89. G.R. No.

172334 June 5, 2013

DR. ZENAIUA P. PIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR.,

FACTS:

The respondent Dr. Roman Dannug (Dannug), in his capacity as Dean of the College of Economics,
Finance and Politics (CEFP) of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), filed a complaint
against Pia who was then a professor at PUP, for directly selling to her students books believed to be
overpriced, in violation of Section 3, Article X of the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers, which
reads:

For her defense, Pia argued that her students were not forced to buy copies of the book.

After preliminary conference and the parties’ submission of their respective memoranda, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.

Herein respondent Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. as the Overall Deputy Ombudsman and Acting
Ombudsman, Pia was declared guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

Pia filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied via an Order10 dated November 20, 2002.

Feeling aggrieved, Pia filed a petition for review with the CA. Even before she could have filed the
petition, respondents Dannug and Dr. Ofelia M. Carague (Carague), former PUP President,
implemented the penalty of suspension that was imposed by the Office of Ombudsman.

The Issue

1. Whether or not Dannug and Carague erred in implementing the Office of the Ombudsman’s
decision during the time that Pia’s period to appeal had not yet expired.

This Court’s Ruling

The Court also finds no irregularity in Dannug and Carague’s implementation of the rulings of the
Office of the Ombudsman, notwithstanding the fact that Pia then still had the remedy of an appeal
before the CA.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately effective and executory even pending
appeal under Section 27 of RA 6770.

x x x In the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether the decision
of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay was
immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.

Clearly from the foregoing, Pia's complaint against Carague and Dannug's immediate implementation
of the penalty of suspension imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman deserves no merit.

90. ABRIGO vs. FLORES

G.R. No. 160786; June 17, 2013; BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Involved in the suit is a lot with an area of 402 square meters situated in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Laguna and inherited by both Francisco (Faylona) and
Gaudencia (Faylona) from their deceased parents. Upon Francisco’s death, his widow
and Gaudencia entered into an extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the
same lot was assigned to Francisco’s heirs while the eastern half thereof to Gaudencia.
There was, however, no actual ground partition of the lot up to and after Gaudencia’s
death. It thus resulted that both the heirs of Francisco and Gaudencia owned in common
the land in dispute. Both, later on, moved to terminate their co-ownership with the heirs
of Gaudencia, by filing their complaint for judicial partition in the RTC of Laguna. The RTC
rendered judgment for the private respondents by ordering the partition of the land in
dispute in such a way that the western half thereof shall pertain to the heirs of Francisco
while the eastern half, to the heirs of Gaudencia whose heirs were further required to pay
rentals to the plaintiffs for their use and occupancy of portions on the western half.
The heirs of Gaudencia, petitioners included, went on appeal to the Supreme Court where
it affirmed the appealed judgment of the CA, minus the award for rentals. With no further
appellate proceedings having been taken by the petitioners and their other co-heirs, an
Entry of Judgment was issued.
Thereafter, the heirs of Francisco filed with the CA a motion for execution to enforce and
implement its decision as modified by the SC.
Pending action thereon and pursuant to the parties’ agreement to engage the
services of a geodetic engineer to survey and subdivide the land in question, the CA
issued an order appointing Engr. Domingo Donato "to cause the survey and subdivision
of the land in question and to make his report thereon within thirty (30) days from receipt
hereof." The CA took note of the report submitted by Engr. Donato. In the same order,
however, the court likewise directed the defendants, more specifically the herein
petitioners, to remove, within the period specified therein, all their improvements which
encroached on the western half. They were given 2 months within which to remove their
garage, a small portion of their residence which was extended to a portion of the property
of the plaintiffs as well as the chicken pens thereon and to show proof of compliance
herewith. Petitioners again prayed the respondent court for a final extension of sixty (60)
days within which to comply with the order. Petitioners alleged that they "are about to
conclude an arrangement with the plaintiffs and just need ample time to finalize the
same." Private respondents interposed an opposition, therein stating that the alleged
arrangement alluded to by the petitioners did not yield any positive result. The CA denied
petitioners’ motion for extension of time to remove their improvements and issued a writ
of execution.
Sheriff Baliwag served the writ on the petitioners, giving the latter a period twenty
(20) days from notice within which to remove their structures which occupied portions of
private respondents’ property. The implementing sheriff returned the writ "PARTIALLY
SATISFIED", with the information that petitioners failed to remove that portion of their
residence as well as their garage and poultry fence on the western half of the property.
Private respondents then filed with the CA a Motion for Issuance of Special Order of
Demolition. Before the CA could act on private respondents’ aforementioned motion for
demolition, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Resolution on Motion for Demolition, this
time alleging that they have become one of the co-owners of the western half to the extent
of 53.75 square meters thereof, purportedly because one of the successors-in-interest of
Francisco Faylona – Jimmy Flores – who was co-plaintiff of the private respondents in
the case, sold to them his share in the western half.
In the herein first assailed order, the CA denied petitioners’ motion to defer resolution of
private respondents’ motion for a special order of demolition and directed the issuance of
an alias writ of execution. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, thereunder
insisting that being now one of the co-owners of the western half, there is need to defer
action of the motion for demolition until the parties in the co-ownership of said half shall
have decided in a formal partition which portion thereof belongs to each of them.
A timely opposition to the motion for reconsideration was filed by the private respondents,
thereunder arguing that the alleged Deed of Sale and supposedly executed by Jimmy
Flores was merely falsified by the latter because one of the Floreses, Marites Flores, did
not actually participate in the execution thereof, adding that the same document which
seeks to bind them (private respondents) as nonparticipating third parties, cannot be used
as evidence against them for the reason that the deed is not registered. An alias writ of
execution was again issued. Again, petitioners failed and refused to comply.
Petitioners instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA against respondents and
the RTC, alleging that the RTC had gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order denying their motion to defer resolution on the
motion for demolition, and the order denying their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners contended that the sale to them by respondent Jimmy Flores, one of the
successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona, of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the
402-square meter lot had meanwhile made them co-owners of the western portion, and
constituted a supervening event occurring after the finality of the November 20, 1989
decision that rendered the execution inequitable as to them.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the RTC did not gravely
abuse its discretion. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of their
petition, but the CA denied their motion.

ISSUE: WON the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of his 1/4 share in the western portion
of the 402-square meter lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution
of the final judgment against petitioners inequitable.

RULING: NO. The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his
1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot under the deed of sale dated
March 4, 1998 was a supervening event that rendered the execution inequitable is devoid
of merit.
Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of
right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such
circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the
final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the western portion thereby
adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose
of segregating the ¼ portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The
reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989
decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified, even
if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct what was perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest
Court of the land, rendered it. This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final
judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to
consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause
not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the
suspension.
Petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property in litis their demand
for the segregration of the 1/4 share of Jimmy Flores.

It irritates the Court to know that petitioners have delayed for nearly 17 years now the full
implementation of the final and immutable decision of November 20, 1989, as modified
by the CA. It is high time, then, that the Court puts a firm stop to the long delay in order
to finally enable the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona as the winning
parties to deservedly enjoy the fruits of the judgment in their favor.

91. LIM-LUA VS LUA

Facts:
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for
the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought
the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent's huge earnings from
salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order granting support
pendente lite
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the
plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand
Pesos... for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her
eye[s] which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already
extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be
continued by him... considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff
needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
,[7] asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does
not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family for... their sustenance and well-being in accordance with
family's social and financial standing.
As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well
as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and...
beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,... nullified and set aside and instead a
new one is entered... to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of
P115,000.00 ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus
946,465.64, or a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of
Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the
past expenses incurred by respondent which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the
two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well.
It also noted the lack of contribution... from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses
to support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE
AMOUNT OF PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80
FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO
THE PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN.[17]
Ruling:

Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed
by either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The
dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of
petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his
disposal. As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can
solely provide for the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and
recreational activities of his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then
unemployed and a full-time housewife.

92. Agner V. BPI (2013)

FACTS:
On February 15, 2001: Sps. Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed Promissory Note
without prior notice or demand with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. secured
by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and an interest of 6%/month for failure to
pay each installment. Citimotors assigned them to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc. which
assigned them to BPI Family Savings Bank. On October 4, 2002, due to failure to pay
despite demand, BPI filed on an action for Replevin and Damages in RTC of Manila. RTC
issued writ of replevin but vehicle was not seized. The RTC upon trial on merits ordered
Sps. to jointly and severally pay the amount of Php576, 664.04 plus interest at the rate of
72%/annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not, prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of
replevin.
HELD: The Civil Code in Art. 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or is in default from
the time the obligor demands the fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee. However,
the law expressly provides that demand is not necessary under certain circumstances,
and one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly waive demand. Hence,
since the co-signors expressly waived demand in the promissory notes, demand was
unnecessary for them to be in default. Under the case, Navarro v. Escobido: prior demand
is NOT a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on
the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Royeca: x x x The creditor's possession of the
evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment. A promissory
note in the hands of the creditor is a proof of indebtedness rather than proof of payment.
In an action for replevin by a mortgagee, it is prima facie evidence that the promissory
note has not been paid. Likewise, an un canceled mortgage in the possession of the
mortgagee gives rise to the presumption that the mortgage debt is unpaid.
In Elisco Case: The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative.
The exercise of one bars the exercise of the others. At the same time, it prayed for the
issuance of a writ of replevin or the delivery to it of the motor vehicle
As Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered
and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no
seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and
enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or
concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative
prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfilment of the
obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.

93. G.R. No. 190818 June 5, 2013

METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP., vs.
MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila,
and THE CITY OF MANILA,Respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in October 2001, respondent Liberty M. Toledo, as Treasurer of respondent
City of Manila (City), assessed petitioners for their fourth quarter local business taxes
pursuant to the "Revenue Code of the City of Manila" Consequently, petitioners paid the
total assessed amount under protest.
Petitioners informed the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila of the nature of the
foregoing payment, assailing as well the unconstitutionality of Section 21 of the Manila
Revenue Code. Petitioners’ protest was however denied so petitioners filed a case with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) against respondents, reiterating their claim that
Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code is null and void. Accordingly, they sought the
refund of the amount of local business taxes they previously paid to the City, plus interest.
Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint which in essence, reprised their previous claims.

For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. The RTC did not address the
arguments raised in the aforesaid Motion to Dismiss but merely admitted petitioners’
amended complaint.
Consequently, respondents filed their Answer. Notably, in their Motion to Dismiss and
Answer, respondents averred that petitioners failed to file any written claim for tax refund
or credit with the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC, however, denied.
Respondents received a copy of the said order so they filed two (2) Motions for Extension
to File Petition for Review with the CTA, effectively requesting for a period of thirty (30)
days from May 27, 2007, or until June 26, 2007, to file their petition for review.
On June 26, 2007, respondents filed their Petition for Review via registered mail. The
respondents likewise filed a Manifestation via personal filing, alleging that they have
previously filed their Petition for Review via registered mail and that they are attaching
another copy of the same in the Manifestation. In its Resolution, the CTA Division granted
respondents’ Motions for Extension, noted their Manifestation, and admitted their Petition
for Review.

ISSUE
Whether the CTA Division correctly gave due course to respondents’ Petition for Review
by extending the reglementary period within which respondents may file their Petition for
Review, considering that Section 3, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA (RRCTA) is
silent on such matter and by entertaining respondents’ Petition for Review for their failure
to comply with the filing requisites set forth in Section 4, Rule 5 and Section 2, Rule 6 of
the RRCTA.

RULING

Although the RRCTA does not explicitly sanction extensions to file a petition for
review with the CTA, Section 1, Rule 7 thereof reads that in the absence of any express
provision in the RRCTA, Rules 42, 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court may be applied in
a suppletory manner. In particular, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9282 makes reference
to the procedure under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In this light, Section 1 of Rule
42 states that the period for filing a petition for review may be extended upon motion of
the concerned party. Thus, in City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., the
Court held that the original period for filing the petition for review may be extended for a
period of fifteen (15) days, which for the most compelling reasons, may be extended for
another period not exceeding fifteen (15) days. In other words, the reglementary period
provided under Section 3, Rule 8 of the RRCTA is extendible and as such, CTA Division’s
grant of respondents’ motion for extension falls squarely within the law.
Neither did respondents’ failure to comply with Section 4, Rule 5 and Section 2,
Rule 6 of the RRCTA militate against giving due course to their Petition for Review.
Respondents’ submission of only one copy of the said petition and their failure to attach
therewith a certified true copy of the RTC’s decision constitute mere formal defects which
may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. It is well-settled that dismissal of
appeals based purely on technical grounds is frowned upon as every party litigant must
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. In this regard, the CTA Division did not
overstep its boundaries when it admitted respondents’ Petition for Review despite the
aforementioned defects "in the broader interest of justice."

96. G.R. No. 177103

ORIENTAL SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., INC.
vs.
RAINERIO N. NAZAL, Respondent.
FACTS:
On November 15, 2000, respondent Rainerio N. Nazal entered into a 12 month contract
of employment as cook with Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. (agency) for its principal,
Bennet Shipping SA Liberia (collectively, petitioners). Allegedly after the termination of
his work with said agency, he reported to the agency about his health condition and work
experience on board M/V Rover. He claimed that the agency referred him to a company-
designated physician who found him to be suffering from high blood pressure and
diabetes. He then asked for compensation and medical assistance, but the agency denied
his request. As his demand went unheeded, he filed the present complaint.
In his decision, Labor Arbiter (LA) Eduardo J.Carpio dismissed the complaint and Nazal
appealed from LA Carpio’s decision. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
rendered a decision in Nazal’s favor. It set aside LA Carpio’s ruling and awarded Nazal
US$10,075.00 as partial disability benefit, plus 5% attorney’s fees..
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration. For his part, Nazal pleaded with the NLRC
that he be granted permanent total disability benefits as he would not be able to resume
his employment as a seaman anymore. On the other hand, the agency insisted that
laches barred Nazal’s claim, but in any event, he failed to comply with the mandatory
post-employment reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. NLRC denied both
motions.
Thereafter, the agency elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The CA dismissed the petition outright for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE: whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for having been filed
out of time

RULING:
Obviously, the appellate court counted the 60-day period for the filing of the
petition from the date the petitioners claimed they received a copy of the NLRC resolution
denying their partial motion for reconsideration (first motion) and not from the day they
received the NLRC resolution (dated October 31, 2006) denying their urgent motion for
reconsideration (second motion).
The CA considered the agency’s urgent motion for reconsideration as a second motion
for reconsideration which is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court and
also under Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure. The agency
takes exception to the CA ruling, reiterating its position that the two motions dealt with
two different subject matters, the first motion addressed the merits of the case and the
urgent motion was filed on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. It adds that even
the NLRC did not consider the urgent motion for reconsideration a prohibited pleading.
We find merit in the agency’s argument. Technicalities of law and procedure are
interpreted very liberally and are not considered controlling in labor cases. Article 221 of
the Labor Code provides that "in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the
Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its
members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process."
In keeping with the spirit and intent of the law and in the interest of fairplay, we find it both
necessary and appropriate to review the present labor controversy. For the same reason,
we rule out laches as a bar to the filing of the complaint.

97. SY VS LOCAL GOVERNMENT

GR. NO. 202690
HENRY L. SY VS. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY
JUNE 5, 2013

Doctrine: FACTS:
On November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint
for expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned
and registered under the name of Henry L. Sy, which was intended to be used as a site
for a multipurpose barangay hall, day-care center, playground and community activity
center for the benefit of the residents of Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City.
The requisite ordinance to undertake the aforesaid expropriation namely, Ordinance No.
Sp-181, s-94, was enacted on April 12, 1994. On March 18, 1997, pursuant to Section
198 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as the “Local Government
Code of 1991,” the City deposited the amount of P241,090.00 with the Office of the Clerk
of Court, representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based on its
tax declaration. During the preliminary conference on November 8, 2006, Sy did not
question the City’s right to expropriate the subject property. Thus, only the amount of just
compensation remained at issue.
On July 6, 2006, the RTC appointed Edgardo Ostaco (Commissioner Ostaco),
Engr. Victor Salinas (Commissioner Salinas) and Atty. Carlo Alcantara (Commissioner
Alcantara) as commissioners to determine the proper amount of just compensation to be
paid by the City for the subject property. Subsequently, Commissioners Ostaco and
Alcantara, in a Report dated February 11, 2008, recommended the payment of P5, 500.00
per sq. m., to be computed from the date of the filing of the expropriation complaint, or on
November 7, 1996. On the other hand, Commissioner Salinas filed a separate Report
dated March 7, 2008, recommending the higher amount of P13, 500.00 per sq. m. as just
compensation.
ISSUE: Whether the taking of the private property was expropriated with just
compensation?
HELD:
NO. The Court cannot sustain the amount of P5, 500.00/sq. m. as just compensation
which was set by the RTC and upheld by the CA. The said valuation was actually arrived
at after considering: (a) the September 4, 1996 recommendation of the City Appraisal
Committee; (b) several sworn statements made by Sy himself; and (c) Sy’s own tax
declaration for 1996. It is well-settled that the amount of just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking. However, the above-stated documents do not
reflect the value of the subject property at the time of its taking but rather, its valuation in
1996. Consequently, the case must be remanded to the RTC in order to properly
determine the amount of just compensation during such time the subject property was
actually taken.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 was the law applicable at the time of the subject
property’s taking in 1986 as RA 7160 took effect only in January 1, 1992. Under Section
9, Book 1, Title 1, Chapter 2 of the former law, a resolution was the proper authorization
to institute condemnation proceedings, thus:
SEC. 9. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its Sanggunian,
exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public
use or purpose.
Meanwhile, under Section 19 of RA 7160, an ordinance is required:
 SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.
A previous law only requires a resolution for expropriation of land for public use, but
the discussion now reiterated that a new law requires an ordinance for expropriation of
land for public use.

98. Philworth Asis Vs PCIB 697 SCRA 206

INDIRECT CONTEMPT
G.R. No. 161878, June 05, 2013
FACTS:

The former Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) sued petitioners in the RTC
to recover upon an unpaid debt (Civil Case No. 91-1536),2 alleging petitioner Philworth
Asia, Inc. (Philworth) had borrowed P270,000.00 from PCIB to be paid on or before
November 8, 1988 in accordance with a promissory note; that petitioners Spouses Luisito
and Elizabeth Mactal (Mactals) and Spouses Luis and Eloisa Reyes (Reyeses) had
executed a deed of suretyship binding themselves to pay Philworth’s obligations under
the promissory note should Philworth refuse to perform its obligation; that Philworth had
paid only partially, leaving an unpaid balance of P225,533.33, inclusive of interest and
penalty charges; that Philworth had not paid its balance despite repeated demands; and
that attempts to collect from the Mactals and Reyeses had likewise failed.

The RTC rendered its decision against defendants.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, claiming that the RTC had thereby violated their right to
substantive and procedural due process mainly due to its decision being solely based on
the evidence of PCIB.
the CA affirmed the RTC, ruling that Defendants-appellants were not deprived of their day
in court. They were given by the court a quo more than ample opportunity to be heard
and to present evidence in their behalf, but, for reasons known only to them, they opted
not to be heard, they chose not to present evidence in support of their defense.

Scrutiny of the records shows that the court a quo has been very lenient in granting the
series of motions for postponement filed by the defendants-appellants which have
dragged this case for years. The court a quo was even more liberal when after the
defendants-appellants have been declared to have waived their right to present their
evidence, they were still given another opportunity to present their evidence when the
court a quo granted their motion for reconsideration. Hence, defendants-appellants
cannot feign that they were denied of their right to due process.

Issues

Whether the petitioners that the RTC violated their right to due process of law by deciding
the case on the merits based solely on the evidence of PCIB; that the delay could not be
blamed exclusively on petitioners; and that substance should take precedence over mere
technicalities.

Ruling

The appeal is absolutely devoid of any merit.

Petitioners were not denied their right to be heard. The RTC set the case several times
for the pre-trial and the trial. In so doing, the RTC undeniably relaxed the rigid application
of the rules of procedure out of its desire to afford to petitioners the opportunity to fully
ventilate their side on the merits of the case. The RTC thereby acted with liberality. This
was in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving
all the parties the chance to argue and prove their respective sides.Here, however, they
apparently stretched the limits of the RTC’s liberality, to the point of abusing it. A review
of the proceedings has given the Court the impression that they deliberately delayed the
presentation of their evidence by asking postponements of the hearings. The pattern of
delay that followed indicated that they did not intend to present any evidence in their favor,
and that they were simply temporizing as a way of avoiding the inevitable adverse
outcome of the case. Otherwise, they and their counsel would have easily completed the
task of presenting their evidence and shunned the delays. They did present Ms. Garcia
on direct examination, but they thereafter did not see to the completion of her testimony.

A party and its counsel who deliberately or neglectfully delay the prompt termination of
their court case are further guilty of abuse of court processes and of impeding the smooth
administration of justice, rendering them amenable to being cited for indirect contempt
of court under Section 3, (c) and (d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners and their
counsel should then show cause why they should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of
court. The trial judge’s tolerance of the delays or liberality did not exonerate them and
their counsel from their impeding the smooth administration of justice.

99. REP GAS VS PETRON 698 SCRA 666

G.R. No. 194062

FACTS
LPG Dealers Associations, such as the Shellane Dealers Association, Inc., Petron Gasul
Dealers Association, Inc. and Totalgaz Dealers Association, received reports that certain
entities were engaged in the unauthorized refilling, sale and distribution of LPG cylinders
bearing the registered tradenames and trademarks of the petitioners. As a consequence,
Genesis Adarlo, on behalf of the aforementioned dealers associations, filed a letter-
complaint in the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") regarding the alleged illegal
trading of petroleum products and/or underdelivery or underfilling in the sale of LPG
products.

Acting on the said letter-complaint, NBI conducted an investigation and found that
REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant in Malabon was engaged in the refilling and sale of LPG
cylinders bearing the registered marks of the petitioners without authority from the latter.
Based on its General Information Sheet filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission,
REGASCO's members of its Board of Directors are: (1) Arnel U. Ty President, (2) Marie
Antoinette Ty Treasurer, (3) Orlando Reyes Corporate Secretary, (4) Ferrer Suazo and
(5) Alvin Ty (hereinafter referred to collectively as private respondents).

Subsequently, the NBI lodged a complaint in the Department of Justice against the private
respondents for alleged violations of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines but
this was dismissed.
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, respondents sought recourse
to the CA through a petition for certiorari which was granted. Petitioners then filed a
motion for reconsideration. However, the same was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for Certiorari filed by RESPONDENTS should have been denied
outright.

RULING:
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before
a certiorari petition may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to
correct any error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case.
However, this rule is not absolute as jurisprudence has laid down several recognized
exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a
motion for reconsideration, viz.:

(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon
in the lower court.
Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
(c) delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
(f)
such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
(h)
object; and,
(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.[7]

In the present case, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may already be dispensed
with considering that the questions raised in this petition are the same as those that have
already been squarely argued and passed upon by the Secretary of Justice in her assailed
resolution.

100. Lim vs Lazaro

G.R. No. 185734 July 3, 2013
ALFREDO C. LIM, JR., PETITIONER,
vs.
SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO AND CARMEN T. LAZARO, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Petitioner Lim Jr filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the respondent Sps Lazaro. The RTC
granted the writ of preliminary attachment application and upon the posting of the required
bond issued the corresponding writ on October 14, 2005. 3 parcels of land owned by the
respondent spouses were levied upon.
The parties later entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to
pay Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, following a schedule
of payments covering the period from September 2006 until October 2013. The RTC
rendered a decision on the basis of the compromise.
Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary
attachment annotated on the subject TCTs.
In granting the Motion, the RTC ruled that a writ of preliminary attachment is a mere
provisional or ancillary remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect and preserve certain
rights and interests pending final judgment. Considering that the case had already been
considered closed and terminated by the rendition of the decision based on the
compromise agreement, the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and quashed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.

HELD: NO. By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
(Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the
attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main
or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is
available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a
final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire
jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those
instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be
effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which
an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment,
jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had
under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which
had already been approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the
obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of
the total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt
remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have continued to
subsist.