Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Association of American Geographers

The Functional Approach in Political Geography
Author(s): Richard Hartshorne

Source: Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 1950), pp.
95-130
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THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY *
RICHARD HARTSHORNE
TI SHE subjectof thispaperand thatof PresidentRussell'saddressof last

Universityof Wisconsin
year reveal in strikingfashionthe wide scope of the fieldin whichgeogra-

phers work. Comparisonof the treatmentin the two papers will, I hope,
demonstrate the justificationforassumingthatthe same body of readersmay find
commoninterestin the two extremes. This is possible in all our work only if
each of us, in developingour special area of interest,will followRussell's example
in strivingto maintainits geographicquality.'
We can do this if we keep in the forefront of our thinking,that the core of
geographyis "the studyof places,"2that is, the analysis of the significant differ-
ences that distinguishthe various areas of the world fromeach other. Among
the differences one of the more
that are significantto this areal differentiation,
obviousare differences in landforms;one of the least obviousto the eye,but none-
theless importantin moldingthe characterof areas, are the differences in their
politicalorganization. In pursuingthese and otherseparate topics, geographers
"radiate out in diversedirections""and forvarious distances,towardthe cores of
otherdisciplines." As long as theyremain"ever consciousof wheretheyare" in
referenceto.the centralcore, theymay hope to understandeach other'spurposes.
"Questions of boundariesalways seem pedanticin comparisonwithquestionscon-
cerningthe cores of disciplines."
SURVEY OF PROGRESS
From this commonviewpoint,let us cast a criticaleye over the progressof

politicalgeographyin thetwentyyearssinceit was describedas "the waywardchild
in which"method
of the geographicfamily"-the fieldthat was "least scientific,"
* PresidentialaddressdeliveredbeforetheAssociationat its Forty-sixth AnnualMeetingin
Worcester,Mass.,April7, 1950.
1 RichardJoelRussell,"GeographicalGeomorphology,"Annals of theAssociationof Ameri-
can Geographers, XXXIX (1949): 1-11; Presidentialaddressof the 1948 meetingsdelivered
underthe title"Towards a More GeographicalGeomorphology."My title,in presenting the
presentpaperat theApril1950meetings imitation:"Towardsa More Geogra-
was an intentional
phicalPoliticalGeography."
2 As a demonstration of thesimilarityofviewpoints,thephrasesin thisparagraphin quota-
tionmarksare takenalternately fromRussell'saddress,op. cit.,p. 11, and frommyown article
on "On the Mores of Methodological Discussionin AmericanGeography," Annals of the As-
sociationof AmericanGeographers, XXXVIII (1948): 122. The firstphrase,quotedfrom
Russell,geography as "thestudyof places,"stemsfromVidal de la Blache and no doubtfrom
manywriterscenturies beforehim. Anyconcerned withmorefulldiscussionof thefunction of
geography are referredto myNatureof Geography, publishedbythisassociation,1939,1949par-
ticularlyto ChaptersII, IV, and VIII.
96 RICHARD HARTSHORNE JUNE
and materialare freeto the choice of the student,"and whose relationshipto the
fieldas a whole was difficult to determine. I wish that we could justifya very
differentdescription;that we could claim to have developed a sound structural
evolutionof political geography,clearly integratedinto geographyas a whole,
withestablishedmethodsof scientific analysis.4
It would be easy to pointto manyoutwardsigns of success. The threatthat
politicalgeographywould be driven off the reservationhas subsided. Whereas
formerly but one or two departmentsof geographygave courses underthis name,
today politicalgeographyis foundin manycollege curricula.
One cannotbut be amazed by the temerityof Americangeographerswho feel
ready to teach this subject withoutprevious training,with but a minimumof
studyof the literatureof the field,and with the barestamountof materialsavail-
able to put in the hands of students.
True, we have more such materialsthan we had twentyyears ago. Whereas
then we had hardlymore than a single volume in the English language entitled
politicalgeography,todaythereare manyand more are promised. Unf6rtunately
these are mostlytextbooks. Better textbooksare essential for betterteaching,
but thepublicationof moretextbookscan do littleto give standingto a fieldunless
we can produce a reallygood text. To seek that resultby simplywritingmore
and bettertexts is an attemptto pull ourselvesup by our bootstraps. A really
good textbookcan be producedonly fromthe digest of sound scholarlystudies.
Whetherto providethebasis fora firstclass text,or to establishscholarlystanding
for the field of political geography,our need is for an organized structureof
scholarlyknowledge-one in whichstudentscan build upon what has been written
before.
I do not wish to belittlethe scholarlywork that has been accomplishedin this
field. In one or two directions,I thinkwe mightclaim to have laid down a few
fundamentalconceptsand principles,to have establisheda few technicalterms.
Perhaps "established"is too stronga word,since some textbookswriterscontinue
to confusestudentswithterms,such as "naturalboundaries,"althoughlong since
discreditedby scholarsin the field.
In an effortto appraise our situation,a graduateseminarjoined me a year ago
in an examinationof a wide rangeof studiesin politicalgeography. We soughtto
determinewhatmethodsgeographersuse and whatmaterialstheyemployin studies
in thisfield. We foundthegreatestvarietyof methods,and theuse of almostevery
kind of materialconceivable. We foundno indicationof commonpurpose or ob-
jective. In fact,in most cases we could not findthat the authorshad any clear
purpose or objectivein mind,otherthan the rathergeneral idea that geography
3 Carl Sauer,"RecentDevelopments in CulturalGeography," in RecentDevelopments in the
Social Sciences,E. D. Hayes, editor,Philadelphia,1927,p. 207.
4On the statusof politicalgeographyfifteen years ago, with extensivebibliography, see
RichardHartshorne, "RecentDevelopments in PoliticalGeography," AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,XXIX (1935): 785-804,943-966.
1950 FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 97
somehowhas a lot to do with internationalaffairs,and the politicalgeographer

should endeavorto findall the ways in whichthat was the case. I do not think
you could finda comparablesituationin otherbranchesof geography. If you take
a halfdozen studiesin economicgeographyyou will no doubtfinddifferent systems
in the same text. It has been a long timesince one could accuse economicgeog-
raphyof beingnothingmore than a collectionof geographicaspects of economics.
In that fieldwe have developed specificobjectivesand methods,and have even.
arrivedat some degreeof agreementas to the materialsto be studied.
What are the writersin politicalgeographytryingto do? Using the device
of the census,let me throwtogetherinto several groupsthe worksof a large num-
ber of students,in ordernot to revealthe operationsof any specificauthor.5
In one of these groups,we findthat each state is studiedin termsof a series
of "aspects"-physical, human,and economic-with subheads like landforms,cli-
mate . . . agriculture,industry,cities,etc. In this treatment,differing littlefrom
that of a conventionalgeographicstudy,politicalflavoringis added by a section
on historicalaspectsand a discussionof boundariesand conflictswithotherstates.
The thoughtbehindthis appears to be simplythat in orderto studythe state,
one mustknowa lot about its geography. We may all agree to that,but to supply
a collectionof information, some of which may be pertinent,some not, is not a
techniqueofanalysisand will notbuilda fieldofpoliticalgeography.
More distinctiveis what I may termthe "historical"approach. This at least
startswitha definiteproblem-namelyto explain how a state has come to occupy
the particulararea includedwithinits presentlimits. One way of doing this-the
easiest and quickestway-is to startwith what exists, point out apparentcorre-
spondenceofphysicaland politicalfeaturesand thenconcludethathistorysomehow
or other has resultedin what was more or less bound to develop. In short,as
Vidal de la Blache observed,anotherformof geographicdeterminism.
Germanstudents,indoctrinated withRatzel's misleadingconceptof the stateas
an organism,have attemptedby comparativestudiesof a handfulof examples,to
develop principlesof state territorialdevelopment. We are all too familiarwith
the dangerousconsequencesof this formof pseudo-scientific thinkingon political
action.
To decipherthe processesof stateterritorialdevelopmentfrompresentfacts-
as the geomorphologist is forcedto do in attempting to recapitulatethe evolution
of landforms-maybe intellectualsport,but hardlyintelligentscience. For the
processes of state developmentare recorded,in great detail and commonlywith
contemporaneous explanation,in historicalrecords. The studentwho undertakes
5 On theotherhandtheoccasionofthispaper,as wellas its substantivepurposeas a progress
reportmay permitspecificindicationof the relationof my own work duringthe past twenty
yearsto thethemedevelopedherein. I have therefore at appropriate
referred, points,to all my
in this field. At the same timeI shouldexpressmy indebtedness
previouspublications to the
othermembersof the CentennialCommitteeon Political Geographyfor theircriticismsand
on thefirstoutlinedraftedforthatcommittee
suggestions and utilizedfreelyin thispaper.
to study this topic, whetherhe be historianor geographerby profession,must

therefore mastera verylarge amountof historicalmaterial. To attaina definitive
analysisof a singlechangein a relativelysmall area may requireexaminationof a
vast amount of both historicaland geographicmaterial. To comprehendfully
whatthatmeans,a studentmightcheckthroughthe referencesin my recentstudy
of the boundaryin Lorraine,6or observe the scholarshipthat underliesWhittle-
sey's study of Andorra7and the voluminoushistoricalresearch needed for his
studyof the territorial evolutionof France.8
Beforeconcludingthatall who wishto workin politicalgeographymustdo like-
wise, we mustfirstask: Is thisapproachnecessary? How significant are the find-
ings of such studiesfor an understanding of the presentpoliticalgeographyof a
state? If I use again the studyof Lorraine as an example,its authorwill not be
provoked. Even if Alsace-Lorrainewere still part of Germany,would it matter
to the geographyof Germanywhetherthe reason forthe inclusionof the Cotes de
Moselle was because of its strategicimportancein the militarytechnologyof 1871
or because of the iron ores imbeddedin its strata? The factis that Germanygot
both.
Or considerthe storyof how the GaronneBasin came to be part of the present
state of France. This would, I think,involveexaminationof such factorsas the
langue d'oc branchof Romance languages,the relativeproductiveresourcesof the
Aquitainelowlandand the Paris Basin, the theoreticalsignificance of the Kingdom
of the West Franks as a unit divisionof Charlemagne'sempire,the centuriesof
success of Frenchqueens in producingmale offspring, and the long periodof con-
flictwith the alien kingsof England. But how much of all this is needed for an
understanding of the politicalgeographyof France today?
Isn't it enoughto say thattheseregionshave sharedin commonsocial,economic,
and politicallifeof the Frenchkingdomand republicformanygenerations,so that
in spite of linguisticdifferences theyare now integralparts of the French nation,
and therefore will chooseto adhereto the Frenchstate?
It is notclear to me therefore thatsuch historicalstudiesof genesisare essential
foreverystudyin politicalgeography. This is not to say thatthe geographerdoes
not have a distinctcontribution to make to the studyof the evolutionof a state.
But has he not contributed perhapsmoreto historyand to our knowledgeof politi-
cal processesthanto politicalgeography?
In short,if we acceptthe analogythatMaull and East9 have suggestedbetween
studiesof the evolutionof state-areasand those of the evolutionof landforms, we
6RichardHartshorne,"The Franco-German Boundaryof 1871,"World Politics,II (Jan.
1950): 209-250.
7Derwent Whittlesey, "Andorra'sAutonomy," Journalof ModernHistory (June 1934):
147-155.
8 DerwentWhittlesey, The Earth and theState: A Studyin Political Geography.New
York,1939,pp. 129-165.
9 Otto Maull,"PolitischeGeographieund Geopolitik,"
Geographischer Anzeiger,1926: 251;
WilliamG. East, "The Natureof PoliticalGeography," Politica II (1937): 270.
may stillbe uncertain,in bothcases, as to whethersuch studiesforma necessary

and integralpart of the studyof the presentgeographyof areas.
I want to make certainthatI cannotbe misunderstood in sayingthatI am un-
certainconcerningthe place of geneticstudies.10 In thus straddlingthe fence-on
the groundsthatthe attemptto determineboundariesin scienceis pedantic-I am
not sayingthat I wish to push such studiesbeyondthe fence,or that I recognize
the existenceof an actual fence. On the contrary,so far as individualgeographers
are interestedin makingsuch studies of states, I personallyshall be more than
interestedin theirresults. I shall no doubt wish to make more of such studies
myself. And if historiansor politicalscientistsshould wish to claim this part of
the field,like my predecessor,I would feel happy to agree on joint exploration;
and be somewhatdejected if eitherside attemptedto pass the topic over to the
other.1L
The onlynegativeconclusionI am suggestingthatis significant to our present
themeis that I am not convinced that such studies form an essential part, or a
necessarypreliminary section,in the study of the political geography of any state.
But neitherdo I assert the opposite; ratherI conclude that only in the course
of his studyof the presentpoliticalgeographyof a state can a studentdetermine
how farhe need dip back intoits historicaldevelopment.
Let us turnto a thirdapproach,whichI may describeas the "morphological
approach." This is represented in substantive worksprimarily in theGermanlitera-
ture. It was presentedin outlineformto Americangeographersin an article I
publishedsome fifteen yearsago."2 Its chiefclaim to consideration, I think,is that
it focussesattentionat the starton the major subjectof studyin nearlyall political
geography-thepresentstate-areaas a geographicphenomenon.
This approachcalls for a descriptiveand interpretive analysis of the external
and internalstructureof the state-area,consideredas a geographic object. The
items are familiar: externally-size, shape, location,and boundaries; internally,
the regionalbreakdownin natural regions,culturalregions,regions of different
kindsof people,and the locationof the capital.
This is almostpure morphology, and thereforestaticand dull. I am not sur-
prisedthatno otherstudent,so far as I know,has seen fitto use this outline. It
does representa methodor system,but not one thatseemslikelyto producesignifi-
cantresults.
Justwhat is it that is 'wrongwith this morphologicalapproach? Similar ap-
proachled I supposeto successfulresultsin geomorphology, possiblyin some other
branchesof geography. In certain fields,however, I think we would findit did
not. As long as agriculturalgeography was tied down to the measurement of crops
10 Similar statementsof uncertaintyregarding the place of geomorphologyin geography,
though expressed as a definiterefusal to pass judgment (in The Natureof Geography:423-424)

have led some readers to suppose that I would exclude that subject.
"Russell, op. cit., p. 11.
12 Richard Hartshorne,"Recent Developments in Political Geography,"op. cit., pp. 943ff.
and fields,ignoringthe functioning of farmsas organizedunits of production,we

were preventedfrom making significantadvances. Likewise in manufactural
geography,or in the geographyof cities,the morphologicalapproachoftenled to
resultsfarless significant than the studyof functions.
or
Whether not you agree withme on that,I thinkyou will agree thatthe sig-
nificanceof state-areasin geographyis to be soughtfar more in theirfunctioning
thanin the morphologyin itself. A schoolchildmay be interested, or amused,by
the peculiarelongatedshape of Chile on the map or the factthat it adds up to a
larger size than France, but this interestis not on the same level as our direct
interestin the formand size of Mount Shasta, say, in contrastwith the Sierra
Nevadas.
In a review of certainworks in German politicalgeography,Bowman once
pouredridiculeon the elaboratedetailof morphological analysis,the detailedclassi-
ficationof state-areasby size and shape leading,sofaras he could find,to no sig-
nificantconclusions.13
In otherwords,thereis a certainfallacyin the comparisonof a state-areawith
a landform. As a definitely organizedsectionof land, a state-areais a real phe-
nomenon,but it is not an object as a mountainis an object. It is not of "direct
importanceto areal differentiation," ratherits place in a geographicstudyis due
to "its indirectimportancethroughits causal relationto otherphenomena."14
The morphology primarilyas it effects
of a state-area,I conclude,is significant
the functionsof the state. If that is true, aren't we puttingthe cart beforethe
horse in startingwiththe detailsof morphologyin order in each case to look for
significant relationsto functions? I suggestthat this is anotherexample of our
inheritancein geographyin general,which leads us to look firstat the physical
environment and thenattemptto draw conclusionsabout its significance forhuman
relations.
So I suggestthatwe startwiththe functionsof politicallyorganizedareas, and
thatwe maintainthis procedurethroughout.
LIMITATION IN SCOPE OF THIS PAPER
In confining our attentionto politicallyorganizedareas, I do notmean to assert

by implicationthat there are not other political phenomenaof concern to the
geographer. Wright'sclassic studyof the areal differentiation in votinghabitsof
the Americanpeople is a highlysignificant contribution
to a fullunderstanding of
the geographyof this country.15 Wigmore and Whittleseyhave examined the
areal distributionof differentlegal codes over the world.'6 If such studies are
Review,XVII (1927): 511-512.
In Geographical
13
Natureof Geography,
14 p. 464.
15JohnK. Wright,"Voting Habits in the United States," GeographicalReview,XXII
(1932): 666-672.
16 JohnH. Wigmore,"PresentDay Legal Systemsof the World," Geographical Review,
XIX (1929): 120; Whittlesey,The Earth and The State,pp. 557-565.
valuable contributions to geography,as I thinktheyare, it would be pedantic,at

this stage of our developmentat least, to discuss whethertheyforma part of an
integratedfieldof politicalgeographyor are to be classifiedin some otherbranch,
such as social geography. Sufficeit to say thata distincttypeof problemis pre-
sentedus in the studyof the geographyof politicallyorganizedareas and I will
thereforeconfinemyselfto thattypeof problem.
There are of course manyvarietiesand different levels of politically-organized
areas. If one were studyingcertainareas of Africaor Asia at an earlierperiodof
history,one would be primarilyconcernedwith the very loose formof territorial
organizationeffectedby tribal units. In a future,we trust better,world, the
geographermay be concernedwiththe politicalorganizationof large international
territories-ultimately, one hopes,of the whole world. In the presentworld,how-
ever, there are but two types of politically-organized territories, which together
covertheoretically the entireinhabitedworldand are of transcendent importance-
namely,the areas of the independent,sovereignstates and those of dependent
countries,whethercalled colonies,protectorates, or possessions,whichare organized
in greateror less degreeby membersof the firstgroup,the imperialstates. (This
statementintentionally overlooksthe problemof definingthe actual statusof con-
triesat presentdisorganized,like China,or thosewhose independencefromoutside
controlis debatable.) The uninhabitedoceans, togetherwith Antarctica,do not
constituteunitsforstudyunderour major headingbecause theyare not politically
organized. Their use and controlhoweverwill presentus withproblemsin con-
sideringthe relationsamongthe politicallyorganizedareas.
There is of coursea place forthe geographicstudyof politicallyorganizedareas
of lower levels-the subdivisionsof states. The relationshipbetweenthe units at
different levels is not howevercomparableto that in non-politicalregionalgeog-
raphy. A sub-regionof the Corn Belt may includeall the functionsfoundin the
Corn Belt, and its validityas a regionis independentof the largerregion. In con-
trast,thesubdivisionsof states-whetherprovinces,departments, counties,or town-
ships-are generallycreatedby the stateand are specifically excludedfromcertain
politicalfunctionsperformedforthemby the stateof whichtheyare a part. This
statement mustbe qualifiedin significant,but on thewholeminor,degreein respect
to the autonomousunits of federalstates-the States of the United States, or
Australia,or the Provincesof Canada.
Units of politicalorganizationat a higherlevelthanthe sovereignstatesinclude
the empiresthathave been organizedindividuallyby certainof those states. Or-
ganizationsof territory includingmorethanone sovereignstatehave hithertobeen
representedonly by the BritishCommonwealth, but both France and the Nether-
lands are now attempting to constructsimilarorganizations. Finally studentsare
not limitedto what exists; we are freeto use our imaginationto studythe poten-
tial basis for other larger units-whether an Arab union, a Western European
Federation,a NorthAtlanticUnion, or a worldunion.
For the purposesof this paper, I wish to focusattentionsolelyon one typeof
politicalarea-the sovereignstate,even thoughthat ignoresthe large part of the

worldthatis organizedin unitsdependenton outsidesovereignstates.
My methodof proceduremay give the impressionof a secondmajor limitation
-that I am concernedonly with the regionalapproach in politicalgeography-
the studyof the individualstates-that I ignorethe systematicapproach. Other
studentshave urgedthatwe shouldstartwiththesystematic approach,thatwe must
firstestablishgenericconcepts,precise terminology, and generalprincipleswhich
then can be applied to specific,regional,cases. I submitthat the historyof de-
velopmentof geographyin generaldemonstrates thatwe must do both simultane-
ously and that,like both Ritter and Humboldt,we must start with specificand
actual cases.'7 It is only in the attemptto make analyses of specificregionsthat
we can determinewhat are the specifictopicsthatneed to be examinedsystemati-
cally for all states in order to yield genericconceptsand definitiveterminology.
Failure to followthis procedurein the past has led, by deductivereasoningto a
prioriprinciplesthathave not stood the testof comparisonwithreality.
Even whenwe have establishedthe significant genericconcepts,we should not
be over-sanguineof the possibilitiesof establishinggeneral principlesin political
geography. In otherbranchesof geographywe deal with units-whetherland-
forms,farms,factories,or cities-of whichthereare thousandsor even millions,
many of them very much like each other in characterand purpose. The state
unitsof politicalgeographynumberless than one hundredin the world,and each
of themis notablydifferent fromall the others. By dippingback intopast history
we may add a fewscoremorecases, but in doing so we run the dangerof carrying
back assumptionsof motivationsand processesthatmay be valid todaybut not in
the earlier historicalframework. More than in any otherbranch of geography
thereforewe are handicappedin developingscientificprinciples,are restrictedto
the considerationof unique cases.18
PRACTICAL VALUE?
One finalstatementon the purposeof thispaper. Will it providea methodby

which geographersmay undertakestudies directedto the solution of the great
criticalproblemsfacingthe world today? Most certainlygeographersshould be
urged to apply theirtrainingand knowledgeto the solutionof these problemsin
all cases in which that trainingand knowledgeis adequate to aid more than it
hinders. But let us not deceive ourselves,for we will deceive few others. The
major problemsthatface the worldtoday are not problemsin politicalgeography;
and fortunately so. For our trainingand knowledgein this fieldare stillfarfrom
adequateto prepareus to tacklewithassuranceany of its major practicalproblems.
At the end of the First World War a major problemfacingthe world did fall
rightin our field-the problemof reorganizingthe territorialdivisionof Europe
17 Cf. Nature of Geography:54-57,72-74,79-80.
For discussionofthisproblemin generalsee The Natureof Geography:378-386,431-434,
18
446-451.
on a basis thatwould make it possibleforthe manynationalitiesof thatcontinent

to live in productiveharmony. The geographerswho were called upon to assist
at that time,'9howevermuch they could contributeof factualknowledge,were
drasticallyhandicappedby immaturity of thinkingin politicalgeography.
If todaywe mustleave to othersthe solutionof theproblemof theatomicbomb
and the problemof CommunistRussia, we mustalso anticipateothercrises ahead.
When the need comes for a soundlydevelopedscience of politicalgeography,we
shouldbe preparedto offerit.
I do not mean to say thatpoliticalgeographyhas at presentno value in public
affairs. We all have the constantopportunity, in teachingstudentsand adults,to
contributeto a wider understanding amongthinkingpeople concerningthe nature
oftheworldwe live in and its international problems.
Further,those of us who have attainedspecializedknowledgeand understand-
ing of particularforeignareas of concernto this countrymay be called upon to
offerbothinformation and advice to our government.We are rightlyproudof the
factthatduringand since the war manyof us have been called upon for such ser-
vice. It will be a greatmisfortune, not only for us, but for our countryif geog-
raphersare preventedfromcontributing to students,the public,and the govern-
mentthe maximumof objective knowledgeand of sincere and loyal counsel on
foreigncountries. But insofaras we geographersare able to contributeto the
problemsof Americanforeignpolicy,we find ourselves-like our colleagues in
othersocial science fields-exposed to the danger of attack frompoliticaldema-
gogues who findin any divergenceof opinionfromtheirown a sign of disloyalty
to the state. We cannotforeseewherethe blindlightningof ignorancewill strike,
but mustrecognizethatsuch attackon any one of us is attackon the freedomand
integrity of all our profession.20
At thesame time,thefreedomwe requireas scientistscarriesspecialobligations,
greaterthan those of ordinarycitizens. Amateurishideas or foolishproposals
frommenof no standingmaydo littleharm. But whenwe writeas professorsand
as geographers,the public presumesthat we speak with some authorityand they
cannotknow how littlethat authoritymay be in the fieldof politicalgeography.
We mustrecognizethat,as long as our knowledgeis as unorganizedas it is in this
field,and commonlywithoutdiscipline,some of us may contributeonly misunder-
standing. In particular,the publicationin criticaltimesof misinformation, or of
irresponsible recommendations purporting to representmorethanthepersonalviews
19 See "War Servicesof Membersof theAssociationof AmericanGeographers," Annals of
theAssociationof AmericanGeographers, IX (1919): 53-70. A list,probablyincomplete,of
Europeangeographers broughtto Paris is givenin RichardHartshorne, "RecentDevelopments
in PoliticalGeography," op. cit.,p. 791.
20 If to anyfuturereadersthepertinence ofthisparagraphis notclear,theymaycountthem-
selvesfortunate forlivingin a betterera. Anywho are historicallymindedmayfindthe pertin-
ent connection by lookingto the frontpages of almostany Americannewspaperfor any day
duringthemonthof March,1950.
of the author,or of such a characteras to arouse animosityin foreigncountries

can do seriousdamage to thiscountry-as we learnedduringthe last war.2'
We may have produced no atom bombs in politicalgeography,but the field
is nonetheless strewnwith dynamite-it is no place for sophomoresto play with
matches. Fortunately,we appear to have escaped the danger of repeating,in
Americanterms,the crimeof those of our colleagues in Germanywho were re-
sponsiblefor the dangerousdoctrinesof geopolitics.22But we will be exposed to
similardangersuntilthe foundationsof our knowledgein this fieldare on a much
firmerbasis thanappearsnow to be thecase.
Only then will our contributions to public thinkingbe more than additional
small voices enteringthe generalargument. The functionof scientificlearningis
to establishknowledgeon such firmfoundationsthat argumentdisappears,and
acceptancebecomes relativelyenduring. This we can accomplishonly the long,
hard way. We mustget at thefundamentals;lay thegroundworkfora solid struc-
tureof knowledge,on thebasis of whichwe mayhope one day to arriveat applica-
tionsof sound value in the solutionof actual problems.
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF A STATE: INTERNAL
I propose,as stated earlier,to considerthe centralproblemsof politicalgeog-

raphy in termsof the functionsof state-areas. What comes first? The funda-
mentalpurpose of any state,as an organizationof a sectionof land and a section
of people,as Ratzel firstput it, is to bringall the varied territorialparts,the di-
verse regionsof the state-area,intoa singleorganizedunit.
What does thestateattemptto organize,in all regionsofthe state-area?
In all cases, it attemptsto establishcompleteand exclusivecontrolover internal
political relations-in simplestterms,the creationand maintenanceof law and
order. Local politicalinstitutions mustconformwiththe conceptsand institutions
of the central,overall,politicalorganization.
In manysocial aspects-class structure, familyorganization,religion,and edu-
cation-a state may tolerateconsiderablevariationin its differentregions. But
because of the significance of these factorsto politicallife,thereis a tendency-in
some statesa verymarkedeffort-toexertunifyingcontroleven over these insti-
tutions.
In the economicfield,every modernstate tends to develope some degree of
21 The evidence demonstrating thatan articlein "politicalgeography" publishedin a popular
Americanmagazinecaused seriousrepercussions in several foreigncountries, bothallied and
neutral,is stillclassifiedmaterialin statedepartment documents or in confidentialstatementsof
one of our ambassadors.
22 It shouldbe added thatthe menprimarily responsible forthe development of Geopolitik
wereforthemostpartnotmenof highstandingin Germangeography, see Carl Troll,"Geogra-
phic Science in Germany,1933-1945,"Ainnalsof the Associationof AmericanGeographers,
XXXIX (1949): 128-135. Of thedangeroustendencies Americanstudentswere
of geopolitics,
warned-inwhatappearsnow as muchtoo cautiousa manner-inRichardHartshorne, "Recent
Developments in PoliticalGeography," op. cit.,pp. 960-965.
unityof economicorganization. At the minimum,it establishesuniformcurrency,

some uniformity in economicinstitutions, and some degreeof controlover external
economicrelations. Beyond that,states of course vary greatlyin the degree to
whichall aspectsof productionand trade-price and wages levels,etc.-are placed
underuniformcontrol.
Finally,and most importantly, because we live in a world in which the con-
of
tinuedexistence every state-unitis subject to the threatof destructionby other
states,everystate must striveto secure the supremeloyaltyof the people in all
its regions,in competitionwith any local or provincialloyalties,and in definite
oppositionto loyaltyto any outsidestate-unit.
Throughoutthis statementof the organizationof the state-areaas a unit,the
geographeris primarilyconcernedwith emphasis on regional differences. The
state of course is no less concernedto establishunityof controlover all classes
of populationat a singleplace. In politicalgeography,our interestis in the prob-
lem of unificationof diverse regionsinto a single whole; the degree of vertical
unificationwithinany horizontalsegmentconcernsus only as a factoraiding or
handicappingregionalunification.
Parenthetically, we may also note the ways in whichthis primaryfunctionof
the stateaffectsthe generalfieldof geography. Land-use, industrialdevelopment,
trade,and a countlesslist of social aspects of humangeographyin any regionwill
differin greateror less degreeas a resultof the effortsof the state in whichit is
includedto controlits developmentas part of a singlewhole. Only the peculiarity
of geographicstudyin such a large countryas the United States, where we are
usuallyforcedto do most of our work withinthe territory of our single state,has
permitted us to studygeographyas thoughwe could ignorepoliticalgeography.
Our analysisof the primaryfunctionof any state leads directlyto the primary
problemof politicalgeography. For no state-areaconstitutesby the natureof its
land and people,a naturalunit fora state,in whichone merelyneeds to create a
government whichshall proceedto operateit as a unit. The primaryand continu-
ing problemof everystate is how to bind togethermore or less separate and di-
verseareas intoan effective whole.
For the politicalgeographer,thispresentsa wide rangeof specificproblemsfor
analysis. In everystatearea, largerthansuch anomaliesas Andorraor Liechten-
stein,the geographerfinds: (1) regionsthatare more or less separatedfromeach
otherby physicalor humanbarriers; (2) regionsthatin greateror lesser degree
divergein theirrelationswith outside states; and (3) regionsthat differamong
themselvesin characterof population,economicinterests,and politicalattitudes.
Let us look briefly at each of thesetypesof problems.*
* Throughout thisdiscussiontheterm"region"is used to indicatemerelyan area in some
or different
way distinct fromneighboring areas,withno implication
thata regionis a unit. See
The Natureof Geography op. cit.,Chap. IX.
106 RICHARDHARTSHORNE JUNE
Centrifugal
Forces
Geographersare familiarwiththe effectof particulartypesof physicalfeatures
in handicappingcommunicationbetweenregions. Semple and others have de-
scribedfor our own earlyhistorythe politicalconsequencesof the forestedAppa-
lachians and later of the mountainand desert barrierof the west. Whittlesey's
studyof the Val d'Aran depictsin detail the problemin that bit of Spain north
of the Pyrenees.23 In most modernstates,however,these problemshave largely
beenovercomebythedevelopment ofthetelegraphand therailroad. They continue
of importancehoweverin parts of the Balkans, in the highlandstates of Latin
America,and in China.
Since state-organizationrequirescommunication not only fromone region to
the next, but froma centralpoint to each peripheralregion,distanceitselfis a
centrifugalfactor. Obviouslydistancewithina statedependson its size and shape.
Size and shape are significant to the state in other,quite differentrespects,but I
suggestwe wait untilwe have determinedthatin our analysis,ratherthanattempt
to proceeddeductively fromsize and shape to consequences.
Of humanbarriers,the most commonis the absence of humans. Uninhabited
or sparselyinhabitedareas were, until recently,difficult and dangerousto cross.
It was primarilyon this accountthat relativelylow mountains,in centralEurope
or the Appalachians,long functionedas dividingzones. Even in the Alps, the
problemof surmounting highelevationswas less serious,in the Middle Ages, than
the difficultyof securingsupplies along the way and the ever-presentdanger of
attackfrom"robberbarons."
Further,the presenceof such relativelyemptyareas created,and stillcreates,a
feelingof separationin the regionson eitherside. Both on this accountand be-
cause of distance,oceans continueto functionas the strongestseparatingfactors,
otherthan the Arcticice, even thoughtheyhave long been crossed with relative
ease.
France has firstinauguratedthe interesting experimentof incorporating trans-
oceanic areas into the organizationof its state. Its West Indian islands and the
islandof Reunionin theIndian Ocean are now departments ofmetropolitan France,
sendingdelegatesto its nationalassembly. We may be about to do the same with
Hawaii.
Perhaps themostdifficult barrierto overcomeis separationby a zone populated
by a different people, especiallyan unfriendly people. The Germanshave appar-
entlyconvincedtheworldthattheseparationofEast Prussia bythePolish Corridor
was an experimentthat is neverto be repeated. (They overlookedthe factthat
therewerenotone buttwo alternatives to thatdevice.) 24
Serious difficulties
may arise for a state if any of its regionshave closer rela-
23 "Trans-PyreneanSpain: The Val d'Aran,"ScottishGeographical
DerwentWhittlesey,
Magazine, 1933: 217-228.
XXXVI (1937):
24Richard Hartshorne,"The Polish Corridor,"Journalof Geography,
161-176.
1950 FUNCTIONALAPPROACHIN POLITICALGEOGRAPHY 107
tionswithregionsof outsidestatesthanwiththosewithinthe state. This is com-

monlythe case where a boundaryhas been changedso that it now cuts across an
area formerly withina singlestate. The partitionof Upper Silesia, in 1922, pre-
senteda particularlyintensecase.25 But thereare many cases, not dependenton
boundarychanges,in whicha regionhas closer connections,particularlyeconomic
connections,with regionsof other countriesthan with other regionsof its own
state. We are familiarwith the politicalimportanceof this factorin each of the
major regionsof Canada, each more closely related in certainrespectswith the
adjacent areas of the United States than with the otherregionswithinthe Do-
minion. In some cases mutualinterdependence amongthe regionsof the state-area
is less than the dependenceof individualregions on remote,overseas countries.
This is a major problemof the AustralianCommonwealth, in whicheach stateunit
is primarilydependenton separate trade with Great Britain. In Western Aus-
tralia,this factor,togetherwith notablephysicaland hunianseparationhas led at
times to demand for secession from the Commonwealth. NortheasternBrazil
offersa somewhatsimilarproblemforstudy.
The geographerhowevermustbewareof drawingconclusionsfromthe physical
map, or, on the otherhand, of assumingthat an economicsituationto which we
are accustomedrepresentsa "normal" developmentin economicgeographyinde-
pendentof a particularpoliticalframework. Consider southernCalifornia,sepa-
rated by thousandsof miles of desert and mountainfromthe main body of the
United States,facingthe Pacifichighwayto denselypopulatedlands of the Orient.
And yet which region of the United States is more completelybound into the
economyof the countryas a whole?
All the previousexamplesare relativelyextremecases. In most instancesthe
potentialitiesare highlyflexible. The plain of Alsace, separatedfromthe rest of
France by the ruggedheightsof the Vosges, facingsouthernGermanyacross the
narrowband of the Rhine flood-plainand easilyconnectedwithnorthernGermany
by that navigableriver-with which state does it fitin termsof economicgeog-
raphy? Surely the answer mustbe that in termsof moderntechnologyall these
featuresare of minorimportanceand in termsof the economicpotentialities of the
area it can be associatedalmostequally well in eitherthe French or the German
economicunit.
Separationof regionsby barriersor by divergenceof outsideconnectionsare
commonlyless importantthan the centrifugal forcesthat resultfromdiversityof
characterof the population. To secure voluntaryacceptanceof a single common
organizationrequires some degree of mutual understanding;obviouslythis is
easier in a populationhomogeneousin character. Further,where regionsdiffer
in social character,the tendencyof the stateto forcesome degreeof uniformity of
social life meets with resistance. Thus the very attemptto produce unitymay
"Geographicand PoliticalBoundariesin Upper Silesia,"Annals of
25 RichardHartshorne,
XXIII (1933): 195-228.

the Associationof AmericanGeographers,
intensifydisunity. Hungary, before 1918, was the classic example; since then
Yugoslavia has been perhapsthe leading,among several,successors.
What particularsocial characteristics maybe importantdependson the particu-
lar state. Everyonethinksof language and religion. I suggest,also, education
and standardsof living,typesof economicattitudesand institutions, attitudesto-
ward class and racial distinctions,and, especially,politicalphilosophy.
For materialson thesetopicswe look to thatbranchof geographythathas been
least developed-social geography. In mostcases what materialswe have provide
onlythe raw data, the factsabout the distribution of,say, religionsor races,rather
thanthe regionaldifferences in social attitudestowardsthese facts; it is the latter
thatwe need.
Thus, the factthatAlsace was predominantly Roman Catholic,like France but
unlikemost of Germany,was less importantthan the factthat its attitudetoward
therelationof churchand statewas similarto thatin the GermanEmpire of 1871-
1918, and was in conflictwith the anti-clericalattitudeof the French Republic.
Racial differences,in the termsstudiedby the physicalanthropologist, may be
of no relevanceto our problem. The distribution, percentage-wise, in the different
countriesof Europe, ofblondesand brunettes, dolichocephalic versusbrachycephalic
-what does it matter? These factshave no reflection in social or politicalattitudes
in those countries. Though standardmaterialin most geographiesof Europe, I
submitthattheyhave no significance to politicalgeography,or forthatmatter,to
geographyin general.
In contrast,the United States is a countryin whichregionaldifferences in atti-
tudes of people towardthe racial componentsof the regionalgroup-as indicated
by skin color-are of tremendousimportancein social, economic,and politicallife.
We have mapped and studied the underlyingdifferences in racial composition,26
but we have not studiedthephenomenonitself-namelythe differences in attitudes.
We need a map, a series of maps, portrayingdifferent kinds and degrees of Jim
Crowismin the United States. These I would rate as a firstrequirementfor an
understandingof the internalpoliticalgeographyof the United States, for in no
otherfactordo we findsuch marked regional cleavages, such disruptionto the
nationalunityof our state. For geographyin general,in one quarterof our coun-
try,theseattitudesare fundamental factorsin everyaspectof thehumangeography,
and are significantlyrelatedto its physicalgeography.
Geographersare more familiarwith differencesin economic interests,since
theseare more closelybound to the land. But theseare seldomseriouslydisrupt-
ing to nationalunity. It is true that almosteverymodernstate has experienced
markedpoliticaltensionbetweenthe divergentinterestsof highlyindustrialregions
and those of still primarilyagriculturalareas. But these very differencestend
to lead to interlocking,ratherthan competing,interests. Even when competing,
"Racial Maps of theUnitedStates,"Geographical
26 RichardHartshorne, Review,XXVIII
(1938): 276-288.
1950( FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 109
economicdifferences, Marx to the contrarynotwithstanding, are easier to compro-

mise thandifferences in social and politicalattitudes.
Furthermore, the state is onlyin partialdegree an economicunit. Since it is
basicallya politicalunit,the state necessarilyimposesthe greatestdegree of uni-
formityin politicallife. Political attitudesare peculiarlyinflexible. If a region
is accustomedto one set of politicalconcepts,ideals and institutions-mostespe-
ciallyif its people feelthattheyhave foughtin the past to establishthose political
values-it may be extremelydifficult to bringthemunder the commoncloak of a
quite different system. Even whereregionsformerly in separatestateshave volun-
tarilyjoined togetherto forma state,on the basis of commonethniccharacter-for
examplethethreePolish areas in 1918,or the Czech and Slovak areas-the marked
difference in past politicaleducationled to difficult problems.
In times and areas of relativelyprimitivepolitical developmentsuch factors
were no doubtof minorimportance.In long-settled areas of relativelymaturepoli-
tical developmenttheymay be of firstimportance. The classic exampleis, again,
Alsace. Thanks particularly to the FrenchRevolution,the people of thatprovince
had become strongsupportersof political concepts,ideals, and institutionsthat
could not be harmonizedwithinthe semi-feudal, authoritarian monarchyof Hohen-
zollernGermany.
Conversely,one may understand,on this basis, the negative reactionof the
Swiss in 1919, to the proposal that the adjacent Austrianprovinceof Vorarlberg
shouldbe added to theirstate.27
CentripetalForces
The precedingdiscussionof politicalattitudespointsto an essentialingredient
thathas been lackingin thediscussionup to thispoint. We have been considering
a varietyof centrifugalfactorsin theregionalgeographyof a state-areawhichmake
to bind those regionstogetherinto an effectiveunit. In considering
it difficult
how such difficulties may be overcome,we have not asked whethertherewas any
forceworkingto overcomethe difficulties, anythingtendingto pull these regions
togetherinto a state.
This, omissionI suggest,has been the singlegreatestweaknessin our thinking
in politicalgeography. If we see an area markedclearly on both physicaland
ethnicmaps as suitablefora state,butwhichformanycenturieswas notintegrated
as a state-as in the Spanish peninsula,the Italian peninsula,or the Germanarea-
we cudgel our heads to findfactorsin its internalgeographythat will explain the
failure. We forgetthatbeforewe speakoffailure,we mustask whatwas attempted.
The Italian peninsula,togetherwith the northernplain attachedto the main-
land but isolatedby the Alps, witha settledpopulationspeakingapproximatelya
commontonguesince the Middle Ages, has offeredone of the most obvious geo-
to me yearslaterby two geographers:LawrenceMartin,who had been sent
27 As reported
to Switzerlandby PresidentWilsonto soundout the Swiss reaction,and Peter H. Schmidt,of

St. Gallen,withwhomhe had discussedthe proposal.
graphicunitsof Europe forthe developmentof a state. Yet Italy,as an Austrian

ministerjeered, was only a geographicexpression; therewas nothingthat could
be called even the beginningsof a state of Italy. For no one of importancehad
any idea of producingan Italian state and had anyone tried,his purpose would
have shatteredin conflictwithtwo opposingideas: one, the conceptof the Papal
States,the secularcontrolof mid-Italyby the Pope in orderto securehis undivided
dominationof Rome as the spiritualcapital of Western Christendom;the other,
the conceptof a singlegreatempirein the heartof Europe, extendingfromnorth-
ern Germanyto northernItaly. Only afterthe power of thesecenturies-oldideas
had been irrevocablydestroyedby the fermentof the French Revolutionwas it
possibleforany Italian leader to considerseriouslythe unification
of Italy.
One of the conceptsthat preventedintegrationin Italy is likewisethe key to
the failureof medievalGermanyto develop a unifiedstate,at the time when the
kingdomsof France and England were beingeffectively established. For centuries
the personsholdingthe titleof King of Germany,and whateveropportunity that
mightgive, were far more affectedby the highertitleof Emperor. Inspired by
the granderidea of reincarnating the empireof Rome, theyfoughtto build a state
straddlingthe Alps, unitingmany different peoples. The sacrificesmade in the
vain attemptto accomplishthe greateridea destroyedthe possibilityof achieving
the lesser when later emperorsfinallywere reducedto consideringGermanunity.
The fact that a countryhas a name and a government, that an international
treatyrecognizesits existenceas a state and definesits territoriallimits-all that
does notproducea state. To accomplishthat,it is necessaryto establishcentripetal
forcesthatwill bind togetherthe regionsof thatstate,in spiteof centrifugal forces
thatare always present.
The State-Idea
The basic centripetalforcemustbe someconceptor idea justifying theexistence
of this particularstate incorporating
these particularregions; the state must have
a raisond'etre-reason forexisting.
Althoughignoredin much of the literatureof politicalgeography,this is not
a new thought. Ratzel definedthe state as a sectionof land and a sectionof hu-
manityorganizedas a singleunitin termsof a particular,distinctive idea.28 Maull,
amongotherGermangeographers,has discussedthe conceptat some length.29It
was presentedto thisAssociationa decade ago.30
At the primitivelevel,Ratzel explained,thisidea may be no morethanthe will
of a rulerto which,forwhateverreasons,all the regionalpartsthroughtheirlocal
leaders granttheirloyalty. In such a case, as in the empireof Charlemagneor
thatof GhengisKhan, the statemay endurehardlylongerthan the lifetimeof the
FriedrichRatzel,PolitischeGeographie,
28 3rd ed., Munichand Berlin1923,pp. 2-6.
Otto Maull,PolitischeGeographie,
29 Berlin1925,pp. 112-115.
30RichardHartshorne,"The Conceptsof 'Raison d'Etre' and 'Maturityof States'," (ab-
stract),Annalsof theAssociationofAmericanGeographers, XXX (1940): 59.
individualruler. In the attemptto perpetuatethe bindingidea of loyaltyto a
personal ruler,there evolved the concept of hereditarymonarchy. Where that
succeeded,however,we findtherewas always somethingmore-politically-minded
people in the various parts of the kingdomcame to regardthe state,for reasons
independentof the monarch,as representing somethingof value to them. Today
the monarchicalinstitutionis safe only in those states in whichthe monarchhas
exchangedtheactivepowerto rule forthepassive role of personification of the na-
tionalheritage.
To be sure, a state in whichthe originalidea has lost its validitywill not fall
apart at once. The forcesof inertia,vestecfinterests,and fearof the consequences
of changemay keep it goingmoreor less effectively forsome time. But inevitably
a structurethathas lost its originalraisond'etre,withoutevolvinga new one, can-
not hope to stand the stormsof externalstrifeor internalrevoltthat sooner or
laterwill attackit. For when that day comes,the state,to survive,must be able
to count upon the loyalty,even to the death,of the populationof all its regions.
It is not merecoincidencethatthe termsI have been using came to me froma
Viennesegeographer, in his analysisof thefailureof the Habsburgmonarchy.Un-
less Austria-Hungary, Hassinger wroteafterthe First World War, had been able
to discoverand establisha raison d'etre,a justification forexistence,even without
the calamityof thewar, it could not long have continuedto exist.3'
Those statesare strongest,Ratzel had concluded,"in whichthe politicalidea of
the statefillstheentirebodyof the state,extendsto all its parts."32
What does this mean for our studyof the politicalgeographyof a state? It
means,I am convinced,thatbeforewe can begin to studythe problemspresented
by the centrifugalforcesI have previouslyoutlined,we must firstdiscoverthe
motivatingcentripetalforce,the basic politicalidea of the state. Under what con-
cept,forwhat purposes,are theseparticularregionsto be boundtogetherinto one
politicalunit,absolutelyseparatedfromeveryotherpoliticalterritory?
Does this seem too remotefromgeography? Too much like politicalscience?
The studentof geographyof climatesmustunderstandthe natureof air-masses,as
analyzed by the meteorologist.We cannot intelligently study the geographyof
soils until we have grasped the soil scientist'sanalysis of soil types. In agri-
culturalgeographyit is not sufficient, we now know,to studycrops and animals;
we are concernedwiththe farmunitof organizationof crops fromfields,livestock
in barnsand pasture,all directedtowardultimateproductionof foodforthefarmer
and productsto be sold fromhis farms. We are not readyto begin the studyof
farm geographyuntil we have analyzed the farmer'spurpose-the idea under
whichhis piece of land is organized.
Geographersusuallyknowquite a bit about farming,so theymay knowbefore-
hand what is in the farmer'smind,or perhapstheycan inferthatfromobservation
31Hugo Hassinger,in R. Kjellen and K. Haushofer,Die Grossniichte
vor und nach dem
Berlinand Leipzig,1930,p. 34.
Weltkriege,
32 Ratzel,op. cit.,p. 6.
of thevisiblefacts-the fields,silo,corncrib,or cow-barn. But to knowforcertain,

you mustask thefarmer.
Whom shall we ask concerningthe idea of the particularstate? Obviouslyone
mustgo to thosewho actuallyoperatethe statein question. This is not so easy as
in the case of the farmor factory. A modernstate is an organizationoperated,in
greateror less degree,by all of thepolitically-minded people includedin it-ideally
its entireadult population.
One mightlogicallysuppose thatgeographersshouldbe able to findthe answer
to this questionin studies in politicalscience. Unfortunately, fromour point of
view,politicalscientistsseem to have concernedthemselvessolelywiththe idea and
purpose of the genericstate-the purposes,that is, thatare commonto all states.
This ignoresthe very thingthat is of directconcernto the geographer-namely
the idea thatis distinctfortheparticularstatein contrastwiththatof otherstates,
that which makes,for significantdifferencesfromcountryto country. Perhaps
thatmeansthatit is logicallya problemforthe geographer.
In any case, unless we can findthe answerto this fundamental questionin the
works of otherstudents-perhapsof the historiansif not the politicalscientists-
we are apparentlyforcedto work it out for ourselves. We must discoverand es-
tablishthe unique distinctiveidea underwhicha particularsectionof area and of
humanityis organizedintoa unitstate.
I realize thatthe problemis remotefromthe geographer'strainingand knowl-
edge. But yearsof stumblingefforthave convincedme thatthereis no circumvent-
ing it. Until we can determineforany particularstate the idea underwhichit is
organized,we shall have no basis on whichto analyze its politicalgeography;we
shall not have startedon the significant contribution that geographycan make to
the studyof states.
Perhaps we exaggeratethe difficulty of the problembecause it is unfamiliar.
To pin down preciselythe particularidea on whichany state is based is certainly
very difficult, but study of the essentialhistoricaldocumentsmay enable one to
come fairlyquicklyto a roughstatementsufficiently close to the markto be usable.
Let me give you a case in whichone of my advanced graduatestudents33 had
particulardifficulty-the state of Iraq. He finallyarrivedat somethinglike this:
The idea of an Iraqi state sprang fromtwo factors: (1) the recognitionby the
Great Powers of the special strategicand economicsignificance of the Mesopotam-
ian region,and (2) theneed to providea pied a terreforArab nationalismbanished
fromSyria. On the basis of thesetwo considerations therewas establisheda terri-
toryembracingthe settledArab regionof the Tigris-Euphratesplain,togetherwith
adjacent but dissimiliarregions of mountainand desert tribes,the whole to be
developedas a separateArab state.
You note that the idea of this state was a compoundof purposes and those,
external:foreigndiplomacyand transportednationalistfire. That was the case in
1919. One would need to determinewhetherthe Iraqi have since evolveda truly
nativeconcept.
33Mr. JohnPatersonin an unpublished
manuscript.
In mucholder states,we mayexpectto findthatan indigenousraisond'etrehas

evolvedthatmay have littleor no relationto the originalgenesis. To determine
the distinctiveidea of such,a state,therefore we must studythe currentsituation,
ratherthantheremotepast. In the well-developedmodernstatepolitically-minded
people in all regionsof the state-areaare consciousof theirloyaltyto the stateand
have some commonunderstanding, even thoughnot clearlyphrased,of what that
statemeansto them. In such a case, we may recognize,I think,the existenceof a
nation-as somethingdistinctfromthe state itself.
The Conceptof Nation

At what I choose to call the moreprimitivelevel,the conceptof nationrepre-
sentssimplya feelingof kinship,of belongingtogether,an extensionof the concept
of family,more properlyan extensionof the conceptof the in-groupversus out-
siders. While usuallyexpressedin termsderivedfromthe languageof the family
-terms like "blood," "breed," "race," etc.,-it is in realityless of kin and more
of kind-similarityof cultural,ratherthan of biologicalcharacteristics.
The direct significanceof this elementaryconceptof nationalityto the state
lies firstin the factthat all peoples tend to prefergovernmentby those of their
own kind,even if inefficient or unjust,ratherthan any governmentover themby
foreigners, howeverbeneficient.The second reason is thatthe individualseeks to
identifyhimselfwithhis state; nationality,someone said, is "pooled self-esteem."
Indeed the stateis sure of the loyaltyof the people onlyif thereis such identifica-
tion. Each citizenmustfeelthatthe state is "his" state,its leaders,"his" leaders.
For this to be possiblehe mustfeel thatthose who operatehis state,who govern
him,are people like himself.
The main purposeof a statehoweveris not the furtherance of a particularlan-
guage or culture. Its main purposesare political. The values over which it has
completecontrolare politicalvalues. As the people in a state maturein positive
politicalexperience,theirfeelingof belongingtogetherbecomesless dependenton
the such obvioussimilaritiesas commonlanguage,and moredependenton common
adherenceto particularpoliticalconcepts,ideals,and institutions.It is forthesake
of thesethattheyare readyto devotetheirultimateloyaltyto theirstate.
It is in termsof these concepts,more specificallydefinedto fitthe particular
case, thatwe can explaintheevolutionof a Swiss nationout of a collectionof many
smallregions,usingfourdifferent languages,separatedby imposingphysicalbarriers,
with sharplydivergingoutside connections,and originallybroughttogetherby
a seriesof historicalaccidents,includingforceof arms.
In sharp contrastto Switzerland,and the other small states of long historic
evolutionin westernEurope, is the situationin mostof the small statesof Eastern
Europe. These owe theirexistenceprimarilyto the oppositionof individualna-
tionalities,based on culturalkinship,to alien rule,but the geographicdistribution
of the nationalitiesmade impossiblea systemof stateseach confinedto the single
nationality.In the relativelyshortperiodof theirindependentexistenceas states,
none have been able to evolvepoliticalvalues and institutionscommandingnational
loyaltyon a higherlevel thanthatof culturalkinship-i.e., theyhave not been able

to bringthe nationalminorities,presentin almosteverycase, into membershipin
the nation.
to summarizethe analysisof the conceptof nation into a single
It is difficult
statement,but, for those readers who wish a definition, I would suggest that a
"nation"may be definedas a groupof people occupyinga particulararea who feel
themselvesheld togetherin termsof commonacceptanceof particularvalues that
are of such primeimportanceto themthattheydemandthattheirarea and people
shouldbe organizedin a distinctstate,as thepoliticalagencyby whichthosevalues
may be preservedand furthered.34
The relationsbetweenthe stateand the nationare mutualand manifold. In the
older national states of westernEurope, the nation,as Vidal de la Blache has
pointedout,was in no smallpart the productof the state. William of Normandy,
as successorto the Anglo-Saxon kings,establisheda relativelyeffectivestate,the
kingdomof England, later expanded to includeWales. In the process,however,
whateverdegreeof Anglo-Saxon nationhad developedwas destroyedin the con-
flictwiththe NormanFrenchconquerors. But in the course of centuriesthe state
createda new nation,the English. Althoughmost of the kingdomcame to have
a commontongue,the conceptof the nationwas acceptedin areas of the statebe-
yond the limitsof the English language-notablyin the Celtichighlandsof Wales.
The subsequentunion of two states, England and Scotland, each of which had
evolved a distinctnationalcharacter,led in time to the developmentof a larger,
single,Britishnation. On the otherhand,the greaterpart of the island of Ireland,
thoughincludedin the English kingdomfor centuriesand largelyconvertedto
English tongue,neverbecamepart of the Britishnation.
Likewise therewas no French nation-nor even a commonlanguage of what
we thinkof as the singleFrenchpeople-until centuriesafterthe kings of France
unityoverthe statearea we call by thatname.
had establishedmoreor less effective
Or, to take a differentkindof example,the French-speaking cantonsof Lausanne,
Geneva,and the Valais were includedin the Swiss state long beforetheirpopula-
tions came to regard themselvesas part of the Swiss nation,and the process of
becomingpart of that nationinvolvedno lesseningin theiradherenceto the lan-
guage of France ratherthanthe Germaniclanguageof the greaterpart of Switzer-
land.
In Norway and Eire the relationof state and nationwas reversed:the nation
antedatedand demandedthe state. In the case of Poland we see a nation,ori-
ginallyproducedin part by the long historyof a state,which survivedthe total
destructionof that state and more than a centurylater demandedthe restoration
of the state.
The story of Austria-Hungaryis particularlyilluminating. The Habsburg
monarchydid not disintegratedirectlybecause of the large numberof different
is a productof exchangeof viewswithProfessorHardy Dillard,Dean of
34This statement
the Law School,Universityof Virginia.
ethnicregionsof whichit was formed,but ratherbecause thatstate neverevolved

politicalconceptsor institutions thatcould gain acceptance,not to say enthusiasm,
in its diverseregions.35
For an example in currentprocess, consider Yugoslavia. Ignoring for the
momenttheGerman,Magyar,and Albaniandistricts, threeregionalgroups-Serbs,
Croats,and Slovenes-voluntarilyjoined to forma state. Though based on close
relationshipof South Slavic language,the main motivatingimpulsewas opposition
to foreignrule by GermanAustriaand Magyar Hungary. In the hope of creating
a nationtheyinventeda new nationalword-Yugoslav. But findingno positive
politicalconceptfortheirstate-or failingto make real the conceptof a federation
of relatedbut different groups-the state became increasinglyan imperialexpan-
sion of the dominantSerbian group. In consequence,under the forceof outside
attack by Germany,it broke internally. Again, however,the commonsuffering
under foreigntyrannybroughtincreasedunityof feelingamong the three Slavic
groups. This rise of Yugoslav nationalismhoweverwas splitby the socio-political
conflictof communistrevolution,dividingthe countryby classes, ratherthan by
regions. If communism had thecapacityto win overtheadherenceof all thepeople
of an area to its faith,thecountrymightattainnationalunityon thatbasis-but no
doubtonlyto be mergedin the largerunityof a CommunistEastern Europe. To-
day, dictatorialorders fromoutside have again awakened Yugoslav nationalism.
In the struggleagainstalien rule fromMoscow, the regionalnationalitiesmay con-
ceivablybe mergedinto a genuineYugoslav nation-unless the class conflictin-
herentin communismdestroysthe possibilityof unityof the people of even the
smallestarea.
The United States,one of the moststrikingand intenseof nationalstates,pre-
sentsstilla different type. The nationantedatedthe state,but was itselforiginally
onlya part of an older Britishnationthathad been developedby the United King-
dom. Separated fromits then larger part by the AtlanticOcean, the American
sectorbecame a new nation,broughtto high temperin the revolutionary firesof
the War forIndependence. But this new nationfounditselfthennot organizedin
one state,but in thirteen. The Constitutional Conventionof 1787 was broughtto-
getherto createa single state organizationto serve a nationrecognizedas already
in existence.
One furtherramification may be brieflysuggested. Once the concept of a
nationhas beenwell establishedwithinan area, its spreadoutwardis notnecessarily
limitedby the frontierof the state-area. Thus, when the Frenchnationalarmyin
1792 enteredthe French-speakingregionsof Savoy, a regionthathad neverbeen
a partoftheFrenchkingdom,theyfoundthatthenationalconceptsof revolutionary
France had precededthem. The Savoyards,who had neverbelongedto a nation,
but had merelybeen subject to a feudalstate lackingin politicalideals, were pre-
35 RichardHartshorne,"The Tragedyof Austria-Hungary:A Post-Mortemin Political
XXVIII (1938):
Geography,"(abstract)Annalsof theAssociationof AmericanGeographers,
49.
pared to regardthemselvesas partof thenationof France. It would be interesting

to comparetheirattitudewiththatof theFrench-speaking areas of Switzerlandand
Belgiumwhichwere likewiseconqueredat thattimeby the Frencharmies.
The Conceptof the"Core Area"

These considerationsshould enable us to look more criticallythan has hitherto
been done,I believe,at the conceptof the core area of a state. Commonlywe look
at France, England, Scotland,or Sweden-the classic cases in whichthe core area
appears so important,whetherin the historyof developmentof the state-areaor
thatof the evolutionof nationalunity. Or we contrastthe situationin thosecoun-
tries with that in Spain, where the centralarea, the Meseta, is relativelyweak.
But considerthe territory of the old kingdomof Hungary,where the core-areaof
Magyar populationin the rich plain of the Mid-Danube would appear to provide
thenaturalfocusforsurrounding smallerlowlandsand mountainhighlands. While
this situationno doubt facilitatedconquestand organizationof the large area in-
cluded in the kingdom,nationalunitywas neverachieved.
In contrastthe manyscatterednuclei of the Norwegianpeople,connectedonly
by sea, providedthe basis for nationalunityand a modernstate. In the United
States, no one area ever functionedas a single core, but ratherthe associationof
a large numberof regions,closely interrelatedin an ever-shifting balance, forms
the basis foreffectiveunity.
Clearlywe mustdraw negativeas well as positiveconclusions. A core area is
neithersufficientnor essentialto the evolutionof a nationor state. What is essen-
tial is a commonidea thatconvincesthe people in all the regionsthattheybelong
together. Historicallyin certainstatesa core area may have played a major role
in spreadingthat idea to otherregionsand it may continuetoday as in France,
Argentina,or Mexico, to focus the interestof the regionson itselfas the center
of what has becomea functioning unit; but the commonidea for a state may de-
velop whereno core area exists.
The Applicationof theState-Idea in Political Geography

Whateveris foundto be the raison d'etre,the underlyingidea of the state,it is
withthisconcept,I submit,thatthe geographershould startin his analysisof the
state-area. What use is he thento make of it?
His firstconcernis to determinethe area to whichthe idea applies,then,the
degreeto whichit operatesin the different regions,and finallythe extentof corre-
spondenceof thoseregionsto theterritory actuallyincludedwithinthe state.
On this basis we may approachthe mostelementaryproblemin politicalgeog-
raphy-namelythatof distinguishing withinthelegal confinesof its territory,those
regionsthat formintegralparts of the state-areain termsof its basic idea, and
thoseparts thatmustbe recognizedas held under controlin the face of eitherin-
differenceor of oppositionon the part of the regionalpopulation.
The vastareas ofthesubarcticlands,whetherin Alaska, Canada, Sweden,or the
-1950 FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 117
Soviet Union, sparselypopulatedby primitivetribes,with a few scatteredsettle-

mentsof civilizedpeoples,are organizedpoliticallyas thoughtheywere coloniesof
an outsidestate,even wherethereis no break in the extentof territory under the
same flag. The same is true of tropicallowland areas, in almost all the Latin
Americancountries. In mostof the latter,theseessentiallyunorganizedterritories
constituteover halfthe total area officially creditedto the country.36
A moredifficult question fordefinitionis raised in examiningthe areas of long-
settledIndian populationin the highlandsof tropicalAmerica-both in Central
Americanstatesand in the Andes. Are theseareas of nativelanguageand culture
to be consideredas integralparts of statesor are theynot stillcolonialareas sub-
ject to outsidecontrol,even thoughthe centerof controlis not in Spain but in the
neighboringdistrictsof Spanish-Americanculture?
A similarsituationmay be foundin more highlydevelopedcountries. Thus
duringthe centuriesin whichall of Ireland was recognizedin international law as
part of the United Kingdom,its greaterpart was certainlyoperatedin fact as a
subjectarea, distinctfromthecontrolling state. Much the same may be truetoday
of certainportionsof the Soviet Union, notablythe so-calledrepublicsof Central
Asia-but the difficulty of determining the actual operationsof the Soviet govern-
mentmakedefinitestatementimpossible. On theotherhand,we have in theUnited
States clear-cutthoughtinyrelicsof internalcolonialismin the Indian reservations.
If the idea of the stateis based on the recognitionof the existenceof a nation,
then the major geographicquestion to consideris whetherthere is close corre-
spondencebetweenthe area of the nationand that of the state. Are thereregions
withinthe statewhose populationdo not feelthemselvespart of the nation? Are
there regions of the nation that are not includedwithinthe state-the issue of
irridentism ?
It is not easy to measurethe area to be includedin a particularnationalgroup.
In manycases we mustapproachthe questionindirectly. If we can determinethe
essentialfactorsinvolvedin the particularnationality, we may be able to measure
the area over whicheach of these factorsexists. On this basis we may establish
certainareas that are clearly includedin the given nation,and otherareas that
adherein termsof some factors,but not in termsof others.
The entirearea over which the nation extends,but in varyingdegreesof in-
tensity,may thenbe comparedwiththe area presentlyincludedin the state. We
have thus determinednot only the areal correspondenceof state and nation,but
also the regionsin which the nationalcharacteris partial ratherthan complete.
We shall therebyhave presented,in part in map form,the basic factorsand rela-
tionshipsinvolvedin the primaryproblemof politicalgeography-the analysisof
the degreeto whichthe diverseregionsof the state constitutea unity.
36 For morecomplete withan attempt
discussion, to maptheseareas see RichardHartshorne,
"The Politicio-Geographic
Patternof theWorld,"Annalsof theAmericanAcademyof Political
and Social Science,CCXVIII (Nov. 1941): 45 ff.
Internal Organization
At this pointwe reach one otherproblemfor analysis-the relationof the in-
ternalterritorialorganizationof the state-areato the regionaldiversitieswe have
analyzed. Though all the regionsof a state are clearlyincludedunder the state-
idea, have completeloyaltyto the overall conceptsof the nationalunit, regional
differences inevitablycause some differences in interpretation and implementation
of those concepts.
If thesedifferences are relativelyminor,as in mostof France or, I presume,in
Uruguay,the regionsmay acceptunitarygovernment froma singlecentralauthor-
ity. If the differences are great,the attemptto imposesuch a uniformsystemmay
provokeoppositionendangeringthenationalunity. Since such regionaldifferences
are importantin most countries,but most states attemptto operateunder a uni-
form,centralizedgovernment, the numberof examples of this type of problemis
very large. Spain, at the moment,providesone of the most striking.
Certainstatesrecognizeopenlythe need to permitdiverginginterpretations of
the overall conceptsof that state and hence significantdifferences in the institu-
tions and laws thereunder. This is the system of the federal state, of which
Switzerlandprovidesthe oldest example,the United States the largest. In both
cases, a notabledegree of regionalheterogeneity is guaranteedby the constitutional
divisionof powers.
In this countrywe are at the momentengagedin one of our periodiccrises in
determiningjust how much social and politicalautonomyis to be permittedthe
regions that are crudelyrepresentedby our so-called States. This crisis, inci-
dentally,causes the Congress of the United States to work for the social and
politicalgeographer,producingraw materialusefulto us in measuringdifferences
in intensityof regionalattitudestowardsthe factsof racial composition.
The possible ways of organizingthe state-areaare not limitedto the unitary
and the federalsystems. The United Kingdom,for example,has evolved in the
course of its long historya mostcomplicatedsystemunderwhichWales, Scotland,
NorthernIreland,the Isle of Man, and the ChannelIslands-each has a different
degree of autonomyadjusted to its particularlinguistic,religious,economic,and
politicalgeography.
In determining the methodof state-organization of a country,the studentmust
studythe actual methodof government, not merelythe wordswrittenintoa consti-
tution. He will recognizethat while the constitution of the Soviet Union grants
on paper more independenceto its memberrepublicsthan is true of the individual
States of this country,and even thoughit encouragesand exploitsa great variety
of languagesand folkcultures,in everyotheraspect of economicand politicallife
regionsas a highlycentralized,mono-
it operatesits vast area of radicallydifferent
lithic state.
ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL FUNCTIONS
approachto theanalysisof thepoliticalgeographyof a state,our

In a functional
firsthalfwas concernedwiththe internalproblemsof the state-area. The second
halfis concernedwiththe externalrelationsof the state-areato the otherareas of

the world,whetherthose are also organizedas states,controlledby outsidestates,
or unorganized. For conveniencewe may group these relationsas territorial,
economic,political,and strategic.
TerritorialRelations
Under territorial relationswe are of course concernedin the firstinstancewith
the degreeto whichadjacent statesare in agreementconcerningthe extentof ter-
ritorywhicheach includes. Whetherthe area in questionis large or small,agree-
mentultimatelyrequiresthe determination of a preciseboundary.
Of all the problemsof international relations,theseconcerningthe allocationof
territoriesand hence the determination of boundariesare the most obviouslygeo-
graphic. It is no doubtforthatreasonthattheyhave been the mostcommonob-
ject of studyby geographers. In the last two decades Americangeographerscan
point to notableprogressin the developmentof genericconceptsand usefulgen-
eralizations,if not definiteprinciples,concerninginternational boundaries.37
In muchof thisworkhowever,we stilltendto starton the wrongfoot. In the
initialclassificationof internalboundarieswe have, as geographers,looked firstat
the physicalcharacterof the zones in whichthe boundarylines are drawn. This
is not a classificationof international boundaries,but ratherof the featureswith
which such boundariesare associated.
If we startwithwhat we are studying-thestate-areas-we can recognizethe
essentialfunctionof the boundaryfromits name: it is that line which is to be
acceptedby all concernedas boundingthe area in which everything is under the
jurisdictionof one state as against areas under differentjurisdiction. In well-
developedregionsof the world it mustbe determinedto the exact foot. (Consid-
erationof the functionsof a boundaryzone, as an elementof militarydefense,for
example,is a separatequestionto be consideredelsewhere.)
The firstthingto knowabout an international boundarythereforeis the degree
to which it is acceptedby all the partiesconcerned-i.e., the adjacent states and
the populationwhose statehoodis determinedby the locationof the boundary.3S
Considerthe followingcases of international boundaries;the boundarybetween
37 The followingseriesis unusualin Americanpoliticalgeography in thateach derivesmuch
fromthe precedingstudiesand fromearlierstudiesby Europeangeographers:RichardHart-
shorne,"Geographicand PoliticalBoundariesin Upper Silesia," Annals of the Associationof
AmericanGeographers, XXIII (1933): 194-228; idem,"Suggestionon the Terminologyof
PoliticalBoundaries,"Mitteilungen des Vereinsder Geographenan der UniversitatLeipzig,Heft
14/15(1936): 180-192;abstractin Annalsof theAssociationof AmericanGeographers, XXVI
(1936): 56 f.; S. Whittemore Boggs, InternationalBoundaries,New York, 1940; StephenB.
Jones,Boundary-Making: A HandbookforStatesmen,TreatyEditorsand BoundaryCommis-
sioners,ColumbiaUniversity Press,1945.
38 A considerationof a largenumberof internationalboundariesfromthisapproachis given
in RichardHartshorne, "A SurveyoftheBoundaryProblemsof Europe,"in Geographic Aspects
of InternationalRelations,C. C. Colby,editor,University of Chicago Press, 1938,pp. 163-213.
Great Britain and France (includingthe Channel Islands with Great Britain);
thatbetweenFrance and Spain; thatbetweenSwitzerlandand Italy (includingthe
Ticino boundarythatreachesfar down the Alpine slopes almostto the Po Plain);
and, finally,the boundarybetweenthe United States and Mexico both east and
west of El Paso. These run throughradicallydifferent types of physicalzones.
Some correspondclosely with ethnic divisions, others do not. But from the
pointof view of the primaryfunctionof an international boundary,all are in the
same category,namelythatof boundariescompletelyacceptedas finalby the states
themselvesand the people of the borderareas.
In a differentcategoryis theFranco-Germanboundary(consideredas of 1930).
Though this was fullyaccepted by France and officially so by Germanyin the
Treaty of Locarno, one could not assume that the Germanleaders intendedthat
acceptanceto be finaland by imprisoningcertainof the local leaders in Alsace the
Frenchgovernment demonstrated its lack of faithin thecompleteacceptanceby the
Alsatianpeopleof theirinclusionin the Frenchstate.
Still differentis the case of the German-Polishboundaryof the inter-war
period,whichneitherstateacceptedas morethana temporarydivisionof territory
claimedby both sides.
Where boundariesrun throughprimitive,essentiallycolonial,regionswhichat
presenthave very slightproductivevalue but offerpossibilitiesfor futureimpor-
tance,we may need to recognizea different set of categories. Thus we may find
cases in whichfora timethe states concerned, while not committing themselvesto
an ultimateboundary,raise no questionconcerningthe line lost in the wilderness,
but may at any momentchallenge,withthe forceof'arms,the line thathad appar-
entlybeen accepted.39
If we firstestablishsuch a systemof classification, based on the primaryfunc-
tion of boundaries,and only then seek to determineto what extentthose of par-
ticularcategoriesare based on different typesof features-e.g., on naturaldivides
of population,on ethnicdivisions,or on boundariesantecedentto state develop-
ment-we may hope to avoid one of our more commonformsof geographicde-
terminism.
The second questionconcerningany international boundary(whetheror not it
is fullyaccepted) is the degree to which its boundingfunctionis maintainedby
the borderingstates,the degree,thatis, to whichall movementsof goods and per-
sons across theline are effectivelycontrolledby theboundaryofficials. In examin-
ing that,the geographer will of course observethe ways in which the controlis
made easier or more difficult by the characterof the zone throughwhich the
boundaryline is drawn.
A special aspect of boundaryproblemsemergeswhere the territory of a state
reachesto the sea. Though open to use by all, the seas are in factlittleused by
Territorialclaimsin theUpperAmazon,"in Geographic
39Cf. RobertS. Platt,"Conflicting
Problems,C. C. Colby,editor,University
Aspectsof International of ChicagoPress, 1938,pp.
243-278.
anyone. Hence, it is sufficient formostpurposesto definethe boundarysimplyas

followingthe coast,as mosttreatiesdo. But forcertainpurposes,notablyfishing,
bordercontrol,and naval warfare,the exact determination of the line in the waters
may be critical. There is no overall agreementin international law eitheras to
the width of waters-the
territorial zone of sea includedas part of the possession
of the borderingstate-or as to the mannerin which the off-shoreline bounding
thosewatersfollowsthe indentationsof the coast. The literatureon thisproblem
is voluminous,but among geographers,Boggs, so far as I know,is the only one
who has made special studyof the problem.40
The use of territorialwaters by merchantships of a foreignstate,commonly
forthe purposeof enteringthe portsof the countryconcerned,representsthe most
commonoccurrenceof use of territoryof one state for the purposes of another
state. In this case the purposeis mutual. In other,more special cases, problems
arise fromthe desireor need of the people of one stateto utilizethe territory of a
foreigncountryin orderto have access to stillothercountries,or in some cases to
a differentpart of theirown state. Both Canada and the United States have per-
mittedtheconstruction of railroadsacross portionsof theirterritorieswhose major
purpose was to connectregionsof the othercountry-e.g., the Michigan Central
across Ontario fromDetroit to Buffalo,or the Canadian Pacific across the State
of Maine fromMontrealto St. John,New Brunswick. European countriescom-
monlywill not tolerateforeignrailroads across their territories,but the Polish
railroadsin the inter-warperiod operated,for Germany,throughtrainsbetween
East Prussia and the main part of Germany.
Nearlyall statesrecognizethe need of providingtransitservicefortradeacross
theirterritoriesbetweenstateson eitherside, thoughthis involvesa multiplicity of
minor problemsof control. Most importantare provisionsfor transitfroman
inland state to the seacoast in orderto have access to the countriesof the world
accessibleby sea routes. The Grand Trunk Railroad of Canada, now a part of
the Canadian National Railways,not only crosses New Hampshireand Maine to
reachthe sea, but,when the winterice closes the St. Lawrence,uses the harborof
Portland,Maine as its portof shipmentforforeigntradeof interiorCanada, which
constitutesmost of the total trafficof that Americanport. In certainEuropean
cases morespecificarrangements seem necessary:a sectionof a port,as at Trieste
or Hamburg,may be allocatedexclusivelyto handle the transittrade of a foreign
country.*
Economic Relations
Trade in commoditiesamongstatesin an essentialpart of the fieldof economic
geography,treatedusuallyas simplya formof interregional trade for which defi-
nite statisticshappen to be available. Other formsof internationaleconomicre-
lations,as in services,investments,etc.,mightno less logicallybe studiedin eco-
40 Boggs, op. cit.,pp. 184-192.
* Air Transporthas ofcourseaddeda newvarietyoftransitproblems.
nomicgeography,but as yetfewgeographershave attemptedto do this. While it

is obviousthattheseeconomicrelationsbetweenindividualsor corporationsin one
state and those in othersare somehowsignificant to the statesconcerned,it is by
no meanseasy to determinewhatthatsignificance is. In consequencemanywriters
in politicalgeographysee no alternativebut to throwin a sectiontreatingthe in-
ternationaltrade of the countryin standardeconomic-geographic fashion.
In the analysisof a state-areathe need to considerits economicrelationswith
outside areas arises fromthe fact that in many respectsa state operates,must
operate,as a unit economyin relationwith other unit economiesin the world.
The difficulties arise because,while it must operatecompletelyas a politicalunit,
a state-areaoperatesonly partiallyas an economicunit.
The firstproblemis to determineto what extentthe economyof one state-area
is dependenton thatof others,thoughthe mereanalysisof self-sufficiency is onlya
beginning. If one says thatthe United States producesa surplusof coal and iron,
but is dependenton foreigncountriesfor much of its supply of tin, nickel,and
manganese,of sugar and rubber-such a statement, even in precisepercentagefig-
ures,tell us directlylittleof importance. If a countryhas plentyof coal and iron
it can normallysecure the other metals mentionedfromwhereverin the world
theyare produced. Under abnormalconditionsof war, or threatof war, it is es-
sentialto knowthatthe manganesenormallycomes fromthe Transcaucususin the
Soviet Union, the tin from British Malaya (but can be obtained in Bolivia),
whereas the nickel comes fromadjacent Canada. Natural rubber supplies are
availablein adequate amountsonlyin one remoteregion-Malaya-East Indies-but
nearbyCuba can supplymostof our sugar needs.
In general,the geographerwill analyze the economicdependenceof one state-
area on othersin termsof the specificcountriesconcernedand theirlocationand
politicalassociationin relationto the state he is studying.
Since all sound tradingis of mutualadvantageto bothparties,to say thatone
stateis economicallydependenton any othernecessarilyimpliesalso the converse.
But the degree to whichany particularcommoditytrade,shippingservice,or in-
vestmentis criticallyimportantvaries in termsof the total economyof each of the
two states concerned. It is only in this sense that the commonquestion "Is a
particularstate economicallyviable?" has any validity,since everystate above the
mostprimitivelevel is in some respectscriticallydependenton others.
The problemis far fromsimple,but perhaps we can suggesttwo generaliza-
tions. As betweentwo countriesthat differgreatlyin the size of theirtotal na-
tional economy,the economicrelationshipsbetweenthem are more criticallyim-
portantfor the lesser country(though this mightnot be true under war condi-
tions). This is true because these economicrelationships, whichmay be takenas
equalized throughinternational balance of payments,will forma largerproportion
of the totalnationaleconomyof the lesser state. An obvious exampleis foundin
the relationof Eire to Great Britain,of Cuba to the United States.
The second generalizationrests on the factthat the criticalsignificanceof the
trade dependson the possibilityof alternatives, of findingothersourcesforneeded

suppliesor othermarketsforproductswhichmustbe sold to maintainthe national
economy. Most popular discussionstend to thinkonly of the former,whereas
under the capitalistprofit-system under which most internationaltrade operates,
it is the latterthat is more significant.The reason is thatfor most commodities
of worldproductionthereare alternativesourcesof supplyat moderateincreasein
cost; theremay not be alternativemarketseven at greatlyreducedsellingprices.
Finally we may note thatrelativelyfew areas of the worldnow producea sur-
plus of manufactured goods requiringa high degree of technologicaldevelopment
and theseconstitutetherefore a relativelylimitedmarketforthe surplusof primary
productsof farm,forest,and mine whichcan be producedwidelyover the world.
Consequentlythe countriesproducingprimaryproducts,even the very necessities
of life,may findit moredifficult to findalternativemarketsfortheirproductsthan
the industrialcountriesproducingarticlesless essentialto life. With widerspread
of industrialization over the world,this situationwould of course be altered,con-
ceivablyreversed.
It shouldnot be assumedhoweverthatthese roughgeneralizationswill provide
the answerin any givencase. Considerthe problemposed by the independenceof
Austria afterthe dissolutionof the Habsburg empire-a problemwhich Austria
stillfaces. T'o surviveas a viable economicunit,Austrianeeded to maintainwith
theadjacent regions,re-organizedas independentstates,a highdegreeof economic
relationship. Its positionin competitionwith otherwisemore favoredregionsof
industrialEurope, made it peculiarlydependenton marketsimmediatelyto the
east. For these easternneighborssuch relationshipswere also necessaryfor the
maximumeconomicprogress,but were not vitallynecessaryto economiclife. If,
for political reasons, and to develop their own industriesat greater cost, they
preferrednot to tradefreelywithAustria,theyhad the choiceof the less profitable
plan, whereasfor Austria the alternativewas economiccollapse.
In the nineteenthcentury,internationaleconomicrelations,thoughboth sup-
portedand retardedby stateaction,were generallyoperatedas the privatebusiness
of individualsand corporations. With the depressionof the 1930's, the rise of
totalitarianstates,and the last war, therehas been an increasingtendencyforthe
state itself to direct the operationsof internationaltrade and investment. In
these respectsstates functionincreasinglyas economicunits so that the economic
relationsamong them become increasinglyimportantin the politico-geographic
analysisof the state.
Political Relations
The mostobviousformof politicalrelationof a stateto any outsideterritory is
politicalcontrol-as a colony,possession,dependency,or "protec-
that of effective
torate." Commonlywe recognizeonly a small numberof states as colonial,or
imperial,powers: eight or nine in western Europe, togetherwith the United
States, Japan,Australia,and New Zealand (the two latterfunctioning in islands
of the SouthwestPacific). Germanywas eliminatedfromthe list by the First

World War, Japan by the Second. If, however,we recognizethe colonialreality
of areas adjacent to a state and legallyincludedin its territorybut actuallynot
formingan integralpart of that state (as discussedearlierin this paper), the list
is far longer-includingCanada, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union, China, the
Union of South Africa,andmost of the Latin Americanstates. A new-comerto
thislist is the IndonesianRepublic,withlarge territories subjectto it in theprimi-
tive areas of Borneo,Celebes,Xetc.
The legal formsof colonialrelationshipvary widely-even withina single em-
pire, such as that of Great Britain. Further,these legal formsmay or may not
expressthe realityof the relationship, the degreeto whichpoliticalorganizationis
imposed and operatedby the outside state. It is the latter,I presume,that is
our concernin politicalgeography.
One characteristic of colonialareas thatis of particularconcernfromour pres-
entpointof view is the degreeto whichthegovernmental systemof the home state
is extendedover the colonial territory. France is in the process of fullyincor-
poratingcertainformerlycolonialareas into metropolitan France, but othersonly
partially. Many imperialpowers have always extendedtheirlegal systemsinto
colonial areas so far as citizens fromthe home countryare concerned,so that
withinany colonialarea theremay be an overlappingof two authorities-onehav-
ing jurisdictionover citizensof the home state,the otherover nativepeople.
Many countriesrecognizedby treatyas independentstates,and functioning in
large degree as such, are nonethelessunder some particulardegree of political
controlby an outsidepower. This may be limitedto utilizationof small fractions
of the territory of one stateby the government, usuallythe armed services,of the
other-e.g., Great Britain in militarycontrolof the Canal Zone of Egypt, the
United States Navy at GuantanamoBay. The most important,relatively,is the
Americancontrolfor essentiallyan indefiniteperiod,of the Panama Canal Zone,
across themostpopulouspartof the Republicof Panama. In othercases, the out-
side countrymaycontroldirectlyno partof theterritory, but ratherexerciselimited
control,as throughan adviser,over major aspects of government, especiallyforeign
relations,customs,or the national budget. The United States has in thepast exer-
cised such controlfor limitedperiods over small states in the -Caribbeanarea; a
group of outside powers for years operatedthe tariffcustomsof China to raise
moneyto pay the Chineseforeigndebts. The clearestcase of politicaldomination
of supposedlyindependentstatesby an outsidestatetodayis foundin the obvious
controlby the Soviet Union over the internalpolicies as well as foreignpolicyof
the "satellite"states on its west,fromPoland to Bulgaria, even thoughthis rela-
tionshipis expressedin no formaltreaties.
Generallyspeaking,recognitionof independentsovereigntyof a state by the
other states of the world presumesthat that state will maintainsimilarpolitical
relationswithall friendlystates,will not be bound by special politicalassociations
withany particularstates. Numerousexceptionshoweverare widelyrecognized.
Thus thedominionsoftheBritishCommonwealth are recognizedas havingemerged

fromcolonialto independentstatus,even thoughtheycontinueto be held together
in continuouslyvoluntaryconfederation with the United Kingdom,extendingto
each othernumerouspoliticaland economicprivilegesnot extendedto otherstates.
Likewise outside states have long recognizedthe special politicalconcernof the
United States forthe Latin Americanrepublics,a concernnow finallyexpressedin
treatyas a mutualpolicyof association. Likewise theyhave recognizedthe long-
standingpoliticalinterestof the United States in the negrostate of Liberia. The
recentNorthAtlanticPact, thoughintendedprimarilyformilitarypurposes,con-
tainspoliticalclauses which,if implemented, would tendto createa specialpolitical
associationof the United States,Canada and the statesof westernEurope.
Finally,of course,nearlyall the statesof the worldhave acceptedcertainpoliti-
cal commitments in joiningtheUnited Nations; insofaras thisapplies to all states,
such commitments are universal,ratherthan geographicallydistinctive.
StrategicRelations
In no phase of politicalgeographydoes the geographerexperiencesuch diffi-
cultyin maintaining his geographicpointof view or in keepinghis eye focussedon
problemshe is competentto studyas in the fieldof strategicrelations. Strategy
obviouslydependson nationalpowerand thisis a subjecton whichthe geographer
feelsreadyto contributehis share,in "geographicfoundationsof nationalpower."
But in so doing he is migratinginto a fieldwhose core and purpose is not geog-
raphy,but militaryand politicalstrategy. Further,to answerthe questionsraised
in thatfield-e.g., "How strongis a state?"-one must analyze not only the geo-
graphicconditions,but a wide host of otherfactorsincludingthe effectof party
systemson the conductof foreignpolicy,moraleof fighting of
troops,effectiveness
personalleadership,size of standingarmies,and numberof fighting planes.
It is thereforenot merelyan intellectualexerciseto attemptto distinguishbe-
tweenpoliticalgeographyand the studyof the power of states (to whichgeogra-
phy has muchto contribute);it is a problemof practicalimportanceforthe indi-
vidual geographerconcernedto outlinea unitaryfieldof political geographyin
whichhe maycompetently work.
The literatureof politicalgeographyprovidesno clear answer,so far as I can
find,to this problem. Certainlythe developmentof Geopolitikgreatlyconfused
the problemfor the Germangeographers,and those of our own colleagues who
have hoped to establisha purifiedfieldof geopoliticshave inheritedthat confusion.
Some writersevidentlysolve the problemby simplyomittingany considerationof
strategicrelations. But surelythisproducesan incompletestudy. In the analysis
of the externalrelationswith otherstate-areas,we must certainlyrecognizethat
the state-area,as a unit,has vitallyimportantstrategicrelationswith the other
areas of theworld.
I thereforeapproachthisproblemwithno assurancethatwe have a satisfactory
answer.41 But in this progressreport,it may be appropriateto presentas current

thinkingeven verytentativeconclusions.
Every state-areain the world lives in a strategicsiutationwith otherstates,a
situationthatmay be in part createdby its own actionsand policies,but in major
partis determined forit by thoseotherstates.
Thus Switzerlandin moderntimes has been a unit area of relativelysmall
offensivepower,thoughnot inconsiderabledefensivepower,situatedin the midst
of a group of largerneighbors,each fearfulof expansionof power by the others.
In this situationSwitzerlandhas foundits best hope for securityin a policy of
armed neutralitybecause such a neutralizedarea was in the mutual interest,de-
fensively,of the neighboringpowers. In a much earlierperiod,in the sixteenth
and seventeenthcenturies,when Austria was the only major power bordering
Switzerland,and manyof its neighborswere small states,the Swiss Confederation
followeda verydifferent policyof strategicrelations,frequentlyallyingitselfwith
any of various neighborsin conflictwiththe others.
The strategicrelationsof a state,in otherwords,mustbe adjusted to the par-
ticular strategicsituationin which it findsitselfat any time. With the unifica-
tion of'Germanyin 1871, the strategicmap of Europe was changedno less than
the politicalmap. Because thatnew unitincreasedin economicproduction,popu-
lation,and power fasterthan any of its neighbors,and was able to "establishclose
strategicrelationswith Austria-Hungary,forminga solid block of power across
CentralEurope,all the otherstatesof Europe includingGreat Britain,were forced
to changetheirstrategicrelationswith each other.
Withinthe last fiveyearsthe United States has founditselfforcedto abandon
one of its most time-honored principlesof internationalrelations-that of having
no strategicrelationsin peacetimewith any states outside of the Americas. The
new relationships enteredintounderthe NorthAtlanticPact followedan appraisal
of the new patternof space-relationships of power as createdby the changedsys-
tem of states in Europe. It mightbe significant, though now too late, to ask
whetheran equally realisticappraisal of that situationin 1938 or 1939 would not
have shownthe need fora similarstrategicassociationat thattime.
Whateverreactionthe readermay have to that idea, our concernin this theo-
reticaldiscussionis merelyto illustratethe typeof problemthatseems appropriate
forinclusionin the analysisof the politicalgeographyof a state-area. In studying
the relationswhichsuch an area, operatingas a unit,entersintowithotherareas,
we are concernedwith engagementswhich it has, or has not, made with other
units,whetherfordefensiveor offensive purposes. Interpretation of theseassocia-
tionsncessarilyinvolvesan appraisal of the space relationshipsof all the strategic
41 As examples ofattempts to handlethisproblemin specificcases,reference
maybe madeto
two studies,by the writer,one writtenearlyduringthe last war (thoughpublishedsomewhat
later), the otherjust afterthe end of thatwar: "The UnitedStates and the 'ShatterZone' of
Europe,"in Hans W. Weigertand V. Stefansson, Compassof the World,New York, 1944,pp.
203-214;and "The GeopoliticalPositionof theUnitedStatesand the SovietUnion,"Education,
(October1946): 95-100.
areas involved,whetheras power unitsor as territories of passage. The problem

is logicallyinherentin the politicalgeographyof states and its geographicquality
seems clear.
It is equally clear fromour examples howeverthat in makingsuch a study,
one must assume as given quantitiescertainfactorsthe determination of which
formsa main part of the studyof nationalpower,the fieldwe are attempting here
to separatefrompoliticalgeography. But is this difficulty not inherentin most,
if notall, branchesof geography? We are constantlydependenton otherfieldsto
provideus, as resultof lengthyresearch,withconclusionswhichwe acceptand use
as established.
Ideally,the studentin politicalgeographywould have at his commandconclu-
sions alreadyarrivedat in studiesof the potentialmilitarypower of states,upon
which he would base his interpretation of the strategicrelationsof the state he
has under study. If such studies have not been made, the political geographer
may findit desirableto make themhimself;as a geographerhe has commandof
much of the basic materialnecessaryand with the help of colleaguesfromother
fieldsmay be able to reach reasonablyreliableconclusions. But if our distinction
betweenthe two fieldsis valid, the generalrequirement that a studentshould not
lose his orientationin referenceto the core of his fieldis of particularimportance
in this case; for otherwisethe attractivenessof studyingquestionsof such great
momentas nationalpower may resultin his never returningto the fieldin which
by trainingand experiencehe is fullycompetent.
Relationof Territorial,Economic,Political,and StrategicRelations

For purposes of organization,we have consideredseparatelyfour different
typesof associationswhichthe state-areahas withotherareas of the world. It is
also necessaryto see them togetherin their interrelationships.If one were to
suppose that there would generallybe a high degree of correspondenceamong
them,theexaminationof concretecases would reveal many discrepancies. Thus,
popularthoughtassumesthatGreatBritain'smostimportanteconomicassociations
are withthe countriesof the Commonwealth and Empire,but actuallyher largest
and most criticaleconomictrade is with the United States. Argentinais more
importanteconomicallyto Great Britain than any of her African possessions.
Throughoutour history,the dominanteconomic and strategicconcern of the
United States was with European statesand our major territorialproblemswere
settledwith those states. And yet until 1949, the United States carefullyab-
stainedfromany continuouspoliticalassociationwith any European states. But
it was primarilyour strategicconcerntowardEuropean statesthatled us into our
special relationshipwith Latin America under the Monroe Doctrine. On the
otherhand our politicalguardianshipof Liberia was unrelatedto any territorial,
economic,or strategicconcern until the Firestone Tire Company utilized that
politicalrelationshipforeconomicpurposes,in its projectforrubberproductionin
the 1920's, and in the last war we discoveredat least a temporarystrategicvalue
in the need forairportsin West Africa.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Political geography,as a distinctunit branch of geography,is to be justified

neitherin termsof politicalaspects of geographynor in termsof geographicfoun-
dationsof politics,since each of those constitutesbut a collectionof partial solu-
tions separatedfromthe problemsinvolved. The core of politicalgeographyis
the study of one distinctivephenomenonin the total differentiation of areas,
namelythe sectionsof area organizedas politicalunits. Areal differentiation is
both most markedand most importantin respectto units of land at the level of
state-areas.
The state-area,like a farmor an industrialplant,but unlikethese sectionsof
area thatwe ordinarilystudyas "regions,"is an organizedunitof land and people,
organizedby man accordingto a particularidea or purpose. Though in no proper
sense an organism,the state-areais an organizationthat has genesis, structure,
and function. Logically,therefore, the analysisof a state-areamay be approached
fromany or all of thesethreeviewpoints. In contrastto genuineorganisms,there
is no close mutualrelationshipbetweengenesison the one hand and structureand
functionon the other; on the contrary,states have tendedto add pieces of terri-
torywheneverit was possibleto do so, regardlessof need,and thento adapt func-
tion to the automaticallyresultingstructure. Hence the study of the genesis of
state areas tendsto be largelyhistoricalin interest,throwinglittlelighton struc-
ture and function.
Likewise, in contrastwith such areal units as farmsor industrialplants,the
stateis not able to plan or evolveits regionalstructure, but mustsimplyoperatein
whateverstructureits historyand geographyhave happenedto produce. Since
thesevary for everystate,not in minordegree,but fundamentally, the attemptto
finda generalprincipleof regionalstructureof state-areasis futile. Further,the
state-area,thougha genuinegeographicphenomenon,is not a concreteobject ex-
citingdirectinterestin its morphology forits own sake. Hence the morphological
approachto the studyof the state-areais eithera dull and lifelessdescriptionof
somethingthat appears real only on a map, or, if used as a methodof approach
to the understanding of function,temptsthe studentto naive formsof geographic
determinism.
State-areas are important,both in the practical and in the academic sense,
primarilyin termsof theirfunctions:namelywhatthe state-areaas a whole means
to its partsand its relationsas a wholewithoutsideareas. These functions, deter-
minedby the human forcesthat operatethe state-areaas a unit, are greatlyaf-
fectedby the structureof the state-area,whichof course is the currentproductof
its past dvelopment. In a sequence of cause-and-effect relationships,science can
safelyproceedfromcause to effectonlyin those situationsin whichthe relatively
small numberof factorsand a multiplicity of similarcases makes possible the es-
tablishmentof reliable scientificlaws or general principles. These requirements
are lackingin politicalgeography.
Consequentlywe concludethat the rational,scientifically reliable,and realistic

approachto the studyof state-areasis to startwiththe phenomenawithwhichwe
are mostconcerned-thefunctionsof the state-area-to determinehow these have
been affectedby the characterof the area itself,its structureand contents,and to
utilize historicfactsof genesis insofaras those aid us in understanding structural
featurespreviouslydeterminedto be significant.
There is howevera practicalsituationin which we may be forcedto reverse
this procedure. If plans are being made for the constructionof an entirelynew
state-area,or for major territorialalterationsin an existingone, one is forcedto
attemptsome predictionof the capacityof such a projectedorganizationto func-
tion effectively as a unit. Political geographerswill be able to claim superior
competencein attempting predictionsin such cases only if theyhave establisheda
high degreeof understanding of the reasonswhy presentor past state-areashave
or have not functioned effectively.
The fundamentalinternalfunctionof the state-areais to establishitselfas an
effectiveunit in fact,ratherthan merelyin internationallaw. T~hisrequiresthe
conceptionand establishment of an idea of the state,a purposeor set of purposes,
sufficientlystrongto overcomethe centrifugal tendenciesresultinginevitablyfrom
the separateand divergentinterestsof the diverseregionsthat are included,in a
particulargeographicpattern,in the structureof the state-area.
Externally,the state-areafunctionsas a unit area in friendlyor unfriendly
relationswith other state-areasand other outside areas, relationsthat may be
economic,political,or strategic. Its specificrelationswith
classifiedas territorial,
any one outsidearea may involvea complexof all these and furthertheyare in-
terrelatedto its similar relationswith all otheroutside areas in a world system
whichformsa singlewhole. The studyof these interrelations among state-areas
is primarilya study in space relationshipsamong unit-areasdiffering in internal
character,production,and power.
I trustthat the categoricalmannerin whichthese conclusionsare stated will
misleadno one to suppose thatthis paper is intendedas a blue-printwhichfuture
studiesin politicalgeographyshould follow. We are not readyforthat,if indeed
we ever should be. Rather the attempthas been to suggest how we may con-
structa systemforthe studyof state-areas,a systemthatmustbe sufficiently flex-
ible to be bent to the differences that distinguisheach state-areafromall others,
but whichmay enable studentsto workcumulatively, to build upon what has been
producedby previousstudents.
Because the themeof my paper is limitedto one branchof geographyit might
appear to be addressedto onlya limitednumberof our members. I hope thatwill
prove to be a large number,since we need the combinedeffortsof manyto work
out more effectivemethodsof study. But this is not a call to all geographersto
leave whatevertheyare studyingto work in thisparticularfield.
In anothersense howeverthe paper is addressedto all geographers,certainly
to all geographerswho specialize in any foreignareas. In your regionalstudies
you inevitablycome face to face with problems in political geography. As

specialistsforyour particularregionyou know more about the underlyingfactors
in its politicalgeographythan does the studentof politicalgeographyin general
who is not at home in your region. In order that such knowledgemay be ana-
lyzed and organizedintostudiesusefulto otherstudents,lastingcontributions
both
to regional geographyand to political geography,we need to develop effective
methodsfor study that will give political geographyan organized structureof
knowledge,clearlyintegratedinto the fieldof geographyas a whole. This paper
is a progressreportof effortsto achievethatgoal.

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The Functional Approach in Political Geography

Author(s): Richard Hartshorne

TI SHE subjectof thispaperand thatof PresidentRussell'saddressof last

year reveal in strikingfashionthe wide scope of the fieldin whichgeogra-

From this commonviewpoint,let us cast a criticaleye over the progressof

somehowhas a lot to do with internationalaffairs,and the politicalgeographer

to study this topic, whetherhe be historianor geographerby profession,must

may stillbe uncertain,in bothcases, as to whethersuch studiesforma necessary

though expressed as a definiterefusal to pass judgment (in The Natureof Geography:423-424)

and fields,ignoringthe functioning of farmsas organizedunits of production,we

LIMITATION IN SCOPE OF THIS PAPER

In confining our attentionto politicallyorganizedareas, I do notmean to assert

valuable contributions to geography,as I thinktheyare, it would be pedantic,at

politicalarea-the sovereignstate,even thoughthat ignoresthe large part of the

One finalstatementon the purposeof thispaper. Will it providea methodby

on a basis thatwould make it possibleforthe manynationalitiesof thatcontinent

of the author,or of such a characteras to arouse animosityin foreigncountries

ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF A STATE: INTERNAL

I propose,as stated earlier,to considerthe centralproblemsof politicalgeog-

unityof economicorganization. At the minimum,it establishesuniformcurrency,

tionswithregionsof outsidestatesthanwiththosewithinthe state. This is com-

XXIII (1933): 195-228.

economicdifferences, Marx to the contrarynotwithstanding, are easier to compro-

to Switzerlandby PresidentWilsonto soundout the Swiss reaction,and Peter H. Schmidt,of

graphicunitsof Europe forthe developmentof a state. Yet Italy,as an Austrian

of thevisiblefacts-the fields,silo,corncrib,or cow-barn. But to knowforcertain,

In mucholder states,we mayexpectto findthatan indigenousraisond'etrehas

The Conceptof Nation

loyaltyon a higherlevel thanthatof culturalkinship-i.e., theyhave not been able

ethnicregionsof whichit was formed,but ratherbecause thatstate neverevolved

pared to regardthemselvesas partof thenationof France. It would be interesting

The Conceptof the"Core Area"

The Applicationof theState-Idea in Political Geography

Soviet Union, sparselypopulatedby primitivetribes,with a few scatteredsettle-

approachto theanalysisof thepoliticalgeographyof a state,our

halfis concernedwiththe externalrelationsof the state-areato the otherareas of

anyone. Hence, it is sufficient formostpurposesto definethe boundarysimplyas

nomicgeography,but as yetfewgeographershave attemptedto do this. While it

trade dependson the possibilityof alternatives, of findingothersourcesforneeded

of the SouthwestPacific). Germanywas eliminatedfromthe list by the First

Thus thedominionsoftheBritishCommonwealth are recognizedas havingemerged

answer.41 But in this progressreport,it may be appropriateto presentas current

areas involved,whetheras power unitsor as territories of passage. The problem

Relationof Territorial,Economic,Political,and StrategicRelations

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Political geography,as a distinctunit branch of geography,is to be justified

Consequentlywe concludethat the rational,scientifically reliable,and realistic

you inevitablycome face to face with problems in political geography. As

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