Philosophical Review

Philosophical Review
In Defense of a Different Doppelganger

Author(s): Joseph Owens
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), pp. 521-554
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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The PhilosophicalReview, Vol. XCVI, No. 4 (October 1987)
IN DEFENSE OF A DIFFERENT DOPPELGANGER*

Joseph Owens
Today's most fashionablebrand of psychologicaltheorizing,

cognitivepsychology,is in deep troublein thatit appearsto
be constrainedby incompatiblerequirements.Such is the charge
leveled by Stephen Stich. Cognitive theory, he claims, is apparently
committed (i) to making essential explanatory appeal to content-
individuated states, states akin to belief, desire, and the like, and
(ii) to the methodological principle that organisms can differ in
psychological explanatory states only if they differ in some internal
(nonrelational) physical fashion-the principle of psychophysical
supervenience.1 This twin requirement is problematic in that a
number of thought experiments clearly suggest that common-
sense psychological states do not satisfy the supervenience require-
ment, and suggest that the psychological states of physical doppel-
gangers may differ in content.
Stich's claim, however, has not gone unchallenged; there have
been numerous attempts to undermine the force of the thought
experiments, to demonstrate the compatibility of the two require-
ments.2 In this paper I examine what is currently the most popular
*For their comments on an earlier draft of this paper I am grateful to

an anonymous referee and the editors of The PhilosophicalReview and to
my colleagues C. Anthony Anderson, P. Kitcher, and H. E. Mason.
'Stich (33). The 'supervenience'-terminology is Kim's (Kim (18) and
(19)) not Stich's. Stich refers to his version of the principle as "the prin-
ciple of psychological autonomy," while Fodor, in turn, speaks of the "for-
mality requirement" (Fodor (9) and (10)). There are substantive differ-
ences in their respective formulations, but for our purposes we can ignore
them. But see note 5 in which this general kind of supervenience principle
is distinguished from a much weaker one, and for some very brief com-
ments on the notion of an internal physical state. Actually I have taken
some liberties with Stich's argument as developed in (33). His concern
there was not with cognitive theory per se, but rather with what he took to
be the popular conception of psychological explanation. However some
defenders of cognitive theory have seen him as offering a direct challenge
to their enterprise (for example, Fodor (10)), and here I simply follow
their lead.
2For a variety of such attempts see Fodor (9) and (10); Kim (17); and
McGinn (24).
521
JOSEPH OWENS
line of response, one which appeals to a specially introduced no-

tion of content-'narrow-content' and I argue that it, like earlier
efforts, is unsuccessful.3 In effect, I defend the conditional claim
that cognitive theory is committed to an impossible task to the extent
that it is bound by these two constraints; they are genuinely incom-
patible. I shall not argue that the theory is so bound; indeed in the
concluding section I shall argue that, despite widespread opinion
to the contrary, we have as yet been provided with no good reason
for thinking that cognitive theory should abide by the superve-
nience requirement. I agree then with Stich's claim that cognitive
theory cannot satisfy both requirements, but I strongly disagree
with the remedy he advocates in his recent book, From Folk Psy-
chology to Cognitive Science, namely, that the theory go 'syntactic'
and abandon any appeal to content-individuated explanatory
states.4 To abandon content-individuated states so as to satisfy the
supervenience requirement is, I think, to abandon what is central
to psychological explanation out of allegiance to a questionable
metaphysical/methodological doctrine. Section I is devoted to a
brief explication of the principle of psychophysical supervenience
and of the ways in which the relevant thought experiments appear
to tell against it. In Section II I critically discuss those attempts at
reconciling the requirements which make essential appeal to
narrow content.
The principle of psychophysical supervenience is best construed

as a negative constraint on psychological explanation, or on the
kinds of entities which may figure in such explanations. To put it
crudely: the internal psychological states appealed to in such ex-
planations must be individuated in such a way as to ensure that
individuals can differ in such states only if they differ in some in-
ternal physical respect.5 Physical doppelgangers or replicas must
3The wide/narrow distinction is first found in Putnam (28).

4Stich (33).
5The general notion of supervenience, as a relation between two well
defined sets of properties, may be defined, following Kim (Kim (16) and
(18)), in the following fashion:
First: For any set M of properties (or predicates) we define M* to be the
closure of M under the usual operations of conjunction, disjunction, etc.
That is, M* is the set of all properties constructible (in the usual ways)
from those in M.
522
IN DEFENSE OF A DIFFERENT DOPPELGANGER
share the same explanatory psychological states. In one fashion or

another, and for a variety of methodological and metaphysical
reasons, this principle has proven virtually irresistible to many. In
the closing section of this paper, I will examine what reasons have
been (or plausibly might be) offered in favor of this principle; but
in this section I want to recount briefly the way in which this prin-
ciple proves problematical for the theorist who seeks to retain what
might be called the traditional view on psychological explanation, a
view embodied in contemporary cognitive theory.
The traditional and increasingly popular view embraces two
claims: (a) common-sense psychological states, in particular belief
and desire (or some close analogue of these), must figure crucially
Def. of Supervenience: The set of properties M supervenes on the Set N

just in case, necessarily, for each individual x and each property P in M*, if
x has P, then there is a property Q in N* such that x has Q, and necessarilyif
any y has Q then it has P.
The second occurrence of the necessity operator ensures that the notion
of supervenience applies "across worlds"- if any individual y in any world
Wi has Q then it has P. Accordingly, this notion of supervenience is to be
distinguished from a weaker one which requires only that there be no
world in which individuals agree in their N properties while disagreeing in
their M properties. (For further details, and further conceptions of super-
venience, see Kim (18).)
While it is relatively easy to specify this general relation, it is quite diffi-
cult to characterize precisely particular cases of supervenience. The pri-
mary difficulty lies, of course, in specifying the relevant property sets. In
the case at hand the difficulty lies in determining what is to count as a
psychological property and what is to count as a physical property. More
particularly, what is to count as an internal psychological property, and
what is to count as an internal physical property. Kim and others have
offered suggestions in this direction (see Kim (17)). In this paper I shall
not follow up on this issue; I shall assume that the notion of internal psy-
chological state is intuitive; and so far as internal physical states are con-
cerned, I shall assume (following the lead of Kim and others) that any two
individuals who are particle for particle alike are such as to agree in all
their internal physical states (thus setting such internal states apart from
relational states).
This brand of supervenience which would have the psychological su-
pervene on internal physical states (in the above sense) should be sharply
distinguished from a third and much weaker kind of supervenience thesis,
for example, that proposed by Hellman and Thompson (Hellman and
Thompson (14)) and Haugeland (Haugeland (13)). This weaker kind of
supervenience is 'world-wide supervenience'-it is characterized by the
claim that any two possible worlds alike in all physical properties are alike
in all properties including psychological properties. Kim, in (18), argues
that his brand of supervenience is equivalent to this world-wide superven-
ience, but the argument is fallacious.
523
JOSEPH OWENS
in any plausible psychological theory, and (b) these states are indi-
viduated by way of content: if two ascriptions differ in content,
then they ascribe different states.6 One who subscribes to this posi-
tion on psychological explanation, and at the same time wishes to
abide by the supervenience requirement, must suppose that these
attitudes are such as to satisfy this requirement-that physical
doppelgangers cannot differ in such states. The claim is not that
physical doppelgangers must agree in every psychological state of
the common-sense kind, but only in those states which figure in
psychological explanation. Thus such a theorist can allow that,
given appropriate differences in their respective worlds, one
doppelganger might know or remember that P while the other
fails to do so; one might have de re beliefs about a certain indi-
vidual, beliefs not shared by the other, and so on. The theorist can
allow for such differences without casting the supervenience re-
quirement into doubt by simply denying that such states need
figure as theoretical explanatory states. So far as knowledge goes
(and, likewise, memory, etc.), the explanatory theory need not ap-
peal to such a state as opposed to belief; the theorist can restrict
herself to belief, ignoring distinctions which might be made in the
light of truth, evidence, etc., distinctions which do not provide for
any genuine distinction in content.7 Likewise with de re beliefs. To
the extent that one's concern is with the explanation of behavior,
one need distinguish between psychological states only to the ex-
tent that they play different explanatory roles, and such states can
differ in explanatory role only if they differ in content (or in the
attitude of the agent to the content). The theorist can ignore de re
distinctions which are drawn in the light of differences in the sub-
jects' respective environments, but which do not provide for any
genuine difference in content. Genuine conflict arises only if it is
possible for psychological states of physical doppelgangers to
differ in content.
Though the notion of sameness of content is somewhat vague, I
shall employ the following criterion of difference: Where Cf and
Cg are sentences differing only in that the one contains the predi-
6For discussion and defense of these claims see, for example, Fodor (8)
and (9); and Stich (32).
7This general strategy is explicit in Fodor (9); Kim (17); and Stich (32).
524
catef wherever the other contains the predicate g, then ascriptions

of the form:
J believes that Cf
and
J believes that Cg
attribute different content if (i) f and g figure obliquely in these

ascriptions, (ii) f and g contain no indexical element, and (iii) f and
g differ in intension, that is, differ in extension in some possible
world. I am not, of course, suggesting that satisfying these condi-
tions is the only way in which two ascriptions might differ in con-
tent, only that they are sufficient conditions for such difference.
And despite some vagueness in the conditions, they are, I think,
relatively unproblematical.
However, as has been emphasized in recent literature, a number
of thought experiments originating, in particular, from the work
of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge seem to suggest that the states
of physical doppelgangers can disagree in such content.8 Consider
this version of Putnam's original example. Twin-Earth, we assume,
is a place exactly like our familiar planet with one exception to be
shortly noted. It is populated by individuals some of whom are
exact physical replicas of us earthlings and who speak a language
which bears an uncanny resemblance to English. The only relevant
difference between our world and that of the Twin-Earthlings is
this: while we use aluminum in the manufacture of pots, pans,
sports cars, and the like, they use molybdenum; it being as plen-
tiful on their planet as aluminum is on ours. Like us, however, they
use the term 'aluminum' to designate the metal they use in manu-
facturing these goods and reserve the term 'molybdenum' for a
rare metal about which most of them have little or no information.
The terms 'aluminum' and 'molybdenum' are in effect inter-
changed in the two linguistic communities; their terms 'aluminum'
and 'molybdenum' having respectively the same extensions as our
terms 'molybdenum' and 'aluminum'. Assume that the scientific
8See Putnam (28); Burge (1) and (3).
525
JOSEPH OWENS
communities in both societies are acquainted with the differences

between the two metals, but that this knowledge has not "trickled
down" to all the common folk. In particular, it has not trickled
down to our Earthling Alf, and his physical doppelganger Alf*.
Alf and Alf* are particle for particle alike; they have the same vi-
sual and auditory inputs, the same dispositions to behavior (non-
intentionally characterized), etc. Both, for example, have heard,
and accept as true, sentences of the form, 'Aluminum is a metal',
'Aluminum is commonplace and is used in the manufacture of
pots', and so on. They are both quite proficient in their usage, and
each passes as understanding the term 'aluminum' within his own
community. Both sincerely assent to, 'Aluminum is a metal'. Alf we
may assume thereby expresses his belief that aluminum is a metal;
he believes that aluminum is a metal. However, given the exten-
sion of the Twin-Earthian term 'aluminum', we should use some
term other than the English term 'aluminum' in translating their
speech into English. We should at least use a term co-extensive
with theirs, perhaps 'molybdenum'. So when indirectly reporting
what Alf* said when he sincerely uttered the words, 'Aluminum is
a metal', we should not report him as saying that aluminum is a
metal, but rather as saying that molybdenum is a metal (or some-
thing like this). Likewise we should not employ the English term
'aluminum' in characterizing the belief he expressed on this occa-
sion; rather we should report him as believing that molybdenum is
a metal (or some such).9 It would appear, then, that such physical
differences in their respective environments, and corresponding
differences in linguistic conventions, provide grounds for attrib-
uting psychological states with different contents to Alf and Alf*;
this, despite the fact that they are by hypothesis physical doppel-
gangers. Though this particular example turns upon the conven-
tions governing the natural-kind term 'aluminum', similar ex-
amples can be constructed using a wide-ranging variety of terms:
artifact terms, color terms, legal terms, and so on. 10Such examples
9Putnam employed the Twin-Earth examples only to illustrate a point

about meaning-that the meaning of what one says is not simply a function
of 'what is in one's head'. Burge drew the further moral: the content of
what one believesis likewise not simply a function of 'what is in one's head'.
loSee Burge (1), especially Section Ib for a variety of such further ex-
amples.
526
pose a direct challenge to the supervenience thesis; they serve to

illustrate what Burge has fittingly called 'the non-individualistic
character of the mental'.
Before turning to a discussion of narrow content, and of the way
in which it is employed in an effort to minimize the implications of
such examples, I want to distinguish the problem posed by them
from a quite different problem with which it is sometimes con-
fused, viz. the problem indexicals present for the classical Fregean
construal of the propositional attitudes. In the Fregean tradition,
propositional attitudes are construed as relations to propositions,
abstract entities, which, among other things, satisfy the following
two conditions: (i) they are the bearers of absolute (context inde-
pendent) truth-value (thus contrasting with linguistic expressions),
and (ii) they are individuated in light of cognitive role (if it is pos-
sible for a subject to believe that P while not believing that P*, then
P and P* express different propositions). As the recent literature
attests, serious difficulties arise when one tries to accommodate be-
liefs expressed with the aid of indexicals within this tradition."1 For
our purposes we may safely ignore the details of this debate; in-
deed we may ignore the central issue. Enough to note the fol-
lowing. In the Fregean tradition two sentences express different
propositions, and thus different beliefs, if they differ in truth con-
ditions. So tokens of the indexical sentence, 'I am ill', express dif-
ferent propositions and different beliefs in the mouths of different
individuals. Consequently, if one construes a psychological state
such as belief as a relation to a Fregean proposition, one has little
or no alternative but to suppose that dopplegangers will differ in
belief; any two doppelgangers who use the representation 'I am ill'
to express their respective beliefs will express different proposi-
tions, and thus differ in their Fregean propositional attitudes. But,
insofar as our concern is with the explanation of behavior,it is plausible
to regard two such individuals as having the same belief; other
things being equal, their respective beliefs are likely to figure in
generating the "same kinds of behavior," etc. Thus, it is plausible
to suppose that the psychological theorist can dispense with this
element in the Fregean tradition while retaining the essential no-
tion of psychological state as a content-individuated state. Though
"1Forsome discussion of such issues, see Kaplan (15); Perry (26); Burge
(2); Stalnaker (31); and Lewis (22).
527
JOSEPH OWENS
there are interesting links between the issues relating to indexicals

and the problem posed by Alf* they are nevertheless quite distinct
problems.'2 The former problem is of concern only for those of a
certain philosophical persuasion, viz., those who wish to retain the
Fregean perspective on propositions, and construe psychological
states as relations to such entities. The problem posed by Alf and
Alf* depends on no such intuitions, but rather on the realization
that the term 'aluminum' has different extensions in their respec-
tive communities, and thus the beliefs they fashion and express
employing these terms differ as well. Indexicals appear to play no
role in this problem; there is no reason to think that the English
term 'aluminum' shifts its reference from one context of use to
another. Indeed it was with a view to separating off clearly our
problem from the Fregean one that we included condition (ii) in
our criterion of content difference.'3
Defenders of supervenience were quick to react. Initial re-
sponses typically took the form of direct attempts at undermining
the examples, at demonstrating that, contrary to appearance, the
doppelgangers agree in belief and thereby warrant the same belief
ascriptions. The general idea was to try to construe the apparent
difference in content in such a way as to leave de dicto content con-
stant across the doppelgangers; to argue that the difference was
just a difference in res, or a difference due to a hidden indexical
element, etc.'4 This kind of response, however, never seemed to
'2Though Stich's paper (32) played a crucial role in setting the stage for
the resulting controversy about the implications (if any) of Twin-Earth
style examples for cognitive theory, it also generated some confusion in
that it treated the problems created by indexicals as being similar in kind
to those created by Twin-Earth style examples. Stich's assimilation of these
two kinds of problems was facilitated by his criterion of content differ-
ence, viz., contents (or thoughts) are different if they have different truth
conditions.
131t is true, of course, that Putnam interpreted natural kind predicates
as having an indexical component (Putnam (28)); but, as Burge has urged,
this claim seems to be unfounded (Burge (3)).
'4One finds both approaches in J. Fodor: The de re approach in (9) and
an appeal to an implicit indexical element in (10). The de re approach fails
for the simple reason that we can easily construct examples in which the de
re reading is inappropriate. The 'implicit indexical' story told by Fodor in
(10) might explain how the doppelgangers' beliefs differ in truth condi-
tions, but it does not explain why we are entitled to use the concept 'water'
in characterizing the belief of one and not the other. Burge, in (1), dis-
528
offer much promise, and has now largely been replaced by a very
different strategy; one which attempts, on the one hand, to grant
the point of the examples, while, on the other, attempts to mini-
mize their implications for cognitive theory and the supervenience
thesis. It is to this kind of response that we now turn.
II.
Today's favored line of defense goes something like this. Burge

and others are correct in maintaining that the doppelgangers war-
rant different belief ascriptions; Alf and Alf* do differ in their
ordinary propositional attitudes. But, this objector rightly notes,
this tells against psychophysical supervenience only if you addi-
tionally suppose that the content-individuated states appealed to in
psychological explanations are propositional attitudes -full-fledged
beliefs, desires, etc. This, they stress, is an additional claim, and
one they are prepared to abandon. Their commitment is to the
supervenience of content-individuated psychological explanatory
states on the physical, not necessarily to the supervenience of this
particular kind of content-individuated state-ordinary proposi-
tional attitudes. They are ready to allow that the examples do illus-
trate ways in which the content of such attitudes is, in part, a func-
tion of contextual factors and so does not supervene on internal
physical states; but, they claim, the story is quite different for
genuine explanatory states. Though these states are content-
individuated, their content is not that of full-fledged propositional
attitudes. They, by way of contrast, are said to have "narrow con-
tent," and it is only such states that are said to supervene on the
physical. 15
This, of course, constitutes a genuine response only if there is
reason to think there are such states; that is, reason to think that
there exist states which are individuated in such a way as to satisfy
the twin requirement of (i) being genuinely individuated by way of
content (even if this is not propositional in character), and (ii) su-
cusses and rejects a variety of further responses, in particular, those in-

volving reconstrual of the subject's beliefs.
'5This kind of approach is growing increasingly common, and variations
on it may be found in McGinn (24); Fodor (10); Woodfield (36); Lewis
(22); etc.
529
JOSEPH OWENS
pervening on internal physical states. (The realization that such

states would conveniently solve our current difficulties is hardly
adequate.) This kind of approach must, then, if it is to be a starter
at all, incorporate some account of the nature of these "narrow
states"; some account of how they are individuated so as plausibly
to satisfy both (i) and (ii). The examples seemed, after all, to sug-
gest that states individuated so as to satisfy (i) fail to satisfy (ii).
Though the notion of mental content occupies center stage in
current philosophy of mind, there is, so far as I know, only one
serious proposal as to how states should be individuated if they are
to satisfy this dual requirement: they should be individuated by
functional or conceptual role. Conceptual role theories, of course,
come in a bewildering variety of forms: there is, for example, no
agreement on such issues as the nature of the "representations"
whose content is said to be determined by role; no agreement on
how roles should be specified; indeed there is disagreement about
the character of the content that is supposedly determined by
role.16 In what follows, I shall not explicitly treat of each variation
on the theme. I shall draw only such distinctions as are called for;
but it will, I hope, be clear that the argument addresses all cur-
rently available formulations. One broad distinction, however,
needs to be drawn right at the outset. When functional role ac-
counts of content were first introduced role was conceived of as
determining full-fledged propositional content; but in the face of
'6Functional and conceptual-role accounts are advanced, for example,

in Harman (11) and (12); Schiffer (30); Woodfield (36); Field (6) and (7);
and in McGinn (24). Within functionalist camps controversy rages as to
whether the representations are drawn from a natural language (Harman)
or from a mental language (Fodor); while still others deny that the repre-
sentations need be linguistic in character at all (Stalnaker). In some ac-
counts the role specifications are supposed to be extracted from common
sense or folk psychology (Lewis), while in others these specifications are to
be provided by theoretical psychology (Fodor, Field, etc.). Like behavior-
ists before them, functionalists are united not by any agreement on detail
but in the spirit in which they approach issues in the philosophy of mind
and psychology: in one way or another causal role of one kind or another
serves to determine content.
There are of course other, non-functionalistic, accounts of mental con-
tent, for example, Dretske (5), but these accounts typically construe con-
tent as being at least partly determined by environmental factors, and as
such they are not designed to provide a notion of content which is com-
patible with the supervenience requirement.
530
examples such as Burge's, this conception has now largely been

abandoned in favor of the apparently more modest claim that role
serves to determine only "narrow content." Consequently my ex-
plicit concern in this paper is with functional role theories only
insofar as they are employed in defense of this more modest goal
(though the arguments advanced tell equally against those who
make even stronger claims for the role-individuated states.)
I shall first offer a brief sketch of this increasingly popular kind
of account, and then flesh it out a little by attending to one partic-
ular version, that of Colin McGinn. The fundamental suggestion is
that full-fledged propositional content (the content of ordinary
(wide) psychological states) is best thought of as being a function of
two distinct and independent factors: (a) the conceptual or func-
tional role of the state in the individual's mental life, and (b) a
variety of contextual elements, physical and conventional. Thus we
may speak of states which agree in conceptual role as having the
same ''cognitive" or "narrow content," while allowing that these
same states might differ in wide or propositional content because
of relevant contextual differences (of the sort exploited by Burge
and others). But, they claim, for the purposes of psychological ex-
planation one may ignore differences which result simply from
contextual factors-the psychologist can restrict her attention to
states individuated in terms of conceptual role. One may in this
way allow that there is a sense in which doppelgangers differ in
content, while denying that this is relevant to psychological expla-
nation, denying that they differ in psychological explanatory
states. Supervenience is salvaged because the doppelgangers agree
in these role-individuated states, and these states are content-
individuated. It is important to keep in mind that this theorist does
not think of herself as engaged in the question-begging procedure
of simply tagging these role-individuated states with the character-
ization "content-individuated." No, the idea is that they deservethis
characterization because of the way in which they are intimately
linked to paradigmatic content-individuated states, propositional
attitudes. Propositional content, it is claimed, is a function of, or
decomposesinto, role and context; a state is conceived of as having a
given propositional content if and only if it satisfies a certain func-
tional role (or more suggestively, "cognitive" or "conceptual" role),
and the environment is of the appropriate kind. In what follows
we shall refer to this principle as the "two factor" principle. It is
531
JOSEPH OWENS
the conception of propositional content as decomposing in this

way that is intended to justify the characterization of these role-
individuated states as "content-individuated." So far as Alf and
Alf* are concerned, they may be said to agree in role-individuated
states, and thus in narrow content, even though these states differ
in propositional content because of the relevant contextual differ-
ences.
This line of response is proving attractive to many, but perhaps
it has received its most extended treatment at the hands of Colin
McGinn in his paper, "The Structure of Content."'7 In developing
the position McGinn drawn on Hartry Field's, "Logic, Meaning,
and Conceptual Role," and even though Field's concern was with
promoting a two-component theory of semantic content (theory of
meaning) rather than a dual theory of mental content, a glance at
his paper provides a useful introduction into the kind of account
McGinn has in mind.'8 Field argues that a theory of meaning for a
natural language should have two components: a conceptual-role
component and a Tarskian truth-theoretic component which
serves to specify the extensions of the various expressions, etc.
(i) The conceptual-role component. The meaning or content of a
sentence for an individual speaker J is, in part, a function of its
role in his mental life, of the way it figures in his reasoning, etc., if
speakers differ systematically in their employment of a given sen-
tence, then there is a sense in which they understand it differently
and mean something different by it. (ii) The truth-theoretic com-
ponent. Though Field has conceptual role play a central task in
determining content, he denies that it exhausts meaning-that
one has fully specified the meaning of a given sentence for a
speaker J when one has specified its conceptual role. Conceptual
role is not enough because a pure conceptual-role account of
meaning does not accord with one
of our most fundamental beliefs about meaning, namely, the belief

that meaning determines truth conditions. To know whether the
German sentence 'Beethovenwohnte in Deutsland'is true, it is natur-
al to say we need to know only two things: first, whether Beethoven
lived in Germany; and second, what the German sentence means.
This condition is met by an account of meaning which includes refer-
'7McGinn (24).
'8Field (6).
532
ential meaning as one component. But it does not appear to be met by

any pure conceptual-roleaccount of meaning.'9
Thus Field argues, a full account of meaning must incorporate

both a conceptual-role element, and a Tarski-like account of refer-
ence and truth conditions.
McGinn applies this kind of strategy directly to mental content
(as well as to linguistic or semantic content). He agrees with other
mental representationalists that one is in a given psychological
state, such as belief, if and only if one is appropriately related to a
representation of some kind; and that the state is a state of be-
lieving that P if and only if the representation has the content P.
Following the lead of Field he argues that any adequate account of
such mental content will have two components:
our concept of belief combines two separate elements, serving sepa-

rate concerns: we view beliefs as causally explanatory states of the
head whose semantic properties are, from that point of view, as may
be; and we view beliefs as relations to propositions that can be as-
signed referential truth-conditions,and so point towards the world
. . . these components and the concerns they reflect are distinct and
independent-total content supervenes on both taken together. We
get different and potentially conflicting standards of individuation
... according as we concentrate on one or other component of con-
tent.20
Just as, on Field's account, a linguistic representation has the

semantic content that water is wet if and only if it satisfies a certain
conceptual role and satisfies the necessary referential require-
ments, so on the kind of approach suggested by McGinn a mental
representation has the propositional content that water is wet if
and only if it plays a certain functional role and satisfies the appro-
priate referential conditions (is causally linked to the appropriate
environmental entities, etc.). The causal or functional role of a
representation is determined by intrinsic (physical) features of the
representation; two tokens can differ in causal role only if they
differ in some physical fashion. Thus it is claimed that when repre-
sentations are individuated in respect to their causal roles they will
'9Field (6), p. 397.

20McGinn (24), pp. 211 and 216.
533
JOSEPH OWENS
clearly supervene on the physical. But given appropriate contex-

tual differences two token representations which agree in causal
role may have different semantic properties, and thus differ in
propositional content (as illustrated by the Twin-Earth examples).
Factoring out these two features of the representations and
making propositional content a function of both enables us to
speak of the doppelgangers as agreeing in their role-individuated
representations, while acknowledging their difference in content.
This gives the appearance of providing a rather tidy and intuitive
solution to the problem posed by Twin-Earth examples if one takes
the line advanced by McGinn, viz., to the extent that one is con-
cerned only with psychological explanation and sameness of psy-
chological explanatory states (as opposed to psychological states as
bearers of semantic properties such as truth, etc.), one can ignore
differences in content which result simply from contextual factors
(just as the theorist bent on explanation can ignore the difference
between strong belief and knowledge).
Not only does this kind of account give the appearance of pro-
viding an intuitive response, it would I think clearly constitute a
solution if we had good reason to think that such role-indivilduated
states are both content-individuated and supervene on the
physical. But then of course we have to face the question as to
whether there is any reason for thinking that such states do satisfy
these two requirements. The answer, I am afraid, is clearly nega-
tive, as may be seen by a quick survey of the options open to the
conceptual-role Theorist. Though such theorists are unusually reti-
cent when it comes to specifying the kinds of vocabularies which
are supposed toi figure in these role-characterizations, we can at
least distinguish between two broad options. The theorist can char-
acterize the roles' of the various representations, their relationships
to each other, to' varied perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs
in a language whkch employs a wide range of intentional idioms, or
she can attempt to characterize these roles in a more impoverished
language, one devoid of such idioms.2' Given the task at hand,
explaining how it is that the role of mental representations pro-
vides for a certain kind of content, one kind of characterization is
2'The notion of intentional characterizationis somewhatvague; I use it

in line with current practice to include attitude- and action-characteriza-
tions.
534
excluded from the outset. In specifying the relations that must ob-
tain between a given representation Ri and other representations
Rj, Rk, etc., if Ri is to have content P, these other representations
must be theoretically specifiable in some other way than as repre-
sentations having this and that content. The task, after all, is that
of providing an account of how any mental representation can be
said to have this kind of content in virtue of role; and this goal is
not realized by a theory which explains the content of a given rep-
resentation as resulting from its being appropriately related to
other representations where these others are theoretically specifi-
able only as representations having this or that content. To meet
the requirements of the account the various internal representa-
tions appealed to in the conceptual-role characterizations have to
be specifiable in some way other than as representations having
such and such specific content. This, of course, is a requirement
conceptual-role theorists willingly acknowledge, and indeed func-
tional definitions were introduced, in part, to meet this need, to
enable the theorist to characterize relations between arrays of
mental states SI, . . . S., without using any explicit mentalistic vo-
cabulary in the process (and so without explicitly characterizing
the states by way of content). Let us assume then that the internal
representations and their interrelations are characterized in some
standard abstract functionalist fashion, and turn our attention to
the language employed in input and output specifications, and, in
particular, to the descriptive language employed in output charac-
terizations. The output characterizations will have to employ a
substantial descriptive vocabulary if they are to play their assigned
role in the specification of psychological states; one can hardly
characterize both outputs and internal states in the same abstract
fashion, and hope to provide anything like appropriate conditions.
And in deciding upon this vocabulary the theorist is faced with the
familiar choice, to employ or eschew common-sense intentional ac-
tion terminology; both options seem doomed given the task she
has set herself-the provision of an account of mental content
compatible with the supervenience requirement.
Suppose that the theorist opts for the first alternative, and
taxonomizes outputs in an intentional fashion. Without losing any
generality we may, for the sake of argument, confine our attention
to the characterization of verbal behavior, where the contrast be-
tween the intentional and non-intentional is most sharply drawn.
535
JOSEPH OWENS
On the kind of account now being considered speech productions

will be treated as instances of the same verbal behavior (same
output) if they have the same semantical content, despite, for ex-
ample, the lack of any phonological similarity. Likewise such
speech productions will be counted as instances of different be-
havior if in the light of ordinary and reliable intuitions they are
taken to differ in content despite any lack of phonological dis-
agreement. A similar story is true for the rest of our action termi-
nology; when one taxonomizes using action terminology one cuts
over and across various lower-level non-intentional taxonomies.
On such accounts, token Representations Ri and Rk will count as
playing the same conceptual role only if, in conjunction with other
representations, etc., they both dispose subjects to the same kinds
of actions, to say the same kinds of things, etc.22 On the other hand
these token representations will differ in role, and thus in content,
if (in conjunction with other representations) one disposes a sub-
ject to say, for example, that aluminum is a metal while the other
disposes a subject to say that molybdenum is a metal.
When construed in this fashion conceptual-role accounts have a
certain plausibility, but it should be clear that this kind of theory
will not enable the theorist to avoid the kind of problem posed by
Twin-Earth examples. Such conceptual-role accounts do not pro-
vide a notion of mental content which is such as to satisfy the su-
pervenience requirement for the simple reason that, on this way of
taxonomizing behavior, the doppelgangers do and say different
things: one says for example, that aluminum is a metal while the
other says something quite different. Intuitively they say different
things (intentionally construed). The only reasons for denying this
are (a) that they produce the same word forms, or (b) that their
respective utterances express the same beliefs, etc. But (a) is clearly
inadequate (given the identity criteria being employed), while (b)
begs the question at issue. Given this difference in output charac-
terization (which was the primary focus of Putnam's paper) we
have to provide different conceptual-role stories for the respective
representations of Alf and Alf*. The functional-role theorist thus
22Hereand elsewhere I appeal to grossly simplified role specifications,

but I do not intend to saddle this theorist with some kind of behavioristic
model; I allow that the interactions between the various internal states,
inputs and outputs are likely to be complex, probabilistic,etc.
536
has to provide them with different content, different psychological

states, thereby violating psychophysical supervenience. Whatever
else might be said for intentional conceptual-role accounts they
cannot be said to provide a genuine response to the issues posed by
Twin-Earth examples.
If she is to provide an account of mental content which is sup-
portive of the supervenience requirement, the conceptual-role
theorist has no alternative but to opt for some non-intentional
specification of behavioral output, and the problems then are of an
entirely different kind.23 Such an account will satisfy the super-
venience requirement in that the doppelgangers will not differ in
conceptual-role specification, and hence will not differ in their ex-
planatory states, the role-individuated representations. But it will
fail to provide any support for the original psychophysical super-
venience thesis, in that there is no reason for thinking that the
"psychological theory" which appeals to such role-individuated
states is one which appeals to states individuated by content of any
kind. There is no reason to think of these states as being content-
individuated because, as I shall argue, they fail to satisfy the de-
compositional or two-factor requirement (p. 531). Ordinary prop-
ositional content is not plausibly construed as a function of such
role-individuated states and contexts. Failing this requirement
they lose their only claim to the states of being content-indivi-
duated.24
There are of course several options open to the theorist when it
comes to deciding on the appropriate non-intentional specification
of behavioral outputs, and mature theory is itself likely to provide
further alternatives. Let us assume, however, that some canonical
231n forcing the defender of supervenience to choose between these al-

ternatives I mean to deny him the option of appealing to some special
'narrow-intentional-output characterizations'. We currently have no such
vocabulary; there is no reason to think such a vocabulary could be devised;
and in this context it would be clearly question-begging to invoke such a
notion.
24A second and intimately related difficulty, but one on which I will not
dwell, is that a psychological theory which taxonomizes behavior in a non-
intentional fashion will not provide the requisite generalizations. This
point has been emphasized by many, and in particular by J. Fodor, one of
the staunchest supporters of supervenience: "The generalization that the
practical syllogism ... articulates thus applies to behavior under inten-
tional description; and so, in similar ways, do the rest of our folk psy-
chology and practically all of our cognitive science" (Fodor (10), p. 101).
537
JOSEPH OWENS
non-intentional taxonomy has been decided upon; and, since I

don't believe that the choice among the alternatives is particularly
relevant to our concerns, let us suppose that outputs are to be
characterized in terms of molar bodily movements, sentence pro-
ductions, and the like (comparable to Hull's "colorless move-
ments"). On this kind of account the theoretical conceptual-role
characterization Ci of a representation Ri will specify Ri's relations
to further representations Rj, Rk, etc., and to bodily movements,
Om, 0 etc.
If one is to appeal to such role-individuated states in defense of
psychophysical supervenience, then it is clearly not enough to sug-
gest that theoretical psychological supervenience can get by with
such states; one must also defend their claim to be content-individuated.
This line of defense must incorporate some reasons for regarding
these states as content-individuated. It should be clear from the
outset that this claim is not supported by the vague intuition that
subjects will agree in propositional attitudes if they satisfy the same
role-characterizations and their environments are relevantly sim-
ilar. It is after all certainly intuitive to suppose that sameness of
neurophysiology and context guarantees sameness of attitude; but
this, we know, provides not the slightest warrant for thinking of
neurophysiological states as being content-individuated. To sup-
port the individuative claim we need something much stronger
than these kinds of "sufficiency" intuitions.25 We clearly need
25Similarlyit is mistaken to suppose that the claim of role-individuated

states to be content-individuatedis supported in any way by the mere fact
that systems designed to satisfy complex functional requirements may
warrantcontent ascriptions.We do speak of sophisticatedrobotic devices
as 'seeing that such-and-such'etc. (and there is no reason to think of such
ascriptionsas being false or metaphorical),but this provides no reason to
think that the states appealed to in the functional specification are con-
tent-individuated; indeed, in itself, this provides no reason to think that the
theoreticalvocabularyand concepts employed in the constructionof such
devices is likely to shed any light on the nature of mental states; this ap-
pears to be the case regardless as to whether the vocabularyis of a rela-
tively low-level kind-circuitry specifications and the like-or of some
higher, more abstractlevel as, for example, might be employed in speci-
fying systems 'computationally',characterizingthem by way of their oper-
ations upon non-intentionally specified 'representations'.From the fact
that a certain way of conceptualizingsystems proves fruitful in designing
devices which merit intentional characterizationsone cannot simply infer
that this brand of conceptualizationthrows light on the nature of inten-
538
something with the force of the two-factor principle: the principle

which embodies the claim that being in a given propositional atti-
tude is being in a certain role-individuated state in such-and-such
an environment. It is entirely obscure as to why anyone should
think that these role-individuated states can legitimately lay claim
to be content-individuated unless they are capable of being linked
in some such intimate fashion to paradigmatic content states-
propositional attitudes; that is, unless it is possible to provide iden-
tity conditions for propositional attitudes in terms of role and con-
text. If such identity conditions were forthcoming, this theorist
would be clearly justified in regarding these states as content-indi-
viduated; to deny him this would be to engage in a verbal quibble.
But in the absence of the same, there is, so far as I can tell, no
reason whatsoever to honor these states with that characterization.
The problem, of course, is that such identity conditions simply ap-
pear not to be in the offing. There are numerous and familiar
reasons for rejecting such identity conditions as inadequate: intu-
itively, the resulting taxonomy is far too fine-grainsed; the ap-
proach embodies an extreme holistic conception of the attitudes, a
conception under which it is virtually impossible for any two indi-
viduals to share even a single belief (if they differ in any attitude
they will tend to differ in all);26 this holistic treatment of content
ensures that every change in a subject's disposition to assent and
dissent brings in its wake a change of meaning (because of change
of role), and while it may be reasonable to deny that there is a
sharp line between change of mind and change of meaning, it is
another thing altogether to suppose that every change of mind
tional systems and intentional states. No one, after all, wants to suppose
that ability of genetic engineers to fashion devices which warrant inten-
tional characterizationslends any support to the claim that intentional
states are best understood in terms of constructs drawn from genetic
theory.
26Intuitivelyit seems evident that such role-individuatedstates are too
fine-grained to do the work of psychologicalstates; and simply to assume
that there must be some way of generating the appropriate taxonomy
within this non-intentional framework smacks of the behaviorist'sinsis-
tence that there must be some way of characterizingbehavior which both
serves to express the requisite generalizationsand is 'observational'-not
requiring any 'interpretation'on the part of the theorist. Some fifty-odd
years of fruitless searching provide reason enough for thinking there
simply is no such vocabularyto be found.
539
JOSEPH OWENS
results in a change of meaning. Though these objections, and

others along similar lines, are telling, I shall make do with a much
simpler and more direct argument.
Unlike many advocates of conceptual-role semantics, this de-
fender of supervenience has not undertaken the task of providing
identity conditions for propositional attitudes merely in terms of
non-intentional causal roles; she is, after all allowing that context
can provide for difference in propositional content despite same-
ness of causal role (it is, of course, for this reason that one cannot
simply use an argument such as Burge's to reject this position).
However, given her conception of role-individuated states, she has
to construe propositional attitudes as having identity conditions of
the form:
x believes that P if and only if x is in a state that satisfiesrole C and the

environment is of type E (where C and E are, no doubt, extremely
complex and disjunctivein character).
In advancing this claim she is of course committed to thinking of

these conceptual roles as being necessaryconditionsof propositional
attitudes; a state qualifies as a state of believing that P only if
(among other things) it satisfies role C. This, I argue, is reason
enough to reject this approach. In evaluating this claim it is impor-
tant to keep in mind, first, that C characterizes the state's role in a
non-intentionalfashion; it characterizes the state, in part, as the state
that is causally linked to such-and-such outputs, 01, 02, etc., where
01, 02, etc. are described in the language of bodily movements.
Second, these behavioral conditions must be quite "substantial" or
"interesting" if they are to play their assigned role. The functional
specifications and the behavioral characterizations they employ
must, when supplemented with environmental characterizations,
be specific enough to yield sufficient conditions for propositional
attitudes. To be sure, this general requirement that the output de-
scriptions be substantial is vague, but it is intuitive and the force of
it is relatively clear once we are provided with specific output char-
acterizations. Thus while very specific grammatical or phonetic
characterizations of speech behavior might be interesting in the de-
sired sense, characterizations of the form 'utters some sound or
other' would not fill the bill.
Such a theorist would have us believe then that a necessary con-
540
dition for, say, believing that snow is white is that one be in the
appropriate role-individuated state. That is, to have this belief one
must, on this account, be in a state which bears certain specific
(causal) relations to other internal states (functionally specified),
and, in conjunction with these other states, to non-intentionallyspeci-
fied behaviors. It is this last element that is especially problematic.
There seems to be about as much reason to think that the attitudes
bear such necessary links to non-intentionally characterized be-
havior as there is to think that they admit of necessary neurophysi-
ological conditions; a claim that is now thoroughly discredited.27
However, to re-emphasize the point that such necessary conditions
are not forthcoming, it is helpful to turn once again to linguistic
behavior. And, for a particularly clearcut example, consider some
linguistic behavior which is taken to express a sophisticated belief,
for example, of a philosophical nature; one which need not find
expression in nonsymbolic behavior. Let P be such a belief. Then
whatever about the mental, we do know that it is not possible to
provide interesting necessarynon-intentional behavioralconditions(be
they grammatical, phonetic, or whatever) for saying that P, for ex-
ample, for saying that synonyms are not interchangeable in em-
bedded belief contexts. Given any set of allegedly necessary behav-
ioral conditions for saying this, one can always fashion a new way
of saying the same thing, one not in the original set. This belief can
be expressed in an indefinite variety of forms which bear no inter-
esting similarities to each other when characterized at the phonetic
level, at the grammatical level, or indeed at any currently available
non-intentional level. This difficulty is not avoided by appealing to
more abstract non-intentional characterizations. It won't do, for
example, to suppose that the necessary conditions are relational
conditions on the lexical items in the individual's repertoire-that
an expression could serve to encode the belief that P only if it bore
certain specific relations to other expressions in the individual's
language. Of course the expression must satisfy some substantial
constraints if it is really to express this belief; it must bear certain
relations to other expressions which encode conceptually related
beliefs. The difficulty however lies in the claim that there is some
27See Putnam (27) and Davidson (4), for arguments against there being
nomological necessary physiological conditions for mental states.
541
JOSEPH OWENS
way to specify these relations in a non-intentional fashion (without

individuating the relata in terms of content, etc.). Intuitively it
seems clear that we cannot place interesting non-intentional con-
straints on the relationship the expression must bear to other items
in the individual's language-the route the subject takes in ac-
quiring and selecting the expression can vary just as much as the
expression itself. Given any lexical item, one can construct a stage
setting in which it is used to express the belief that P, and there just
do not appear to be any interesting non-intentional constraints
that must be satisfied in constructing this setting. It is, I think,
clear, beyond reasonable doubt, that one cannot provide non-
intentional necessary and substantial behavioral conditions upon
saying that P within the non-intentional vocabularies now available
to us; and there simply is no reason whatsoever for thinking that
any non-intentional vocabulary is up to the task.
The recognition that there can be no non-intentional necessary
behavioral conditions for saying that P draws in its wake the recog-
nition that there can in general be no necessary non-intentional
behavioral conditions for believing that P. There being no such
necessary conditions for asserting that P, there will, of course, be
none for sincerely asserting that P; which is to say that we cannot
provide interesting non-intentional necessary conditions on the
exercise of the disposition sincerely to assert that P. And to the
extent that there are no such necessary conditions on the exercise
of this disposition, there will be none for believing that P. Circum-
stances in which x is sincerely disposed to assert that P are typically
circumstances in which x believes that P. I don't mean to endorse
any kind of reductionism here. I am not, for example, suggesting
that being disposed to assent to 'P' is a sufficient condition for
believing that P. No, the intended connection is of quite a different
characters it is between the belief that P and the disposition sin-
cerely to assert that P; and this latter disposition is not a behavioral
disposition in the sense in which that notion has been appropriated
by behaviorists and other reductionists. On the other hand, it
should nit be thought that a subject's sincere disposition to assert
that P is simply evidence for his corresponding belief; whatever
about the linkage between a subject's disposition to assent to P
and her believing that P, it seems quite clear there is a conceptual
linkage between believing that P and being sincerely disposed to
assert that P. Could one who did not believe that P be sincerely(with
542
whatever qualifications are appropriate) disposed to assert that P?

Rather than offering these remarks in a reductionist spirit, I am
simply pointing to the obvious: no functional specification which
includes substantial behavioral characterizations can yield neces-
sary conditions for believing that P; given any such specification S,
we will always be able to conceive of systems which engage in lin-
guistic or representational behavior and manifest the belief that P
(and associated beliefs, etc.) in a way not countenanced by S. There
are simply no reasons to think that there are substantial non-inten-
tional behavioral conditions upon either saying that P or believing
that P. Thus far I have argued only that sophisticated beliefs lack
these kinds of non-intentional behavioral conditions; this indeed is
enough for my purpose, but it should be clear that in allowing this
much we undermine the prospects of providing substantial neces-
sary behavioral conditions upon a vast tange of beliefs. The so-
phisticated beliefs provide for indefinite diversity in the manifes-
tation of these other beliefs. I leave the details to the reader. There
is then no reason to think of non-intentional role specifications as
expressing genuinely necessary conditions on believing that such-
and-such. Consequently this theorist cannot hope to construct
identity conditions for propositional attitudes after the fashion
proposed, that is, in terms of non-intentional role plus context.
And in abandoning that hope we have lost our sole reason
for thinking of these role-individuated states as being content-
individuated.
This argument is sure to draw the charge that it blithely ignores
one of the central and most attractive features of the functionalist
program, viz., the fact that such accounts don't purport to provide
necessary or sufficient behavioral conditions for mental states
taken one at a time. The functionalist account is explicitly designed
to accommodate the intuition that an individual mental state does
not necessarily give rise to any characteristic behavior in and of
itself, but rather generates behavior of different kinds when con-
joined with other different internal states. Indeed it is this more
than anything else that sets functionalism apart from behaviorism.
Thus, it would appear that the functionalist can concede that there
are no necessary behavioral conditions for believing that P while
denying, that this undermines his claim that a given state has the
content that P only if, among other things, it satisfies the relevant
role C. But, in point of fact, it is this response that is wide of the
543
JOSEPH OWENS
mark. My argument has little or nothing to do with standard

worries about the interplay of different beliefs, desires, etc. My
claim was rather this: for at least a wide range of beliefs any at-
tempt at linking these to non-intentionally specified behavior will
always result in non-necessary conditions; and this is so regardless
as to how complex and indirect the linkage is. In specifying the
role C that supposedly is characteristic of the belief that P the func-
tionalist can incorporate reference to any number of internal states
Si ... Sm (all likewise functionally specified); he must nevertheless
employ substantial output characterizations if the functionalist
specification is to serve its assigned task. The point then is that
given the selection of any specific non-intentional output charac-
terizations 0i ... Om. we can always provide alternative output
characterizations which will serve the intended purpose equally
well; there is simply no reason to think of the original output char-
acterizations as being in any way necessary. Though I am generally
suspicious of "burden of proof" arguments, this appears to be a
situation in which it is clear as to who carries the burden: we have
as yet not been provided with a non-intentional vocabulary which
taxonomizes outputs in such a way as to provide interesting neces-
sary conditions upon belief; and the failure of the more obvious
vocabularies (for example, currently available non-intentional lin-
guistic characterizations) points to the likely failure of all.
I conclude then that this popular strategy of appealing to
"narrow content"-construing psychological explanatory states as
different only if they differ in such content- is no more successful
than a variety of earlier failed attempts at retaining supervenience.
To count as a genuine response to Twin-Earth style arguments it
has to incorporate some account of how such states are indi-
viduated so as to justify the claim that they are both content-
individuated and supervene on the physical. We have just now ex-
amined what is currently the only plausible story as to how such
states might be so individuated (that is, by role) and we have found
it to fail in this regard. To summarize that argument: When the
explanatory states of psychological theory are construed as repre-
sentations individuated by role after the functionalist fashion, then
either (a) the output specifications in the role characterizations are
intentional, and the doppelgangers differ in explanatory states, or
(b) the output characterizations are non-intentional, and we lack
any reason for calling these explanatory states content-
544
individuated. The lesson of the Twin-Earth examples still holds

good. Psychological theory cannot both appeal to content-
individuated states and satisfy the supervenience requirement.
Two final remarks in regard to conceptual-role accounts. In the
first place, my concern has not been to argue against conceptual-
role theories per se, but only against the claim that such theories
provide for a notion of psychological content which satisfies the
supervenience requirement. Thus, for example, nothing I say
bears on the kind of conceptual-role account associated with
Quine, who combines this with a deep skepticism about the theo-
retical utility of intentional and common-sense psychological no-
tions. Second, I have ignored one kind of conceptual-role speci-
fication, what might be called 'wide-role specification'. A "wide"
conceptual-role specification of a given representation R, specifies
the way in which it is related to further representations, and to
inputs and outputs, which in turn are specified in terms of the
ways in which they cause and are caused by objects, events, and
processes in the subject's environment. On such accounts environ-
mental differences will warrant different input/output specifica-
tions, and thereby different functionally defined internal represen-
tations. I have treated such wide-functional theories elsewhere,
but there is no need to consider them here for the simple reason
that a theory which construes conceptual role, and thus role-
individuated content, as, in part, a function of environmental en-
tities, can hardly be used to salvage supervenience; to serve this
task the roles, and hence the inputs and outputs, must be specifi-
able independently of context.28 Theories which individuate their
psychological explanatory states in this "wide way" will assign dif-
ferent explanatory states to physical doppelgangers, thus violating
the supervenience requirement.
III.
In this final section I briefly address the issue as to whether we

have reason to think that psychological theory should be con-
strained by the principle of psychophysical supervenience, and
thereby reason to follow Stich in maintaining that cognitive theory
28See Owens (25).
545
JOSEPH OWENS
should abandon any appeal to content-individuated states. The an-

swer appears to be clearly negative, as even a cursory survey of the
considerations advanced in favor of the thesis reveal them to be
less than compelling. The general picture is, we shall find, a fa-
miliar one: the plausibility of the various arguments typically
tends to rest on blurring and underestimating the intentional/non-
intentional distinction as it applies to behavioral outputs (and
inputs).
In the first place one might be drawn to such a principle on very
general metaphysical grounds, thinking it to be an essential ingre-
dient in any materialistic conception of the universe, thinking that
its rejection commits one to some form of objectionable dualism.
This, however, is simply incorrect. One can satisfy one's material-
istic bent with a much weaker principle, with, for example, the
kind of principle advanced by Hellman and Thompson (men-
tioned in note 5). The physicalistic thesis they defend is roughly of
the following form: any two worlds which agree in all their lower-
level characterizations (that is, physical characterizations) will
agree in all their higher-level characterizations, including psycho-
logical characterizations. This is physicalism, but it does not incor-
porate or entail any thesis to the effect that physical doppelgangers
will agree in all their higher-level characterizations. Recall that the
Twin-Earth cases all turned on there being some non-intentional
difference between the worlds of Alf and Alf*.
There are three further arguments, all of a vaguely methodo-
logical character, two of which are due to J. Fodor. There is the
now famous argument to the effect that opting for the Putnam/
Burge approach (on which content is, in part, a function of phys-
ical context) would make cognitive theory practically impossi-
ble; the theorist would not be in a position to assign (content-
individuated) psychological states to a subject x in the absence of a
full scientific inventory of x's environment.29 Since this argument
has been widely discussed, and has been ably criticized elsewhere, I
will not delay over it here.30
Fodor has also advanced a quite different argument, and one
which has received little attention. In defense of the claim that psy-
29Fodor (9).
30See, for example, P. Kitcher (19).
546
chological theory should allow for difference in content only

where there is some physical difference, he writes:
The main thing to be said in favor of this speculationis that it allows

us to explain, within the context of the representational theory of
mind, how beliefs of different content can have different behavioral
effects, even when the beliefs are transparentlytype-identical.The
form of explanation goes: it's because different content implies for-
mally distinct internal representations (via the formality condition)
and formally distinct internal representationscan be functionallydif-
ferent-can differ in their causal roles. Whereas, to put it mildly, it's
hard to see how internal representations could differ in causal role
unless they differed in form.3'
The argument, I take it, goes like this: those who accept the super-
venience (or formality) thesis and those who reject it agree on the
principle that states with different contents can play different
causal roles in the genesis of behavior; difference in content can
provide for different "behavioral effects." The theorist who ac-
cepts the supervenience requirement can at least understand how
such difference in content can provide for different behaviors;
difference in content implies some physical (or formal) difference,
and it is this physical difference that makes for the possibility of
different behaviors. One who abandons the supervenience prin-
ciple, however, and attributes different psychological states to
physical doppelgangers, must allow that these different psycholog-
ical states could have different behavioral effects in the absence of
any physical difference. And this Fodor finds totally mysterious: if
the internal states of the doppelgangers are physically identical,
how could they generate different behaviors?
There is an air of mystery here, but it arises simply from the
same old ambiguity in the term 'behavior', from the fact that the
term is neutral vis-at-visthe intentional/non-intentional distinction.
This argument would tell against the opponent of supervenience if
that opponent were committed to the claim that the different con-
tents he ascribes to Alf and Alf* (in the light of relevant contextual
factors) were such as to provide for physically different behaviors
(for some non-intentional difference). If the different internal
psychological states he ascribes could cause different physical be-
31Fodor (9), p. 68.
547
JOSEPH OWENS
haviors (in Alf and Alf*) then Alf and Alf* better differ in some
(internal) physical fashion. But the defender of Twin-Earth ex-
amples makes no such claim; indeed it is an essential part of the
story he tells that Alf and Alf* are exact counterparts when it
comes to physical behavior and dispositions to physical behavior.
Given that the different psychological states ascribed do not pro-
vide for the possibility of physically different behaviors, there is no
need to postulate some internal physical difference. In these ex-
amples the different psychological states do indeed provide for
different behavior, but only for behavior as intentionally charac-
terized. And such difference does not necessarily require some in-
ternal physical difference; the relevant contextual factors support
different intentional characterizations of both behavior and in-
ternal psychological state.
In general the opponent of supervenience can agree with
Fodor's principle: difference in content provides for different be-
haviors. But he accepts this principle in all its generality only when
it is construed as a principle to the effect that difference in content
provides for difference in intentionally characterized behavior;
and when construed in this weakened fashion it poses no threat to
his non-individualistic account of the mental.
One final argument for the supervenience principle is drawn
from S. Stich (who, remember, speaks of "psychological au-
tonomy" rather than "supervenience"):
I think the best defence of the autonomy principle begins with what
might be called the replacementargument. Suppose that someone were
to succeed in building an exact physicalreplica of me . .. the replica,
being an exact physical copy, would behavejust as I would in all cir-
cumstances.. . . But now, the argument continues, since psychologyis
the science which aspires to explain behavior, any states or processes
or properties which are not shared by Stich and his identically be-
having replica must surely be irrelevantto psychology.32
Stich recognizes that the argument will not do as just stated,

since replicas do not satisfy all the same behavioral descriptions (as
illustrated by Twin-Earth examples). To accommodate this fact
Stich introduces the notion of autonomous behavioral description.
32Stich (33), pp. 165-166.
548
Let me introduce the term autonomous behavioral descriptionfor any

description of behavior which satisfies the following condition: if it
applies to an organism in a given setting, then it would also apply to
any replica of the organism in that setting. It would appear, then, that
the issue before us reduces to the question of whether autonomous
behavioral descriptions include all those that a psychologistwill find
useful in constructingsystematicexplanationsof behavior.33
The replacement argument thus turns on the crucial issue as to

whether or not it is possible to taxonomize behavior in such a way
as to ensure that (a) doppelgangers exhibit the same behavior, and
(b) the behavioral' characterizations are such as to enable the
theorist to provide the relevant psychological generalizations, etc.
In defense of a positive response, Stich writes:
In thinking about this questions it is helpful to reflect on the analogy

between organismsand industrialrobots.... Unless one is tempted to
dualism, it is plausible to think that theories explaining the behavior
of various sorts of robots and theories explaining the behavior of
various sorts of organisms will be at least roughly analogous.34
But, he claims, robotics can surely get by without employing non-

autonomous descriptions. True, a robot's behavior on a given oc-
casion may be characterized in an non-autonomous fashion: we
may, for example, characterize a robot as performing the millionth
weld, and as thereby falsifying Professor Hubert's claim. These
descriptions are, on Stich's account, non-autonomous, but they
are not the kinds of descriptions which are likely to figure in the
theoretical generalizations of any plausible robotics. Such non-
autonomous descriptions, Stich claims, are best viewed as "concep-
tual hybrids"; they are satisfied by the robot only because its be-
havior satisfies a certain autonomous description and certain other
relevant factors obtain. The robot, for example, satisfies the de-
scription 'falsifying Hubert's claim' only because it satisfies a de-
scription such as 'performing a weld', and additionally, it has al-
ready performed 999,999 such welds, and Hubert has made some
specific claim about the limited life of such robots. The first com-
ponent ('performing a weld') is an autonomous description, and it
33Ibid., p. 167.
34Ibid.
549
JOSEPH OWENS
is only such descriptions that are likely to figure in the generaliza-

tions of robotics. Stich then concludes:
Now if the analogy between robotsand organismsis a good one-and

I think it is-it suggests that we should seek a parallel pattern of
explanation in real psychology.... We should expect to have our
theory aim at explaining behavioralevents autonomously described.
Non-autonomous descriptionsof behavioralevents should be viewed
as conceptually complex, resolvableinto an autonomous component
and a potpourri of other factorswhich explain why the autonomously
described event countsas satisfyingthe non-autonomousdescriptions.
This is just the conclusion we needed to make a go of the replace-
ment argument and thus to support the principle of autonomy.35
This argument can be challenged at every step, but I shall confine

myself to two main issues. And once again it is clear that whatever
plausibility the argument has it is a plausibility inherited from a
benign neglect of the intentional/non-intentional distinction.
First, consider Stich's claim that robotics can get by without any
non-autonomous descriptions, and that such a robotics provides a
plausible model for theory-construction in psychology. It is incor-
rect to suggest, as he does, that "unlessone is tempted by dualism"
it is plausible to think that theories explaining the behavior of
robots will be analogous to theories explaining the behavior of or-
ganisms. To the extent that the robotics is of the restricted kind
Stich appeals to-one devoid of non-autonomous characteriza-
tions-it is this restriction on the vocabulary, not dualism, that casts
doubt on the claim that such a theory is likely to be analogous to
any plausible psychological theory. Restricting the theory in this
way serves to exclude a vast variety of intentional characterizations
(for example, semantically characterized verbal behavior), and it is
doubtful that the theorist can fashion the needed psychological
generalizations without the aid of such characterizations.
The claim that robotics can provide a plausible model for psy-
chological theory is an inherently vague one; it all depends on how
the robot and its behavioral repertoire are described. Any given
robot can, of course, be characterized, and its behavior explained,
without the aid of non-autonomous notions, but then one must lookto
such specific characterizationsand explanations to determinewhetheror
35Ibid., p. 169.
550
not they provide appropriatemodelsfor psychologicaltheory. Consider,

for example, the following partial specification of a particular kind
of industrial robot (Hitachi's Process Robot):36
STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS
Robot main body
Rotation ? 1500
Arm Upper arm + 500, - 450
Moving Fore arm + 250, - 450

function
Wrist Bend ? 900
Twist ? 1850
Speed Arm Max. 1,000 mm/sec
Wrist Bend 1200/sec

Twist 1800/sec
Weight capacity Max. 10kg (including grips)
Repeatability ? 0.2 mm
Weight 200 kg
To the extent that one's robotics is geared to explaining the be-

havior of systems specified in this kind of fashion (a paradigm of
non-intentional specifications) it is fairly clear that the explanations
can get by with autonomous descriptions. But to the extent that
the theory is fashioned so as to explain the behavior of systems
specified in this way-to explain behavior under descriptions such
as, '30? rotation of upper arm'-it is hardly a plausible model for
psychological theory.37 To provide for a more plausible model it is
natural to employ higher-level characterizations of the systems and
their capacities, to abstract from the particular physical mecha-
nisms whereby the systems perform their appointed tasks; to char-
acterize them as 'spot-welders', as 'chess players', as 'devices that
understand and obey certain ranges of commands', and so on.
Theories which serve to explain the behavior of systems character-
ized in these ways may perhaps provide plausible models for psy-
36Tver and Bolz (34), p. 209.

37See note 24
551
JOSEPH OWENS
chological theories, but there is little or no reason to think that these

characterizations (or the resulting generalizations) can be fash-
ioned without the aid of non-autonomous descriptions.
Second, I think there is every reason to doubt the general
thesis that the non-autonomous descriptions, which figure largely
in our common-sense characterizations and explanations, are, as
Stich claims, resolvable into an autonomous component (plus a
potpourri of other factors ... .), where these autonomous compo-
nents are such as to satisfy conditions (a) and (b) mentioned above.
Stich gives us no general indications as to what these autonomous
characterizations might look like, though he wisely denies that they
must be "bodily-motion" characterizations (these are surely going
to fail (b)). He does offer some examples of non-autonomous de-
scriptions and their autonomous components, for example, the
welding example, but this is not enough. If the thesis is to survive
it must be possible to isolate such a component in all psychologi-
cally relevant non-autonomous behavioral descriptions, and this, I
think, is implausible. Once again characterizations of linguistic be-
havior may serve as the touchstone. Traditional semantic charac-
terizations of such behavior are non-autonomous (they violate
condition (a)), but the alternative characterizations, phonological,
phonetic, etc., all seem doomed to violate condition (b)-they do
not seem to provide for the appropriate generalizations. In face of
this intuitive difficulty it is not enough to note, as Stich does, that
"[i]t may be that substantial work needs to be done in forging ap-
propriate autonomous behavioral descriptions for use in scientific
psychology."38 As things now stand a vast variety of psychological
generalizations relating to linguistic behavior can be expressed
only when that behavior is characterized in a semantical, non-
autonomous, intentional fashion, and to rest one's argument for
autonomy (or supervenience) on the unsupported claim that there
must be some kind of non-semantical, non-intentional characteriza-
tions which will provide for somewhatsimilar generalizations is, I
think, to rest it on something less than sand. The familiar story
once again: the argument's persuasiveness rests on a vague and
undifferentiated notion of behavior (and an equally vague notion
of autonomous behavioral description). It sheds its credibility
38Stich (34), p. 169.
552
when one looks to that kind of behavior where the intentional/

non-intentional distinction is most sharply drawn (linguistic be-
havior) and inquires as to whether or not "autonomous character-
izations" of such behavior are intentional or non-intentional in
character. Either way autonomous descriptions fail to live up to
expectations.
To conclude: Content-individuated states do not satisfy the
principle of psychophysical supervenience, but this does not tell
against theoretical appeal to such states, since we have, as yet, been
provided with no good reason for thinking that cognitive theory
should abide by this principle.
The Universityof Minnesota
REFERENCES
1 Burge, T. (1979). "Individualism and the Mental," in MidwestStudies in

Philosophy, Vol. IV: Studies in Metaphysics,edited by P. A. French, T. E.
Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein. Minneapolis, Minn., University of Min-
nesota Press.
2 , (1979). "Sinning Against Frege," The PhilosophicalReview 88.
3 , "Other Bodies," in Woodfield (35).
4 Davidson, D. (1980). "Mental Events," in Essays on Actions and Events.
Oxford, The Clarendon Press.
5 Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge,
Mass., The MIT Press.
6 Field, H. (1977). "Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role," Journal of
Philosophy 74.
7 , (1978). "Mental Representation," Erkenntnis 13.
8 Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought. New York, Crowell.
9 , (1980). "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research
Strategy in Cognitive Psychology," The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3.
10 , (1982). "Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem,"
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23.
11 Harman, G. (1973). Thought. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University
Press.
12 , (1982). "Conceptual Role Semantics," ANotre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 23.
13 Haugeland, J. (1982). "Weak Supervenience," American Philosophical
Quarterly 19.
14 Hellman, G., and Thompson, F. (1982). "Physicalism, Ontology, De-
termination, and Reduction,"Journal of Philosophy72.
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P. Cole. New York, Academic Press.
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41.
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AustralasianJournal of Philosophy50.
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22 , "Postscripts to 'Radical Interpretation'," in Lewis (23).
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24 McGinn, C. "The Structure of Content," in Woodfield (35).
25 Owens, J. (1983). "Functionalism and Propositional Attitudes," Nou's
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26 Perry, J. (1979). "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," Nous 13.
27 Putnam, H., "The Nature of Mental States," in Putnam (29).
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30 Schiffer, S. (1982). "Intention-Based Semantics," Notre DameJournal of
Formal Logic 23.
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554

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Philosophical Review

In Defense of a Different Doppelganger

IN DEFENSE OF A DIFFERENT DOPPELGANGER*

Today's most fashionablebrand of psychologicaltheorizing,

*For their comments on an earlier draft of this paper I am grateful to

line of response, one which appeals to a specially introduced no-

The principle of psychophysical supervenience is best construed

3The wide/narrow distinction is first found in Putnam (28).

share the same explanatory psychological states. In one fashion or

Def. of Supervenience: The set of properties M supervenes on the Set N

catef wherever the other contains the predicate g, then ascriptions

attribute different content if (i) f and g figure obliquely in these

8See Putnam (28); Burge (1) and (3).

communities in both societies are acquainted with the differences

9Putnam employed the Twin-Earth examples only to illustrate a point

pose a direct challenge to the supervenience thesis; they serve to

there are interesting links between the issues relating to indexicals

Today's favored line of defense goes something like this. Burge

cusses and rejects a variety of further responses, in particular, those in-

pervening on internal physical states. (The realization that such

'6Functional and conceptual-role accounts are advanced, for example,

examples such as Burge's, this conception has now largely been

the conception of propositional content as decomposing in this

of our most fundamental beliefs about meaning, namely, the belief

ential meaning as one component. But it does not appear to be met by

Thus Field argues, a full account of meaning must incorporate

our concept of belief combines two separate elements, serving sepa-

Just as, on Field's account, a linguistic representation has the

'9Field (6), p. 397.

clearly supervene on the physical. But given appropriate contex-

2'The notion of intentional characterizationis somewhatvague; I use it

On the kind of account now being considered speech productions

22Hereand elsewhere I appeal to grossly simplified role specifications,

has to provide them with different content, different psychological

231n forcing the defender of supervenience to choose between these al-

non-intentional taxonomy has been decided upon; and, since I

25Similarlyit is mistaken to suppose that the claim of role-individuated

something with the force of the two-factor principle: the principle

results in a change of meaning. Though these objections, and

x believes that P if and only if x is in a state that satisfiesrole C and the

In advancing this claim she is of course committed to thinking of

way to specify these relations in a non-intentional fashion (without

whatever qualifications are appropriate) disposed to assert that P?

mark. My argument has little or nothing to do with standard

individuated. The lesson of the Twin-Earth examples still holds

In this final section I briefly address the issue as to whether we

28See Owens (25).

should abandon any appeal to content-individuated states. The an-

chological theory should allow for difference in content only

The main thing to be said in favor of this speculationis that it allows

31Fodor (9), p. 68.

Stich recognizes that the argument will not do as just stated,

32Stich (33), pp. 165-166.

Let me introduce the term autonomous behavioral descriptionfor any

The replacement argument thus turns on the crucial issue as to

In thinking about this questions it is helpful to reflect on the analogy

But, he claims, robotics can surely get by without employing non-

is only such descriptions that are likely to figure in the generaliza-

Now if the analogy between robotsand organismsis a good one-and

This argument can be challenged at every step, but I shall confine

not they provide appropriatemodelsfor psychologicaltheory. Consider,

Arm Upper arm + 500, - 450