.13'0092'2-dcl9 CIP
( B]
TO CAPTAIN JOSEPH F. ROSS
Pan American Airways, retired
A fine pilot and a good friend

•
CO N TE N T S
Introd uction : ix
Henry Ford and Aeronautics during the 1920s : 1

William M. Leary
Daniel and Harry Guggenheim and the Philanthropy of Flight : 18

Richard P. Hallion
W i lliam P. MacCracken, Jr. , and the Regulation of Civil Aviation : 35

Nick A. Komons
William A . Moffett and the Development of Naval Aviation : 60

Wm. ]. Armstrong
Benjamin Foulois and the Fight for an Independent Air Force : 74

John F. Shiner
George W. Lewis and the Management of Aeronautical Research : 93

]ames R. Hansen
Edward Pearson Warner and the New Air Age : 1 13

Roger E. Bilstein
Herbert Hoover and the Golden Age of Aviation : 1 2 7

David D. Lee
Notes : 149
Bibliographical Essays : 1 79
Contributors : 1 9 1
Index : 193
..
'
•
I N T R ODU CTIO N
Flying the crowded skies of the contemporary air transport system can he a
nerve-shattering experience. After being crammed into uncomfortable seats,
suffering through interminable delays, eating tasteless food, and searc hing
for lost luggage, travelers find it easy to look back on the interwar years as
a "golden age" of aviation. Aviators were heroes then. Although few remem
ber Maitland, Macready, W il l iams, or Hegenherger, the names of Charles
Li ndbergh and Amelia Earhart have survived. They stand for all the forgot
ten fliers, recalling a time of adventure and romance.
It was never that simple, of course. There was nothing romantic about a
Ford trimotor, at least for passengers who sat inside a badly vibrating cabin,
ears stuffed with cotton against the noise, clutching airsickness bags as the
100-MPH airplane bounced all over the sky. Flying also could be dangerous
in the absence of accurate weather forecasting, radio aids to navigation, and
strict safety regulations. In short, nostalgia for the past should not be al
lowed to obscure the hard work and struggle that were the hallmarks of
American aviation during the interwar years.
Aeronautical development i n the United States came slowly following the
Great War, con trary to the expectations of those who saw the armistice as
heralding the dawn of a new aerial age. Technological progress had been
rapid during the war years, as the frail observation planes of 1914 gave way
to the speedy and deadly Sopwith Camels, Spads, and Fokker D- VIIs of
1918. The time had come, many believed, to exploit the peaceful uses of
the airplane. Aviation, one industry group proclaimed, had freed man from
"the old belief in his limitations, from the cramped power of one who is a
creature of the earth and subject to it. Now, neither earth's mountains, nor
deserts, nor storms are obstacles to his passage. Not only the world but the
sky has been given to man's dominion." 1
Reality fell far short of the dreams of aviation enthusiasts. The election
of 1920 brought to office a Republican administration pledged to economy.
Determined to balance the budget, and not perceiving any threats to na
tional security, President Warren G. Harding directed his subordinates to
slash military spending. The air components of the Army and Navy soon felt
the cut of the budgetary axe. The Army Re-organization Act of 1920 fiXed
x : I N T R O D U C T I O N
the strength of the Army Air Service at 1 , 500 officers and 16,000 enlisted
men. Legislation also limited naval aviation to 400 officers and 4,500 men.
With little money available to purchase new equipment, the military
services were stuck with huge stores of wartime aircraft that soon became
technologically obsolete. Well into the 1920s, American-manufactured de
Havi l land DH-4s continued to dominate Air Service inventories, while twin
engine F-5-L and single-engine HS-2L seaplanes were the frontline aircraft
of a land-based navy.
Organizational confusion added to the woes of military aviation. Some
aviators and their political allies believed that the United States should
follow the example of Great Britain and create an independent air force.
Others fought for a greater degree of autonomy within the existing structure
of the military services. All agreed that the domination of aerial units by
nonaviator senior officers, who misunderstood ainnen and air power, had
to end.
Commercial aviation shared the hard times. In Europe governmental sub
sidies underwrote the development of passenger and mail services. The par
simonious Harding admini stration, however, declined to follow a simi lar
course. It might fund reluctantly the U.S. Air Mail Service, but it did
not intend to open federal coffers to private enterprise.
Many private companies tried to go it alone, but only one survived for
any appreciable period of time. Aeromarine Airways made a valiant attempt
to beat the economic odds, operating a passenger and mail service from Key
West to Havana during the winter and summertime passenger routes frmn
New York to Atlantic City and from Detroit to Cleveland. The company was
an operational success. Between 1920 and 1923, it carried 30, 000 passen
gers and flew more than one million passenger-miles with only one fatal
accident. 2 But despite intelligent and imaginative management, generous
financing, an<:l excellent equipment, the airline went broke in 1923. Aero
marine's inability to survive emphasized, in a most dramatic fashion, the
l imitations of private enterprise at this formative stage of aeronautics.
The U . S . Air Mail Service provided the only bright spot in the cloudy
skies of American aviation. Operated by the Post Office from 1 91 8 to 1927,
this pioneering venture laid the technological foundations for the later de
velopment of commercial aviation. It laid out the transcontinental airway,
undertook night flying on a regular basis, and experimented with instrument
and radio navigation. "There has been no more valuable experiment i n aero
nautics," the National Advisory Commit�ee for Aeronautics pointed out,
"and certai nly none that contributed more directly to the demonstration of
I N T R O DUC T I O N : xi
the practical value of air transportation and the advancement of aeronautics

generally." 3
Yet the Harding administration treated the Air Mail Service l i ke an un
wanted leftover from its detested Democratic pred ecessors. At first Harding
tried to turn the airmail over to private enterprise only to find that private
enterprise did not want it (at least without a subsidy). He agreed to continue
operation of the transcontinental mail route, but with the idea that the gov
ernment would abandon the airmail transportation business at the earliest
possible opportunity. 4
The aviation scene in the United States seemed anything but promising
in the early 1920s. Federal regulation of airplanes and pilots did not exist.
Airport facilities were wretched. Weather forecasts were more useful to
farmers than to fliers. Radio aids for navigation and communication re
mained in the experimental stage. Wood-and-wire biplanes, powered by
unreliable liquid-cooled engines, made flying a hazardous undertaking. As
historian Thomas Worth Walterman has summarized, postwar aerial activi
ties remained "unorganized, unregulated, unsafe, and unprofitable." 5
By 1938 progress had been nothing short of astonishing. The Army Air
Corps, with 29,000 officers and men and 1 , 700 aircraft, was poised for rapid
expansion. Fighter squadrons were equipped with all-metal monoplanes
Seversky P-35s and Curtiss P-36s. The Curtiss P-40 and Lockheed P-38,
both destined to gain fame in World War II, were i n the testing stage. The
four-engine Boeing B - 1 7, pride and joy of the Air Corps, was the foremost
bomber in the world.
Changes in naval aviation had been even more dramatic. No longer tied
to the land, the navy had five fleet carriers at sea Saratoga, Lexington,
Ranger, Yorktown, and Enterprise. Although most of the navy's carrier-based
aircraft were biplanes, Grumman and Douglas had sleek new monoplanes
in the developmental stage that would join the fleet before Pearl Harbor.
By 1938 the United States had taken world leadership in commercial
aviation. In addition to the global service provided by Pan American Air
ways' giant flying boats, twenty domestic airlines crisscrossed the country.
With 386 airplanes, many of them streamlined, comfortable, fast, and reli
able DC-3s, domestic airlines carried l. 3 million passengers and 7. 3 mil
lion pounds of cargo in 1938. Most comforting of all, especially for the
airlines' passengers, the accident rate had declined sharply. In 1 921 the
Air Mail Service had suffe red one fatality for every 273 ,000 miles flown; i n
1938 domestic airlines registered one fatality for every 1 3 million miles
flown . 6
xi : I N T R O D U CTI O N
Government regulation of aviation came of age in 1938 with passage of

the Civil Aeronautics Act. The new law, building on the Air Commerce Act
of 1926, charged the Civil Aeronautics Authority with overseeing a vast
system of federal airways. This complex of radio aids to navigation, supple
mented by a network of weather reporting stations, was the key to reliable,
safe airline operations. The CAA also form ulated air traffic rules, licensed
airmen, and certified the airworthiness of aircraft. A separate agency, the
Air Safety Board , conducted accident investigations and made recommen
dations for accident prevention. 7
Many people contributed to the constructive changes that took place dur
ing this formative era in the history of American aviation. The authors of
the essays that follow examine some of the accomplishments and the fail
ures of a number of individuals whose important contributions to aeronau
tical development are so little remembered today. Henry Ford and the Gug
genheims led aviation out of the doldrums of the early 1920s even before
Charles Lindbergh flew the Atlantic. William MacCracken and Edward
Warner made no dramatic flights, but they provided skilled leadership for
civil aviation during its formative years. William Moffett and Benjamin Fou
lois did not have Billy Mitchell's talent for publicity, but they were the ones
who laid the foundation for the great American army and navy air forces
of World War II. Few people, then and now, would recognize the name of
George Lewis, yet this engineer-bureaucrat played a pivotal role in Ameri
ca's technological advancement. Finally, H erbert Hoover is remembered for
many things (mostly unpleasant), but his contribution in placing aviation on
a sound legal and administrative footing is not one of them, as by all rights
it should be.
American civil and military aviation destined to grow with such vigor
during and after World War II took shape during the 1 920s and 1 930s. It
was a "golden age" of accomplishment, and these are some of the individ
uals who made it possible.
•
A V I A T I 0 N'S G 0 L D E N A G E
-
•
H E N RY F O R D A N D
A E R O N A U T I C S D U R I N G
T H E 19205
'
WIL L I A M M. LEA R Y
Henry Ford never really liked airplanes, at least not enough to fly in them.
Only three times in his l ife was he coaxed into the air: twice on one memo
rable day in 1 927 by Charles Lindbergh, and once in 1936 by C. R. Smith
of American Airlines. W h i le preferring to keep his feet planted firmly on
the ground, Ford appreciated the commercial potential of aviation. Intent
on profiting from this new mode of transpottation, the Dearborn industrialist
contributed substantially to the early development of commercial aviation
iQ the United States.
The range of Ford's aeronautical activities during the 1920s was impres
sive. H e operated a successful and widely publicized company air-freight
service, flew the rnail for the Post Office, built a modern airport, improved
radio aids to air navigation, and above all constructed a safe and reliable air
plane for the first passenger-carrying airlines. "The full array of Ford experi
mentation," historian Thomas Worth Walterman has pointed out, "touched
upon practically every facet of the aviation industry and lent aid and en
couragement to them all." The mere fact that Ford was interested in aviation
had an impact on most Americans second only to Lindbergh's dramatic trans
atlantic flight. "People said that if Ford had faith in aircraft," H oward Mi ngos
wrote in 1925, "then flying must be practical. " 1
Ford's first serious connection with aeronautics came during World War I,
when his company produced Liberty engines for American-built de Havilland
bombers. Ford also wanted to use assembly-line techniques to manufacture
1 50,000 airplanes, which he believed could he turned out as easily as au-
2 : A V I AT I O N ' S G O L D E N A G E
tomobi les, but this proposal never received serious consideration. It would
take another war to test Ford's theory about mass production of airplanes. 2
Dirigibles, not airplanes, caught Ford's attention following the armi stice.
Impressed with the transat lantic round-trip of the British airship R-34, he
developed plans to build dirigibles in the United States. Discussions took
place with the navy during the winter of 1919- 1920, but he received l i ttle
encouragement, most likely because growing budgetary restraints left the
mili tary services with little money for such projects. While disappointed,
Ford did not abandon the airship scheme. In the mid- 1920s he came up
with a proposal to build a metal-clad dirigible capable of flying between
Detroit and London. This time he secured a government contract, but the
metal airship never got beyond the experimental stage. 3
Ford's interest in metal construction stemmed from his association with
William B . Stout, one of the pioneer builders of all-metal airplanes in the
United States. An engi neer, journalist, publicist, salesman, promoter, and
inventor, Stout began developing experimental airc raft following World War
I . 4 In June 1920 he went to Mineola, New York, to inspect two newly arrived
Junkers F. 1 3s , examples of the first practical duraluminum passenger air
craft. 5 Stout saw the future. "Do not fail to investigate Junkers planes now
at Mineola," he wired his friend Leon B . Lent, general superintendent of
the Post Office's Air Mail Service. "Performance nearly twice that of present
ships. Had marvellous flight Friday. "6 Further investigation into the work of
German designers Hugo Junkers and Claude Dornier led Stout to the con
clusion that "all commercial planes of the future will be of all-metal
.
,_
construct�on. r
Stout's first opportunity to experiment with lightweight, high-strength dur

aluminum came in 1922 when he received a contract from the navy to build
three twin-engine torpedo planes. The prototype, however, failed to meet
expectations. Based on Stout's earlier cantilevered monoplane ( known as
"The Bat"), it featured two 300- H P Packard engines that were faired into a
high, thick, delta-shaped wing. The ST All-Metal Torpedo Plane crashed
during acceptance tests, and the navy canceled the contract for additional
airplanes. Stout lost over $ 1 50,000 on the project but gained a good deal of
practical experience in working with duraluminum. 8
Despite this setback, Stout remained convinced that the all-metal air
plane had a bright future. Aptly described as a man of "unlimited optimism
and energy," in November 1 922 he formed the Stout Metal Airplane Com
pany and set out to raise funds for the construction of a commercial version.
A talented promoter, Stout soon convinced thirty Detroit businessmen to
H E N R Y F O R D : 3
invest $ 1 ,000 each in the new company. With this money he built the Aerial
Sedan, a three-passenger, high-wing monoplane powered by a 90-HP OX-5
engine. 9
Following the first successful test flight of the Aerial Sedan in February
1923, Stout put his fund-raising campaign in high gear. In March he wrote
to William B . Mayo,. a Ford Motor Company executive who was more or less
in charge of aeronautical development, and outlined progress to date. The
time had come, Stout said, "for commercial airplane development separate
from any Government angle a development that can stand on its own feet
on the basis of earning capacity and service to the country on a real indus
trial base." The Aerial Sedan, he continued, would be refined over the next
few months to serve as "a basis of continued production ." 10
Stout needed three things. First, he required "the moral and financial
su pport of the community and its big men ." He planned to expand the sub
scription list from thirty to fifty, and he wanted to know if Mayo and Edsel
Ford could be counted on for $5,000 each. Second, he needed a suitable
place to work, preferably with a flying field nearby. Did Ford have any
vacant land that could be made available? Finally, he had to find a better
engine. With the OX-5, the Aerial Sedan was "admittedly under-powered
for ideal work and high-altitude cities." It was being used because i t was
readily available and cheap: OX-5s could be obtained from government sur
pluses for $200 apiece. Stout consid ered the 400-H P Liberty engine, also
easily obtained, "too big and expensive to run to be considered." The an
swer lay with development of a radial, air-cooled engine. Aware that Ford
was working on an eight-cylinder radial, Stout suggested that the two com
panies pool their efforts. 11
Mayo passed Stout's letter to Edsel Ford. Stout's efforts, Mayo believed,
had been "of a high enough character to warrant giving him some assis
tance." He pointed out that the Aerial Sedan would be an appropriate
testbed for the new Ford radial engine. An association with Stout at this
early stage "might be of considerable assistance to us should you or your
father decide to start into the aerial game." In any event, the connection
could be made "without any real liability or responsibility on our part other
than being small stockholders." 12
Mayo's recommendation made sense, but it was not until December that
Edsel Ford invested $2,000 and agreed to become a director of the Stout
Metal Airplane Company. By this time Stout had abandoned the underpow
ered Aerial Sedan and was working on a larger, seven-passenger transport,
built around the 400-HP Liberty engine that he previously had rejected.
4 : A V I A T I O N'S G O L D E N A G E
Tests of the 2-AT, or Air Transport, during March and April 1924 revealed
that Stout had come up with a win ner. "Something is in the wind," he wrote
to his stockholders, "come out, and see what it is." 13
By early summer, after the 2-AT had carried more than 600 passengers
and flown nearly 3,000 miles, Henry Ford had seen enough. H e decided to
build an airport at Dearborn and to erect a factory that would be devoted to
aeronautical projects. The building would be used by the Stout Metal Air
plane Company and the Ai rcraft Development Corporation, the latter orga
nization devoted to Ford's dirigible experiments. 14
Although Stout now had his long-desired modern facilities, he quickly dis
covered that customers were scarce. At a time when commercial aviation in
the United States was more dream than reality, the 2-AT had no market. In
December he managed to sell the prototype to the Post Office for use with
the U.S. Air Mail Service; however, this did not lead to additional sales.
Again, Henry Ford came to the rescue and ordered five airplanes for a pro
jected company freight line. 15
The Ford air freight service, which began on April 13, 1925, attracted
wide publicity. "The country is witnessing a beginning of a vast development
of commercial aviation," the Washington Post proclaimed. The newspaper as
sumed that after Henry Ford had demonstrated the economic advantages of
air cargo an air express service would quickly grow up to link all major cities
in the country. "This service will call for thousands of planes," the paper
predicted, "and as experience is gained it is to be expected that the planes
will be improved and made cheaper. The use of cheap airplanes for travel
and freight traffic thus promises to become uni versal in this country." 16
Henry Ford gave every indication that he was prepared to make a major
commitment to the development of aeronautics as a sound business propo
sition. "It's a very big thing," he told reporters, "and I am keenly interested
in i t from every angle." The time had come to make a success of commercial
flying. ''We are confident we can do just that," Ford said, "and we are going
to do it." 17
The most tangible sign of Ford's commitment to aviation came when he
acquired the Stout Metal Airplane Company. Determ ined not to repeat his
unhappy experience with partners in the automobile business, Ford in
structed Mayo to secure all stock i n the Stout company. By July Mayo had
made arrangements to acquire the stock of the Detroit businessmen who had
responded to Stout's blandishments, giving them two to one on their specu
lative investments. There remained the 40, 149 shares of preferred stock
held by R. A. Stranahan, president of the Champion Spark Plug Company
and an early financial backer of Stout, and the 50,049 shares of preferred
stock in the hands of Stout and his close associates. Mayo was prepared to
offer Stranahan two and one-half to one for his cash investment of $ 1 50,000;
Stout and associates, whose stock represented nearly twelve years of work,
would also receive two and one-half to one for their holdings, based on a
value of five dollars per share. Mayo summarized:
Stockholders (investment $ 1 85,000) $ 3 7 1 , 000

Stranahan (investment $ 1 50,000) 337, 000
Stout (41, 362 shares X $5 X 2V2) 5 1 7 , 023
Associates (8,687 shares X $5 X 2 V2) 108, 587
$ 1 ,334, 1 1 2 [sic]
In addition, Mayo recommended that Stout be retained as a consultant at

a salary of $20,000 a year. 18 Ford approved this plan, and on July 3 1
the Stout Metal Airplane Company became a division of the Ford Motor
Company.19
Earlier i n July, Mayo and Stout had gone to Washington to discuss airmail
prospects with postal official Paul Henderson. In February 1 925 Congress
had passed the Kelly Act, providing for payment to contract carriers to fly
the mail, and the government was preparing to abandon the pioneer Air
Mail Service that it had been operating since 1 9 18. Henderson, who had
emphasized safety while spearheading the development of the transconti
nental mail route, expressed concern about the hazards of night flying over
the Alleghenies. "He and his associates," Mayo reported to Edsel Ford, "are
thoroughly of the belief that a three motored plane is the only safe job for
this particular piece of night mountain flying." As rnost people who were
giving serious thought to passenger flying agreed about the safety of a tri
motor, Mayo continued, "I think it is well for us to develop this plane as
quickly as possible." No doubt reflecting Stout's advice, Mayo suggested to
Edsel Ford that three air-cooled engines be mounted on a 2-AT. "My opin
ion ," he concluded, "is that this work can be done at very little cost as there
will not be any very extensive changes to make on our plane to modify it for
the three motor job." 20
As Stout began work to turn a 2-AT into a trimotor, the first Airplane
Reliability Tour provided additional incentive for the multiengine airplane.
Sponsored by the Detroit Aviation Society, the tour involved a round-trip
from Ford Airport in Dearborn to twelve midwestern cities, covering 1 , 900
miles. It was not a race "but a straight-forward demonstration of commercial
airplanes in everyday reliability for practical use in commerce." The Ford

Motor Company offered small cash prizes, and Edsel Ford would present
trophies to the finishers. 21
Sixteen airplanes completed the tour, eleven with perfect scores. Al
though there was no official winner, a Fokker trimotor attracted the most
attention. Powered by Wright 14 200-H P Whirlwind engines, the Fokker
F. V l l a-3m featured a fabric-covered metal tube fuselage and a high, thick
wooden wing. Thoroughly impressed, one knowledgeable writer urged Amer
ican designers to become familiar with "one of the most notable airplanes
ever brought to this country." 22
Henry Ford announced that the tour had demonstrated that "airplane
transportation not only is safe, but that it is reliable." H e expressed high
hopes for the new industry: "It's bigger in possibilities than anything else in
the world." The Ford Motor Company, he told reporters, had been experi
menting for some time on an air-cooled, eight-cylinder, 200-HP engine.
Tests had proved it "highly satisfactory." One day it would be placed in
quantity production for a "plain people's" air flivver, but first it would be
used to power the new Stout trimotor. 23
Henry Ford turned out to be excessively optimistic about the test results
of his new engine. On its first full-power trial, it delivered only 1 7 5-HP
before the crankshaft broke. As someone who worked on the project later
commented, the engine was "not a good design." 24 •
While Ford was having trouble with his engine, Stqut was running into
problems with the design of the trimotor. As Mayo earlier had indicated,
Stout's plan was to place three engines on a slightly modified 2-AT. H e cut
away the front section of each wing to accommodate two uncowled Wright
14 Whirlwinds, which he bolted to the wing spar. H e stuck a third Whirl
wind in the nose below the passenger compartment with the pilot perched
on top. In back of a widened landing gear, the 3-AT was identical to the
2-AT. 25
There is an old maxim among pilots: if a plane looks like a brick, it will
fly like a brick. The 3-AT looked like a brick with windows, and tests during
November and December 1925 revealed that it flew like one. It could not
maintain altitude on two engines with a 1 ,500-pound payload, and it landed
at the unsafe speed of 90 MPH, about 20 MPH less than its cruising speed. 26
The basic problem with the airplane was that placing the engines in the
wing destroyed the air flow behind them; this decreased the wing's lift and
compelled a power-on, high-speed landing. A few years later, the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics developed a streamlined cowling that
enabled designers to fair engines into the leading edge of wings without
causing the airfoil to stall , but this innovation came too late for the 3-AT. 27
In early January 1926, Henry Ford instructed company engineer Harold
H icks to take charge of building a practical three-motored airplane. "He
said," H icks recalled, "that I was to get in there and run i t , and to keep
Stout out of the design room. H e said that for the first t i me in his life, he
had bought a lemon and he didn't want the world to know it."2 8
On Saturday, January 16, Hicks told Stout engineer Tom Towle to bring
all drawings of the 3-AT to the Ford Laboratories. At six o'clock the next
morning, a fire broke out at the factory of the Stout Metal Airplane Com
pany. A series of explosions were seen inside the plant, centering around
the 3-AT. Within minutes, intense heat caused the roof to collapse. The
building and its contents were a total loss. Although no one ever produced
proof that the fire had been set deliberately, pervasive rumors pointed to
that conclusion. 29
Hicks, who had only l imited aeronautical experience, gave Towle overall
responsibility for design of the new airplane. A 1920 graduate of Yale with
a degree in mechanical engineering, Towle had worked as a designer and
stress analyst for the Dayton-Wright Company and as an aeronautical engi
neer for the Glenn L. Martin Company and the Aeromarine Plane & Motor
Company before joining Stout in 1924. Assisted by John G. Lee, an aero
nautical engineering graduate of MIT ( 1922) , Towle quickly turned out a
new airplane that bore little resemblance to its ill-fated predecessor. I n
place of the low-lift NACA 8 1 airfoil of the 3-AT, he selected a new high
lift wing profile that blended a modified Gottingen 387 at the root (featuring
a flat bottom contour and no camber) with a USA 27 at the tip. Towle and
Le.e agreed that the engines had to be located below the wings. This was a
natural decision, Lee explained, "in view of the demonstrated behavior of
the three-engine Air Pullman. Beside, i t had the precedent of the Fokker
wood -wing trimotor which had just made its appearance . . . and was known
to handle well." 30
In his memoirs, Stout denigrated the work of H icks, Towle, and Lee,
claiming that they had simply modified a 2-AT by copying the Fokker tri
motor. Ford people "swarmed all over" a Fokker that had remained over
night at the Dearborn airport, Stout noted, learning i ts secrets, especially
the wing curve. Like so much else i n Stout's memoirs, there is a grain but
only a grain of tntth in this story. While Hicks admitted that his staff had
been interested in the Fokker design and had taken a profile of the wing,
- - -- - - -
Wright 1908 Gottingen 387 1919
c�-==-
_ =- ==-
- - =--
=--�-� :::-:--
::-
Bleriot 1909 Clark Y 1922
-
•
( - -- - -- -
•
R.A.F. 6 1912 M-6 1926
�------·
R.A.F. 15 1915 R.A.F. 34 1926
• •
U.S.A. 27 1919
N.A.C.A. 2412 1933
• - -&--- -- ----
Joukowsky
1912
'
N.A.C.A. 23012 1935

(Gottingen 430)
Gottingen 398 1919 N.A.C.A. 23021 1935
- --- ---· --- ·
N.A.C.A. 66 1-212 1940
-+-- --- --- ---·
N.A.C.A. 747 A315 1944
Historical evolution of airfoil sections, 1908-1935.

the information had not been used. In fact, when Lee later tested the Fokker
wing section against the Ford section in the MIT wind tunnel, the Ford
airfoil aheady in production proved superior. 31
On June 1 1 , 1926, Henry Ford watched with what must have been a good
deal of pleasure and relief as the 4-AT flew for the first time. Test pilot
R . W. Schroeder landed after an hour aloft and declared the all-metal,
eight-passenger transport a success. The fabulous "Tin Goose" was ready to
fly into history. 32
With the passing years, as Ernest K. Gann has pointed out, the Ford
trimotor became the object of "more legend, admiration, and misconception
than any other si ngle aircraft." The airplane, he observed, was not without
its problems. Passengers were either too hot or too cold, and noise in the
cabin could be deafening, despite H i cks's best efforts at soundproofing. The
plane was difficult to keep in trim, and flying was a chore for pilots even in
smooth air. Takeoff performance was more remarkable than landing speed,
which tended to be high, and the plane actually cruised closer to 1 00 MPH
than the advertised 120 MPH. But the Ford trimotor was safe, rugged, and
dependable. Furthermore, it was far and away the premier commercial air
liner i n the United States from 1926 to 1932.33
Shortly after the debut of the 4-AT, Edsel Ford met with President Calvin
Coolidge and outlined the aeronautical progress being made by the Ford
Motor Company. Interviewed afterward by reporters, Edsel Ford predicted
the rapid development of freight and passenger service. However, he denied
reports that the Ford Company would join with Colonial Air Transport to
operate a network of airways between Detroit and New England. There were
no plans to expand the company's air freight service, which was established
as an experiment. "Our interest," he emphasized, "is chiefly i n the manu
facture of planes . " 34
Planning for a modern airplane factory had begun following the destruc
tion of the Stout plant in January. On November 15, 1926, the impressive
new facility opened for business. With 60,000 square feet of floor space, i t
was three times the size of the old plant. A steel and glass roof, without
intervening supports, extended from wall to wall of the one-story building.
There was room for two complete assembly lines, one on either side of a
central aisle. For the first time, the Ford News announced, the Ford system
of "progressive production" would be used to manufacture airplanes. Raw
materials would enter at one end of the factory and a finished airplane would
roll out the other. 35
But first the 4-AT had to go through the inevitable "teething trouble"
1 0 : A V I A T I O N'S G O L D E N A G E
experienced with all new airplanes. The open cockpit and tailskid of the
original model of which fourteen were built
gave way to an enclosed
pilot's compartment and a tailwheel developed mainly by Otto C. Koppen.
When an engine tore loose from its wing mounting during the 1926 Reli
ability Tour, H icks knew that strengthened bracing would be required. 36
During this developmental phase, criticism of the A irplane Division ( as
it was known) surfaced within the Ford organization. Sometime early in
1927, R. H . McCarroll, head of metallurgy at Ford , sent a confidential
memorandum that obviously was intended for the boss's eyes to Frank
Campsall, Henry Ford's private secretary. McC arroll complained that the
Airplane Division had been guilty of a "needless waste of money" in devel
oping the 4-AT. He went on to cite the fact that there had been 800 changes
in blueprints while the first four airplanes were under construction; at least
200 of these changes "could be considered as a total loss of labor and tna
terial." Furthermore, McCan·oll said, the Airplane Division was headed in
the wrong direction. Campsall argued that an airplane with an externally
braced wing could carry 800 pounds more payload than the 4-AT and could
cruise 5 MPH to 1 0 MPH faster. "This type should be built around a Liberty
moto,r," Campsall concluded, "as that is about the only moderate-priced
motor that the [air transport] companies could afford to run and make
money. " 37
McCarToll's ignorance of aerodynamics was nearly complete, and nothing
came of his memorandum. However, it stood as a port�nt of things to come.
A number of people in the Ford organization believed that airplanes could
be built in the same fashion as automobiles and could be designed by ama
teurs. Eventually, these notions would contribute to the demise of the Air
plane Division.
Sales of what the New York Ti1nes termed "the Ford Superplane" went
slowly at first. By the end of 1927, airlines had purchased five, the govern
ment four, and private companies four; three others had gone into service
with the Ford company freight line. But 1927 did see a quickening of aero
nautical interest in the country, highlighted by Charles Lindbergh's New
York-Paris flight in May. As a result, sales increased to thirty-eight tritno
tors in 1928.38
The original 4-AT grew over the years. In 1 927, 220-HP Wright JS en
gines replaced the original J4s (which had had problems with overhead
pushrods) and passenger capacity increased to twelve. A major change came
in 1928- 1929 with the introduction of the S- AT, a thirteen-passenger model
that was equi pped with 420-HP Pratt & Whitney Wasp radial engines. 39
H E N R Y F O R D : 1 1
Production of trimotors reached a peak in 1929, when eighty-six large trans

ports rolled off the assembly line.
At the head of the thriving Airplane Division stood Wi lliam B . Mayo.
Starting out as an office boy for J . A. Grant & Company, a Boston steam
plant engineering firm, his sales ab ility eventually led to a partnership.
Mayo had sold Henry Ford the power equipment for the Highland Park plant
and then supervised its installation. H e went on to play a major role in the
development of the great River Rouge facility. Mayo became i nterested in
aviation during World War I , when he worked on the Ford-produced Liberty
engine. A charter member of the Detroit Aviation Society, he saw a tremen
dous future for commercial aviation, and he believed that Detroit should be
at the center of it. Intrigued by Stout's plans for an all -metal airplane, he
was responsible for interesting Henry and Edsel Ford in the project. 40
Mayo remained good friends with Stout after the 3-AT fiasco, even man
aging to protect him from Henry Ford's wrath. H e often took the colorful
inventor with him on trips to publicize the trimotor. The two men made a
superb sales team. As one associate pointed out, Mayo "had an eye for
busi ness. " 41
Edsel Ford, president of the Ford Motor Company, was Mayo's nominal
superior. The two men were on cordial terms. Edsel took a keen interest in
the aeronautical program, which for the first time gave him widespread pub
licity. It was Edsel who called on President Coolidge, and i t was Edsel who
was quoted on the front page of the New York Times. In public Henry Ford
seemed prepared to let Edsel do for aeronautics what he had done for auto
mobiles. But in fact the father continued to be the source of final authority
for the Airplane Division, as he was for everything else i n the company.
Despite Edsel's position as president, as Mayo's personal secretary R . T.
Walker recalled, "Mr. [Henry] Ford was the prime mover in what we did. It
was to Mr. Ford that we went. It was his interest. " 42
Primarily concerned with administration and sales and having l i ttle tech
nical knowledge of aviation, Mayo usually exercised only the most general
supervision over the design and production of airplanes. The Airplane Di
vision, Harold H icks pointed out, "really more or less ran itself." Chief of
design and development, Hicks was a graduate of the U niversity of Michi
gan with degrees in mechanical engineering. H i s first connection with avia
tion had come during the war, when he had assisted Colonel E. J. Hall with
the wartime Liberty engine. After joining the Ford Motor Company in 1 9 1 9,
Hicks had worked on a proposed gasoli ne-powered streetcar and had helped
Edsel Ford with the design and construction of speedboats that used modi-
fied Liberty engines. Aware that his detractors liked to point out that he was
a mechanical and not an aeronautical engineer, H icks relied on his staff for
design work. 43
George Goin, originally employed by Stout, supervised manufacturing.
By 1929 Goin and his 1 , 000 workers were capable of turning out three
planes a week in what was without doubt the finest aircraft production fa
cility in the world. Flat sheets of duraluminum arri ved at one end of the
factory in nine thicknesses, ranging from . 0 1 0 to . 1 25 inch. The thinnest
gauges were used for covering, while the thicker gauges were made into
spars, braces, and other structural members.
The duraluminum was coiled into rolls, then immersed in a solution of
equal parts sodium and potassium nitrate and held at a temperature of 940
to 960 degrees. The rolls were removed and quenched in boiling water to
dissolve the adhering salt. A t this point the metal began to harden, reaching
its maximum strength in ten days. All cold work had to he done within
several hours of the heat treatment, while the metal was still malleable.
Duraluminum intended as covering was corrugated for added strength in
a press that took sections twelve feet long by sixteen inches wide. The cor
rugated sheets then were fitted to wooden frames or jigs that corresponded
to the shape of the finished part. A t the same time, rollers and presses
shaped frame members. Sections of the fuselage frame, main spars, wings,
rudder, and other parts were assembled separately on jigs, later to be
brought together as the plane moved down the asserp.hly line. These jigs
compelled the use of interchangeable parts and were the key to speedy
production.
The first step on the assembly line was to bring together on a cradle the
thirteen frames or bulkheads of the fuselage that had been assembled on
individual jigs. Cross members were riveted in place to form a rigid unit,
and then the skin was applied. The wing assembly, composed of three main
and five auxiliary spars, came next. The center section, from which the
outboard engines were hung, formed an i ntegral part of the main body. On
either side, outboard sections were attached by means of six bolts.
Workers next attached the landing gear, enabling the plane to roll off the
assembly cradle. A tractor crane lifted the motor assembly from special jigs
and lowered i t into position to be securely bolted onto the frame. The mount
ing braces for the engines were made of steel to avoid problems of metal
fatigue due to vibration.
The last step was to finish the interior. Cockpit instruments and controls
were installed, and cabin walls and ceilings were covered with Ford Aero
H E N R Y F O R D : 1 3
board (two thin sheets of aluminum with a balsa-wood core), under which a
padding of kapok was attached to the duraluminum in an effort to deaden
the sound of the engines and provide some warmth for the passengers, a
largely unsuccessful effort. After leather-covered tubular aluminum chairs
were placed in the cabin (replacing earlier wicker chairs), the plane left the
assembly line. It was flight-tested and faults were cotTected before the
ground crew filled its tanks with gasoline and delivered it to the customer. 44
As production of the trimotor i ncreased during 1929, Henry Ford had
every reason to be optimistic about the future of his aeronautical interests.
However, there had been a number of disappointments along the way. The
much-ballyhooed eight-cylinder air-cooled engine never left the test stand,
to Ford's great chagrin. The airmail business also flopped. Early in 1926
Ford received a contract from the Post Office to fly mail from Detroit to
Cleveland and Chicago. Service began with great fanfare on February 1 5,
1926, but traffic never lived up to expectations. By the summer of 1 927,
revenue on the routes amounted to less than $ 1 ,300 a month. Ford gave up
the contract in July 1928.45
Without doubt, Ford's greatest setback came with the failure of his flivver
airplane. The idea of a small airplane for the masses most l i kely originated
with the visit to Dearborn of Lawrence B. Spetry, son of inventor Elmer
Sperry and a talented i nventor in his own right. In December 1923 Sperry
landed his Messenger, a single-place biplane, on the lawn of the Ford estate.
Henry Ford was impressed by the tiny airplane, especially by its two
cylinder engine. During the winter of 1925 - 1 926, he initiated a special
project, apart from the Airplane Division, to develop a small airplane
that would be as useful and affordable as an automobile, a veritable
Model T of the air. Otto Koppen was largely responsible for designing the
low-wing monoplane, weighing only 550 pounds (empty), that first flew on
July 30, 1926.46
An improved model with a new engine appeared eighteen months later.
The 45-HP, three-cylinder Anzani radial engine of the first flying flivver had
been replaced by an innovative horizontally opposed air-cooled engine, de
signed by Harold H icks and built by Carl Schultz. Weighing only 120
pounds (with magnetos), the 36- H P engine enabled Flivver #2 to lift twice
its own weight. 47
The little plane also had great range, with a 50-gallon tank and an engine
that burned 2 . 4 gallons per hour at a cruising speed of about 80 MPH. On
February 21 , 1928, H arry Brooks (who was the only pilot to fly the airplanes
except for a single, brief flight by Charles Lindbergh) established a world's
1 4 : A V I A T I O N 'S G O L D E N A G E
distance record for light planes when he flew nonstop from Dearborn to
Titusville, Florida, a distance of nearly 1 , 000 miles. Five days later, how
ever, Brooks crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off Melbourne, Florida, and
was killed. 48 Edsel Ford wanted to continue the project and asked H i cks to
work up models of three-passenger low-wing monoplanes. Edsel and H icks
took these models to Henry Ford. Edsel told his father that he intended to
build five planes for testing. "No, that's no good," H icks recalled Henry
Ford's responding; "don't do that." There would be no Model T of the air. 49
Brooks's death and the decision to abandon the flying flivver did not bring
an end to Henry Ford's aeronautical interests, as some writers have sug
gested. 50 It was the Great Depression and a failure to respond effectively to
a shrinking market for large airplanes that caused Ford to close the Air
plane Divi sion. Sales of the trimotor fell off sharply during the winter of
1929- 1930. In an effort to stimulate declining interest i n the 5-AT, Hicks
used data from the division's wind tunnel (a model with a 42-inch throat
that had been desi gned by Harry Karcher) to streamline the airplane and
improve performance. Flow patterns revealed that lowering the engine pods
twelve inches reduced friction between the nacelle and wing, resulting in
increased airspeed. Other modifications included improved engine cowl
ings, streamlined engine exhaust pipes, and metal pants to cover the
wheels. Wind-tunnel data also suggested that a redesigned fuselage would
substantially improve pe:rformance; however, this major change was rejected
as too costly. 5 1
Operationally tested in airline service during the summer of 1930, the
modified 5-AT clearly outperformed the standard trimotor. I n a round-trip
between Detroit and Chicago, the streamlined airplane registered a fifteen
percent increase in groundspeed ( 1 23 MPH vs. 107 MPH), with decreased
fuel consumption (304 gallons vs. 3 1 7 gallons). Airlines liked these num
bers. By the end of 1930 the Airplane Division had $750,000 of business
on order, mainly for modification work. 52
The Ford Motor Company also sought to stem declines i n sales by moving
for the first time i nto the military market. A streamlined 5-AT was further
modified to carry a crew of five and 2,000 pounds of bombs. The X B-906
underwent tests at Wright Field during the summer of 1931 with disappoint
ing results. The Air Corps rejected the airplane because of "lack of rear
ward vision, inadequate angles of fire for machine guns, and inherently
poor aerodynamic qualities." Efforts by the A irplane Division to improve
the airplane's "semi -dangerous" flying qualities ended in tragedy on Sep
tember 1 9 when the XB-906 crashed in Dearborn, killing veteran pilot
Leroy Manning. 53
H E N R Y F O R D : 1 5
The XB-906 episode did not sit well with pacifist Henry Ford. U ncom
fortable with the idea of turning the trimotor that bore his name into a
bomber, he viewed Manning's death almost as divine retri bution. H e com
mented to his private secretary, E . G. Liebold, that the Ford Motor Com
pany had made an airplane to kill people and had managed to kill one of its
own men. 54
By the end of 193 1 , the Airplane Division teetered on the brink of col
lapse. It had sold twenty-one trimotors during the year and had orders for
only three more. Attempts to land a military contract had failed, as had
efforts to convert some trimotors into single-engine freighters. Its last hope
lay with a new forty-passenger airplane that had been under development
for the past three years. 55
After seeing at the 1929 Chicago A i r Show a new Boeing biplane that had
been developed to compete with the Ford trimotor, Mayo had ordered work
to begin on a forty-passenger airplane. H icks objected at first, as he had
plans of his own for a smaller twin-engine low-wing monoplane, a model of
which had performed well during wind-tunnel tests. But Mayo had already
sold Henry and Edsel Ford on the larger airplane and was not interested.
When H icks persisted, Mayo told him to get on with the design work for
what became the 14-AT or he would find someone else to do the job. 56
H i cks's staff came up with a dinosaur. A t a time when the trend i n aero
nautical research pointed toward a two-engine low-wing airplane with a
stressed-skin monocoque fuselage and retractable landing gear the type
that Boeing and Douglas would produce during the early 1930s they de
signed a high-wing, corrugated-duraluminum-covered, fixed-gear anach
ronism. 57
And that was the least of H icks's problems. H i c ks wanted to use four
Pratt & Whitney air-cooled Hornet engines, two faired into the wings and
two mounted in tandem atop the fuselage. One day, while the prototype was
under construction, Henry Ford came through the factory and told H icks,
"I want to take those Hornets off this design." It seems that Ford had taken
a fancy to newly developed Hispano-Suiza engines, and he wanted these
used on his airplane. Later Ford told H icks that four engines were too many:
three would be enough. H icks duly placed two twelve-cylinder H i ssos in
the wing and mounted a single eighteen-cylinder H isso in a nacelle above
the fuselage. As his associate AI Esper commented, "Our weight ratio was
shot." The Civil Aeronautics Administration agreed and would license the
14-AT for only ten instead of forty passengers. 58
But the worst was yet to come. The fittings in the wing that carried the
load cracked before installation. The Ford metallurgical laboratory was
called in, and new fittings were developed and forged at the Rouge plant.
After two days of taxi tests over rough ground, these fittings also cracked.
"The whole ship had to be torn down," Esper recalled. It was never put
back together again. 59
"The failure of that airplane," Hicks believed, "and the prospect of
spending some more millions on development ended the Ford interest (in
aeronautics]." He was right. In the middle of a depression, having lost an
estimated $5,600,000 on his aviation enterprises, and with no sales or pros
pects in sight, Henry Ford had had enough. 60
In July 1932 Ford hatchetman Charles E. Sorenson came through the
Dearborn Engineering Laboratory at two o'clock i n the afternoon and told
H icks that he wanted all aeronautical engineers off the payroll by four-thirty.
H icks immediately called Edsel Ford for confirrnation. Yes, Edsel replied,
"Father wants to disband the A ircraft Department." A few of the staff with
automotive experience were retained, but most found themselves unem
ployed. Mayo left i n August, followed by H icks i n November. The factory
completed two final orders for Pan American Airways and then closed down.
By the end of 1932, Ford's first but not last aviation adventure was
over. 6 1
Ford of course had the resources to continue, even during the darkest
days of the Great Depression. But the folk hero of the 1920s had lost heart.
H i s interest in aviation had come during a period of buoyant optimism, a
.
time of great prosperity for Ford and the country. Now people were going
.
hungry, Dearborn police were shooting protesting unemployed workers, and

national magazines were publishing articles about "The Despot of Dear
born." 62 An aging Henry Ford he was seventy in 1 933 simply no longer
had the determination to prevail over adversity that had marked his earlier
career, at least when it came to aviation. The Airplane Division had become
one headache that he could do without.
Perhaps it was just as well. The methods and philosophy that had enabled
Ford to mass-produce automobiles with unparalleled success did not always
lend themselves to the development of airplanes. John Lee, who came to
Ford from the Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Company, knew the difference.
Curtiss had an excellent engineering department, staffed by well-trained
structural analysts and designers. A t Curtiss, he pointed out, "and in all
modern aircraft companies, engineering was k i ng, and the shop built what
it was told." At Ford, however, "the shop was king," and the emphasis was
on practicality. "If it worked," Lee explained, "it was all right. Unless it
was cheaper, or quick er, or handier, they were not interested in changes or
suggestions . " 63
H E N R Y F O R D : 1 7
There were lessons to be learned from Ford's venture into aeronautics

during the 1 920s. Above all, it should have been clear that while mass
production techniques worked well with a sound design that required only
limited modification over time, they were a good deal less effective under
conditions of rapid technological progress. However, as events during World
War I I would demonstrate, Henry Ford had derived little knowledge from
the past. Perhaps this is not too surprising. After all, he believed that his
tory was more or less bunk. 64
D A N I E L A N D H A R R Y
G U G G E N H E I M A N D T H E
P H I LA N T H R O P Y O F F L I G H T
R I C H A R D P. H A L L IO N
Two of the most remarkable figures in aviation history made up the father
and-son team of Daniel and H arry Guggenheim. At a critical point in aero
nautical development, these two men formulated a national program of aero
nautical education, research, demonstration, and support that radicall y
transformed the face of American aeronautics and even extended its impact
to the rest of the world. Undeniably, the great philanthropic fu nd that these
two set in motion i n 1926 and that lasted but four years was the single
most important factor in the professionalization and growth of A merican
aviation. It is ironic, then, that the name Guggenheim is little known in
aeronautics except among "old-timers" and professional aerospace histori
ans. Instead, to the world at large, the aeronautical activities of the Guggen
heim family are virtually unknown, whereas the various philanthropic ac
tivities of other branches of the Guggenheim family arguably of much less
significance than those of Daniel and Harry are universally recognized
and acknowledged.
The Guggenheim family arri ved i n America in 1848, the year of great
revolutions. Simon Guggenheim, his wife, son Meyer, four daughters, and
·
seven stepchi ldren had left the small Swiss town of Lengnau to escape a
civil war raging between the Catholic and Protestant cantons, to avoid eco
nomic depression, and to escape Swiss anti-Semitism. After journeying to
Hamburg, they embarked on a three-month crossing to Philadelphia. Simon
and Meyer then peddled household goods throughout eastern Pennsylvania,
hitting upon a form of stove polish that soon was in great demand. Simon
D A N I E L A N D H A R R Y G U G G E N H E I M : 1 9
turned to manufacturing the polish and Meyer to selling it, and soon Meyer
felt secure enough to marry one of his stepmother's four daughters. From
this union came eleven children Isaac, Daniel, Murry, Solomon, Jeanette,
Benjamin, twins Simon and Robert, William, Rose, and Cora. Meyer sent
his ch ildren to a Catholic day school i n Philadelphia, but he ensured that
the children would receive Jewish religious training as well. W i th a broad
mindedness for which the family would become famous, he su pported both
Jewish and Catholic educational and charitable organizations.
By the time father Simon died i n 1869, Meyer was already on the road to
financial success. The family's conditions improved as he moved up the
scale from selling household goods and stove polish to selling the Union
army an instant-coffee mix during the Civil War. Eventually he turned to
- -
lace manufacturing and impo1ting and then, in the early 1880s, to lead and
silver mi � ing. In all of these ventures, he relied increasingly upon his sec
ond son, Daniel, a short, personable young man with a keen intellect and
inquisitive nature. For a brief time, it appeared that the mining ventures in
Col orado had been a mistake, but then the mine superintendent announced
a rich silver strike. Meyer was a millionaire, and with four of his seven sons
in the n1ining business, the old man established M . Guggenheim's Sons.
Then began a period of almost explosive growth; the Guggenheims expanded
from mining to the smelting of ores and established a specialized exploration
company in 1 899 to seek out new n1ineral areas for mining and processing.
A skirmish with Rockefeller tnining interests turned into a ful l - fledged
corporate war, as the Rockefeller interests sought to shut down the Gug
genheims completely. Instead, in an early example of corporate raiding,
the Guggenheims skillfully bought up a majority of stock and took control
of the rival smelting conglomerate (dubbed the "Smelters Trust") away from
the Rockefellers, adding the $43 million plum to the Guggenheim empire. 1
For all of their corporate skills, the Guggenheims were not cut from the
same cloth as such "Robber Barons" as Jay Gould or the Rockefellers.
Daniel, in particular, had high standards of personal honor and integrity,
and in a time of growing social consciousness, received high marks from
reformers, including Ida Tarbell. In 1 844 Daniel Guggenheim married Flor
ence Schloss of Philadelphia, and they had three children Meyer Robert,
H arry Frank, and Gladys Eleanor. Daniel had easily and gracefully assumed
the mantle of Guggenheim family leadership from his father, and the other
brothers generally and supportively deferred to his wishes. In 1 9 1 6 the
brothers replaced M . Guggenheim's Sons with a new firm, Guggenheim
Brothers, headquartered at 1 20 Broadway, New York. After World War I,
2 0 A V I A T I O N 'S G O L D E N A G E
Daniel retired from business i n 1923 to Hempstead House, his mansion on

Long Island's Sands Point. He had always consi dered philanthropic support
to educational institutions importatnt, and in 1924 he and his wife estab
lished the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Foundation to advance the
"well-being of mankind throughout the world." 2
Daniel's son H an)', born in 1 890 in West End , New Jersey, led an atypi
cal life for a society child. Tall, dark, and powerfu lly built, with a pleasant
but confident demeanor, young Guggenheim was clearly a man of action.
Fond of sports, he enrolled in Yale's Sheffield Scientific School to study
mining in 1907, but he dropped out the fol lowing year to marry Helen Ro
senberg. The couple soon moved to Mexico to look after the family's smelt
ing interests. Two years later, at the behest of his father, who took a strong
paternalistic interest in his childrens' activities, Harry enrolled at Pembroke
College, Cambridge, England. He studied economics and political science
under John May nard Keynes and minored in chemistry. While at Cam
bridge, he won a tennis Blue and was president of the Pembroke College
Lawn Tennis Club. By the time he graduated with a B . A . in 1 9 1 3 he was
thorough! y Anglo-American in outlook. Guggenheim was deeply affected
by the death of a British friend during the opening stages of World War I,
and for reasons that are unclear, he decided to learn to fly. Perhaps it was
partly because other members of his family were interested in aviation. H i s
brother, Meyer Robert, served as a vice-president of the Seattle Aero Club,
and his mother Florence had sponsored a prewar New York ball to raise
funds for the purchase of military aircraft. In any case, in earl y 1 9 1 7 , while
he was on vacation in Florida, Harry Guggenheim began flight training at
his own expense, continuing lessons that March at Port Washington at Man
hasset Bay, Long Island.
With the American entry into the war, Guggenheim joined a naval reserve
training group, completed his flight trai ning in June 1 9 1 7 (including flights
with Glenn Curtiss himself in twin-engine Curtiss pusher flying boats) and
received his commission as a lieutenant, junior grade. Guggenheim soon
found himself overseas in Europe, flying Caproni heavy bombers. During
his naval service, which he thoroughly enjoyed, H arry Guggenheim made
contacts with many men who would later prove useful when he directed the
Guggenheim Fund, notably Trubee Davison, Artemus Gates, David Ingal ls,
and Rear Admiral Hutchinson Cone. Guggenheim attained the rank of lieu
tenant commander before being discharged in September 192 1 . ( Later, dur
ing World War II, Guggenheim would rise to the rank of captain in the
naval reserves while serving in shore and fleet billets, including a tour in
the Western Pacific during which he flew as a combat observer in Grum

man-General Motors TBM Avenger torpedo bombers from the carrier USS
Nehenta Bay. )
During the Great War, H arry's father, Daniel, had developed a strong in
terest in the airplane for both mili tary and civilian purposes. In fact , he had
written to his son asking, "I wonder whether you think as much of the aero
plane in bringing the war to a final close as I do?" After the war, Daniel's
awakened interest never flagged, though he had a serious heart condition
that would forever prevent him from flying in a plane. H arry continued to
fly as a sportsman pilot and made the acquaintance of a brilliant aeronauti
cal engineer, Alexander Klemin, then teaching at New York Uni versity.
Klemin hoped to establish a school of aeronautical engineering at New York
Uni versity, but he needed to find strong financial backers for the proposed
department. Mter a series of serendipitous meetings among Klemin , H arry
Guggenheim, various school officials, and H arry's father, Daniel, N Y U re
ceived a grant and the Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aero
nautics was established. 3
To appreciate the impact the Guggenheim Fund had on American avia
tion , one must consider the state of aviation in the U nited States i n the
1920s. Federal air regulation, until passage of the A ir Commerce Act of
1926, had been decidedly haphazard. Such booster organizations as the
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce warned that the lack of control i n civil
aeronautics was directly responsible for an i ncreasing number of fatalities. 4
To the public mind, flying usually meant barnstorming, a romance
drenched activity of questionable value that seriously hindered those who
promoted safe aircraft operation. By 1924 reckless barnstormers caused two
out of three fatal accidents, and public faith i n the airplane was at an un
derstandable low. 5 Aside from a thwarted attempt by Alfred Lawson to
develop an airline and passenger-carrying airliners i n 1919, and Inglis
Uppercu's i ll-fated Aeromarine Airways experiment, civil air commerce in
the United States was restricted to the government-run Air Mail Service.
Passage of the Kelly Act in 1925 finally opened the way for private contrac
tors to haul the mail and also helped produce conditions conducive to the
establishment of passenger-carrying air service.
Appalling accidents indicated the great need for improvements in "blind
flying" techniques, instrumentation, and refinements in ai rcraft design. De
sign changes were necessary to improve low-speed stability and handling
characteristics and to enable aircraft to land at steeper descent angles and
lower speeds. Although such research bodies as the National A d visory Com-
mi ttee for Aeronau tics, the army's Engineering Division, and the navy's
Bureau of Aeronautics were doing excellent work in applied research, th�re
was no pool of trained aeronautical engineers upon which these agencies
and private industry could draw. In 1922 only five schools i n the entire
nation offered courses in aeronautical engineering; of these on ly two the
University of Michigan and MIT granted degrees. By the mid-1 920s,
aeronautical journals and industry spokesmen were calling for increased
aeronautical education, programs to instill public confidence in the air
plane, greater federal regulation, and stall-and-spin-proof aircraft, as well
as for college and university programs in aeronautical engineering. It was
in this climate that the Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aero
nautics appeared. 6
In March 1925 New York U niversity Chancellor Elmer E. Brown ap
pointed H arry Guggenheim to an organizing committee seeking a permanent
endowment for a school of aeronautical engineering at N Y U . Committee
members advocated a public subscription campaign, but the younger Gug
genheim argued cogently that the American public was not favorably enough
disposed toward flying to support such a campaign; he favored approac hing
a single wealthy individual instead. H e brought this matter before his father,
who on June 12, 1925, wrote Brown of his intention to endow a "Daniel
Guggenheim School of Aeronautics" at N Y U for $500,000 . 7 His goals were
to place aeronautical engineering on a level comparable to other engineering
specialities then being taught and to turn out "highly trained engineers ca
pable of building better and safer commercjal aircraft. " 8 This concern for
civil aeronau tics remained a hallmark of Daniel Guggenheim until his death
in 1930 at age seventy-four.
The response to the N Y U grant was overwhelmingly favorable. Daniel
Guggenheim always had considered the gift to N "Y U as simply the beginning
of a larger yet undefined program of aeronautical philanthropy building on
the general philanthropic mission of the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim
Foundation. Daniel Guggenheim hoped to endow more schools of aeronau
tical engineering, and when Harry Guggenheim mentioned this to a New
York public relations director, Ivy Lee, Lee suggested that his father start
a fund for the promotion of aeronautics. Harry Guggenheim, at Daniel's
behest, contacted industry and government officials for their views, includ
ing Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover and President Calvin Coolidge.
All were in favor of the idea. By late December 1 925, Guggenheim was
prepared to place up to $2.5 mill ion in a fund to sponsor education, re
search, and the promotion of aviation. The next month Harry Guggenheirn
began asking prominent American scientists, financiers, and aviation per

sonalities (i ncluding A . A . Michelson, Dwight Morrow, and Orville Wright)
if they would be willing to serve on a board of trustees for the fu nd. 9 They
were, and by mid-Jan uary all was ready.
On January 16, 1926, Daniel Guggenheim formally notified Hoover of
the creation of "a Fund which will cooperate with you and with all agencies
of the Government and the public generally in advancing the art and science
of aeronautics and aviation." 10 The elder Guggenheim immediately donated
$2.5 million to the fu nd, a sum that was later increased to $2.8 million. He
had no intention, however, of creating a permanent fund; rather, he hoped
that private enterprise would be able to carry forward on its own from where
the fund left off. Harry F. Guggenheim served as the fund's president.
The fund had four major purposes: ( 1 ) to promote aeronautical education
in colleges, universities, and secondary schools and among the general pub
l ic; (2) to foster aeronautical research; (3) to assist in the development of
commercial aircraft and aircraft equipment; and finally, (4) to "further the
application of aircraft in business, industry, and other economic and social
activities of the nation." 1 1 The elder Guggenheim also recognized an urgent
need "to awaken the American public, especially our business men, to the
advantages and possibilities of commercial aircraft in a word to make the
American public in a very real sense 'air-wise.' " 1 2
The first major undertaking of the fund, and the start of an ongoing pro
gram, was the endowing of schools of aeronautical engineering around the
nation. Between 1 926 and 1930 the fu nd gave major grants to seven univer
sities, inc1uding Stanford, the California Institute of Technology, the Un i
versity of Michigan, MIT, the University of Washington, the Georgia School
( later Institute) of Technology, and the University of Akron. Most of these
grants strengthened and built upon existing programs or plans; some, as in
the case of Georgia Tech and A kron , broke new ground. The fund sought to
endow schools in each major geographical sector of the nation. Daniel and
H arry Guggenheim were concerned particularly about the western grants,
"inasmuch as there is practically no aeronautical instruction available west
of Michigan ." 1 3 In each case the grants provided for su pport of a school of
aeronautics, for construction of a wind tunnel and laboratory facilities, and
for the hiring of qualified fac ulty members. In the case of Akron, the fund
created the Guggenheim Airship Institute, which was devoted sol ely to ad
vancing research and development of lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles. Akron
was the national center of LTA activity, and the Guggenheim choice of this
school was a natural one. H
As soon as the Guggenheims announced the creation of the fund, inter

ested academicians applied for grants. Among the very first to seek research
money was Robert Millikan, a Nobel laureate in physics at the California
Institute of Technology. Millikan had initially sought $500,000, the same
amount as the earlier Guggenheim grant to N Y U . But after investigating the
Caltech program, the fund whittled the request to $305,000, approving it
on June 2, 1926. One of the stipulations was that Caltech must hire a dis
tinguished instructor in aeronautics. Millikan wanted Theodore von Kar
man, a Hungarian professor at Aachen's Technische Hochschule. After much
haggling over the next two years with the tempestuous but brilliant scientist,
M illikan and the Guggenheims finally convinced him (with an assist from
the rapidly deteriorating political conditions in Germany) to emigrate a
major coup. In December 1929, von Karman assumed the directorship of
the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at the California Institute of Tech
nology, soon world-renowned as Caltech's GALCIT. 1 5
In European fashion, von Karn1an, the greatest aerospace scientist of his
generation, built a school of students, some of whom went into private in
dustry, some to other universities and colleges, and some to the federal
government. Under von Karman's paternalistic guidance, GALCIT devel
oped exceptionally close ties with the West Coast aircraft industry, ties that
paid off almost immediately. For example, GALCIT engineers and von Kar
man himself made major design inputs affecting the development of the
•
famed Douglas DC-1 and DC-3 transports . 16

Von Karman also supported a small group of graduate students, led by
Frank Malina, who energetically investigated rocket propulsion during the
1930s. 17 G ALCIT's rocket research eventually led in 1 943 to the establish
ment of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which has played a key role in
present-day space flight projects. GALCIT's research was diverse and not
all flight related. Before World War II, GALCIT engineers also studied
wind-power generators (only now again receiving serious consideration) and
determined the causes of the Tacoma Narrows bridge collapse. 1 8
Each of the other Guggenheim schools, in its own way, also made signif
icant contributions. Stanford emphasized research on aircraft propellers;
by 1939 the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had published
over twenty propeller-research reports generated by Stanford investigators.
William F. Durand, a disti nguished Stanford engineer and Guggenheim
Fund trustee, prepared at Stanford, under the aegis of the fu nd, a six
volume aeronautical encyclopedia published by the Julius Springer Verlag
in Berlin from 1934 through 1 936. This work, Aerodynamic Theory: A Gen-
eral Review of Progress, became the standard aeronautical engineering ref

erence for many years, and even now it is much respected by practicing
engineers.
•
New York U n iversity, the original Guggenheim school, devoted much of

its attention to autogiro and helicopter research, a measure of the influence
of Alexander Klemin� the school's director. Like Caltech, N Y U became a
major testing center for private industry. Before World War II, all the major
East Coast manufacturers tested their aircraft in NY U's wind tunnels.
MIT and the University of Michigan concentrated on turning out highly
trained engineers for industry and government service. Some of them, l i ke
N ACA's John Stack ( MIT) and Lockheed's Clarence "Kelly" Johnson ( Michi
gan) radically altered the future course of aircraft design and development.
MIT also gained a worldwide reputation for its meteorology program, started
by Carl Gustaf Rossby for the Guggenheim Fund i n 1928.
Under Frederick Kirsten, the Guggenheim school at the University of
Washington developed close ties with the Boeing A irplane Company. Virtu
ally all Boeing production aircraft have, at some point, been tested in Wash
ington's tunnels. Other manufacturers, including North American, Vought,
and Consolidated, also tested their ai rcraft at Washington.
Georgia Tech had farther to go than the other Guggenheim schools inas
much as no previous aeronau tical course programs at Georgia or at any
southern school had existed prior to the Guggenheim grant. Georgia Tech
was selected by the fund expressly for the purpose of establishing an aero
nautical school in the South. It specialized in helicopter studies, and the
school's director, Montgomery Knight (a former NACA engineer), designed
one helicopter configuration that might have been quite successful if funding
had been available for development.
Unlike the other Guggenheim schools, success did not come to the Gug
genheim Airship Institute at Akron. The institute did useful work until the
loss of the Hindenburg in 1937 brought the era of the rigid airship to a
horrific end. After 1 937 the Airship Institute tottered on, furnishing studies
that benefited blimp development, especially during World War II. It con
tinued in operation until ] 949, when the University of A kron discontinued
its aeronautical engineering program.
One can measure the influence of the Guggenheim schools by considering
that in 1926 only ninety-six students were studying for degrees in aeronau
tics in the United States, and the majority of these were students at the
Guggenheim-assisted NYU , Caltech, Stanford, and Michigan schools. By
1942 a clear majority of the senior aeronautical engineers and scientists in
the U n ited States were Guggenheim-school graduates; N ACA's Langley

Laboratory alone had fifteen MIT Guggenheim-school alumni on its staff.
Without question, the Guggenheim aeronautical engineering programs had
a significant impact in bringing America into the air age. 1 9
Guggenheim educational activities did not end with the university grant
program. The fund also promoted air tours by prominent aviators, encour
aged towns to paint large identifying signs as an aid to pilots fly ing cross
country, fostered special programs of aeronautical education at universities
and elementary and secondary schools, and initiated publication of various
bulletins and publications. Most of these activities were aimed at making
the American public more air-minded and at encouraging business and in
dustrial leaders to use aircraft for commercial purposes.
The Guggen heim air tours, by Floyd Bennett and Bernt Balchen in Rich
ard Byrd's Fokker trimotor Josephine Ford and by Charles Lindbergh in the
Spirit of St. Louis, were undertaken with the full support of the Aeronautics
Branch of the Department of Commerce. The Byrd tour came first, at the
suggestion of Harry Guggenheim, following Byrd's Arctic flights. "The spe
cific object of this program," Harry Guggenheim wrote, "is the promotion of
the establishment of airports and the encouragement of the public in the use
of established air mai l rou tes." 20 Between October 7 and November 23,
1926, the Josephine Ford flew 7,000 miles and was seen by about 540,000
people nationwide. 21
After his return from the Paris flight, Harry Guggenheim decided to spon
sor a similar tour by the boyish aviator Charles Lindbergh. 22 Between July
20 and October 23, 1927, Li ndbergh touched down in all forty-eight states
and was seen by rnillions 30 million according to Guggenheim Fund esti
mates, 50 million according to the popular press. 23 Just as it had with the
Byrd tour, the fund sponsored Lind bergh's swing around the country to pro
mote the use of airmail , to encourage airport development, and to stimulate
popular in terest in aviation. The fund aggressively supported town identi fi
cation. Of the 8,000 communities contacted by the fund and postal authori
ties, 2,000 replied that they already were marked, typically with a name
sign and arrows pointing north or to a local airport. The other 6, 000 soon
afterward decided to identify thei r communities by using a standardized
marking scheme, a trend that spread to nearly 2,000 other towns not con
tacted by the fu nd. In all the fund awarded 7,800 certificates signed by
Lindbergh to towns that had complied with the town-marking appeal. 24 One
state, Ohio, responded to the Guggenheim campaign by passing a law that
made it obligatory for cornmunities to place markers. Coming at a time be-
fore the advent of widespread radio navigation aids and a federal ai rways
system, the Guggenheim action was extremely helpful and was warmly wel
comed by pilots and airline managers. 25
In addition to its uni versity grants, the Guggenheim Fund undertook spe
cial programs related to aeronautics at various universities and institutions.
At the suggestion of John H . Wigmore, dean of the Law School at North
western University, the fund cosponsored creation of the Northwestern Air
Law Institute, the first center in the United States for the study of aviation
law. its journal, the Journal of Air Law, quickly gained preeminence in its
field, a position it continues to hold. In response to a request by Louis
Mitchell, a trustee of Syracuse University, the fund issued a grant establish
ing an aerial photographic surveying and mapping center at Syracuse, the
first center of its kind in the nation. On its own, the fund approached the
Library of Congress with a proposal to create an aeronautics section. Li
brarian Herbert Putnam quickly assented, and the fund issued the Li brary
of Congress a grant for $ 1 40,000 for a Daniel Guggenheim Chair of Aero
nautics. The chair was filled by Albert Zahm, an American aeronautical
pioneer, and the library began vigorous acquisition of a collection of books,
documents, and manuscripts. The fund also undertook to support aviation
collections in foreign aeronautical archives with small grants up to $28, 000
to the aero clubs of France and Germany, to the Royal Aeronautical Society
of Great Britain, and to Italy's Association of Aero Technology. In 1 928 the
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration asked for and received
a $ 1 5,000 Guggenheim grant establishing a three-year research program to
study the effect of commercial aviation on the economy and industrial
growth. The fund also awarded graduate fellowships to train A merican en
gineers at European aeronautical research centers. 26
Guggenheim educational efforts extended beyond the university and col
lege level and down to the elementary and secondary schools. Fund trustee
William F. Durand, the "grand old man" of American mechanical engineer
ing, noted in a fund report that aviation education suffe red from "the present
lack of any special preparation on the part of teachers . . . . Broadly speak
ing, the teachers, at the present time, are no better informed than are their
pupils and in some cases presumably less so. " 27 Harry Guggenheim and the
fund trustees decided to support aviation education programs dealing with
such topics as the history of aviation, the language and terminology of avia
tion, and general aeronautical information, such as the difference between
an airship and an airplane. The fund created a Committee on Elementary
and Secondary Education chaired by John W. Withers, dean of New York
University's School of Education. The committee compiled an annotated

bibliography of books on aeronautics, and distributed 7, 000 copies to
schools nationwide, held national meetings in cooperation with the N ational
Education Association, arranged for summer courses at N Y U to train teach
ers i n aeronautics, and sponsored programs to train ground-school instructors
who would then train prospective student pi lots. After the fund c losed down,
N Y U remained at the head of the public-school aeronautical education
movement, two decades in advance of similar efforts by the federal govern
ment's Civil Aeronautics Admini stration and the American Council on
Education. 28
No less important were the Guggenheim Fund's bulletins, book lets, and
survey reports. The fund published a total of thirteen bulletins. Some ex
plained the reasons behind certain of the fu nd grants. Others were practical
"how-to" pamphlets on setting up flying schools, on various technical prob
lems, and on the use of airplanes in aerial photography, forest-fire patrols,
and cropdusting. Four survey reports dealt with European aeronautics,
including manufacturing and design techniques, European airline opera
tions, airport management, and safety in aircraft design. The authors of
these reports were specialists hired by the fund for the task and incl uded
Virginius E. Clark, a noted aeronautical engineer, Brigadier General Wil
liam E. Gill more, director of the Army Air Corps's Engineering D ivision,
and Clarence M . Young, director of the Aeronautics Branch within the De
partment of Commerce. Army Air Corps Captain Ray A . Dunn, an insur
ance expert, prepared at the fund's request an in-depth and factual analysis
of casualty figures in aircraft accidents. Dunn's report was remarkably thor
ough and provided insurance underwriters and the Actuaries Society of
America with the first reliable data upon which to base requirements for
writing and issuing policies. 29
The Guggenheim Fund also undertook one other aviation promotional
venture creating a special medal fund, which extended beyond the life of
the Guggenheim Fund itself, to honor those individuals who made excep
tional contributions to aviation. The award, the Daniel Guggenheim Medal,
was first presented to Orvi lle Wright in 1930, and it soon became one of
aviation's most prestigious and coveted awards. Recipients have inc luded
such individuals as aerodynamicist Ludwig Prandtl, NACA administrator
Hugh Dryden, and rocket pioneer Robert Goddard. 30
During the life of the fu nd, it made three contributions to the develop
ment of commercial passenger-carrying air transport services. It established
a "Model Air Line" between San Francisco and Los Angeles operated by
Western A ir Express. It created a weather reporting service along that li ne

which later served as a model for weather-bureau reporting networks along
other airways. And finally, the fund's research on blind (instrument-onl y )
flight assisted i n the emergence of practical and safe commercial air service.
H arry Guggenheim always credited Daniel as the driving force behind the
Model Air Line experiment, since Daniel used to drop by the fu nd's New
York headquarters and demand that the fund do something to encourage
commercial passenger-carry ing activities. In response, Harry Guggenheim
called together the nation's leading airmail operators in May 1927 and pro
posed that the fund subsidize equipment loans for new trimotor aircraft,
which the lines could then use to promote passenger flying. Only two opera
tors were interested, and of the two the most enthusiastic was Harris M .
Hanshue of Western Air Express, a West Coast airmail line that already had
been carry ing one or two passengers along with mail in Douglas M -2 air
planes over the Los Angeles-Salt Lake City air route. Negotiations fo l
lowed, and i n J une 1927 the fund approved a grant to pe1mit WAE to pur
chase trimotor airliners.
The next few months were occupied with selecting a suitable design. The
one chosen was the Fokker F- 1 0 Super Trimotor, a derivative of the Fokker
F-7 but built expressly to fund specifications. WAE put the first of its three
Guggenheim-funded F-10s i n service on May 26, 1928, along the Guggen
heim Model Air Line between Los Angeles and San Francisco. A new era
in American air transpo1tation had dawned. WAE soon repaid the Guggen
heim equipment loan and subsequently purchased twenty-three additional
F- 10 and F-lOA aircraft . Heavy passenger utilization made the Model Air
Line experiment a major Guggenheim success, for WAE demonstrated suc
cessful on-time, accident-free, and reliable service. 3 1
Of equal significance was the weather reporting network that the Guggen
heim Fund established along the Model Air Line route. This network was
the brainchild of Carl Gustaf Rossby, chairman of the Guggenheim Fund's
meteorology committee. Basically the system consisted of a series of twenty
two reporting stations (later i ncreased to forty) issuing three (later six) daily
weather reports, radio transmitters to transmit in-flight weather reports, and
pilot-balloon stations for gathering information on winds aloft. The extent of
government and private support for the system was notable, indicating the
i ncreasing reputation of the fund. The navy provided theodolites for the
weather balloons, the a1my furn ished Rossby with an assistant, the weather
service furnished observers, and the PacifiC Telephone and Telegraph Com
pany arranged for free telephone service between the report ing stations and
airports. The weather service went into operation a week before the Model
Air Line was available for use by all pilots. It was immediately acclaimed.
Lieutenant Colonel G. C. Brant, the commandant of the Army A ir Corps
base at Crissy Field, stated that the weather reporting service "has done
more to raise the morale of the Army Flying Corps than anything else that
has happened since I became associated with i t . Formerly a pilot did not
know what was ahead; now he knows and is prepared ." 32 Another meteo
rologist reported that the service's reports had enabled fire fighters to chan
nel a fire i n the Santa Barbara National Forest "as one would herd a bunch
of sheep" into a basin where waiting fire ftghters put it out. 33 H istorian
Donald Whitnah has credited the Guggenheim Fund effort with being "the
major source of aid to the Pacific Coast expansion" of the U . S. Weather
Bureau's Paci fic Coast aviation services. :34 These services soon reached all
the way up to Seattle.
On June 22, 1 928, Harry Guggenheim announced a most important
change in the fund: a switch of emphasis from assisting commercial aviation
and awakening public i nterest to the direct financing of aeronautical re
search. The following month Harry Guggenheim announced that the fund
would undertake a "fog flyi ng" research program using actual experimental
aircraft and test pilots. As early as June 1926, H arry Guggenheim had rec
ommended that the fund "finance a study and solution of fog flying." 35 Pilots
flying in a cloud of fog usually became disoriented within a minute or two at
most, and they often flew into the ground. The problem was how to develop
reliable methods of enabling a pilot to control the ai rcraft by reference to
the cockpit instruments alone with no external visual cues.
The army, at the fund's request, assigned test pilot James H . Doolittle,
who held a doctorate in aeronautical engineering from MIT, to act as proj ect
pilot on the program. Two ai rcraft were purchased for use by the fund, and
one of these, a Consoli dated N Y-2 single-engine two-place biplane trainer,
was modified as a blind-flying research airplane. The other ai rcraft crashed,
ironically, during overcast conditions when Doolittle was unable to locate a
suitable airfield. Doolittle was unhurt, and the fund purchased a replace
ment airplane.
At a final cost of $85,000, the fund established a "Full-Flight Labora
tory" at the army's Mitchel Field on Long Island. There i t undertook blind
flying research in conjunction with radio experts from the Bureau of Stan
dards and the Aeronau tics Branch of the Department of Commerce, along
with instrument makers Elmer SpeiTy, Jr. , and Paul Kollsman. Three new
and crucial aviation instruments the gyrocompass, the artificial horizon,
and the precision altimeter were developed by Sperry and Kollsman for
testing. Using these three instruments in addition to the plane's standard
instrument display and with the aid of radio navigation, Doolittle com
pleted the first successful blind flight, from takeoff through landing, on
September 24, 1929. It was a major milestone in aviation. Within a de
cade, advanced models of the three instruments and the techniques used by
Doolittle on the flight were standard operating procedures for U . S . airline
crews. If the fund had done nothing else, sponsoring the development of the
artificial horizon, directional gyro, and precision altimeter would have suf
ficed to make its efforts a spectacular success. 36
Shortly after establishment of the fund, Harry Guggenheim and fund vice
president Hutchinson I. Cone had journeyed to Europe to study the state of
aeron autical development abroad. While i n England, Guggenheim became
enamored of several developments that promised to reduce approach and
landing speeds for aircraft while also rendering them stall- and spin-proof.
One of these was the autogiro, a forerunner of the helicopter. The other
two innovations were wing leading-edge slats and traili ng-edge flaps. Be
fore returning to the United States, Han·y Guggenheim asserted to Major
R . H . �1ayo, a leading British aeronautical engineer who later served as the
Guggenheim Fund's British representative, that he believed "safety was the
vital necessity of civil aviation." 37
Harry Guggenheim recommended that the fund establish an international
aircraft competition with $ 1 50,000 in prizes for the safest aircraft that could
be built. Alexander Klemin and Mayo, who was technical advisor to Impe
rial Airways, among others, drew up the competition rules. In April 1927
H arry Guggenheim announced the opening of the Daniel Guggenheim Inter
national Safe Ai rcraft Competition. Entries would be accepted through the
fall of 1929. Eventually, twenty-seven companies entered the competition,
but only fifteen actually appeared with innovative ai rcraft for the final test
ing. Only two entries, one American and one British, passed preliminary
tests and moved on to the stringent safety tests, which included, among
other things, a minimum controllable airspeed of 35 MPH or less. The
American aircraft, the Curtiss Tanager, won, but only by a single point,
which caused some i l l feeling on the part of the British. They fel t in some
ways rightly so that the Tanager made use of British aerodynamic ad
vances to secure an advantage over its British competitor. In fact, however,
the British entry the Handley Page Gugnunc had failed to pass two criti
cal tests, and it generally did not perform as well, nor was its design as
useful, as the Curtiss entry.
The real importance of the safety competition, however, lay not in the
event i tself but in the effect it had upon subsequent short-takeoff-and-land
ing (STOL) aircraft development. The competition provided the first occa
sion for engineers to set forth design requirements and criteria for STOL
aircraft according to rigorously prescribed standards. The competition had
in fact led to the formulation of these criteria long before many in the aero
nautical community recognized that any such need existed. Without ques
tion, the STOL ai rcraft of today, with their profusion of high-lift devices,
owe their conception in part to the Guggenheim competition of 1927 - 1 929.
The competition directly influenced Otto Koppen's development of the post
war Koppen-Bollinger Helioplane, which paved the way for the later Helio
Courier and the Helio Stallion, the most outstanding single-engine STOL
aircraft of the 1 960s. Five of the six devices the fund recommended for fur
ther study leading-edge slots or slats, automatic or manually controlled
flaps, floating ailerons, long-stroke oleo shockstrut-equipped landing gear,
an adjustable horizontal stabilizer, and good brakes became virtually in
dispensable items on future STOL aircraft. The only exception, in fact , was
the Curtiss-developed "floating aileron," which used aerodynamic balancing
to position the aileron so that it always assumed a streamlined position with
respect to the actual flight path of the aircraft. Thus, it afforded the pilot the
maximum amount of aileron deflection possible, enhancing lateral (roll)
control . 38
'
In September 1 929 Harry Guggenheim infonned the fund trustees that he

believed the fund had fulfilled its fou nding purposes. At a special meeting
i n October 1929, the trustees decided to conclude the fund's activities on
January 1 , 1930. In fact, the fund remained in operation for an additional
month until February 1 , 1930. "The work of the Fund," H arry Guggenheim
then wrote, "now passes into other hands." 39 The aeronautical community
greeted the passing of the fund with admiration for its accomplishments but
regrets at its closing. Officials of the NACA judged that the fu nd "was one
of the most important factors in accelerating the development of aviation
during the years 1 926 to 1929," noting that the fund's work i n education
had been "outstanding. " 40 Pioneer aviator Charles Lindbergh remarked in
197 4, shortly before his death, that the fund "was the first important boost
that aviation in the United States had . . . . Putting all this money in an
infant industry had a tremendous psychological effect." 4 1
During its existence, the fund actually had expended $2,663,749.52 on
various projects, most of them educational activities. 42 But the conclusion
of the fund did not mark the end of Guggenheim involvement i n aero-
•
nautics. Within months of its closing, Daniel Guggenheim, on Li ndbergh's

advice, was pledging his own money to support the experiments of rocketeer
Robert H . Goddard , the father of the modern rocket. This support continued
over the next decade under the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Founda
tion, and i t doubtless would have gone on into the postwar years had not
Goddard's tragic death intervened. After World War II, the foundation, un
der the direction of Harry F. Guggenhei m, established a number of research
bodies and educational institutions dealing with aeronautics and astro
nautics, but its impact, while substantial, was much less than that of the
earlier fu nd. 43
The Guggenheim Fund grants were crucial in supporting American avia
tion during its formative era. At a time when most philanthropic foundations
engaged i n strictly charitable works, Guggenheirn fu nding su pported a wide
range of scientific, educational, and social programs relating to aeronautics,
programs from which Guggenheim financial i nterests did not benefit. The
grants stemmed from Daniel and H arry Guggenheim's idealistic enthusiasm
for the airplane. In a book of essays, H arry Guggenheim put his philosophy
into words:
The airplane gives to man a new freedom, eliminating the geographical

barriers of river, sea, mountain and desert between him and his kind,
and thus eliminating those prejudices and misunderstandings which
have jeopardized human relations in the past. 44
As already noted, the Guggenheim father-and-son team's interest i n flight

outlasted the fund. Shortly before his death, Daniel began funding the rock
etry experiments of Robe1t H . Goddard, initiating a series of bequests and
moral support that Harry would continue until Goddard's death in 1945. For
'
his part, H arry remained an enthusiastic pilot and aviation supporter. After
World War II, he attempted to reassert the fami ly's catalytic role in aero
space development and did, i n fact, make some important contributions,
chiefly the creation of the Cornell-Guggenheim Aviation Safety Center.
Overall, however, the nature of aerospace development was already so ex
pensive that no private individual, no matter how well endowed, could have
the impact that the early fund had had in the 1920s. The greatest contribu
tion in the postwar years of Guggenheim funding came, not surprisingly,
through its support of individuals, not through the fu nding of institutions.
H arry Guggenheim was born i n an era when those who advocated pow
ered flight were regarded as si mpletons. Yet he lived to witness the landing
on the moon and intercontinental jet transports girdling the globe before his
death in 197 1 at age eighty. The accomplishments he w itnessed rested on a

firm technological base bolstered by public acceptance and confidence in
air transportation. Both the technological base and the climate of public
opinion owed much to the great fund for aeronautics that father and son had
set in motion nearly a half-century before at a time when neither cou]d have
foreseen the impact that flight, and their fund, would have on modern
SOCiety.
•
W I L L I A M P. M A c C R A C K E N, J R.,
A N D T H E R E G U LAT I O N O F
C I V I L AV I AT I O N
N I CK A. K 0 M 0 N S
Time has not been kind to W illiam P. MacCracken, Jr. It has diminished
his once imposing reputation and even abated our interest i n the man. That
i s unfortunate, for this pioneer aviation regulator is well worth rememberi ng.
MacCracken's career perlectly illustrates that aviation has freely drawn
on a variety of talents. It was not just heroic pilots, brilliant engineers, and
farsighted entrepreneurs who made avi ation what i t is today. There were
also men l i ke Fred Fagg and Bill MacCracken, men who never broke an
altitude record, designed an airplane, or ran an airline but who blended
such disciplines as the law and econornics with an intimate knowledge of
aeronautics and thereby helped shape the industry's future. Indeed, Mac
Cracken probably exerted as great and as lasting an influence on early fed
eral civil-aviation policy and hence on the course of U . S. civil-aviation
development as any single individual.
MacCracken's claim to a secure place in U . S . aviation history rests on
his successful pursuit of a single idea. Between 1921 and 1926, during the
debate that eventually led to the passage of the Air Commerce Act, Mac
Cracken stood with those who, in his words, believed that "uniform regula
tion of aeronautics [was] not only desirable but absolutely indispensable
to the effective development of aerial transportation as an instrumentality
of interstate commerce." 1 MacCracken further believed that only the fed
eral government could effectively regu late aviation. Once aerial regu lation
became a federal responsibility, MacCracken was given the opportunity
to administer it, thus becoming the first federal regulator of civil avia-
tion. Today's Federal Aviation Administration and the modern Federal

Aviation Regulations ( FARs) spring directly from MacCracken's pioneering
activities.
• • •
But that was only one side of MacCracken's aviation career. H e had an
other. U pon leaving government, he became a lobbyist from all accounts
a very effective lobbyist for the industry he helped create. It was this part
of his career that, in time, changed indeed, significantly colored our
perception of the man.
MacCracken was born on September 1 7 , 1888, on Ch icago's South Side
in the middle-class neighborhood of Kenwood to a pair of homeopaths who
nourished the notion that he too would some day practice homeopathic
medicine. But young B ill's talents seemed to lie elsewhere, as was clearly
evidenced by his performance on his high school debating team. One par
ticular debate had a direct bearing on MacCracken's future. When he was
in high school, the hottest political topic in town was whether or not Chicago
should acquire and run the city's traction system, then under the control of
the notorious Charles Tyson Yerkes, who operated it on the principle that
"the straphangers pay the dividends." H i s pa1ticipation in that debate led
to thoughts of becoming a lawyer. 2
Rockefeller's millions had created a magnificent uni versity practicall y at
MacCracken's doorstep. So it was off to H yde Park and the U niversity of
Chicago, where in due course he earned both an undergraduate ( 1 909) and
a law degree ( 19 1 1 ). H e joined a local law firm and found himself drawing
up wills, filing routine briefs, and even handling traffic accidents. Although
there was nothing i n his early career to suggest the extraordinary, Mac
Cracken did seem admirably fitted for the law, pa11icularly for the work of a
trial lawyer. H e had a quick mind, a fetching personality, and an imposing
physical presence. His contemporari es even his enemies attested to his
amiability, charm, and good humor. "You could not see him and talk to him
without laughing," Hugo Black recalled. A one-time Chicago law partner
said of him: "People simply liked him, and he would speak to them with
great earnestness and sincerity and simplicity." Charm, humor, sincerity
these were the kind of qualities that served him well in the courtroom. They
also served him well in back room negotiations. 3
Little else of note is known about MacCracken's life prior to the American
entry into World War I. He was twenty-nine years old in 1 9 1 7 and had not
yet married. His mother had died, as had his only sibling, a sister. That left
father and son alone until the good doctor remarried. Not particularly fond
of his father's wife, MacCracken took separate quarters at the earliest op
portunity. Still, father and son were a devoted pair that much we know
•
W I L L I A M P. M A c C R A C K E N, J R. 3 7
from their letters. We also know that whatever else may have occupied Mac
Cracken at this time, it was not aviation. In fact, he was about to accept a
commission in the navy when he was persuaded by a friend to give the Army
Signal Corps flying section a fling. H e probab ly did not know it at the time,
but the day he arrived for flight training at Rich Field in Waco, Texas,
marked a major turning point in his life. 4
Two things happened to MacCracken at Waco: he formed an abiding in
terest in aviation and he met and married Sal l i e Lucile Lewis, known to all
her acquaintances as Chic. MacCracken met the twenty-three-year-old
blonde who "[stands] about 5 ft. 7 Vz in. and weighs about 140 pounds"
short l y after arriving in Waco and began "going with her pretty steadily ever
since" that in spite of the fact that he had "competition on all sides and
from all qua1ters ." He felt certain enough that he would have her for his
bride, but he just did not know when. A date was quickly set when Chic's
father, who suffered from "smoker's throat," saw his health rapidly deterio
rate. Chic wanted to get married before her father died. In consequence,
Dr. MacCracken did not hear of Chic until his son i nformed him that as of
September 14, 1 9 18, he had a daughter-in-law. MacCracken only barely
hinted that in marrying Chic he had taken on the ftnancial respons ibility for
more than one person. The dying Mr. Lewis, it appears, had been associated
with a bonding company that took one bad risk too many, leaving Mrs. Lewis
dependent on her new son-in-law. Mrs. Lewis took her dependency seri
ously: she insisted on living and did live with Bill and Chic the rest of
her life. 5
MacCracken was at Ellington Field for a course in night bombing when
the influenza epidemic broke out. Ellington was quarantined; Chic, who was
staying nearby, was sent packing back to Waco. In Chicago, meanwhile,
Dr. MacCracken was vi1tually in over his head trying to keep up with his
patients. MacCracken worried about "the hard grind" his father was going
through, while the father worried about the son taking proper care of him
self. "[I] get plenty of sleep, good eats and spray n1y nose and throat twice
a day with Listerine," Bill assured his father. Within a month, the war was
over, and Bill MacCracken soon left Texas for Chicago with his new family
in tow. Once home, he joined the law firm of Montgomery, Hart & Smith,
and although a disti nctly junior partner he was soon doing most of the firm's
trial work. In due course, he also became involved i n another, progressively
more time-consuming, activity lobbying for the passage of federal legis
lation regu lating civil aviation. That activity engaged his energies for the
better part of six years. 6
Conventional wisdom holds that American businessmen abhor govern-
ment regulation. The truth is that American busi nessmen like regulation
if they think it will make them rnoney. This was certainly the case with
aviation in the post-World War I period. Influential people in the aviation
community were in substantial agreement that the federal government
should regulate and foster the development of civil aviation. That was be
cause Americans seemed incapable of exploiting the airplane commerci ally
in an unregulated environment. Indeed, soon after the armistice, the U . S.
aviation industry became an economic di saster area. To be sure, barnstorm
ers and gypsy fliers plied their trade; few, however, made ends meet. Sky
writing, cropdusting, aerial photography, and aerial surveying showed signs
of stirring, but these activities made not so much as a ripple i n the gross
national product. Scheduled air-passenger service was virtually nonexis
tent. Only one civil aviation enterprise gave even a hint of promise, the U . S.
Air Mail Service, a federal activity inaugurated in 1 9 1 8 by the Post Office
because private i nterests had judged the venture too risky. Busi nessmen
were not ready to hazard their money in an unproven enterprise, particularly
one perceived to be as dangerous as aviation. 7
As a matter of fact, it was dangerous. No central authority certificated
pilots, aircraft, or flying schools. A i r traffic rules did not exist. Less-than
competent pilots were free to climb into less-than-airworthy aircraft and
threaten both their own lives and those of people on the ground. Little won
der that aviation insurance was prohibitively high. "The underwriters, suf
fering heavy losses from crashes by irresponsible flier�," noted an organ of
the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, "pass the burden on by increasing
the premium from the responsible operators . " The nation's only scheduled
caiTier suffered a single fatal accident i n the four years it was in operation,
yet its insurance costs came to 1 7 . 1 5 percent of total operating expenses. 8
Regulated flying, as conducted by the U.S. Air Mail Service, was far
safer. l n 1924 the service had one fatal accident for every 463,000 miles
flown; i n contrast, commercial fliers suffered a fatal accident every 1 3 , 500
miles. A U . S. Senate committee, in examining these figures, noted that the
Post Office used only pilots and planes approved by federal authority. "The
inference is obvious," the committee said. Others made the same i nference
and began beating the drums for federal regulation. Most important among
those joining this chorus was the aviation community itself. "It i s interesting
to note," wrote Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover in 1 92 1 , "that [avia
tion] is the only industry that favors having itself regulated by government. " 9
Government had not entirely forsaken the field, though existing regula
tions were probably of questionable value. In 192 1 , for example, Connect-
W I L L I A M P. M A c C R A C K E N , J R. : 3 9
icut and Massachusetts had statutes regulating aviation safety, while ftve
cities, including Los Angeles and Newark, passed local ordinances regulat
ing flying. But, as noted by a committee of the American Bar Association,
"Any people who are so organized as to permit or to compel regulation of air
flight by local ordinance are headed for a confusion which will retard the
development of the art ." This was scarcely a minority point of view within
the aviation community. Before anyone "would think of investing any sub
stantial amount of money i n the air business," said Paul Henderson, who
ran the U . S. Air Mail Service, "he must first have some basic law" a
federal law regulating who may fly, where he may fly, and in what sort of
aircraft. 10
Safety regulation, however, was not all that the aviation community
wanted of the federal government. It wanted the government to play a more
direct role in aviation's development. After all, the government had done no
less for other transportation modes. It had dredged rivers and harbors, dug
canals, paved highways, and subsidized the westward expansion of railways
with munificent land grants. If the central government developed highways
and seaways, why should it not develop airways? "There is no question that
the development of commercial aviation requires that these things be done
just as surely as there could have been no extensive motor-car develop
ment . . . except that the states and Federal Government provided good
roads," said aircraft builder Chance M . Vought. H erbert Hoover agreed,
arguing that airway facilities must be public facilities. 11
There was, then, a strong and highly vocal movement demanding federal
intervention in the aviation field. A number of impediments, however, stood
i n the way. One was a philosophical division between those who wanted a
civil agency the Department of Commerce to perform that function and
those who wanted it performed by a unified department of aeronautics re
sponsible for both mil itary and civil aviation. That split weakened the forces
favoring federal regulation. Further weakening these forces was a consti
tutional question. Many respected constitutional lawyers held that the fed
eral government could not regulate air commerce without a constitutional
amendment specifically granting it that power. Other equally prominent
scholars believed the field was entirely open to federal intervention. This
was the confused situation when MacCracken returned to civilian life.
MacCracken became involved in the question of regulation in the spring
of 1 9 1 9 when he was asked by a local club to deliver a paper. The former
military pilot decided to talk about aviation law, a topic he knew nothing
about but which he thought he would research. To his astonishment, he
could barely find a citation in the literature. MacCracken spoke anyway,

outlining what he believed were some of the problems aviation might face
during the course of its immediate development: What constituted aerial
trespass? Who would license pilots and inspect aircraft? Who would regu
late air traffic? There were many potential problem areas, and he now began
to think about them seriously.
In August 1920, MacCracken went to St. Louis for the specific purpose
of attending a session of an American Bar Association meeting devoted to
aviation law. It proved a sobering experience. The principal paper, a report
prepared by a special committee, rambled on about the law of the sea and
made no attempt to come to grips with aviation's special problems. Although
the document was an exercise in intellectual sterility, it was considered
acceptable and the convention was ready to adopt it. A dissati sfied Mac
Cracken, aided by New York attorney Charles A . Boston, managed to per
suade the A B A to appoint a new Special Committee on the Law of Aviation
to study the question further. MacCracken was picked to sit on the commit
tee; Boston was chosen chairman. 1 2
The Boston committee conducted a more searching inquiry than that of
its predecessor. On the technological level, the committee noted, aviation
had developed "with marvelous rapidity." But it had not made any commer
cial impact because the law of aeronautics had been "entirely undevel
oped." The primitive state of aviation law, it emphasized, was "the one
fundamental vital problem of the actual commercial development of the art
at the present time." The utter uncertainty of the law made risk incalcu
lable, "and accordingly dissuades the investment of capital ." The committee
believed that aviation would never progress commercially until it was gov
erned by a uniform law and all pilots were licensed and all aircraft certifi
cated by a central authority. The committee agreed unanimously that only
the federal government could properly regulate commercial aviation. The
majority held the view, however, that "if complete control over aeronautics
is to be lodged in the national government . . . , the power should be con
ferred by constitutional amendment and should not be seized i n the guise of
the exercise of existing powers." In retrospect, the majority members were
not very good constitutional lawyers. MacCracken concurred with a minority
opinion filed by Judge Orrin N. Carter of Illinois, who said that he had "not
yet reached any positive conclusion as to the authority and power of the
federal government to enact aviation laws." 13
The report was attacked with a vengeance, particularly by the members
of the previous year's committee. So fierce was the assault that Boston re-
W I L L I A M P. M A c C R A C K E N, J R. : 4 1
signed, vowing never to serve agai n. MacCracken, however, pressed on. He

managed to get the committee reconstituted and himself named chairman. 1 4
It was in connection with his work for this committee that in late February
1922 MacCracken first visited Washington on aviation business. When he
went to Capitol Hill to lobby for federal regulation, he met Congressman
Samuel Winslow, chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and For
eign Commerce, and persuaded him to introduce legislation granting the
federal government broad powers over civil aviation activities. W inslow i n
turn introduced MacCracken to a lawyer on the staff of the House Legislative
Drafting Service, Frederic P. Lee, and instlucted the two men to work to
gether and draft a regulatory bill that he could introduce. Lee and Mac
Cracken did not know it at the time, but they would be law partners before
the decade was up.
On February 27, after MacCracken had checked out of his room at the
Willard Hotel and was ready to make his way back to Chicago, the Supreme
Court of the United States ruled in Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R . Co. that if interstate and intrastate commerce are so
mingled together that Congress cannot exercise effective control over inter
state commerce without incidental regu lation of intrastate commerce, "such
incidental regulation is not an invasion of State authority." Events had sud
den} y turned in favor of MacCracken and the advocates of federal regula
tion. Nevertheless, four more years of hard work remained before the advo
cates of regulation attained their goal. 1 5
Part of the problem for the long delay was MacCracken himself. H e and
Lee drafted a bill that was far too comprehensive to stand a chance of pas
sage. It was so detailed that it actually set down specific rules. Even an
amateur nitpicker could find serious fault. What was needed was a piece of
legislation that gave the executive branch in this case the secretary of
commerce general powers that he could in turn employ to prescribe spe
cific rules. Such a bill, introduced by Senator James W. Wadsworth, had
actually passed the Senate. It, too, however, had a disability; it lacked teeth
and was therefore opposed by MacCracken and others who favored concen
trating as much power as possible in the federal government. 1 6
Perhaps the greatest barrier standing in the way of the new legislation
were those who wanted all aviation activities, both civilian and military,
regulated by a unified department of aeronautics. Brigadier General William
("Billy") Mitchell led the drive for a unified department. He had as his allies
a small bloc of congressmen and a coterie of U . S. Army fl ying officers who
wished to free aviation from the domination of ground commanders. Presi-
dent Warren Harding and other top civilians in the executive branch, the
military establishment, and the civil aviation community vigorously opposed
M i tchell's solution. "Water transportation for commercial purposes is not
under the Navy Department, and T have never known of anyone wanting i t
put there," MacCracken argued . 17
MacCracken also became deeply involved in lobbying for the legislation.
Lobbying, however, meant organ ization, and the civil aviation industry was
in di sarray. That condition had largely been brought about by a bitter
dispute within the Aero Club of America, the oldest and largest private
civil-aviation organization in the U n i ted States. MacCracken was enlisted
by prominent businessmen with aeronautical interests, such as Godfrey L.
Cabot and Howard Coffi n, in the struggle to establish a new organization
that could better promote aviation's interests. The result was the founding
of the National Aeronautic Association ( N A A ) , which brought civil avia
tion's diverse interests under one roof. MacCracken not only helped draw
up the N A A's papers of incorporation but also presided over the October
1922 meeting in Detroit that gave birth to the new organization. 1 8
More than three additional years elapsed before events eventually con
spired to bring about a solution. In January 1 925, Congress enacted the
Kelly Air Mail Act. No event was more pivotal in the assumption of civil air
regulation by the federal government. The Kelly Act authorized the Post
Office Department to contract for the carriage of �omestic mail with com
mercial air carriers. Businessmen, seeing how well the U . S. Air Mail Ser
vice had perfo rmed, greeted the Post Office's request for bids w i th enthusi
asm. Congress knew, however, that these airmail contractors stood little
chance of succeeding without federal safety regulation and airway develop
ment. All that remained to be resolved was whether they would reside in a
unified aviation department or a civilian agency. 19
As 1925 wore on, the proponents of a civil solution had reason for con
cern. A special investigative committee headed by Representative Florian
Lampert, a progressive Republican from Wisconsin, had been organized by
the House to look into alleged i rregularities in the letting of military con
tracts to aviation concerns. The investigation had been inst igated by insur
gent legislators who believed that the drive fo r civil air legislation was
the work of a pernicious "aircraft trust ." There was reason to believe that
this committee would recom1nend Billy Mitchell's solution to the aviation
question. On September 3, 1 925, events took an ominous turn when the
navy's rigid airship Shenandoah was destroyed in a storm over Ava, Ohio.
Mitchell, by now complete] y at loggerheads with the military establishment,
issued a provocative statement blaming the accident on "the incompetency,

criminal negligence and almost treasonable admini stration of the National
defense by the Navy and War Departments." The tide, it appeared, was
turning in fa vor of civil-mil itary unification. 20
President Calvin Coolidge, stung by Mitchell's attack and the trend to
ward unification, acted swiftly and resolutely. First, he ordered Mitchel]
court-martialed. Next, he established a board headed by Dwight W. Mor
row, a J . P. Morgan partner and longtime Coolidge acquaintance, to upstage
the Lampert committee and at the same time tum back the unif1cation tide.
With an uni ntentional assist from Mitchell, Morrow succeeded. In late Sep
tember, Mitchell appeared as a witness before the board. Inexplicably, the
usually articulate aviator performed miserably, delivering a long, d iscursive
monologue that left nearly everyone numb. Even his most ardent supporters
in the hearing room knew the unification cause was now lost. To no one's
surprise, the Morrow board recommended that military and civil aviation be
kept separate. In due course, the Lampe1t committee also recommended
keeping civil and military aviation in separate departments. 2 1
With Morrow and Lampert in close agreement, the c i v i l aviation issue
was all but settled. There was, however, one l ast hurdle for those who be
lieved i n concentrating power i n the central government, and MacCracken
played an important role in determining that outcome. Senator Hiram Bing
ham, who had sat on the Morrow board, introduced a bill in the Senate that
clearly deferred to the wishes of the states' righters. Ignoring the advice of
N A A president Godfrey Cabot, who counseled in favor of accepting the
Bingham bill, MacCracken sabotaged Bingham by persuading Congressmen
Schuyler Merritt and James S. Parker to hammer together a bill that paid
scant attention to those who wished to reserve a l arge body of powers to the
states. The bill that President Coolidge signed into law on May 20, 1926,
more strongly reflected the views of MacCracken than those of H iram
Bingham. 22
The A i r Commerce Act of 1926 gave the responsibility of regulating and
promoting civil aviation to the secretary of commerce. It also established a
new position, an assistant secretary of commerce for aeronautics to assist
the secretary in carrying out his new responsibilities i n aviation. Mac
Cracken seemed a natural choice for the post. Commerce Secretary H erbert
Hoover, however, did not see matters that way. He first offered the job to
Paul Henderson and then, on being turned down, to Hollinshead N . Taylor,
a Philadelphia tinplate manufacturer. Rejected again, Hoover finally turned
to MacCracken . A l though Hiram Bi ngham hit the ceiling, MacCracken
had powerful allies. Martin Madden, chairman of the House Appropria

tions Committee, was from Chicago, and he was not going to allow any
senator from Connecticut to stand i n the way of a fellow Chicagoan's getting
that post. Putting his prestige on the line, Hoover urged MacCracken's
nomination before the president. MacCracken took the oath of office on
August 1 1 , 1926.23
Being the first to lead a new organization or engage in a new activity
provides a unique opportunity to influence the future. MacCracken, though
he left government in 1 929, still casts a benign shadow over the way civil
aviation is regulated today.
It was MacCracken's idea and i t was sh ared and abetted by Herbert
Hoover that a regulated industry should participate in the regulatory pro
cess. In those days there was no Federal Register Act or Administrative
Procedures Act to protect the public from precipitate federal rule-making.
In a sense, MacCracken anticipated the enactment of these statutes by spon
soring conferences during which representatives of the aviation industry
could review and comment on the rules that the Department of Commerce
proposed to promulgate. Conferences were held for airframe builders, en
gine manufacturers, and air transport operators. Even insurance underwri
ters were invited. Nor did one have to be a member of an organized interest
group to attend. Pilots, mechanics, and other individuals with an interest in
the proceedings were also welcome. In this way, the rules that eventually
were promulgated were the product of a cooperative governrnent-industry
effort. The practice proved so popular in the future that nearly every revision
of the air commerce rules was preceded by a government-industry confer
ence. Though today other forums are used more extensively as a way of
exchanging ideas with the public on proposed rules, conferences still play
a vital role in the rule-making process. 24
If holding government-industry conferences reflected a certain kind of
attitude an attitude of solicitousness perhaps on the part of regulators,
the institution of the type certifteate was a Teflection of the regulators' inge
nuity. The old saying that necessity is the mother of invention fits the insti
tution of the type certificate precisely. MacCracken recognized early that
aircraft certification must begin at the manufacturing plant. If it did not,
personnel of the Aeronautics Branch, the small organization of bureau rank
that had been established to carry out the secretary's responsibilities under
the Air Commerce Act, would be forced "to take apart every ai rcraft that
came out of the factory." That was clearly impractical. For one thing, i t was
beyond the meager resources of the Branch's Engineering Section, which
•
counted only eight airplane factory inspectors among its ranks. So the
Branch hit on a solution that seems obvious today because it has become so
fundamental: it instituted a system whereby a single certificate covered all
aircraft of identical design and construction. When federal inspectors and
engineers found that a new aircraft type conformed with federal airworthi
ness standards, the aircraft's manufacturer was issued a certificate that au
thorized the company to produce aircraft of "an exact simi larity of type,
structure, materials, assembly, and workmanship" to the test model. Type
certification proved such an efficient procedure that it soon expanded into
other areas first to propellers and then to other aircraft components. No
innovation adopted by this pioneer regulator has proved more durable or
felicitous. Today the approved type certificate is at the core of federal pro
cedures for certificating aeronautical products. 25
In addition to certificating new designs, the Aeronau tics Branch faced
the problem of what to do with World War I surplus aircraft. I n 1927, just
prior to his historic Atlantic crossing, Charles Lindbergh made two emer
gency parachute jumps that were due i n part to the fact that he was flying
war-surplus equipment. Aeronautics Branch personnel spent a good deal of
time thinking of what to do with these World War !-vintage machines, par
ticularly those in commercial service. Operators picked up this equipment
for a nominal price, patched it up, and pressed it into service. Many an
operator was doing a brisk business i n these dilapidated aircraft, as were
spare-part suppliers. 26
MacCracken had reservations about the safety of this equipment. "The
ten years which have elapsed since those ships were constructed has [sic]
meant that there has been a good deal of deterioration in the material itself,"
he told a group of industry representatives. "The rebuilding that has been
done has been done without any supervision, and without much n1eans of
checking on it." Accident statistics bore out MacCracken's suspicions. Over
a ten-month period, war-surplus equipment experienced structural failures
at twice the rate of postwar equipment. MacCracken contemplated a general
ban but decided not to impose it in the face of industry opposition. Instead,
he would determine the airworthiness of these aircraft on a case-by-case
basis. In doing so he was fol lowing the advice of Wi lliam B . Stout, reputed
builder of the Ford trimotor, and Leon Morgan, a Chicago fixed-based op
erator, who held that no operator would stay in business long if he did not
acquire, in Stout's words, "a whole new suit of clothes." As it turned out,
Stout and Morgan were right. Operators were not long in equipping their
fleets with new and more efficient airplanes. 27
New developments in aircraft design had not been entirely expected.

In fact, many ai rcraft manufacturers had feared that the establishment
of federal aitworthiness standards might tend to stifle design innovation. But
federal regulators were not interested i n design per se; they were only inter·
ested in whether an airplane was safe. Thus, they did not intervene in the
design process but i nstead gave manufacturers the greatest latitude i n de
veloping new equipment. Manufacturers were not slow in exploiting this
freedom. Within three years after issuing the first type certificate, the Aero
nautics Branch had issued approved type certificates for 390 airplanes and
65 engines. An analysis of these certificates revealed distinct new trends in
airplane and engine design. The new aircraft were outfitted with more pow
erful engines, which meant greater speed and maneuverability. Lift-drag
and weight-payload ratios improved, and average wing loading increased
all of which meant that the new airplanes were carrying more load with less
structure. Moreover, they were sporting many, if not all, the hallmarks of
the modern air transport: closed cockpits, single wings, streamlined cowls,
tail wheels, metal props, stressed metal skins, and monocoque fuselages.
They were far removed from the war-surplus aircraft that had given Mac
Cracken pause. 28
Other innovations followed. It had been decided early on that civilian
pilots would be required to meet minimum medica] standards, similar to
those req uired for military pilots. The military services, however, had
medical corps staff to conduct physical exarninations. The Department of
Commerce did not possess such a corps; nor, it was decided, did it need
one. Private physicians designated by the Department of Commerce could
conduct pilot examinations. The aviation medical examiner thus came into
being. (Dr. Wi lliam P. MacCrac ken, Sr. , was one of those successfully re
cruited to perform this fu nction . ) The physician was only the first to be
inducted into the federal aviation designee system. Pilots, mechanics, and
engineers followed. It was simply not feasible at least that is what those
who controlled the purse strings believed for the federal government to
hire all the people required to perform the various and sundry tasks neces
sary to maintain aviation safety. 29
The first type certificate was jssued on March 29, 1927, to a Buhl J-4
Airster, and the first pilot license ·on April 6, 1927, to MacCracken himself.
If MacCracken had had his way, the license would have gone to Orville
Wright. MacCrac ken had proposed to Hoover that it was only fitting that the
ftrst license go to the ftrst man to fly an airplane. Hoover demurred. It was
more appropriate that it go to MacCracken, who had spent the better part of
eight years lobbying for federal legislation regu lating aviation safety. Mac
Cracken, however, "being Scotch [sic] and a bit stubborn," got in touch with
Wright and asked him to take the license. The physical and written exami
nations and the flight test would be waived. All Wright had to do was fill out
an application blank. Wright declined. He no longer flew, he told Mac
Cracken; besides, he - did not think he needed a federal license to prove he
had been the first man to fly. 30
The Aeronautics Branch under MacCracken also built an extensive air
way system. That work, however, had been pioneered by the U . S . Air Mail
Service; MacCracken's Aeronautics Branch merely expanded and improved
upon what others had already started. Still, the airway system built by the
Aeronautics Branch during MacCracken's tenure had no rival anywhere in
the world. And the Collier Trophy for 1928 went to the Aeronautics Branch
not for its regulatory innovations but for tying the nation together i n a system
of ground-based airways. Hoover took parti cular pride in the growth of the
airways, referring to them as a great economic and human agency. "I felt a
personal triumph," he recalled years later, "with every mile of service we
added. " 3 1
In 1928 MacCracken's boss was elected president of the United States.
Although delighted with H oover's triumph, MacCracken did not plan to
remain with the new administration. H e had come to Washington as a
relatively young man and had not yet made his fortune. H e now needed
to devote more attention to the business of making money. H i s wife's
double-mastoid operation, which proved very expensive, helped bring mat
ters to a head. 32
Three days after Hoover was inaugurated, MacCracken submitted his let
ter of resignation to the White House. "We had all hoped you would be able
to continue i n the Administration," Hoover wrote back, and he asked Mac
Crack en to stay on until the new secretary of commerce, Robert P. Lamont,
"is able to arrange for your successor." MacCracken agreed, but Lamont
dawdled in the search. By late April there was no replacement in sight, and
an international aviation conference was scheduled to be held in Paris in
June. At the same time, MacCracken was invited to deliver the 1929 Wilbur
Wright Memorial Lecture before the Royal Aeronautical Society in London
on July 25. His commitment to leave government notwithstanding, these
were temptations neither he nor his wife could resist. "I might have to go to
Europe in about a month," MacCracken wrote his father. That meant, he
said, staying in his present post until his return. H e hinted that, in addition
to his wife, both his mother-in-law, Nell, and his son, Lewis, might go
along. But he must have had second thoughts, because when he and his
wife checked in at the Hotel D'lena, near the American Embassy in Paris,
Nell and Lewis were still in Washington. 33
The conference was no picnic, hut the MacCrackens still had time to
enjoy Paris. Bill saw Rene Lacoste heat Jean Borotra for the French tennis
title while "Chic has done the shops or they have done her, I don't know
which," Bill reported to his father. The good doctor also heard from Ch ic's
side of the family. "Mac never one time asked me to go," Nell complained,
" he just did not want to he bothered with either [Lewis or me] I sure
have had a hard time in this big house nursing, cooking [etc. ]" Write, she
urged, because "we are lonesome. " ·34
From Paris MacCracken traveled to Italy and then north again to Germany
and the Rhine Valley, where he visited Claude Dornier's works. The famed
German designer was building a huge twelve-engine flying boat with three
decks, the D. O . X . "[Dornier] was very anxious I should return next week
or the week after to witness the tests," MacCracken noted. But time was
running short. Amsterdam, The Hague, Brussels, and London beckoned.
Meanwhile, there were reports of progress from the U nited States. Transcon
tinental Air Transport, popularly known as the "Lindbergh l i ne," announced
a coast-to-coast air-rail passenger service. Lindbergh himself flew the first
flight across the country. With MacCracken out of the country, Lamont
stepped into the spotlight a bit too prominently to suit Dr. MacCracken.
"[For] heavens sake don't express yourself to anyone the way you did to me
.
about Lamont," MacCrac ken cautioned his father. "It is quite all right. H e
is the boss and aviation is the best news of the day so the boys in the press
room have to play him up in connection with it." MacCracken had no inten
tion of allowing a little misp laced press coverage to alienate him from the
influential friends he had cultivated over the years. 35
The European trip seemed over before it started. l n mid-August, since
they were still part of l-Ioover's official family, the MacCrackens headed
south on "a beautiful drive" that was "far from the beaten track" to the
president's camp on the Rapidan. This was H oover's version of Camp David,
only more rustic, with guests making do with tents instead of cabins. De
spite the season it was "pretty cold," according to MacCracken, and "some
of the folks complained of having to put on extra clothing to keep warm."
He left no record on how he spent his time; he did note, however, that his
wife went horseback riding with Mrs. Hoover. 36
Finally, on October l , MacCracken left office. Lamont simply elevated
Clarence Young to assistant secretary and left Young's position, director of
air commerce, vacant. MacCracken was now free of government service but
not of Washington. He decided to stay on, despite the fact that his old firm
in Chicago had made him an enticing offer. 37
MacCracken scarcely had time to hang up a shingle before a series of
powerful shocks hit Wall Street. No one knew precisely what was hap
pening, least of all the experts. Many people MacCracken included
believed that the investment community was merely going through a tem
porary run of bad luck. "Only wish I had some spare cash to pick up some
bargains," MacCracken lamented on November 1 , just a week after the
panic began. By June of the following year, he had changed his tune. "It
looks as if the financial situation is not very good," he said, embroidering
on the obvious. H e was not investing. "I had some information that the turn
was going to come tomorrow and thought of putting in some orders today,
but after some further conferences decided I had better keep the money in
the bank for a while longer," he wrote his father. H e cautioned, moreover,
that any rise i n the market may be temporary and that the patient investor
would have "a chance to buy some good stocks at even cheaper prices than
they can be purchased at present." 38
Wall Street may have been a disaster area, but the contacts MacCracken
had made while he was at the Department of Commerce were now paying
dividends, thanks to a transformation that saw U.S . air transport lines con
verted from being primarily movers of mail to calTiers of both mail and
people. MacCracken got deeply involved in facilitating this transition. The
leading force behind it was Hoover's postmaster general, Walter Fogler
Brown, a talented but stubborn visionary who could do things only one
way his own . Brown wanted to create, through the judicious use of airmail
contract awards, a system of serviceable airways that would "encou rage the
habit and practice by the public of using aviation in the ordinary affairs of
life." H e correctly concluded, however, that such a system was not in th-e
country's foreseeable future unless the airmail rate structure was thoroughly
overhauled. That rate structure, set by a 1926 amendment to the Kelly Air
Mail Act, was heavily skewed in favor of mail carriage; indeed, it penalized
air transport companies that carried passengers. 39
Brown determined that new airmail legislation was required to do two
things: ( l ) to set rate schedules that gave air transport companies a financial
incentive to establish scheduled passenger services, and (2) to give the post
master general the authority to bypass competitive bidding and award air
mail contracts by negotiation. Brown considered the noncompetitive award
provision every bit as crucial as the financial prov ision. Only the pioneers
of the air transport industry, those who had bid on the original airmail con
tracts, he believed, had the knowledge, operational experience, and sta
bility to establish the kind of system that could serve the nation's needs. To
allow interlopers to bid on and win airmail contracts would he akin to
"throwing away an invaluable industry." Brown enlisted MacCracken and
Paul Henderson to help draft the needed legislation. 40
Brown's bi ll ran i nto trouble in the House of Representatives. There had
been some bad blood between Brown and Representative Clyde Kelly, the
author of the Air Mail Act of 1925. Thus, when it came time to hammer
together the new legislation, the postmaster general foolishly decided to
keep Kelly out of the legislative loop. Predictably, Kelly was offended and
threw a roadblock in the way of the bill's progress. Brown had no choice but
to swallow his pride and dispatch MacCracken to the H i l l to work out an
accommodation with Kelly. Kelly agreed to allow the bill to proceed to pas
sage; Brown, however, did not get the unbridled contracting power he
sought. A s amended by Kelly, the law permitted the postmaster general to
extend existing routes without competitive bidding. But he could award no
new route without ftrst calling for bids from all responsible parties. 4 1
MacCracken had salvaged a good bit of what Brown had wanted; never
theless, the postmaster general was determined to accomplish his ends with
out resort to competitive bidding. In May 1930, he called a conference of
airmail carriers and a few favored operators that did not possess mail con
tracts and outlined to them how he planned to restructure the nation's airway
.
map. That restructuring, he told them, would he done without competitive

bidding. He then left the operators to divide the nation's airmail routes
among themselves. MacCracken, in attendance to look after the interests of
his clients, was selected chairman of the session. 42
While uninvited operators pounded the door to be admitted, those i nside
could not agree on what should go to whom. After reaching agreement on a
few minor routes, they informed the postmaster general that they were dead
locked. At the same time they agreed to allow Brown to act as a referee in
settling conflicting route claims. The General Accounting Office, however,
put a stop to Brown's plans. The postmaster general now turned to out-and
out collusion. H e dictated which line or combination of lines got what routes
and warned the colluding li nes not to bid on any routes other than those he
had designated for them. "Have been kept very busy with the foreign and
domestic air mail situation," MacCracken noted ten days after the confer
ence broke up. A big part of Brown's plan was to promote the merger of
Transcontinental Air Transport, a line that had never made money despite
•
Lindbergh's name, with Western Air Express, and to give the merged line
the central transcontinental route. "Confidentially," MacCracken confided
to his father, "Western Air-T. A . T. negotiations are pending and while it
looks as though something would develop, there i s still considerable uncer
tainty as to just what will happen." Western, in fact, was resisting the
merger, but eventually gave in, realizing that it could either play according
to Brown's rules or risk losing all mail traffic. The awards for the other major
routes United got the northern transcontinental, American the south
ern were also predetermined by the postmaster general, who used the car
rot and the stick to discourage potential competitors from bidding. Brown
was pleased, but the airlines that were excluded would not soon forget how
cavalierly they were treated. 43
MacCracken kept busy on other fronts, mainly doing his best to get Pan
American the lion's share of overseas airmail contracts. Pan A m president
Juan Trippe came to Washington on June 9, a Monday, had dinner that
evening with the MacCrackens, and then spent practically all day Tuesday
with MacCracken "on the air mail situation." In December 1929, Mac
Crack en had accepted the post of chairman of the board of the New York,
Rio, and Buenos Aires Line (NYRBA). H e had been picked for this post for
one reason and one reason only: N Y R B A's backers believed that Mac
Cracken, with an inside track to the president and the postmaster general,
would give N Y R B A an edge over its chief competitor, Pan A merican Air
ways, in securing a contract to fly the U.S. mail along the east coast of
South America. Two months after his meeting with Trippe, however, he
helped engineer the hostile takeover of N Y R BA by Pan Am. Pan Am was a
Brown favorite, and the contract that had been coveted by N Y R B A eventu
ally went to Trippe. What MacCracken earned at his N YR B A post is un
known; but Juan Trippe saw fit to pay him $4,000 in legal fees during
1930.44
Whatever joy the 1930 Christmas season brought, it was tempered by the
depressing news on the economic front. The crisis hit the president particu
larly hard; he was spending longer and longer hours in near-futile endeavor
and seemed to get more despondent with every downward tick of the Dow
Jones. But even Hoover had to take time off to enjoy old acquaintances. I n
early October, he invited a select party for another outing on the Rapidan.
MacCracken drove down with writer Mark Sullivan, and the president
shared his car with Justice Harlan F. Stone. "Chic was in the car with
wives," MacCracken wrote later. "Regular Quaker style." Unlike the other
women, though, Mrs. Hoover drove her own car, with Mrs. Stone along for
company. This time accommodations were better. There were cottages in
stead of tents, and an open fire lit the living roorn of every cottage. To
MacCracken, everything about the place was cozy and rustic except the
bathroom, where there was an electric heater, a hot water tank, and an
enamel tub. After dinner the men not the women sat around a log f1re
and chewed the fat. Hoover, according to MacCracken, "did most of the
talking." 45
MacCracken's father was having some problems of his own. When Clar
ence Young appointed an additional aviation medical examiner in the Chi
cago area, Dr. MacCracken took umbrage. Young, however, minced no
words in telling the good doctor that he was not serving the needs of aviation
in his community. There was a demand for a designated medical examiner
i n and around Chicago's Municipal Airport, he said; Dr. MacCrac ken , how
ever, did not trouble himself with conducting examinations in that area.
"Would it not, therefore, be in order," Young asked, ''for you to consider
making your services for pilots' examinations somewhat more convenient by
arranging suitable facilities and visiting periods at the airport?" Dr. Mac
Cracken's problems with the Aeronautics Branch multiplied as time went
on, particularly when the Democrats took over the White House. 46
MacCracken too must have expected problems when Roosevelt was swept
into office. Republicans had occupied the White House the entire period
that MacCracken was involved in politics. In addition, his law partner, Fred
Lee the same man who had helped MacCracken draft the Winslow hill
was also largely connected with Republican politicos. In any event, busi
ness did drop off, but how much was due to economic conditions and how
much to the new admini stration is difficult to say. Much of the airmail busi
ness had been settled or appeared to have been settled by the previous
administration. So it was inevitable that MacCracken and Lee would not
only lose clients but also see the size of their retainers shrink. MacCracken
admitted considerable uncertainty about the future. "These are certainly
strenuous days and it is a problem to know what to do," he observed. Yet
the Democrats were not exactly shunning his law office. Lee was known as
a superb legislative draftsman, and he was persuaded to work on the Farm
Relief bill. The firm donated Lee's services, and MacCrac ken reckoned that
the donation would pay handsome returns in the long run. But those returns,
if they were ever realized, would come at a high price. By July Lee was out
of the office most of the time on agricultural matters. Things did not improve
by December. Lee, MacCracken informed his father, "is still spending the
majority of his time in work for George Peek ," the head of the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration. Meanwhile, the time MacCracken spent going

over his finances was dish eartening. "As far as investments go most of rny
securities cost me more than I could realize for them even at today's prices,"
he noted late in the year. But at least he still had "a fair amount" of cash
on hand. 47
The Democratic administration replaced Clarence Young with Eugene
Vidal. The new assistant secretary of commerce was a young man who had
made a name for himself by running the Ludington Line and marrying the
daughter of Thomas Pryor Gore, the blind U . S . senator from Oklahoma.
Rumors that Vidal was not altogether friendly toward MacCracken caused
worry and concern in Chicago. Would MacCracken, Sr. , be losing his posi
tion as a medical examiner? MacCracken, Jr. , lunched with Vidal in De
cember. It was a nice visit, he felt, although Vidal did most of the talk
ing about his efforts to get Public Works Admin istration funds to finance
airport development. Come January the MacCrackens must have felt more
in the stream of things. MacCracken was invited to a White House dance
and had "a most enjoyable time." With most of the Roosevelt clan in atten
dance, it was ce1tainly a less formal party than any the Hoovers had ever
thrown. James Roosevelt, it so happened, was confined to bed with a cold,
so he held a "small" reception of his own in the family living quarters. "The
party lasted until two o'clock," MacCracken's secretary Joan Murphy noted,
"even though it was Sunday morning. " 48
That was the last of good times for the MacCrackens under a Roosevelt
administration. A U.S. Senate committee headed by Hugo Black, Mac
Cracken's good fri end, was at that very moment holding hearings on the
airmail contract machinations of the Hoover administration. �'The Black
Committee is continuing to bombard the air mail contractors and promises
to keep it up for some time," MacCracken observed in mid-January 1 934.
"They are certainly out to raise a rumpus." Before too long MacCracken
himself was called before the committee, not an unexpected development
since he had chaired what now became known as the "spoils conferences"
and had represented more than one company that took part in those
proceedings . 49
At the same time, MacCracken was served with a subpoena duces tecum
ordering him to bring before the committee "all hooks of account, bank pass
books, canceled checks, check stubs, deposit slips, papers, memorandums,
correspondence, maps, [and] copies of telegrams relating to air-mail and
ocean-mail contracts . " Mac Crack en appeared before the committee on
January 3 1 and announced that he was prepared to turn over all documents
called for in the subpoena except communications between himself, as an

attorney, and his clients; those communications, he said, were privileged.
Black took a different view of the matter. MacCracken was not perform i ng
the traditional duties of an attorney in representing his aviation clients in
the airmail matters the committee was investigating; rather, Black said, he
was performing the duties of a lobbyist and you do not need to pass a bar
examination to be a lobbyist. Anyone who knew his way around Washington
could have done what MacCracken was doing for his aviation clients. But
Black apparently saw no difficulty in settling the matter and suggested a way
of avoiding an impasse. Would MacCracken ask his clients for permission
to hand the files in question over to the committee'? MacCracken agreed and
wired each and every client who had an airmail contract. U p to this point,
MacCracken had no reason for deep concern. In fact, on Thursday, Febiu
ary 1 , he went to a White House reception and came away reassured. Things
changed dramatically the following day when MacCracken informed the
committee that although most of his clients had granted a waiver, four had
not. H e requested more time to obtain the permission of the holdouts. The
committee refused his request. Indeed, Black was so impatient that he went
before the Senate and pushed t hrough a resolution directing the president
of the Senate to issue a warrant calling for MacCracken to be brought before
"the bar of the Senate" and for him to produce the materials previously
subpoenaed by the committee. With the Senate about to adjourn for the
weekend, MacCracken was released i n the custody of his lawyer, Frank J .
Hogan, until Monday, February 5. 50
No sooner had the warrant been issued than newspaper repo1ters and
photographers filled the corridor outside MacCracken's office and mobbed
his reception room. Things quieted down after MacCracken's bond was ar
ranged, and his staff went to work going through the files and setting aside
those that had been subpoenaed by the Senate. Meanwhile, MacCracken
secured the permission of the remaining four clients to hand over their air
mail papers. On Saturday his staff began stamping and numbering every
piece of paper that was to leave the office. That job was not finished until
late Sunday night. MacCracken and Lee tried to avoid the office on Sunday,
which had become a crowded scene again with the arri val of "Governtnent
people [who were] also taking care of the identification of documents." So
they spent most of the day at the Press Club and did not look into the office
until 5 P . M . Then they took off for a long strategy session at Frank Hogan's
house. 5 1
Everyone was exhausted, not only from the physical work but also from
•
the emotional stress created by the surprising swiftness and resoluteness

with which the Senate acted. MacCracken looked terri ble when he showed
up at the office on Monday morning. H e had qad virtually no rest between
Friday evening and Monday morning. Joan Murphy, his secretary, read him
the riot act. H e would either go to bed or she would walk out. She picked
up the telephone, dialed his mother-in-law, and impressed on her "the
absolute necessity for [Bill to] rest." Mrs. Lewis not only got him medication
for his nerves but also engaged a fifth-floor room for him at the Wardman
Hotel. Safely tucked away i n his new quarters, MacCracken did not show
up at the office again until Tuesday afternoon. 52
"The situation is not a pleasant one and the family [is] under considerable
nervous strain," MacCracken wrote a day after the warrant was served. Chic
and her mother were indeed "very much worried and upset." Nell, in fact ,
was "ready to take a baseball bat and settle the argument i n the good old
fashioned way of trial by battle." Joan Murphy confirmed that Mrs. Lewis
was outraged and that "the tension and excitement was quite bad." Later, a
minor case of paranoia became manifest. "I don't think my mail is being
tampered with hut you never can tell," he wrote his father, "so I would
suggest you he careful about calling names." But MacCrack en believed he
was in good hands, for Frank Hogan, he informed his father, "is recognized
as the leading lawyer of the U nited States i n matters of this kind." Mac
Crack en relied heavily on Hogan. According to Joan Murphy, Hogan was
standing by MacCracken "like a father." 53
As i t turned out, MacCracken did need a lawyer of Hogan's caliber, for
he had allowed a hit of carelessness to take place at his law office on Feb
ruary 1 while the Senate subpoena was in ful l force and effect. Two things
actually happened on that day that MacCracken came to regret. First, L. H .
Brittin, vice president of Northwest Airlines, showed u p at MacCracken &
Lee when l\'IacCracken was out and told Lee that he had personal papers in
the Northwest file that he wanted to remove. Lee turned over the file to
Brittin and allowed him to take a number of papers from it. Brittin went to
his own office and tore them up. Later, while MacCracken was in his office,
Gilbert Givvin, a representative of Harris M . Hanshue, the president of
Western Air Express, arri ved and with MacCracken's permission indeed,
assistance removed what he also claimed were personal papers. The se
riousness of what had happened must have h i t MacCracken during the
course of that weekend. It had certainly hit Joan Murphy. "He was perfectly
right in refusing to allow [the Senate] to seize his files," she wrote of her
employer, "but i t is too had that he did let a few papers get away." She
5 6 : AV I A T I O N'S G O L D E N A G E
attributed this lapse to his being "all worn out and practically past the point
where he could think," though she admitted that perhaps Hanshue had
worked on his sympathy. In any event , it was the only thing she had ever
known him to do that was remotely questionable. On February 7, she ob
served that the whole matter "was really nothing and I think in the final
analysis it will be all cleared up." She thought, moreover, that "Fred Lee's
work of the past year will stand them in some stead." 54
Murphy was wrong. Postal inspectors found the papers Brittin had torn
up, pieced them back together, and discovered that they concerned airmail
matters. When Hanshue returned what had been taken from his file, a
memorandum dealing with mail contracts was discovered. Black brought
contempt citations against Brittin, Hanshue, Hanshue's private secretary,
Gilbert Givvin, and MacCracken and persuaded the Senate to try the men.
The trial was set for Friday, February 9. Even the elements were conspiring
against the MacCrackens, as February brought snow and ice. MacCracken's
son, Lewis, caught cold and stayed home. Lewis's illness was probably for
the best, MacCracken rational ized, because "other 'kids' would have a lot
to say to him." 55
Hogan's strategy was to challenge the Senate's authority to try his client
for contempt. In fact, while Brittin, Givvin, and Hanshue appeared before
the bar of the Senate on Feb1uary 9, MacCracken , through Hogan, sent a
communication to the president of the Senate charging that "your honorable
body" did not possess the power under the constitution to try him under the
prevailing circumstances. H ogan did not deny that the Senate could compel
inquiry and possessed the power to enforce it; such a power was an essential
auxiliary to the exercise of its legislative fu nction. MacCracken, however,
was no longer obstructing the legislative process. The obstruction had been
removed when Hanshue turned over to the Senate the materials he had
removed from MacCracken's office and when the postal inspectors recovered
and restored the Brittin file. In other words, Hogan said, the act that the
Senate proposed to punish had reached such a stage of finality that it could
no longer affect the proceed ings of the Senate; indeed, the effects of that act
had been undone long before MacCracken was summoned before the bar of
the Senate. Nevertheless, the Senate issued a warrant for MacCracken's
arrest. 56
MacCracken deliberate! y eluded arrest on the ninth, a Friday, but ful l y
expected to be arrested by the Senate's sergeant at arms over the weekend,
when the Senate was not in session and could not try him. Once arrested,
he proposed to ftle for a writ of habeas corpus and challenge the Senate's
•
authority to try him. Black antici pated this strategy and ordered that Mac
Cracken remain at liberty until the Senate convened on Monday. Chesley
W. Jurney, the Senate's sergeant at arms, knew MacCracken well and was
an old friend of the late Sim Lewis, MacCracken's father-in-law. Seeing that
Jurney had no intention of serving him with the arrest warrant that weekend,
he showed up at Jurney's apartment and demanded to be arrested. When
Jurney did not comply, MacCracken refused to budge, forci ng Mrs. Jurney
to put MacCracken up for the night. There followed a game of hide-and
seek, in which J urney managed to elude MacCracken for a good part of the
weekend. 57
In the end, all MacCracken succeeded i n doing that weekend was to add
a comic touch to an impending d isaster. He knew deep down that he could
not prevail. "[My] guess is that the steam roller . . . is headed in my direc
tion," he wrote his father, "so if you learn from the press that it has gone
over me do not be surprised." H e eventually obtained his writ from the
Supreme Court of the Di strict of Columbia; but when that same court heard
H ogan's argument it set aside the writ without comment.
MacCracken was hailed before the Senate, tried, convicted, and sen
tenced to ten days in the District of Columbia jail. Brittin, who had been
convicted earlier, decided to get the matter over with and served his sen
tence. H e was too wrought up to struggle any longer; he would take his
medicine and then go back to Mi nnesota "and raise some Hell." Mac
Crack en, however, was not through fighting. H e appealed. H i s Republican
friends were furious at the Senate's action, as might be expected, and so
were some prominent Democrats. Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland
came up to MacCracken after the Senate's verdict and expressed his sym
pathy, as did others. Hugh Auchincloss, who, according to MacCracken,
"has been a brick all through this thing," made a special trip to New York
to ask Henry Luce for help. These gestures no doubt reinforced Mac
Cracken's feelings that he was being unduly set upon. On the other hand,
he did not consider himself blameless. "Of course I realize that I made some
mistakes," he admitted to his father, "and I hope to learn some real lessons
out of this school of hard knocks."
Meanwhile, life went on. There were rides to Mount Vernon with the
fam ily and the usual rounds of the social circuit. Mr. and Mrs. Adlai Ste
venson came to town, threw a cocktail party, and invited the MacCrac kens.
Then came more unpleasant news. The Department of Commerce had re
moved Dr. MacCracken from its rolls of designated medical examiners.
"They are not taking the position that there is no need for your services, but
merely that they have been unsatisfactory," MacCracken explained to his

father. "My guess is that they won't give you a hearing."
He was right; Dr. MacCracken was finished as a designee. Some good
news did come on July 9, 1 934, when the U nited States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia ruled in MacCracken's favor. But the steamrol
ler kept advancing. On February 4, 1935, in a unanimous decision read by
Justice Louis D. Brandeis, the Supreme Court of the U nited States reversed
the Appeals Court, holding that Congress can punish anyone obstructing
the legislative process, notwithstanding that the original obstruction had
been re1noved. On February 26, MacCracken began serving his ten-day
sentence. 58
In real ity, though, he would serve a life sentence. Soon after the Black
hearings revealed the existence of the spoils conferences, Roosevelt can
celed all airmail contracts while Congress began writing new airmail legis
lation. The result was the A ir Mail Act of 1 934, which, among other things,
proh ibited airmail con tractors from employing or engaging any person who
had enlered into any unlawful combination to prevent airmail bidding. Since
MacCracken had chaired Brown's "spoils conferences," he could not work
for any airline that wanted to retain or bid on an airmail contract. H e had
been effectively banned for life from the ind ustry that he had helped
create. 59
MacCracken was only forty-six and would live to the age of eighty-one,
'
so he had ample time to construct a life and a career apart from aviation.
That he did, earning a very comfortable living as the Washington lobbyist
for the American Optometric Association. H e even managed to live i n the
same town as Hugo Black and Franklin Roosevelt. In April 1 939, Chic went
to a funeral also attended by the president. " I thought F. D. R . looked un
usually well he is a fine looking man," she wrote to her son. A few years
earl ier she would have been incapable of saying such a thing about Roose
velt. Hugo Black was another matter. His name remained forever anathema
in the MacCracken household. In Chic's letters he was "old Black" or "Mr.
Justice Hugo L. Black!XO!" In 1943, when she ran into him at a cocktail
party, she wrote, "My spine got rigid and I did a good job looking over
him, beyond him, and through him." Black was never forgi ven.
Through the years there were more pleasant reminders of MacCracken's
bonds with aviation. In 1936 Norwich University conferred on him an hon
orary doctor of laws for pioneering "the development of government guid
ance of our newest means of transportation." Twelve years later, when the
Wright Brothers' Flyer returned from England to its permanent home at the
•
Smithsonian Institution, MacCracken was invited to deliver a speech to

mark the occasion. Eventually, in 1959, ten years before he died, the Na
tional Aeronautic Association saw fit to bestow on him the prestigious
Wright Brothers Memorial 'I'rophy. These were all reminders that he had
been present at the creation. ·But the memory of the triumphant days that
preceded the Black hearings always remained clouded by the travail that
followed. 60
W I L L I A M A. M O F F E T T
A N D T H E D EV E L O P M E N T
O F N A V A L A V I AT I O N
W M. J. A R M S T R 0 N G
U nited States naval aviation made enormous progress during the Great War.
In the short space of eighteen months, the navy trained 4,000 pilots and
30,000 enlisted technicians. Monthly aircraft production (primarily sea
planes) reached 4, 000 in November 1 9 1 8, and there were plans to increase
output to 10,000 by the following March. L But these impressive figures were
deceptive. The American people and their representatives in Congress had
'
not yet been convinced of the value of naval aviation to the country, and
senior naval officers remained skeptical about the importance of aircraft to
the fleet. Furthermore, naval aviation stood on a shaky organizational foun
dation that threatened to collapse when attacked by the army's Brigad ier
General William Mitchell and the postwar advocates of a united air service.
One man, more than any other, worked effectively to solve the many prob
lems facing naval aviation during the interwar period. Head of the Bureau
of Aeronautics for thirteen years, William A . Moffett earned the accolade,
"Father of Naval Aviation."2
Born in Charleston, South Carol ina, on October 3 1 , 1 869, Moffett was
the fourth son in a family of nine children. His father, George Hall Moffett,
a merchant and Civil War hero, died in an accident in 187 4, leaving his
widow, Elizabeth Simonton Moffett, the difficult task of raising the large
fam ily. Moffett attended public schools in Charleston before entering the
U . S . Naval Academy by competitive examination in 1 886. H i s career at
Annapolis was not particularly distinguished, and he graduated thirty-first
in a class of thirty-four. 3
W I L L I A M A. M O F F E T T : 6 1
Moffett spent most of the next quarter-century at sea, serving in warships

that ranged from the full-rigged sailing steamer Pensacola to the battleship
Arkansas. His finest hour came in April 1914. Commanding the scout
cruiser Chester, Moffett was ordered into action agai nst the forces of Mexi
can dictator Victoriano Huerta, whom President Woodrow Wil son was trying
to force out of power. -On the night of April 2 1 -22, Moffett took Chester into
the inner harbor of Veracruz and landed a shore party of marines and sail
ors. When fierce fighting erupted after daybreak, Chester's accurate gunfire
enabled the landing force to seize the city. Moffett received the Congres
sional Medal of Honor for his conduct during this engagement, an affair that
remains controversial in the history of American foreign policy. 4
In August 19 14, Moffett became commandant of the U . S. Naval Trai ning
Station at Great Lakes, Illinois. He remained at this post through the war
years, supervising the rapid expansion of what became the navy's premier
training faci l ity. Between April 1 9 1 7 and August 1 9 18, under Moffett's ex
pert guidance, Great Lakes grew from a small i nstallation of 33 buildings
with a capacity of 1 , 600 men to a giant complex of 950 buildings that
housed and educated 4 7, 000 men. A talented administrator, Moffet pro
moted a number of innovations, including the establishment of a school for
aviation mechanics. This assignment brought Moffett a captaincy and a Dis
tinguished Service Medal. 5
Moffett returned to sea after the war, taking command of one of the
mightiest warships in the world, the superdreadnought Mississippi. Two
years later, he left the fresh breezes of the quarterdeck for the less salty air
that blew through the corridors of the Navy Yard. Appointed director of
naval aviation, he immediate! y found himself in the midst of an organiza
tional battle to determine the future of the navy's air arm.
Moffett's contribution to the organizational development of aeronautics
can best be understood by considering the situation that existed when he
took office in March 1 92 1 . Only ten years old, naval aviation had begun in
1 9 1 1 with the purchase of three ai rcraft. In the beginning, responsibility
for coordinating information on aeronautics fel l to Captain Washington I.
Chambers, a staff assistant to the secretary of the navy. Ai rcraft were treated
like small ships, with responsibility for their design, procurement, and main
tenance parceled out among the appropriate bureaus. The Bureau of Con
struction and Repair, for example, looked after ai rframes, while the Bureau
of Steam Engineering took care of engines and the Bu reau of Navigation
handled instruments, flight clothing, and person nel. By the time the Un ited
States entered World War I, however, the Bureau of Construction and Re-
pair had become the dominant force in naval aeronau tics, and the other
bureaus had to accommodate their aeronautical work to its aircraft designs.
The office of director of naval aviation, established in September 1 9 1 4 and
by 1 9 1 7 located on the staff of the chief of naval operations (CNO), had no
real authority. The CNO coordinated the activities of the various bureaus,
but the bureau chiefs reported directly to the secretary of the navy, from
whom they took their orders. For any component of the navy to enjoy the
full support of the department's resources, it either had to have its own
bureau or had to enjoy the unqualified support of an existing bureau, pref
erably the former. 6
By 1 9 1 9 naval aviation clearly had developed suffic ient influence and
impo1tance to warrant its own bureau. The trend toward this development
received added impetus from General Billy Mitchell's agitation for a national
air service that would encompass all aeronautics under a single department
in the federal government. Although Mitchell's scheme failed, the threat of
it brought together the supporters of naval aviation and forced them to move
forward on reorganization. 7
The director of naval aviation obviously would have a large say in any
reorganization plans. Moffett's appointrnent to this key post had not come
about by accident. An authentic naval hero with excellent administrative
credentials, his voice would carry weight in senior naval circles that were
not overly enthusiastic about aviation or about aviators. H e was known as
'
both "a good fighter" 8 and "something of a genius at public relations. " 9
Although Moffett lacked aviation experience, many pioneering airmen (in
cluding Captain H. C. Mustin) had urged him to accept the position, believ
ing that he would forcefully represent the best interests of naval aviation. 1 0
Moffett hardly had time to find his new office before being called to testify
before the House Committee on Naval Affairs in March 192 1 . H e spoke
strongly in favor of creating a bureau of aeronautics, stressing the efficiency,
economy, and accountability that it would bring to naval aviation. "A Bu
reau of Aeronautics is needed," he emphasized, "in order to get quick action
and resu lts in furnishing the aviation needs of the Fleet at the earliest pos
sible moment and at the lowest possible costs, and so that one person could
be held responsible to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval
Operations for the expendi ture of naval aviation appropriations, and for the
progress, success, and fai lure of naval aviation." The head of naval avia
tion, he argu ed, had to have the authority that went with responsibility. H e
had to be able to give and to execute orders instead of "merely being able
to make requests or suggestions to the Chief of Naval Operations who, in
tum, if he approves them must forward them to the various bureaus, causing
untold delay, and often no action at all ." l t
Moffett's emphasis on efficiency and economy was fully in tune with the
direction of the new Republican admini stration of Warren G. Harding. On
April 10, the president recommended to Congress that a bureau of aeronau
tics be created. Congress passed the necessary legislation on July 12, and
the Navy Department established "BuAer" on September l . As expected,
Moffett was appointed chief of the bureau with the rank of rear admiral to
serve for four years. Although he would never have total control over aero
nautics, his long tenure in office he was reappointed in 1926 and again in
1929--meant that his personal influence would be an enduring one. 12
While the new BuAer controlled "all that relates to designing, building,
fitting out, and repairi ng Naval and Marine Corps aircraft ," there were nu
merous exceptions to its authority over aeronautics. The Bureau of Steam
Engineering retained control of design and installation of radios; the Bureau
of Construction and Repair had charge of shipboard aviation accessories;
the Bureau of Navigation had responsibility for Hight instruments, clothing,
personnel, and training; and the Bureau of Yards and Docks looked after
shore installation. However, no bureau could ignore BuAer i n regard to
aviation matters. The Bureau of Ordnance, for example, was responsible
for the design and production of aeronautical ordnances, but regulations
provided that "all designs, specifications, and tests of such material shall
be determined after consultation with and according to the requirements of
the Bureau of Aeronautics, �nd the installation of all ordnance material in
aircraft and all final tests of aeronautic ordnance material in the aircraft
itself will be under the direct cognizance of the Bureau of Aeronautics." 13
Much the same relationship existed between BuAer and both BuDocks
and BuNav. Shore structures had to meet Moffett's approval , as did aircraft
instruments and flight clothing. Also, BuAer provided recommendations to
other responsible bureaus about the nature and priority of all experimental
development and production of aeronautical material.
While sorting out the place of his new organization i n the navy's bureau
cracy, l\1offett faced the equally difficult problem of integrating aeronautics
into the naval service. Naval aviators wanted to end the policy of rotation
by which an officer could be assigned to flight duty, subsequently to surface
or submarine duty, and eventually, perhaps, back to flying. They opposed
the practice of disallowing time spent on aviation duty as sea duty, and they
wanted only aviators to command seaplane tenders, ai rcraft carriers, and
aviation shore facilities. Some airmen took a more extreme position and
6 4 : AV I A T I O N'S G O L D E N A G E
wanted to see established within the navy a separate aviation corps with
regulations for command, promotion, and training distinct from those appli
cable to the rest of the service. 14·
These issues occupied much of Moffe tt's time during his first tour as chief
of BuAer. In 1925, following much discussion and argument, Moffett con
vened the so-called Johnson board chaired by Captain A. W. Johnson,
assistant chief of BuAer to make recommendations about the status of
aviation personnel i n the naval service. As expected, the board stressed the
need to end rotation; i t also urged the creation of aviation ratings for enlisted
men. Its recommendations, if fully enacted, would permit an officer or en
listed man to spend his entire career in the specialty of aviation and advance
to a rank or rate as high as that of anyone else i n the navy. In short, it was
a codified alternative to a separate air service. 1 5
When Moffett forwarded the Johnson report which he strongly fa
vored to the chief of naval operations, he attached to i t a plan drawn up
by H arold T. Ba1tlett ( U . S. Navy Aviator No. 2 1 ) that called for the estab
lishment of a separate corps of aviation, much like the Marine Corps. This
approach was vintage Moffett. Although opposed to Bartlett's plan, he
wanted the CNO to see the Johnson board's recom mendations as a reason- .
able alternative. 16
Moffett faced stiff opposi tion. Rear Admiral W i l liam Shoemaker, chief of
the Bureau of Navigation, spoke for many senior naval bureaucrats when he
commented that the Johnson report was "built about a predetermined opin
ion as to the position and specialized status of the naval aviator . . . as
distinct from an attempt to solve the aviation personnel problem for the best
i n terest of the service." 17 As i t turned out, however, events conspired to
support Moffett's efforts.
The year of the Johnson report proved pivotal for naval aviation . As noted
below, General Billy Mitchell's renewed demands for a national air service
and the crash of the airship Shenandoah prompted both Congress and the
White House to take action to resolve the difficulties affl icting military and
civil aviation. Appearing before various investigating bodies, including the
presidentially-appointed Morrow board, Moffett used the opportunity to ar
gue for enactment of the recommendations of the Johnson board. In the end,
he obtained most of what he wanted.
On June 24, 1926, Congress passed legislation to implement the Morrow
board's recommendations concerning the navy. The new law provided that
command of aviation schools, stations, and tactical flight units be assigned
to naval aviators; that command of aircraft carriers and tenders be assigned
either to aviators or aviation observers, both of which the law defined; that
the office of an assistant secretary of the navy for air be established to foster
naval aeronautics; that a five-year aircraft procurement program be under
taken to increase the number of ai rcraft on hand to 1 , 000 useful planes; and
that the number of enlisted pilots be not less than thirty percent of the total
number of fliers on active duty. 1 8
Two years later, Moffett saw another old thorn withdrawn when Congress
amended an 1860 law that specified that only service perform ed at sea was
to be considered sea duty. In May 1928 Congress provided "that when offi
cers are assigned to airships on duty requiring them to participate regularly
and frequently i n aerial flights, the Secretary of the Navy shall determine
and certify whether or not, i n his judgement, the service to be performed i s
equivalent to sea duty." This solved the problem of keeping avi ators quali
fied i n lighter-than-air craft free from rotation to sea duty. 19
Settlement of the status of aviators within the naval service was among
the most important developments during Moffett's stewardship over naval
aviation. It established within the navy a career for fliers and ended the idea
of a separate aviation corps. It also went a long way toward integrating
aeronautics with the fleet in a way Moffett approved. But the establishment
of an aviation career path was only one of many organizational battles fought
by the chief of BuAer.
BuAer was born i n the midst of demands that the U nited States organize
a national air service. Moffett's opposition to this proposal was based on
his concepts of naval aviation and the navy itself. In 1 922, responding to
bombing tests in Great Britain and the U nited States that had led some
observers to conclude that aircraft operating from land bases could sink
opposing navies and therefore the navy needed no aircraft, Moffett argued
that aircraft had to be developed "as an adjunct to the fleet and not as a
substitute for the capital ship." He feared the consequences of a national
air service that no doubt would be dominated by army aviators. "I firmly
believe," he said, "that in time it [a national air service] would result i n the
loss of the surface navy if naval aviation were developed and managed by
Inen who know nothing of naval matters, naval tactics, navigation nor of the
sea in general." 20
Naval aviation, Moffett knew, had come a long way since World War I,
when naval flyers had flown antisubmarine patrols in seaplanes operating
from shore bases. The navy's first aircraft carrier, Langley (CV - 1 ) , was com
missioned i n March 1922. Five months later, Moffett observed that "with
planes aboard surface ships and carried on carriers with the fleet at all
times, the men who manage these planes must of necessity be pilots with
sea training and not landlubbers." He was convi nced that aeronautics must
be developed as inseparable from ships and sailors. For this reason, he
viewed a national ai r service as tactically not feasible. "In my opinion," he
continued, "it would be no more foolish to man our battleships with soldiers
than to man the planes aboard them with landsmen." 2 1
Moffett went on to clairn all sea flying for the navy. H e believed that the
army was trying to eliminate the navy's aircraft from land stations and con
fine them to operating from ships and water. This was part of an attempt by
the army to take over the air portion of convoy duty and the patrol and scout
ing of coastal waters by using landplanes operating from army bases. Such
a policy, he declared, was founded on a misunderstanding of tactics at sea.
"The defense of the coast itself," Moffett sai d, "may rest with the A1my Air
Service," but America's first line of defense was "the main fleet," including
its aviation component. There fol lowed a second line of defense, which was
composed of the fleet's aux iliary vessels. The third line, he concluded, was
"our coast fortifications, augmented by the Army Air Service." 22
Although Moffett's claim over all sea flying did not extend naval aviation's
role inland, he was not about to give up the navy's air stations ashore. From
these stations, the navy operated its coastal patrol planes, convoy duty air
craft, and lighter-than-air craft. By insisting that the navy retain these sta
tions, he was i n fact claiming that the navy should control all aviation over
the ocean, even though the aircraft were operating ' from land bases. As he
pointed out:
In patrol, scouting, and convoy work, unity of command and control i s

absolutely essential, with personnel trained and indoctrinated in Naval
methods, tactics, seamanship, navigation, and familiar with the char
acteristics of all types of Naval and merchant craft. Furthern1ore, they
must also be proficient in N aval radio and signals, i ncluding recogni
tion signals, otherwise they become a n1enace and danger to our ves
sels. Furthermore the air personnel of the aircraft and ships should be
under the control of the Naval commander at all times to insure their
preparation, efficiency, and readiness. If under another branch of the
Government, who would decide what planes and personnel were needed
for any operation? Who would be held responsible for inefficiency, or
even failure of planes to arrive on time, or at all, when needed'? Would
not divided responsibility result in delay in sailing of convoys, ineffi
ciency and perhaps disaster? 23
By the time Moffett stated the above doctrine in 1924, demands for a
national air service had reached a point at which action by the federal gov
ernment appeared imminent. This came at the same time that Moffett found
himself in direct conflict with the outspoken Billy Mitche l l . The occasion
for the confrontation between the two men was the Shenandoah disaster.
Moffett had been an advocate of lighter-than-air aviation ever since he
took over BuAer. Sensitive to criticism about the vulnerability of lighter
than-air craft, he had pointed out in April 1923 that it was wrong to believe
that the navy was considering the use of airships i n tactical situations. "The
merits and limitations of airships suggest at once that their function wil l be
strategical rather than tacti cal , i . e. , that they will be used mainly for long
di stance scouting and reconnaissance and as little as possible for combat."
He pointed out that over such a vast expanse of water as the Pacific Ocean,
no aircraft or surface ship could match the rigid airship in surveillance
capacity. "The airship is essentially a scout," he emphasized. It could op
erate 1 , 000 or more miles at sea at twice the speed of the fastest surface
vessel, and it could stay in the air for three days. The navy, he said, seldom
would find it necessary "to push home the observation against strong
resistance. " 24
On September 3, 1925, the airship Shenandoah (ZR - 1 ) was torn apart i n
a thunderstorm near Byesville, Ohio. Fou1teen officers and men died i n the
tragedy. Mitchell took the occasion to attack the navy. Rejecting the navy's
claim that it had demonstrated proficiency in a Pacific Ocean exercise i n
�.1arch of that year, Mitchell said: "If the Pacific maneuver showed anything
conclusively, i t was that aircraft acting from land bases can destroy any
surface fleet coming within their radius of operations." Noting that $50 to
$80 million had been spent to conduct "the Pacific parade of our Navy," he
asked: "What would this amount applied to development and improvement
of airplanes and submarines have meant?" 25
Mitchell went on to lambast the navy for several recent air accidents,
including the Shenandoah disaster. "These accidents," he claimed, "are
the direct result of the incompetency, criminal negligence and almost trea
sonable administration of the National defense by the Navy and War
departments." 26
Moffett responded to these extraordinary accusations by defending his
administration of naval aviation. H e also registered his disgust with the
constant carping by Mitchell and his followers for a national air service.
They had been chanting the same chorus since the World War, and Moffett
was tired of it. H e accused Mitchell of trying to create a dangerous person-
ality cult. "The most disturbing factor in the situation," Moffett contended,
"is the example of mili tary officers in the employ of the government making
a political appeal over the heads of Congress to the people. This might be
the opening wedge for military dictatorship in the United States." 2 7
President Calvin Coolidge responded to the furor created by Mitchell's
insubordination by court-martialing the flamboyant aviator in December
1925 and by establishing the Morrow board to look into the entire question
of military and civil aviation. This investigation paral leled a congressional
probe, headed by Representative Florian Lampert. As noted earlier, al
though the inquiries produced major changes in the government's aeronau
tical policy, they did not lead to the creation of a national air service, putting
an end to the festering issue that had consumed so much of Moffett's time
and attention. 28
Another problem that proved equally vexing and more enduring
involved the navy's relationship with the manufacturers who built its aircraft
and equipment. Moffett knew that naval aviation needed the best aircraft
and support gear in order to realize its full potential. Therefore, he wanted
to promote a healthy aeronautical industry and at the same time protect the
government's interest. Reconciling these two interests turned out to be one
of the most difficult problems of his career.
When the World War ended, the navy had 2, 1 00 ai rcraft in its inventory.
By 1 922 this number had dropped to nearly 1 , 200 and would decline to 851
by 1928. Between January 1919 and December 1925, the navy placed con
tracts with aircraft manufacturers for seventeen new combat types, a total of
1 , 081 machines. By contrast, in fiscal year 1918 the navy had placed orders
for five new types, resulting in 1 , 938 ai rcraft. In short, orders for 2 ,000
aircraft a year declined after the war to 1 50 a year and stayed there . 29
There was not enough government business to keep the fledgling aircraft
industry afloat during the early 1920s, nor did the civilian market take up
the slack. No one expected Congress to appropriate large sums of money for
aircraft during peacetime. Indeed, military officers were far from unanimous
in their demands for substantial ai rcraft appropriations. 3° Fighting for sur
vival, the aircraft industry naturally fastened onto every aspect of potential
government business. It took a special interest in the mili tary procurement
system and government aircraft factories.
Prior to the 1 920s, the aircraft industry, if not exactly spoiled, had grown
accustomed to not competing for the navy's ai rcraft contracts. During the
prewar years, naval planes had been purchased as "proprietary items" on
contracts negotiated between the navy and the man ufacturers. Although pro-
•
curement statutes generally dictated that competition be held and the lowest
bid accepted, there had been exceptions to these requirements, proprietary
items among them. During the World War, the mil itary services had enjoyed
great latitude in contracting for aircraft. In fact, they had been practically
at liberty to negotiate whatever contract they wished with the manufacturer
of choice.
This situation brought evil days after the war when government procure
ment came under attack for what some people viewed as corruption. These
charges grew mostly out of mil itary use of an oddity known as the cost-plus
percent-of-cost contract, and not so much from the use of negotiated, in lieu
of competitive, contracts. Nonetheless, accusations and talk of imprison
ment frightened government contract ing officers into adhering almost slav
ishly to the letter of the law. Also, changing aircraft technology compelled
a new procedure. Before the war, it had been easy to declare an ai rcraft a
proprietary article. By the 1920s, however, technology and the industry
itself had advanced to a point where proprietary certificates had become
highly specialized aspects of contracting procedure. The result of all this
was an atmosphere in which the i ndustry, already struggl ing with a postwar
economic recession, faced customers who now required competition for each
contract. 31
Industry also complained about the aeronautical work that the army and
navy were perlormi ng in their own plants. The navy's offending edifice stood
at the Philadelphia Navy Yard as the Naval Ai rcraft Factory. Between 1 9 1 9
and 1925, the factory built fourteen percent of the aircraft procured b y the
navy; it had the capacity to supply nearly a third of the navy's peacetime
aircraft needs. To an industry starving for business, the factory's share of
the market was well worth a fight. 32
The factory's charter enjoined it not only to construct aircraft but also to
undertake aeronautical developments and to provide cost data. Building
aircraft, therefore, constituted only a part of its mission, and not the most
important part at that. While Moffett was by no means comrnitted to the
navy's making large production runs of aircraft, he strongly believed that
the factory's research and development functions should be retai ned. Also,
he was not about to sacrifice the construction cost data that the plant
provided.
Moffett tried to compromise with the aircraft industry by offe ring to re
strict production at the factory to experimental models, but the industry
would not be mol1ified. Indeed, there should be little wonder that Moffett's
attempt to compromise failed. The industry was, after all, concerned both
about production and about research and development. Much of the problem
centered upon design rights, which were entwined with the government's
procurement policy. 33
Ai rcraft manufacturers ce1tainly had a point about the competitive prac
tices of the military services. The army and navy would conduct a competi
tion for the design and prototype of an aircraft. The winner would be
awarded a contract, following which the prototype would be produced and
tested. The military services, however, would not automatically negotiate a
full-scale production contract with the wi nner, even if they wanted to add
the type to their inventory. This required another competition! The pro duc
_
tion winner, if different from the designer, then would have access to all the
designing firm's drawings and data. In 1 922, for example, the Curtiss Com
pany won a design contract for an aircraft that the navy designated the CS.
But the Martin Company underbid Curtiss i n the competition for the pro
duction contract and produced the aircraft as the SC . Although Martin had
access to Curtiss's drawings, the need to retool meant that profits were less
than expected.
Clement M . Keys, president of Curtiss, told the House of Representatives
Lampert committee that the mi litary services had a policy "which, brutally
speaking, means that they must buy airplanes below cost of production. "
The problem, he said, had less to do with the mili tary than with the laws
under which they labored. "There are always contractors," he continued,
'
"who are either on the verge of bankruptcy or on the verge of liquidation

and willing to contract to keep i n business even though they are compelled
to take a loss." H e warned that the Curtiss Company, one of the nation's
largest aircraft manufacturers, would no longer compete for military con
tracts unless it could show a fifteen percent profit or turnover on the com
pany's anal ysis of costs. 34·
The small aircraft manufacturers also had their woes. As one of their
number, George E. Barnhard, told Congress, orders from the military ser
vices were too sporadic and limited to allow a small company to maintain a
plant and staff to handle them. "Construction bids called for by the War and
Navy Departments," he complained, "are on price and design, and either
price or design are liable to throw out the bids ." He explained that it was
entirely possible for an excellent design to be ruled out on the basis of price.
H e also ch arged that large companies were being treated better than small
ones. H e believed that competitive bidding "virtually confines contracts to
l arge producers" because bids could be thrown out on the basis of "insuffi
cient factory facilities." ::�s
•
Pressure from both large and small companies produced a response from
Moffett. H e believed that the answer to their problems lay with continuing
open competition for design contracts but limiting competition for produc
tion. "In matters pertaining to design both general and detailed," he told
the presidentially appointed Morrow board, "the closest cooperation is
invited with the trade. In order that the interest of the Navy Department
may be safeguarded, it i s the general policy to have at least two contrac
tors interested i n a specific type of design. This encourages competition,
improvements, especially i n details, and tends to advance the state of
the art. " 36
Moffett, however, wanted legislation that would leave the question of ne
gotiable contracts to the discretion of the secretary of the navy. He also
called for the creation of a selected and approved list of responsible bidders.
Finally, he wanted to expand the use of the proprietary certificate so that
the winner of a design contract would almost assuredl y be awarded the pro
duction work if it produced a successful aircraft.
Although the Ai rcraft Procurement Act of 1 926 was supposed to resolve
for government and industry the major problems involved with aircraft pro
curement, it represented an improvement rather than a panacea. Moffett
considered the new law a step i n the right direction, hut he was not entirely
pleased with the wording that related to production contracts, preferring that
more discretion be placed i n the hands of the secretary of the navy on
whether competition would he necessary for quantity production. Much de
pended on administrative in terpretation of the law. As it turned out, by the
early 1930s the controller general was interpreting the law so strictly that
the requirement for competition on all contracts had been reasserted almost
as strong} y as before. 37
By the end of his first term i n office, Moffett had good reason to he pleased
with the course of events. The Bureau of Aeronautics i n 1925 was acknowl
edged as the center of naval aviation. From it emerged the aviation organi
zation both ashore and afloat. The Pacific and Atlantic fleets, components
by now of the United States Fleet, were divided into Battle Forces, Scouting
Fleets, Control Forces, and Fleet Base Forces. Each had an air component,
except for the Control Forces (which included mainly submarines). There
also was an air unit with the Asiatic Fleet. With time, the complement of air
craft became more sophisticated as aircraft carriers Lexington and Sara
toga joined the fleet in 1 927 became the centerpiece of naval aviation . 38
The introduction of a fleet organization for aircraft and a full array of
aircraft types depended heavily on technological advances. The years 1926
to 1931 saw numerous improvements in aircraft and equipment. Moffett

considered the most significant advance to be the transition from water
cooled to air-cooled engines, a development i n which the navy had led the
way. Other significant developments i ncluded the elimination of wooden
structures i n favor of all-metal monocoque airframe construction, which
added strength and enhanced shi pboard launching and arresting; the re
placement of wooden propellers with metal propellers of variable pitch,
which i ncreased aircraft performance and lengthened propeller life; and the
improvement in catapults, which permitted the operation of heavier and
stronger planes from carriers and simplified launching of aircraft from other
ships. Carrier operations also had been greatly improved with the introduc
tion of oleo shock absorbers, tail wheels, and low-pressure tires. 39
By 1932 there had been significant quantitative as well as qualitaiive
advances in naval aviation. The navy in that year had i n commission the
carriers Langley, Lexington, and S aratoga, two seaplane tenders and ten
small tenders, plus an aircraft inventory consisting of 909 combat planes,
1 7 utility planes, 246 trainers, and 62 other aircraft. The navy was operat
ing the rigid airships Akron and Macon and four nonrigid airships. With
regard to personnel, there were 1 , 3 1 7 U.S. Navy and Marine Corps offtcers
on aviation duty, including 904 rated fliers. Of 4, 262 enlisted men i n avia
tion ratings, 387 were fliers. During Moffett's y ears as chief of the bureau,
combat aircraft i ntroduced into operational service included the Martin MO,
BM, PM, T3M, and T4M; Curtiss OC, CS, TS, F6C, F7C, F8C, F9C , and
F 1 1 C ; Douglas DT, PD, and P2D; the Naval A ircraft Factory PT; Boeing
F2B, F3B, F4B, and 02B; the Hall all-metal P H ; the Consolidated P2Y,
Loening OL; and Vought UO, VE-9, 02U, and 03U. 40
By the time Moffett boarded the giant rigid airship Akron (ZRS-4) on
April 3, 1933, he had presided over the creation of an impressive naval air
force. H e no doubt looked forward to the air voyage from N AS Lakehurst to
Newport, Rhode Island. During the night, however, Akron encountered a
severe thunderstorm while east of Barnegat Inlet, New Jersey. The pride of
the navy's airship fleet plunged into the Atlantic Ocean, taking to their
deaths seventy-three officers and men, including the chief of BuAer. 41
Moffett left a rich legacy for naval aviation. A skilled bureaucrat, he had
carved out an important place for BuAer in the navy's ad ministrative hier
archy. He had helped defeat the movement toward a national air service,
which he believed would have destroyed the navy's air arm, and he had
advanced the status of aviators in the naval service. Moffett integrated aero
nautics into the fleet, both in terms of doctrine and technology. As hi storian
•
Richard K . Smith has observed, "Moffett's view of the air weapon was an
organic one, in which it was a vital part of the Fleet." 42 He promoted the
development of aircraft carriers, advocating a minimum of eight ships for a
two-ocean navy, and he fought for the procurement of modern aircraft of all
types. 43 In sum, he provided the solid foundation upon which his successors
would build the powerful naval air arm of World War II and beyond.
B E N J AM I N F O U L O I S A N D
T H E F I G H T F O R A N
I N D E P E N D E N T A I R F O R C E
J 0 H N F. S HIN E R
The fight for an independent air force caused great public controversy dur
ing the interwar years. Alt hough Brigadier Genera] William �'Billy" Mitchell
captured the lion's share of public attention on this issue, Benjamin Dela
hauf Foulois also made a very significant contribution to the creation of an
independent United States Air Force in 1947. The two men d iffered both in
personality and tactics. Mitchell was flamboyant and relatively wealthy. He
had important fam ily connections reaching all the way to the United States
Senate and moved with ease in the high circles of society. 1 Fou lois, an
ex-enlisted man, came from humbler origins. He was more comfortable i n
a pair of overalls than in a well-tailored uniform, and he felt more at home
amidst the dirt and grime of an aircraft repair shop than at a social tea. 2
Foulois was born in the country village of Washington, Connecticut, on
December 9, 1879. His father, Henry, provided the family a comfortable
living from his plumbing business, while his mother, Sarah, made a loving
home for the chi ldren. Yearning for excitement, at the outbreak of the
Spanish-American War in 1898, Benny ran off to New York City to join the
military. Fifteen minutes after entering an army recruiting station, he
emerged as a private in the l st U . S . Volunteer Engineers. 3
Foulois's early military experiences took him to Puerto Rico and the Phil
ippines. He served with the Engineers in Puerto Rico during the war with
Spain and was mustered out of the service as a sergeant in January 1 899.
He immediately sought an appointment to West Point hut was turned down
because of his weak academic background. Benny thereupon enlisted as a
•
B E N J A M I N F O U L O I S : 7 5
private in the infantry, and was sent to the Philippines to help put down the
native insu rrection. Young Foulois faced more than his share of close com
bat during the next several months. Cool under fire and a natural leader, he
was promoted to company first sergeant in 1901 and to second lieutenant a
few months later. 4
After a second tour of duty in the Philippines, in 1 905 Foulois entered
the army's professional-education program first the Infantry and Cavalry
School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and then the Army Signal School. The
Signal Corps was responsible for all balloon activity; only recently, in 1907,
it had established an aeronautical division. Foulois became interested i n the
possibilities of aviation while at the Signal School and wrote his school
thesis on "The Tactical and Strategical Value of Dirigible Balloons and
Aeronautical Flying Machines." This must have impressed his superiors,
for in July 1 908 the army ordered him to Washington, D . C . , for avia
tion duty. 5
The rough-hewn Foulois might have lacked Mitchell's social skills, but
he brought to the struggle for independence a wealth of practical knowledge
about aviation. Whereas Mitchell came late to aviation, Fou lois had re
ceived a few minutes of instruction from the Wright brothers soon after the
army purchased its first plane. Then, in December 1909, the War Depart
ment sent him and the aircraft to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Brigadier Gen
eral James Allen, chief signal officer, told Foulois: "Your orders are simple,
Lieutenant. You are to evaluate the airplane. Just take plenty of spare parts
and teach yourself to fly." That was exactly what Foulois did, by correspond
ing with the Wright brothers. H e went on to command the Army's first tac
tical air unit, the 1 s t Aero Squadron, which he led during the punitive
expedition into Mexico i n 1 9 1 6 against Pancho Villa. Foulois drafted the
army's wartime aviation-expansion program and then served as chief of
the Army Air Service in the American Expeditionary Forces in France,
where he first clashed with M i tchell. 6
The differences between Foulois and M itchell carried over into the meth
ods each adopted in the postwar struggle to free mili tary aviation from the
control of ground officers. Mitchell directed much of his effort toward sway
ing public opinion. Fou lois, believing the officer� should keep the struggle
within the government, tried to exert pressure in testimony before Congress
and other official investigative bodies.
The question of a separate air force was raised almost immediately after
the war. Swift demobilization of American forces and radically reduced
defense-spending hit the Air Service particularly hard . Air officers, knowing
that the General Staff did not appreciate the combat potential of military
aviation, feared that the army's leaders would reduce the Air Service to its
meager prewar size in order to free more funds for the ground forces. When
the air arm's officer strength fell from a wartime high of 20,000 to 200 in
1919, the aviators were ready to fight. They were assisted by a rash of bills
introduced in Congress during 191 9 - 1 920 to create an independent air
force. As expected, ranking army and navy officers testified against all such
proposals. They regarded mili tary fliers as upstarts, denied that air power
would ever be able to independent! y affect the outcome of war, and argued
powerfully against removing a useful auxiliary from the control of the exist
ing services. 7
Fou lois did not immediately join the fray. He remained in Europe until
July 1919 working with Major General Mason Patrick on the air provisions
of the Versailles Treaty. However, when he did return he quickly became
the leading Air Service advocate for independence. Now head of the Liqui
dation Division in the office of the chief of the Air Service, Foulois made
many appearances before congressional committees considering bills to es
tablish a separate air force. Neither his postwar reduction in rank from
temporary brigadier general to his permanent grade of major, nor his five
foot six-inch stature, diminished the biting character of his remarks. 8
During each visit to the congressional hearing room, he defiantly attacked
the General Staff as ill-suited to administer, control, and provide for the
future development of military aviation. On October 7, 1 9 1 9 , he told the
House Committee on Mili tary Affai rs:
The General Staff of the Army is the policymaking body of the Army
and, either through lack of v ision, lack of practical knowledge, or
deliberate intention to subordinate the Air Service needs to the needs
of the other combat arms, has utterly failed to appreciate the full mili
tary value of this new mili tary weapon and, in my opi nion, has utterly
failed to accord it its just place in our military family.
He went on to damn the General Staff's prewar lack of concern for aviation
that had caused the gross weakness of the army's air arm in 1 9 1 7 .9
Foulois repeated his criticism of the War Department a week later before
the Senate Mil itary Affairs Committee. He could become vitriolic when he
was angry, and that day he was very angry. He condemned the General Staff
for its inability to understand the full value of mil itary aviation. During the
World War, the ai rplane had been used for strategic bombing, interdiction,
counter-air operations, and close air support. Yet the army now was seeking
•
to employ it almost exclusively in what he considered the "defensive" roles

of reconnaissance and artillery spotting. Foulois appreciated, as did other
knowledgeable fliers, that air power's real value lay in concentrated, offen
sive employment a concept unappreciated by the ground officers who ran
the army. He decried the lack of aviation development at the hands of the
General Staff and angri ly asserted that, "based on a practical experience in
Army aviation, ever since its birth in 1908, I can frankly state that . . . the
War DepartJnent has earned no right or title to claim further control over
aviation." 10 In December before the House Military Affairs Committee, he
again argued that m i l itary aviation would never achieve its offensive poten
tial if left under the control of the General Staff. Let the army keep its
observation planes, but the rest of the air arm should operate as a separate
service. 11 In subsequent years he never wavered from this view.
Mitchell, Henry H . "Hap" Arnold, and others joined Foulois in the
campaign. Each took his turn before the congressional committees in
1 9 1 9 - 1920, but army and navy opposition, together with the Air Service's
unimpressive record as an offensive force in the Great War, proved more
persuasive. The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 gave the air arm neither
independence nor autonomy. The result was a growing cleavage between the
aviators and the army ground officers who control led the General Staff. 12
The aviation branch of the army remained poorly funded and firmly under
General Staff control throughout the 1920s. Although the rest of the army
also suffered a lack of funds during this period, and the General Staff was
gradually coming to appreciate the offensive potential of tactical aviation by
the end of the decade, avi ators never abandoned their goal of indepen
dence. In Foulois's opinion and that of most other army fliers, a separate air
force was essential if mi litary aviation was ever to become an effe ctive com
bat force.
Foulois soon realized that his congressional campaign for independence
had not endeared him to the army's leadership. It seemed a good idea to
leave town until the dust settled, so in the spring of 1 920 he volunteered to
serve as the mili tary attache in Germany, a billet that called for an officer
with aviation experience. He arri ved in Berlin in May 1920. Foulois trav
eled freely about the country during his four-year tour, and he became a
drinking friend of Hermann Goering and Ernst Udet, men who would lead
the Luftwaffe a decade later. As a result, he learned of German plans and
designs for new aircraft and aerial weapons that existed al the end of the
World War. H e sent this information home to the War Department, but it
was considered of little value by his army superiors. 13
Position on the army's promotion list, not ratings on officer-effectiveness

reports, determined advancement in the 1 920s. In February 1923 there '
were enough vacancies i n the grade of lieutenant colonel for Foulois and
others who had the same seniority to be promoted. The new "light colonel"
returned to the U nited States ftfteen months later to attend the one-year
course at the armv's
"
Command and General Staff School at Fort Leaven-
worth, Kansas. Foulois remained an uninspired student, but he realized that
successful completion of the course was a prerequisite for important posi
tions i n the army. J 4
Halfway through the school year, Foulois's ambition got the best of him.
When news circulated through the Air Service grapevine in early 1925 that
Mitchell soon would be replaced as assistant chief of the Air Service,
Foulois saw this as his big chance. He temporarily let slide his studies at
the Command and General Staff School in favor of a letter-writing campaign
to senior army officers and politicians asking their support for his efforts to
gain the post. Perhaps the War Department had not yet forgotten his con
gressional testimony of five years past. In any event, Lieutenant Colonel
James Fechet got the job. But Foulois received an assignment in mid- 1 925
that tempered his disappointment command of a major flying unit. 1 5
The aviation pioneer was filled with antici pation as he traveled east, for
he would soon be in charge of the showplace of army aviation, M i tchel
Field, Long Island, New York. Years later, Fou lois recalled being "as eager
to get my hands on the controls of our new planes as a teenager approaching
the driving age." During the next two years he worked to whip his 9th Ob
servation Group into a combat-ready force. This often proved difficult, for
his people were frequently called upon to assist in public relations acti vi
ties. Typical of these was a stunt in which Babe Ruth was to catch a baseball
dropped from an army plane circling at 250 feet while media representatives
and an eager crowd looked on . Foulois tried to maintain the dignified com
posure befitting a commander on this occasion, but his sense of humor got
the best of him when Ruth was knocked flat during the first two attempts.
Undaunted, Ruth tried again, and this time held on. Reported Fou lois, "the
last I saw of the Babe he was slowly flexing his burning hand and trying to
smile about it as he left in a big limousine." 1 6
Fou lois went to Washington infrequently during his tenure at Mitchel
Field. However, he willi ngly made the trip to testify before the Morrow
board, which was investigating mili tary aviation at the behest of President
Coolidge in the autumn of 1925. Dwight Morrow's group, fully aware that
the chief executive opposed creating a separate air force, fell under the
•
General Staff's influence from the outset. Yet chief of the Air Service Major
General Mason Patri ck, Mitchell, Foulois, and others tried their best to win
the board's support for independence. The Mitchel Field commander re
peated the arguments he had used in 1 91 9 - 1920: "Based on my knowledge
of the past seventeen years . . I am fully convinced that aviation will never
.
reach its proper place in the scheme of national defense so long as it remains
in the control of the War Department General Staff." 17 Major H orace
Hickam joined in with an accurate analysis of the existing situation: "I am
confident that no general thinks he can command the Navy, and no admiral
thinks he can operate an army, but some of both believe they can operate
an air force." 18 Foulois and his flying comrades were again bitterly disap
pointed. The Air Corps Act of 1926 that resulted from the Morrow investi
gation granted the air arm a five-year expansion program, authorizing i t to
grow to a strength of 1 , 650 officers, 15,000 enlisted men, and 1 , 800 ser
viceable airplanes. It also gave it some representation on the General Staff
and established an assistant secretary of war for air. But i t left army avia
tion, now renamed the "Army Air Corps," under General Staff control. Army
generals and navy admirals would go on supervising their respective air
organizations. 19
Although fai ling to win Air Corps independence, Foulois was not stymied
in his efforts to gain a greater role in the future development of military
aviation. When it became known in mid- 1927 that Patrick would soon retire
and Fechet would replace him as chief of the Air Corps, Foulois left few
stones untumed in his quest for the assistant chiefs job. H e wrote to every
one he thought could help, i ncluding the governor of his home state, Con
necticut. H i s persistence paid off, for on December 20, 1927, he assumed
the much-sought position, which carried the rank of brigadier general. 20
Foulois spent the next three and a half years preparing for the day when
he might succeed Fechet. At first he concentrated on gaining experience in
the Washington office of the chief of the Air Corps, where he was responsible
for everything from training to war planning. After eighteen months, he
arranged a one-year exchange of duties with the chief of the Air Material
Division in order to become more familiar with the air arm's research and
procurement activities, for which the Dayton-based division was respon
sible. Back i n Washington in July 1930 as assistant chief, Foulois again
took charge of planning and policy matters. 21
His big chance to put into practice all he had learned came when Fechet
selected him to command the Air Corps's 1931 maneuvers. They were to be
by far the largest air exercise ever attempted in the United States. The chief
\
of the Air Corps had decided to form a provi sional air division of 670 planes
and to use them in a series of aerial demonstrations over major cities in the
Great Lakes region and the eastern United States. The number of aircraft
taking part would severely tax the small air arm, but the exercise would be
a good test of Air Corps mobility. Foulois and his staff set to work at once
planning what proved to be a tremendous logistics exercise involving most
of the army's U . S. -based planes. 22
Foulois was an excellent choice to organize and command the maneuvers.
A "doer" rather than a great thinker, he performed best when dealing with
the real and the tangible. H e was not afraid to make decisions or to experi
ment; further, he led by example. All units were to be i n place i n the Dayton
area by May 18. Foulois and his staff left by air from Bolling Field in Wash
ington on May 12, but the first flight of three single-place aircraft, which he
led, ran into bad weather over Cumberland, Maryland. The general, an
excellent pilot, pressed on, while his much younger fellow aviators headed
back to Bolling Field and clear skies. A second flight of three also turned
back. Foulois delighted in ribbing his Washington cohorts when they finally
arrived in Dayton later that day. H e believed i n flying safety, but he also
believed i n realistic training. 23
The air maneuvers, which Foulois supervised from his own plane, were
an unqual i fied success. H i s force flew nearly 38,000 hours, sometimes in
close formation for up to four hours at a stretch, with more than 600 aircraft
in the sky at once. Yet not one serious accident occurred . This was a
remarkable record and a tribute to Foulois's planning and leadership,
for which the National Aeronautic Association awarded him the Mackay
Trophy. 24
Foulois's exceptional performance as commander of the provisional air
division probably was a major factor in his selection to succeed James
Fechet as chief of the Air Corps. Shortly after the conclusion of the maneu
vers, Fechet announced that he would retire in December. By the end of the
first week in June, many eastern papers ran stories praising Foulois's fine
record and claiming the popular assistant chief had already been tapped to
replace Fechet. The War Department leadership was irritated, since Presi
dent Hoover apparently had not yet reached a final decision. The assistant
secretary of war for air, Trubee Davison, wanted to know the source of the
news stories. Fou lois claimed he had no idea where they came from .
Whether he or some of his friends were the culprits remai ns a mystery. H e
did have newspaper friends, and he was not about to discourage their specu
lation. Finally, on July 1 3, 1 93 1 , the arm y's adjutant genera] informed Fou·-
lois that he would become chief of the Air Corps upon General Fechet's
retirement. The rank and file of the Air Corps seemed genuinely pleased
with Hoover's choice. 25
Although Foulois faced many problems as air ch ief, he never lost sight of
the campaign for air power independence. During his ftrst two years in of
fice, he pursued a dual course arguing before Congress for a separate air
organ ization while at the same time working within the War Department for
permission to establish a consolidated strike force, the General H eadquar
ters Air Force. Bills to create a separate air force or to reorganize the de
fense establishment cropped up on a recurring basis in the early 1 930s,
usually introduced as depression-era economy measures. Presidents Hoover
and Roosevelt joined the army and navy in opposing all such changes, but
this did not deter Foulois.
In February 1 932, after serving only two months as chief of the Air
Corps, 26 a slightly less outspoken Benjamin Foulois was back on Capitol
H i l l telling members of Congress that they should thoroughly study the na
tion's defense organization and ultimately create an air force coequal with
the army and navy. 27 He quickly developed a good work i ng relationship
with Congressman John J . McSwain of South Carol ina, the new chairman of
the House Military Affairs Committee. McSwain shared Foulois's views on
the need for an i ndependent air force, and over the next two years he en
couraged the air chief to persist in his campaign. 28
Foulois testified before the congressman's committee the following year,
on March 3 1 , 1 933, i n support of a bill to establish a separate air force.
Senior officers of the General Staff were again angry over the air chiefs
unwillingness to support the War Department's position, but there was little
they could do for the present to prevent him from speaking his mind when
called upon to do so by Congress. The bill got nowhere, while Foulois fur
ther antagonized his superiors. 29
The chief of the Air Corps made better headway on the G H Q Air Force
issue. H e began a running di alogue with the General Staff in 1932 and
eventually beat down army resistance. The struggle was not easy. The Gen
eral Staff was reluctant to establish a consolidated air organization in peace
time. It liked the existing arrangement that gave senior ground commanders
throughout the United States control over the air resources in their geo
graphic areas. The General Staff feared a consolidated air force would take
the Air Corps a step closer to independence and encourage the aviators to
concentrate on strategic bombing rather than army support. 30
Foulois, like other aviators, believed that strategic bombing could be
decisive in fu ture conflicts, but this was not the issue in his fight with the
army's leadership. Concentrated, offe nsive employment of air power was the
proper method, no matter whether the mission was coast defense, ground
support, or strategic bombardment. By the late 1 920s the General Staff had
agreed in principle to establish a GHQ Air Force i n time of war. Foulois
wanted the War Department to take the next step to create the new orga
nization in peacetime so the Air Corps could train as it would fight. H e even
hi nted to Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur i n December 1932 that
the aviators might become less persistent i n their campaign for indepen
dence if a GHQ Air Force were soon brought to life . H e also 1nade it clear
that the chief of the Air Corps should command the new organization. 31
Foulois's office kept up a steady stream of correspondence with the Gen
eral Staff on the GHQ Air Force issue. Through the air chiefs efforts, the
army eventually came to see the value of a centrally controlled combat air
organization, both for peacetime coast defense and for effective air support
of ground forces at the onset of war. The army's senior leadership realized,
too, that Foulois was right about the new understanding's moderating the
move for air arm independence. In October 1 933 the War Department offi
cially endorsed the ftndings of a committee headed by Deputy Chief of Staff
Major General H ugh Drum (of the Drum board) to organize a G H Q Air Force
i n peacetime. 32 Foulois's campaign had paid off, but his persistence created
such resentment toward him that there was virtually no chance the army
would allow the chief of the Air Corps to command the new organization
when it was brought to life . 33
Fou lois was pleased with the decision of the Drum board, but when the
army took no immediate action to establ ish the GHQ Air Force, the aviation
pioneer stepped up his efforts to win complete independence for the air arm.
In early February 1934, he secretly sli pped a bill to Congressman McSwain
designed to achieve that end. 34 McSwain immediately i ntroduced it as his
own and called Foulois to testify i n its behalf. The air chief obliged, resort
ing to his old tactic of damning the army's inept handling of the Air Corps.
He branded the General Staff the "main obstacle" to proper development of
aviation. What was needed, he said, was an "independent organ ization that
can fu nction without a lot of obstruction" from red tape-bound ground
leaders. 35
Senior officers of the General Staff were angered by Foulois's testimony.
That anger turned to bitterness when they learned months later that his staff
had written the bill. In their eyes, Fou lois clearly was a self-serving rene
gade who no longer merited their trust. Nevertheless, the General Staff
moved to bring the GHQ Air Force to life, hoping to undercut the renewed
threat of air arm independence. :�6 Implementing action was held up i n the
spring of 1934 only because the Air Corps was heavily involved in carrying
the nation's airmai l.
The 1934 airmail episode was not a happy experience for the Air Corps
or for its chief. On February 9 President Roosevelt canceled government
mail contracts with the commercial airlines, which he believed had been
•
arranged through collusion and frau d. Before doing so, he had asked the
Post Office to check with Foulois and to determine whether the Air Corps
could temporarily take over airmail operations. Foulois looked on the re
quest from the president as tantamount to an order. Also, a good perfor
mance might be just the thing to open the government's purse strings for the
purchase of much-needed replacement aircraft and gain public support for
independence. The mail operation also would provide a good readiness test
for the Air Corps. 37
After a three-hour discussion with members of his staff, Foulois told the
Post Office that he could see "no reason why the Army could not handle the
mails and handle them satisfactorily." Asked when the Air Corps could take
over this task, Foulois answered, rather hastily: "I think we can be ready in
about a week or ten days." 38 Later that day Roosevelt announced the con
tract cancellations and ordered the Air Corps to begin hauling the mail on
February 19. 39
The chief of the Air Corps had erred on two accounts. Because of the
hastily arranged discussions with the Post Office, he had not consulted the
Chief of Staff General MacArthur until after he had volunteered the air arm's
services. Caught off guard, and believing that the army's reputation was on
the line, MacArthur told a press conference: "I have the utmost confidence
the Army will handle the air mail in a magnificent way." 40 But MacArthur
did not like surprises, and Foulois's stock no doubt dropped another notch
in the War Department.
The second error was Foulois's failure to appreciate the extent to which
airmail operations req uired proficiency i n night and instrument flying
skills his aviators lacked. Imbued with the "can-do" spirit, he had charged
ahead without giving the issue serious thought. H e told himself that flying
�
the mail could be no more hazardous than normal -peacetime training. 41 Per-
haps that was true, but the public had never been concerned with the Air
Corps's large number of annual flying accidents. Flying the mail was another
story.
The Air Corps was poorly equipped for mail service. Army planes nor-
\.
mally did not have the blind-flying instruments or radios that were essential
for airmail operati ons. Military av iators traditionally favored light, maneu
verable planes and trained primarily for combat operations in good weather
during daylight hours, when the enemy could be located and engaged. As
one combat veteran pointed out: "In war we must see our objective. "42 Fly
ing the mail involved both nighttime operations and navigation across great
stretches of the country in all kinds of weather. Foulois was not insensitive
to this; he ordered each mail plane equipped with a directional gyro (com
pass), an artificial horizon (aircraft attitude indicator), and at least a radio
receiver. Mechanics hastily installed this equipment, frequently in hard-to
see locations. Foulois also ordered a quick inst1ument refresher course for
his ainnail pilots, but it was too little too late. Army avi ators, with only
limited weather-flying experience, were not about to trust their fate to some
new-fangled gauges. Instead, they tended to rely on the seat of their pants
when they encountered bad weather, or they tried to go beneath the clouds.
To compound the situation, as operations started on February 19, the nation
was hit by some of the worst weather in its history. Snow, rain, dense fog,
and icy gales prevailed throughout the month across much of the country. 43
Air Corps pilots struggled valiantly against the elements in their open
cockpit machines, and Foulois did everything possible to ensure that his
aviators complied with strict flight-safety rules. Still, the first weeks were
marked by crash after crash, which took the lives of six Air Corps fliers.
Roosevelt and the congressional Democrats were embarrassed. Clearly the
Air Corps was not up to the task. Just as clearly in FDR's view Foulois
had put him in a difficult spot. 44
In late March Roosevelt authorized new contracts with the commercial
airlines, which would take over all airmail routes by June
With the arrival
l.
of better weather in mid-March and increased instrument proficiency, army
aviators did a much-improved job during the last months of the operation .
The Air Corps's overall record, however, was not good: twelve deaths, sixty
six crashes, and a scheduled sortie completion rate of only 65.83 per
cent a rate well below that of the commercial airlines for the same months
in previous years. The operating cost of seventy cents per mile flown was
almost double the cost of commercial airmail operations. 45
The airmail episode did produce some positive results. Military fliers
received valuable training and instrument-flying experience, and the Air
Corps awakened to the need for an extensive ins trument training program.
This new appreciation fo r an all-weather capability would pay great di vi
dends during World War II. Also, the airmail operation was the final stimu
lus that brought the GHQ Air Force into being.
•
Responding to widespread criticism, Secretary of War George Dern in

March appointed a special committee to analyze Air Corps deficiencies. 46
Fou lois was a member of this special committee, chaired by former Secre
tary of War Newton Baker. However, the Air Corps chief kept a low profile
during the Baker board's deliberat ions. The other uniformed members of the
group were senior ground officers who held no love for Foulois. Only re
cent! y the origin of Congressman McSwain's latest bill to create a separate
air force had come to light. Then there was the army's embarrassment over
the Air Corps's showing in the airmail fiasco. Foulois, well aware in the
spring of 1 934 that some members of Congress were after his scalp as well,
decided this was a time to show his fellow board members what a coopera
tive person he could be. He refused to comment when army avi ators ap
peared before Baker's group to argue the case for an independent air arm.
Instead, he asked the board's endorsement only for a GHQ Air Force and
for completing the Air Corps's ai rcraft expansion program begun in 1926.
The aviation pioneer was ready to put aside for the time being his dreams of
a separate air organization in order to gain immediately the G H Q Air
Force. 47 Other members of the Air Corps were soon to take the same view.
The Baker board's mid-July report was quickly accepted by the Gen
eral Staff and became the War Department's official aviation policy. On
March l , 1935, the GHQ Air Force finally came into being as the army
consolidated all Air Corps attack, bombardment, and pursuit units in the
continental United States under the command of veteran aviator Lieutenant
Colonel Frank Andrews. Promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier gen
eral, Andrews was to report directly to the army chief of staff in peacetime
and to the theater commander in time of war. Foulois's efforts had finally
secured a centrally controlled air-strike force for the Air Corps. The GHQ
Air Force, capable of offensive, concentrated operations unhindered by the
whims of local ground commanders, would serve as the rnodel for America's
World War II air organization. 48 But for Foulois, the victory was only half
won, for the chief of the Air Corps had no control over this force. H i s re
sponsibilities remained as they were before to organ ize, train, and equip
the army's air arm and to develop employment doctrine. 49 This division of
respon sibility between Air Corps headquarters and the GHQ Air Force (later
called the Air Force Combat Command) would not end until the eve of
American entry into World War II, years after Foulois had retired.
The new GHQ Air Force not only gave the Air Corps a more sensible
arrangement for can·ying out its coast defense responsibilities but it also
provided the kind of organ ization that could best carry out strategic bom
bardment. While Foulois was no doctrinal innovator, he fully agreed with
the views of his subordinates: coast defense might be the Air Corps's most
important immediate mission in wartime, but once the enemy's invasion
forces had been driven off, it was the air arm's strategic air campaign agai nst
the hostile nation that would deliver victory. Since the War Department
adamantly denied the decisiveness of strategic bombardment, and since the
American public refused even to consider the possibility of offe nsive mili
tary operati ons, Foulois and his subordinates had to wal k a fine li ne.
During his four years as chief, Fou lois encouraged the Air Corps Tactical
Schoo] at Maxwell Field, Alabama, to continue refming strategic bombard
ment doctrine, while he worked within the War Department to win greater
acceptance of the usefulness of long-range bombers. Although Foulois never
made strategic bombing a major issue in his somewhat antagonistic relation
ship with the General Staff, some senior Army officers, like MacArthur and
his War Plans Division chief, Brigadier General Charles Ki lbourne, finally
came to the conclusion in 1934 that, in some circumstances, air activity
beyond the immediate theater of ground operations might be useful. Bomb
ing of rear areas, while certai nly not decisive in its own right, could assist
the army indirectly. 50
Foulois realized that the current state of aviation technology did not sup
port the claims of Air Corps Tact ical School strategic bombing advocates.
Nor could existing planes, with their limited range and load carrying capac
ity, be shifted quickly from coast to coast to attack an enemy's invasion fleet.
It was obvious to him that the Air Corps could not ignore bomber research
and development, even in the Great Depression years, if i t hoped to serve
the nation effectively in time of war. He agreed with others in the Air Corps
that bombers should have top priority, for they could protect the American
homeland and then go on to destroy an enemy's war-making capabilities in
a strategic air campmgn.
• • •
In December 1 933 Foulois had submitted to the General Staff a request

to develop an experimental bomber with a 5,000-mile range and a speed of
200 miles an hour. He had pointed out that the aircraft could rapi dly deploy
to defend either coast as well as Panama, H awai i , or Alaska, but he had
astutely avoided mentioning that i t also would be an ideal plane to carry out
a long-range strategic air campaign against an enemy's heartland. Much to
his surprise, a less than enthusiastic General Staff gave rather grudging
approval to "Project A" in May 1 934. The experimental bomber, a Boeing
bu ilt XB- 1 5, did not fly until 1937, and subsequent flight tests showed that
it was too large for engines available at the time. Nevertheless, Project A
and later research and development initiated by Foulois advanced the state
I
of aeronautical technology and led to the unparalleled U . S . heavy bomber

forces of World War I I . 5 1
The air chief was not satisfied with just providing for the future. When
the Air Corps finally received more money for aircraft procurement in mid-
1934, Foulois directed his staff to seek bids for a quantity order of new
bombers. H e was elated when he heard about the Boeing entry in the August
1935 prototype flyoff. The Boeing 299 ( later designated the XB- 1 7) cruised
2, 100 mi les from the company's Seattle plant to Dayton, Ohio, at an average
speed of 232 miles an hour. Nearly as fast as existing fighter planes, and
able to carry 2,500 pounds of bombs to distant targets, here was an aircraft
to make strategic bombardment possible. 52 Technology had finally caught
up with doctrine.
The Air Corps had made great progress while Fou lois was at the helm,
yet his last two years as chief were not happy ones. Senior army officers
were angered by his open advocacy of a separate air force and his uncoop
erative attitude whenever Air Corps interests were involved. They also com
plained that he spent too much time out flying and visiting air units across
the country to properly discharge his duties in Washington. But Fou lois's
greatest headaches in 1 934- 1 935 came from Congress rather than from the
General Staff.
H i s problems started in February 1934 when the House Military Affairs
Committee decided to investigate military aircraft procurement. Foulois and
previous ch iefs of the Air Corps had played somewhat loose with procure
ment statutes, using negotiated contracts rather than competitive bidding to
buy new planes. The avi ators believed they could better control quality and
prices by arranging contracts with proven producers. Applicable laws and
army regulations contained enough loopholes to allow this practice, and Air
Corps procurement officers were careful to ensure that aircraft manufactur
ers did not make undue profits. 53
When Congressman McSwain and his colleagues learned in early 1934
that the Air Corps had been using negotiated contracting, they were dis
mayed. The procurement provisions of the 1926 Air Corps Act had been
written specifically to foster competitive buying practices. Members of the
House Mil itary Affairs Committee, stunned by fatalities during the early
weeks of the airmail operation, suspected the army's air arm was buying
inferior planes under an i llegal procurement system. They decided to
investigate. 54
Representative Williams Rogers' subcommittee of the House Mili tary Af
fairs Committee opened hearings on March 7, 1934. Rogers was clearly on
\
a witch-hunt. H i s subcommittee did not stop to determine whether Air Corps

aircraft were, in fact, inferior. Instead, it charged ahead looking for the
corruption the members were sure they would uncover, only to discover
there had been none. The subcommittee realized that investigations which
reveal no misdeeds soon lose the publicity on which politicians flourish. I t
needed to find a guilty party. Rogers and his colleagues decided that
Foulois, a leading advocate of negotiated contracts, might be a suitable
candidate.
Appearing before the subcommittee on the first day of hearings, Foulois
defended the negotiated-purchase system. When Representative Edward
Goss asserted that the army's judge advocate general had rendered opinions
in the past branding negotiated quantity purchases illegal, Foulois angrily
responded: "You have indicated that he says it was illegal. I am not certain
of that. . . . Every contract we have ever signed has gone to the Judge
Advocate General, and has always come back legally sufficient. Is that the
interpretation that the Judge Advocate General, h imself, is illegally approv
ing these contracts?" When other subcommittee members claimed that such
contracts violated army regulations (which they did not), Foulois became
riled. Without considering his words, he shot back: "That i s perfectly all
right. I have overlooked the army regulations and broken them hundreds of
times in the interest of the Government, and I will break them again." 55
This angry outburst helped the subcommittee to choose him as its target .
So, too, did the airmail episode. After all, Foulois had not only assured
the president that his aviators could do the job but had also told the Rogers
subcommittee that the Air Corps was properly trained and equipped for the
operation. Congressmen Rogers and Lister H i l l had believed Foulois and
had defended the air arm against charges to the contrary on the House floor,
arguing that bad weather, and not Air Corps deficiencies, caused the early
difficulties. 56 When accidents continued, the subcommittee members were
left with egg on their faces. They concluded that Fou lois had intentionally
lied to them and began a review of his earl ier testimony in search of more
lies. Their attention was quickly drawn to his February l testimony before
McSwain's committee, in which he supported the bill to create a separate
air force.
Foulois had appeared before the Military Affairs Committee that day on
the short-notice request of McSwain and had used his customary approach
of campaigning for Air Corps independence by damning the General Staff's
purportedly inept handling of military aviation. H e had prefaced his re
marks by saying he was only expressing his personal opinion . Then, at his
•
vitriolic best, he had lashed out in an unguarded manner, mixing opinion

with fact. To McSwain's delight, he told the committee that "the main
obstacle" to mili tary aviation progress over the past twenty years "has been
the War Department General Staff." 57 These remarks, replete with overgen
eralizations, became a wellspring of trouble for him as the Rogers subcom
mittee checked them for accuracy. Fou lois had not deliberately l i ed to
McSwain's committee. H e had simply followed his usual approach of stating
the case against the General Staff in the worst possible terms.
Concern over the air ch iefs deceptiveness, rather than over his involve
ment in negotiated contracting, became the driving force behind the Rogers
subcommittee's continued in vestigation. The congressmen latched onto ev
ery inconsistency and every biased opinion in Foulois's February 1 testi
mony in an attempt to prove his duplicity. During May and early June of
1934, Rogers called four senior General Staff officers to testify in closed
session on the accuracy of Foulois's remarks and his fitness to serve as chief
of the Air Corps.
As might be expected, the ground officers described Foulois in rather
black terms. General K ilbourne, who had butted heads repeatedly with him
over the past two years, objected strongly to Foulois's contention that the
General Staff knew nothing about military aviation and was unresponsive to
Air Corps needs. Other senior officers joined in refuting the assertions made
by the air chief. Committee members asked Kilbourne for his appraisal of
Foulois. "For a man to come up here and make such statements as he had
made to you, which are easily capable of being refuted, it looks like he is
crazy," volunteered the chief of the War Plans Division. 58 The deputy chief
of staff, Major General H ugh Drum, went even further: "My personal
opinion is that he is not a fit officer to he Chief of the Air Corps. " The
subcotnmittee now had the biased views of several ranking officers as addi
tional evidence that Foulois had sought to deceive the Military Affairs
Committee. 59
The investigation had been a success; an individual had been found who
was responsible for both i llegal contracting and the airmail debacle. Fur
ther, that same individual had l ied to the members of Congress. The Rogers
subcommittee charged Foulois with all three offenses in its final report of
June 1 5, 1 934, and demanded that he be removed immediately from his
position of chief of the Air Corps. 60
The pioneer aviator was justifiably angered by the report. Evidence sup
porting the charges was extremely tenuous, and virtually all of it had been
gathered i n closed session in the absence of the accused. The charge of
using i l legal contracting methods was absurd. The navy, bound by the same
procurement laws, had also been using negotiated contracts for ai rcraft pur
chases. The House Naval Affairs Committee had looked into the situation
in early 1 934 and had endorsed the nav y's practices. Likewise, the army's
judge advocate general had consistently approved the Air Corps's negotiated
contracts. 61
Foulois's opinionated overgeneralizations of February l provided some
evidence to support the charge of ly ing. H e had lambasted the General Staff
without concern for objectivity, but he had done that before. In his view, he
was explaining the real ity of the Air Corps's situation, and he had warned
the committee at the outset that he was giving it his personal opinion. The
fact remai ns, however, that some of his remarks did present a d istorted
p1cture.
•
The third charge, that of inefficiency and mismanagement in the airmail

operation, was ridiculous. No doubt Foulois had exercised poor judgment
when he told Post Office offic ials the Air Corps was up to the task. Yet he
did everything in his power to enforce flight safety regulations and to provide
proper aircraft and facilities to his mail-carrying aviators. The airmail op
eration was not mismanaged; it was simply a task that overtaxed the capa
bili ties of the air arm.
His rage nearly out of control, Foulois reacted at once to the subcommit
tee's report. In a bitter statement to reporters, he damned the subcommittee's
use of secret sessions, argued his innocence, and 'chall enged Rogers and
his colleagues: "I am ready and willing at any time to · meet my accusers i n
open court . " The frustrated air chief demanded that the subcommittee pro
vide him a transcript of the hearings, a necessary step if he was to refute
the charges against him. 62 H e renewed this plea throughout the summer, but
Rogers would not budge.
Public opinion quickly sided with Foulois, as newspapers throughout the
country protested both the subcommittee's findings and its secret methods.
A Washington Evening Star editorial summed up the c1ux of the press
cnt1c1sm:
• • •
The House Subcommittee on M i litary Affairs did not content itself w i th

merely making to the Secretary of War a report of its findings. It
tried if you can call i t a trial General Fou lois, found him guilty,
and acting as judge and jury, sentenced him to be dismissed, and
called upon Mr. Dern to cany out the sentence. This appears, at best,
to be a high-handed proceeding on the part of the subcommittee. . . .
A trial conducted behind cl osed doors, with the prosecutors acting as
•
both judge and jury, is certainly repugnant to all ideals of American

justice. 63
Secretary of War George Dern, although no friend of Fou lois's, took a

similar view. When Rogers demanded that Dern immediately remove the
aviation pioneer, the secretary replied that the subcommittee would first
have to give Foulois a complete transcript of the testimony so he could
respond to the charges. 64
In December, Dern and Rogers finally reached a compromise. The War
Department would have the inspector general (IG) investigate the charges
against Foulois, and the subcommittee would provide the IG a transcript of
the secret hearings. 65 The air chief was displeased by this turn of events; he
had little confidence in the army's ability to carry out an impartial investi-·
gation, especially with Congressman Rogers and other lawmakers taking
such an active interest i n the case.
Dern released the IG's final report on June 1 4, 1935. The secretary of
war explained:
The Inspector General found with regard to these allegations, first, that
the evidence adduced did not establish that General Fou lois violated
existing laws in the purchase of airplanes and ai rcraft materials; sec
ond, that there was no cause for censure in General Foulois' opinional
staten1ents with regard to the capacity of his corps to fly the air mail;
and third, General Foulois did depart from the ethics and standards of
the service by making exaggerated, unfair, and misleading statements
to a Congressional committee. 66
For this minor misdeed Dern sent Foulois a letter of reprimand. 67

Both the chief of the Air Corps and the Rogers subcommittee considered
the IG's conclusions tantamount to an acquittal. Pleased and relieved, Fou
lois thought that his ordeal was over. Rogers, however, was livid. On June
15, on the House floor, he blasted what he called "a slap on the wrist"
administered to "a liar and perjurer. " 6 8 The subcommittee's vindictive
chairman would not give up his campaign to oust the air chief.
Rogers' attacks and the continuing hostility of the M i l itary Affairs Com
mittee persuaded Foulois to reach a difficult decision in August 1935. He
concluded that the committee members' feelings toward him might adversely
affect subsequent Air Corps legislation. Frustrated and disheartened by the
continued pressure for his removal and wanting to spare his beloved Air
Corps further problems, Foulois announced he would retire at the end of
December and would begin terminal leave on September 25.69
At the end of September, General Foulois sli pped quietly out of Washing
ton, sick at heart. He returned just as quietly on Christmas Day, going out
to Bolling Field to make his last flight as an Air Corps pilot. As his 0-38F
lifted into the sky, he again experienced that special elation known only to
aviators. That evening Foulois partied with members of his staff and remi
nisced about old times. Six days later, on New Year's Eve, he stopped by
his office to clean out his desk. H e still was persona non grata in the War
Department, and no one from the General Staff dropped in to say good-bye.
Foulois signed out at five o'clock. H e was fifty-six years of age and his career
as a military officer was over. 70
Fou lois had played an instrumental role in strengthening the Air Corps
as a combat force. Firmly believing in the importance of military aviation,
he had worked to place i t i n a position of prominence in the nation's defense
structure. As chief of the Air Corps, he had persistently campaigned to free
the air arm from General Staff control unti l mid- 1934, when his problems
with the House subcommittee required him to temper his advocacy. H e had
supplied the continuing pressure on the War Department that resulted i n
the creation of the GHQ Air Force. Fou lois had struggled throughout his
tour as air chief to equip the Air Corps with more and better aircraft. H e
had badgered the General Staff to provide the Air Corps with the necessary
funds and had frequently complained to Congress over what he considered
ground-officer neglect of military aviation needs. H e had gained War De
partment approval of long-range bomber development and pressed the Gen
eral Staff to accept the Air Corps's offensive employment concepts. As a
result of his efforts, the army's air arm was far better prepared to meet the
challenges of World War I I . And he had prepared the ground for the postwar
independent air force that he had long desired.
General Foulois remained a strong advocate of air power throughout the
remainder of his life. He settled i n Ventnor, New Jersey, but was frequently
on the road during the years leading up to World War II, giving speeches
on preparedness and the importance of military aviation. During World War
I I , Foulois ran New Jersey's civil defense program; afterward he returned to
private life. When his wife became terminal l y ill in 1959 and was confined
to the Andrews Air Force Base hospital near Washington, Foul ois moved
into base guest quarters to be near her. After her death, Air Force chief of
staff General Thomas D. White invited him to continue living at Andrews
and to undertake a speaking tour on the importance of air power: Foulois
eagerly accepted both offers. After twenty-five years� he was once again part
of the Air Force he had helped to create. Over the next several years he
traveled more than 1 ,000,000 miles to tell the mili tary aviation story. 7 1
G E 0 R G E W. L EW I S
A N D T H E MA N A G E M E N T O F
A E R O N A U T I CA L R E S EA R C H
J A M E S R. H A N S E N
One of the most important early leaders of American aeronautical research

and development was engineer George William Lewis ( 1 882- 1 948). For
nearly thirty years, from 1919 to 1 94 7, Lewis served as director of research
for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics ( N ACA), an indepen
dent federal agency created in 1 9 1 5 to give advice on aeronautical matters,
particularly to the nation's armed services.
By the time of World War II, Lewis led an organ ization of more than
6,000 people working in national laboratories in Virginia, Ohio, and Cali
fornia. He personally recru i ted and trained many of the NACA staff, includ
ing scientists, engineers, test pilots, and technicians. His researchers con
ducted aeronautical experiments using wind tunnels and other unique test
equipment that might not have been built if Lewis had not presented the
rationales and plans for them so persuasively to Congress. By 1945 this
research equipment was worth a total of $ 1 00 million. And once facilities
had been authorized and procured for the NACA laboratories, Lewis was
the one who, above all others, made sure that they were used productively. 1
Congress had created the NACA in 1 9 1 5 "to supervise and direct the
scientific and technical problems of flight with a view to their practical so
lution." The leaders of America's embryonic aviation establishinent, how
ever, had been in sharp d isagreement over how to interpret this mandate.
Some had felt that the NACA should remain small and continue to serve as
merely an advisory body, devoted to pure scientific research. Others had
argued that the N ACA should grow larger and combine basic research with
engineering and technology development. This second group, which in-
'
eluded Lewis, wanted the N ACA to attack the most pressing problems ob
structing the immediate progress of American aviation, particularly those
that were vexing the fledgling military air services and aircraft manufactur
ing and operating industries.
Under Lewis's carefu l direction, the NA.CA moved slowly but surely along
the second course. By the mid-1920s, engineers, not scientists, were i n
charge, and the keystone of the NACA's charter rested securely in their
notion of "practical solutions." Over the next twenty years, NACA con
ducted research into basic aerodynamic, structural, and propulsion prob
lems whose solutions led to the design and operation of safer, faster, higher
fly ing, and generally more versatile and dependable aircraft. With these
aircraft, the United States became a world power in commercial aviation
and Allied victory in World War II was assured. In the opinion of many
experts, the NACA did "at least as much for aeronautical progress as any
organization in the world," and "a very high proportion of the credit for that
work" was due to Lewis. 2
Lewis was born March 10, 1 882, in Ithaca, New York, the first of two
chi ldren and the only son of Edith Sweetland and William Henry Lewis, a
sales representative for the American LaFrance Fire Engine Company.
When George was a young boy, the family moved to Scranton, Pennsylvania,
but for college he returned to Ithaca, where he still had relatives, and en
rolled at Cornell University. In the summers from 1904 to 1907, he did
machine and foundry work in the hydraulic turbine department of A llis
Chalmers, the old Dickson Manufacturing Company plant, in Scranton. H e
also helped to conduct experiments on gas engines for the Fairbanks-Grant
Company i n Ithaca.
After graduating from Cornell U n i versity as a mechanical engineer in
1 908, Lewis married Dolly Myrtle Harvey, a chi ldhood sweetheart whose
father owned a silk mill in Scranton; with her he would eventually rear six
children. Staying at Cornell for graduate studies, Lewis served in the
engineering col lege as an i nstructor of machine design and experimental
eng1neenng.
• •
After receiving a master's degree in 1910, Lewis joined the faculty of

Swarthmore Coll ege as an assistant professor of mechanical engineering. In
a department of only four members, he taught a variety of courses, including
kinematics, machine work and design, steam- and gas-power machinery,
power plants, and the principles of manufacturing and factory management.
With Swarthmore located adjacent to Philadelphia, and with the im por
tant manufacturing centers in its vicinity, Lewis naturally grew fa miliar with
•
G E O R G E W. L E W I S : 9 5
a number of different engineering and industrial organizations. One of the

more interesting of these was Clarke Thomson Research, a private founda
tion established i n Philadelphia i n September 1 9 1 6 "for the purpose of
aiding the advancement of the science of aviation," especially aircraft
propulsion. 3
At the end of the spring term in 1 9 1 7 , with the United States having just
entered the war in Europe, Lewis resigned his teaching post at Swarthmore
and accepted a job with Clarke Thomson Research as its "engineer-in
charge." A few months later, the owner tendered the facilities of his young
organization to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, itself only
two years old , with the request that the N AC A "direct the future activities
of the research." The NACA did that for the rest of the war.
During this period, Lewis became deeply involved in basic applied re
search designed to increase the power and efficiency of aircraft engines.
The subject he studied most intensively was supercharging, a mechanical
means for obtai ning greater power in takeoffs and for preventing loss in
power at high altitudes by aspirating the engine. Another wartime investi
gation at Clarke Thomson involved him, curiously enough, in exploring the
possibilities of the gas turbine as a power plant for airplanes. As director of
aeronautical research for the N ACA i n the 1920s and 1 930s, Lewis would
be pessimistic about the future of jet propulsion. 4 Perhaps his early experi
ences all of them disappointing with gas-turbine applications during his
Clarke Thomson days first led him to believe that inherent technical diffi
culties would forever eliminate the turbojet as an effective aircraft power
source.
Lewis's supervision of aircraft engine research at Clarke Thomson brought
him into close contact with the staffs of the NACA and the National Bureau
of Standards (NBS), and it was this association with federal agencies i n
Washington that eventually earned him a niche in the NACA itself. I n 1918,
while still with Clarke Thomson, Lewis joined the NACA's Subcommittee
on Power Plants for Aircraft. In this role he made such a positive impression
on N AC A leadership that the chairman of the Subcommittee on Personnel,
Buildings, and Equipment, Joseph Ames of Johns Hopkins U n i versity, rec
ommended i n September 1919 that Lewis he made the NACA's "executive
officer," a new position which was to be under the control of the NACA's
Executive Committee. According to Ames, Lewis possessed the necessary
"professional experience and talent," but his most outstanding qualities
were his "forcefu l personality and leadership." 5
In the early years of the NACA, during and immediately after World War
\
I, its committee system had worked satisfactorily without a strong executive

structure because the range of tasks the agency sought to accomplish had
been limited. The NACA mediated the bitter patent dispute between the
Wright-Martin Company and Glenn Curtiss over the wi ng-warping technique
for the lateral control of airplanes. It evaluated aeronau tics-related inven
tions for the War Department and elaborated a plan by which an Aircraft
Production Board became a branch of the Council of National Defense. It
helped the aircraft industry what there was of it by coordinating meet
ings between manufacturers and the armed services and by bringing order
to the procedure by which the military procured aircraft . Through the Sub
committee on Motive Power, it worked to stimulate production of the high
performance Liberty airplane engine. Continuing to lack research facilities
of its own, the NACA sponsored wind-tunnel tests and other aerodynamic
tests at Stanford University, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
and at the navy's model basin in Washington, D. C . Until its laboratory i n
Virginia was operational, however, the NACA could not venture far be
yond the advisory fu nctions explicitly expressed in the agency's founding
legislation.
As the construction of the first buildings at Langley Memorial Aeronau
tical Laboratory near Hampton, Virginia, approached completion i n 1 9 1 9 ,
it had become clear to N ACA leaders that someone inside the NACA had to
take charge of research activities. With flight testing just beginning at Lang
ley Field, and with wind-tunnel operations soon to begin there, the NACA
desperately needed someone to take over the responsibilities of the labora
tory's daily administration.
For some time the committee had been searching for a prestigious scien
tist to direct the research effort, but the first three candidates who seemed
right for the job (one of whom was H arvard physicist Percy William Bridg
man, a future Nobel laureate) each turned it down. After further fruitless
searching, the NACA decided to redefine the position and to hire thirty
seven-year-old George Lewis as "executive officer" someone to carry out
the will of the Executive Committee instead of "director of aeronautical
research," with the autonomy that title implied. For $5,000 a year, Lewis's
job would be to implen1ent the programs and policies set forth by the Execu
tive Committee, which was the real governing body of the NACA, and to
report results directly back to the chairman of that committee.
Lewis did not have impressive scientific or engineering credentials, but
he soon demonstrated extraordinary leadership both inside and outside the
organization. Although modest and self-effacing, his personality inspired
•
G E O R G E W. L E W I S 9 7
respect and admiration. And somehow he had acquired both the savvy re
quired for winning military and congressional su pport for aeronautical pro
grams and the bureaucratic seamanship necessary for steering a safe course
through deep and frequently troubled political waters. A key advantage in
this regard was Lewis's ability to translate scientific and technical jargon
into language understood and appreciated by the lay public. This talent,
which so many great scientists and engineers lacked, would prove invalu
able to the NACA in its everyday business. In 1 923 the NACA recognized
Lewis's many talents and promoted him to director of research, "a t i tle that
described what he had been doing almost from the start." 6
Originally, the N AC A meant to install Lewis in an office at Langley Field,
hut he convinced the committee that he could be more effective in Washing
ton. There he could deal with political and bureaucratic matters on a daily
basis and still be only an overnight steamer ride or a ninety-minute airplane
flight from Hampton. A little distance between himself and his staff at Lang
ley would give the researchers an important sense of freedom and autonomy,
Lewis predicted, while his almost weekly visits to the laboratory and careful
daily communiques could keep him abreast of all the vital operations.
When Lewis first took charge of the NACA's research program in Novem
ber 1919, there were only twenty employees at the infant Langley Memorial
Aeronautical Laboratory, and only ten had any college education. Flight
test work had just gotten underway with three war-surplus Curtiss JN-4
Jennys on loan from the army, but a wind tunnel then under construction
would not be ready to operate for eight months.
Overall, prospects for success at the new laboratory, the NACA's only
research facility, looked pitiful. Construction of Langley Field, i n the midst
of America's rushed involvement in World War I, had been a mess. Along
with "the muddiest mud, the weediest weeds, the dustiest dust and the most
ferocious mosquitoes the world has ever known," there had been serious
labor problems, an influenza epidemic, primitive housing, and generally
poor relations between the military and its NACA tenants. The situation had
grown so bad at the tidewater site that plans for a combined army-NACA
aeronautical-experiment station had been scrapped. At one point, the
NACA had even requested congressional approval to move its lab from
Langley to Bolling Field in the District of Columbia. 7
These were just some of the problems that Lewis faced when he joined
the NACA in 1919. He also had to begin building virtually from scratch
an institutional basis for a comprehensive and far-sighted agenda of aero
nautical research, for which many of the nation's leaders had high hopes
and for which others had no hopes at all. Those whose aim was high wanted
the United States to regain the upper hand over the major European nations
for the first time since the Wright brothers had flown their machines over
Huffman Prairie, and they hoped the NACA would be a potent force in
accomplishing this feat. It might have seemed to them that Lewis, with only
his college teaching and two years of research at Clarke Thomson in hand,
possessed limited leadership qualities.
Lewis soon resolved all doubts about his abi lity. With the help of John F.
Victory, the N ACA's fastidious executive secretary, he built up a small (sev
enteen members in 1923) but efficient administrative staff at NACA head
quarters. This staff kept the wheels of the agency running smoothly through
the morass of government paperwork and red tape. Staff members also is
sued written instructions to the laboratory personnel and supervised the
preparation of technical papers for publication, distributing them to users
in the military services, i ndustries, universities, and various government
departments.
Perhaps more importantly, though, Lewis gave strong personal direction
to the budding research enterprise at Langley. For a national aeronautical
research program to thrive, it needed a maestro '�someone with a passion
for the engineering objective, not for position in a permanent organization."
Driven by "a consuming appetite for knowledge of the details of the job,"
Lewis orchestrated a team performance. In order to see how things were
getting along when supervisors were absent, he made unannounced and
after-hours visits to the shops, offices, and lunchrooms. As with a Toscanini
or a Bernstein, the quality of the performance and the appreciation of it by
an audience were the maestro's only criteria of success. 8
In Langley's formative years when so many things about aviation were
sti l l unknown or untried, when so many things could have gone wrong and
so many th ings in fact did George Lewis was the N ACA's maestro of tech
nology. This is not to suggest that he was its most bri11 iant thinker or boldest
visionary ; he was far from either of those. H e was, in fact, exceedingly
cautious and shortsighted when it came to the promise of alternative or
radically new aeronautical technologies such as hel icopters, jet and rocket
propulsion , and supersonic aerodynamics. But Lewis was the engineer
manager with pri rnary responsibi l ity for building the N A C A into a competent
organ ization, capable of generating the successful basic research that would
make possible evolutionary American progress in aeronautical technology.
He had tremendous faith in the talents and intel ligence of his research staff.
Although he might disagree on technical matters, he was tolerant and
•
G E O R G E Wo L E W I S : 9 9
imaginative enough to know that bright members of the staff should not be
discouraged from pursuing ideas in which they believed strongly, as long
as those pursuits did not unduly interfere with work on the NACA's high-
pnon ty Items.
0 0 0
To appreciate the effect of Lewis's direction of Langley, one must first

consider the unhealthy state of aeronautical development when he became
the NACA's executive officer in 1 91 9. Al though there had been important
technological breakthroughs during World War I , frai l wooden biplanes cov
ered with fabric, braced by wires, powered by heavy water-cooled engines,
and driven by hand-carved wooden propellers still ruled the airways. The
principles of aeronau tical engineering had yet to be fully discovered, and
only a few programs at major schools like MIT and the University of Michi:
gan existed to find them and teach them to students. The design of aircraft
remained a largely i ntuitive and empirical practice requiring bold specula
tion and daring, in both a financial and technological sense.
In terms of engineering, there were still a number of bothersome and
potentially dangerous unknowns. No one knew for sure how to reduce engine
drag without degrading cooling. No one knew with certainty how to shape
wings to increase lift or to diminish the effects of turbulence. No one knew
how and when flaps, ailerons, and other control surfaces worked best. No
one knew if i t was even worthwhile to retract landing gears (according to
various pundits, the added weight and complexity of a retractable under
carriage would not be worth the saving in air resistance). Substantial in
creases in aerodynamic efficiency might follow on the heels of con·ect an
swers to just a few of these technical concerns, but no one knew exactly
how, or even whether to try, to get at them.
For Lewis, a mechanical engineer with no boyhood experiences as a
model airplane builder or college work in aeronautics or trials as a pilot,
the principles of flight were equally mysterious. "He understood engines
and power," recalled NACA associate Jerome C. Hu nsaker, "but airplanes
were strange to him and he was distressed by their erratic and unpredictable
performance. " 9 Aware of his shortcomings, Lewis set out to improve his
understand ing of the airplane's many unique features as a mechanical mode
of transportation.
As a NACA official, Lewis attended virtually all important meetings, ex
ercized the responsibility for publishing all NACA reports, monitored all
research at Langley Field, and dealt regularly with the many aeronautical
authorities in the Washington area; it was not long before Lewis the engine
man became Lewis the expert on flight technology. Work ing out of the
1 0 0 : A V I A T I O N 'S G O L D E N A G E
NACA's office in the Navy Building at Seventeenth and B streets northwest,

Lewis came to know the nation's aviation leaders on both a professional and
personal basis, cultivating contacts and creating friendships during long
hours in the NACA co nference room or in the back halls of the Army-Navy
and Cosmos clubs. Because the NACA's offices were in the Navy Building,
he grew especially close to key officers in naval aviation. The most important
of these were Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, chief of the navy's Bureau
of Aeronautics; Captain Emory S. Land, assistant chief of BuAer; and Lieu
tenant Commander Walter S. Diehl, BuAer's aerodynamics expert and offi
cer in charge of liaison with the NACA.
As Lewis grew more and more familiar with flight technology and with the
people and institutions most deeply concerned with its practical advance
ment, he "saw at once that realization of the potentialities of the airplane
must be based on a thorough understanding of the aerodynamic phenomena
involved in flight, in the means of propulsion , and finally on a sure corre
lation of measured flight performance with measured characteristics of the
airplane structure and its power plant." 10 In other words, Lewis recognized
that flight could be demystified and airplanes designed on a rational basis
for a wide range of optimal performances only after the fledgling aviation
establishment, of which the NACA was an integral part, had acquired solid
experimental knowledge of the three interlocking areas aerodynamics,
propulsion, and structures most central to aircraft design and operation.
The most vital arena for aeronautical research, Lewis realized, was the
human mind, not the wind tunnel. Without a knowledgeable staff of creative
scientists, engineers, and technicians, the N ACA could never produce
worthwhile results, no n1atter how good the facilities or how expert the nlan
agement. So Lewis's first goal as director of research was to recruit and
develop a quality research staff.
Originally, Langley's staff was small and it was young with a median
age of only twenty-eight. At the time of the laboratory's formal dedication
on June 1 1 , 1920, it had fewer than thirty employees, and fewer than half
of them held professional ranks i n the civil service. The rest were mechan
ics, carpenters, metalworkers, and other nonprofessionals who were needed
to support the research efforts with various technical services. There were
only a few qualified aeronautical engineers, and their talents were raw. The
most experienced man was twenty-six-year-old David Bacon, who had
worked between 1 9 1 8 and 1921 for Gallaudet Ai rcraft on design, develop
ment, and a certain amount of flight research on seaplanes. The senior aero
dynamicist, Frederick Norton, had worked for less than a year for the Anny
G E O R G E W. L E W I S : 1 0 1
Air Service. This experience, which involved some research in a wind tun
nel at MIT, his alma mater, plus only one year's work with the NACA at
Langley, qualified Norton at age twenty-five (and only three years after his
receiving his B.S. degree) to be the laboratory's chief physicist. H ired fresh
out of school with little practical experience of any kind, the early staff
members had to learf! nearly everything on the job. 1 1
I t was up to Lewis to see that they did learn and that they applied their
learning as quickly as possible to the solution of practical problems. Lan
gley's original organizational chart divided the staff into three simple com
mittees: ( 1 ) the Power Plant Committee, headed by a senior staff engi neer,
(2) the Aerodynamic Committee, headed by a chief physicist, and (3) the
Personnel Committee, headed by a chief clerk. But above this triumvirate
there was no on-the-spot manager. Not until 1923, when senior staff engi
neer Leigh Griffith rose to the top of the organ ization as the lab's first
"engineer-in-charge," did Langley acquire a chief executive officer of
Its own.
•
Before Griffith's appointment as the engineer-in-charge, i t had been nec

essary for Lewis to concern himself directly with everything from checking
the specifteations for the cement to be laid at a new building site to finding
suitable off-base housing for employees. Griffith's appointment lifted some
of this load off his back, but Lewis's leadership role was still necessary.
There were philosophical debates, technical arguments, petty bureaucratic
fights inside Langley's organization, and quarrels between Langley and the
N AC A's Washington office needing his mediation.
One of the nastier of these latter exchanges involved Griffith and John
Victory, the NACA's priggish executive secretary in Washington, in a trivial
dispute over interoffice correspondence policy. Despite Lewis's interven
tion , this squabble led indirectly, in late 1925, to Griffith's premature de
parture from the NACA and to the rapid promotion of electrical engineer
Henry J . E. Reid frorn the instrument research division to the post of
engineer-in-charge. 1 2
Another headache that would not go away for Lewis was Langley's chronic
staffing shortage. In the ten years following the lab's dedication i n 1920,
Lewis successfully enlarged the laboratory staff from the original 30 to 228
members. The difficulty for Lewis was not the numbers hut the high turnover
rate. In the first fifteen years of its operation, from 1919 to 1 934, Langley
experienced no fewer than 600 separations, an average of 40 per year, at a
time when the lab's total complement was never larger than its 1932 level
of 270.
1 0 2 A V I A T I O N'S G O L D E N A G E
In the early years, a primary reason for the many separations was discon
tent with living conditions in the Hampton area. The NACA had built its
laboratory at the remote eastern end of a tidewater peninsula known to some
people in those years as the Asia Minor of Virginia. In the eyes of newly
aiTiving northern professionals and most engineers came from the north
em states that possessed the major polytechnical schools the area ap
peared a cultural backwater. Hampton, the closest community of any size,
with a population of roughly 6,000 in 1920, seemed to them an isolated and
sleepy spot, dreadfully hot and muggy in the summer and oppressed year
round by closed societies of provincial watermen and plantation magnates.
The staff failed to appreciate that the federal government's huge investment
in Langley Field would eventually change the antebellum character of tide
water Virginia significantly. 1 3
A great number of separations also occurred because of the attraction of
other jobs. In the early 1 920s, the nascent aircraft industry had suffered
through the political tumult of the postwar argument over how the future of
aviation should be carried out. But when the noise died down and the fed
eral government made the Kelly bill of 1 925 and the Air Commerce Act of
1926 the first in what turned out to be a series of major national investments
in aviation, the industry took off. Daniel Guggenheim's Fund for the Pro
motion of Aeronautics, launched in 1926, and the public's fascination with
Charles Lindbergh's solo nonstop flight in May 1927 increased the i ndustry's
momentum. With the public awakened to the potential of flight, worldwide
sales of American-built aircraft shot up from 789 units in 1925 to over 6, 000
in 1929. During this boom, which lasted into 1933 in spite of the Great
Depression, it was difficult for the NACA to recruit as many researchers as
i t wanted or to keep them for more than two or three years. 14
Lewis worked with the federal bureaucracy for better salaries and he
strengthened the NACA's recruiting campaigns by sending articulate Lang
ley employees on road trips to all the major engineering colleges and
polytechnical schools. He also wrote personally to aeron autics professors
and college deans about the value of NACA "apprenticeship," that is, a
three- or four-year job at Langley prior to employment in the aircraft indus
try. J-Ie also tried to improve the employee's morale by helping them to build
and enjoy a nearby "Shore Camp" for fishing, picnicking, and other vacation
activities. His major contribution, however, was to make Langley into a
productive laboratory like no other in the world, a mecca of aeronautical
research to which dynamic young scientists and engineers would be drawn
even if salaries and living conditions were less than ideal.
•
G E O R G E W. L E W I S : 1 0 3
The major shrine in this mecca was the wind tunnel, the aerod ynamic
testing device that had been instrumental in the achievement of powered
flight in the first place. The Wright brothers had built a primitive wind
tunnel in their Dayton bicycle shop after their glider tests of 1 90 1 had re
vealed major i naccuracies in the published aerodynamic data on which they
had been relying. By testing the l ift of each of nearly 200 ai1foil models in
their tunnel, they had obtained much of the critical information needed to
build the highly successful glider of 1 902 and its derivative, the landmark
powered airplane of 1903. Anyone who wanted to follow in their footsteps
and who knew anything about the technical problems of flight recognized
that the wind tunnel was an essential tool. W i thout putting an aircraft shape
through wind-tunnel tests, no one could accurately predict how that shape
would hold up under the conflicting aerodynamic forces that would affect it
in actual flight. 15
In the beginning Langley had only one wind tunnel, and i t hardly quali
fied as a shrine. Patterned after an atmospheric wind tunnel that had been
in operation for some time at the N ational Physical Laboratory in Britain,
the NACA "Tunnel No. 1 " was a learning device that, from the standpoint
of research, was relatively unproductive. By the time it came on line i n June
1920, a new generation of closed-circuit tunnels in Europe had made the
borrowed open-circuit design obsolete.
During the formative age of aeronautical research, however, one con
ceptual breakthrough could quickly make the difference between obsoles
cence and state of the art. In 1923 the world's first compressed-air or
variable-density tunnel (VDT) went into operation at Langley. Designed by
the N AC A's brilliant, German-born aerodynamicist, Dr. Max M. Munk
( 1 890- 1 986), the VDT represented "the first bold step by the NACA to
provide its research personnel with the novel, often complicated, and usu
ally expensive equipment necessary to press forward the frontiers of aero
nautical science." 1 6
A major engineering challenge, the VDT was the world's first high
pressure tunnel of any size. Its specifications called for an 85-ton shell with
walls made from steel plate lapped and riveted according to a practice stan
dard in steam-boiler construction. This huge vessel would have to withstand
pressures as high as twenty atmospheres. An explosion or fire inside when
the air was pumped up to the maximum PSI would not only destroy the
precious test model, balance, and other interior mechanisms, but it could
also kill the men working outside the shell.
The VDT yielded test results so superior to those obtained with any pre-
1 0 4 : A V I A T I O N'S G O L D E N A G E
vious tunnel design, especially regarding wing performance, that it made

the NACA a world leader in aerodynamic research for the next decade.
Aircraft companies, engineering schools, and foreign research establish
ments sent personnel to Langley to study the VDT; they returned home with
ideas for building improved versions of it.
This kind of technological leadership enabled the NACA Langley Labo
ratory to attract ambitious young researchers and to keep a formidable nu
cleus of them on its staff for productive tenures. But Lewis knew that in the
long run it would take more than one wind tunnel, no matter how revolution
ary, for Langley to become the productive technology-development labora
tory demanded by the nati on's military air services and aircraft industries.
New aircraft design and operating problems arose every day. By the mid-
1920s it was clear to experts that fundamental research across the broad
range of technical problems blocking aviation progress required a d iverse
complex of research facilities capable of precise measurements of different
things. It required more sensitive recording devices and other improved
flight-test instrumentation; better equipment for the analysis of engines,
fuels, materials, and structures; and larger, faster, and more specialized
wind tunnels.
Along with the VDT, the most unique and productive research facility
that came to life at Langley i n the 1920s was the Propeller Research Tunnel,
or PRT. Like the V DT, the basic idea for the PRT came from Max Munk.
In order to accommodate a full-scale propeller, the tunnel's throat would
have to be at least twenty feet in diameter. This was four times the size of
the largest wind tunnel at Langley, and it meant that the tunnel structure
would require sixty-four times the volume of any tunnel built there before.
Furthermore, for the test to be practical, the tunnel's airflow would have to
reach at least 100 MPH, and to achieve that it would take 2,000 H P ten
times the power it took to drive the NACA Wind Tunnel No. l and eight
times what i t took to drive the VDT. As neither the Hampton nor the nearby
Newport News generating plants were l arge enough to supply the necessary
electricity to power the PRT, the NACA obtained two surplus 1 , 000-H P
diesel submarine engines from Lewis's friends in the U . S . Navy.
Development of the famous NACA low-drag engine cowling took place
i n the gigantic PRT, as did the equally significant if not more vital
program that identified the aerodynamically optimum location of an engine
in relation to the wing for multiengine aircraft. The NACA engine-placement
program moved American aircraft builders ahead of European manufactur
ers in the early 1 930s by providing them with confidential information basic
'
G E O R G E W. LEWIS : 1 0 5
to the design of pioneering heavy-transport aircraft like the Boeing 24 7 , the

Doug las DC-3, and the Boeing B- 1 7 . 17
Lew is paved the way for these research successes by laying the political
and bureaucratic groundwork req uired for the N ACA's authorization, as well
as for Congress's appropriation, of funds for both faci lities; this amounted to
$262, 000 for the VDT and $29 1 ,000 for the PRT. In fact, w ithout his pro
motional activities neither tunnel likely would have been built. Both con
cepts were rather esoteric, w ith no guarantees that either would prove
workable.
Developing the talents and handl i ng the emotions and ambitions of doz
ens of differently talented personnel was one of Lew is's most important re
sponsibilities. As director of researc h , he had to smooth many ruffled feath
ers and to arbitrate many disputes. The most onerous of these was a heated
contest of w i lls for control of the VDT and PRT tunnels between Munk,
their temperamental father, and the eng ineers at Lang ley responsible for
nurturing them to productive lives. Placating Munk while keeping h i m out
of the hair of the Lang ley engineers who did not care much for Munk's
autocratic temperament was in fact one of the biggest challenges faci ng
Lew is.18
From 1920 throug h 1925, Lew is met the challenge successfully by keep
ing Munk at work on theoretical problems in the NACA's small Washington
off i ce. In early 1926, however, Munk demanded a transfer to Langley
as chief of the aerod ynamics division. Fully cogni zant of Munk's major
achievements for the N A C A up to that point, and know i ng that there were
prominent members of the committee who would not like to see the talen ted
aerodynamicist resign for work elsewhere, Lew is had little choice but to g ive
i n to h i s demand and hope for the best.
Whether one should interpret Munk's stormy resig nation from the N ACA
i n early 1927 as a failure of Lew is's management has been a matter for some
interesting historical debate. 19 What is beyond dispute, t houg h, is that for
the more than six years since Munk's arrival in the Uni ted States in 1920,
Lewis had bent over backw ard to keep a difficult genius happy, to make him
a productive member of the NACA team, and to encourage him to develop
h i s best ideas and boldest proposals. He had even g iven in, against h i s
better judgment, to Mun k's stubborn w ish to move to Lang ley. Eventually
he had to w ithd raw that support, but he did so only after all of the section
heads of the aerodynamics div ision resigned en masse i n protest ag ainst
lVIunk's difficult superv ision.
Lewis's ulti mate d ecision in favor of the section heads was characteristic
of his research management philosophy; he emphasized teamwork over in

dividual genius. In 1 9 3] , for example, he told Langley's engi neer-in
charge, Henry J . E . Reid, to frame and hang in his office or along the
corridor of the adrninistration building a copy of a quotation from a speech
by President Herbert Hoover in praise of Thomas Edison. According to the
quote, "discovery and invention do not spring f u l l-blown f rom the brains of
men"; rather, they result f rom the "long and patient" labor of a "host of
men" who build up the structure of knowledge '�not stone by stone, but
parti cle by particle."
Lewis accepted Edison's nonheroic theory of invention and especially
liked its emphasis on collective action and practical applications. Over and
over during his career he cited the phrase in the N AC A charter, "to study
the scientific problems of Hight with a view to their practical solution,"
thereby reminding skeptics of the utilitarian wisdom behind Congress's
original mandate. "He advised his research teams repeated ly," recalled
longtime N A C A member Jerome Hunsaker, "that their research , while a
fascinating pursuit for themselves, was never completed until an intelligible
report was available to designers including , whenever possible, verification
of critical data by tests i n actual flight." Besides insisting on verification of
laboratory data in flight, Lewis also "planned basic research so that the
results of theoretical analysis would be checked by a critical laboratory
experiment conducted by an independent team." 20 In this way Lewis not
only helped to bring the work of his different research teams to fruition but
also protected them f rom making costly mistakes.
In vital matters of research administration, Lewis could be cautious. For
his men at Lang ley he acted as benevolent guardian, making sure that they
did not get involved in things that damaged the integrity of the committee's
work and cut their own throats. The system that he instituted in the early
1920s for the prepublication editorial review of their technical papers was
thorough and strict. According to S. Paul Johnston, editor of Aviation from
1 9 3 1 to 1940 and an employee at N A C A headquarters from 1940 to 1942,
Lewis "was so af raid that he would get caught with a mistake in a report that
wind tunnel res ults all research results would he hung up down there at
Langley until all the i's were dotted and t's crossed and he was damn sure
that the results were what they said." 21 Contradicting Johnston's opinion,
most NACA veterans argue that it was not fear that motivated Lewis; rather,
it was his insistence on technical integrity. Users of N A C A research
manufacturers and operators of ai rcraf t could not be tnisled by incorrect
information, Lewis realized, without American fliers and their passengers
G E O R G E W. L E W I S : 1 0 7
risking the loss of limb and life. If he feared anything, it was these tragic
consequences. 22 This is not to say that an instinct to protect and strengthen
the reputation of his organization was not part of his motivation. Only the
most highly respected scientific and technical papers could give the N A C A
the kind of outstanding recognition its leaders wanted their organization to
enJoy.
•
A nother means Lewis used to serve the national aviation community and
at the same time promote the NAC A's reputation was the N A C A' s annual
aircraft-engineering conference. Held annually at Langley beginning i n May
1926, this event became the NAC A's ''rite of spring. "
A combined technical meeting and public relations extravaganza, the
annual conference gave the N AC A research staf f an oppo1tunity to ascertain
the problems deemed most vital by the aircraft industry so that it could
incorporate them as far as possible into its research programs. A t the same
time, the conference gave the staff a chance to publicize its recent accom
plishments before individuals who rarely had the time to read the N A C A's
technical reports but who needed, and wanted, to know what the NAC A was
doing. The conference also gave Lewis's staff a chance to bang a big dru m
before congressmen and other public officials who "had neither the time nor
the qualifications to read the technical reports" but who played critical roles
i n the appropri ations of government money. 23
The event started out as a modest and relaxed affai r, but it soon grew into
an elaborately staged pageant that took weeks of preparation by the N A C A
staffs both at Langley and i n Washington. By 1936 the spectacle lasted two
days, the first day for executives of the aircraf t industries and government
of ficials, the second "for personnel of the governmental agencies using air
craf t , representatives of engineering societies, and members of professional
schools." More than 300 people attended each session, including aviation
writers who reported f ully on the laboratory's presentations i n newspapers
and journals.
The NACA's executive secretary, John Victory, looked after the social
administration of the confer ence. Knowing Victory's enthusiasm for such a
role and how difficult the peculiar little man could be over petty things that
did not please him, Lewis mostly stayed away from Y ictory and concentrated
on the technical presentations. 24
For weeks prior to the meeting, Lewis personally supervised the prepa
ration of talks and demonstrations by members of Langley's staff. The engi
neers were then rehearsed as if they were boys "putting on a parade for their
parents. " The idea was not only for them to offer the most refined and up-
to-date technical i nformation but also for them to present it in a clear and
powerful way. And this way had to conform to NACA usages. N e w men
learned that "we don't say that" or "we don't say it that way here at the
NACA." In every rehearsal, for example, some uninitiated laboratory em
ployee would receive Lewis's ad monition that the word "research" should
b e pronounced" reSEARCH, " not " REsearc h"
.
When the day of the conference finally arrived , everything was ready to
go like clockwork. After welcoming speeches by the air base commander
and the NACA chairman, Lewis would have his engineer-in-charge and
chief of the aerod y namics d i vision summarize the laboratory's major inves
tigations of the past year. A t 1 0 A .M . sharp a guid ed tour began. The visi
tors, organized into color-coded groups for compatibility of membership,
were taken on a strict schedule through the various wind tunnels, the shops,
and the hangar as well as along the flight line. Lewis himself escorted the
"gold group," which includ ed the most important d ignitaries. At each loca
tion, a thoroughly prepared engineer demonstrated some current work i n
terms that Lewis and Victory had jud ged d u ring rehearsals to be suitable for
both expert and layman. No pains were spared in helping the visitor to
visualize tests and understand results.
After lunch originally in the base officers' club hut in later years i n the
Full-Scale Tunnel key staff members, such as the heads of propeller and
power plants research, deliv ered technical reports at special conferences,
answered questions, and entertained comments. Here was industry's oppor-
,
tunity to recommend new w i nd-tunnel and free-flight tests. Records show

that conference guests from 1926 through 1939 offered hundreds of sugges
tions for research. At the 1935 conference alone, the NACA staff heard
seventy-two d iffe rent ideas. 25
The Great Depression brought a new challenge for Lewis's efforts to main
tain the NACA's leadership in aeronautical research. Though it had an ex
cellent reputation in government circles for fiscal responsibility, even for
turning hack unspent money to the U . S . Treasury, the N ACA had to con
vince skeptics that its efforts gave an adequate return for the precious dol
lars spent. Throughout the early 1 930s, the NACA wisel y kept its budget re
quests below what its leaders felt their researchers needed , but even so
Congress was forced in 1931 and 1 932 to authorize less than the agency
requested . In the same years, Congress refused to appropriate to the N AC A
a single penny for new construction. 26
Fortunately, Congress had appropriated the money for the construction of
Langley's mammoth Full-Scale Tunnel in Febru ary 1929, just months before
G E O R G E W. L E W I S : 109
the Wall Street crash. Contracting for materials and labor at depression
prices, the NACA laboratory was able to complete what was then the world's
largest wind tunnel at a cost of just over one mill ion dollars. In July 1 933,
chiefly through Lewis's effo rts, the NACA managed to get from the new
Public Works Admini stration nearly $750,000 for new construction. 'W ith
this rn oney the NACA eventual l y built at Langley four new research facili
ti es: the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory, the 24-inch H i gh-Speed Tun
nel, the 1 5-foot Spin Tunnel, and the 8-foot H i gh-Speed Tunnel. The last
tunnel, completed in March 1 936 at a cost of $266,000, was capable of
testing complete models of aircraft at speeds up to 575 M P H . I n this tunnel
NACA researchers developed many of the high-speed cowli ngs and propel
lers that would be used by American aircraft during World War II .
B y the mid- 1 930s, then, despite problems caused or exacerbated by
the depression, the NACA had achieved a very competitive position as a
world leader i n aeronautical research. Many European observers envied the
N A C A its resources. As a British aviation editor observed in 1 934:
Ful l credit must be given to those who have directed the policy of the
National Advisory Committee for the vision and foresight they have
displayed i n providing at such early dates research equipment of i n
many instances entirely new type which has sooner or later been found
to be essential to progress in knowledge i n other countries.
As a result, the editor continued, the research plant at Langley Field "has
a grandiosity that is almost staggering to others who have to he content with
equipment of less gargantuan proportions. "27
At the same time that Europeans were singing the praises of the N A C A ,
the agency grew urgently concerned over developments i n Europe. I n No
vember 1935 the NACA's permanent intell igence offi cer i n Paris, John Jay
Ide, reported that the French had just completed a full-scale wind tunnel at
Chalais-Meudon; the I talians had built an entire city, Guidonia, devoted to
h igh- speed aeronautical research; and the Germans were in the midst of
what appeared to be a major revitalization of their nation's aeronautical
resources. As a result of Nazi support, there would soon he five major re
gional stations for aeronautical research and development i n Germany and
a central establishment, the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fu r Luftfahrt (DVL)
at Aldershof near Berlin.
This news disturbed Lewis so much that in the late summer of 1936 he
crossed the Atlantic i n the German airship Hindenburg in order to see for
himself what the Europeans were doing. He visited England and France,
but his real mission was to tour major aeronautical installations i n Germany
and Russia. In Germany he visited the Air M inistry i n Berlin, the DVL, the
Heinkel ai rcraft factory at Oran ienbaum, and the U n iversity of Go ttingen;
in Russi a, he concentrated on the operations of Moscow's Central Aerohy
drodynamic Institute.
Lewis came away alarmed over the warlike aspect of the expanded re
search programs in both Germany and Russia. The DVL at Aldershof looked
to him "like a construction camp" being readied for experiments "with every
conceivable device." He estimated that between 1 , 600 and 2 , 000 well
trained employees were working there, compared with only 350 at Langley.
Although he still considered Langley "the single best and bi ggest aeronau
tical research complex in the world," he warned the government about the
dangers of complacency. 28
Lewis's were not the only warnings i n those troubled times, but his were
among those that paid off, preparing the way for the great expansion of
NACA fac ilities undertaken in the years 1938 to 1 9 41 . B y the time of the
Japanese attack at Pearl H arbor, construction was nearing completion on
two new separate N A C A laboratories: Ames Aeronautical Laboratory on
Moffett Field near Palo Alto, Cal ifornia, and the Airc raft Engine Research
Laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio. Without these new laboratories, the N A C A
would never have been able to accomplish the tremendously increased work
load brought on by the war. Between 1 9 4 1 and 1945, at Langley alone, the
NACA tested 1 3 7 different airplane types, representing half of all the types
contracted for by the army and navy during the war and including virtually
all that actually saw combat service.
Accord i ng to Jerome H unsaker, who succeeded Vannevar Bush as N A C A
chairman (and thus as Lewis's boss) i n 194 1 , "Lewis had a kind of profes
sional integrity which would not permit him to make an i m portant decision
about a man or a problem which he did not understand. "29 Before the war
Lewis traveled to Langley innumerable times to confer not just w i th leaders
of research departments but with their indiv idual members. He often held
informal sessions where junior engi neers could meet with section heads,
division chiefs, and even the engineer-in-charge to exchange ideas without
fear of overstepping formal rank. At the same time, in order to judge trends
i n the art, Lewis also "felt i t necessary" to ma ke frequent visits to naval and
mil itary flying centers, to ai rcraft and engine factories, and, as we have
seen, in the criti cal years before the war, to European research establish
ments. He visi ted England, France, and Germany again i n 1939 .
As long as the NACA research staff was small and concentrated relatively
G E O R G E W. L E W I S : 1 1 1
close to Washington, the professional integrit y that drove Lewis to know all
the important thi ngs for himself was of great advantage; but "it eventu ally
subjected him to an intolerable pressure." As H u nsaker explained:
Before Pearl Harbor there were some six hundred people at Langley.
By V . J . Day, there were more than six thousand people in three great
laboratori es. The annual operating budget rose to more than thirty mil
lion [ compared to n ever more than four million before the war] . Since
Lewis felt that he must make all important decisions from his own sure
knowledge, he could not delegate full responsibility to his assistants.
H e did not take a vacation for the five years after Pearl Harbor.
This unforgiving pace and the feeling that the weight of the air war was on
'
his shoulders took a toll, and Lewis's health began to fail. 30

On September 1 , 194 7, at age sixty-five, Lewis resigned as director of
aeronautical research, agreeing to serve as a research consultant i f neces
sary. Before he left, however, he said to Ira Abbott, his assistant: " I have
given m y life to the NACA. I want you t o promise me that i t will never
become simply another Government agency i nterested chiefly i n i t s own
preservation and bureaucratic growth." 31 Succeeding Lewis was H u gh L.
Dryden, former director of the N a tional Bureau of Standards. Dryden did
not have Lewis's zest for sitting down daily w i t h pol i ticians and military
leaders to deal with the n i t ty-gritty of research appropriations and procure
ments, but he was scientifically sharper than the former director. Under
Dryden's more formal and less paternal management, the N A C A extended
its vision beyond the subsonic aeronautics of Lewis's era to new supersoni c ,
hypersonic, and space frontiers .
. On July 1 2 , 1948, Lewis died at his summer home at Lake W i nona,
Pennsylvania, from a stroke. I n memory of its beloved director, the N A C A
soon renamed i t s Cleveland l aboratory the Lewis Flight Propulsion Labora
tory. I t was a fitting honor for Lewis, who after all had started h i s career as
"an engine man." Today this facility is N A SA's Lewis Research Center. 32
In the opinion of many people who knew him well, Lewis was close t o the
ideal person for the management of NACA research during the critical pe
riod of American aviation development between the two world wars. A
warmly gregarious and charismatic man, his protective "hands-on" ap
proach to laboratory admi nistration had suited his own personality, the
NACA's small size, and the N A C A's delicate and frequently precarious pub
lic position. I n return for his concerned guardianship, Lewis demanded loy
alty. Some say he demanded i t above all else.
1 1 2 : A VI A T I O N ' S G O L D E N A G E
One anecdote concerning Lewis's attitude toward organ ization charts cap
tures his personality and style as a research manager and technological
maestro better than any other. Once in the 1930s, a young personnel officer
at Langley could not find an up-to-date chart of the laboratory. Since he had
taken a course in industrial engineering in college, he drew one up and took
it to the Langley engineer-in-charge. It was not an elegant chart, only a few
boxes with the names of people in them, but it was the young man's oppor
tunity to show the boss that he had a little something extra to offer.
The personnel officer started to explain the chart when Lewis arri ved from
Washington for a routine v i sit. A man of great d igni t y and presence, Lewis
could assume a formidable appearance, and he was not above u s i ng it to
intimidate or coax his researchers. On the other hand, he was also the type
of person who could say "No" and make others feel he was doing them a
favor. The young man naturally stood up and tried to excuse h i mself from
the meeting. The d i rector told him to sit down and carry on with what he
was doing. In fact , Lewis soon took a look at the chart and t urned to the
employee and said , "Son, do you know what they do with boxes?" " N o ,
sir," the young employee answered . Lewis shot hack: "They bury people
in them." 33
George Lewis would reject one last box. After his death in 1 948 , his bod y
was cremated and the ashes were scattered over Langley Field .
•
·
'•
Air travel during the 1920s: Pilot]ames P. Murray of Boeing Air Transport
prepares to load a suitcase for intrepid Salt Lake City-San Francisco
passengers, 1928. The Boeing 40B could seat two passengers in a tiny space
between two mail compartments; Murray sat outside in the open cockpit.
Courtesy ofMrs. ]ames P. Murray.
National Air Transport opened passenger service between Chicago and
Dallas in 1927 with Travel Air 4000 cabin monoplanes. As each airplane
could carry only five passengers, ticketing tended to be informal.
Courtesy of the National Air and Space Museum.
The famous "Tin Goose," premier air transport in the United States from
1926 to 1932. This Ford trimotor, a 5-AT-B, was operated by National Air
Transport, 1928 - 1929.
•
]ames H. Doolittle stands in front of a Vought 02U-1 during the

Guggenheim-sponsored blind-flying experiments of 1929.
Courtesy of the National Air and Space Museurn.
A Curtiss Tanager climbing steeply during short-takeoff-and-landing
(STOL) competition sponsored by the Guggenheim Fund. The Tanager won
the competition.
•
Left to right: Robert Goddard, Harry Guggenheim, and Charles Lindbergh

standing in front of Goddard's rocket test stand in the New Mexican desert,
1930.
Courtesy of the NationaL Air and Space Museum.
Leading figures from aviation's Golden Age assemble in 1929. Left to right:
William P. MacCracken, ]r., Paul Henderson, Charles A. Lindbergh,
Secretary of Commerce Robert P. Lamont, Henry Ford, Orville Wright, and
Harry Guggenheim (individuals in the back row are not identified).
Courtesy of the Federal Aviation Administration.
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When Orville Wright declined the honor, William P. MacCracken, ]r.,

became the proud possessor of Pilot's License No. 1.
•
President Calvin Coolidge (left) presents the 1928 Robert]. Collier Trophy
to the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce for its
outstanding work in the development of airways and air navigation
facilities. Standing to Coolidge's left are the director of air commerce,
Clarence Young; Senator Hiram Bingha1n; an unidentified man; and the
assistant secretary of commerce for aeronautics, William P. MacCracken, ]r.
A T4M-1 of VT-2, tail hook down, approaches USS Saratoga (CV-3).
Courtesy of the National Archives.
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An N-9 seaplane on a turntable catapult at the Naval Aircraft Factory.

The turntable catapult greatly facilitated the launch of aircraft
from noncarrier ships.
•
William A . Moffett departing USS Akron (ZRS-4) at NAS Lakehurst.

Benjamin Foulois (left), head of the AEF's Air Service, and General John].
Pershing, 1918.
Courtesy of the U.S. Air Force.
•
An Air Corps pilot prepares to leave March Field, California, with the mail.
The aircraft, a P-12 pursuit, was poorly equipped for all-weather flying.
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A Curtiss B-2 bomber, pressed into service for airmail operations.

The first production model of the XB-17 arrives at Langley Field, Virginia,
March 1, 1937.
George Lewis (third from right, checking his cigar) escorts a British aero
delegation around Langley Field, March 1923. Langley's first engineer-in
charge, Leigh H. Griffith, is at the far left.
Courtesy of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Langley's variable-den5ity tunnel, 1929. This facility compensated for the
small size of scale models by increasing the density of air in the tunnel up to
twenty atmospheres.
The 30-by-60-foot test section of Langley's full-scale tunnel, 1931.

Powering this tunnel were two 4,000-HP electric motors. The aircraft being
tested is a Loening XSL-1 seaplane.
Edward P. Warner, shortly after his appointment as first assistant secretary
of the navy for aeronautics, 1926.
Courtesy qf the National Archives.
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover (center) with the assistant secretary
for aeronautics, William P. MacCracken , ]r. (left), and the assistant
secretary of commerce,]. Walter Drake (right).
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•
DWARD PEARSON WARNER
AND THE NEW AIR AG
R 0 G E R E. B I L S T E I N
Edward Pea rson Warner wa s o ne o f those largely unsung individuals whose

imprint o n aeronautics was institutional i n c ha racter. While a viation head
lines of the interwar years focused o n a viation's spectacular a spects
speed, distance records, a nd colorlul persona l i ties Wa rner and others
toiled behind the scenes a t equally impo rta nt ta sks perfec t i ng the planes,
visualizing polic ies, and creating the enviro nment fo r global a i r travel a s i t
emerged after World Wa r I I . I n a career that embraced the ro les of educator,
engineer, consultant, a u thor, and international c i v i l serva nt, Warner played
a key ro le i n sha ping the course of a viation i n the modern world. 1
Wa rner's fa ther, Robert Lyon Wa rner, graduated fro m Cornell and be
came a well-to-do electrical engineer. A tradition of educa tion ra n i n the
fa mily; Edwa rd's mother, Anne Pearso n Wa rner, was a l so a Cornell student,
and o ne of his grea t-uncles, Professor George W. James, headed Cornell's
mathematics department fo r ma ny years. When Edward wa s born o n Novem
ber 9 , 1894, the Wa rners lived in Pittsburgh, but the fa mily soo n moved to
Concord, Massachusetts. Warner grew up under relentless pressure to
achieve. Pea rso ns were directors of ra ilroa ds, college administrators, and
state exec utives. As Edwa rd's brother, Nathaniel, put it, "In this Pea rson
fa mily, there was no such thing a s fa i lure. It couldn't happen. It just
wo uldn't be permitted . " 2
Edward seems to ha ve been a precocious boy, even though a t the age of
six he struggled with his arithmetic. On one occa sion, he too k some pro blems
to his gra ndmother for help. After vario us frustrations, she decided to show
her young grandson ho·w to find the answers by using algebra . Edward be
came fa sc inated by the logic of algebraic equa t io ns, and he a t tributed his
later phenomenal mathematical skills to this early incident. As a young
1 1 4 : A V I A TI O N ' S G O L D E N A G E
man, Warner was sent off to the Volkrnann Sc hool, a private academy i n
Boston. A school friend, Raymond Baldwin , remen1bered him as ''somewhat
c lumsy, physically, and [he] wore c ustom-made brown suits that looked as
though they had been slept i n . " H e laughed at the sc hoolboy pran ks of his
friends but did not indulge in any of his own. 3 The picture that emerge s of
Warner's early teen-age years is that of an intelligent boy who was something
of a loner. However, his mathematical prowess was remembered with awe. 4
Warn er's interest in flight was probably sharpened during the years at
Volkmann. He knew something about mechan i cs an d often rode his motor
cycle to sc hool, a run of twenty miles. About 1 9 11, Warner and a c lassmate
bui l t a glider an d entered a Boston soaring competition. Warn er provided
the design an d technical detail for the airc raft, which won first place with a
flight of on e thousand feet. 5
Warner received a B . A . with honors from Harvard Un i versity in 1 9 1 6. A
year later he obtained a B . S . from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
( then known as Boston Tec h ) , fo llowed by an M . A . degree in 1 9 1 9 .
I t was a measure of Warner's intellectual abilities that MIT put h i m in
the c lassroom as an instructor of aeronautics during the first year of his
graduate studies. After the United States entered World War I in 1 9 1 7 ,
various universities were designated as spec ial centers for advanced courses
intended to help the country matc h the expe1tise of Germany, as w e l l as that
of our allies. Warner instructed a n umber of army an d navy cadets during
the war years, including fu ture airc raft designer Leroy Grumman and aero
nautical engineer Theodore P. Wright, who went on to a variety of academic
and government positions in aviation. 6
There was a brief hiatus in Warn er's teaching career during 1 9 1 9 and
1920 when he joined the fledgling National Advisory Committee for Aero
nautics. The NACA was completing work on the research fac il ities at its
Langley center in Hampton, Vi rgin ia, an d Warner joined the staff as the
NACA's first ch ief physic ist, serving as head of aerodynamic an d flight re
searc h . Among other contributions, he designed the agenc y's first wind tun
nel and then supervised its con struction . He spent the su mmer of 1920 i n
Europe as the NACA's technical attache, gaining his first exposure to the
in ternational aspects of aviation. A l l in all, it was a promising start for a
twenty-five-year-old engineer, but Warner, like many young N ACA engi
neers, soon left the agency, reportedly because of administrative turmoil at
Langley. However, he maintained cordial relations with the N ACA and
served on several influential cotn m ittees over the next twenty-fi v e years. 7
Warn er returned to MIT with the rank of assoc iate professor of aeronau-
E D W A R D P E A R S O N W A R N E R : 1 1 5
tical engineering. He wo uld rema i n there fo r six yea rs , reaching the ra nk of

ful l professor. His former teacher, Dr. Jero me C . Hunsaker, had started o ne
of America's first progra ms devoted to aero nautical engineering, and Wa rner
beca me part of this pioneering curriculum. Among the students who passed
through Wa rner's c lasses in those years were future designers l i k e James
McDonnell and Arthur Raymond, a s well as future mil itary leaders l i ke
James Doo little a nd Felix Stump. The uni versity's students a l l benefited
fro m exposure to one of the few wind tunnels i n use o n a co llege campus,
since Hu nsaker had built a fo ur-foot , o pen-circuit design. Wa rner, to the
benefit of his students, was well prepared to get the most fro m it. 8
As a teacher, Wa rner wa s known a s a ra pid-ftre lecturer, very profes
siona l and somewhat a loof i n his relationships with students. As a respected
member of a distinguished fa culty, his a b i l i t ies i n ma thema tics became leg
endary. F. T. Kurt, later a n engineer a t Grumma n , vividly reca lled Wa rner's
classroom perfo rma nce: "When giving a lecture, he no t o n l y put o n the
board the most complicated differential equatio ns, introducing a host o f con
stants fro m memory, but then so lved them sho wing a l l computa t io ns , a s fa st
a s he could write." Ba ck in their rooms, students woul d pa insta k i ngly work
through class no tes to check their teacher's equa tions. But Wa rner, they
discovered, never made a mistake. Kurt a lso reco llected that Warner could
multiply fo ur-digit figures fo r instance, 4,327 and 7, 851 immediately
i n his hea d . 9
Warner's rumpled suits fro m Vo lkmann school days continued a s a sig
nature a t M IT. They were still custom-made; Warner o rdered them with
additional pockets to carry misce l laneous memos a nd notepads. Chest po ck
ets invaria bly sprouted ro ws of pens, pencils, and slide rules, and Warner
wa s rarely seen i n the ha l lwa ys without a n a rmful of additiona l pa pers a nd
magazines. 10
Wa rner was a dynamo of energy, and his infl uence spilled o ut beyond the
classroo m . Wa rner served o n the NACA's Committee o n Aerodynarn ics fro m
1919 untill945, as wel l as o n the Committee o n Materia l s fo r Aircraft from
1920 to 1945 . H e published extensively. H i s na me first a ppeared in NACA
li terature a s one of the a u thors of "Technica l Report N o . 1 7" o n sta tic a nd
dynamic sta b i l i ty. H e not o nly prepared professional pa pers that a p peared
as a series of technical memoranda i n NACA reports but a lso bega n a re
ma rka ble series of po pularly written articles fo r the Christian Science Moni
tor. There were severa l dozen such articles o ne o n "Giant Airplanes," a
comparison of mono planes and biplanes, and vario us comments on helicop
ters, metal construction, a nd other mechanica l deta i l s . But Warner was ob-
viously concerned about the total aviation infrastructure, and he also wrote
about depreciation of transports, fl y i ng comfort, fire, subsidies, and other
broad issues . 1 1 Though dealing with a nascent technology struggling to find
a place i n competition with well-established train and automotive transpor
tation, Warner revealed an impressive awareness of the broad range of de
velopment necessary to make aviation acceptable to the general public.
The mid- 1920s was a crucial period for American aviation, and Warner
was i n the center of it al l. The pioneering U . S . Air Mail Service hired h i m
as a consultant from 1924 to 1925, and he made a thorough analysis of its
equipment and navigational aids. I n the process he survived the crash of a
Ford transport, an experience that convinced him of the advantages of metal
construction over wood and fabric. H e immediately informed the second
assistant postmaster general of h i s mishap and passed on some personal
recommendations. 1 2
One of the nagging problems of early aviation involved regulatory con
trol. Without adequate licensing and examination of aircraft and pilots, in
surance companies balked at underwriting equipment and operations, and
investors were leery of putting money into uninsured comrnercial aviation
enterprises. Trained as an engineer, Warner nonetheless had a realistic un
derstanding of the policy and institutional foundations needed for the future
growth of aeronautics. I n 1 921, when a hill for the licensing and regulation
of pilots ran into opposition in the Massachusetts legislature, Warner con
tacted a lawyer who was an old school friend. Together they drafted a statute
that became the basis for Massachusetts' aviation law, four years before
similar national legislation was enacted i n the Air Commerce Act of 1926.
Warner also helped Boston into the world of air travel in 1925. Backed by
some of Boston's wealthiest families (an associate recalled that the list of
stockholders "read l i ke a composite of Dun and Bradstreet's highest ratings
and the Social Register" ) , Warner organ ized the Boston A irpo1t Corporation
to turn a landfill site into an airport. The corporation built a hangar and the
legislature reluctantly paid for cinder runways. Eventually airlines estab
lished themselves, and the Boston Airport Corporation sold out at a profit. 13
All of this activity made Warner a nationally known aviation expert. H e
understood the realities of aircraft and flight operations as well as the reali
ties of regulation and balance sheets. For th i s reason, he was named as a
consultant to the President's Ai rcraft Board in 1 925. This entity, better
known as the Morrow board after its chairman, banker Dwight Morrow, was
one of several investigative boards, commissions, and committees sclutiniz
ing Arnerican aviation and attempting t� establish some sort of coherent
po licy for both c ivil and military aeron autics. The Morro w board was in
session during the court-martial of General William " B illy" M i tchell and
issued a fin al report just days before Mitchell's trial en ded. Among other
things, the Morro w hoard favored upgrading the Air Service to the Air Corps
and creating posts for an assistant secretary fo r air in the Department of
Commerc e as well in the army and navy departments. In many details, the
subsequent Air Corps Act o f 1926 reflected recommendations of the Morrow
board. W ithin the Departmen t of the N avy, the reco mmendation fo r a n e w
assistant secretary fo r aeron autics resulted in Warner's appo intmen t . 14
Between 1926 and 1929, Warner played a leading ro le in the develop
ment of naval aviation as an integral arm of the A merican military capabil
ity. Although he had little experience as a seaman , his understanding o f
aviation in all its fac ets was enc yclopedic . In h i s teac h in g career at MIT,
Warner had dealt not only with the theory o f flight and aeron autical engi
neering but also with the minutiae o f practical, day-to-day aeron autics, like
flight instrumen ts, landing gear, engin e mo untings, and all the other mun
dane but essential paraphern alia o f aircraft. H is exten sive writing fo r the
Christian Science Monitor had helped him assess a wide range of issues and
po licy tren ds in both c ivil and commercial aviation. Finally, his consultant's
role with the Morrow board had pro vided a unique insider's view o f the
country's c urrent situation and future needs. This background was to serve
Warn e r w e l l in the new post he assumed in 1 926.
Warn e r was still a bachelor when he mo ved to Washington . With his
pench an t for long hours o f work and an almost insatiable urge to soak u p
information, he was an intense and hard-dri ving administrator. Not long
after Warn e r assumed o ffice, the New York Times reported that the assistan t
secretary had logged an impressive 1 5 , 000 miles on his inspection to urs.
During a visit to the West Coast, Warn er climbed into the o bserver's seat o f
a reconn aissance plane and experienced the thrill o f a catapulted launch
fro m the battleship California, fo llowed by the jarring landing o f the float
plan e on the o pen ocean . W ithin the corridors o f the Navy Department in
Washington , his self-assuranc e evidently ruffled the feathers o f some naval
personnel, inc luding the director o f naval aviation , Rear Adrniral William
Moffett. Warner's lon gtime person a l secretary, E lizabeth B ro wn , recalled
that Moffett used to become furio us with Warner because the admiral "was
not acc ustomed to being talked to as a studen t . " 1 5
Although Warner's interest in the sc ien ti fic and technologica l aspects o f
aeronautics never waned, his commitment to the field o f aviation policy
began to take precedence. The U . S . Navy itself was at the threshold o f major
changes, as a new generation of aircraft carriers began to enter the fleet.

Langley, a converted collier, had entered service in 1922, followed by Lex
ington and Saratoga in 1927. The latter two, built on keels laid down as
f ast cruisers, had been converted fo llowing agreements worked out during
the Wash i ngton Disarmament Conference of l92 1 -1922. Naval aviation now
required greater budgets for combat planes, training planes, facilities, per
sonnel, and operations generally, as new can·ier tactics were developed.
Warner found himself i n the midst of considerable turmoil. He fought fo r
expanded aeronautical budgets and kept an eye on the promotion boards to
see that avi ators were not denied advances i n rank because their records
appeared to lack appropriate "seagoing" time. Jerome C . H u nsaker, a
staunch friend of naval aviation, commended Warner for a job well done. 1 6
After three years of work in f ederal service, Warner returned to the pri
vate sector in 1929 as editor of Aviation magazine, published by McGraw
H i l l . He also became editorial assistant to the president of McGraw-Hill
Publications. For the next ftve years, until 1934, his technical expertise and
firsthand experience in the development of aeronautical policy helped make
the publication into the leading American aviation journal of the day. 1 7
As a courtly and pleasant-looking bachelor in his mid-thirties, Warner
must have been the despair of more than one matchmaking matron on the
Boston, New York, and Washington dinner circuits. H e finally became en
gaged and at the age of thirty-seven married Joan Potter, a former Vassar
student and resident of Boston's Beacon H i l l . H i s daughter, Sandra, was
born i n 1 939; a son, Barry, arrived three years later.18 I n the meantime, the
pace of Warner's commitment to aviation affairs continued.
I n 1934 and 1935, Warner was again drawn into public service. I n the
summer of 1935, he took a leave of absence from McGraw-Hill i n order to
serve as vice-chai rman of the Federal Aviation Commission appointed by
President Franklin D . Roosevelt to analyze problems plaguing airmail ser
vices. A t issue were reported i rregu larities in airmail contracts awarded
during the Hoover administration. After canceling existing contracts early
in February 1 934, Roosevelt called on the Air Corps to take over. Unhap
pily, the military pilots had to fly during a stretch of severe weather. Inade
quate navigational equipment, aggravated by a lack of instrument flying
experience, resulted in a rash of crashes and dead pilots. The commission,
including Warner, Jerome H u nsaker, and others, was established to get
airmail services and American aviation back on course.
With characteristic energy, Warner plu nged into preparation of the study.
Theodore P. Wright wrote that "there is wide speculation that it was he who
•
drafted much of the existing report ." 19 There was considerable jockeying
and political skirmishing over the next three years, with Senator Pat Mc
Can·an, Representative C larence Lea, and Senator Harry Truman playing
key roles in shaping leg i slation that finally led to the C i v i l Aeronautics Act
of 1938. Nevertheless, as historian Nick Komons has written, "The case for
comprehensive economic reg u l ation of airline affairs had been g i ven per
haps its clearest, though not earliest, expression by the Federal Aviation
" 20
Commission .
Throug hout all of this busy life, Warner took an active role i n several
professional groups and conti nued to publish i n a variety of professional as
well as popular journals. I n addition to the long series of avi ation articles i n
the Christian Science Monitor, in 1927 he published his first book, Aero
statics, which he dedicated to grandmother Pearson, followed by a second,
Aeroplane Design Aerodynamics, issued in the same year. The latter prob
ably had a g reater impac t on a generation of aero engineers than is generally
recognized. Theodore Wright, who enjoyed a distinguished aeronautical ca
reer himself as an eng i n eer, administrator, and educator, ac knowledged the
significance of Aeroplane Design: "This rather classic text served as a 'bible'
i n this field for many of us. Many observations in i t were ahead of the times.
In subsequent years, what appeared to me as a new concept, would upon
searc h , be found i n Aerodynamics worked out i n detail but not fully appre
ciated nor absorbed on orig inally reading . " 2 1
In 1936 Aeroplane Design was rewritten with enough additional mate
rial to justify its publication under the new title of Aeroplane Design
Performance. A mong other things, the new book included certain steps that
allowed ai rc raft designers and engineers to make a quick calculation of the
performance c haracteristics of specific planes. During World War I I , Theo
dore Wrig ht used the technique, known as the Warner K speed formula, to
estimate the speed of enemy aircraft once the w i ng area and engine power
were known. I n a more popular vein, two Warner essays, "The Early History
of A i r Transportation" and "Tec h n ical Developm.ent and its E ffects on A i r
Transportation" were published i n 1938 by Norwich University. The year
before the u n iversity had sponsored the James Jackson Cabot lectures, and
Warner expanded his presentations into the published versions. While
popularly written, the essays also enjoyed recog nition among professional
eng i neers. As Theodore Wrig ht noted, they "served rnany of us as valuable
and quotable material in our own work, whether i n preparation of talks, i n
eng ineering analyses, or i n making air transportation forec asts." 22
For three years, between 1936 and 1939, Warner returned to the profes-
sion of engineering. During this segment of his career, he served as con

sulting engineer to U n i ted A i r Lines i n the development of a new airliner.
The success of the Boeing 24 7 and Douglas DC-3 pointed the way to even
larger aircraft, and several airlines were ac 6 v e in developing spec i fic ations
for a four-engine landplane. Under his contract to lJnited Air Lines, Warner
not only worked on the i n i tial specifica tions but also helped draft the con
tract for development and construction for the transport. As a result of this
activity, Warner moved to California, where he worked with the Douglas
Aircraft Company and with Arthur Raymond in setting out the design re
quirements for a plane designated the DC-4E.
Plans for this new "supertransport ," about three times the size of the
DC-3, grew out of a joint contract funded by Tra nscontinental and Western
Air, American Airlines, U nited A i r Lines, Pan American, and Eastern A i r
Lines. The DC-4E incl uded many refinements that later became sta ndard:
tricycle landing gear, a first for planes of this size; a fuselage that Douglas
boasted was larger than a rail coach; lavatories with hot and cold running
water; soundproofing; and many other embellishments. Warner made a spe
c i al contribution to the DC-4E program i n terms of establ ishing the plane's
flying qualities. In the course of design work, he perfec ted a highly signifi
cant techn ique of quantitative measurement and specification. Beginning
with descriptions of desirable flying qualities for transport aircraft as given
by pilots, Warner converted these ideas into engineering language that
could be i ncorporated into basic design specifications. The concept spurred
'
further flying-quality research by the NACA and was i ncorporated into air-
worthiness regu lations for air transports. 23
The DC-4E rolled out of the Douglas plant in 1938 and made extensive
demonstration flights. "Ed kept i n close touch with the design of the a ir
pla ne . . . and actually part ici pated i n some of the flights for the purpose of
observing stalling and other characteristics first hand," Arthur Raymond
reca lled. "His contribution to the project was considerable." Despite the
interest generated by the DC-4E demonstration flights, the plane never en
tered production. Rising costs and the chance to acquire Boeing 307 Stra to
liners broke up the five-company consortium. I n any case, Douglas had
already begun work on a smaller, refined version of its new tra n sport. This
became the DC-4, and it won the support of U nited Air Lines and American
Airl ines. Al though all of the production DC-4s went to the army as the
C-54 on the eve of World War I I , work on the DC-4E and the DC-4 reflected
signiftcant trends in postwar airliner development of the DC-6 and DC-7 . 24
Even before the big new Douglas transport began its demonstration
flights, Warner's gro wing reputation as bo th a techn ical and legal expert had
captured the attention of a new federal bureaucracy in need of his skills
the Civil Aero nautics Authority. Regulation of American aeronautics began
with the A i r Commerce Act o f 1926, which established the Aero nautics
Branch of the Department of Commerce. This legislatio n , in many ways an
extension o f the Progressive Era refo rm mo vement i n American po litics,
established procedures fo r the certification of aircraft and pilots, alo ng with
funding for research, airway improvement, and other services. U nder the
New Deal reorgan ization occurred, and the Civil Aeronautics Act o f 1938
created a more centralized Civil Aero nautics Authority, an independent
agen cy to con duct all civil-aviation activities of the federal go vern men t .
A t the time o f the o rgan ization o f the C i v i l Aeronautics Authority ( C A A )
in 1938, Warner became a special economic and techn i cal advisor. A s his
work on the DC-4E came to a close, he had the opportun i ty to spend more
time with the new agency. When Warner began as a consultan t to the C A A
in 1 938, he was primarily engaged i n the area of econo mic regulatory pro
visions, especially in regard to airmail rates. In this instance, his asso c i
ation with airmail operation s, the result of his consulting work in the twen
ties and thirties, gave h i s o p inions considerable weight. When the first
vacancy o n the C A A governing board occurred in 1939, Warn e r was
promptly appointed to fill the slot. The next year saw the C A A experience a
further bureaucratic metamorphosis. The C A A con tinued administrative
and operatio nal fun ctions of Ameri can aviation, but a new agen cy, the C i v i l
Aero nautics Board, set rates and established policy for scheduled airlines.
Warner settled into a prominent niche in the CAB, serving as vice-chairman
from 1941 to 1945 . 25
Thro ugho ut h i s tenure on the CAB, Warner maintained a deep and con
sistent interest in flight safety. This commitment was well remembered b y
many colleagues, especially Jerome Lederer, who later became famous as
the director o f the Flight Safety Fo undation . "In 1922," Lederer recalled,
"long before there was any governmental activity in the field, he [ Warner]
was instrumental in developing an Aviation Code sponso red by the S. A . E.
[Society of Automotive Engineers] . " Once Warner was permanen tly o n the
CAB, he quickly brought i n Lederer as director o f the Saf ety Bureau, giving
him strong support. Summing up Warner's contributions to this aspect o f
American avi ation , Lederer said that "his many penetrating suggestions
made him an immense influence in safety, an d a catalytic agent i n stimulat
ing air safety research." 26
Warner's broad background in aviation invariably brought him a variety
of assignments. As C A B member and aviation authority L. Welch Po gue

commented, Warner was "a natural tro uble-shooter. " 27 Fo r meetings with
sc heduled airlines, espec ially i n cases where saf ety as wel] as engineering
problems were at issue, Warner was the person most often there to represent
the C A B . H i s engineering expertise gave him a principal role i n the devel
opment of a C A B regu lation known as CAR 4B, which represented f ederal
guidelines f o r airworthiness c riteria go verning the design of c i vii transpo rts.
The doc ument becarne a pattern f o r similar regulatio ns i n many f oreign
countries. 28
During Warner's tenure o n the C A B , he became deeply involved in many
official aspects of international aeronautics. As World War II spread i n Eu
ro pe and the ro le of aviation began to take o n greater significance in terms
of national security, Warner served as a l i aison between the C A B and the
Department of State, the War Department, and the Department of the Navy.
Following the enactment of the Lend-Lease agree ments in 194 1 , Warner's
international aeronautical di plomacy took o n ever-greater urgency. In M arc h
1941 he was named special consultant to the Harriman Commission and
flew to Europe aboard Pan American's big Boeing flying bo at, the Dixie
Clipper. Warner f elt a great deal of satisf ac t io n i n this posting, believing
that he was making a genuine contribution to the Allied cause. The reality
of the war came c lose, s i nce Warner worked in Lo ndon during a period of
heavy German air raids. Like native Brito ns, he experienced the danger and
tensions c reated by the destructi veness of air power. His work as an aviation
expert in Great Britain and his missions to the Caribbean combined to give
Warner an excellent backgro und in international af fairs. Moreo ver, his d i g
nity, prof essionalism, and f airness won h i m a gro wing c i rcle of international
f riends. 29
Thro ughout the war years, Warner juggled a variety of tasks in keeping
up with the C A B doc ket, mastering the nuances of diplomatic give--and
take, and writing. H i s colleague o n the C A B , L. Welch Po gue, marveled at
his capacity f o r work as well as at the strength of his perso nality when
dealing with other people:
H e was a prodigious worker. He never wasted a minu te; he dictated

into a dictaphone at home i n the evening; i n the middle of the night
when he happened to wake up; and in the morning. As an ill ustration
of his prodigious capacity to work, one of the members of the Board
during the time when Ed Warner served and who was very consc ien
tious about reading all memoranda on issues presented, f requently re-
E D W A R D P E A R S O N W A R N E R 1 2 3
ferred to analytical data coming fro m Ed Warner's typewriter as "de

scending upon me 1 i k e snow fro m Heaven." He also had the capacity
to maintain a delightful sense o f humor and goo d relations to ward ev
eryone with whom he worked. Tho ugh intolerant o f mediocrity on an
intellectual basis, he was always kindly toward everyone o n a personal
and emotional basis. :}o
A li kely reason fo r Warner's intimidating grasp of data and trends may be

his remarkably active ro le in several different professional o rganizatio ns.
The range of his professional aviation acquaintances was formidable, en
compassing Americans fro m coast to coast during the 1 920s and 1930s. The
nature of these societies also put Warner in contact with several key figures
fro m abroad, and his work with the CAB and wartitne missions during the
war generated many more international contacts. As noted earlier, his inter
action with the N ACA was constant. His work o n the N ACA Committee o n
Aerodynamics spanned the years 1 9 1 9 to 1945 . B y all acco unts, these years
encompassed an amazingly fruitful era o f progress, as awk ward, 100-MPH
biplanes gave way to modern aircraft that began to nibble at the edges o f
the sound barrier. Warner sat i n an enviable pos i tion to watch it unfo ld. H e
served as the committee's secretary fro m 1921 to 1925 and as its chairman
fro m 1 935 to 1945. Mo reo ver, Warner held a seat o n the N A C A's prestigious
Executive Committee fro m 1929 to 1945 .
There were other N AC A commitments as well. Warner was the chairman
o f the Committee o n Aircraft Accidents fro m 1 933 to 1 9 4 1 and held the
same responsibility with the Co mmittee on Operating Problems during the
war. 3 1 Warner's effectiveness i n all these ro les is difficult to j udge. However,
some measure can be inferred fro m observations made fo llowing his death
by Hugh L. Dryden, then director o f the N AC A and an acquaintance of
many years. "The wide range o f his interests resulted i n majo r contributions
to all aspects o f aeronautics, technical and non-technical, national and in
ternational," Dryden wro te. H e also recalled that Warner's friends referred
to him as "America's aeronautical encyclopedia." Concluding h i s tribute to
Warner, Dryden said that "his influence on the develo pment of aeronautics
in all its aspects was profo u n d . " 32
Warner was an indomitable spirit in technical so cieties. During the 1920s
there was no permanent professional so ciety fo r aeronautical peo ple; rnany
became members of the Society of Automotive Engineers instead. Warner
was no exceptio n . His position as chair o f the Aeronautical Division o f the
Standards Committee is understandable, as was the same post o n the Wright
Bro thers Medal Committee. But Warner c haired other commi ttees spec i fic
on ly to the SAE, such as the Publications Committee, the Con stitution Com
mittee, the Students Committee, and ( sign ifican tly) the Overseas Relations
Committee. He also partic ipated in the activities of other technical an d
admin istrative groups o f the SAE. In 1930 the Society elected Warn er as its
presiden t . ��
Although Warner valued his ro le in the Society of Automotive Engineers,
the pace o f aeron autical developmen t clearly called for a strictly aeron auti
cal professional society. B y 1928 Jerome Hunsaker an d others had already
taken the initiative an d contacted the o ffic ers o f the Royal Aeron autical
Soc iety fo r guidance. With in fo ur years, an ad hoc o rgan izing committee,
including Warn er, fo rmalized a protocol fo r an American counterpart, which
was directly pattern ed after the soc iety. Warner himself came up w i th a
name fo r the American o rgan ization the In stitute of the Aeron autical
Sciences an d it was incorporated in 1932 ( i t was renamed the Am erican
In stitute fo r Aeron autics an d Astron autics in 1963 ) . Given the immediacy
o f other commitments, even someone like Warn e r could not devote time to
the institute as he had to the SAE, although he remained active in its meet
ings an d concern s for the rest o f his career. 34
All these experiences helped give Warn er the broad understanding and
broad vision that he effectively applied during his ten ure with the Interna
tional Civil Aviation Organ ization . As its first head, Warner's stewardship
left a sign i fican t imprint in terms of ac hievemen t s that set a pattern for
future ac tivities. The International Civil Av iation Organ ization origin ated in
the closing years o f World War I I . It was clear that air po wer i n the form
o f both military and c i v i l aviation would have a major role in the postwar
world. Planning fo r the o rderly progress of international air tran sport stirred
conf
licting issues o f national interest and became the subject o f consider
able study and speculation .
One o f the more interesting respon ses to the postwar age o f aviation an d
the issues i t raised came fro m a n e w journ al , Air Affairs, which published
its first issue in September 1946. The ro ster of editors and contributors drew
heavily from academe an d fro ·m the upper echelons of Washington's c i v i l
service an d residen t power establishment, with a leavening o f international
avi ation spokesmen. The first issues included papers fro m faculty members
o f the University of Chicago , including an thropologist William F. Ogburn ,
intern ational law an d mili tary expert Quincy Wright, an d n uclear physicist
Haro l d C . Urey. Wel
l-placed bureaucrats included William A . M . B urden ,
assistant secretary of commerce, and Warn er, cutTen tly presiden t o f the
Interim Council o f the Pro visional International Civil Aviation Organ i zation.
E D W A. R D P E A R S O N W A R N E R : 1 2 5
Either i n the abstract o r i n speci fic detail, succeeding volumes of Air Affairs
addressed issues of the soc ietal implications of expanding aviation ac ti v i
ties, the somber implications of warfare i n an age of atomic power, and the
po l i t ical implications of living i n a world shrunk i n time by airlines. 35
American air carriers faced the postwar era of international air routes
with a number of issues under ho t debate. Pan A m lo bbied intensively to
enhance its preeminent pos i tion as America's international airline, a posi
tion just as intensively contested by TWA and o ther c arriers with the poten
tial fo r o verseas ro utes. American aviation leaders clashed with the British
i n determining which international routes would he served by their respec
tive countries, while dozens of nations o n the sidelines sniped at both
of them. There was talk of an all-enco mpassing international aviation or
ganizatio n , but the sco pe of its activity and regulatory powers remained
unsettled.
This was the backgro und of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), a convention of delegates from fifty-two countries held i n C h icago
late i n 1944. Previous! y there had been considerable debate i n the U n i ted
•
States as to its relative degree of contro l o f international air ro utes. Adolph

A . Berle, Jr. , an assistant secretary of state, adhered to what was called the
"open-sky concept," an approach subject to numero us i nterpretations hut
one that generally favored a minimum of nationali stic regulations by the
United States, Great Britain, or anyone else. At the other end of the spec
trum was a handful of senators who worried that either unrestrained com
petition or strict regulations wo uld favor weaker airways i n the short run and
inevitably result in the ero s io n o f American international routes, since they
w<?uld face stiff competition fro m heavily subsidized foreign flag lines; they
felt i t was better to have a strong, single, American international airline
to compete against the foreign carriers a po sition favored by Pan A m .
L. Welch Pogue, c hairman o f the C A B , occupied the middle ground. W h i l e
opposing monopo l i stic domination o f American o verseas ro utes b y o n e air
line, he was unwilling to see American expertise and leadership i n inter
national transport flying, developed i n World War II, dissipated by blind
adherence to open-skies arrangements. Po gue accepted the concept of open
skies in princ i ple but felt that speci fic s should be negotiated o n a bilateral
basis. As a C A B veteran of the American delegation, Warner tended to
fo llow Pogue's lead. 36
The delegates failed to reso lve the problems of fares and flight schedules,
but they did reach agreement o n other key issues. The right to navigate the
skies of foreign countries, alo ng with certain landing rights at fo reign air
ports, were i ncorporated i nto a transport agreement. Adoption of the Inter-
national Convention on C i v i l Aviation, one of the most significant agree

ments to come out of the C h icago conference, provided for the formation of
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), governed by an as
sembly of all members and an elected council of twenty-one seats. The
operational functions of the future ICAO were included in a dozen technical
annexes that spelled out uniform international rules and procedures on
communications, traffic control, l i censing, aerology, and navigation. After
affiliating with the United Nations as a specialized agency i n 1947, ICAO
became an outstanding factor i n safe, regularized international aviation. 37
Warner had played a valuable role in the evolution of the technical an
nexes. As Theodore Wright, technical secretary at the conference, corn
mented, "It is not over-statement to say that without the availabil i t y of his
great knowledge and h i s freely given advice and guidance, the annexes
would never have been the outstanding documents that they were." To the
surprise of few, the highly respected American aviation expert became head
of the new international organization. 38
During his twelve years with ICAO, Warner's position as presiding officer
of the council constituted but one element of a complex and demanding job.
H e regularly sat i n during sessions of committees coping w ith administra
tive, legal, economic, and technical issues. Regional meetings took place
around the world, and Warner faithfully attended them all. The high ethical
and moral slandards of the Pearson fam i l y never waned i n these sojourns
abroad. If hotels discrimi nated agai nst people of any racial or ethnic back
grounds, Warner decli ned to stay there . :39 I n the process, Warner also sub
ordinated his American identity i n the interest of international amity. Sir
Frederick Tymms, the British delegate to ICAO and a friend of many years,
emphasized that "he was, by nature, an 'internationalist. ' " 40 Another close
associate remembered that Warner's absolute commitment to impartiality
had its droll aspects. Warner's American passport expired, the fri end ex
plained, and Warner was "sincerely troubled over how he could swear the
oath then required for U nited SLates passport without prej udice to h i s over
riding responsibilities as a high international public servant." 4 1
Warner resigned as director of ICAO in 1957 and died one year later.
His obituaries noted his pioneering contributions to the evolution of aviation
i n the twentieth century and recorded the many honors and awards that he
had received over the years. 42 Yet i n his last days, Warner had been de
pressed about his career. A s his brother recalled, "He was constantly
haunted b y the feeling that he would let down the Pearson standards." H i s
torians can record that he had no reason to despair. 43
•
HER B ER T HOO V ER
AND THE G O L DEN AG E
O F A V I A TION
D A V I D D. L E E
The interwar decades are remembered as a "golden age" in the history of

aviation, a dramatic, even glamorous era that laid the foundation of a vital
new industry. Its lumi naries were the pilots, businessmen, and industrialists
whose often spectacular achievements gave form to commercial flying. But
the growth of aviation in the United States inevitably created significant
questions about the relationship between this fledgling enterprise and the
nation's legal and political structures. One of the major figures in defining
the relationship between commercial aviation and the federal government
was the mining engineer-turned-pu blic servant, Herbert Hoover. Involved
w i th aviation issues from the time he entered Warren Harding's cabinet as
secretary of commerce in 1 92 1 until he rel inquished the presidency i n
1933, Hoover strove both to nurture commercial aviation during the Great
Prosperity and later to rescue i t during the Great Depression. I n the process
he played a crucial role i n shaping both the statutory and bureaucratic
mechanisms that guided the federal role i n this area. 1
Through the boom years of the 1920s, Hoover saw aviation as a struggling
business whose development was impeded by feeble market conditions,
technical limi tations, and a fai lure to develop responsible leadership.
Guided by his concept of the "associative state," he believed that commer
cial aviation should pursue scientiftc rationalization under the stewardship
of industrial statesmen working through voluntary associations. The federal
government should support these indus try-generated solutions by offering
publicity and pertinent economic and scientifi c data. Moreover, taking water
1 2 8 : AV I A T I O N 'S G O L D E N A G E
transportation as a model, Hoover also believed the government should pro

vide and maintain the infrastructure of air transportation just as it provided
navigational aids for the nation's waterways. 2
Working from these assumptions, Hoover promoted aviation through two
basic strategies. One approach was the generation and dissemination of
i nformation for professional constituencies and for the general public.
Through the Department of Commerce, Hoover worked to provide the in
dustry with economic and technical data designed to serve as the basis for
better management decisions and better qual i t y service. S i m u ltaneously, he
sought to educate the pu blic, especially the business community, about the
potential value of commercial aviation. Many Americans in the 1920s saw
aviation as a suitable arena fo r m i l i tary p ilots and civilian daredevils but
not for serious financial investment. To counter this view, Hoover's Depart
ment of Commerce launched a publicity campaign designed to persuade the
nation that air travel boosted efficiency and enhanced profits. 3
Beyond his public relations campaign to make the nation "air-minded, "
however, Hoover realized that skepticism about flying stemmed not only
from ignorance about its possibilities but also from legitimate concerns
about its safety. The inadequate training of p i lots and the improper mainte
nance of planes contributed to an alarming accident rate, which i n turn
encouraged the idea that flying was too dangerous for most people. I n devis
ing his approach to this problem, Hoover embraced a larger rol e for the
federal government than he was typically w i l l i n g to accept because he real
ized that the ind ustry itself could not credibly certify the safety of its own
service. Only a disinterested party such as the government could assume
that responsi b ility, so Hoover played a substantial role i n committing the
Department of Commerce to the regu lation of civi lian flying. Obviously,
such a role could not be undertaken without some legal sanction, and Hoo
ver became an i nfluential advocate for a federal air law that could serve as
a charter for the i ndustry and a guide for its relationsh i p with the govern
ment. The Air Commerce Act of 1 926 was the work of many hands, but
Hoover was an important architect of the legislation. 4
Hoover's efforts to build the infrastructure of the industry around govern
ment-industry cooperation were highly successfu l , but his plans for eco
nomic regu lation met a different fate. H i s early strategies were designed to
secure the place of the new industry i n an expanding economy, but the
collapse of 1 929 changed the thrust fron1 development to rescue. With Post
master General Walter F. Brown as chief policymaker, the Hoover admin
istration used the airmail contracts to restrict entry to the industry, to en-
'
H E R B E R T H O O V E R : 1 2 9
courage 'the consolidation of small firms, and to limit competition. Whatever

economic validity this approach had, i t proved to be a political lightning
rod. The Hoover-Brown system was overturned during the mi d - l 930s amid
a storm of controversy, al though it was later resurrected in modified form by
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and i n fluenced federal aviation policy for
decades to come. 5
I n one important respect, Hoover's plan for aviation represented a special
application of his corporatist philosophy because he assigned an unusually
large role to government. The specifiCs of his policy, however, came from
industry leaders, an approach which was at the heart of Hoover's corpora
tism. Frankly confessing he was not an expert in this area, Hoover was eager
to draw on the ideas of the best thin kers in commercial aviation. Solutions
to aviation problems should be i ndustry-generated, and he encouraged avia
tion leaders to use professional organizations to speak out on such matters.
Throughout his service i n Washington, he and his assistants consistently
nurtured government-industry cooperation as the most efficient method of
addressing avi ation problems. 6
It was precisely the lack of such industry-generated solutions that made
Hoover i n itially reluctant to become involved with aviation. Indeed, the
aviation industry i n 1 92 1 appeared to be precisely the sort of industry least
susceptible to the corporatist strategies of the new secretary of commerce.
Buffeted by scandal and by market dislocations, the industry was foundering
i n the aftermath of a brief period of prosperity fueled by World War I . The
bitter competition for scarce resources i n a period of low public esteem
exacerbated the tensions i n an industry famous for intramural struggles even
as early as the acrimonious patent battles between the Wright brothers and
Glenn Curtiss. A s a result, aviation lacked the kind of voluntary trade as
sociation Hoover considered essential. The Manufacturers Aircraft Associ
ation, for example, did not represent the transport companies, and its pres
tige had been severely damaged by charges of wartime misconduct. Another
organization, the Aero Club of America, had a broader membership, but
it too was dragged into disrepute by internal divisions born of wartime
scandal . 7
Ever mindful of his personal reputation, the scrupulous Hoover was re
luctant to work with either group, and he urged the industry to organize
itself more effectively. Writing to a prominent aviation spokesman, Maurice
Cleary, barely three months after taking office, Hoover declared, "There is
no reason why those interested in civil aviation should not form an associ
ation for promotion of their views. " At least in part due to the encouragement
of the secretary, two such organizations emerged by early 1 922. The general
rnanager of the declining M A A , Samuel Bradley, organized the Aeronautical
Chamber of Commerce, which was ch artered on January 1 , 1922, with
Bradley as general manager. When Hoover entered the government, the
ACC noted, he "laid down the principle of co-operation with national trade
associations as the surest means of teamwork between the Government of
this nation and the business of this nation." With the format ion of the ACC,
"The aircraft industry thus fol lows the example of all other modern indus
tries which owe their present greatness in no small measure to the trade
association." The first act of the new organization was to make contact with
the Department of Commerce by submitting a review of the major events i n
aviation during 192 1 . 8
Almost simultaneously, Howard Coffin, an automobile executive with
growing li nks to aviation, began to work for the formation of another orga
nization. Acting "at the insistence of responsible offtcers of the Govern
ment," probably Hoover, Coffin wanted to disband the factionalized Aero
Club and replace it with a new National Aeronautic Association. W h i le the
ACC, as a spin-off of the M A A , was largely the voice of the -manufacturers,
the N A A would represent a broader range of aviation interests. Its members
were primarily "air-minded" people who had no significant financial in
volvement with the industry. Designed to promote public awareness of avia
tion and to rationalize the wobbly young industry, the group officially came
into being at a 1922 meeting i n Detroit where the annual air races were
being held. Hoover ind icated his approval by attending the races, one of the
few times he accepted such invi tations. 9
I n conjunction with these organizations, Hoover and the Department of
Commerce acted on several fronts to encourage aviation. Most of his actions
centered on expanding the market for aircraft and i m proving safety. One
way of increasing the market was to demonstrate the usefulness and versa
tility of the airplane. Pursuing this goal, department spokesmen publicized
the value of the airplane to farmers i n dusting crops, to geographers i n
permitting aerial photography, and to conservationists i n patrolling forests
and fighting fires. To underscore aviati on's economic value, i n 1923 Hoover
announced with great fanfare that the department had begun sending its
foreign market surveys to the West Coast by airplane. These surveys, filled
with important leads on export poss ibilities, usually reached western busi
nessmen sixty hours later than they reached their eastern competi tors a
gap Hoover said the airplane would substantially reduce. H e frequently
pointed out that airmail would speed up the transfer of banking docutnents
•
H E R B E R T H O O V E R 1 3 1
and suggested that its cost would be balanced by savings on interest. Si
multaneously, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce prepared and
distributed abroad pamphlets on American planes and directed its overseas
representatives to submit i nforrnation on fore ign aviation. Along these same
lines, Hoover ordered a worldwide study of commercial aviation with em
phasis on what the United States might learn from the experience of others. 10
Such reliance on public relations and cooperative mechanisms to imple
ment voluntary strategies borne of discussions between industry and govern
ment leaders was at the heart of Hoov er's approach to regulation, but
he realized that the special needs of commercial aviation dictated some
changes in this model. Specifically, he believed that a strong commercial
aviation industry would be of such value to the country that the federal
government should take a hand i n �ncouraging its growth. A thriving com
rnercial aviation industry would help sustain i n peacetime the manufactur
ing capabi l i ty that would be needed in case of war and would also provide a
ready reserve of trained personnel and planes. Without commercial avia
tion, the government alone would have to bear the expense of maintaining
an air capabi lity, probably through a subsidy program that Hoover consid
ered unwise. Furthermore, Hoover realized that faster transportation would
bolster the national economy by saving time, a concept that fit nicely with
Hoover's general policy of reforming industry through the elimination of
wasteful practices. I n the 1920s commercial aviation was much rnore ad
vanced i n Europe than i n the U nited States, but Hoover saw this as a tem
porary condition. The U n i ted States did not have the political barriers that
Europe did, and its greater distances put a premium on speed. Over the
long run, Hoover was convinced that America was better suited than Europe
to commercial aviation. u
Despite this potential, however, Hoover agreed with ind ustry leaders that
aviation would not progress without federal assistance. Influenced by h i s
torical precedent i n the transportation field, Hoover justified this departure
from his usual attitude by comparing aviation with shipping. The public
owned the airways just as it owned the navigable waterways; and j ust as the
government provided basic services to shi ppers by water, so it should pro
vide precisely the same services to shippers by air. This meant supplying
navigational aids, such as airways equipped with ernergency landing fields
properly lighted, marked, and mapped. Hoover considered lighting espe
cially important because it opened the way to night flying, which i n turn
meant the faster deli very of goods and passengers and a stronger competitive
position for air transport. tz
Hoover also believed that the federal government should uphold the
safety of flying by licensing pi lots and certifying the airworthiness of
aircraft. Once again , his reason ing flowed from the shipping analogy be
cause the government performed the same services for that industry. Only
the government imprimatur, Hoover felt, could counteract the tremendous
amount of bad publicity the indu stry had received and restore a measure of
public confidence. By reducing accidents and building public respect, gov
ernment inspection would help to reduce i nsurance rates and would there
fore attract more capital for investment . 13
Still pursuing his comparison with shipping, Hoover staunchly opposed
federal i nvolvement i n establishing airports. Each locality was responsible
for its own docks, so each city, he believed, must provide for its own airport,
although the facility would have to conform to federal standards. I n this area
Hoover was closer to a more conventional application of his philosophy on
business and government. H e approved a federal propaganda campaign to
publicize the economic advantages of airports and stressed that they should
be close to centers of population so the time gained by flying would not be
lost agai n, but he refused to endorse the use of federal money i n their con
struction. This was a proper area for local initiative. 14
Hoover also had definite ideas about the financing involved in h i s pro
posals. Strongly opposed to direct subsidy on the E uropean model, he ad
vocated using the airmail contract as a form of indirect subsidy to stimulate
growth through private i n itiative. Hoover argued that the government should
stop flying the airmail and instead contract various routes to private com
panies at generous rates. H e envisioned a system wherein mail planes would
carry passengers and freight as well, with airmail c<;>ntracts ensuring that
the enterprise would be profitable. These airmail contracts would provide a
firm base for the creation of self-sufficient commercial aviation. Hoover ad
mi tted that navigational aids, safety inspection, and airmail contracts would
be expensive, but he believed that these steps would save the government
money in the long run. Although his plan would cost roughly one to four
million dollars, depending on the volume of traffic , he predicted a tenfold
savings in mili tary expenditures if commercial aviation developed. Encour
aging commercial aviation, he said, was "a most constructive drive for im
mediate economy in government ." 15
While many aspects of Hoover's plan for nurturing aviation could be
readily implemented, he needed statu tory authority i n order to begin the
regulation of safety-related matters. Consequently, Hoover quickly became
an advocate of a federal air law. At a meeting with him in July 1 92 1 , indus-
•
H E R B E R T H O O V E R : 1 3 3
try leaders laid out their plans for a federal agency to rational ize flying
by mapping out airways, licensing pilots, and inspecting planes. Accord
ingly, Hoover created a committee to prepare a bill encompassing the
recommendations of the meeting concerning an air law. The committee's
completed draft was introduced i n the Senate by James Wadsworth, Jr. , of
New York . 16
Unfortunately, the Wadsworth bill encountered turbulent weather over
Capitol H ill. The idea of federal regulation of aviation was generally ac
cepted, but the advocates of such legislation were divided on the form i t
should take. A small hut vocal m inority insisted on the creation of a separate
Department of Air, either to exist independently or as part of a newly struc
tured Department of Defense. Introduced in Congress several times, such a
bill never had a serious chance for passage. Most observers agreed that
responsibility for c i v i l aviation should be vested i n the Department of Com
merce, but the debate went beyond questions of government structure.
States' rights advocates and some constitutional experts believed the federal
government did not have the authority to regulate i ntrastate flying. Their
opponents argued that the safety of all traffic required that no aircraft escape
federal supervision. Another disagreement was over specifically how the
legislation should be written. Broadly speaking, air-law advocates wanted a
very detailed bill that carefu l l y explained regulation procedures, but some
felt the law should simply provide guidelines for the secretary of commerce
and permit him the flexibility to formulate and modify rules i n the light · of
experience, the approach Hoover himself ultimately preferred. 1 7
Wadsworth, whose bill provided for regulation of intrastate flying, soon
found h i s proposal attacked as unconstitutional. Despite the bill's endorse
ment by President Harding and by Hoover and the widespread newspaper
backing i t enjoyed, states' rights senators on the Commerce Committee at
tacked it harshly. Fearful the bill would not reach the floor, Wadsworth
submi tted a new measure in January 1922 that dropped the provisions con
cerning intrastate commerce. Wadsworth's action alarmed aviation leaders
who felt the new draft was too weak. A fretful Howard Coffin, who had
chaired the industry committee responsible for the original Wadsworth bill,
wrote to Hoover, "I trust that the teeth are not being extracted from this Bill,
and that the counsels of our timid friends who fear the States Rights and
other bugaboos, may not be given too much weight." Moreover, the Wads
worth bill was not the elaborate bill many wanted but a very general one
intended, as Wadsworth put it, "to be as simple as possible and to be used,
if enacted, to break the ground as i t were i n the development of comprehen-
sive legislation based on experience . " The industry would accept a broad
bill if intrastate flying was regulated hut not if that feature was eliminated.
By the time the revised Wadsworth hill passed the Senate on February 1 4 ,
1922, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Society of Au
tomotive Engineers, the National Aircraft U nderwriters Association, and the
recently formed Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce were all urging that
substitute bills be prepared. 1 8
Responsive to the air industry's unhappiness with the altered Wadsworth
bill , as early as December 192 1 Hoover had department solicitor William
Lamb at work on a rnore satisfactory proposal. Besides Lamb, two other men
who played an important part in shaping the hill were Massachusetts con
gressman Samuel Wi nslow, chairman of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, and William P. MacCracken, Jr. , a former "'orld
War I pilot, chairman of the American Bar Association's committee on avia
tion law, and advocate of a comprehensive air measure. When the Wads
worth Bill reached the House, it was referred to Winslow's committee. Mac
Cracken v i sited the congressman to suggest revisions but found Wi nslow
more i nterested in harness racing than in airplanes. The pragmatic Mac
Cracken shrewdly played to his subject's interest and finally secured a
promise fr<Om Winslow to sponsor any new bill MacCracken recommended. 1 9
Unfortunately, this auspicious beginning evolved into a fiasco. Winslow
became infatuated with the idea of a Depa1tment of Air with complete con
trol of military as well as civilian flying. Some industry spokesmen were
appalled, because they feared that a completely new avi ation bill, especially
one containing such a controversial provision, would delay congressional
action indefinitely. Then Lamb and MacCracken offended everyone with
their slowness in drafting the b i l l . When Hoover prodded Lamb, the latter
replied that he was working on the disputed intrastate-flying section, but he
assured his chief that the final draft, although late, would encounter virtu
ally no opposition. A week later, an irritated Hoover told Lamb that the
House committee was "becoming indignant over the delay" and ordered him
to "send it along immediately in whatever shape it may he." Only as an
afterthought did the secretary in sert the word "kindly" at the beginning of
the sentence. Even then, Hoover had to wait another week for the bill to
reach his desk. 20
Hoov er's worst embarrassment was yet to come. E ager to appease the
impatient Winslow, Hoover sent the draft to the congressman on June 1 2
without going over it. Later that day he discovered to his horror that he had
forwarded a bill to establish a Departrnent of Air. I n a chagrined note to
H E R B E R T H O O V E R : 1 3 5
Wi nslow, Hoover said, " I regret that I sent on to you the B i l l drafted by the
'
Committee without having first given it more attention. I was so anxious to

get it into your hands that I sent i t on as soon as it reached me through the
mai l . " Hoover dismissed as a "political dream" the idea of a secretary of
aeronautics, saying i t "has never been discussed by the Administration
and . . . I do not think i t will receive support." Hoover's opposition appar
ently persuaded W i nslow to abandon a Department of A i r. H e made no
further reference to i t and simply suggested that the secretary "endeavor to
cause a new bill to be prepared as expeditiously as possible." Hoover dis
patched a new bill on June 19 but Winslow, plainly indifferent, replied that
it would create more problems than i t would solve. The measure was finally
introduced on January 8, 1923, much too late to be passed before the March
adjournment. 2 1
Proponents of aviation regu lation, including Hoover, contributed a great
deal to their own defeat in the Sixty-seventh Congress. Although the indus
try tended to favor the W i nslow bill after the Wadsworth measure was re
written, its spokesmen were divided on the proper strategy to pursue. Sam
uel Bradley and others ins isted on sticking with the modified Wadsworth
measure because they felt i t had the best chance to pass. A weak law, they
contended, was better than no law. Another group agreed with MacCracken
that industry should demand a stronger bill even if it meant defeat. By
cooperating with the second group, Hoover contributed to a legislative
strategy that i n effect divided the proponents of air legislation and brought
about the defeat of both bills. The stalemate continued in the Sixty-eighth
Congress when both bills were reintroduced. The Wadsworth proposal again
passed the Senate, but Winslow, who had decided to retire at the end of the
session, let them languish i n his House committee. 22
By 1 926, however, the political cli mate was much more receptive to air
legislation. The economic base of the industry was enhanced by the passage
of the Kelly Air Mail Act, which transferred the airmail to private carriers
and drew the Fords and other important i nvestors into the field. Also, almost
simultaneously, three panels investigating commercial aviation reported
similar findings. A l l three rejected the idea of a s i ngle Department of A i r
and opted instead for delegating commercial aviation to the Department of
Commerce. I n effect this represented the establishment of a consensus
among the executive branch, Congress, and private industry on the proper
course for c i v ilian flying. 23
Hoover, Department of Commerce attorneys, and two members of Con
gress, Senator H i ram Bi ngham and Congressman James Parker, collabo-
rated in preparing a draft of the proposed legislation based on these recom

mendations. The new bill was simi lar to the old Wadsworth bill but had
some significant differences. L i ke the Wadsworth measure, it restricted fed
eral authority to interstate flying and contented itself with providing a gen
eral outline of regu lation rather than involving itself in many specifics. Hoo
ver strongly endorsed the b i l l's vagueness, noting that "difficulties can be
solved equally well or better when they arise than by anticipation." The
major difference lay in the new administrative procedure embodied in the
bi l l . Over the years, Hoover had moved away from the creation of a bureau
of civil aeronautics and toward the idea that services to aviation could best
be provided by extending the fu nctions of existing department agencies and
simply creating an assistant secretary of commerce to coordinate them. For
example, the Bureau of Lighthouses could assume responsi bility for lighting
airways, or the Bureau of Standards could make research faci li ties avail
able. Hoover argued that this method would prove cheaper and more effi
cient than a new government bureau. In a letter to Senator Wesley Jones,
Hoover described the new bill as a "much simplifted method of setting u p a
civilian aviation agency." 24
Passed on May 20, 1926, the Air Commerce Act has been hailed as the
"legislative cornerstone" of the industry, and the period from 1926 to 1929
represents the high-water mark of Hoover's aviation efforts . The secretary
later summarized those years by observing, "We went at it wit h great zest."
Hoover named W i l liam P. MacCracken to the newl y created post of assistant
secretary of commerce for aviation. U nder the leadership of MacCracken
and his successor, Clarence Young, the department supervised the estab
lishment of 25,000 miles of improved airways and l icensed 6,400 planes
flying 25,000, 000 mi les annually. The late 1920s also saw the construction
of 2, 200 airports and the manufacturing of 7 , 500 planes per year. "I know
of no sati sfaction," Hoover wrote, "equal to the growth under one's own hand
of a great economic and human agency. " 25
The work of the secretary and his associates in government and private
business benefited enormously from Charles Lind bergh's spectacular solo
flight from New York to Paris in 1 927. The acclaim this achievement gar
nered swept away much public suspicion of flying and symboli zed its appar
ent coming of age. "There seemed to be a general consensus among aviation
figures," historian Roger Bi lstein has noted, "that the close of the twenties
constituted an over-all benchmark of maturity in aeronautical develop
ment." A s Harry Guggenheim, a wealthy aviation enthusiast, put it at the
time, "The pioneering period has come to an end." This new confidence i n
H E R B E R T H O O V E R : 1 3 7
aviation came precisely as the economic optimism of the 1 920s neared its
crest, making the industry an increasingly attractive financial investment.
The influx of capital sometimes called the "Lindbergh boom" sharply
changed the face of the industry as small operators were overwhelmed by
larger, better-funded competitors. 26
Specifically, the late 1 920s saw the rise of three large holding companies,
each controlling diverse aviation interests, while roughly sixty other smaller
firms struggled to survive i n an increasingly consolidated industry. The larg
est and best-organized of the holding companies was Un ited Aircraft and
Transport, which embraced several major manufacturing concerns plus the
four airmail operators that collectively made u p Uni ted Air Lines. North
American Aviation controlled a variety of ai r transport companies, including
Transcontinental Air Transport, which operated the first air-and-rail service
across the United States, as well as Eastern Air Transport and National Air
Transport. Backed mainly by W. Averill Harriman and Lehman Brothers,
Aviation Corporation, or AVCO, bought up more than eighty subsidiaries,
including eleven airlines knit together as American Airways. Poorly orga
nized and overcapitalized, AVCO was the most fragile member of the Big
Three. 27
By 1 929, then, Hoover's efforts to nurture commercial aviation through a
creative government-industry partnership had helped to alter the face of
commercial flying in important ways. Pursuing a strategy largely generated
by the private sector, the gove1nment had worked to create new attitudes
about the potential economic value of aviation and had assumed primary
responsibility for ensuring the safety of civil ian flying. These actions i n turn
had encouraged considerable economic expansion. However, this growth
i ncorporated many of the structural weaknesses that generally marked the
hollow prosperity of the 1920s. For one thing, aviation boosters, Hoover
included, had actually overpromoted the industry, giving aviation a faddish
ness that caused stock prices to i n flate far beyond real values. This opti
mism was nurtured further by the anticipation of large, government-sup
ported profits from overly generous airmail contracts. But as serious as these
problems were, other aspects of the situation were even more troubling.
Despite years of effort, no real market for air transport yet existed aside from
the U . S. Post Office Department. Moreover, many transport companies were
marginal operations, flying short routes in good weather. The limited mar
ket for transport in tum depressed the market for planes. The situation
had improved since 192 1 , but commercial aviation remained a very frail
industry. 28
The Stock Market Crash of 1 929 punctured the Lindbergh boom and
threw all these problems into bold relief. The impact of the downturn was
exacerbated by another worrisome problem, the expiration of airmail con
tracts with the government. At a time when hauling passengers and freight
was simply not profitable, the lucrative airmail contracts functioned, as
Hoover had anticipated, as a government subsidy. But as important as these
contracts were to the industry, they were creating an enormous financial
headache for the Post Office Department because the re venue from the
postal rate lagged fa r behind the weight-based compensation the department
was paying to its carriers. By 1 929 the government was losing roughly seven
million dollars a year on its airmail operat ions. 29
The crisis i n the air industry precipitated important changes i n govern
ment policy. Heretofore, Hoover and his associates had worked at the tech
nical regulation of aviation, a process conducted largely by the Department
of Commerce, but the situation now required ftrm efforts to regulate the
economic side of the industry as well. With economic issues achieving a
new primacy, Hoover increasingly relied on the Post Off1ce Department as
the instrument of government policy. As a consequence, the chief architect
of aviation policy during the Hoover presidency was Postmaster General
Walter Brown. Like Hoover in 1 92 1 , Brown came to the cabinet knowing
little about aviation, hut he shared many of Hoover's ideas about the ''asso
ciative state." Each man had supported Theodore Roosevelt in 1 9 1 2 and
remained committed to applying progressive principles to the problems of
the 1920s. During the Harding administration, Brown came to H oover's
attention through his chairmanship of the Joint Congressional Committee on
Reorganization of the Executive Departments. H e later served as an assis-
•
tant secretary of commerce and as Hoover's campaign manager i n 1 928

before becoming postmaster general i n the new administration. 30
Brown soon concluded that aviation was a none too vigorous industry
riding for a fall. It was "going into a tailspin," Brown believed, and "some
thing had to be done and done quickly." Commercial aviation was "in a had
way," and "the men who were at the head of it were running wild. " The new
enterprise was "so romantic, so fascinating . . . that people from every walk
of life decided to go into the aviation industry." People who knew nothing
about flying were not equipped to plan an industry. "Factories grew u p ev
erywhere, airports were established all over the country," said Brown, "and
apparently a lot of people thought that in a very few years, perhaps a very
few months, people would be flying about the country just as they had been
traveling in automobiles." This "mistaken theory" had grossly di storted the
H E R B E R T H O O V E R : 1 3 9
ind ustry and "led to a great deal of grief, to a great surplus of manufacturing
capacity, and to the prod uction of a great many planes, planes that would
fly but that would do nothing more ." Without decisive action, "the millions
which the Government has contributed to encourage commercial aviation,
as well as a large part of the public's investment in the aviation industry will
be lost." 3 1
I n late 1929, Hoover and Brown unveiled their strategy for managing the
situation. "In our judgment," Brown said, "the method of determining the
compensation of airmail contractors must be revolutionized" to permit
"the dispatch of airmail on regularly scheduled passenger flights." Under
the existing system, Hoover later wrote, "the air transport industry was rap
idly developing complete chaos." By way of reform, Hoover and Brown pro
posed to j u nk the weight-based formula in favor of paying a ftxed rate per
mile for space in the aircraft. Furthermore, the department would pay extra
for night flying, for flying mountainous or fog-enshrouded rou tes, and for
carrying passengers. Simply put, the new rate system would create an in
centive for operators to buy larger planes and establish around-the-clock
schedules to lure private-sector customers as well as mai l from the govern
ment. According to this plan, the airmail contracts would serve to nurture
the industry until the American people "realize the safety and advantage of
travel by air on regular scheduled routes and . . . give to the air passenger
carriers the support necessary to put the aeronautical industry permanently
on a sound financial basis." 32
Hoover and Brown believed this plan would work only if they could cur
tail competition i n the industry and guarantee the contractor that the invest
ment i n passenger-related planes and equipment would be protected. They
also feared bids from companies with too little flying experience or from
firms not i n terested i n becoming passenger carriers. Such companies d id
not fit their vision of a flourishing, responsible industry, and they wanted to
make sure these companies could not obtain a government contract. There
fore, Brown wanted to end competitive bidding for contracts and negotiate
terms with firms of "good character and financial respons ibility." Hoover
agreed with Brown's assessment, complaining that "a great many distortions
have grown up" i n the airmail system. Describing competitive bidding in
the airmail business as being "of doubtful value and more or less a myth ,"
Brown feared businessmen with no experience in aviation would establish
paper companies and underbid established operators who understood the
real costs of the industry. H e did not want to be compel1ed to award a
contract to stock-manipulating promoters "who will pick up a fly ing person-
1 4 0 : AV I A T I O N 'S G O L D E N A G E
nel and such equipment as can get by the Department of Commerce" w hile
simultaneously "doing the most unbusinesslike thing of throwing away . . .
the experience of these men in the pioneering period of the aviation
industry." 33
Such a plan required rev ision of the existing airmail laws, so in November
1929, i n the aftermath of the Great Crash, Brown assembled a small com
mittee of aviation experts from the private sector and put them to work
preparing new legislation based on his ideas. The three were William Mac
Cracken, Paul Henderson, and Mabel Walker Wi llebrandt, all people with
prior experience i n both government and aviation. They were joined in their
deliberations by the second assistant postmaster general, Warren Irving
Glover, and by Brown h imself. Neither the small operators nor the operators
without airmail contracts played any role in the drafting process. These
sessions were ill ustrative of Brown's attitude toward government regulation
of the industry. Like Hoover, Brown preferred to deal with "industrial states
men," business leaders who supposedly were aware of the public dimension
of their enterprises, i n preparing a regulatory system based on cooperative
rather than adversarial proceedings. Within a few weeks the group had
drafted a bill changing the method of compensation for airmail carriers to a
space-mile form ula, giving the postmaster general authority to negotiate
terms of the contracts and permitting him to extend and consolidate routes
in the public interest. On January 14, 1930, Brown announced the sub
stance of the proposed legislation in a speech before the Cleveland Chamber
of Commerce. 34
The major obstacle to Brown's corporatist approach was the ' failure of the
acrimonious aviation community to sustain the kind of industry-wide con
sensus that had fostered such successes as the passage of the Air Commerce
Act. Two prime sources of tension beset the industry. First of al l, the major
holding companies included a wide variety of aviation interests, most no
tably manufacturing concerns, transport operations, and various accessory
companies. Consequently, many im portant industry spokesmen had admin
istrative and financial commitments that reached beyond air transport. For
example, North American Aviation and U n i ted Ai rcraft and Transport, con
glomerates that controlled a number of manufacturing interests, often took
a different view of government policy than did the Aviation Corporation,
which mostly controlled transport companies. A second source of tension
was the rivalry among the various transport companies themselves. Scram
bling for scarce resources in a tight market, the firms were bitterly di strust
ful of one another. In the words of aviation student Henry Ladd Smit h , they
H E R B E R T H O O V E R : 1 4 1
were "suspicious, jealous of each other, and only too willing to stab a
rival." 35
Such tensions completely di srupted efforts by the operators to reach a
new airmail agreement and thus stymied Brown's hopes that the industry
could work out a solution of its own. Even the direct intervention of Herbert
Hoover could not bring them to agreement oil a revised airmail-rate sched
ule. Concerned that rates "be readj usted upward before they become too
crystallized," Hoover wanted a formula that would abolish the old inequities
between routes and would be "as uni versal i n its application as possible."
Deeply antagonistic · toward one another, the operators could not arri ve at
such a formula, and as the arguments stretched out through October 1929,
an angry Walter Brown compared the situation to "a kennel at feeding
time, w i t h each operator clawing and scratching for a ladle of government
gravy. " 3 6
The mounting bitterness broke forth at a series of conferences convened
by Hoover aide Julius Barnes to establish a national response to the disaster
on Wall Street. Frederick Rentschler of U n i ted was invited by Barnes to
organize aviation's participation i n the program. Working through the Aero
nautical Chamber of Commerce, Rentschler and ACC director Luther Bell
brought together representatives from major aviation i n terests for a general
discussion of the industry's condition. Founded and dominated by manufac
turers, the ACC was less responsive to the voice of the operators, and the
two groups soon clashed over the proper strategy to pursue i n the crisis.
Rentschler, along w i t h Paul Henderson and Clement Keys of North Ameri
can Aviation, favored pressing Brown heavily to take strong action on behalf
of the i ndustry. An ad hoc committee chaired by Rentschler prepared a
memo for President Hoover blaming Brown for the current plight of com
mercial flying and calling on Hoover t o prod h i s postmaster general toward
more effective action. 37
The alarmed operators, led by Hainer H inshaw of American Airways,
L. H . Brittin of Northwest, and William Bishop of Western Air Express,
vigorously protested the sharp tone of the document. Much more dependent
on the good will of Brown than were the manufacturing companies, they
feared the memo would embarrass and anger the postmaster general. Brown
had already threatened to leave airline regu lation to another body, perhaps
to the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Department of Commerce, or
even to abandon the operators entirely to the perils of competitive bidding.
Indeed, Earl B . Wadsworth, superintendent of airmail, had privately cau
tioned H i nshaw that Brown was in no mood to be pressured. The operators
ultimately prevailed, and Rentschler himself finally moved that the critical
memo be withdrawn. 38
The breach between the two sides was by no means healed, however, and
their differences spilled over into discussions of Brown's proposed changes
i n the airmail law. Even though Henderson had participated in drafting the
bill, he was disappointed in the final product. H e and Clement Keys be
lieved it gave the postmaster general too much power and would stir consid
erable opposition in Congress. Consequently, in mid-December Henderson
and Keys paid calls on Brown and Hoover, cautioning them that the pro
posed bill was "one which is full of danger and which may be criticized i n
many respects." Once again, Hainer H i nshaw acted to smooth administra
tion feathers and assure Brown that the bulk of the operators accepted his
leadership. He telephoned the White House before Henderson and Keys
aiTived, warning they would �'paint it very black and bitter agai nst the
PMG." Henderson, Keys, and their backers represented only three of
twenty-four airmail contracts, Hinshaw pointed out, while he and his allies
held fou11een. 39
Besides receiving criticism from the industry, Brown's proposal also re
ceived a hostile reception on Capitol Hill, largely because of the opposition
of Clyde Kelly. The "father of the a i rmail" and the postmaster general had
a history of personal antagonism, and Kelly soon proved himself to be an
effective adversary of B rown's plan to award contracts through negotiation.
Convinced "such arbitrary power granted to any man would lead to abuses
which would endanger the entire airmail service," he insi sted that Congress
could not compromise the principle of competitive bidding. Kelly's point of
view won strong support from the testimony of Comptroller General John
McCarl, who declared that Congress had already embraced competitive bid
ding i n previous airmail legislation and that he saw no reason to abandon
the concept. Brown's backers countered that if the government was going to
assist an industry, then the executive officer responsible should have ade
quate authority to carry out his mandate. After a bitter discussion, the com
mittee reported the bill out, but Kelly's influence with the House leadership
kept it from reach i ng the floor. 4·0
Stymied, the frustrated Brown realized Kelly had effectively blocked him.
Swallowing his pride, he met with Kelly, Laurence Watres of the House Post
Office Committee, and a few others i n a six-hour session that resulted i n
H . B . 1 1 704, a revised bill that Watre.s introduced in mid-April. The new
measure eliminated the provisions that would have given Brown the power
to evade competitive bidding. Kelly then withdrew his opposition, and the
H E R B E R T H O O V E R : 1 4 3
hill quickly passed both houses of Congress. It became law on April 29,
just a few days before the old airmail contracts would have started to
expire. 41
Although the final version of the Watres Act was a distinct disappoint
ment to Brown, he was nevertheless still determined to carry out his plans
for the industry. I n accord with his usual pract ice, he began by calling a
meeting, the first of the so-called "spoils conferences." The actual intent of
the meetings has been obscured by charges and countercharges. A s one
legal scholar noted i n 1 94 1 , "Much ink has been spi lled and many fine
verbal distinctions drawn, both as to what transpired at this meeting and
what its exact purpose was." Brown's critics charged that the big operators
met to d i vide the spoils of federal largesse by conspiring to thwart competi
t i ve bidding. H is backers contended that Brown was s i mply i n v iting the
industry, i n MacCracken's words, "to co-operate with the Postmaster Gen
eral i n trying to make some sense out of the Watres Act so that aviation
service i n the country could continue." 42
More accurately put, the postmaster general was now empowered to use
the airmail contracts as an instrument of industrial rationalization, and he
was i n v i t i ng the airmail contractors to join h i m i n the process. According to
an i nternal Post Office Department memorandum, Brown was concerned
about "the feeling that is developing among the passenger-carry ing l i nes
who have no mail contract and have no way of getting into the picture unless
i t i s by competitive bidding." Faced with the prospect of financial rui n , the
passenger lines were desperate for a contract, and their mounting frustration
added a new note of acrimony to an already clamorous sector of the
economy. Brown was al armed by the prospect of competi t i ve bidding and
eager to provide support for viable passenger companies. The representa
tives of the industry and Brown would discuss "the best way for them to
approach the question of gi ving aid to passenger l i nes." If the current con
tractors could not reach some sort of understanding, "it will . . . all be
thrown into the pot and the passenger lines left entirely outside due to the
fact that the airmail operators would have the inside and would have the
ten·itory covered . " 43
The charges of collusion directed against the spoils conferences are dif
ficult to gauge. On the one hand, groups involved i n the conferences re
cei ved 1 4, 700 miles of new airmail routes while nonparticipants received
no contracts. On the other hand, the operators were so deeply distrustful of
one another that collusion among them was virtually impossible. As Fortune
magazine noted, "every air l i ne operator on the map despised every other"
and "near1 y al1 shared an abiding professional hat red of . . . Walter

Brow n." Moreover, Brown later testi fied that he did not expect the operators
to reach agreement but i nstead antici pated they would ask him to adj udicate
their di fferences, opening the way for him to offer his own solution. In ret
rospect, the charges of collusion seem irrelevant to the real issue, namely
formulating a coordinated response to economic trauma created by the de
pression. In that sense, the spoils conferences not only typified the recovery
mechanisms devised by the Hoover admini stration but also anticipated the
industry-wide conferences arranged by the N ew Deal under the National
Industrial Recovery Act . However, the tone of the meetings clearly reflected
the failure of an important element of the administration's corporatist phi
losophy, specifically the need for the industry to formulate answers to its
own problems. The acrimony and ultimate deadlock of the spoils confer
ences severely undercut the basic working mechanisms of corporatism. 44
Brown opened the May 1 9 meeting by outlining his plans for the future
of commercial aviation. Gesturing toward a map of the nation's airways,
Brown announced his determination to consolidate and rationalize the sys
tem while integrating the mail and passenger lines. The economics of air
travel dictated long routes, yet many routes stretched merely a few hu ndred
miles. Only United had established transcontinental service, and Brown was
determ ined that no single company would have such a monopoly. Instead,
he wanted two additional competitive routes with all three supplemented by
a system of north-south feeders. Simu ltaneously, Brown wanted to protect
the pioneering investments of both mail operators and independents, so he
invited members of the council to negotiate among themselves how the air
mail pie would be divided. Only by agreeing on trades and consolidations
of routes could the conferees hope to avoid competi tive bidding. With that
admonition, Brown withdrew to let the companies deliberate. 45
The conference participants, after choosing MacCracken as their chair
man, convened almost daily for the next two weeks, but to lit tle avail. Of
the twelve routes Brown outlined on the map, the committee could agree on
contractors for only seven of them. In virtually every case, the favored air
l i ne was the one already flying the route. "As to the remaining five," Mac
Cracken wrote to Brown, "there are still some matters i n controversy."
Among the five were the two new transcontinental routes Brown intended to
establish. MacCracken concluded his report by saying, "The operators in
terested in the routes under controversy have all agreed to submit the issues
to the Postmaster General, i n the hope that a sati sfactory solution may be
reached . " 4-6
H E R B E R T H O O V E R : 14 5
Brown now moved forcefully to develop his own solutions. H i s initial

approach was simply to extend the routes of existing contractors, thereby
molding the air network to his model while avoiding competitive bidding.
This strategy, however, raised the possibility that Comptroller General
McC arl might disallow the transaction. McCarl, who had testified against
the original Watres bill, took a narrow view of Brown's power to grant exten
sions. In early June the postmaster general tested McCarl's attitude by ex
tending the Chicago-Mi nneapolis route held by Northwest Airways all the
way to Winnipeg, Manitoba, an action that roughly doubled the original
route. Within a wee k , McCarl rejected the change. He claimed Brown had
exceeded his authority and further asserted that extensions must be fairly
modest and not major additions to the original route. 47
The McC arl ruling meant that Brown would have to award the contracts
on the basis of competitive bidding, but the resourceful Brown now moved
to elimi nate the competition. Pred ictably, he first called an industry confer
ence to consider the possible options. After considerable deliberation, Mac
Cracken hit upon the device of requiring bidders to have at least s i x months
of experience in flying night schedules over routes of at least 250 miles.
Because only mail carriers had such experience, the provision effectively
excluded the independents from bidding. 48
Brown proceeded to dominate the field through a vigorous blending of the
carrot and the stick. H i s plan to award the central transcontinental route to
Transcontinental Western Air (TWA), a firm being created by the merger of
Transcontinental Air Transport and Western Air Express, was challenged
by a new firm, United Avigation, an amalgamation of three small l i nes, the
most important of which was N . A. Letson's United States Airways. United
Avigation was precisely the k i nd of firm Brown wanted to exclude from his
network. U nderfinanced and hastily assembled, the business existed only
on paper and was primari ly a vehicle for bidding on the lucrati ve mail con
tract. Although U A substantially underbid TWA, Brown d isallowed its sub
mission because it had no night-flying experience. TWA received the con
tract, but Letson appealed to Comptroller General McCarl, arguing that the
night flying provision was not part of the Watres Act and was therefore
illegal. Anxious to forestall another u nfavorable ruling, · Brown quietly prom
ised part of the southern route would be sublet to Letson i f he withdrew his
appeal. Letson complied and received his route the next spring. 49
Brown also moved boldly to guarantee American Airways the southern
transcontinental route. Although five other lines were interested i n the con
tract, the postmaster general removed each one from the picture before bids
were let. In a complicated series of transactions, Brown arranged for Ameri

can to buy out three of its rivals, none of which met the night-flying require
ment. One of these operators, Erle Halliburton of Southwest Air Fast Ex
press (Safeway ), received an especially good price when he threatened to
reopen the night-flying question. A fourth contender, Eastern, with drew
when Brown threatened to exclude the company entirely if i t challenged his
plans. Wedell-W i lliams, a small New Orleans-based carrier already in dire
financial straits, simply went out of business. As Brown intended, American
was the only bidder for the southern route. 50
Over the next three years, Brown steadily perfected his ai:rwa ys design
through his route-extension powers. By 1 933 the nation was bound together
by eight north-south lines as well as by the three transcon tinental routes,
and i n the far north Northwest Airways aspired to establishing a fourth trans
continental route. Perhaps most strikingly, the once frai l passenger-carry ing
lines were prospering i n the midst of the nation's worst depression. Between
1930 and 1932, the latter being Brown's last full year i n office, the number
of passenger-miles flown rose from 84,000,000 to 1 2 7 , 000,000. Scheduled
aircraft miles during the same period went from 16,200, 000 to 34, 500,000.
Simultaneously, Brown cut the rates the government paid to the haulers
through periodic renegotiation of the contracts. The average rate per mile
had been $ 1 . 09 when he took office, but the Post Office Department was
paying only $ . 54 per mile in M arch 1933. Clearly, Brown's efforts mark one
of the most important achievements of the Hoover administration. 51
Whatever its merits as an exercise in econo.mic · planning, the Hoover
Brown aviation policy proved to be a political failure. I n early 1934, Brown's
actions i n awarding airmail contracts becan1e the focal point of a major
congressional investigation chaired by Senator Hugo Black. Deeply suspi
cious of large concentrations of economic power i n private hands, Black
stressed competition as the surest regulator of economic activity, and de
spite his usually fervent su pport for FDR, he had strongly opposed a major
Roosevelt program, the N ational Recovery Administration, because he be
lieved it sanctioned collusion and price-fixing. The senator was ultimately
successful in discred i t i ng the aviation policy of the Hoover years and secur
ing legislation based on a different set of assumptions about the American
political economy. The Black-McKellar Act of 1934 encouraged a more
competitive industry made up of smaller firms supposedly free of control by
the large aviation holding companies and other major financial interests that
had flourished under the Watres Act. "In a sense," historian Ellis Hawley
has written, "the act represented a qualified vi ctory for the champions of
small business and enforced competition." 52
H E R B E R T H O O V E R : 1 4 7
Alt hough the Black committee hearings brought about the repudiation of
the Hoover-Brown policies i n the area of economic regu lation, N ew Deal
aviation policy gradually embraced more and more of their once-discred ited
ideas. For example, one of the f1rst actions taken by Postmaster General
James Farley i n implementing the new airmail law was to assemble a meet
i ng of the contractors, a session some found rather s i m i l ar to the spoils
conferences. Indeed, some observers argued that the 1 930 confere nces were
simi lar to the industry-wide meetings held under the auspices of the Na
tional Industrial Recovery A c t to draw up the Blue Eagle codes. Moreover,
the Black-McKellar Act exacerbated rather than mneli orated the economic
turmoil besetting the industry. It attempted to deal only with airmail w h i ] e
ignoring the broader problem of commercial aviation in general. Under i ts
provisions, the carriers lost money, and many provided inferior service.
Consequently, in 1 938 Congress passed the C i v i l Aeronautics Act, which
restructured the industry according to the assumptions of the Hoover-Brown
policy. As aviation historian Henry Ladd Smith put i t , the new legislation
"tossed overboard the old conception of competi tion, thereby coming back
to the policy advocated by Postmaster General Brown," an interpretation
reiterated more recently by Hawley, who descri bed the C i v i l Aeronau tics
Act as restoring the "legitimacy" of the Hoover administration approach to
the industry. 53
In retrospect, Herbert Hoover clearly looms as a major architect of gov
ernment-industry relations i n the field of commercial aviation. H i s approach
to the industry was i nformed by his corporatist phi losophy, and he nurtured
strong l inks between government on the one hand and important manufac
turing and transportation concerns on the other. Work i ng i n i tially through
an i nformal partnership between industry leaders and officials of the De
partment of Commerce, Hoover developed a strategy for promoting the air
plane as an economic force while enhancing its public appeal by underwrit
i ng i ts safety. U nfortunately, Hooverian corporatism proved to be less than
successful as a mechanism for economic recovery and rational izat ion. When
the always precarious industry consensus largely collapsed, Walter Brown
was left trying to impose order, but his h i ghhanded methods stirred in
tense opposi tion that ultimately undermined his efforts. Nevertheless, the
C i v i l Aeronautics Act revived some basic principles of the Hoover era
government-industry linkages, l i m ited compet iti on, and restricted entry
and made them the core of national aviation policy for the next forty years.
"\
'
N 0 T E S
I ntrod ucti on
l . Manufacturers Aircraft Association,Aircraft Year Book, 1 9 1 9 ( New York, 1 9 1 9),

p. 1 1 . See also Joseph J. Corn, The Winged Gospel: A merica's Romance with Aviation,
1900- 1 950 ( New York, 1983).
2. On Aeromarine Airways, see William M. Leary, "At the Dawn of Commercial
Aviation: Inglis M. Uppercu and Aeromarine Airways," Business History Review 53
(1 979): 78-102.
3. NASA, Annual Report for 1927 (Washington, 1928), p. 20.
4. See William M. Leary, Aerial Pioneers: The U.S. Air Mail Service, 1 918-1927
( Washington, 1985).
5. Thomas Worth Walterman, "Airpower and Private Enterprise: Federal-Industrial
Relations in the Aeronautics Field, 1918- 1 926" ( Ph . D. diss. , Washington University,
1970), p. 43.
6. Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, A ircraft Year Book for 1 939 ( New York,
1939), pp. 504-5, 52 1 -24.
7. See Nick A. Komons, Bonfires to Beacons: Federal Civil Aviation Policy under the
Air Commerce Act, 1 926- 1 938 (Washington, 1978).
H e n ry Ford and Aeronautics during the 1 920s
l. Thomas Worth Walterman, "Ai rpower and Private Enterprise: Federal-Industrial

Relations in the Aeronautics Field, 1918- 1926" (Ph. D. diss . , Washington University,
1970), p. 438; Howard Mingos, New York Times, August 23, 1925.
2. Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, Ford: Expansion and Challenge, 1 91 5 - 1 933
( New York, 1957), pp. 64-68.
3. David Ansel Weiss, The Saga of the Tin Goose (New York, 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 63, 100.
4. For a sympathetic and uncritical sketch of William B. Stout's career, see Maurice
Holland and Thomas M . Smith, Architects of Aviation (New York, 1951 ) , pp. 1 27-44.
Stout's own book, So Away I Went! (Indianapolis, 1951), recounts his career the way he
remembers i t but not necessarily the way i t was.
5. In addition to aluminum, duraluminum contains 3Y2 to SY2 percent copper, approxi
mately 1 percent magnesium, and less than 1 percent silicon. It has minimum ultimate
tensile strength of 55,000 pounds per square inch and a tensile strength at yield point
of 30, 000 pounds per square inch. See U.S. House, Committee on Mili tary Affairs, Hear
ings: Air Service Unification, 68th Congress, 2d session, 1925, pp. 245-46. The use of
duraluminum by the aircraft industry during the 1920s i s discussed by John B. Rae,
Climb to Greatness: The American A ircraft Industry, 1920 - 1 960 (Cambridge, Mass. ,
1968), p. 74.
1 5 0 •
• N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 - 6
6. For Stout's telegram and the ill-fated auempt by the Post Office to use the Junkers
to fly the mail, see William M. Leary, AeriaL Pioneers: The U.S. Air Mail Service, 1 918-
1927 (Washington, 1985).
7. Stout, "Requirements for Commercial Aircraft," Aviation 12 (January 16, 1922):
72-74; the emphasis is Stout's. Roger G. Miller and F. E. Seiler, Jr. , "The Design of
Metal Airplanes," Aviation 1 4 ( February 19, 1923), describes in detail the construction
of the Junkers, Dornier, and Zeppelin-Staaken metal airplanes.
8. Stout, So Away I Went!, pp. 141 -57.
9. "The Reminiscences of Glen H. Hoppin," November 1957, the Papers of Henry
Ford, Edison Institute, Dearborn, Michigan.
10. Stout to Mayo, March 12, 1923, Accession 1 , Box 125, Ford Papers.
1 1 . Ibid.
12. Mayo to Edsel Ford, March 22, 1923, Ace. 1 , Box 125, Ford Papers.
13. Stout to Edsel Ford, May 2, 1924, Ace. 1 , Box 125, Ford Papers. So Away I
Went!, the source used by writers to describe Stout 's relationship with Henry Ford, is
not entirely trustworthy. For example, Stout recalls (and recreates) a conversation with
Henry Ford during which the industrialist offered to provide financial backing for the
Stout Metal Airplane Company. Stout claims to have allowed him to invest only $1 ,000
( "That's the limit for everyone" ), although he did relent to the point of permitting him
to put in an additional $ 1 ,000 for Edsel. See So Away 1 Went!, pp. 175-85, and Weiss,
Saga of the Tin Goose, pp. 65-66. There is good reason to doubt that this conversation
ever took place. Stout's letters of 1923-1924 make it clear that he was not in a position
to reject anyone's money. Also, Edsel, not Henry, Ford signed the subscription list, a
copy of which can be found in the Stout Airlines Collection, Burton Historical Collec
tion, Detroit Public Library, Detroi t, Michigan.
14. Weiss, Saga of the Tin Goose, pp. 73- 75.
15. Detroit News, December 9, 1924; Mayo to Edsel Ford , July 22, 1925, Ace. 1 ,
Box 125, Ford Papers.
16. Quoted in U.S. Air Services 10 ( May 1925): 20.
1 7 . Ibid . , 18.
18. Mayo to Edsel Ford, July 1 , 1925, Ace. 1 , Box 125, Ford Papers.
19. Ford News, August 1 , 1 925; Aviation 19 (August 1 7 , 1 925): 178.
20. Mayo to Edsel Ford, July 22, 1925, Ace. 1 , Box 125, Ford Papers. For an excel
lent discussion of the Kelly Act, see Paul T. David, The Economics qf Air Mail Trans
portation ( Washington, 1934), pp. 54-59.
2 1 . Thaddeus Nelson Sandifer, "The Reliability Tour-A Mile-Stone in American
Aviation,'' U.S. Air Services 10 ( November 1925): 1 1 - 14.
22. W. Laurence LePage, "The Start of the Ford Reliability Tour," Aviation 1 9 (Oc
tober 5, 1925): 423-25. The original Fokker trimotor, acquired by the Byrd Arctic
Expedition and named Josephine Ford, is preserved in the Ford Museum, Dearborn,
Michigan.
23. New York Times, October 7, 1925.
24. "The Reminiscences of Al Esper," October 195 1 , Ford Papers.
I
25. Douglas J. lngel.ls, Tin Goose: The Fabulous Ford Trimotor ( Fallbrook, CaL ,
1968), pp. 24-25� William T. Larkins, The Ford Story (Wichita, 1957), pp. 6-7;
Weiss, Saga of the Tin Goose, pp. 1 1 3- 15.
N O T E S T O P A G E S 6 - 1 3 1 5 1
26. Weiss, Saga of the Tin Goose, pp. 1 1 3 - 1 5 .

27. "The Reminiscences of Harold Hicks," July 1952, Ford Papers. The evolution of
the famous NACA cowling is best explored in Alex Roland, Model Research: The Na
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958, 2 vols. (Washington, 1 985), and
in James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Labo
ratory, 1 91 7- 1956 (Washington, 1987). See also Hansen's "The Cowling Story at Lang
ley Laboratory, 1926- 1936," Aerospace Historian, 32 ( 1 985): 1 6 1 -72.
28. Hicks, "Reminiscences," Ford Papers. Ford managed to hide the existence of the
3-AT for more than a decade. For example, it is not even mentioned in the eight-part
atticle by John T. Nevill, "Ford Motor Company and American Aeronautical Develop
ment," that appeared i n Aviation between June and October 1929.
29. Hicks, "Reminiscences," Ford Papers; Larkins, Ford Story, p. 1 1 ; Ne'W York
Times, January 1 8, 1926; John G. Lee, It Should Fly Wednesday: Recollections of an
Airplane Designer (privately printed, 1984), pp. 96-97.
30. Tom Towle, "Who Designed the Ford Trimotor'?" American Aviation Historical
Society Journal 15 ( 1970): 181 -86; Lee, It Should Fly Wednesday, pp. 90- 1 1 2. In
1928 Mayo ordered Hicks to fire Towle after the young designer got into a fistfight with
a colleague on the plant floor. See Hicks, "Reminiscences," Ford Papers, and Lee, It
Should Fly Wednesday, pp. 106-7.
3 1 . Stout, So Away I Went!, pp. 204-5; Hicks, "Remi niscences," Ford Papers; Lee,
"Who Designed the Ford Trimotor?" American Aviation Historical Society Journal 1 5
( 1 970): 187-93.
32. Weiss, Saga of the Tin Goose, pp. 121 -22. For an excellent short account of the
Ford trimotor, see Owen Bombard, "The Tin Goose," Dearborn Historical Society 8 (May
1958): 2-20.
33. Ernest K. Gann, Ernest K. Gann's Flying Circus ( N ew York, 1974), pp. 1 04- 16.
34. New York Times, July 29, 1926.
35. Ford News, March 1 and November 1 5 , 1 926.
36. Larkins, Ford Story, pp. 1 1 - 12, 132.
37. McCarroll to Campsall, "Data of the Aeronautical Division of the Ford Motor Co. ,"
n. d. [c. early 19271, Ace. 1 , Box 1 25, Ford Papers.
38. New York Times, J uly 1 1 , 1926; Bombard, "Tin Goose," 1 7 - 19.
39. Larkins, Ford Story, discusses in detail the evolution of the Ford trimotor, as does
lngells, Tin Goose.
40. William L. Mayo, "William B. Mayo and Henry Ford," Michigan Alumnus Quar
terly Review 65 ( 1959): 318-27; Owen Bombard interviews with R. T. Walker, June 6,
August 15, and September 1 1 , 1951, Ford Papers.
4 1 . Hieks, "Reminiscences," Ford Papers.
42. Bombard interviews with WalkeT, Ford Papers.
43. Hicks, "Reminiscences," Ford Papers.
44. Ford News, November 1 5, 1927; Alan Munro, "Shi pyards of Aviation," World's
Work 60 (May 193 1 ): 75-80, 102.
45. U.S. Air Se1vices 12 (September 1927): 64; R. E. G. Davies, Airlines of the United
States Since 1914, rev. ed. (Washington, 1982), p. 72.
46. Walterman, "Airpower and Private Enterprise," pp. 432 -34; Hicks, "Reminis
cences," Ford Papers; Weiss, Saga of the Tin Goose, pp. 1 6 1 -63.
1 5 2 •
• N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 -1 8
47. Hicks, "Reminiscences," Ford Papers; New York Times , February 9, 1 927.
48. Hicks attributed the accident to Otto Koppen's insistence on using 1/] 6-inch
diameter wire for the control cabJes. According to Hicks, examination of the wreckage
indicated that the rudder wire had snapped; Hicks, "Reminiscences," Ford Papers. For
Koppen's later work on developing outstanding short-takeoff- and-landing (STOL) air
craft, see Richard P. Hallion, Legacy of Flight: The Guggenheim Contribution to Ameri
can Aviation (Seattle, 1977), p. 1 5 1.
50. lngel ls, Tin Goose, p. 34; Joseph J. Corn, The Winged Gospel ( New York, 1983),
p. 95.
5 1 . Bombard, "Tin Goose," 20; Esper, ''Reminiscences," Ford Papers; Hicks, "Remi
niscences," Ford Papers.
52. Ralph A. Read, chief pilot for Stout Air Lines, to Stanley Knauss, July 19, 1930,
Stout Air Lines Collection; Ford News, December 1 , 1930.
53. Major C. W. Howard, chief, engineering section, Wright Field, to Ford Motor
Company, November 10, 193 1 , Ace. 18, Box 50, Ford Papers. Boxes 50 and 149 con
tain a good deal of information on the XB-906.
54. "The Reminiscences of E. G. Liebold," January 1953, Ford Papers. Mechanic
L. H . Garriott also died in the crash of the XB-906.
55. Bombard, "Tin Goose," 20.
57. Peter W. Brooks, The Modern Airliner (London, 196 1 ) , contains the best discus-
sion of advances i n airplane design during the 1930s.
59. Esper, "Reminiscences," Ford Papers.
60. Hicks, "Reminiscences," ford Papers; Nevins and Hill, Ford: Expansion and
Challenge, p. 247.
62. Edmund Wilson, "The Despot of Dearborn ," Scribners Magazine 90 (July 193 1 ):
24-35. The popular view of Ford is traced best by David L. Lewis, The Public Image
of Henry Ford ( Detroit, 1976), and by Reynold M . Wik, Henry Ford and Grass-roots
A merica (Ann Arbor, 1 972).
63. Lee, "Who Designed the Ford Trimotor?"; Lee became director of research at the
United Aircraft Corporation.
64. For Ford's attempt at mass production during World War I I , see Irving Brinton
Holley, Jr. , Buying A ircraft: Materiel Procurement for the A rmy Air Forces (Washington,
1964), and Tom Lilley eL al. , Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production during World
War 11 (Boston, 1946).
Daniel and Harry Guggenheim and the P h i l a nt h ropy of Flight
This essay is based upon "Philanthropy and Flight: Guggenheim Support of Aeronautics,
1925- 1930," published in Aerospace Historian 28 (March 1981 ): 10-2 1 . It is an elabo
ration of a conference paper originally presented at the annual meeting of the Western
History Association, Portland, Oregon, on October 13, 1977. Readers desiring addi-
'
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 8 - 2 4 : 1 5 3
'
tiona! information on Lhe Guggenheim connection with aviation are invited to consult the
author's Legacy of Flight: The Guggenheim Contribution to American Aviation (Seattle,
1977).
l . For background on the Guggenheim family and their earJy history in America, see
Harvey O'Con nor, The Guggenheims: The Making of an American Dynasty (New York,
1937), pp. 18-20, 24-30, 34, 42 -61, 73 -81, 85-95, 102- 125; M i l ton Lomask,
Seed Money: The Guggenheim Story (New York, 1964), pp. 1 2 - 18, 20 - 2 1 , 24, 26-27;
and Edwin P. Hoyt, The Guggenheims and the American Dream (New York, 1967),
pp. 3- 15, 1 7 - 20, 23, 72 - 1 06, 1 1 3-28.
2. O'Connor, Guggenheims, pp. 322, 355-56, 414, 424-25; Lomask, Seed Money,
pp. 24-25, 27 -28; Hoyt, American Dream, p. 259.
3. Lomask, Seed Money, pp. 33-36, 62, 79-81 ; Major R. H . Mayo, " History of the
Daniel Guggenheim Fund" (unpublished MS, n.d. ), in the Papers of the Daniel Guggen
heim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics (hereafter referred to as DGF Papers),
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, pp. 14- 15; data from Harry F. Guggenheim
biographical file, library, National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution;
Guggenheim biographical sketch, April 20, 1929, in "Aeronautics: National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics, 1929: Jan. - April," Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover
Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa; Albert Marquis, ed. , Who's Who in America,
1 928-1929 (Chicago, 1928), p. 6 1 7 ; Alfred Lawson, "Who is M. Robert Guggenheim?"
Fly 1 (March 1909): 1 7 ; "Women of 1 9 1 5 Raise Fund for Coast Defense," Aerial Age
Weekly 2 (January 3 1 , 1916): 470.
4. Bradley to Hoover, August 24, 1922, "Commerce Bureau of Aeronautics Legis
lation, 1921 -22," Commerce Papers, Hoover Library.
5. Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, Inc . , Aircraft Yearbook for 1 924
(New York, 1924), pp. 103-7.
6. Hallion, Legacy of Flight, pp. 6- 19.
7. Ibid . , pp. 27-29; Guggenheim to Brown, June 12, 1925, cited in Technical Notes
to the Daniel Guggenheim School of Aeronautics (New York University, January 193 1 ).
8. Guggenheim to Brown, June 12, 1925.
9. Hallion, Legacy of Flight, pp. 3 1 -32.
10. Guggenheim to Hoover, January 16, 1926, "Aviation Daniel Guggenheim
Fund," Commerce Papers, Hoover Library.
1 1 . Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. DGF, Tentative Report on Program (New York, 1926), p.8.
14. Hallion, Legacy of Flight, pp. 45-70.
15. Robert A. Millikan, The Autobiography of Robert A . Millikan ( New York, 1 950),
pp. 240, 243-44. See also M i llikan to Harry F. Guggenheim ( hereafter HFG), Decem
ber 24, 1925; Millikan to HFG, December 2, 1927; Minutes, Special Meeting of the
DGF Board of Directors, June 2, 1926; HFG to M i llikan, June 7, 1926; and telegram,
HFG to Millikan, December 17, 1928; all in DGF Papers, Box 6. Other sources include
Theodore von Karman with Lee Edson, The Wind and Beyond: Theodore von Karman,
Pioneer in Aviation and Pathfinder in Space (Boston, 1967), pp. 121 -27, 1 4 1 - 46, and
various letters: Millikan to HFG, January 29, 1926; H FG to Millikan, March 4, 1926;
HFG to Millikan, May 25, 1926; and Millikan to HFG, July 7, 1926; all in Robert A.
1 5 4 : N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 4 - 3 0
Millikan Papers, Cal ifornia Institute of Technology. For a detailed examination of von
Karman's coming to Caltech, see Paul A. Hanle, Bringing Aerodynamics to A merica
(Cambridge, 1982).
16. Douglas Aircraft Company Report SW - 1 57 A , "Development of the Douglas Trans
port" (Santa Monica, n.d. ) ; Douglas J. lngeHs, The Plane That Changed the World: A
Biography of the DC-3 ( Fallbrook, 1966), pp. 39-40; von Karman, The Wind and Be
yond, pp. 243-44; von Karman, review of ''Assisted Take-off of Ai rcraft," James Jack
son Cabot Fund Lecture by Calvin M. Bolster at Norwich University, Journal of the
American Rocket Society 85 (June 1951 ): 92-93.
1 7 . Von Karman and Edson, The Wind and Beyond, pp. 234-39.
18. Hallion, Legacy �f Flight, pp. 187-207; Reginald M. Cleveland, A merica
Fledges Wings: The History of The Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aero
nautics (New York, 194 1 ) , pp. 137-44.
19. Hallion, Legacy �f Flight, pp. 207-30.
20. News release, n. d. , DGF Papers, Box l .
21. "Report of the Byrd North Pole Plane Tour," n.d., DGF Papers, Box 20.
22. HFG to Lindbergh, July 19, 1927, DGF Papers, Box 6.
23. Postmaster General Harry S. New, news release, October 23, 1927, DGF Papers,
Box 1 ; "Lindbergh Tour Great Boost to Commercial Aeronautics," July 13, 1927, in
"H. H. Personal Lindbergh, Charles A . " folder, Box 52, Hoover Library.
24. Donald E. Keyhoe, Flying with Lindbergh (New York, 1928), pp. 241 -42.
25. Hallion, Legacy of Flight, pp. 158-60.
26. Ibid. , pp. 75-85.
27. William F. Durand, Aeronautic Education: Creating a Background of Understand
ing for a Fundamental Economic and Social Enterprise (New York, 1928), p. 10.
28. Hallion, Legacy of Flight, pp. 7 1 - 75.
29. DGF Bulletins, nos. 1 - 1 3 (August 1926 to November 1929); copies of all these
bulletins can be found in the DGF Papers, Boxes 1 , 2, and 6. See also V. E. Clark, "A
Report on Airplane Construction in Europe," n . d . , DGF Papers, Box 8; William E .
Gillmore, Aeronautical Observations on a European Tour: 1 928 ( New York, 1928); DGF,
Safety and Accommodation in European Passenger Planes ( New York, 1928); Clarence
M. Young, Airport Management and Administration in Europe (New York, 1929); and
Ray A. Dunn, Aviation and Life 1nsurance: A Study in the Death Rate and the Hazard of
Flying in Relation to Policy Underwriting (New York, 1930).
30. See various papers and correspondence in "Guggenheim Medal" File, DGF Pa
pers, Box 1 1. See also the DanieJ Guggenheim Medal Board of Award, Pioneering in
Aeronautics: Recipients of The Daniel Guggenheim Medal, 1 929-52 (New York, 1952),
and G. Edward Pendray, The Guggenheim Medalists: Architects of the Age of Flight. ( New
York, 1964.).
3 1 . Hallion, Legacy of Flight, pp. 86 -91 . Western is also the subject of Robert J.
Serling's The Only Way to Fly: The Story of Western Airlines (Garden City, 1976).
32. Edward Bowie, Weather and the Airplane: A Study of the Model Weather Reporting
Service Over the California A irway (New York, 1929), p. 1 7 .
33. Ibid. , pp. 1 9 - 2 1 .
34. Donald R . Whitnah, A History of the U.S. Weather Bureau ( U rbana, 1961 ), p. 182;
see also Rossby to HFG, June 28, 1928, DGF Papers, Box 8.
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 0 - 3 7 : 1 5 5
35. HFG to directors, DGF, June 2, 1926, Box 2 1 , the Papers of Theodore P. Wright,
John M . Olin Library, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
36. Hallion, Legacy of Flight, pp. 101-27. Three useful sources on the blind-flight
trials are James H . Dool ittle, "Early Blind Flying: An Historical Review of Eady Ex
periments in Instrument Flying," Third Lester Gardner Lecture, presented at the Mas
sachusetts Institute of Technology, April 28, 1961 ; DGF, Solving the Problem of Fog
Flying: A Record �f the Fund's Full Flight Laboratory to Date (New York, 1929); and
DGF, Equipment Used in Experiments to Solve the Problem �l Fog Flying (New York,
1930).
37. R . H . Mayo, ''The Promotion of Aeronautics: A Review of the Work of the Daniel
Guggenheim Fund" (unpublished MS, n . d . ) , DGF Papers, Boxes 20-2 1 , p. 15.
38. Hallion, Legacy �f Flight, pp. 128 - 5 1 . For a good brief summary of the compe
ti tion results, see DGF, The Daniel Guggenheim International Safe A ircraft Competition;
Final Report (New York, 1 930).
39. DGF, The Final Report of The Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of
Aeronautics, 1 929 ( New York, 1 930), p. iv.
40. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Sixteenth Annual Report, 1 930
(Washington, 193 1 ) , p. 14.
4 1 . Author's conversation with Charles A. Lindbergh, July 22, 1974.
42. Chart of Guggenheim Fund appropriations and expenditures as of January 27,
1939, DGF Papers, Box 18.
43. Hallion, Legacy of Flight, pp. 1 73-85. For a detailed discussion of Guggenheim
Goddard activities, see Milton Lehman, This High Man: The Life �f Robert H. Goddard
(New York, 1963).
44. Harry F. Guggenheim, The Seven Skies (New York, 1930), p. 1 2 .
Wi l l iam P. MacCracken, J r. , and the Reg u l ation of C i v i l Av iation
l . MacCracken is quoted in Aero Digest 1 ( November 1922): 139.

2. Michael Osborn and Joseph Riggs, eds. , "Mr. Mac": William P. MacCracken, ]r. ,
on Aviation, Law, Optometry ( Memphis, 1970), pp. 3, 4-5. Yerkes is quoted in Lloyd
Wendt and Herman Kogan, Lords of the Levee: The Story of Bathhouse John and Hinky
Dink ( New York, 1 943), p. 38.
3. Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," pp. 8, 1 0- 1 1 , 55, 180; Aviation 27 (July 13, 1929):
142.
4. Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," pp. 13-20; Nell E. MacCracken, ITanscript of
telephone interview with Komons, January 2 1 , 1988.
5. MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , July 3 1 and September 2 1 , 1918, the Papers
of William P. MacCracken, Jr. , in the possession of Nell E. MacCracken, Washington,
D.C. (copies at the Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters); Nell MacCracken,
transcript of telephone interview with Komons, January 2 1 , 1988. Nellie Rebecca Lewis
lived with the MacCrackens for thirty years.
6. MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , November 1 3 , 1 9 1 8, MacCracken Papers;
Nick A. Komons, Bonfires to Beacons: Federal Civil Aviation Policy under the Air Com
merce Act, 1 926 - 1 938 (Washington, 1 978), p. 48.
1 5 6 •
• N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 8 - 4 1
7. For business attitudes toward regulation, see Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and
Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 13, 14, 52, 55,
136, 212, 215, 217. For the U . S. Air Mail Service, see William M . Leary, Aerial Pio
neers: The U.S. Air Mail Service, 1918- 1 927 (Washington, 1985). See also Komons,
Bonfires, pp. 1 1 - 1 7.
8. Aero Digest l (September 1922): 67; Aero Digest 2 (April 1923): 274; Aero Digest
7 (September 1 925): 481; A ircraft Year Book, 1923 ( New York, 1923), p. 2 1 ; A ircraft
Year Book 1926 (New York, 1926), p. 1 1 6; E. N. Gott, "Flying and Its Relation to the
General Public," U.S. Air Services 6 (October 1922): 19-23; Joint Committee on Civil
Aviation of the U . S . , Department of Commerce and the American Engineering Council,
Civil Aviation: A Report (New York, 1926), pp. 106, 1 08; Charles F. Redden, '�The
Outlook for Commercial Aviation in America," Aero Digest 2 ( February 1923): 100.
9. U.S. President's Aircraft Board, Hearings , vol. 1 (Washington, 1925), pp. 281,
286, 287, 288 ( hereafter cited as Morrow Board Hearings); Samuel S. Bradley to
Hoover, August 24, 1 922, the Papers of Herbert Hoover, Herbert Hoover Presidential
Library, West Branch, Iowa; U . S. Senate, The Promotion of Commercial Aviation,
69 th Congress, 1st session, 1926, S. Rept. 2, p. 2; Hoover to Frederick C. Hicks,
December 30, 1 92 1 , Hoover Papers.
10. Report of the Special Committee on the Law of Aviation to the Executive Com
mittee of the American Bar Association ( 192 1 ), p. 4, Federal Aviation Administration
Archives; Aircraft Year Book, 1 922 (New York, 1922), p. 1 7 ; U . S. House, Inquiry into
Operations of the United States Air Services, Hearings before Select Committee of Inquiry,
68th Congress, 2d session, 1925, p. 28� (hereafter cited as Lampert Hearings) .
l l . Lampert Hearings, pp. 1 074, 1 2 1 3 , 2748; Joint Committee, Civil Aviation,
pp. 35, 37; Aero Digest 6 (March 1925): 151; Morrow Board Hearings, vol. 1 , pp. 307,
147 1 . For Hoover's position on airway development, see Morrow Board Hearings , vol. l ,
pp. 318- 19.
1 2. Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," pp. 33-34, 37-39.
13. Report of the Special Committee to the ABA ( 1 92 1 ), passim, but see Carter opin
ion on pp. 32-33. See also by the same committee i ts First Preliminary Report to the
ABA Executive Committee, January 3, 192 1 , FAA Archives.
14. Report of the Special Committee to the ABA ( 192 1 ) , passim; Osborn and Riggs,
"Mr. Mac," pp. 33-34; Frederick P. Lee, "The Air Commerce Act of 1926," American
Bar Association ]ournal 1 2 (June 1926): 371.
15. MacCracken, Jr. , to Phillip Carroll, February 27, 1922, the Files of the National
Aeronautics Association ( copies at the FAA Headquarters); U . S . Congress, Office of the
Legislative Counsel, Civil Aeronautics: Legislative History of the Air Commerce Act of
1 926 (Washington, 1926), p. 53 ( hereafter cited as Legislative History); Railroad Com
mission of Wisconsin et al. v. Chicago, B . & Q. R . Co. , 42 Supreme Court Reporter 232
( 1922). Frederic P. Lee is not to be confused with Frederick B. Lee, who headed the
Civil Aeronautics Administration during Eisenhower's first term.
16. Thomas Worth Walterman, "Airpower and Private Enterprise: Federal-Industrial
Relations in the Aeronautics Field, 1 9 1 8 - 1 926" (Ph. D. diss . , Washington Uni versity,
1970), pp. 400, 402-3; Minutes of Meeting of the Legislative Committee of the National
Aeronautic Association, September 2, 1924, NAA Files. See also various letters: Fred
eric P. Lee to MacCracken, Jr., September 12, 1 922; W. Jefferson Davis to Solicitor,
Department of Commerce, December 2 1 , 1922; Philip A. Carroll to MacCracken, Jr. ,
•
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 1 - 4 4 : 1 5 7
•
December 20, 1922; F. B. Patterson to MacCracken, Jr. , May 2 1 , 1924; MacCracken,

Jr. lo Patterson, May 24, 1924; Patterson to MacCracken, Jr. , June 12, 1924; all in
NAA Files. See also J. W. Wadsworth to Hoover, November 28, 1925, and Clarence M .
Young to Hoover, December 7, 1925, Hoover Papers; William P. MacCracken, Jr. ,
"What the American Bar Association Did for American Aeronautics," Contact 2 (Sep
tember 1923): 18; and Lampert Hearings, pp. 829-30, 1200.
1 7 . MacCracken, Jr., to Harold Hartney, January 22, 1925, and Godrey Cabot to
MacCracken, Jr., March 6, 1925, NAA Files; Komons, Bonfires, p. 7 1 . For MitcheJl's
position, see Lampert Hearings, pp. 292-93.
18. Minutes of the Business Sessions of the Second National Aero Conference,
October 12, 13, 14, 1922, pp. 6, 166, NAA Files; Lampert Hearings, p. 128 1 ; Mac
Cracken, Jr. , to Phillip Carroll, September 16, 1922; B. H . Mulvihill to MacCracken,
Jr. , January 27, 1 923; Howard E. Coffin to MacCracken, Jr. , September 20, 1923;
H. W. Karr to MacCracken, Jr. , October 19, 1923; NAA Files.
19. Walterman, "Airpower," pp. 426, 427, 428-36; Leary, Aerial Pioneers,
pp. 223-26.
20. Walterman, "Airpower," pp. 391-92, 412- 13, 415; Aircraft Year Book, 1927
(New York, 1 927), pp. 5-6, 133; Alfred F. H urley, Billy Mitchell (New York, 1964),
pp. 95-98; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., Plans and Early Opera
tions, voL 1 of The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago, 1948), p. 27; Maurer
Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. A rmy, 1 9 1 9 - 1 939 (Washington, 1987), pp. 72-73; U.S.
Air Services 10 (October 1925): 15- 18; Aviation 19 (September 14, 1925): 309,
3 1 1 - 1 4, 318-20, Aviation 19 (September 2 1 , 1925): 345, 350.
2 1 . Harold Nicolson, Dwight Morrow (New York, 1935), pp. 280-81, 283-84; Wal
terman, "Airpower," p. 48 1 ; Aero Digest 8 ( February 1926): 66, 105; U . S. President's
Aircraft Board, Report of the President's A ircraft Board (Washington, 1925), pp. 1 , 6- 10,
14- 15, 19, 25-26; H. F. Ranney, "President Coolidge Names Board of Nine to Decide
Aviation's Needs," U.S. Air Services 1 0 (October 1925): 23-25; Morrow Board Hearings,
pp. 495ff. ; Burke Davis, The Billy Mitchell Affair (New York, 1967), pp. 228-30; Lam
pert Hearings, pp. 1 -2, 7, 8.
22. Congressional Record, 69th Congress, 1st session, April 12, 1926, pp. 7 3 1 2 - 14,
7318, 7330; Frederic P. Lee to MacCracken, Jr. , December 29, 1925; Godfrey L. Cabot
to MacCracken, Jr. , January 2, 1926; MacCracken, Jr. , to Cabot, January 16, 1926;
Cabot to MacCracken, Jr., February 10, 1926; Cabot to Howard E. Coffin, February 10,
1926; MacCracken, Jr. , to A. H . Amick, Jr. , June 19, 1926; Cabot to MacCracken, Jr.,
May 20, 1926; NAA Files; Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac, " pp. 52-53.
23. Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 1 7, 1926; Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," p. 56.
See also Hoover to George Wharton Pepper, June 23, 1926; Frank Mcintyre, Chief,
Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, to Hoover, July 29, 1926; radiogram,
Hoover to H i ram B i ngham, July 30, 1926; telegram, Senator Charles S. Deneed to
Hoover, July 3 1 , 1926; Martin Madden to Coolidge, July 3 1 , 1926; Hoover to Coolidge,
August 3, 1926; all in Hoover Papers.
24. Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," pp. 63, 65; Aviation 20 (January 22, 1926): 249;
Aviation 22 (January ·3, 1927): 13; U.S. Department of Commerce Transcript of Aeronau
tical Conference, December 5-9, 1927, Washington, D . C . , p. 25 ( hereafter cited as
Aero Conference ) ; MacCracken, Jr. , to Russell Owen, November 23, 1927, Civil Aero
nautics Administration Central Files, Record Group 237, National Archives, Washing-
1 5 8 : N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 4 - 4 7
ton, 0. C. ; Charles L. Lawrance, "The Opportunity of the States," Aviation 31 (Oc tober
193 1 ) : 579; U.S. Senate, Departments of State, .Justice, Commerce and Labor Appropri
ation Bill, 1 928, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
69 th Congress, 2d session, 1927, pp. 23-24; Aero Digest 9 ( November 1 926): 408;
Domestic Air News (January 31, 1927): ] ; Domestic A 1:r News ( February 28, 1927): l .
The new rules appeared as Aeronautics Bulletin no. 7, "Air Commerce Regulations,"
FAA Archives.
25. Charles C. Rohlfing, National Regulation of Aeronautics (Philadelphia, 1 93 1 ),
pp. 78-79, 109 - 10; Kenneth M. Lane, "Regulating Air Commerce, Article II
Engineering," Aviation 28 (Jan uary 25, 1930): 154; U . S. House, Department of Com
merce Appropriation Bill for 1 930, Hearings B�fore a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations , 70th Congress, 2d session, 1928, p. 23; Joseph P. Ju ptner, ed. , U.S.
Civil Aircraft, vol. 1 (Aero Publishers, 1962), pp. 9- 13. See also various Aeronautic
Bulletins: no. 7 -A, "Airworthiness Requirements for Aircraft"; no. 7-F, "Airworthiness
Requirements for Aircraft Components and Accessories"; no. 7-G, "Airworthiness Re
quirements for Engines and Propellers"; and no. 12, "Aircraft Engine Testing"; all i n
FAA Archives. See also Nick A. Komons, "Midwife to a New Industry," FAA World, 1 7
( March 1987): 8-9, 1 1 .
26. Aero Conference, pp. 144, 1 78, 360.
27. William B. Robertson to MacCracken, Jr., October 24, 1927; Robertson to
MacCracken, Jr., October 22, 1927; C larence Young to Robertson, October 27, 1927;
MacCracken, Jr., to Robertson, October 27, 1927; all i n CAA Files, series 671 .
28. Reed G. Landis to Clarence Young, February 6, 193 1 , and Gilbert G. Budwig to
Reed G. Landis, February 10, 193 1, CAA Files, FN 612.001; U.S. House, Appropri
ation Hearings, 1 930, 70th Congress, 2d session, 1928, p. 22; Aeronautic Bulletin no.
2 1 , "Trend i n Airplane Design as Indicated by Approved Type Certificates,'' FAA
Archives.
29. Aeronautic Bulletin no. 7, pp. 29- 3 1 ; Domestic Air News ( December 18, 1926):
8; Domestic Air News (January 3 1 , 1927): 2; Aviation 27 (July 13, 1929): 143-44;
Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," pp. 66-67; Arnold E. Briddon, Ellmore A. Champie,
and Peter A. Marraine, fAA Historical Fact Book: A Chronology, 1926 - 1 971 (Washing
ton, 1974), p. 1 1 .
30. Briddon et al., Historical Fact Book, p. 1 1 ; Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac,"
pp. 105-6. See also Nick A. Komons, "It Should Have Been Orvi lle," FAA World 1 7
(April 1987): 4.
3 1 . For airway development during MacCracken's tenure at the Department of Com
merce, see Komons, Bonfires, chapters 5 and 7. Hoover quotation from Herbert Hoover,
The Memoirs ofHerbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920- 1 933 ( New York,
1952), p. 134.
32. MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr., December 27, 1928, MacCracken Papers.
MacCracken was well off by any standard; he was just not earning up to his economic
potential. I n 1924 he had reported income to the IRS of $ 1 7 ,6'7 1 . 32 (equivalent to about
$105,000 in 1988 dollars) . Only slightly more than $9,000 of that sum, however, came
from his law practice; the rest came from stock and real estate investments. In 1926 he
had done slightly better, rising to $ 1 8,765.96. But then came federal service and a sharp
drop in income: to $12,489.80 in 1927 and to $10,547.38 in 1928. He was clearly
taking an economic beating by staying in government. His father's practice was not
'
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 7 - 5 2 : 1 5 9
•
flourishing either; in 1925, for example, Dr. MacCracken's medical practice netted only
$3,200. Duplicate IRS Form 1040 for calendar years 1 925, 1926, 1 927, and 1928,
MacCracken Papers.
.
33. Hoover to MacCracken, Jr. , March 8, 1929, and MacCracken, Jr. , to Mac-
Cracken, Sr., April 24, 1929, MacCracken Papers. The Wright Memorial Lecture was
entitled, "Science in Relation to Regulating and Promoting Civil Aviation."
34. New York Times, June 4, 1 929; MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , June 5 and
June 16, 1929, and Nell Lewis to MacCracken, Sr. , June 27, 1929, MacCracken Papers.
35. MacCracken, Jr. , Lo MacCracken, Sr., July 7 and July 1 4, 1929, MacCracken
Papers.
36. MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , August 19, 1929, MacCracken Papers.
37. Briddon et al. , Historical Fact Book, p. 1 7 ; MacCracken, transcript of telephone
interview with Komons, January 2 1 , 1988.
38. John Kenneth Galbrai th, The Great Crash, 1 929 (Boston, 1955), pp. 93ff. ; Mac
Cracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , November 1 , 1929, June 12, 1930, MacCracken
Papers.
39. Aviation 28 ( M arch 1, 1930): 460; New York Times, January 27, 1 96 1 ; Henry
Ladd Smith, Airways: The History of Commercial Aviation in the United States ( N ew
York, 1942), pp. 1 56-57; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. , The Coming of the New Deal
( New York, 1958), p. 449; Gilbert Goodman, Government Policy Toward Commercial
Aviation (New York, 1944), pp. 2 1 5- 16; Hoover, Cabinet and Presidency, p. 244.
40. U . S . Senate, Investigation ofAir Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, Hearings Before
a Special Committee, 73d Congress, 2d session, 1933- 1934, p. 2580 (hereafter cited
as Black Hearings); Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," p. 147; U.S. House, Amend the Air
Mail Act of February 2, 1 925, 7 1 st Congress, 2d session, 1930, H . Rept. 966, p. 4.
4 1 . Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," pp. 145-47; U . S. House, A mend the Air Mail
Act, 7 ] st Congress, 2d session, 1930, H . Repl. 1209, pp. 2-4; Congressional Record,
7 1 st Congress, 2d session, 1930, pp. 727 1 - 73; Charles J . Kelly, Jr. , The Sky's the
Limit: The History of the A irlines ( N ew York, 1963), pp. 73-74; Smith, A irways , p. 1 6 1 .
The Air Mail Act of 1930 can be found i n U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 46, pp. 259-60.
42. Black Hearings, pp. 1655, 2325-26, 2449, 2643, 3 102; U . S . Senate, Investi
gation of Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, 73d Congress, 2d session, 1934, S. Rept.
245, pt. 2, pp. 127 -38; Kelly, Sky's the Limit, p. 74.
43. Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," p. 148; Black Hearings, pp. 1 549, 2045-46,
2326, 2551, 2555, 2714- 1 5, 280 1 -2; MacCracken, Jr. , lo MacCracken, Sr. , June 1 2 ,
1930, MacCracken Papers; U . S. Senate, Revisions ofA ir-Mail Laws, Hearings Before the
Committee on Post Office and Post Roads, 73d Congress, 2d session, 1934, pp. 227-40;
Congressional Record, 73d Congress, 2d session, 1934, p. 3 1 23.
44. Wesley Phillips Newton, The Perilous Sky: U.S. Aviation Diplomacy and Latin
A merica, 1 9 1 9 - 1 931 (Coral Gables, 1978), pp. 266-67, 272-77; R. E. G. Davies,
Airlines of Latin America Since 1 9 1 9 (Washington, 1984), pp. 354-59; Marylin Bender
and Selig Altschul, The Chosen Instrument: Pan Am and Juan Trippe, the Rise and Fall
of an American Entrepreneur ( New York, 1982), pp. 1 66- 76; MacCracken, J r. , to Mac
Cracken, Sr. , June 12 and December 3 1 , 1930, MacCracken Papers; IRS Form 1099
for Calendar Year 1930 (Salaries, Wages, Fees, Commission, Bonuses Paid to Wm P.
MacCracken, Jr. , by Pan American Airways, I nc . ), MacCracken Papers.
45. MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , October 1 1 , 193 1 , MacCracken Papers.
1 6 0 : N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 2 - 6 0
46. Clarence M. Young to MacCracken, Sr. , August 6, 1 931. FAA Archives.

47. MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. ; May 6, July 8, November 18, and Decem
ber 1 6, 1933; MacCracken Papers.
48. Komons, Bonfires, pp. 230-32; MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , November
25, November 29, and December 2, 1933; Joan Murphy to MacCracken, Sr. , January
6, 1934; MacCracken Papers.
49. MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr., January 24, 1934, MacCracken Papers.
50. MacCracken v. Jurney, 72 Federal Reporter 2d 560 ( 1934); Osborn and Riggs,
"Mr. Mac," pp. 157, 179, 181; Black Hearings, pp. 2 1 1 2 - 19; MacCracken, Jr. , to
MacCracken, Sr. , February 3, 1934, MacCracken Papers.
51 . Joan Murphy to MacCracken, Sr. , February 7, 1934, and MacCracken, Jr. , to
MacCracken, Sr. , February 6, 1934, MacCracken Papers.
52. MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , January 13 and February 6, 1934, and
Joan Murphy to MacCracken, Sr. , February 7, 1934, MacCracken Papers; Nell Mac
Cracken, transcript of telephone interview with Komons, January 2 1 , 1 988.
53. MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , February 3, February 6, and February 10,
1934, and Joan Murphy to MacCracken, Sr. , February 7, 1934, MacCracken Papers.
54. Black Hearings, pp. 2 1 93- 2220, 2222-45; Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac,"
pp. 159-63; Joan Murphy to MacCracken, Sr. , February 7, 1934, MacCracken Papers.
55. Congressional Record, 73d Congress, 2d session, 1934, pp. 1902 - 14; Mac
Cracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , February 6, 1934, MacCracken Papers.
56. Hogan's argument can be found in Congressional Record, 73d Congress, 2d ses
sion, 1934, pp. 2533-37, and in J urney v. MacCracken, Brief for Respondent in Op
position to Petition for Certiorari, Supreme Court of the United States, October Term
1934, No. 339; MacCracken's comments to Hogan's original brief can be found in Mac
Cracken, Jr. , to Frank J . Hogan, March 3, 1934, FAA Archives.
57. Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," pp. 166-67; Virginia Van Der Veer Hamilton,
"Barnstorming the U.S. Mail," American Heritage 25 (August 1974): 36; MacCracken,
Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr., February 14, 1934, MacCracken Papers.
58. MacCracken v. J urney, 72 Federal Reporter 2d, 560 ( 1 934); Jurney v. Mac
Cracken, 55 Supreme Court Reporter 375; MacCracken, Jr. , to MacCracken, Sr. , Feb
ruary 14, February 16, February 19, and May 14, 1934, MacCracken Papers; Senator
Warren R . Austin's remarks on William P. MacCracken, Jr., Congressional Record, 74th
Congress, 1st session, 1935, pp. 2731-35.
59. Komons, Bonfires, pp. 256, 266-67, 273.
60. Norwich University Record (June 1936): 4-5; MacCracken, Jr. , speech delivered
at the homecoming of the Kitty Hawk, November 22, 1948, in Washington, D . C . , Mac
Cracken Papers; Eugene M . Emme, Aeronautics and Astronautics: An American Chro
nology of Science and Technology in the Exploration of Space, 1 9 1 5 - 1 961 (Washington,
196 1 ), p. 198.
W i l l i a m A. Moffett and the Development of Nava l Aviation
Material from U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings reprinted with permission (copyright
1 923, 1 93 1 , U . S. Naval Institute); material from Aviation reprinted with permission
(copyright 1922, 1924, 1925 by McGraw-Hill, Inc. ) .
•
N O T E S T O P A G E S 6 0 - 6 7 : 1 6 1
1 . Archibald D . Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation
(New Haven, 1949), pp. 142-49.
2. Edward Arpee, From Frigates to Flat-Tops (privately printed, 1953), and Turpin
C. Bannister, "William Adger Moffett," in Harris E . Starr ed. , Dictionary of A merican
Biography, vol. 2 1 , supplement one (New York, 1944), pp. 560-6 1 ; both give this title
to Moffett .
3. Arpee, From Frigates to Flat-Tops, an erratic study, is the only book-length treat
ment of Moffett. His official biography is on file at the U . S . Naval Historical Center,
Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D . C .
4 . Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Vera
cruz (Lexington, 1962), is the standard account of this foreign policy episode.
5. Arpee, From Frigates to Flat-Tops, pp. 55-70.
6. See Clifford L. Lord, History of Naval Aviation, 1898 - 1 939, vol. 5 of Monographs
in the History of Naval Aviation, Naval Aviation History Unit, DCNO (Air) ( 1946), lo
cated at the U . S. Naval H istorical Center.
7. Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, pp. 176-86.
8. As described by Admiral Emory Land, quoted in Charles M. Melhorn, Two-Block
Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1 9 1 1 - 1 929 (Annapolis, 1974), p. 142n.
9. Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, p. 189.
10. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, p. 67; Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval
Aviation, p. 189.
l l . U.S. House, Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings on Sundry Legislation, 67th
Congress, 1st session, 192 1, pp. 89-90; Lord, History ofNaval Aviation, p. 838.
12. Act of July 12, 192 1 , 42 Statutes; U.S. Navy Department , General Order 65,
August 16, 192 1 ; BuAer, Circular Letter No. 1 , August 1 6, 1921. Some men served as
long as seven years as chief of a bureau, but most bureau chiefs served four years or
less. See "Former Chiefs of Bureaus," Biographies and Research Section, Office of Pub
lic Relations, Department of the Navy, NAVEXOS, 1946, p. 628.
13. U.S. Navy, Manual of the Bureau of Aeronautics, 1 923 (Washington, 1923),
pp. 3-5.
14. Lord, History of Naval Aviation, p. 1073.
15. Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, pp. 245-47.
16. Moffett earlier had told Congress that morale might be enhanced by the creation
of an aviation corps, "but the experience of the Navy has been that the fewer corps you
have the better." U . S. House, Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings on Sundry Legis
lation, 67th Congress, 1 st session, 192 1, p. 768.
1 7 . Lord, History of Naval Aviation, p. 1076.
18. U . S. Government, 45 Statutes, 764-68, chap. 688, Laws Re Navy,
pp. 349 1 - 93.
19. U.S. Government, 45 Statutes, 498, chap. 523, Laws Re Navy, p. 2 140.
20. Aviation 14 (August 28, 1922): 252.
2 1 . Ibid.
22. Aviation 16 (May 26, 1924): 558.
23. Ibid.
24. Moffett, "Dirigibles Defended by Admiral Moffett," U.S. Naval Institute Proceed
ings, 49 ( 1 923): 1055-58. See also Arpee, From Frigates to Flat-Tops, chap. 1 2 .
1 6 2 •
• N O T E S T O P A G E S 6 7 - 7 1
25. Aviation 19 (September 14, 1 925): 318. Fleet Problem V, conducted March
2 - 1 1 , 1925, was the first fleet exercise to incJude carrier aviation.
26. Ibid. In addition to the Shenandoah disaster, Mitchell referred to the loss of lives
and aircraft in recent air races. He also decried the unsuccessful attempt by the navy to
fly a PN-9 flying boat nonstop from San Francisco to Honolulu. The aircraft was forced
down at sea and the crew presumed lost until sighted on September 1 0, 1925.
27. Aviation 19 (September 21, 1925): 353. See also Moffett, "Aviation in National
Defense; Why the Navy Opposes an Independent Air Force," Liberty 2 (November 28,
1925): 27-30.
28. For a detailed discussion of the work of the Morrow and Lampert investigations,
see Thomas Worth Walterman, "'Airpower and Private Enterprise: Federal-Industrial Re
lations in the Aeronau tics Field, 1 9 1 8 - 1 926" (Ph.D. diss . , Washington University,
1970), chap. 6.
29. Clarke Van Vleet and Wm. J. Armstrong, United States Naval Aviation,
1 9 1 0 - 1 980 ( Washington, 198 1 ) , app. 4.
30. The military was not unanimous in a push for greater spending. For example,
major generals Charles T. Menoher, Frank W. Coe, William G. Haan, and William .J.
Snow commented on a bill to create an executive department of aeronautics: "On account
of the short life of aircraft and the great cost of production and maintenance, no nation
can in time of peace maintain military air fleets even approximating in size to such as
will be necessary in time of war." "Board of Officers Convened to Report Upon the New
(S. 2693) and Curry ( H . R. 7925) Bills Which Propose the Creations of an Executive
Department of Aeronautics," August 8, 1919, p. 2.
31. See the recommendation of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics in
Aircraft Year Book, 1925 (New York, 1925), pp. 7-8. When an aircraft design or pro
totype was dec lared a "proprietary item," its creator was in fact declared to be the sole
proprietor capable of producing the item. In common parlance of the era, the words
proprietary items, objects, articles, and certificates were used casually and often inter
changeably. Properly speaking, the design or prototype was the item, or object, and the
phrase of declaration in the contract was the certificate or article.
32. For an excellent account of the Naval Aircraft Factory, see WiUiam F. Trimble,
"The Naval Aircraft Factory, the American Aviation Industry, and Government Compe
tition, 1919- 1928," Business History Review 60 ( 1986): 1 75-98.
33. Ibid.
34. U . S . House, Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air Services, Hearings
before Select Committee of inquiry, 68th Congress, 2d session, 1925, pp. 1 1 33-35.
35. Ibid . , pp. J -7.
36. U . S. President's Aircraft Board, Hearings, vol. 1 ( Washington, 1925), p. 206.
37. Moffett memorandum to the Judge Advocate General (JAG), November 10, 1926.
The Act in question is Public Law 446 of July 2, 1926, 69th Congress. See also William
0. Shanahan, Procurement of Naval Aircraft, 1907-1939, vol. 27 of Monographs in the
History of Naval Aviation, p. 335. For another good account of the Aircraft Procurement
Act of 1926, see Irving Brinton Holley, Jr. , Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for
the Army Air Forces (Washington, 1 964), pp. 84-93.
38. U.S. Navy Department, Annual Report �f the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics
for Fiscal Year 1 926 ( Washington ), p. 49. Although Moffett deserves credit for the
N O T E S T O P A G E S 7 1 - 7 6 : 1 6 3
organization of carrier aviation, he was not involved with its tactical or strategic
employment.
39. Moffet t, "Recent Developments in Naval Aviation," U.S. Naval institute Proceed
ings 57 ( 1 93 1 ): 1 18 1 .
40. Van Vleet and Armstrong, Naval Aviation, pp. 378, 38 1 , 461.
4 1 . For an outstanding account of the navy's experience with rigid airships, including
a detailed analysis of the Akron's crash, see Richard K. Smith, The Airships Akron and
Macon (Annapolis, 1965).
42. Ibid . , p. 92.
43. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, pp. 25-26, 29-38.
Ben j a m i n Foulois and the Fight for a n Ind ependent Air Force
l . On Mitchell, see Alfred F. Hurley,Billy Mitchell: Crusader/or Air Power, rev. ed.
( B loomington, 1975), and Issac D. Levine, Mitchell, Pioneer C?fAir Power, rev. ed. (N ew
York, 1972).
2. For impressions of Foulois's style and personality, see Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. , to
John F. Shiner, February 1 1 , 1 975; Ira C . Eaker to Shiner, January 22, 1975; Orval R.
Cook to Shi ner, March 10, 1975; and Eugene L. Eubank to Shiner, April 4, 1 975; all
in the possession of John F. Shiner, Washington, D . C . Foulois compares his outlook and
approach with that of Mitchell in "Oral H istory Interview 766," U . S. Air Force H istorical
Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala. (hereafter cited as USAFHRC), pp. 55-56. See
also Foulois interview, October 23, 1956, U . S. Air Force Academy Library, Colorado
Springs, Col. (hereafter cited as AFAL).
3. Air Corps Newsletter 15 (December 15, 1935): 1 ; Benjamin D. Foulois, "Early
Flying Experiences," The Air Power Historian 2 (April 1 955): 18; Benjamin D. Foulois
and Carroll V. Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts: The Memoirs of Major
General Benjamin D. foulois ( New York, 1 968), pp. 7- 1 3 .
4. foulois, "Early Flying Experiences," 18, 24-25; Foulois, Memoirs, p. 15; A rmy
and Navy Journal 68 (July 18, 193 1 ): 1093; "Extract of Personal Service Record of
Major General B. D. Foulois," MIL C-2e, Box 42, Foulois Papers, Libraty of Congress
(hereafter cited as LC).
5. Foulois, "Early Flying Experiences," 19-20. See also Air Corps Newsletter 18
(December 15, 1935): 2 ; A rmy and Navy Journal 68 (July 18, 1 93 1 ): 1093; Foulois,
Memoirs, pp. 42-47; Foulois interview, January 20, 1960, Foulois Files, AFAL, p. l .
6. Foulois, Memoirs, p. 2. On Foulois's career, see John F. Shiner, Foulois and the
U.S. Army Air Corps, 1 93 1 - 1 935 ( Washington, 1 983).
7. Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 39: Legislation Relating to the Air Corps
Personnel and Training Programs, 1907-1939 (Washington, 1945), pp. 14- 1 5; R. Earl
McClendon, The Question of Autonomy for the U.S. Air Arm, 1 90 7 - 1 945 (Maxwell AFB,
Ala. , 1950), pp. 72-73, 84-87; Hurley, Billy Mitchell, p. 4 1 ; AAF Historical Studies:
No. 25: Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1 907- 1935 ( M axwell Field, Ala. , 1944),
pp. 4 1 -43; USAF Historical Studies: No. 89: The Development of Air Doctrine in the
Army Air Arm, 1 9 1 7 - 1 941 ( Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1953), p. 22.
8. Foulois, Memoirs , pp. 1 84-86; Foulois interview, October 23, 1956, Foulois
Files, AFAL.
1 6 4 : N O T E S T O P A G E S 7 6 - 8 1
9. "Extract: Statement of Major B. D. Foulois before the House Committee on Military

Affairs, October 7, 1 9 1 9,'' pp. 3-4, Foulois Files, AFAL.
1 0. U.S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Reorganization of the
Army, 66th Congress, 2d session, 1919, pp. 1 257-60.
1 1 . U.S. House, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on a United Air Service,
66th Congress, 2d session, 1919, pp. 1 19-25.
12. Historical Studies: No. 89, p. 22; McClendon, The Question of A utonomy,
pp. 90-91; Mitchell to the Adjutant General (AG), August 27, 1919, Central Decimal
File (CDF) 321. 9, Record Group (RG) 1 8, National Archives ( NA ) ; Edwin L. W i l liams,
Jr. , "Legislative History of the Air Arm," Military Affairs 20 ( 1 956): 84.
13. Foulois, Memoirs, pp. 188-89, 191 -95.
14. Ibid . , pp. 195, 198.
15. Foulois to Fred T. Austin, February 22, 1925, and other correspondence in MIL
A-1, Box 4 1 , Foulois Papers; Foulois, Memoirs, pp. 198, 203.
16. Foulois, Memoirs, pp. 202-3.
1 7 . U.S. President's Ai rcraft Board, Hearings, vol. 1 ( Washington, 1925), pp. 476-
91 ( hereafter cited as Morrow Board Hearings ). For insight into General Patrick's views
on autonomy, see " 1 s t lnd r basic unknown]," February 27, 1926, Patrick to AG, Subject
File-W ilcox Bill, 1926 - 1 936, Andrews Papers, LC; memos, AG to Chief of Air Service,
September 26, 1925, and Chief of Air Service to AG, October 1, 1925, WPD 888-3 1 ,
RG 165, NA.
18. Quoted in Levine, Mitchell, p. 334.
19. Air Corps Act of 1926, Public Law no. 446, 69th Congress ( H . R. 10827). Also
see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War
II, vol. 1 (Chicago, 1948), p. 29; and Historical Studies: No. 39, pp. 3 1 -32.
20. Correspondence between Foulois and Gov. John H . Trumbull, June-July 1927,
especially Trumbull to Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis, June 30, 1927, MIL A-1,
Box 4 1 , Foulois Papers; Foulois, Memoirs, pp. 207-9.
2 1 . "Biographical Sketch prepared for the Chief, I nformation Division, AC," by Fou
lois, with cover letter, Foulois to Chief, Information Division, January 1 0, 193 1 ,
MIL C-2e, Box 42, Foulois Papers; USAF Historical Studies: No. 10: Organzation
i of the
Army Air Arm, 1 935 - 1 945 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 1956), p. 24; Foulois, Memoirs,
p. 2 1 1 .
22. Army and Navy Journal 68 (January 3, 193 1 ): 413; A rmy and Navy Journal 69
(September 12, 193 1 ): 27; New York Times, April 1 6 and May 14, 193 1 ; A nnual Report
of the Secretary of War (Washington, 193 1 ) , p. 33.
23. "The 'Air Corps' Mass Migration," Aviation 30 (July 193 1 ): 399; Curtiss-Wright
Review 2 (May 193 1 ) : 1 2 - 1 4; New York Times, May 3 and May 13, 193 1 .
24. Annual Report of the Secretary of War (Washington, 193 1 ), p. 33; "The 'Air Corps'
Mass Migration," 398-400; New York Times, February 17, 1933.
25. New York Times , June 6, 1 93 1 ; Foulois, Memoirs, p. 220;
Foulois to Davison,
June 9, 193 1 , MIL A-2, Box 4 1 , Fou lois Papers; AG to Foulois, July 13, 1931,
MIL A-3, Box 4 1 , Foulois Papers; Air Corps Newsletter 15 (July 2 1 , 1931 ): 2 7 1 ; Air
Corps Newsletter 16 (January 25, 1932): 5; Henry Arnold to Foulois, July 14, 193 1 ,
Personal File, Box 4, Arnold Papers, LC.
26. Foulois became acting chief on September 8, 1 93 1 . He formally assumed com
mand and pinned on his second star on December 2 1 .
N O T E S T O P A G E S 8 1 - 8 5 : 1 6 5
•
27. Extract of Foulois's February 4, 1932, testimony before the House Committee on
Expenditures in Executive Departments, LEGIS 3-F2, Box 26, Foulois Papers, pp. 29-
30, 46, 48-49, 56.
28. See, for example, John J. McSwain to Foulois, March 5, 1932, LEGIS 3-F2,
Box 26, Foulois Papers; Army and Navy )ournal 69 (February 20, 1932): 596.
29. "Statement of General Foulois before the House Military Affairs Committee,"
attachment to memo, Westover to Asst. Chief of Staff (C/S), WPD, April 1 3, 1933,
LEGIS 3-G 1 , Box 27, Foulois Papers; daily memos on the hearings, Kilbourne to C/S,
March 3 1 - April l 5 , 1933, WPD 635-35, RG 165, NA.
30. For an example of the General Staff's attitude, see Kilbourne to C/S, Septem
ber 20, 1933, WPD 3561-25, RG 165, NA.
3 1 . Foulois to C/S, December 3, 1932, DEF C-1d, Box 1 7 , Foulois Papers.
32. Drum Board Report, WPD 888, RG 165, NA; Army and Navy Journal 71 (Feb
ruary 3, 1934): 455.
33. Memo, Deputy C/S to Asst. C/S, WPD, February 22, 1933, CDF 32 1 . 9-B, RG
18, NA; copy of Major General Hugh A. Drum 's testimony before Subcommittee No. 3,
House Milita1-y Affairs Committee, June 5, 1934, HEARINGS-F, Box 45, Foulois
Papers.
34. Memo, Foulois to C/S, May 20, 1935, LEGIS 7-E 1 , Box 28, Foulois Papers;
"Final Statement of General Foulois" ( i n the IG investigation), n.d. (c. June 1935),
IG-S, Box 4 7, Foulois Papers.
35. Copy of Foulois's testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee, Febru
ary 1, 1934, pp. 3-7, HEARINGS-A, Box 45, Foulois Papers.
36. Dern to McSwain, with enclosure, January 3 1 , 1934, AG 580, RG 407, NA; Army
and Navy Journal 7 1 ( February 10, 1934): 475.
37. Transcript of Baker Board Hearings, pp. 1 1 44, 1 1 52-53, USAFHRC; Foulois,
Memoirs, pp. 237 -39; U . S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the War
Department Appropriations Bill for 1 935, 73d Congress, 2d session, 1934, p. 43.
38. Quoted in Foulois, Memoirs, p. 238.
39. Executive Order 659 1 , February 9, 1934, Box 14, Foulois Papers.
40. Washington Post, February 10, 1934.
4 1 . Transcript of Baker Board Hearings, pp. 1 1 52-53, 1 1 70- 7 1 ; Foulois's comments
on Paul Tillett 's manuscript of The Army Flies the Mails, March 25, 1954, pp. 4-5, 36,
Box 15, Foulois Papers.
42. Statement by Clarence L. Tinker, quoted in the New York Times, February 24,
1934.
43. Telegram, Foulois to Commander, Middletown Air Depot, February 1 3 , 1934, Air
Corps Air Mail Operations File, Box 5, RG 18, NA; Norman E. Borden, Jr. , Air Mail
Emergency 1 934 ( Freeport, Maine, 1968), pp. 4 1 , 62, 97-98; New York Times, Feb
ruary 20, 1934; Baker Board Hearings, pp. 1 1 40-42.
44. Washington Post, February 23, 24, and 25, 1934; Foulois, Memoirs,
pp. 244-47.
45. Paul Tillett, The Army Flies the Mails (Tuscaloosa, 1955), pp. 57, 60-61; "Final
Report of the Army Air Corps Mail Operation," October 6, 1934, pp. 17-22, Box 15,
Foulois Papers; memo, AG to Chief of Air Corps (C/AC), May 18, 1934, CDF 3 1 1 . 125,
RG 18, NA.
46. Dem to Roosevelt, March 1 1 , 1934, AG 580 Air Mail (2-9-34) Sec 1 file,
1 6 6 : N O T E S T O P A G E S 8 5 - 8 9
RG 407, NA; news release, "Secretary of War Orders Study of A.ir Mail Operations,"
March 13, 1 934, CG-A, Box 28, Foulois Papers; Final Report of the War Department
Special Committee on Army Air Corps (Washington, 1934), pp. 28-30, 66-67.
47. "Statement and Recommendations by Major General B . D. Foulois," submi tted to
Baker Board, July 10, 1934, S & R, Box 28, Foulois Papers.
48. John F. Shiner, "Birth of the GHQ Air Force," Military Affairs 42 ( October 1 978):
1 18- 19.
49. Foulois to Asst. C/S, G-3, January 2, 1935, PERS-C, Box 22, Foulois Papers;
Andrews to Foulois, June 2 1 , 1934, Box 16, Foulois Papers; Baker Board Hearings,
p. 423.
50. Draft memo, enclosed with memo, Kilbourne to AG, Other Asst. Chiefs of Staff,
and Acting Commander, GHQ Air Force, June 13, 19.34, USAFHRC 145. 93 -81 ; An
nual Report of the Secretary of War (Washington, 1935), p. 3; "Doctrine of the Army Air
Corps," enclosed i n memo, Kilbourne to All Asst. Cs/S, C/AC, Commanding General
GHQ Air Force, etc . , December 2 1 , 1934, CDF 32 1 . 9, RG 18, NA.
51. Foulois, Memoirs, pp. 229-30; memos, C/AC to C/S, December 5, 1933, and
Westover to AG, December 19, 1933, MAT DIV B-2, Box 20, Foulois Papers; Foulois
interview, January 20, 1960, Foulois Files, AFAL; memo, C/AC to AG, April 27, 1934,
AG 452. 1 (4-27 -34), RG 407, NA; memo, Deputy C/S to C/S, May 12, 1934, and 1st
lnd, AG to C/AC, May 16, 1 934, AG 452. 1 (4-27-34) (Misc . ) D, RG 407, NA; Craven
and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War 11, vol. 1 , p. 66.
52. Foulois, Memoirs, p. 231 ; USAF Historical Studies: No. 6: The Development of the
Heavy Bomber, 1 91 8 - 1 944 (Maxwell A FB, Ala. , 1 95 1 ) , pp. 1 6- 1 7 ; Historical Studies:
No. 89, p. 47.
53. Baker Board Hearings, pp. 1968, 22 1 9-20; Air Corps Act of 1926, Public Law
No. 446, 69th Congress, H . R. 10827; Edwin H . Rutkowski, The Politics of Military
Aviation Procurement, 1926 - 1 934 (Columbus, 1966), pp. 78, 158-59, 163-64; Re
view of Procurement Practices, n. d. , MAT DIV B-2a(3), Box 2 1 , Foulois Papers.
54. Extract of testimony of General H . C . Prall before House Mil i tary Affairs Com-
,
mittee, February 9, 1934, HEARINGS-C, Box 45, Foulois Papers; Rutkowski, Politics
of Military Aviation Procurement, pp. 75-79.
55. Testimony of General Foulois before Subcommittee no. 3, March 7, 1 934,
pp. 339-43, HEARINGS-B, Box 45, Foulois Papers.
56. Congressional Record, 73d Congress, 2d session, 1934, 78: 36 1 5 - 18. Also see
Washington Post, March 3, 1934.
57. "Committee Print, Statement of Major General B . D. Fou lois Before the Commit
tee on Military Affairs, 73rd Congress, Second Session," February 1 , 1934, pp. 1 -2,
4-5, H E A R INGS-A, Box 45, Foulois Papers.
58. Copy of testimony of generals Simonds and Kilbourne before Subcommitlee no.
3, n.d. (ca. May 1934), pp. 2- 16, 22 -24, 31, 38-39, 49, HEARINGS-E, Box 45,
Foulois Papers.
59. Copy of General Drum's testimony before Subcommittee no. 3, June 5, 1934,
pp. 81, 84-86, 89, 99- 100, HEARINGS-F, Box 45, Foulois Papers.
60. Investigation of Profiteering in Military Aircraft, under H. Res. 275, 73rd Con
gress, 2d session, 1934, H . Rept. 2060, pp. 2-4, 13- 1 4. Subcommittee no. 3 was
composed of William N. Rogers, Democrat-New Hampshire; Joseph Lister Hill, Demo-
N O T E S T O P A G E S 8 9 - 9 5 : 1 6 7
crat-Alabama; Numa F. Modet, Democrat-Louisiana; Dow W. Harter, Democrat-Ohio;

W. Frank James, Republican-Michigan; Edward W. Goss, Republ ican-Connecticut;
Charles A. Plumley, Republican-Vermont; and Paul J. Kvale, Farmer-Labor
Minnesota.
6 1 . Rutkowski, Politics of Military Aviation Procurement, pp. 107-8.
62. Quoted in New York Times, June 18, 1934. See also Army wul Navy Journal 7 1
(Jw1e 23, 1934): 868.
63. Editorial, Washington Evening Star, August 3 1 , 1 934. For other press comments,
see edi torials in the Washington Post, June 19, 1934; New York Times, June 24, 1934;
Aviation 33 (July 1934): 219; Aero Digest 25 (September 1934): 3; Army and Navy )our
nal 71 (June 23, 1934): 876; and Army and Navy }ournal 7 1 (July 14, 1934): 936.
64. Congressional Record, 74th Congress, lst session, 1935, 79: 9392.
65. Rutkowski, Politics of Military Aviation Procurement, pp. 1 26-29; Army and
Navy Journal 72 ( December 15, 1934): 3 1 9; memos, Secretary of War to IG, Decem
ber 13, 1934, OCS 20852-2 through -5, RG 1 65, NA.
66. Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 1st session, 1935, 79: 9392.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid . , pp. 9381-82; Rutkowski, Politics of Military Aviation Procurement,
pp. 130- 3 1 .
69. New York Times, August 9, 1935; Special Orders 188, August 1 2 , 1935, Foulois
File, Box 23, Simonds Papers, LC; Foulois, Memoirs, p. 273.
70. Foulois, Memoirs, pp. 277-80.
7 1 . Ibid . , pp. 283-93.
George W. Lewis and the Management of Aeronautical Research
l . For a survey history of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, see
Frank W. Anderson, Jr., Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915-
1 980, 2d ed. (Washington, 1981). A detailed narrative of the NACA's technical achieve
ments up to the end of World War II can be found in George W. Gray, Frontiers of Flight:
The Story of NACA Research (New York, 1948). For a critical interpretation of the NACA,
see Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics,
1 9 1 5 - 1 958, 2 vols. (Washington, 1985). The histories of the NACA's separate field
laboratories are detailed in James R . Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1 9 1 7 - 1 958 (Washington, 1987); Elizabeth A. Muen
ger, Searching the Horizon: A History ofA mes Research Center, 1 940 - 1 976 (Washington,
1985); and Richard P. Hallion, On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946 - 1 98 1
(Washington, 1984). A NASA-sponsored history of Lewis laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio,
is currently in progress.
2. C . G. Gray, "Dr. G. W. Lewis," The Aeroplane, August 27, 1948; clipping attached
to letter from John F. Victory, NACA executive secretary, to Mrs. George W. Lewis,
November 24, 1 948, Langley Historical Archives (LHA), Milton Ames Collection,
Box 4, Hampton, Va.
3. Fourth Annual Report of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1 91 8
(Washington, 1 9 19 ), pp. 25-26. ( Hereafter annual reports will be cited in the form AR
1918. )
1 6 8 •
. N O T E S T O P A G E S 9 5 - 1 0 3
'
4. Hansen, Engineer in Charge, pp. 228-29. For interpretations of the NACA's po
sition on jet propulsion from the 1920s to the early 1940s, see Roland, Model Research,
pp. 186-94, and Edward Constant, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution ( Baltimore,
1980).
5. Minutes of the NACA Executive Committee, October 9 and November 25, 1919.
These minutes, along with many hundreds of cubic feet of NACA records, are available
in the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, Record Group 255.
For guidance about these materials, consult the bibliographical essay in Roland's Model
Research, as well as Roland's A Guide to Research in NASA /-1 istory, 6th ed. (Washington,
1982).
6. Roland, Model Research, pp. 76-77.
7. AR 1 920, p. 14. See also Model Research, p. 82, and Engineer in Charge, p. 2 1 .
8. On the concept of the "technological maestro," see Hal Bowser, "Maestros of
Technology: An Interview with Arthur M . Squires," American Heritage of Invention and
Technology 3 (Summer 1987): 24-30. Squires is the author of The Tender Ship (Boston,
1 986). For a critique of the concept of the technological maestro, see Bowser, "How the
Space Race Changed America: An Interview with Walter A. McDougall," A merican
Heritage of Invention and Technology 3 ( Fall 1987): 24-30.
9. Jerome C . Hunsaker, "George William Lewis ( 1882 - 1948)," in Year Book of the
American Philosophical Society, 1 948 (Philadelphia, 1949), p. 2 7 1 .
10. Ibid.
1 1 . On the character of Langley's early staff, see Engineer in Charge, pp. 4 1 -54.
12. For slightly different tellings of this bureaucratic conflict between Victory and
Griffith, see Model Research, pp. 85-86, and Engineer in Charge, pp. 28-29.
13. Hansen, Engineer in Charge, pp. 58-63.
14. Figures from Automotive Industries ( February 23, 1935), p. 295.
1 5 . The wind tunnel is based on the following law of physics: a fluid flowing past a
stationary object produces the same interactions as those that occur when the object
moves through the fluid at rest. Although deduced by Leonardo da Vinci in the late
fifteenth century and expressed quantitatively some 200 years later by Isaac Newton,
this law was not fully understood until 187 l . In that year an English scientist and inven
tor by the name of Francis Wenham built, at Greenwich, England, the first known wind
tunnel. His invention consisted of a steam-driven fan that blew air through a wooden box
twelve feet long, eighteen inches square and open at both ends. All succeeding tunnels
shared certain features of the Wenham design: a drive system turned a fan that produced
a controlled airstream, the effects of which were precisely observed on a scale model
mounted in a test section of the tunnel. Balances and other instruments measured the
aerodynamic forces acting on the model and the model's reaction to them. By the time
the NACA Langley laboratory began operations i n 1920, the progressive integration of
improved versions of these wind-tunnel components had rendered secondary or obsolete
all other experimental aerodynamic research tools, with the exception of full-scale ex
perimental aircraft in free flight. A complete history of wind tunnels does not exist. The
best source of information, expecially on the history of NACA and NASA tunnels, is
Donald D. Baals and William R. Corliss, The Wind Tunnels of NASA (Washington,
1981). On Wenham's 1871 tunnel, see L. Laurence Pritchard, "The Dawn of Aerody
namics," Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society 61 (M arch 1957): 1 59-60 .
•
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 0 3 - 1 0 7 .
• 1 6 9
16. Jerome C. Hunsaker, "Forty Years of Aeronautical Research," Smithsonian Insti

tution Publication No. 424 7 (Washington, 1956), p. 256.
1 7 . The NACA supplied its information on optimum engine location to American
ai rcraft companies confidentially in 1930; however, it did not release this data to the
public until 1932. In other words, the NACA did not release a report on this research
finding until new American ai rplanes designed with this information in mind were actu
ally in service. As Lew is explained in testimony before the Federal Aviation Commission
in 1934:
For the past two years we have sensed the value of the committee's reports, and for
that particular reason we are holding up the release of information that we have for
a year or eighteen months, so as to give our industry the opport unity to i ncorporate
it in the designs and actually have i t flying before any of the information is released.
This type of report is the confidential report. Practically all of our new work is of
that type. Then i f the results of that are considered of fundamental and lasting
value, they are published [as public reports]. Those are on sale at the Government
Printing Office, and all foreign countries and foreign representatives have standing
orders with the Superintendent of Documents for the purchase of every report re
leased by the Committee.
Lewis's testimony to the Howell Board, "Hearings Before the Federal Aviation Commis
sion: Air Transport," September 26, 1934, pp. 1291 -92. A copy of this report is avail
able in the LHA Milton Ames Collection, Box 4. Lewis's statement clarifies much his
torical misunderstanding about the NACA's cautious editorial policies of the early 1930s.
18. Hansen, Engineer in Charge, pp. 84-95.
19. For very different but still in some ways complementary analyses of the revolt
against Munk, see Roland, Model Research, pp. 9 1 - 98, and Hansen, Engineer in
Charge, pp. 84-95, 1 1 9-22. See also Mark Levinson, "Gleanings from Oft-Neglected
Sources: Institutional H istory from Technical Documents the Case of the NACA,"
Technology and Culture 28 ( 1 987): 314-23.
20. H unsaker, "George William Lewis ( 1 882- 1948)," p. 272.
2 1 . S. Paul Johnston, interview with Walter Bonney, October 19, 197 1 , NASA Head
quarters Hi story Office, Washington, D. C.
22. Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 40.
23. John V. Becker, The High-Speed Frontier: Case Histories of Four NACA Programs,
1 920 - 1 950 (Washington, 1980), p. 76. Becker worked in high-speed wind-tunnel re
search at Langley from 1936 until his retirement in the mid-1970s.
24. Victory was the NACA's very first employee, hired as an office clerk in June 1915
only three months after congressional approval of the enabling act. His first task was to
handle requisitions from NACA contractors and to deposit them with the bureau of sup
plies and accounts. Victory possessed a tenacious constitution _that mirrored that of his
upstart organization. Born in New York City and orphaned early, Victory had worked
continuously and indefatigably from boyhood. He began his federal career at age sixteen,
studying shorthand and typing at a night school (which he later bought and operated).
A t eighteen, he recorded proceedings of courts-martial and courts of inquiry. To help
support his younger sisters, he earned extra money on his annual leave days by recording
congressional hearings. Before going to work for the NACA, he served as secretary to
1 7 0 •
• N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 0 7 - 1 1 4
committee member Holden C. Ric hardson, officer in charge of the experimental basin at
the Washington Navy Yard. In that position he became familiar with some of the basic
principles of aeronautical research and cultivated a finesse for public relations. He also
took a keen delight in showing lady visitors around the Yard, taking them into its wind
tunnel and turning on the breeze. Whereas Lewis commanded nearly total respect from
his researchers at Langley, Victory was commonly viewed by many of them as a paper
shuffler and a bore. On the other hand, the researchers appreciated the job he did i n
handling the administration of their bureaucratic affairs and were especially thankful for
what he did for them in winning them benefits from the civil service system.
25. For contrasting interpretations of the annual conferences, see Roland, Model Re
search, pp. 1 1 1 - 13, and Hansen, Engineer in Charge, pp. 148-58.
26. For a historical review of the NACA budgets, see appendix C of Roland, Model
Research, vol. 2, pp. 467-81 .
27. "Some Fine Tools of Research: Reflections on New Equipment in England and
America," Aircraft Engineering ( March 1934): 61 -62.
28. George W. Lewis, "Report on Trip to Germany and Russia, September-October
1936." A copy of this document is available in the Langley Central Files, Code E32- 12.
For a description of the historical materials in these files of the NASA Langley Research
Center and the means of access to them, see the "Guide to NACA H istorical Sources at
Langley" in Hansen, Engineer in Charge.
29. Hunsaker, "Lew is," pp. 277- 78.
30. Ibid. •
3 1 . Lewis to Ira H . Abbott, cited in Abbott's "A Review and Commentary of a Thesis
by Arthur L. Levine, Entitled 'A Study of the Major Policy Decisions of the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics,' Dated 1 963," NASA HQ History Office Archive
H HN-35, April l964, p. 155.
32. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, "George William Lewis Com
memoration Ceremony," September 28, 1948, with an address by Emory S. Land. A
copy of this hooklet is available in the LHA, Milton Ames Collection, Box 4.
33. T. Melvin Butler, interview with Walter Bonney, March 29, 1973. A transcript of
this interview is available in the LHA.
Edward Pearson Wa rner and the New A i r Age
1 . For summaries of his career, see "Edward Pearson Warner," Current Biography
Yearbook (New York, 1949), p. 620, and Roger E. Bilstein, "Edward Pearson Warner,"
in John A. Garraty, ed. , Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement Six, 1 956 - 1 960
(New York, 1980), p. 665.
2. Bilstein interview with Dr. Nathaniel Warner, December 30, 1 9 7 1 . For details
on Warner's early life, see Warner to Theodore P. Wright, Jan uary 16, 1953, and
Raymond P. Baldwin to Jerome Hunsaker, August 15, 1958, both i n the Papers of
Theodore P. Wright, John M. Olin Library, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
3. Baldwin to H u nsaker, August 15, 1958, Wright Papers. See also Theodore P.
Wright, "Edward Pearson Warner: An Appreciation,'' Journal of the Royal Aeronautical
Society (]RAS) 62 (October 1958): 31 -43.
•
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 1 4 - 1 1 8 •
• 1 7 1
4. When Warner planned to take the algebra examination for entrance at H arvard, the
head of the Volkmann School himself went to Cambridge to warn the examiners. The
time allotted for such exams was an hour and a half, but Volkmann expected Warner to
finish in much less time. Moreover, he warned examiners, Warner probably would not
write much, since he often did complex calculations in his head, putting down only the
answer on his papers. Volkmann wanted to make sure that Harvard offi cials knew Warner
was not cheating. On the day of the exam, Warner performed as Volkmann had expected,
jotting down the results and walking out of the room in twenty minutes.
5. Baldwin to H u nsaker, August 1 5, 1958, Wright Papers.
6. Wright, "Warner," JRAS, 34.
.
.
7. H ugh Dryden to Wright, August 8, 1958, Wright Papers; James R. Hansen,

Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1 9 1 7 - 1 958
(Washington, 1987), pp. 29-30; Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics, 1915- 1958, 2 vols. (Washington, 1 985), p. 86.
8. Wright, "Warner," JRAS, 34-35.
9. F. T. Kurt to Wright, August 12, 1958.
10. Elizabeth Brown to Wright, August 1 , 1 958; S. Paul Johnston to Wright, August 4,
1958; all in Wright Papers.
1 1 . Dryden to Wright, August 8, 1958, Wright Papers. Roland remarked that "Warner
was the most prolific author" that the NACA had during this period; Roland, Model
Research, p. 342, fn. 38.
12. For a comprehensive survey of airmail of the era, see William M . Leary, Aerial
Pioneers: The U.S. Air Mail Service, 1918- 1927 (Washington, 1985); Leary includes
references to Warner. On the Ford incident, see Warner to Jesse Davidson, January 1 6,
1953, Wright Papers.
1 3. On aspects of licensing and insurance, see Roger E. Bilstein, Flight Patterns:
Trends of Aeronautical Development in the United States, 1 9 1 8 - 1 929 (Athens, 1983),
pp. 1 38-44. Warner's role is summarized in Baldwin to H unsaker, August 1 5, 1 958,
Wright Papers.
14. Bilstein, Flight Patterns , pp. 1 5- 1 6 ; Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord,
History of United States Naval Aviation ( New Haven, 1949), pp. 238-58, covers the
various government hearings.
15. New York Times, October 1 and December 25, 1926; Brown to Wright, August 1 ,
1958, Wright Papers. For an excellent summary of naval developments of the era, see
Charles M. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the A ircraft Carrier, 1 91 1 - 1929 (An
napolis, 1 974).
1 6. Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, pp. 259-69; Hun
saker to Wright, July 3 1 , 1 958, Wright Papers.
1 7. "Warner," Current Biography Yearbook, p. 620; Elsie Fogarty (archivist, McGraw
Hill, I nc . ) to Bilstein, July 26, 1 978.
18. New York Times, Febn1ary 14, 193 1 ; Warner to Wright, January 23, 1 958, Wright
Papers. Because of Warner's extensive travels and crowded work schedules, i t was not a
close-knit family. Mrs. Warner's devotion to Christian Science also seems to have been
a divisive factor as the children grew up. As Barry Warner remarked, "Neither I nor my
sister was triumphs of adjustment." Hunsaker to Wright, July 3 1 , 1 958, and Johnston to
Wright, August 4, 1958, Wright Papers; Bilstein interviews with Nathaniel Warner, De
cember 30, 197 1 , and Barry Warner, November 1 1 , 1977.
1 7 2 N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 1 9 - 1 2 5
19. Wright, "Warner," }RAS, 36. The most recent and balanced assessment of
the airmail crisis can be found in Nick A. Komons, Bonfires to Beacons: Federal
Civil Aviation Policy Under the Air Commerce Act, 1 926 - 1 938. (Washington, 1978),
pp. 2 1 7 -379.
20. Komons, Bonfires, p. 348.
2 1 . Wright, "Warner," JRAS, 36-37.
22. Ibid. , 37. The published Cabot lectures also became a useful source of informa
tion for historians of aviation history.
23. The assessment of Warner's work on flying qualities is that of Wright, "Warner,"
JRAS, 37. For details of the DC-4E, see Frank Cunningham, Skymaster: The Story of
Donald Douglas and the Douglas Aircraft Company (Philadelphia, 1943), pp. 267- 72.
Harry Gann of Douglas Aircraft Company turned up a copy of Warner's report for United
Air Lines, "Further Notes on Flying-Quality Requirements for the DC-4," dated August
1938. It is thorough and technical but notable for its lucid style. There are also frequent
references to NACA research throughout Warner's narrative.
24. Arthur Raymond to Wright, August 26, 1958, Wright Papers.
25. Wright, "Warner," }RAS, 37-38. For the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the
reorganization leading to the CAA in 1938, see Komons, Bonfires. For subsequent de
velopments after 1938, see John R. M. Wilson, Turbulence A loft: The Civil Aeronautics
Administration Amid Wars and Rumors of Wars, 1 938 - 1 958 (Washington, 1979).
26. Lederer to Wright, August 19, 1 958, Wright Papers.
27. L. Welch Pogue to Wright, August 8, 1958, Wright Papers.
28. Lederer to Wright, August 19, 1 958, Wright Papers.
29. Wright, "Warner," JRAS, 36; New York Times, March 26, 1 94 1 ; Pogue to Wright,
August 8, 1958, Wright Papers. As might be expected, Warner's personal address book
had a distinct international flavor by the end of his career. There were main divisions for
Canada, the United States, and Europe, followed by sections for various separate coun
tries. Many names are those of air attaches and airline personal ities, but the U.S. divi
sion carried several interesting entries, including one for Allen Dulles (simply listed as
CIA), historian Herbert Feis, and columnist Walter Lippmann (from E . P. Warner's
address book, loaned to author in 1979). Lippmann looked to Warner as his aviation
authority and attended several dinner parties at Warner's home in Washington during
World War II; Bilstein interview with Dr. Nathaniel Warner, December 30, 1 97 1 .
30. Pogue to Wright, August 8, 1 958, Wright Papers.
3 1 . This compilation has been drawn from material in Wright, "Warner," JRAS,
3 1 -43; "Warner," Current Biography Yearbook, p. 620; and the obituary in the New
York Times, July 13, 1958. Two recent histories of the NACA during those years have
numerous references to Warner: Roland, Model Research, and Hansen, Engineer in
Charge. Roland's book also notes that George W. Lewis, the NACA's director of research
from 1919 to 1947, felt that Warner was the only member of the Main Committee of the
NACA who was qualified to understand what the Langley laboratory was doing. Roland,
Model Research, p. 344, fn. 45.
32. Dryden to Wright, August 8, 1958, Wright Papers.
33. See the sources cited in fn. 3 1 .
34. Wright, "Warner," JRAS, 36.
35. For a summary of postwar thinking, see Roger E . Bilstein, Flight in America,
1900 - 1 983: From the Wrights to the Astronauts (Baltimore, 1984), pp. 1 6 7 - 78.
•
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 2 5 - 1 3 0 : 1 7 3
36. Henry Ladd Smith, Airways Abroad: The Story �f American World Air Routes
( Madison, 1950), pp. 146-48.
37. Smith, A irways Abroad, pp. 182-323; Bilstein, Flight in A merica, pp. 168-70.
38. Wright, "Warner," JRAS, 38-39.
39. Warner, "ICAO after Four Years," Air Affairs 3 (Spring, 1950): 281 -97.
40. See, for example, Betsy Gidwitz, The Politics �f International Air Transport ( Lex
ington, 1980), especially pp. 79-90.
4 1 . Wright, "Warner," JRAS, 39.
42. For a long list of international awards and honors, see "Warner," Who Was Who
in A merica, vol. 3 (Ch icago, 1960), p. 870.
43. Bilstein interview with Dr. Nathaniel Warner, December 30, 1 97 1 .
Herbert Hoover and the Golden Age of Aviation
I would like to thank the National Endowment for the H u manities, the Herbert Hoover
Presidential Library Association, and the Western Kentucky University Faculty Re
search Committee for their support in the preparation of this a11icle.
l . David D . Lee, "Herbert Hoover and the Rise of Commercial Aviation, 1 92 1 -
1926," Business History Review, 58 ( 1 984): 78- 102; Ellis Hawley, "Three Facets of
Hooverian Associationalism: Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 1 92 1 - 1930," i n Thomas
McCraw, ed. , Regulation in Perspective (Cambridge, 1 98 1 ), pp. 95- 123; Henry Ladd
Smith, Airways: The History of Commercial Aviation in the United States (New York,
1942; reissued, New York, 1965), p. 99; Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoo
ver: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1 920- 1 933 (New York, 1952), pp. 132-33,
243-45; R. E . G. Davies, A irlines of the United States Since 1 914 (London, 1972),
pp. 1 1 0- 1 1 .
2. Lee, "Hoover and Commercial Aviation," 79-80, 92-95; Hawley, "Three Facets
of Hooverian Associationalism," 1 08- 15, 120-23; Hawley, "Herbert Hoover, the Com
merce Secretariat, and the Visions of an 'Associative State,' 1 92 1 - 1928," Journal of
American History 61 ( 1 974): 1 1 6-40.
3. Lee, "Hoover and Commercial Aviation," 84, 94-95, 97; Hawley, "Three Aspects
of Hooverian Associationalism," I l l .
4. Lee, "Hoover and Commercial Aviation," 92, 95, 100- 102; Smith, A irways, p. 99;
Nick A. Komons, Bonfires to Beacons: Federal and Civil Aviation Policy under the Air
Commerce Act, 1926 - 1 938 (Washington, 1978), pp. 25, 28, 45-56, 80-82.
5. Komons, Bonfires, pp. 197-216; Smith, A irways, p. 306; Hawley, "Three Facets
of Hooverian Associationalism," 1 1 4.
6. Lee, "Hoover and the Rise of Commercial Aviation," 78- 8 1 , 88-89; Hawley,
"Three Facets of Hooverian Associationalism," 108- 1 5.
7. Komons, Bonfires, pp. 53-54; Donald Whitnah, Safer Skyways: Federal Control of
Aviation, 1 926 - 1 966 (Ames, 1966), p. 14; Howard M ingos, "Birth of an Industry," in
Gene Roger Simonson, ed. , The History of the American Aircraft Industry, A n A nthology
(Cambridge and London, 1968), pp. 45, 49-50, 55-57.
8. Hoover to Maurice Cleary, June 25, 1 9 2 1 in "Aviation: 1920- 1 92 1 ," Commerce
Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa; "Aeronautical Cham
ber of Commerce Organizes," Aviation 1 2 (January 2, 1922): 6; "Annual Report of the
1 7 4 •
• N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 0 - 1 3 5
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, Inc. ," Aviation ( February 19, 1923):
2 1 9; New York Times, January 1 and 2, 1 922; Thomas Worth Walterman, "Airpower and
Private Enterprise: Federal-Industrial Relations in the Aeronautics Field, 1 918- 1 926"
( Ph. D. diss. , Washington U niversity, 1970), pp. 265-69, 324; Howard Mingos, "The
Birth of an Industry," 57-6 1 .
9. Howard Coffin to Hoover, October 1922, and Sidney Waldon to Hoover, Octo
ber 10, 1922, in "Aviation, 1922- 1 924," Commerce Papers, Hoover Library; Komons,
Bonfires, pp. 53-55, 58-60.
10. Herbert Hoover, "Speech Before San Francisco Chamber of Commerce," i n "Avia
tion, 1922 - 1 924," and J. Walter Drake, ''Civil Aviation i n the United States," in "Avia··
tion, Commercial, 1925", Commerce Papers, Hoover Library. See also ''Annual Report
of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, Inc.," Aviation 14 ( February 19,
1923): 219-20; and Aviation 16 ( February 1 1 , 1 924): 150.
1 1 . Herbert Hoover, "Statement on Commercial Aviation" in "Aviation, 1925," and
Hoover, "Speech Before San Franc isco Chamber of Commerce," in "Aviation, 1926,"
Commerce Papers, Hoover Library.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. "Notes for Meeting of Air Craft Men Monday," July 16, 192 1 ; Clarence Stetson to
Maurice G. Cleary, July 8, 192 1; Luther K. Bell to Stetson, July 20, 192 1 ; all in "Avia
tion, 1920- 192 1 ," Commerce Papers, Hoover Library. See also Samuel Bradley to Hoo
ver, April 1 1 , 1922, and Howard Coffin to Hoover, April 18, 1922, in "Commerce
Department; Bureau of Aeronautics: Legislation, 1922," Commerce Papers, Hoover Li
brary. In addition, see New York Times , July 5, 1921, and January 10, 1923; editorial,
Aviation 13 ( November 20, 1922): 683; A ircraft Yearbook, 1 922, p. 33; and Walterman,
"Airpower," pp. 327-29.
1 7. New York Times, January 10, 1923; Waltennan, "Airpower," pp. 328-30; Ko
mons, Bonfires, pp. 46, 50-53.
18. Howard Coffin to Hoover, April 1 8, 1922, in "Commerce Department, Bu reau of
Aeronautics: Legislation, 1922"; James W. Wadsworth, Jr. , to Hoover, November 27,
1925, in "Aviation; President's Aircraft Board, 1925 and u ndated''; all in Commerce
Papers, Hoover Library. See also New York Times, December 3 1 , 1 92 1 , and Komons,
Bonfires , pp. 46-53.
19. Richard Emmet to William Lamb, December 14, 192 1 , in "Commerce Depart
ment, Bureau of Aeronautics: Legislation, 1 92 1 ," Commerce Papers, Hoover Library;
Michael Osborn and Joseph Riggs, eds . , "Mr. Mac": William P. MacCracken, )r. , on
Aviation, Law, Optometry (Memphis, 1970), pp. 33, 40-41.
20. Samuel Bradley to William Lamb, August 3, 1 922; Julius Klein to Richard Em
met, May 25, 1922; Lamb to Hoover, May 26, 1922; Hoover to Lamb, June 2, 1922;
Lamb to Hoover, June 9, 1922; all in "Commerce Department, Bureau of Aeronau tics:
Legislation, 1922," Commerce Papers, Hoover Library. See also Komons, Bonfires,
p. 56.
2 1 . Hoover to Samuel Winslow, June 12, 1922; Hoover to Winslow, June 13, 1922;
Winslow to Hoover, June 14, 1922; Winslow to Hoover, September 1 5, 1 922� all i n
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 5 - 1 3 9 .
• 1 7 5
"Commerce Department, Bureau of Aeronautics: Legislation, 1922," Clommerce Papers,

Hoover Library. See also New York Times, January 9, 1923.
�
22. Komons, Bonfires, pp. 55-57.

23. U.S. President's Aircraft Board, Report (Washington, 1925); U . S. House, Select
Committee on Air Services, Report of the House Select Committee on Operations �l the
United States Air Services, 68th Congress, 2d Session, 1 925; "Summary of the Report of
the Committee on Civil Aviation Organized last June by the Department of Com
merce and the American Engineering Counci l," in "Advisory Committee on Civil Avia
tion, 1925 - 1 926," Commerce Papers, Hoover Library; New York Times, November 6,
1925, and January 26, 1926; Wallerman, "Airpower," pp. 9, 450- 5 1 , 456, 458-6 1 ,
475-78.
24. Hoover to Hiram Bingham, September 23, 1925; James Wadsworth, Jr. , to Hoo
ver, December 5, 1925; Clarence Young to Hoover, December 7, 1925; Hoover to Wes
ley L. Jones, December 9, 1925; all in ''Commerce Department, Bureau to Aeronautics:
Legislation, 1925 - 1 926," Commerce Papers, Hoover Library. See also Congressional
Record, 69th Congress, 1 s t session, 1926, pp. 828-30, 7314- 1 7 ; New York Times ,
December 9, 1925; and Komons, Bonfires, pp. 80-81 .
25. Hoover, Memoirs, p. 134; Smith, A irways, p. 98,; Elsbeth S. Freudenthal, The
Aviation Business from Kitty Hawk to Wall Street (New York, 1940), p. 77.
26. Roger Bilstein, "Technology and Commerce: Aviation in the Conduct of American
Business, 1 9 1 8-29," Technology and Culture, 1 0 ( 1 969): 4 1 1 ; John Rae, Climb to
Greatness: The American Aircraft Industry, 1 920-60 (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 34-35,
39-40; Freudenthal, Aviation Business, pp. 98-99.
27. New York Times, May 19, 1929; "U. S. Aviation and the Air Mail,'' Fortune
9 (May, 1934): 140; Komons, Bonfires, pp. 196-97; Smith, Airways, pp. 132-33,
1 4 1 -42, 147; Freudenthal, Aviation Business, pp. 98- 107. A fourth holding company,
Curtiss-Wright, soon fell under the control of North American Aviation.
28. Lee, "Hoover and Commercial Aviation," 100- 102; Freudenthal, Aviation Busi
ness, p. 98; Smith, A irways, p. 132.
29. Smith, Airways, pp. 1 1 7 -28; Post Office Department press release, May 27,
1929, copy in Box 1 1 7, Records of the Uni ted States Senate Special Committee to
Investigate Foreign and Domestic Ocean and Air Mail Contracts (Black Committee),
Record Group 46, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
30. New York Times, January 29, 1961; Anne Hard, "Uncle Sam's New Mail Man,"
New York Herald Tribune, April 7, 1929, copy in "Walter F. Brown," Box 9, President's
Personal File, Hoover Library; Hoover, Memoirs, p. 220; Randolph Downes, The Rise
of Warren Gamaliel Harding, 1865 - 1 920 (Columbus, Ohio, 1970), pp. 178-80,
346-50; Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and his Administra
tion ( M inneapolis, 1969), pp. 4· 1 5 - 16; Senate, Investigation �fAir Mail and Ocean Mail
Contracts, Hearings Before a Special Committee, 73rd Congress, 2d Session, 1933-
1934, p. 2353 (hereafter cited as Black Hearings) .
3 1 . Brown address to Bond Club, p. 3, in Box 42, and "Commercial Aviation and Air
Mail," Brown address to Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, p. 6, in Box 40, Presidential
Papers, Hoover Library; Brown, "Air Mail and Passengers," Saturday Evening Post 203
(February 28, 193 1 ) : 1 14.
32. "Commercial Aviation and Air Mail," Brown address to Cleveland Chamber of
1 7 6 : N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 9 - 1 4 4
Commerce, pp. 7-9, in Box 40, Presidential Papers, Hoover Library; Hoover, Memoirs,
pp. 243-45.
33. "Excerpt from Press Conference of October 1 5, 1 929," copy in "Air Mail Cancel
lation," Box 1 2, Post-Presidential Subject File, Hoover Papers; U.S. House, Committee
on the Post Office and Post Roads, A mending the Air Mail Act, Hearings, 7 1 s t Congress,
1st Session, 1930, pp. 1 , 8, 23-24; "Commercial Aviation and Air Mail," Brown ad
dress to Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, pp. 3-9; Hoover, Memoirs, pp. 243-45.
34. Black Hearings, pp. 147 1 - 72, 237 1 -72; "Commercial Aviation and Air Mail,"
Brown address to Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, pp. 7 -9; Davies, Airlines of the
United States Since 1914, p. 1 1 4; Dorothy M. Brown, Mable Walker Willebrandt: A Study
of Power, Loyalty, and Law ( Knoxville, 1984), pp. 198-200.
35. Smith, Airways, p. 24 1 ; William (Doc) Bishop to James Woolley, December 7,
1929, in Paul Henderson file, Box 122, Records of the Black Committee, Record Group
46, National Archives; Black Hearings, pp. 2349 - 5 1 , 2371 - 73, 245 1 -58.
36. Herbert Hoover to Walter Brown, August 2 1 , 1 929, "Post Office Correspon
dence," Box 40, Presidential Papers, Hoover Library; Charles Kelly, The Sky's the Limit:
The History of the Air Lines (New York, 1963), p. 72.
37. Bishop to Woolley, December 7 and December 1 0, 1929, and Hainer Hinshaw to
Graham Grosvenor, December 7 , 1929, in Paul Henderson file, Box 122, Records of the
Black Committee.
38. Ibid.
39. Memorandum, "October- December, 1929," Presidential Subject File-Aeronau
tics, Hoover Papers; Paul Henderson to W. Irving Glover, December 13, 1929, Paul
Henderson file, Box 122, Records of the Black Committee.
40. Congressional Record, 7 1 st Congress, 2d Session, 1 93 1 , pp. 7373, 7377; Glover
notes, March 1 5, 1 930, Earl Wadsworth file, Box 1 29, Records of the Black Committee.
Black Hearings, pp. 24.37 -39; House Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads,
Amending the Air Mail Act, p. 25; Osborn and Riggs, eds . , "Mr. Mac," pp. 145-47.
4 1 . Glover notes, March 1 5, 1930, Earl Wadsworth file, Box 1 29; Bishop to Woolley,
April 6, 1 930; Florence Kahn to Woolley, April 1 7 , 1930, and undated; all in Paul
Henderson file, Box 122, Records of the Black Committee. See also Black Hearings,
p. 2438, and Court of Claims decision, p. 120, copy in "Air Mail," Box 34, James
Farley Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D . C .
42. J. Howard Hamstra, "Two Decades Federal Aero-Regulation in Perspective,"
Journal of Air Law and Commerce 1 2 ( 194 1 ) : 1 1 5; Hawley, "Three Facets of Hooverian
Associationalism," 1 14- 15; Osborn and Riggs, "Mr. Mac," p. 148.
43. W. Irving Glover to Earl Wadsworth, May 1 5 , 1930, Spoils Conference file, Box
120, Records of the Black Committee; Black Hearings, p. 2323; Hawley, "Three Facets
of Hooverian Associationalism," 1 14.
44. Black Hearings, pp. 2437, 2555; Fortune 9 (May, 1934): 142; Ellis Hawley, The
Great War and the Search for a Modern Order, A History of the A merican People and Their
Institutions, 191 7- 1 933 (New York, 1979), pp. 226-29.
45. Minutes taken by Earl Wadsworth, Aviation Bid file, Box 1 1 2, and Post Office
Department press release, May 1 9, 1 930, copy in Brown's Press Statements file, Box
122, Records of Black Committee; Black Hearings, pp. 1476, 2323-26; Osborn and
Riggs, "Mr. Mac," pp. 147-48; William Van Dusen interview with William P. Mac
Cracken, June 3, 1966, transcript in William P. MacCracken Papers, Hoover Library.
•
N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 4 4 - 1 4 7 : 1 7 7
•
46. Black Hearings , pp. 2350- 5 1 , 2554-56; William MacCracken to Walter Brown,
June 4, 1930, Avigation Bid file, Box 1 1 2, Records of the Black Committee.
47. Congressional Record, 7 1 st Congress, 2d Session, 1931, p. 7377; "Report of
Fulton Lewis, Jr.," pp. 53-55, Box 1 1 8, Records of the Black Committee; Paul David,
The Economics of Air Mail Transportation ( Washington, 1 934), pp. 1 1 1 - 14; Smith,
Airways, pp. 168-69; Komons, Bonfires, pp. 204-5.
48. "Report of Fulton Lewis, Jr.," pp. 53-55, Box 1 18, Records of the Black Com
mittee; David, Air Mail Transportation, pp. 1 1 1 - 14; Smith, Airways, pp. 168-70; Ko
mons, Bonfires, pp. 204-5.
49. Komons, Bonfires , pp. 205-8; Smith, Airways, pp. 167 -86; Davies, A irlines of
the United States, pp. 1 18-20; Freudenthal, Aviation Business, pp. 1 1 4- 1 7; David, Air
Mail Transportation, pp. 108- 1 9 .
50. Davies, Airlines �f the United States, pp. 1 1 7 -22; Komons, �onfires, pp. 207 -8;
Smith, Airways, pp. 187-213.
5 1 . Komons, Bonfires, p. 2 1 1 ; Smith, A irways, p. 212.
52. John P. Frank, Mr. Justice Black: The Man and His Opinions ( New York, 1949),
p. 65; Virginia Van Der Veer Hamilton, Hugo Black: The A labama Years (Baton Rouge,
1972), p. 220; text of CBS radio address by Hugo Black, printed in New York Times,
February 1 7 , 1934; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in
Economic Ambivalence (Princeton, 1966), pp. 241-42.
53. Smith, A irways, pp. 278-79, 306; Hawley, "Three Facets of Hooverian Associa
tionalism," 224; Komons, Bonfires, pp. 267, 352-54; Hawley, New Deal and the Prob
lem of Monopoly, p. 242; Hawley, Great War and the Search for a Modern Order,
pp. 226-29.
\
'
'
B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S
H E N R Y F O R D
The Papers of Henry Ford at the Edison Institute, Dearborn, Michigan, are the starting
point for research into Ford's aeronautical activities. The collection contains important
correspondence files and excellent photographs. Among the numerous oral histories, the
recollections of Harold Hicks, Al Esper, and Glen H. Hoppin are especially valuable
for aviation.
Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, Ford, 3 vols. ( New York, 1954-1963), remains
the standard biographical source for Ford's life. A recent work, Robert Lacey, Ford: The
Men and the Machine ( Boston, 1986), explores the relationship between Henry and
Edsel but ignores their interest in aviation. David L. Lewis, The Public Image of Henry
Ford (Detroit, 1 976), is the best treatment of Ford as a folk hero during the 1920s.
Only a few interesting documents relating to William B . Stout's flamboyant career can
be found in the Stout Airlines Collection in the Burton Historical Collection at the Detroit
Public Library. His autobiography, So Away I Went! (Indianapolis, 1 95 1 ) , should be used
with caution because of its numerous factual errors. Maurice Holland and Thomas M .
Smith, Architects of Aviation ( New York, 1 951 ), offers the most extended treatment of
Stout, but the authors relied too heavily on Stout's memoirs.
David Ansel Weiss, The Saga of the Tin Goose ( New York, 197 1 ), Douglas J. lngells,
Tin Goose: The Fabulous Trimotor ( Fallbrook, Ca. , 1 968), and William T. Larkins, The
Ford Story (Wichita, 1957), are detailed, well-illustrated, hut largely uncritical biogra
phies of the airplane. A shorter but in many ways more satisfying treatment of the topic
is Owen Bombard, "The Tin Goose," Dearborn Historical Society 8 ( May 1 958): 2-20,
which draws on material from the Ford Papers.
Tom Towle corrects the historical record on the trimotor's evolution in "Who Designed
the Ford Trimotor?" American Aviation Historical Society Journal, 1 5 ( 1970): 187-93,
as does John G. Lee, It Should Fly Wednesday: Recollections of an A irplane Designer
( privately printed, 1 984).
Technological trends during the interwar years are surveyed in Ronald Miller and
David Sawers, The Technical Development of Modern Aviation (New York, 1 970), hut see
also Edward Pearson Wa1·ner, Technical Development and Its E_ffect on Air Transportation
(York, Pa. , 1938). Peter W. Brooks, The Modern A irliner: Its Origins and Development
(London, 196 1 ), is a fine study that places the trimotor in perspective.
Roger E. Bilstein, Flight in America, 1900 - 1 983 ( Baltimore, 1984), and John B.
Rae, Climb to Greatness: The American Aircraft Industry, 1920- 1960, stand out as re
liable and thoughtful surveys. More specialized studies, with extensive bibliographical
references, include Bilstein, Flight Patterns: Trends in Aeronautical Development in the
United States, 1920 - 1 929 (A thens, Ga. , 1983), William M. Leary, Aerial Pioneers: The
U.S. Air Mail Service, 1 91 8 - 1 927 (Washington, 1985), and Thomas Worth Walterman,
1 8 0 .. B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S
"Airpower and Private Enterprise: Federal-Industrial Relations in the Aeronautical Field,

1918- 1926" (Ph. D. diss . , Washington U niversity, 1970).
William M. Leary
D A N I E L A N D H A R R Y G U G G E N H E I M
The activities of the Guggenheims in aeronautics are best traced by consulting the papers
of the history-makers themselves. Fortunately, all of the pertinent records of the Gug
genheim Fund have been meticulously organized and preserved as the Papers of the
Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics within the collections of the
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. This collection amount
ing to twenty-one boxes containing upwards of 6, 000 items ranging from test and trip
reports to financial and tax records is an indispensable source of i nformation on the
Guggenheims and their impact on aviation. The Library of Congress Manuscripts Division
contains other collections that touch on Guggenheim activities, notably the papers of
Grover Loeing, Emory S. Land, Washington I. Chambers (good for early aeronautics at
MIT), and (especially) the papers of Orville Wright, who served as a fund trustee.
The National Archives contains several collections that offer supporting documenta
tion on Guggenheim work and its impact upon other agencies and organizations, notably
Record Group 18 ( Records of the U.S. Army Air Service, Army Air Corps, and Army
Air Forces), particularly the Central Decimal Files, boxes 908, 909, 9 1 1 , and 1056,
and the conespondence of General James Fechet, the chief of the Air Service. Record
Group 40 ( Records of the Department of Commerce) has useful i nformation, particularly
Papers of the Office of the Secretary of Commerce, especially boxes 536 and 568. Some
useful information is also contained in Record Group 255 ( Records of the National Ad
visory Committee for Aeronautics) and Record Group 72 ( Records of the Navy Bureau
of Aeronautics). Additionally, the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa, includes important i nformation about the Guggenheims in the papers of Herbert
Hoover and William P. MacCrac ken, Jr. Interviews with F. Trubee Davison, David S.
Ingalls, and Clarence M. Young offer some supporting data on the Guggenheim Fund
and its accomplishments.
A number of governmental and university libraries and archives have collections that
are related to Guggenheim work, particularly the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale Uni
versity (which has the Lindbergh papers, to which General Lindbergh graciously granted
me access shortly before his death in 1974) and the Millikan Library at the California
Institute of Technology (which has the Millikan papers and the papers of Theodore von
Karman). The John M. Olin Library of Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, has the
Theodore P. Wright papers, and the library of the University of California at Los Angeles
possesses the papers of pioneer Alexander Klemin. The National Air and Space Museum
of the Smithsonian Institution has an assemblage of Guggenheim materials collected
since the establishment of a Guggenheim grant to the museum in the mid-1 960s. Under
the direction of Alexis Doster and, subsequently, the author, a collection of Guggen
heim-related documentation and artifacts was added to the already vast holdings of the
museum. For the museum visitor, there is an exhibit on the fund's activities that uses
selected photographs, reports, artifacts, and models. The museum has selected portions
'
B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S .
• 1 8 1
of the papers of Jerome C. H unsaker, which contain useful material on aviation in the
1 920s. The Science Museum, South Kensington, London, has possession of one of two
significant STOL airc raft developed under the aegis of the fund, the Handley Page Gug
nunc, and accordingly has a collection of material relating to it. The American-built
winner, the Curtiss Tanager, unfortunately does not survive, though there is a superb
model of i t (and a model of the Guggenheims' NY-2 blind-flying testbed, which li kewise
is nonextant) on exhibit at the National Air and Space Museum.
Major R. H . Mayo, � the fund's British representative, made the first attempt to docu
ment i ts history with his unpubli shed manuscript, History of the Daniel Guggenheim
Fund, which is now in the fund papers on deposit with the Library of Congress. This
work formed the basis for Reginald Cleveland's America Fledges Wings: The History qf
The Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics (New York, 1 94 1 ) . Both
are generally useful works but marred by a lack of perspective and by a lack of detail.
Guggenheim aviation activities have received little attention in the numerous family
biographies, with the exception of Milton Lomask, Seed Money: The Guggenheim Story
(New York, 1964), which has a valuable summary of their work. Likewise, M ilton Leh
man, This High Man: The Life of Robert H. Goddard (New York, 1963), contains much
useful material on the role the Guggenheims played in funding the activities of rocketry
pioneer Robert Goddard. The author's own Legacy of Flight: The Guggenheim Contri
bution to A merican Aviation (Seattle, 1977) discusses the fund and subsequent Guggen
heim aeronautical activities in detail, and readers are encouraged to consult i t for further
information on topics covered in this essay and for additional information on useful
sources for Guggenheim material.
Richard P. Hallion
W I L L I A M P. M A c C R A C K E N, J R.
A number of manuscript collections are of value in reconstructing William P. Mac

Cracken's aviation career. For the pre-1926 period, two collections are invaluable: the
Herbert Hoover Papers at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa,
and the files of the National Aeronautic Association. The NAA files, to which the FAA
history staff was granted access more than a decade ago, are indispensable for assessing
private attitudes toward federal regulation of aviation. The Civil Aeronautics Adminis
tration Central Files ( Record Group 237), housed at the National Archives i n Washing
ton, D . C. , contain the records of the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Com
merce. The National Archives also holds the files of the U.S. Post Office Department,
Bureau of the Second Assistant Postmaster General, Division of the Air Mail Service
( Record Group 28). The story of U.S. airway development and that of the formative years
of federal aviation regulation cannot be adequately told without consulting the sources
in these two federal record groups. Also useful but of less importance to this study is the
information in Record Group 40, the U . S. Department of Commerce General Records,
Office of the Secretary, also housed in the National Archives. Ms. Nell MacCracken, of
Washington D. C . , holds private papers of her father that have not yet been placed in a
permanent public depository. It should be noted that copies of the manuscripts cited in
the endnotes exist in the FAA history files at the FAA national headquarters.
How aviation should be organized was a hotly debated issue during the post-World
1 8 2 •
• B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S
War I period. Between 1918 and 1925, Congress and the executive branch conducted
no fewer than twenty-six probes of this issue, generating in the process a voluminous
mass of material in the form of published hearings and reports. Among the more useful
congressional hearings are U . S. House of Representatives, Bureau of Civil Air Naviga
tion in the Department of Commerce, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 68th Congress, 2d session, 1924, and U.S. House of Representa
tives, Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air Services, Hearings before Select
Committee of lnquiry, 68th Congress, 2d session, 1925. The citation for the hearings
conducted by the board headed by Dwight Morrow is U . S. President's Aircraft Board,
Hearings, 4 vols. (Washington, 1925). When these hearings recessed, Morrow issued
U . S. President's Aircraft Board, Report of the President's Aircraft Board (Washington,
1925). An important congressional report is U . S. Senate, The Promotion �f Commercial
Aviation, S. Rept.2, 69th Congress, lst session, 1 925. For MacCracken's involvement
in the airmail scandal, see U . S. Senate, Investigation of Air Mail and Ocean Mail Con
tracts, Hearings Before a Special Committee, 73d Congress, 2d session, 1933 - 1 934.
The early activities of the Aeronautics Branch can be followed through the published
hearings of the House and Senate appropriation committees and the annual reports of
the secretary of commerce. The annual reports for this period are surprisingly informa
tive. The FAA headquarters library has a complete set of Aeronautics Bulletins (num
bered l through 27), which were issued and updated periodically by the Aeronautics
Branch. Bulletin No. 7 contained the Air Commerce Regulations. The library also holds
amendments to these regulations, which first appeared on loose mimeographed sheets
before they found their way into print in the next published revision of Bulletin 7.
Another product of the mimeograph machine was Domestic Air News, a bimonthly peri
odical that contained both aeronautical news and regulatory information. This, too, can
be found in the FAA library.
Newspapers and periodicals covered more than aviation's most dramatic stories. This
'
was particularly tn1e of the New York Times. Among the trade journals of the period,
Aviation was the best, followed by Aero Digest and U.S. Air Services.
MacCracken did not write an autobiography. H e did sit down with Michael Osborn
and Joseph Riggs, however, and talk at length into a recording machine. The edited
transcript is published as Osborn and Riggs, eds . , "Mr. Mac": William P. MacCracken,
]r., on Aviation, Law, Optometry (Memphis, 1970). MacCracken was also interviewed in
1962 by Charles Planck, a former FAA public affairs official. That transcript is held by
the FAA history staff.
Two secondary works written in the early 1930s are still worth consulting: Laurence
F. Schmeckebier, The Aeronautics Branch, Department of Commerce: Its History, Activi
ties and Organization ( Washington, 1930), and Charles C. Rohfing, National Regulation
of Aeronautics (Philadelphia, ] 931 ). MacCracken's role in the passage of the Air Com
merce Act, his tenure as assistant secretary of commerce for aeronautics, and his in
volvement in the airmail scandal are detailed in Nick A. Komons, Bonfires to Beacons:
Federal Civil Aviation Policy under the Air Commerce Act, 1 926 - 1 938 (Washington,
1978). Thomas Worth Walterman, "Airpower and Private Enterprise: Federal - I ndustrial
Relations in the Aeronautics Field, 19 18- ] 926" (Ph. D. diss . , Washington University,
1970), is an especially valuable study.
Nick A . Komons
B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S .
• 1 8 3
W I LL I A M A. M 0 F F ETT
The Navy Department Library at the Washington Navy Yard has fourteen reels of micro
film of Moffett's papers. They are not indexed and there is no finding aid. While there is
some original material in this collection, much of it consists of copies of official corre
spondence from Record Group 72 in the National Archives. Hard copies of the microfilm
are available at the Nimitz Library at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.
Edward Arpee, From Frigates to Flat-Tops (privately printed, 1953), is the only full
length study of Moffett. Although Arpee used material provided by the Moffett family in
writing his admiring biography, he failed to exploit the extensive body of documentation
in governmental archives.
The records of naval aviation prior to the formation of the Bureau of Aeronautics in
1921 are scattered in Record Group 72 among the files of the offices of secretary of the
navy and chief of naval operations and those of the bureaus of Construction and Repair,
Steam Engineering, Ordinance, and Navigation. Upon its creation, BuAer took over the
aviation files of the various bureaus and apparently used some of them as repositories
for its own records. As a result, 1921 does not provide a clean line of demarcation. Only
when the Navy Filing Manual was adopted in 1925 did BuAer's records become clearly
Its own.
.
BuAer files in record Group 72 contain cotTespondence on all matters pertaining to

naval aviation. They also include aircraft contrac ts, test reports, proposals, and specifi
cations, and monthly summary reports from 1926 to 1940 that give number, type, and
location of aircraft. Additional items of interest can be found in the files of the secretary
and CNO.
The Oral History Collection at the United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Mary
land, contains a number of pertinent interviews with aeronautical pioneers, including
Alfred Melville Pride (who helped develop flight-arresting gear on Langley and made the
first landing on Lexington), John S. Thach, and George Van Deurs. The Naval History
Project in the Oral History Office at Columbia University has interviews with Joseph J.
Clark and Emory S. Land.
A series of monographs written by the Naval Aviation History Unit during and after
World War II is invaluable. Comprehensive in coverage of the period from 1 9 1 1 to about
1941, they are available at the Naval H istorical Center in the Washington Navy Yard.
These thoroughly documented volumes provide a solid starting point for anyone inter
ested in subjects ranging from procurement to training. The citations, however, are ob
solete; many of the sources are no longer in navy custody, having been transferred to the
National Archives. Fortunately, archivists at the Mili tary Reference Branch of the Ar
chives usually can translate the old citations to the modern filing system and produce
the records.
Official biographies of officers of the U . S. Navy are in the Naval Historical Center, as
are some organizational manuals of the navy bureaus. Other bureau manuals may be
found in the library or in the Printed Archives Branch of the National Archives. The
biographies provide dates and descriptions of an officer's assignments, while the manuals
are good sources for administrative history. The H isLorical Center also is an excellent
source of specialized publications by the navy, such as "Former Chiefs of Bureaus,"
1 8 4 .
. B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S
written by the Biographies and Research Sec tion of the Office of Public Relations. The
navy has compiled many such studies on a variety of subjects.
The Naval Historical Founda tion, co-located with the Naval H istorical Center, has
amassed an impressive collection of private papers of many leading figures i n naval
history. Especially helpful for naval aviation between the wars are the papers of
Holden C. Richardson and Henry C. Mustin. The papers of John H. Towers, an exten
sive collection that is now in the possession of Towers' biographer Clark G. Reynolds,
will be added to the foundation's archives in the near future. The foundation has ar
ranged for the Library of Congress to house, maintain, and service the collection, which
is located in the Manuscripts Division of the library.
Two autobiographies discuss the development of naval aviation between the wars:
Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record ( New
York, 1 952), and J . J . Clark and Clark G. Reynolds, Carrier Admiral (New York, 1967).
Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation
(New Haven, 1949), is a fine general account that covers the period from 1 9 1 1 to
the eve of World War II . Among the many books on rigid airships, by far the best is
Richard K. Smith, The Airships Akron and Macon (Annapolis, 1 965). Smith also has
written an excellent account of naval aviation at the end of World War I: First Across:
The Story of the NC-4 (Annapolis, 1969). Charles M. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox: The Rise
of the A ircraft Carrier, 1 91 1 - 1 929 (Annapolis, 1974), documents the beginning of car
rier aviation, while William F. Trimble, "The Naval Ai rcraft Factory, the American
Aviation Industry, and Government Competition, 1 9 1 9 - 1 928," Business History Review
60 ( 1986): 1 75-98, is best on that topic.
Wm. }. Armstrong
B E N J A M I N F O U L O I S
Primary source material on Benjamin Foulois's career is plentiful. The Foulois Papers in
the Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, offer a wealth of information about both
the Army Air Corps and General Foulois. Other collections in the Manuscripts Division,
including the Frank M. Andrew Papers, the Henry H . Arnold Papers, the Ernest Joseph
King Papers, the George Van Horn Moseley Papers, and the Carl Spaatz Papers, contain
some useful material. Personal papers in the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Center
at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, are well cataloged but offer little of value on
Fou lois. However, the center does contain a number of documents on the Air Corps and
the Air Corps Tac tical School, as well as extremely important interviews with Foulois.
The Roosevelt Papers in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, have
little of substance on the Air Corps during Foulois's years as chief. The Operational
Archives, Naval Historical Division, Washington, D. C . , provides useful material on the
navy's views, particularly on the coast defense issue, in its Records of the General
Board. There is excellent material on Foulois's experiences through World War I in the
Air Force Academy li brary's Special Collections Division.
The National Archives contains a tremendous amount of Air Corps-related material,
but one must frequently page through numerous documents to locate one or two that are
applicable lo Fou1ois. This is especially true when dealing with The Adj utant General's
B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S •
• 1 8 5
Records ( Record Group 407). The War Plans Division Numerical File ( Record Group
165) contains a great deal of material on the Air Corps, and i t i s well indexed for easy
use; WPD numbers 888 and 3798 are particul arly valuable. The Army Air Forces Cen
tral Decimal File ( Record Group 1 8 ) is replete with significant documents but is not as
well indexed. It uses The Adjutant General's numbering system, and while this is some
what helpful, it still requires the researcher to check a multitude of entry numbers and
to page through numerous inapplicable documents to locate pertinent ones. The most
fruitful index numbers in this file are 032, 3 1 1 . 125, 3 2 1 . 9, 333.5, and 452. 1 . The most
helpful entries within The Adjutant General's Files ( Record Group 407) include 320. 2 ,
352, 452. 1 , and 580. Record Group 255, Records of the Joint Board, is particularly
disappointing, for i t holds few documents relating to the Air Corps and Foulois. Record
Group 72, Bureau of Aeronautics Correspondence, is invaluable for the navy's outlook
on aviation matters. General Records of the Navy Department, Office of the Secretary
( Record Group 80) is less u seful from the aviation standpoi nt. Record Group 233 in
cludes some of the transcripts of the 1934 secret hearings of the Rogers Subcommittee
of the House Mili tary Affairs Committee, as well as subcommittee correspondence. How
ever, the researcher needs to secure clearance from the Clerk of the House to view these
documents a task in itself.
Only two books treat General Benjamin Foulois's life in detail. Benjamin D. Foulois
and Carrol V. Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts: The Memoirs of Major
General Benjamin D. Foulois (New York, 1 968), provides highly readable and i nteresting
but somewhat uncritical coverage of Foulois's military career. John F. Shiner, Foulois
and the Army Air Corps ( Washington, 1983), is a detailed study of Foulois during his
years as chief of the Air Corps ( 1 93 1 - 1935).
There are a few good books treating the Air Service/Air Corps during Foulois's military
career. DeWitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains (Garden City, 1 980), while focusing on
other pre-World War II military aviation figures, captures well the flavor of the army's
air arm during its first thirty years. Alfred Goldberg, ed. , A History of the United States
Air Force, 1907-1957 (New York, 1 957), is the best-known general survey of the de
velopment of American air power. While emphasizing the post - 1 94 1 years, i t contains a
good overview of U . S. military aviation through World War I I . Maurer Maurer, Aviation
in the U.S. A rmy, 1 9 1 9 - 1 939 (Washington, 1987), provides a wealth of detail about the
structure, activities, and problems of interwar army aviation. Robert Frank Futrell,
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force
(Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 197 1 ), has two good chapters on the evolution of air missions,
doctrine, and strategy within the army air arm between 1907 and 1 94 1 . Michael S.
Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power (New Haven, 1987), contains a provocative
chapter on Air Corps thinking about force employment in the 1 930s. Carroll V. Glines,
The Saga of the Air Mail (New York, 1968), and Paul Tillett, The Army Flies the Mails
(Tuscaloosa, Ala. , 1955), both are readable and generally accqrate accounts of the 1934
airmail episode. Edwin H. Rutkowski, The Politics of Military Aviation Procurement,
1 926 - 1 934 (Columbus, Ohio, 1966), is the best volume on the procurement problems
faced by Foulois.
Articles dealing with Foulois and/or the army air arm during his career are not plen
tiful. Three articles written by General Foulois about his pre-World War I aviation ex
periences are invaluable for capturing the essence of the man. Titled "Early Flying
1 8 6 •
Experiences," they appeared in Air Power Historian in April and July 1 955 and i n April
1956. John F. Shiner's "General Benjamin Foulois and the 1934 Air Mail Disaster,"
Aerospace Historian 25 ( 1 978): 22 1 -30, and Eldon W. Downs, "The Army and the Air
Mail," Air Power Historian 9 ( 1 962): 35-6 1 , provide good, brief coverage of one of the
most difficult episodes during Foulois's tenure as chief of the Air Corps. Shiner's "Birth
of the GHQ Air Force," Military Affairs 42 ( 1 978): 1 1 3-20, describes the avi ators'
struggle to win a centralJy controlled air-strike force during the interwar years and fo
cuses on Foulois's part in that effort. Shi ner's "The Air Corps, the Navy, and Coast
Defense, 1 9 1 9 - 1 94 1 ," Military Affairs 45 ( 1 98 1 ): 1 1 3-20, provides balanced coverage
of the struggle between the navy and the army air arm for control of the coast defense
mission, in which Foulois was a key participant.
John F Shiner
G E O R G E W. L E W I S
As the longtime director of research for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronau
tics, George W. Lewis made significant contributions to the history of aeronautics. His
achievements make the most sense when they are considered within the corporate setting
of the federal agency for which he worked. For this reason, an independent collection of
Lewis's papers does not exist and probably never should. Instead, the essence of Lewis
as an influential national leader in American aviation can be retrieved and analyzed by
sifting through the voluminous archival materials of the now defunct NACA.
Forays into these materials have become much easier in recent years, thanks to the
solid support provided by NASA's history program for the preparation of major books
concerning the history of the NACA, NASA's predecessor agency. The results include
Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1 9 1 5 -
1 958, 2 vols. ( Washington, 1985), which is primarily a NACA headquarters-cen tered
institutional study, as well as with studies of three of the NACA's laboratories or field
centers: Richard P. Hallion, On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1 946-1981
(Washington, 1984), Elizabeth A. Muenger, Searching the Horizon: A History of Ames
Research Center, 1940- 1 976 (Washington, 1985), and James R. Hansen, Engineer in
Charge: A His tory of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1 9 1 7 - 1958 ( Washington,
1987). All four books include lengthy bibliographical essays. For newcomers to NACA
history, Roland's bibliographical essay is definitely the place to start. Roland has also
produced a Guide to Research in NASA History, 7th ed. (Washington, 1984), which
contains much useful information about NACA records and their accessibility.
The only meaningful way to study George Lewis's contributions to American aeronau
tics is to penetrate the massive documentary record utilized and described i n the books
mentioned above. Most of this material is preserved either in Suitland, Maryland, at the
Washington National Records Center, or i n Hampton, Virginia (the site of the NACA's
oldest laboratory), at NASA Langley Research Center's Hi storical Arehives.
In the Langley archives is a small collection of documents relevant specifically to
George Lewis. The individual responsible for putting this collection together is former
NACA engineer Milton Ames, who served as chief of aerodynamics al NACA headquar
ters from 1949 to 1958 and who, in the 1 970s, began research for what he hoped ·would
be a comprehensive history of Langley laboratory. Although Ames failed Lo reach his
B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S 0
0 1 8 7
goal, he did pull together hundreds of significant documents, which he organized into
folders and deposited in seven oversize boxes. One of these folders is devoted to news
paper clippings, magazine articles, typescript speeches, photographs, and miscella
neous items specifically concerning Lewis. In this folder, for instance, is a copy of
Lewis's testimony before the Federal Aviation Commission (or Howell board) in 1934.
The folder also contains Lewis's notes on the trips he made to Europe in the late 1930s.
There is also information from oral interviews with members of the Lewis family from the
early 1970s concerning George Lewis's death in 1948 and the distribution of his ashes
over Langley Field. The contents of this folder are insubstantial in comparison to the
hundreds of memos and letters from Lewis that can be found by sifting carefully through
official NACA records, but they include certain items that anyone interested in research
ing Lewis's life story would not want to overlook. This folder can be found in the Langley
archives in box four of the Ames coHection.
In the shaping of my own understanding of George Lewis's character, and of his
plusses and minuses as a research manager, information from oral interviews played a
critical role. Of particula1· value was a series of interviews with former NACA employees
conducted i n the early 1970s by NASA public relations officer WalLer A. Bonney.
Bonney had come to work for the NACA in 195 1 , too late to meet George Lew is, but in
the ensuing years, while working for Lewis's successor, Dr. H ugh L. Dryden, he heard
innumerable stories about the former director of research. When in the 1970s Bonney
retired and turned to historical research about the NACA, the one thing that interested
him above all was comparing and contrasting Lewis and Dryden. As a result, in the
interviews there are some utterly fascinating conversations between Bonney and no fewer
than thirty NACA veterans about Lewis and Dryden, about their very different person
alities as men and research managers, and about what it took to lead the NACA before
and after the changes brought on by World War II. For anyone interested in historical
characterization of Lewis (or Dryden), the Bonney interviews are vital. Transcripts of
them can be found at the NASA Headquarters History Office in Washington, D. C . , and
at the Langley Historical Archives in Hampton, Virginia. However, there are agreements
between NASA and some of the interviewees controlling the access to and publication of
the transcripts.
Three of Lewis's six children are still living, and one of them, Leigh K. Lew is, himself
a NACA/NASA employee, 1·esides in Hampton, Virginia. The family members preserve
some of their father's photographs, news clippings, and other mementos, but there are
no private papers or diaries. As suggested earlier, Lewis gave his all to the NACA.
]ames R. Hansen
E D W A R D P E A R S O N W A R N E R
Unfortunately, there is no central collection of Warner papers. The New York Public
Library has a small assortment of conespondence and clippings. Also, the Warner family
has numerous folders of news and magazine clippings on aeronautical subjects that seem
to constitute Warner's reading and reference files, but there is little in the way of family
correspondence. Apparently, Warner left his official files with the NACA, MIT, the Post
Office, the Navy Department, Aviation magazine, CAA, CAB, and ICAO.
The most comprehensive and useful publication about Warner is the memorial article
1 8 8 •
prepared by his longtime friend, Theodore P. Wright, "Edward Person Warner: An Ap
preciation," Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society 62 (October 1 958): 3 1 -43. The
correspondence from Warner's friends and associates, used by Wright for his article, is
now part of the Theodore P. Wright Papers, John M. Olin Library, Cornell University,
Ithaca, New York. A briefer su mmary of Warner's career can be found in Roger E.
Bilstein, "Edward Pearson Warner," in John A . Garraty, ed. , Dictionary of A merican
Biography, Supplement Six, 1 956- 1 960 ( New York, 1980), p. 665.
William M. Leary, Aerial Pioneers: The U.S. Air Mail Service, 1 91 8 - 1 927 (Washing
ton, 1985), touches on WaTner's stint with the Post Office. Archibald D. Turnbull and
Cl ifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation (New Haven, 1949), is a good
account of the interwar years but says little about Warner. His important role in the
NACA has been noted in recent NASA histories by James R. Hansen, Engineer in
Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1 9 1 7 - 1 958 (Washington,
1987), and by Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aero
nautics, 1915- 1958, 2 vo]s. (Washington, 1985). John R. M . Wilson, Turbulence Aloft:
The Civil Aeronautics Administration Amid Wars and Rumors of War, 1 938 - 1 953, men
tions Warner's service with the CAA and CAB. The best analysis of the background and
evolution of the ICAO is still Henry Ladd Smith, Airways A broad: The Story of A merican
World War Routes ( M adison, 1950). Warner's contribution to the important Chicago con
ference of 1944 can be glimpsed i n Department of State, Proceedings of the International
Civil Aviation Conference, 2 vols. (Washington, 1949).
Roger E. Bilstein
H E R B E R T H O O V E R
The Herbert Hoover Papers housed in the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library in West
Branch, Iowa, are an invaluable source of i nformation about all facets of Hoover's career.
Although the holdings from his presidency contain relatively little material about avia
tion, his Commerce Papers include several valuable items on the subject. Especially
important are a series of speeches he delivered before business groups i n 1924 and
1925, in which he presented his ideas about government involvement in the development
of the fledgl ing industry. Although Hoover himself discusses aviation briefly in The
Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1 920 - 1 933 ( New York,
1952), his approach is more statistical than philosophical and adds little to our knowl
edge of the rationale behind his policies in this area. Crucial to any understanding of
Hoover's approach to government regulation is the work of Ellis Hawley. His seminal
article, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an 'Associative
State, ' 1 92 1 - 1 928," Journal of American History 6 1 ( 1974): 1 16-40, as well as "Three
Facets of Hooverian Associationalism: Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 192 ] - 1 930," in
Thomas McCraw, ed. , Regulation in Perspective (Cambridge, 1981 ), provides the frame
work for my interpretation of Hoover's aviation policies. Professor Hawley's thinking also
shaped my article, "Herbert Hoover and the Rise of Commercial Aviation, 1 921 - 1 926,"
Business History Review 58 ( 1 984): 78-102.
The roles of two important Hoover associates, Walter Brown and William Mac
Cracken, merit further attention from scholars. Unfortunately, the Walter Brown Papers
B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S •
• 1 8 9
in the Ohio Historical Society in Columbus, Ohio, contain relatively little of value. The
collection has virtually nothing about the actual awarding of the airmail contracts, al
though i t has some interesting documents prepared in connection with Brown's long fight
for vindication after he left office in 1933. The William P. MacCracken Papers, housed
in the Hoover Library, are rather thin in policy areas, but they can be supplemented by
Michael Osborn and Joseph Riggs, eds., "Mr. Mac": William P. MacCracken, }r., on
Aviation, Law, Optometry (Memphis, 1970), an oral history that contains some interest
ing details about his career, and by the William Van Dusen interview with MacCracken,
a transcript of which is available in the MacCracken Papers.
Besides the Hoover Papers, the other major sources of material on aviation policy
during the Hoover presidency, not surprisingly, are the records and the hearings of the
United States Senate Special Committee to Investigate Foreign and Domestic Ocean and
Air Mail Contracts ( Record Group 46, National Archives), popularly known as the Black
committee. The committee subpoenaed the records of several aviation firms as well as
those of numerous businessmen and officials of the Hoover administration. Collectively,
these documents provide considerable insight into the making of aviation policy from
both a public and a private perspective. The records include the text of the lengthy
report, prepared by Fulton Lewis, Jr. , which committee investigators used in planning
their work. The published Hearings (Washington, 1934) are lengthy and feature detailed
questioning of principal aviation figures in both business and government. The thinking
behind the actions advocated by Brown and MacCracken, for example, is most clearly
expressed in their testimony before the committee. The exchange between Walter Brown
and Hugo Black develops the major issues dividing the two men. The H ugo Black Papers
i n the Library of Congress, however, shed l ittle light on these hearings so i mportant to
the senator's career. Among the Black biographies, Virginia Van Der Veer Hamilton,
Hugo Black: The A labama Years ( Baton Rouge, 1972), offers the best account of the
Senate hearings.
While historians have produced a substantial body of literature on the history of rail
roads, the history of flight has attracted less attention from scholars. Nevertheless, the
work of three pioneering aviation writers provides important background on the aviation
policy advocated by Hoover and his associates. Henry Ladd Smith, A irways: The History
of Commercial Aviation in the United States ( New York, 1942), an early general study by
a jomnalist, remains a valuable starting point and provides considerable information on
the airmail controversy. Smith also emphasizes the role played by Walter Brown in shap
ing commercial aviation. Elsbeth S. Freudenthal, The Aviation Business from Kitty Hawk
to Wall Street (New York, 1940), is a thorough discussion of the economics of commercial
aviation in the 1920s and 1930s. Paul T. David, The Economics of Air Mail Transporta
tion (Washington, 1934), provides a complex and insightful examination of one of the
early instances of government involvement in civilian flying.
More recent scholars have developed the basic insights presented by these earlier
writers. R. E. G. Davies, Airlines of the United States Since 1 914 ( London, 1972), is an
excellent study of air transport companies and their evolving relationship with the gov
ernment. The best general assessment of government-industry relations i n the interwar
period is Nick A. Komons, Bonfires to Beacons: Federal and Civil Aviation Policy under
the Air Commerce Act, 1 926 - 1 938 (Washington, 1978). Komons devotes considerable
space to an examination of Hoover's role, to the development of the Air Commerce Act,
1 9 0 •
. B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S
and to the competing viewpoints expressed by Postmaster General Brown and Senator
Black. A more specific work, Donald Whitnah, Safer Skyways: Federal Control of Avia
tion, 1926 - 1 966 (Ames, 1966), focuses on safety regu lation, an important element of
Hoover's aviation policy.
I n addition to the material pertaining to the Black committee, several other govern
ment documents are also helpful to a study of commercial aviation in this period. The
Report of the President's Aircraft Board (Washington, 1925) and the Report of the House
Select Committee on Operations of the United States Air Services (Washington, 1925)
provide background to the Air Commerce Act of 1926. U.S. House, Committee on the
Post Office and Post Roads, A mending the Air Mail Act, Hearings, 7 l st Congress, 1st
session, 1930, includes testimony from Walter Brown in support of the Watres Act.
David D. Lee
•
C O N T R I B U T O R S
W M . J . A R M S T R O N G received his R t C H A R D P . H A L L I O N is deputy as

Ph. D. from Miami University in 1 973. He sistant to the commander for community
has been associated with both the army affairs, U . S. Air Force Aeronautical Sys
and navy history programs and has been tems Division, Wright-Patterson AFB,
historian at Naval Air Systems Command Ohio. After receiving his Ph. D. from the
since 1979. A contributor to Naval Avt:a U niversity of Maryland in 1975, he
tion News, Aerospace Historian, Founda served as curator of science and tech
tion Magazine, and Naval Aviation Guide, nology and curator of space science and
he is the coauthor (with Clarke Van Vleet) exploration at the National Air and Space
of UnitedStates NavalAviation 1910- 1 980 Museum. He subsequently held the posi
( 1982). tions of professor of history and adminis
tration and lecturer in aerospace engi
R o G E R E . B I L S T E I N obtained his doc
neering at the University of Maryland.
torate from Ohio State University in 1965,
Chief historian for the Air Force Flight
where he was named Mershon Fellow in
Test Center from 1 982 until 1 986, he was
National Security Policy Studies. Before
designated as director of the special staff
joining the University of Houston-Clear
office, Aeronautical Systems Division. I n
Lake in 1974 as a member of its charter
1987 - 1 988 he served as Harold Keith
faculty, he taught at the University of
Johnson visiting professor of military his
Wisconsin-Whitewater and the Univer
tory at the U . S. Army Mili tary History In
sity of Illinois-Urbana. He has held fac
stitute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
ulty fellowships at NASA's Marshall
The recipient of numerous writing awards,
Space Flight Center and Johnson Space
he has written eleven hooks, including
Center and was designated visiting
Supersonic Flight: Breaking the Sound
scholar in aerospace history at the Na
Barrier and Beyond ( 1972), Legacy of
tional Air and Space Museum. He has re
Flight: The Guggenheim Contribution to
ceived writing awards from the American
American Aviation ( 1 977), and Test Pilots:
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
The Frontiersmen of Flight ( 1 98 1 , revised
the National Space Club, and the Avia
1 988).
tion/Space Writers' Association. He was
named distinguished lecturer by the ] A M E S R . H A N S E N, who received his
American Institute of Aeronautics and doctorate from Ohio State University in
Astronautics for 1987 - 1 988. His books 1 98 1 , teaches the history of science and
include Stages of Saturn: A Technological technology at Auburn University. He
His tory of the Saturn Launch Vehicles spends his summers as historian-in
( 1 98 1 ), Flight Patterns: Trends of Aero residence at NASA Langley Research
nautical Development in the United States, Center in Hampton, Virginia. He has
1 9 1 8- 1 929 ( 1 983), and Flight in Amer served as the American Institute of Aero
ica: From the Wrights to the Astronauts nautics and Astronautics' distinguished
( 1984). lecturer and currently is a member of the
1 9 2 : C O N T R I B U T O R S
Research Advisory Board of the National stitute, the U . S. Air Force Historical Re
Air and Space Museum. He has received search Center, and the U . S . Air Force
the National Space Club's Dr. Robert H. Hi storical Foundation, as well as writing
Goddard essay award, the Air Force His awards from the American Institute of
torical Foundation' s excellence-in-writing Aeronautics and Astronautics and Aero
award, and the American Institute of space Historian. His publications include
Aeronautics and Astronautics' history The Dragon's Wings: The China National
manuscript award. He is the author of Aviation Corporation and the Development
Engineer in Charge: A History of the �� Commercial Aviation in China ( 1 976),
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and
1 9 1 7 - 1 958 ( 1 987) and coauthor (with CIA Covert Operations in Asia ( 1984), and
Fred E. Weick) of From the Ground Up: Aerial Pioneers: The U.S. Air Mail Ser
The A utobiography �� an Aeronautical En vice, 1 91 8 - 1 92 7 ( 1985).
gineer ( 1988).
D A V I o D . L E E, who received his Ph. D.
N I C K A . K O M O N S is the agency histo from Ohio State University in 1975, is
rian of the Federal Aviation Admi nistra professor of history and associate dean of
tion. He obtained his Ph. D. from George Potter College at Western Kentucky Uni
Washington University in 196 1 . He was a versity. The rec ipient of grants from the
research assistant on the Washington His National Endowment for the Humanities
tory Proj ect ( 1 955 - 1957), sponsored by and the Herbert Hoover Presidential Li
the Rockefel1er Foundation, and served brary Assoc iation, he is the author of
as a historian with the U.S. Air Force Of Tennessee in Turnwil: Politics in the Vol
fice of Aerospace Research ( 196 1 - 1966) unteer State, 1920 - 1 932 ( 1979) and Ser
before joining the Federal Aviation geant York: An A merican Hero ( 1985).
Administration in 1966. His works in
J o H N F. S H I N E R is an Air Force col
clude Science and the Air Force ( 1966),
onel and command pilot who holds a doc
The Cutting Air Crash: A Case Study in
torate in military history from Ohio State
Early Federal Aviation Policy ( 1 973),
University ( 1 975). He served as a mem
Bonfires to Beacons: Federal Civil Aviation
ber of the Air Force Academy history fac
Policy under the Air Commerce Act
ulty for eight years and in 1981 - 1982
( 1978), and The Third Man: A History of
was the acting department head. Since
the Airline Crew Complement Controversy
1983 he has been the deputy chief of the
( 1987).
Office of Air Force History. His articles
W I L L I A M M . L E A R Y, who obtained his on military aviation history have appeared
doctorate from Princeton University in in several journals. He was awarded the
1966, has been professor of history at the Moncado Prize by the American Military
University of Georgia since 1973. A Ful Institute for his 1978 article in Military
bright-Hays senior lecturer in Taiwan Affairs on the creation of the GHQ Air
(1974-1975) and in Thailand ( 1 979- Force. He is the author of Foulois and the
1 980), he has received research awards Army Air Corps ( 1985).
from the U . S . Army Military Hi story In-
•
I N D E X
Abbott, Ira H . , 1 1 1 Akron, 72

Actuaries Society of America, 28 Allen, James, 75
Administrative Procedures Act, 44 Allis-Chalmers, 94
Aero Club of America, 42, 1 29, 130 American Airlines, 1 20
Aerodynamic Theory: A General Review of American Airways, 137, 1 4 1 , 145-46
Progress ( D urand), 24-25 American Bar Association, 39, 40, 134
Aeromarine Airways, x, 2 1 American Council on Education, 28
Aeromarine Plane & Motor Company, 7 American Institute for Aeronautics and
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, 2 1 , Astronautics, 124
38, 130, 134, 141 American LaFrance Fire Engine Com-
Aeronautics Branch. See U.S. Depart pany, 94
ment of Commerce American Optometric Association, 58
Aeroplane Design Aerodynamics Ames, Joseph S. , 95
( Warner), 1 19 Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, 1 10
Aeroplane Design Performance Andrews, Frank M . , 85
(Warner), 1 19 Andrews Air Force Base, 92
Aerostatics ( Warner), 1 19 Arkansas, 6 1
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 52-53 Army-Navy Club, 100
Air Affairs, 124-25 Army Re-organization Act of 1920, ix-x,
Air Commerce Act of 1926, xi, 2 1 , 35, 77
43, 102, 1 16, 1 2 1 , 128, 1 30, 136, Arnold, Henry H . , 77
140 Association of Aero Technology, 27
Air Corps Act of 1926, 79, 87, 1 1 7 Auchincloss, Hugh, 57
Aircraft. See individual types Aviation Corporation (AVCO), 137, 140
Ai rcraft Development Corporation, 4 Aviation magazine, 1 1 8
Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory, 1 1 0
A ircraft Procurement Act of 1926, 7 1 Bacon, David, 100
Aircraft Production Board, 96 Baker, Newton D . , 85
Air Mail Act of 1925. See Kelly Act Baker board, 85
Air Mail Act of 1930. See Watres Act Balchen, Bernt, 26
Air Mail Act of 1934. See Black- Baldwin, Raymond, 1 14
McKellar Act Barnes, Julius, 141
Airmail episode of 1934, 83-84, 85, 88, Barnhard, George E . , 70
89, 90, 1 1 8 Bartlett, Harold T. , 64
Airplane Reliability Tour, 5-6, 1 0 Bell, Luther K . , 141
Air Safety Board, xii Bennett, Floyd, 26
Airships: Ford's interest in, 2; Guggen Berle, Adolph A., Jr., 1 25
heim support for, 23, 25; Moffett Bilstein, Roger E . , 136
and, 65, 72 Bingham, Hiram, 43, 1 35
1 9 4 : I N D E X
Bishop, William, 141 Christian Science Monitor, 1 1 5, 1 1 7, 1 19

Black, Hugo L. , 36, 53, 54, 55, 56, 146 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, xii, 1 2 1 ,
Black committee, 53-57, 59, 147 129, 147
Black-Mc Kellar Act, 58, 146 Civil Aeronautics Authority, xii, 28. 121
Boeing Civil Aeronautics Board, 121 -22, 123,
B-17, xi, 105 125
F2B, 72 Clark, Virginius E . , 28
F3B, 72 Clarke Thomson Research, 95, 98
F4B, 72 Clearly, Maurice, 129
028, 72 Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, 1 40
XB-15, 86 Coffin, Howard E . , 42, 130, 133
XB-17, 87, 105, 120, 247, 307 Collier Trophy, 47
Boeing Airplane Company, 15, 25, 86-87 Colonial Air Transport, 9
Bolling Field, 80, 92, 97 Committee on Elementary and Secondary
Borotra, Jean, 48 Education, 27-28
Boston, Charles A . , 40-41 Cone, Hutchinson I . , 20, 3 1
Boston Airport Corporation, 1 1 6 Consolidated
Bradley, Samuel S. , 1 30, 135 NY-2, 30
Brandeis, Louis D., 58 P2Y, 72
Brant, Gerald C . , 30 Consolidated Vu ltee Aircraft Corporation,
Bridgman, Percy William, 96 25
Brittin, L. H . , 55, 56, 57, 141 Coolidge, Calvin, 9, 1 1 , 22, 43, 68, 78
Brooks, Harry, 1 3 - 1 4 Cornell-Guggenheim Aviation Safety Cen-
Brown, Elizabeth, 1 1 7 ter, 33
Brown, Elmer E . , 22 Cornell University, 94, 1 1 3
Brown, Walter F., 49, 5 1 , 58, 128-29, Cosmos Club, 1 00
138-40, 141 -44, 145-46, 147 Council of National Defense, 96
Buhl J-4, 46 Crissy Field, 30
Burden, William A. M . , 124 Curtiss
Bureau of Aeronautics ( BuAer). See U.S. CS, 70, 72
Navy F5L, x
Bureau of Standards. See U.S. Depart F6C, 72
ment of Commerce F7C, 72
Bush, Vannevar, 1 1 0 F8C, 72
Byrd, Richard E . , 26 F9C, 72
F1 1C, 72
Cabot, Godfrey L. , 42 HS-2L, X
California, 1 1 7 JN-4, 97
California Institute of Technology, 23, OC, 72
24, 25 P-36, xi
Campsall, Frank, 10 P-40, xi
Caproni bomber, 20 Tanager, 3 1
Carter, Orrin N . , 40 TS, 72
Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, 1 1 0 Curtiss, Glenn, 20, 96, 129
Chambers, Washington I . , 61 Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Company, 16,
Chester, 61 3 1 , 32, 70
•
I N D E X : 1 9 5
Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Foun Earhart, Amelia, ix

dation, 20, 22 Eastern Air Lines, 120, 146
Daniel Guggenheim Chair of Aeronautics, Eastern Air Transport, 13 7
27 Edison, Thomas A . , 1 06
Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promo Ellington Field, 37
tion of Aeronautics: contributions Esper, Al, 15, 16
of, 18, 32-34, 102; foundation of,
22-23; supports· aeronautical edu Fagg, Fred D. , Jr. , 35
cation, 23-28; establishes Model Fairbanks-Grant Company, 94
Air Line, 28-30; supports aero Farley, James A . , 147
nautical research, 30-32 Fechet, James E . , 78, 79, 80, 81
Daniel Guggenheim I nternational Safe Federal Aviation Administration, 36
Aircraft Competition, 3 1 -32 Federal Aviation Commission, 1 18, 1 1 9
Daniel Guggenheim Medal, 28 Federal Register Act, 44
Davison, F. Trubee, 20, 80 Flight Safety Foundation, 121
Dayton-Wright Company, 7 Fokker
DeHavilland DH-4, x, 1 D-VIII, i x
Dern, George H . , 85, 90, 91 F. Vlla-3m, 6, 7-8, 29
Detroit Aviation Society, 5, 1 1 F-10, 29
Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fur Luftfahrt Ford
( DVL), 109, 1 10 Flivver, 6, 1 3 - 1 4
Dickson Manufacturing Company, 94 Trimotor, ix, 5- 1 1 , 14
Diehl, Walter S . , 1 00 XB-906, 14- 1 5
Dixie Clipper, 122 14-AT, 15- 16
Doolittle, James H . , 30- 3 1 , 1 1 5 Ford, Edsel, 3, 5, 6, 9, 1 1 , 14, 15, 16
Dornier, Claude, 2, 48 Ford, Henry: contributions of, xii; early
Dornier D.O.X. , 48 interest i n aviation, 1 - 2 ; and Wil
Douglas liam Stout, 2-7, 1 1 ; builds airport
C-54, 120 at Detroit, 4; attempts to build
DC- 1 , 24 small airplane, 6, 13- 14; relations
DC-3, xi, 24, 105 with Edsel Ford, 1 1 ; seeks military
DC-4, 120 market for aircraft, 1 4 - 1 5 ; shuts
DC-4E, 120, 1 2 1 down Aircraft Department, 16;
DC-6, 120 fails to learn from experience, 1 7
DC-7, 120 Ford air freight service, 4
DT, 72 Ford Airport, 4, 5
M-2, 29 Fort Sam Houston, 75
0-38F, 92 Foulois, Benjamin D . : significance of,
PD, 72 xii, 92; background, 74-75; sup
P2D, 72 ports an independent air force,
Douglas Aircraft Company, xi, 15, 120 75-77, 79, 8 1 ; serves as military
Drum, Hugh A . , 82, 89 attache in Germany, 77; commands
Drum board, 82 9th Observation Group, 78; serves
Dryden, Hugh L. , 28, 1 1 1 , 123 as assistant chief of Air Corps,
Dunn, Ray A . , 28 79-80; organizes GHQ Air Force,
Durand, William F. , 24, 27 81 -83, 84, 85-86; and airmail
1 9 6 : I N D E X
Foulois, Benjamin D. ( continued) Guggenheim, Jeanette, 19

episode of 1934, 83-84, 88, 90; Guggenheim, Meyer, 18- 19
supports bomber development, 86- Guggenheim, Meyer Robert, 19, 20
87; and aircraft procurement con Guggenheim, Murry, 19
troversy, 87-91; retires, 91 -92 Guggenheim, Robert, 1 9
Foulois, Henry, 74 Guggenheim, Rose, 19
Foulois, Sarah, 74 Guggenheim, Simon, 18- 19
Guggenheim, Solomon, 19
GALCIT. See Guggenheim Aeronautical Guggenheim, William, 19
Laboratory Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory
Gallaudet Aircraft Corporation, 100 (GALCIT), 24
Gann, Ernest K . , 9 Guggenheim Airship Institute, 23, 25
Gates, Artemus L , 20 Guggenheim Brothers, 19
General Headquarters Air Force (GHQ Guggenheim fund. See Daniel Guggen
Air Force), 81 -83, 84, 85-86, 92 heim Fund for the Promotion of
Georgia Institute of Technology, 23, 25 Aeronautics
Gillmore, William E . , 28
Givvin, Gilbert, 55, 56 Hall, E. J . , 1 1
Glenn L. Martin Company, 7 Hall PH, 72
Glover, Warren Irving, 140 Halliburton, Erle, 146
Goddard, Robert H . , 28, 33 Handley Page Gugnunc, 31
Goering, Hermann, 77 Hanshue, Harris M . , 29, 55, 56
Goin, George, 1 2 Harding, Warren G., ix, xi, 41 -42, 63,
Gore, Thomas Pryor, 53 127, 133, 138
Goss, Edward W. , 88 Harriman, W. Averill, 137
Gould, Jay, 19 Harriman Commission, 122
Griffith, Leigh M . , 101 Harvard University, 27, 96, 1 1 4
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corpora- Hawley, Ellis, 146, 147
tion, xi, 1 1 5 Hegenberger, Albert F. , ix
Grumman-General Motors TBM, 2 1 Heinkel aircraft factory, 1 1 0
Guggenheim, Benjamin, 19 Helio Courier, 32
Guggenheim, Cora, 19 Helio Stallion, 32
Guggenheim, Daniel and Harry: contribu Henderson, Paul, 5, 39, 43, 50, 140,
tions to aeronautics, xii, 18, 141, 142
32-34; background of, 18-2 1 ; Hickam, Horace M . , 79
found Daniel Guggenheim Fund for Hicks, Harold, 7, 9, 10, 1 1 - 1 2 , 13, 14,
the Promotion of Aeronautics, 15, 16
22-23; support aeronautical edu Hill, Joseph Lister, 88
cation, 23-28; establish Model Hindenberg, 25, 109
Air Line, 28-30; support aeronau Hinshaw, Hainer, 141, 142
tical research, 30-32; q uoted Hogan, Frank J . , 54, 55, 56, 57
( Hany), 136 Hoover, Herbert C . : promotes commercial
Guggenheim, Florence Schloss, 19, 20 aviation, xi, 22-23, 39, 127-28,
Guggenheim, Gladys Eleanor, 19 130-31, 147; works for federal reg
Guggenheim, Helen Rosenberg, 20 ulation of aviation, 38, 1 3 1 -36;
Guggenheim, Isaac, 19 •
and MacCracken, 43-44, 46, 47 ,
•
I N D E X : 1 9 7
5 1 - 52; and Foulois, 80, 8 1 ; Kilbourne, Charles E . , 86, 89

praises Thomas Edison, 106; his Kirsten, Frederick K . , 25
plans for economic regulation of Klemin, A lexander, 2 1 , 25, 3 1
airline industry, 128-29, 137-47; Knight, Montgomery, 25
urges aviation industry to organize, Kollsman, Paul, 30-31
129-30 Komons, Nick A . , 1 1 9
Hoover, Lou Henry, 51 Koppen, Otto C . , 10, 13, 32
H uerta, Victoriano, 61 Koppen-Bollinger Helioplane, 32
H unsaker, Jerome C . , 99, 106, 1 10, Kurt, F. T. , 1 1 5
1 1 1 , 1 1 5, 1 1 8, 124
Lacoste, Rene, 48
Ide, John Jay, 109 Lamb, William, 1 34
Imperial Airways, 3 1 Lamont, Robert P. , 47, 48
Ingalls, David, 20 Lampert, Florian, 42
Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, 124 Lampert committee, 43, 68, 70
International Civil Aviation Organization Land, Emory S. , 100
(ICAO), 1 24, 125-26 Langley, 65, 72, 1 1 8
International Convention on Civil Avia Langley Memorial Aeronautical Labora
tion, 125-26 tory, 26, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100,
Interstate Commerce Commission, 141 1 0 1 , 102, 103, 104, 1 05, 1 06,
107-08, 109, 1 10, 1 12, 1 14
J. A. Grant & Company, 1 1 Lawson, Alfred W. , 2 1
James, George W., 1 13 Lea, C larence, 1 19
James Jackson Cabot Lectures, 1 19 Lederer, Jerome, 1 2 1
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 24 Lee, Frederick P., 41, 52, 54, 56
Johns Hopkins University, 95 Lee, Ivy, 22
Johnson, Clarence L. ( "Kelly" ), 25 Lee, John G . , 7, 16
Johnson, S. Paul, 106 Lehman Brothers, 137
Johnson, W. A . , 64 Lend-Lease agreement, 122
Johnson board, 64 Lent, Leon B . , 2
Joint Congressional Committee on Reor Letson, N . A . , 145
ganization of the Executive Depart Lewis, Dolly Myrtle Harvey, 94
ments, 138 Lewis, Edith Sweetland, 94
Jones, Wesley, 136 Lewis, George W. : significance, xii,
]osephine Ford, 26 93-94, 1 1 1 ; background, 94-95;
Journal of Air Law, 27 joins the NACA, 95-98; directs
Junkers, Hugo, 2 research at Langley, 98- 100,
Junkers F 13, 2
. 104-06, 108-09; recruits re
Jurney, Chesley W., 57 search staff, 1 00-02; and public
Jurney, Mrs. Chesley W. , 57 relations, 107-08; visits Europe,
109-10; and expansion of NACA
Karcher, Harry, 1 4 facilities, 1 10- 1 1 ; resigns, 1 1 1 ;
Kelly, M. Clyde, 50, 142 death of, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2
Kelly Act, 5, 2 1 , 42, 49, 50, 135 Lewis, Nellie Rebecca, 37, 47-48, 55
Keynes, John Maynard, 20 Lewis, Sim, 37, 57
Keys, Clement M . , 70, 141 , 142 Lewis, William Henry, 94
1 9 8 : I N D E X
Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, 1 1 1 Madden, Martin B . , 44

Lewis Research Center, 1 1 1 Maitland, Lester J., ix
Lexington, xi, 7 1 , 72, 1 1 8 Malina, Frank, 24
Liberty engine, 1 , 3 Manning, Leroy, 1 4
Library of Congress, 27 Manufacturers Aircraft Association
LieboJd, E. G . , 1 5 (MAA), 1 29, 1 30
Lindbergh, Charles A . , ix, xii, 1 , ] 0, 1 3, Martin
26, 32, 33, 45. 48, 5 1 , 102, 1 36 BM, 72
Li ndbergh "Boom," 1 37 , 1 38 MO, 72
Lockheed Ai rcraft Company, 25 PM, 72
Lockheed P-38, xi SC, 70
Loening OL, 72 T3M, 72
Luce, Henry, 57 T4M, 72
Ludington Line, 53 Martin Aircraft Company, 70
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 7,
M. Guggenheim's Sons, 1 9 9, 22, 23, 25, 26, 30, 96, 99,
MacArthur, Douglas A . , 82, 83, 86 1 0 1 , 1 1 4 - 1 5, 1 1 7
McCarl, John R . , 1 42, 145 Mayo, R. H . , 3 1
McCarran, Pat . , 1 1 9 Mayo, William B . , 3, 4-5, 1 1 , 1 5, 1 6
McCarroll, R. H . , 10 Merritt, Schuyler, 43
MacCracken, Lewis, 47-48, 56 Messenger, 1 3
MacCracken, Sallie Lucile Lewis, 37, 47, Michelson, A . A . , 23
48, 5 1 -52, 55, 58 Millikan, Robert A. , 24
MacCracken, William P. , Jr. : signifi Mingos, Howard, 1
cance of, xii, 35-36: background, Mississippi, 6 1
36-37; and aviation law, 39-4 1 ; Mitchel Field, 30, 78, 79
and Air Commerce Act of 1 926, Mitchell, Louis, 27
42-43, 1 34, 1 35; as assistant sec Mitchell, William ("Billy"): talent for
retary of commerce for aeronautics, publicity, xii; argues for an inde
44-47, 136; visits Europe, 47- pendent air force, 4 1 -42, 60, 62,
48; lobbies for airmail legislation, 64, 79; court-martialed, 43, 1 1 7;
49- 5 1 ; and New Deal, 52-53; attacks navy, 67-68; background,
troubles with Black committee, 74, 75
53-58; final years, 58-59; and Model Air Line, 28-29, 30
Watres Act, 1 40, 1 43, 1 44, 145; Moffett, Elizabeth Simonton, 60
personal finances, 1 58n32 Moffett, George Hall, 60
MacCracken, WiJliam P. , Sr. , 36, 37, Moffett, William A . : significance, xii,
46, 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, 57 - 58 72- 73; background, 60- 6 1 ; di
MacCracken & Lee, 55 rects naval aviation, 60-6 1 ; inte
McDonnell, James, 1 1 5 grates aeronautics into naval ser
McGraw-Hill Publications, 1 18 vice, 63-65; opposes national air
Mackay Trophy, 80 service, 65-68; problems with air
Macon, 72 craft manufactUI·ers, 68- 7 1 ; sup
Macready, John A . , ix ports improvements in naval avia
McSwain, John J . , 8 1 , 82, 85, 87, tion, 7 1 -72; and George Lewis,
88-89 1 00; and Edward Warner, 1 1 7
•
I N D E X :
•
1 9 9
Montgomery, Hart & Smith, 37 Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Com

Morgan, Leon, 4.5 pany, 29
Morrow, Dwight W. , 23, 43, 78, 1 16 Pan American Airways, xi, 16, 5 1 , 120,
Morrow board, 43, 64, 68, 7 1 , 78-79, 125
1 16- 1 7 Parker, James S. , 43, 135
Munk, Max M . , 103, 104, 105 Patrick, Mason M . , 76, 79
Murphy, Joan, 53, 55-56 Peek, George, 52
Mustin, Henry C . , 62 Pembroke College, 20
Pensacola, 61
National Advisory Committee for Aero Philadelphia Navy Yard, 69
nautics ( NACA): on U . S. Air Mail Pogue, L. Welch, 122-23, 125
Service, x - xi; develops stream Potter, Joan, 1 1 8
lined cowling, 6-7; directs aeronau Prandtl, Ludwig, 28
tical research, 21 -22, 94, 97- 1 0 1 , President's Aircraft Board. See Morrow
103- 1 1 , 120; research reports by, board
24, 1 1 5, 1 69n l 7 ; mentioned, 25, Public Works Administration, 53, 109
26, 28, 134; on Guggenheim fund, Putnam, Herbert, 27
32; organization of, 95-97, 1 0 1 -
02; Warner and, 1 14, 123 Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chi-
National Aeronautical Association, 42, cago B. & Q. R. Co., 41
43, 59, 80, 130 Ranger, xi
National Aeronautics and Space Adminis Raymond, Arthur, 1 1 5, 120
u·ation ( NASA), 1 1 1 Reid, Henry ]. E . , 1 0 1 , 106
National A ircraft Underwriters Associ- Rentschler, Frederick B . , 1 4 1 , 142
ation, 134 Rich Field, 37
National Air Transport, 137 Roc kefeller, John D. , 19, 36
National Education Association, 28 Rogers, William N . , 87-88, 89, 90, 91
National lndustrial Recovery Act, 144, 147 Roosevelt, Franklin D . , 52, 53, 58, 8 1 ,
National Physical Laboratory, 103 83, 84, 1 1 8, 146
National Recovery Administration, 146 Roosevelt, James, 53
Naval Ai rcraft Factory PT, 72 Roosevelt, Theodore, 138
Nehenta Bay, 2 1 Rossby, Carl Gustaf, 25, 29
New York, Rio, and Buenos Aires Line Royal Aeronautical Society, 27, 47, 124
(NYRBA), 5 1 Ruth, George Herman ("Babe"), 78
New York University, 2 1 , 22, 24, 25,
27-28 Saratoga, xi, 7 1 , 72, 1 1 8
North American Aviation, I nc . , 25, 137, Schroeder, R. W. , 9
140, 1 4 1 Schulz, Carl, 1 3
Northwest Airlines, 55, 1 4 1 Seattle Aero Club, 20
Northwest Airways, 145, 146 Seversky P-35, xi
Northwestern Air Law Institute, 27 Shenandoah, 42, 64, 67
Northwestern University, 27 Shoemaker, William R . , 64
N01ton, Frederick H . , 100-01 Smith, Cyrus, R . , 1
Norwich University, 58, 1 1 9 Smith, Henry Ladd, 140-41, 147
Smith, Richard K. , 73
Ogburn, William F. , 124 Smithsonian Institution, 59
2 0 0 : I N D E X
Society of Automotive Engineers, 1 2 1 , United Avigation, 145

123-24, 134 U.S. Air Force Combat Command, 85
Sopwith Camel, ix U.S. Air Mail Service, x-xi, 2, 4, 5, 2 1 ,
Sorenson, Charles E . , 16 38, 39, 42, 47, 1 1 6
Southwest Air Fast Express, 146 United States Airways, 1 45
Spad, ix U.S. Army, i x - x, xii, 30, 4 1 , 70, 1 1 0
Sperry, Elmer A . , 13 U.S. Army Air Corps, xi, 14, 28, 30, 79,
Sperry, Elmer A . , Jr. , 30-31 80, 81, 82, 83-84, 85, 86, 87,
Sperry, Lawrence B. , 13 88, 89, 90, 9 1 , 92, 1 1 7, 1 18; En
Spirit of St. Louis, 26 gineering Branch, 22, 28; Tactical
Stack, John, 25 School, 86
Stanford University, 23, 24, 25, 96 U.S. Army Air Service, x, 37, 66,
Stevenson, Adlai E . , 57 75-76, 78, 100-01 , 1 1 7
Stevenson, Mrs. Adlai E . , 57 U . S . Army Command and General Staff
Stone, Harlan F. , 5 1 School, 78
Stone, Mrs. Harlan F. , 5 1 U . S. Army Infantry and Cavalry School,
Stout 75
Aerial Sedan, 3 U.S. Department of Commerce, 39, 44,
ST, 2 46, 49, 57, 1 1 7, 128, 130, 133,
2-AT, 3-4, 5-6 135, 1 36, 138, 1 40, 141, 147;
3-AT, 6-7 Aeronautics Branch, 26, 28, 30,
Stout, William B . , 2-7, 1 1 , 45, l 50n13 44-4 7, 48, 52, 1 2 1 ; Bureau of
Stout Metal Airplane Company, 2-5 Standards, 30, 95, 1 1 1 , 136; Bu
Stranahan, R. A . , 4-5 reau of Lighthouses, 136
Stump, Felix B . , 1 15 U.S. Marine Corps, 6 1 , 63, 64, 72
Sullivan, Mark, 5 1 U . S. Military Academy, 74
Swathmore College, 94, 95 U.S. Naval Academy, 60
Syracuse University, 27 U.S. Naval Ai rcraft Factory, 69
U . S. Naval Training Center, 61
Tarbell, Ida, 19 U.S. Navy, ix-x, xi, xii, 2, 20-2 1 , 29,
Taylor, Hollinshead N . , 43 37, 42-43, 60, 6 1 , 62, 63, 64,
Technische Hochschule, 24 65, 66, 67 68, 69 70, 7 1 72,
' ' '
Towle, Tom, 7 73, 104, 1 10, 1 1 7- 1 8; Bureau of
Transcontinental Air Transport, 48, Aeronautics, 22, 60, 6 1 , 62, 63,
50- 5 1 , 137 145 64, 65, 67, 7 1 , 72, 100; Bureau of
'
Transcontinental and Western Air, 120, Steam Engineering, 6 1 , 63; Bu
145 reau of Navigation, 6 1 , 63, 64;
Trans World Airlines, 125 Bureau of Construction and Re
Trippe, Juan T. , 5 1 pair, 61 -62, 63; Bureau of Ord
Truman, Harry S . , 1 19 nance, 63; Bureau of Yards and
Tydings, Millard, 57 Docks, 63
U.S. Post Office, x, l , 4, 5, 13, 38, 42,
Udet, Ernst, 77 83, 90, 137, 1 38, 1 43, 146
United Aircraft and Transport, 137, 140, U.S. War Department, 43, 96; General
141 Staff, 76, 77, 79, 8 1 , 82-83, 85,
United Air Lines, 120, 1 37 , 144 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92
I N D E X : 2 0 1
•
U . S. Weather Bureau, 30 Warner, Sandra, 1 18

University of Akron, 23, 25 Washington Disarmament Conference of
University of Ch icago, 36, 124 192 1 -22, 1 1 8
University of Gottingen, 1 1 0 Washington Navy Yard, 61
University of Michigan, 1 1 , 22, 23, 25, Watres, Laurence H . , 142
99 Watres Act, 49- 50, 142-43, 1 45, 146
University of Washington, 23, 25 Wedell-Williams Air Service Corporation,
Uppercu, Inglis M . , 21 146
Urey, Harold C . , 124 Western Air Express, 29, 5 1 , 55, 1 4 1 ,
145
Vassar College, 1 1 8 West Point. See U.S. Military Academy
Victory, John F. , 98, 101, 1 07, 1 08, White, Thomas D. , 92
l69n24 Whitnah, Donald R . , 30
Vidal, Eugene L. , 53 Wigmore, John H . , 27
Villa, Pancho, 75 Wilbur Wright Memorial Lecture, 47
Volkmann School, 1 1 4, 1 1 5 Willebrandt, Mabel Walker, 140
von Karman, Theodore, 24 Williams, Alford J . , ix
Vought Wilson, Woodrow, 61
02U, 72 Wind tunnels: and Ford trimotor, 9, 14;
03U, 72 and Guggenheim fund, 23, 25; at
uo, 72 the NACA, 100, 103-05, 108-09;
VE-9, 72 at MIT, 1 1 5; described, 168n15
Vought, C hance M . , 39 Winslow, Samuel E . , 4 1 , 134-35
Vought Corporation, 25 Withers, John W. , 27
Wright, Orville, 23, 28, 46-4 7
Wadsworth, Earl B., 1 4 1 Wright, Quincy, 124
Wadsworth, James W. , Jr. , 41, 1 33-34, Wright, Theodore P., 1 14, 1 1 8- 19, 126
135, 136 Wright brothers, 75, 98, 103, 129
Walker, R. T., 1 1 Wright Brothers Medal, 123-24
Walterman, Thomas Worth, xi, 1 Wright Brothers Memorial Trophy, 59
Warner, Anne Pearson, 1 1 3 Wright Flyer, 58-59
Warner, Barry, 1 18 Wright-Martin Company, 96
Warner, Edward Pearson: significance of,
xii, 1 1 3; background, 1 1 3- 14; at Yale U niversity, 7, 20
M IT, 1 1 4 - 1 5; as aviation expert, Yerkes, Charles Tyson, 36
1 15 - 1 7 ; serves as navy's first as Yorktown, xi
sistant secretary for aeronautics, Young, Clarence M . , 28, 48-49, 52, 53,
1 1 7 - 18; as editor and author, 136
1 18- 19; as consulting engineer for
United Air Lines, 1 19-2 1 ; serves Zahn, Albert F. , 27
with CAA and CAB, 1 2 1 -23; con
tributions to technical societies,
123-24·; and ICAO, 124-26;
mathematical skills of, 1 7 1 n4
Warner, Nathaniel, 1 1 3, 126
Warner, Robert Lyon, 1 1 3
'
..
.
•
Professor of history at the University of Georgia,
William Leary is a noted aviation historian
whose books include Perilous Missions: Civil
Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in
Asia and Aerial Pioneers: The U.S. Air Mail
Service, 1918- 1927.
Illustration:
James H. Doolittle in front of a Vought 02U-1 during the
Guggenheim-sponsored blind-flying experiments of 1929.
National Air and Space Museum
·;.;:<
:
e; c..•
� � .. �--- -
ISBN 0-87745-242-3 I

Aviation's Golden Age - Portraits From The 1920s and 1930s (Gnv64)

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Edited by William M.

The years between the two world wars were a

The essays in this volume, all written by leading

In addition, John Shiner and Wm. Armstrong

PORTRAITS FROM THE

19205 AND 19305

University of Iowa Press Iowa City

Copyright© 1989 by the University of Iowa

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

First edition. 1989

Design by Richard Hendel

Typesetting by G & S Typesetters, Austin, Texas

Printing and binding by Thomson-Shore,

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized

in any form or by any means,

electronic or mechanical, including photocopying

and recording, without permission in

writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Aviation's golden age: portraits from the 1920s and 1930s/

edited by William M. Leary.-1st ed.

l. Aeronautics-United States-Biography. 2. Aeronautics-United States-History.

I. Leary, William M. (William Matthew), l934-

TL539.A95 1989 89-4753

Pan American Airways, retired

A fine pilot and a good friend

Henry Ford and Aeronautics during the 1920s : 1

Daniel and Harry Guggenheim and the Philanthropy of Flight : 18

W i lliam P. MacCracken, Jr. , and the Regulation of Civil Aviation : 35

William A . Moffett and the Development of Naval Aviation : 60

Benjamin Foulois and the Fight for an Independent Air Force : 74

George W. Lewis and the Management of Aeronautical Research : 93

Edward Pearson Warner and the New Air Age : 1 13

Herbert Hoover and the Golden Age of Aviation : 1 2 7

the practical value of air transportation and the advancement of aeronautics

Government regulation of aviation came of age in 1938 with passage of

Stout's first opportunity to experiment with lightweight, high-strength dur­

Stockholders (investment $ 1 85,000) $ 3 7 1 , 000

In addition, Mayo recommended that Stout be retained as a consultant at

airplanes in everyday reliability for practical use in commerce." The Ford

Wright 1908 Gottingen 387 1919

R.A.F. 6 1912 M-6 1926

R.A.F. 15 1915 R.A.F. 34 1926

N.A.C.A. 23012 1935

Gottingen 398 1919 N.A.C.A. 23021 1935

- --- ---· --- ·

N.A.C.A. 66 1-212 1940

-+-- --- --- ---·

N.A.C.A. 747 A315 1944

Historical evolution of airfoil sections, 1908-1935.

Production of trimotors reached a peak in 1929, when eighty-six large trans­

hungry, Dearborn police were shooting protesting unemployed workers, and

There were lessons to be learned from Ford's venture into aeronautics

Daniel retired from business i n 1923 to Hempstead House, his mansion on

the Western Pacific during which he flew as a combat observer in Grum­

began asking prominent American scientists, financiers, and aviation per­

As soon as the Guggenheims announced the creation of the fund, inter­

famed Douglas DC-1 and DC-3 transports . 16

eral Review of Progress, became the standard aeronautical engineering ref­

New York U n iversity, the original Guggenheim school, devoted much of

the U n ited States were Guggenheim-school graduates; N ACA's Langley

University's School of Education. The committee compiled an annotated

Stout's first opportunity to experiment with lightweight, high-strength dur

Production of trimotors reached a peak in 1929, when eighty-six large trans

the Western Pacific during which he flew as a combat observer in Grum

began asking prominent American scientists, financiers, and aviation per

As soon as the Guggenheims announced the creation of the fund, inter

eral Review of Progress, became the standard aeronautical engineering ref

had powerful allies. Martin Madden, chairman of the House Appropria

Before Griffith's appointment as the engineer-in-charge, i t had been nec

of his research management philosophy; he emphasized teamwork over in

sion of engineering. During this segment of his career, he served as con

ferred to analytical data coming fro m Ed Warner's typewriter as "de

national Convention on C i v i l Aviation, one of the most significant agree

transportation as a model, Hoover also believed the government should pro