DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES AND QUESTIONS OF APPORTIONMENT

SEMA VS COMELEC
NATURE: Consolidated petitions (certiorari prohibition and mandamus; declaratory relief; and prohibition and mandamus)
seek to annul Resolution No. 7902 dated May 10, 2007 of the COMELEC, treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative
district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
PONENTE: Carpio, En Banc
GIST: He’s saying the case should not have gone on to the merits, since it can be dismissed on procedural grounds, the
requisites for challenging constitutionality of an act not having been fulfilled. By saying what they did, the majority dealt
the policy of local autonomy a blow. So, he’s concurring in the result and in the part where majority said that ARMM
legislative body cannot create a legislative district but he dissents on other portions for, notably, the on the issue of power
to create a province being a power that Congress can delegate.
FACTS:
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines apportioned 2 legislative districts for Maguindanao.
The first consists of Cotabato City and 8 municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM, created under its Organic
Act, RA 6734, as amended by RA 9054. Cotabato City, as part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the
ARMM but of Region XII (having voted against its inclusion in November 1989 plebiscite).
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Later, 3 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9, constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, resulting to total of 11.
Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao. Maguindanao voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in 29 October 2006
plebiscite.
On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board Resolution No. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of
Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.” Resolution No. 07-0407, adopted the COMELEC’s Law
Department recommendation under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007. The COMELEC issued on 29 March 2007
Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the
enactment of MMA Act 201.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 (subject of these cases), amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”
Meanwhile, the Shariff Kabunsuan creation plebiscite was supervised and officiated by the COMELEC pursuant to
Resolution No. 7727. (Option Votes: In favor for creation 285,372; Against the creation 8,802)
The following municipalities seceded from Maguindanao and formed the new province. All of them were from the first
legislative district of Maguindanao. (Barira, Buldon, Datu Blah T. Sinsuat, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang,
Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, Upi) Kabuntalan was chosen as the capital of the new province. The province was the first
to be created under Republic Act No. 9054 or the Expanded ARMM law.
Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which combined Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single
legislative district during the Philippine general election, 2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress representative of the
Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district, Didagen Dilangalen.
ISSUES:
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
If in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.
HELD:
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
(1) The creation of any of the four local government units - province, city, municipality or barangay - must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite
in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to
 create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of
the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power
to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the
creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the
House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province
that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province,
or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of
a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city's
population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or
city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only
by an Act of Congress Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative
districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent
membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such
a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.
(2) In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of
the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative
district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress
because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as
provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
(3) Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution. Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,
preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it
merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
BAGABUYO VS COMELEC
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives
which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body
in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among
the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
FACTS:
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859:
An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro. This law eventually
became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one to two. For the election of
May 2007, Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on
their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the Citys barangays as follows:
Legislative Districts The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan De Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after
the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat,
Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and
Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan,
Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the
second district.
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007. On 10 April 2008, the
petitioner amended the petition to include the following as respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on Audit; the Mayor and the
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City; and its Board of Canvassers.
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued
that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the
conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the
issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district
for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the
May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
The respondents Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that: 1) the petitioner
did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases
assailing the constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in
the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3)
the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371
did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is
required.
The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Courts ruling in Del Mar v. PAGCOR, the Court may take
cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate
exercise of its jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro Citys reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; 3) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units
involve a common denominator the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units
directly affected, as well as of the people therein; 4) a voters sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the
entire citys Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only
allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his
right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 6) government
funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City
ISSUE: Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city, involve the division and
conversion of a local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite.
HELD:
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The
Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos, a case that arose from the division of the congressional
district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact
that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and
held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In
explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the
plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local
Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the
apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a
reapportionment took place.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives
which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body
in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among
the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371 does not
have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than
divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving
each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or reapportionment and the
division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and
does not even imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite
requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code
should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
ALDABA VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The First
Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and
Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter, by creating a separate legislative
district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162
(later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The
population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an
undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected population of
the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to
2000.
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is
unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in
Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress use of projected
population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to
determine compliance with [a constitutional requirement].
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Malolos QUALIFIED to have a Legislative District of its own.
HELD: NO.
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand. The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether
actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010
elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the immediately following
election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election,
such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained
or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected,
prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population.
Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
NAVARRO VS ERMITA 612 SCRA 131 (2009)
“Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an
unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined
“gerrymandering” as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a
candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as
far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
FACTS:
The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 on June 19, 1960. The province
is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and
(3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose,
and Tubajon. Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics Office
(NSO),2 the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte
as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416, broken down as follows:
Mainland 281,111
Surigao City 118,534
Siargao Island & Bucas Grande 93,354
Dinagat Island 106,951
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province may be created if it has
an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of
Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least
2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province.
On April 3, 2002, the Office of the President, through its Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, advised the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Surigao del Norte of the deficient population in the proposed Province of
Dinagat Islands. In July 2003, the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census, with the
assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual population in support of
the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census yielded a population count of 371,576
inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census.
On July 30, 2003, Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which
declared as official, for all purposes, the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576. The
Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands
for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed
province is 802.12 square kilometers.
On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the bill
creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine whether the local
government units directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and
independent province comprising the municipalities of Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San Jose, and
Tubajon. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.
On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a
separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Another set of provincial officials was elected during the synchronized national and
local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1, 2007, the elected provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the
Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate existence.
Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid because it failed
to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local Government Code.
Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent appointments and elections
to the new vacant positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat Islands be declared null and void. They also prayed
for the return of the municipalities of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the return of the former districts to the mother
Province of Surigao del Norte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the territorial requirement in the Local Government Code valid?
HELD:
The territorial requirement in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), thus:
“ART. 9. Provinces.—(a) Requisites for creation—A province shall not be created unless the following requisites on income
and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income—An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately
preceding two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall
include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring
income; and
(2) Population or land area—Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as
certified by National Statistics Office; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.”
However, the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it
added the italicized portion above stating that “the land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands.” Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision
stated or implied.
Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area
requirement need not be complied with is when there is already compliance with the population requirement.
The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such
criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because
the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that “the land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands” is null and void.

NAVARRO VS ERMITA GR 180050 (2011)

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010 filed
by Movant-Intervenors1 dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of
judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dinagat Islands is allowed to stand as a province.
HELD: YES
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then
courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the
implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative
construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the
LGC. It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both
the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight
Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective
implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local
autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a local government code
shall be enacted by Congress.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of
their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of
the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more
islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was
echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and
whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due
deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local
autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated. Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive
construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, but to legislative construction as well, especially with
the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many
details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too
urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability
of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area
requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2)
of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts
of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption
from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as
expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A.
No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in
showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the
time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been
proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as
mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen
from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in
stunting such capacity.
AQUINO III VS COMELEC
Doctrine: Section 5(3) of Article VI of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled
to a representative, but not so for a province.
Population is just one of several other factors to be determined to compose a legislative district in a province.
FACTS:
Senator Benigno Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo question the constitutionality of RA 9716 via petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65.There were originally four legislative districts in Camarines Sur each with a population
exceeding 250,000. RA 9716 reapportioned the composition of the first and second legislative district of the province of
Camarines Sur thereby creating an additional legislative district. This left the first legislative district with a population of
only 176,383 from its original 417,304.
Petitioner’s arguments:
 Save in the case of a newly created province, the constitution requires that each legislative district created by
Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.
 o “Article VI Sec. 5 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.”
o Intent of the framers of the 1987 constitution was to create a population minimum of 250,000 per
legislative district.
 When the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of
Representatives to 200, they took into account the projected national population of 55,000,000
in 1986.
 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000
people for every one (1) representative.
 RA 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation provided in Article VI, Sec 5 par (1), (3) and (4) of the
Constitution.1
Respondent’s arguments:
Substantive matter: There is an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. 1 Article VI Sec 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative (4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
The existence of a 250,000 population condition but only as to the creation of a legislative district in a city and not to a
province.
ISSUE:W/N there can be a legislative district in a province with a population less than 250,000.
HELD: YES
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum
population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
The constitutional “standards” in the apportionment of legislative districts under Section 5 of Article VI, as far as
population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) a minimum “population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand” per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base
increases; and (4) uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts in “provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area.”
The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that “each province, shall have at least one representative” means only that when
a province is created, a legislative district must also be created with it. Can this district have a population below 250,000?
To answer in the affirmative is to ignore the constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be apportioned “in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.” That the
Constitution never meant to exclude provinces from the requirement of proportional representation is evident in the
opening provision of Section 5(1), which states: The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x.”
In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan
Manila area must comply with proportional representation, on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
NAVAL VS COMELEC
Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population
and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.” The aim of legislative
apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The basis for districting shall be the
number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered voters therein.
FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second
District, Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in
Camarines Sur. Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The
present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor,merged with five towns from the old
First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until
2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. He filed before the
COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the
entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district
he had been elected from. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible
three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.
Naval alleges: First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of
new sets of municipalities. With the separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other eight towns which used to comprise
the Second District, the voters from the Third Legislative District are no longer the same ones as those who had elected
him to office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
ISSUE: Is he correct?
HELD: NO
Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population
and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.” The aim of legislative
apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The basis for districting shall be the
number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered voters therein.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality of representation
among the districts. It is with this mindset that the Court should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new
set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013. Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation
of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in
Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents,
would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.

PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
PARTY LIST SYSTEM ACT RA 7941
The House of Representatives is composed of 2 types of Representatives:
 District Representative (80%)
 Party List Representative (20%)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."

Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
 their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
for political and/or election purposes.

Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already
registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with
the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the
party-list system.

Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was
submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint
of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.

Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election,
prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who
have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts
for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list.

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to
the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from
which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named
in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an
elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.

Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for
member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party,
organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a
party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the
first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998.

The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the
matter of the party-list system.

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
(20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate
in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes :
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received
and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the
COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the
COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list
representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he
was elected.

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization.

Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be
automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by
the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party,
organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries
and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.

Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the
regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations
Act.

Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its
information campaign on the party-list system.

Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.

Approved, March 3, 1995.

BANAT VS COMELEC
Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total
votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-
list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this
is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-
list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void
because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the
party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet
the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA
7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections
or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one
seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than
250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from
party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May
2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives
shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the
2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-
list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral
or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not
“qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats”
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded
in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats
given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists
were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2%
of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product,
which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule
shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has
a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes
cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until
all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)
from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA
7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and
that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate
in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people
defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution
– and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
ABAYON VS HRET
FACTS:
Respondents Lucaban, Jr. et al. filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its
nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in
the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Further, they
pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the
immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since the
registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization was a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It
was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All
questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its
jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. She moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on
September 17, 2009, prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioner Abayon as
nominee of Aangat Tayo party-list organization, who took the seat at the House of Representatives.
HELD: YES
RA 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have
the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed
the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo. Since petitioner
Abayon was not elected into office but was chosen by its organization under its internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction
to inquire into and adjudicate her qualifications as nominee.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits and
becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution clearly shows the
Constitution’s point of view that it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or
organizations.
Petitioners Abayon points out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the
party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. But where an allegation is made that the party or
organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House
and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees
are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
ANG LADLAD VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition
for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the
said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated
that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even
punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that
the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELEC’s field personnel.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC is correct in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

HELD: NO.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered
under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality
in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran
to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for
the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at
worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest.
LOKIN JR VS COMELEC (2010)
FACTS:
The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the partylist system
of representation that manifested their intention to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local
elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, CIBAC, through its President Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the
required number of qualifying votes. The nominees in order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination
dated March 29, 2007, were: 1.) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; 2.) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin Jr.; 3.) Cinchora C. Cruz-
Gonzales; 4.) Sherwin Tugma; and 5.) Emil L. Galang. The nominees certificate of acceptance were attached to the
certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspaper of general circulation.
Prior to elections, however, CIBAC still through Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment
of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, hereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugma and Galang and substituted
Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the substitution is valid.
HELD: NO.
The legislative power of the government is vested exclusively in accordance with the doctrine of separation of power. As
a general rule, the legislative cannot surrender pr abdicate its legislative power for doing so will be unconstitutional.
Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the legislative to any other authority, a power that is not
legislative in character may be delegated.
Under certain circumstances, the legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to
adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix
the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide
those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute,
there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities
the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer
or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a
law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power
to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
(3) It must be promulgated in accordance with thr prescribed procedure;
(4) It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC, despite the role as implementing arm of the government in the enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add
anything to the law it seeks to implement. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the
law to be implemented, and should not be override, supplant or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain
consistent with the law they intend to carry out.

LOKIN JR VS COMELEC (2012)

Petitioners contend that the COMELEC never should have taken cognizance of respondents’ Petition to Expunge and/or
for Disqualification. They have reached this conclusion by characterizing the present matter as an intra-corporate dispute
and, thus, cognizable only by special commercial courts, particularly the designated commercial court in this case, the
Regional Trial Court in Pasig City. Pia Derla purportedly filed the Certificate of Nomination pursuant to the authority
granted by the Board of Trustees of the "CIBAC Foundation, Inc.," the non-stock entity that is registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Thus, petitioners insist that the group that participated in the party-list system in the 2004 and 2007 elections was the
SEC-registered entity, and not the National Council, which had allegedly become defunct since 2003. That was the year
when CIBAC Foundation, Inc. was established and registered with the SEC.21 On the other hand, respondents counter that
the foundation was established solely for the purpose of acting as CIBAC’s legal and financial arm, as provided by the
party’s Constitution and bylaws. It was never intended to substitute for, or oust CIBAC, the party-list itself.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC has jurisdiction
HELD: YES. The COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and the nomination of party-list
representatives.
In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that the COMELEC possessed the authority
to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws
and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on Elections and Palmares v. Commission on
Elections, which uniformly upheld the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in
Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its
acts." The Court also declared in another case that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved
the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership
dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well as their individual qualifications, are
outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections 8 and 9 thereof state: Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.
Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in
the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office
in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after
the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not
be considered resigned.
AMORES VS HRET

LAYUG VS COMELEC

ATONG PAGLAUM INC VS COMELEC

COCOFED VS COMELEC

ANAD VS COMELEC

ABANG LINGKOD VS COMELEC

LICO VS COMELEC