Philosophical Psychology

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Naturalism, Physicalism and Epiphenomenalism

Jason Megill

To cite this article: Jason Megill (2007) Naturalism, Physicalism and Epiphenomenalism,
Philosophical Psychology, 20:6, 681-686, DOI: 10.1080/09515080701665896

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Philosophical Psychology
Vol. 20, No. 6, December 2007, pp. 681–686

Naturalism, Physicalism and

Epiphenomenalism
Jason Megill

I argue that physicalistic naturalism entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. I conclude

by briefly discussing implications of my argument for cognitive science, non-reductive
physicalism, and the possibility of formulating a naturalistic form of dualism.
Keywords: Mental Causation; Naturalim; Physicalism; Qualia

1. Physicalistic Naturalism and Epiphenomenalism are Incompatible

Epiphenomenalism, broadly construed, consists in the belief that although mental
events ‘‘are the effects of certain material causes,’’ mental events themselves do not
act as causes, and so themselves ‘‘have no effects whatsoever’’ (Heil, 1998, pp. 37–38).
To be more precise, in contemporary philosophy of mind, it is commonplace to draw
a distinction between two fundamental types of mental events or mental phenomena:
(i) cognitive mental phenomena, such as beliefs, and (ii) phenomenal experiences, or
qualia. This essay discusses the causal efficacy—or lack thereof—of qualia, leaving
aside issues surrounding the causal efficacy of cognitive mental phenomena. Hence
‘epiphenomenalism’, as it is used here, refers to the view that specifically qualia lack
causal efficacy. It used to be that epiphenomenalism was seen simply as a type of
dualism: the question of the compatibility of physicalism and epiphenomenalism
didn’t really arise. This is no longer the case, however. Kim’s (2000, 2005) influential
exclusion argument (that non-reductive Physicalism entails epiphenomenalism)
is one important reason for this shift.
I now argue that physicalistic naturalism and epiphenomenalism are incompatible.
First, suppose that a broad physicalistic naturalism, of the sort endorsed by many
contemporary philosophers, is true (if any one philosopher can be associated with
such a view, it is undoubtedly Quine (see e.g., Quine, 1992)). Of course, it is difficult,

Correspondence to: Jason Megill. Email: jlm3am@virginia.edu

ISSN 0951-5089 (print)/ISSN 1465-394X (online)/07/060681-06 ß 2007 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09515080701665896
682 J. Megill
if not impossible, to precisely define such a view. Nevertheless, one can discern
numerous often interconnected theses that constitute the view, or at least some
versions of it, including, for example, the claim that all that exists is physical;
philosophy is continuous with natural science, there is no ‘‘first philosophy’’ upon
which science rests, and so on. My argument makes appeal to one such tenet
of physicalistic naturalism: the claim that natural science (and philosophy,
naturalistically conceived, of course) determines, or should determine, our ontology.
In effect:
If something is postulated or claimed to exist, but is not described in the
vocabulary that describes natural phenomena, and not studied by the inquiries that
study natural phenomena, it is not something we should recognize as real. (Jacobs,
2005, section 2)

But if science and naturalistic philosophy determine our ontology, then science and
philosophy determine when one type of entity is individuated from another.
For example, science not only tells us that atoms exist, but also tells us that different
types of atoms exist. In short, if the sort of physicalistic naturalism assumed above
is true, then if a type of entity x is a different type of entity than y, science and
naturalistic philosophy claims (or would claim, if complete) that x is in fact
a different type of entity than y. Indeed, although there are no doubt various versions
of physicalistic naturalism, it seems any putative version will endorse the claim that
science and naturalistic philosophy determine our ontology, and so individuate
entities from one another.
Given that science and naturalistic philosophy individuate entities, the next claim
concerns the manner in which they do so; specifically, science individuates entities
based on their causal powers. Of course, this claim is not new, and has been endorsed
by Fodor (1987/1999), for example. Fodor states:
Here are some things it seems to me safe to assume about science: We want
science to give causal explanations of such things (events, whatever) in nature as
can be causally explained. Giving such explanations essentially involves projecting
and confirming causal generalizations. And causal generalizations subsume
the things they apply to in virtue of the causal properties of the things they
apply to. (p. 354)

In other words, ‘‘what you need in order to do science is a taxonomic apparatus that
distinguishes between things insofar as they have different causal properties’’ (p. 354).
In sum, the second step in my argument is: if x 6¼ y, then x and y have different causal
powers (more precisely, if x and y are entities of different types, they have different
causal powers). It might very well be that having different causal powers is necessary,
but not sufficient, for type-individuation; the claim is merely that, whatever else
might be needed for type-individuation, different types of entities cannot be
individuated from one another unless they have different causal powers. So, for
example, claiming that there is some other factor f that is needed for type-
individuation is not sufficient to falsify Fodor’s claim; we must still be shown that
casual powers are not also needed for individuation.
 Philosophical Psychology 683
Fodor (1987/1999) offers a powerful example to support his claim. Suppose that
you have a dime. If you flip the coin and the coin comes up ‘heads,’ then every
particle in the universe is an ‘H-particle,’ but if the coin comes up ‘tails,’ then all
particles are ‘T-particles.’ Clearly, it would be bizarre and pointless to found
particle physics upon the distinction between H and T particles; indeed, it would be
counterproductive to even recognize such a distinction in particle physics. But why
is this the case? The reason, Fodor (1987/1999) surmises, is the following: ‘‘particle
physics, like every other branch of science, is in the business of causal explanation;
and whether something is an H-(T-) particle is irrelevant to its causal powers’’
(p. 354). In short, science does not, and would not, individuate between H and T
particles because science individuates entities based on their causal powers. It appears
that if one rejects Fodor’s claim, one should, at the very least, offer an alternative
explanation of why science does not—and should not—recognize H and T particles.
One might object to Fodor’s claim that a necessary condition for
type-individuation is that the entity types have different causal powers. Suppose,
for example, that entities of type A have the causal power to cause entities of type B
and entities of type C have the causal power to cause entities of type D. Also, entities
of type A are a different type of entity from entities of type C, while entities of types B
and D are epiphenomenal. Perhaps we can claim that entities of type B and entities of
type D are different types of entities because they can be caused by different types of
entities, even though they themselves lack causal powers? In this scenario, causal
powers (specifically, the causal powers of A and C) still individuate entity types, and
entities of type B are individuated from entities of type D, but entities of type B and
D are epiphenomenal all the same.
The problem with this objection is the following asymmetry: causes necessitate
their effects while effects do not necessitate their causes. Given the same cause, we will
have the same effect, but not necessarily vice versa. In other words, the same type of
entity can be caused by different types of entities; fires, for example, can be caused by
many different types of entities (matches, lightning, and magnifying glasses all have
the causal power to cause fires). But if so, then being caused by different types of
entities cannot be sufficient for type-individuation. The objection fails. To elaborate,
think of the scenario given above in which entities of type B and entities of type D are
individuated from one another because they can be caused by entities of different
types (A entities cause B entities and C entities cause D entities), even though B
and D entities are epiphenomenal. The problem is that entities of different types
might share a causal power, namely, the power to cause entities of the same type.
So, although A and C might be different types of entities, this is not sufficient to
show that B and D are.
To continue, the following simple claim about qualia (call it the ‘Multiplicity
Thesis’) is obvious and undeniable: there are in fact different types of qualia. For
example, visual qualia are of a different type than auditory qualia, and both are of
a different type than pain qualia. Further, there are different types of visual qualia;
e.g., a blue quale is a different type of quale than a red one. Indeed, there seem to be
different types of blue qualia: dark blue, light blue and so forth. There is ample reason
684 J. Megill
to endorse the Multiplicity Thesis: each of us knows from our own phenomenal
experience that there are different types of qualia.
Thus far, we have assumed that a broad physicalistic naturalism is true, so,
for example, science and naturalistic philosophy determine our ontology. If so, then
science and philosophy individuate different types of entities from one another (or
would do so, if complete). Further, it is clear that there are different types of qualia;
therefore, science and philosophy must individuate different types of qualia from one
another (or will do so when complete). But science and philosophy individuate
entities based on their causal powers; for example, if entity x is (or would be)
individuated from entity y, then x and y must have different causal powers. It follows
that different types of qualia must have different causal powers. But then, trivially,
different types of qualia have causal powers, i.e. qualia have causal powers.
Epiphenomenalism is false, if physicalistic naturalism is true.
I now briefly discuss some objections. One might object that perhaps physicalistic
naturalism is false. The response: I never claimed that it was true, but merely that if it
is, then epiphenomenalism is false. One might object that naturalism cannot be
equated with physicalism; perhaps there is a viable form of dualistic naturalism. The
response: I never claimed that naturalism must be physicalistic, but only that if both
physicalism and naturalism are true, then epiphenomenalism is false. One might
object that perhaps different types of qualia can have identical causal powers
(a plausible scenario if it is possible to have inverted qualia in the face of physical
indiscernibility), in which case qualia cannot be individuated on the basis of their
causal powers. The response: this objection presupposes that epiphenomenalism is
false, so naturalistic physicalism must still reject epiphenomenalism, which is the very
claim I sought to establish.

2. Consequences
I conclude by briefly discussing some possible implications of my argument.
The argument purported to show that physicalistic naturalism entails the falsity
of epiphenomenalism. But plausibly, any version of physicalism is also a form
of naturalism. For example, any form of physicalism will likely claim that
science and naturalistic philosophy determine our ontology (and really, this is the
only tenet of naturalism that the argument appeals to). After all, what else would
determine ontology in a manner acceptable to a physicalist? But if so, the argument
shows that physicalism, and not merely ‘physicalistic naturalism,’ entails the
falsity of epiphenomenalism. The claim that physicalism entails the falsity of
epiphenomenalism is either good news or bad news for non-reductive physicalism,
depending upon how one feels about Kim’s (2000, 2005) exclusion argument.
If one believes that Kim’s argument succeeds, then non-reductive physicalism is
inconsistent (as it entails epiphenomenalism and not-epiphenomenalism), and so
must be false. If one believes that Kim’s argument fails, then my argument provides
 Philosophical Psychology 685
independent evidence that non-reductive physicalism is immune to the charge
of epiphenomenalism.
The argument also has implications for those, such as Chalmers (1996), who hope
for a scientific or naturalistic dualism. One prominent form of dualism, and
indeed perhaps the most prominent form throughout dualism’s history, is
epiphenomenalism. We have seen how physicalistic naturalism individuates
(or will individuate) qualia types: it will do so via appeal to the causal powers of
qualia. But clearly epiphenomenalism cannot be combined with the type of
naturalism discussed above; if qualia have no causal powers, type-individuation will
be impossible. That is, dualistic epiphenomenalism cannot be a form of naturalism.
Of course, those who wish for a naturalistic dualism can perhaps endorse
interactionism, the other prominent form of dualism. However, it should be
noted that interactionism has a history of clashing with science. For example,
interactionism denies the causal closure of the physical and even perhaps some
specific scientific claims such as the conservation of energy, so one might
reasonably have doubts about whether this type of dualistic naturalism is internally
stable.
Finally, the hard sciences that study the mind, namely cognitive science and
neuroscience, often assume epiphenomenalism. Indeed, Paul Thagard (2004) points
out that cognitive science has often been faulted, generally by philosophers, for
ignoring ‘‘the importance of consciousness in human thinking,’’ while Heil (1998)
remarks that ‘‘neuroscientists have sometimes found epiphenomenalism attractive’’
(p.38). (See also P. M. Churchland, 1984, p. 11; Kim, 2005, p. 11.) But if physicalistic
naturalism is incompatible with epiphenomenalism, and if, as certainly seems to
be the case, science is committed to physicalistic naturalism, then these sciences
must abandon epiphenomenalism, and thereby alter the way they view qualia
in a significant manner.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Harold Langsam and two anonymous reviewers for immensely
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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September 28, 2007 from http://www.iep.utm.edu/.
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