FM 3-20.

15

TANK PLATOON

FEBRUARY 2007
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their
contractors only. This publication contains technical or opera­
tional information that is for official Government use. This deter­
mination was made on 31 October 2006. Other requests for this
document must be referred to Director, Directorate of Training,
Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, 204 1st
Cavalry Regiment Rd Ste 207, US Army Armor Center, Fort Knox,
KY 40121-5123.

Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent

disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 This publication is available at

Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and

General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine

Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).

 *FM 3-20.15

Field Manual Headquarters

No. 3-20.15 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 22 February 2007

Tank Platoon

Contents
Page
PREFACE ...........................................................................................................xiii

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1-1

Section I - Organizations ................................................................................. 1-1

Tank Platoon ...................................................................................................... 1-1

Tank Company ................................................................................................... 1-5

Armored Cavalry Troop ...................................................................................... 1-5

Section II - Capabilities and Limitations ........................................................ 1-6

Capabilities ......................................................................................................... 1-6

Limitations .......................................................................................................... 1-6

Section III - Responsibilities............................................................................ 1-7

Platoon Leader ................................................................................................... 1-7

Platoon Sergeant................................................................................................ 1-7

Tank Commander............................................................................................... 1-7

Gunner................................................................................................................ 1-8

Driver .................................................................................................................. 1-8

Loader ................................................................................................................ 1-8

Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL............................................................................. 2-1

Section I - Command........................................................................................ 2-1

Decision-Making ................................................................................................. 2-1

Leadership........................................................................................................ 2-11

Section II – Control......................................................................................... 2-12

Situational Understanding ................................................................................ 2-12

Fire Distribution and Control............................................................................. 2-26

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only

to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use. This determination was made on

31 October 2006. Other requests for this document must be referred to Director, Directorate of Training,

Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, USAARMC, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road Ste 207,

Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5123.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of
the document.

*This publication supersedes FM 3-20.15 dated 1 November 2001.

22 February 2007 i
Contents

Chapter 3 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS...............................................................................3-1

Section I - Fundamentals of the Offense ........................................................3-1

Purposes of the Offense .....................................................................................3-1

Characteristics of the Offense ............................................................................3-1

Forms of Offense ................................................................................................3-2

Role of the Tank Platoon ....................................................................................3-2

War-Fighting Functions.......................................................................................3-2

Section II - Planning..........................................................................................3-3

Movement and Maneuver ...................................................................................3-3

Fire Support ........................................................................................................3-4

Intelligence ..........................................................................................................3-4

Protection ............................................................................................................3-4

Sustainment ........................................................................................................3-5

Command and Control........................................................................................3-5

The Human Aspect .............................................................................................3-5

Section III - Preparation....................................................................................3-5

Movement and Maneuver ...................................................................................3-5

Fire Support ........................................................................................................3-6

Intelligence ..........................................................................................................3-6

Protection ............................................................................................................3-6

Sustainment ........................................................................................................3-6

Command and Control........................................................................................3-6

The Human Aspect .............................................................................................3-7

Section IV - Execution—Tactical Movement ..................................................3-7

Fire Distribution and Control in the Offense........................................................3-7

Use of Terrain for Cover and Concealment ........................................................3-9

Techniques of Movement....................................................................................3-9

Formations ........................................................................................................3-11

Overwatch .........................................................................................................3-16

Section V - Execution—Actions on Contact ................................................3-18

The Four Steps of Actions on Contact..............................................................3-18

Examples of Actions on Contact .......................................................................3-21

Battle Drills ........................................................................................................3-25

Section VI - Execution—Platoon Tactical Tasks .........................................3-36

Destroy an Inferior Force ..................................................................................3-36

Attack by Fire ....................................................................................................3-38

Overwatch/Support by Fire ...............................................................................3-39

Assault ..............................................................................................................3-40

Bypass ..............................................................................................................3-42

Reconnaissance by Fire ...................................................................................3-44

Hasty Occupation of a Platoon Battle Position (Hasty Defense) ......................3-45

Breaching Operations .......................................................................................3-45

Section VII - Execution—Consolidation and Reorganization.....................3-46

Consolidation ....................................................................................................3-46

Reorganization ..................................................................................................3-46

ii FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Contents

Section VIII – Limited Visibility Operations ................................................. 3-46

Equipment ........................................................................................................ 3-47

Navigation......................................................................................................... 3-47

Vehicle Identification......................................................................................... 3-47

Tactical Movement and Attacks ....................................................................... 3-47

Chapter 4 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS .............................................................................. 4-1

Section I - Fundamentals of the Defense....................................................... 4-1

Characteristics of the Defense ........................................................................... 4-1

Defensive Patterns, Missions, and Tasks .......................................................... 4-2

Role of the Tank Platoon .................................................................................... 4-2

Warfighting Functions......................................................................................... 4-2

Section II - Planning ......................................................................................... 4-3

Reconnaissance and Time Management........................................................... 4-3

War-Fighting Function Considerations............................................................... 4-3

Section III – Preparation................................................................................... 4-7

Phase of Preparation.......................................................................................... 4-7

Preparation Tasks .............................................................................................. 4-8

War-Fighting Function Considerations............................................................. 4-21

Section IV - Execution.................................................................................... 4-23

Hide Position .................................................................................................... 4-23

Occupation of Firing Positions.......................................................................... 4-23

Indirect Fires..................................................................................................... 4-23

Direct Fires ....................................................................................................... 4-24

Displacement.................................................................................................... 4-25

Counterattacks ................................................................................................. 4-26

Limited Visibility Defense ................................................................................. 4-29

Chapter 5 OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS ................................................................... 5-1

Section I - Tactical Road March ...................................................................... 5-1

Preparation and SOPs ....................................................................................... 5-1

Composition........................................................................................................ 5-1

March Columns .................................................................................................. 5-2

Control Measures ............................................................................................... 5-2

Actions During the March ................................................................................... 5-3

Section II - Assembly Areas ............................................................................ 5-5

Quartering Party Actions .................................................................................... 5-5

Occupation Procedures...................................................................................... 5-6

Occupation by Force .......................................................................................... 5-7

Section III - Actions at a Contact Point .......................................................... 5-8

Section IV - Convoy Escort.............................................................................. 5-8

Command and Control ....................................................................................... 5-8

Tactical Disposition............................................................................................. 5-9

Actions on Contact ........................................................................................... 5-12

Actions During Halts ......................................................................................... 5-17

Section V - Passage of Lines ........................................................................ 5-19

Operational Considerations.............................................................................. 5-19

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 iii

Contents

Conducting a Passage of Lines ........................................................................5-19

Assisting a Passage of Lines ............................................................................5-20

Section VI - Breaching Operations................................................................5-20

Types of Obstacles ...........................................................................................5-20

Breaching Procedures ......................................................................................5-26

Section VII - Perimeter Defense.....................................................................5-30

Section VIII – Screen.......................................................................................5-30

Section IX – Delay ...........................................................................................5-31

Section X - Relief in Place ..............................................................................5-31

Coordination and Reconnaissance...................................................................5-31

Relief Procedures .............................................................................................5-32

Security and Communications ..........................................................................5-32

Section XI - Withdrawal ..................................................................................5-33

Chapter 6 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS....................................................................6-1

Section I - Fire Support ....................................................................................6-1

Mortar Support ....................................................................................................6-1

Field Artillery Support..........................................................................................6-2

Fire Support Team ..............................................................................................6-3

Fire Request Channels .......................................................................................6-4

Fire Direction and Control Procedures ...............................................................6-5

Tank Platoon Fire Support Planning...................................................................6-8

Section II - Army Aviation.................................................................................6-9

Air Cavalry...........................................................................................................6-9

Attack Helicopters ...............................................................................................6-9

Section III - Combat Engineers ......................................................................6-10

Capabilities........................................................................................................6-10

Engineer Support to the Tank Platoon..............................................................6-11

Section IV - Air and Missile Defense.............................................................6-11

Air and Missile Defense Warnings....................................................................6-12

Passive Air and Missile Defense ......................................................................6-12

Active Air and Missile Defense .........................................................................6-12

Section V - Air Support...................................................................................6-13

Close Air Support..............................................................................................6-13

Marking Friendly Positions................................................................................6-14

Section VI - Military Police .............................................................................6-15

Maneuver and Mobility Support ........................................................................6-15

Area Security.....................................................................................................6-15

Detainee Operations .........................................................................................6-15

Law and Order ..................................................................................................6-16

Chapter 7 SUSTAINMENT ..................................................................................................7-1

Section I - Organization....................................................................................7-1

Section II - Supply Operations.........................................................................7-1

Basic and Combat Loads....................................................................................7-1

Classes of Supply ...............................................................................................7-2

iv FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Contents

Methods of Resupply.......................................................................................... 7-3

Techniques of Resupply..................................................................................... 7-6

Section III - Maintenance Operations ............................................................. 7-9

Leader Responsibilities .................................................................................... 7-10

Levels of Maintenance ..................................................................................... 7-11

Related Operational Considerations ................................................................ 7-12

Section IV - Personnel Operations ............................................................... 7-13

Personnel Services........................................................................................... 7-13

Personnel Management ................................................................................... 7-13

Section V - Medical Treatment and Evacuation .......................................... 7-13

Health and Hygiene .......................................................................................... 7-13

Soldiers Wounded in Action ............................................................................. 7-14

Soldiers Killed in Action .................................................................................... 7-15

Section VI - Detainees .................................................................................... 7-16

Handling Detainees .......................................................................................... 7-16

Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment.................................................. 7-18

Civilians ............................................................................................................ 7-19

Civil Affairs Units and Psychological Operations ............................................. 7-19

Chapter 8 URBAN OPERATIONS...................................................................................... 8-1

Section I - Urban Operations Planning Considerations ............................... 8-1

Categories of Urban Areas................................................................................. 8-2

Vehicles, Weapons, and Munitions .................................................................... 8-3

Command and Control ....................................................................................... 8-6

Maneuver............................................................................................................ 8-7

Armored Vehicle Positions ................................................................................. 8-8

Intelligence ....................................................................................................... 8-10

Fire Support...................................................................................................... 8-12

Sustainment...................................................................................................... 8-13

Section II - Offensive Urban Operations ...................................................... 8-13

Hasty and Deliberate Attacks in an Urban Environment.................................. 8-13

Phases of Offensive Urban Operations............................................................ 8-14

Task Organization ............................................................................................ 8-15

Offensive Techniques in Urban Operations ..................................................... 8-15

Section III - Defensive Urban Operations..................................................... 8-17

Enemy Forces Outside the Urban Area ........................................................... 8-17

Enemy Forces Within the Urban Area.............................................................. 8-17

Defensive Techniques in Urban Operations .................................................... 8-17

Section IV – Employment of Attack and Assault/Cargo Helicopters ........ 8-18

Support for Ground Maneuver Units ................................................................ 8-18

Role during Urban Operations.......................................................................... 8-18

Command and Control ..................................................................................... 8-19

Maneuver Graphic Aids.................................................................................... 8-19

Identifying Friendly Positions, Marking Locations, and Acquiring Targets....... 8-19

Attack Helicopter Target Engagement ............................................................. 8-24

Air/Ground Integration in the Hasty Attack/Close Fight ................................... 8-25

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 v

Contents

Chapter 9 STABILITY OPERATIONS AND CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS ..................9-1

Section I – General Considerations ................................................................9-1

Balanced Mindset ...............................................................................................9-1

Combat Skills Training ........................................................................................9-2

Section II – Stability Operations ......................................................................9-2

Types of Stability Operations ..............................................................................9-2

Purposes of Stability Operations ........................................................................9-3

Considerations for Stability Operations ..............................................................9-4

Role of the Tank Platoon ....................................................................................9-5

Planning and Operational Considerations ..........................................................9-6

Section III – Civil Support Operations...........................................................9-11

Types of Civil Support Operations ....................................................................9-11

Purposes of Civil Operations ............................................................................9-12

Considerations for Civil Support Operations ....................................................9-12

Section IV – Examples of Stability Operations ............................................9-12

Establish a Battle Position ................................................................................9-13

Conduct Reserve Operations ...........................................................................9-13

Overwatch a Traffic Control Point.....................................................................9-14

Defend a Choke Point.......................................................................................9-14

Overwatch a Blockade/Roadblock....................................................................9-14

Conduct Convoy Escort ....................................................................................9-15

Conduct Proofing/Breaching Operations ..........................................................9-15

Conduct Cordon and Search Operations .........................................................9-17

Appendix A DIGITIZATION ................................................................................................... A-1

Appendix B ORDERS AND REPORTS ................................................................................ B-1

Appendix C INFANTRY/ARMOR OPERATIONS ................................................................. C-1

Appendix D OPERATIONAL SECURITY.............................................................................. D-1

Appendix E CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR (CBRN), AND SMOKE

OPERATIONS ................................................................................................... E-1

Appendix F COMBAT IDENTIFICATION ..............................................................................F-1

Appendix G RISK MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................... G-1

Appendix H FRATRICIDE PREVENTION............................................................................. H-1

Appendix I BATTLE DAMAGED TANK ................................................................................I-1

GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1

REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1

INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures
Figure 1-1. Tank platoon.................................................................................................1-2

Figure 1-2. The wingman concept ..................................................................................1-2

Figure 1-3. Tank and Bradley main gun and coax dead space above street level ........1-3

vi FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Contents

Figure 1-4. Tank company ............................................................................................. 1-5

Figure 1-5. Armored cavalry troop.................................................................................. 1-6

Figure 2-1. Traditional overlay...................................................................................... 2-16

Figure 2-2. Sample FBCB2 with overlay ...................................................................... 2-16

Figure 2-3. Boundary (graphic control measure) ......................................................... 2-17

Figure 2-4. Phase line (graphic control measure) ........................................................ 2-17

Figure 2-5. Assembly area (graphic control measure)................................................. 2-18

Figure 2-6. Route (graphic control measure) ............................................................... 2-18

Figure 2-7. Checkpoint (graphic control measure)....................................................... 2-18

Figure 2-8. Attack position (graphic control measure) ................................................. 2-18

Figure 2-9. Contact point (graphic control measure) ................................................... 2-19

Figure 2-10. Passage lane (graphic control measure)................................................. 2-19

Figure 2-11. Passage point (graphic control measure)................................................ 2-19

Figure 2-12. Objective (graphic control measure)........................................................ 2-19

Figure 2-13. Axis of advance (graphic control measure) ............................................. 2-20

Figure 2-14. Direction of attack (graphic control measure).......................................... 2-20

Figure 2-15. Assault position (graphic control measure) ............................................. 2-20

Figure 2-16. Attack-by-fire position (graphic control measure) .................................... 2-21

Figure 2-17. Support-by-fire position (graphic control measure) ................................. 2-21

Figure 2-18. Battle position (graphic control measure) ................................................ 2-21

Figure 2-19. Target reference point (graphic control measure) ................................... 2-21

Figure 2-20. Example of TIRS...................................................................................... 2-23

Figure 2-21. Platoon reports own position using TIRS (checkpoint)............................ 2-23

Figure 2-22. Frontal fire pattern.................................................................................... 2-29

Figure 2-23. Cross fire pattern ..................................................................................... 2-30

Figure 2-24. Depth fire pattern ..................................................................................... 2-31

Figure 2-25. Use of cross fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage

enemy PCs (with platoon leader’s fire command) ..................................... 2-32

Figure 2-26. Use of frontal fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage

multiple enemy tanks (with platoon leader’s fire command)...................... 2-33

Figure 2-27. Use of different fire patterns in each section (with simultaneous fire

technique) to engage enemy targets (with platoon leader’s fire

command) .................................................................................................. 2-34

Figure 2-28. Use of depth fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique (with section

fire command) ............................................................................................ 2-35

Figure 2-29. Use of cross fire pattern and alternating fire technique (with section fire

command) .................................................................................................. 2-36

Figure 2-30. Use of observed fire technique (with section fire command)................... 2-37

Figure 2-31. Example platoon fire command ............................................................... 2-40

Figure 2-33. Keyhole firing positions ............................................................................ 2-42

Figure 3-1. Example sectors of fire in a moving engagement (platoon moving in

wedge formation) ......................................................................................... 3-8

Figure 3-2. Movement by alternate bounds ................................................................. 3-10

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 vii

Contents

Figure 3-3. Movement by successive bounds ..............................................................3-11

Figure 3-4. Column formation .......................................................................................3-12

Figure 3-5. Staggered column formation ......................................................................3-13

Figure 3-6. Wedge formation ........................................................................................3-13

Figure 3-7. Echelon formation.......................................................................................3-14

Figure 3-8. Vee formation .............................................................................................3-14

Figure 3-9. Line formation.............................................................................................3-15

Figure 3-10. Coil formation ...........................................................................................3-15

Figure 3-11. Herringbone formation..............................................................................3-16

Figure 3-12. Overwatch locations and techniques .......................................................3-17

Figure 3-13A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys using an action drill, and

reports ........................................................................................................3-22

Figure 3-13B. Platoon develops the situation ...............................................................3-22

Figure 3-14A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys, and reports ..............................3-23

Figure 3-14B. Platoon executes a battle drill; platoon leader evaluates the situation

as the drill is executed ................................................................................3-23

Figure 3-14C. Platoon develops the situation and identifies a superior enemy force ..3-24

Figure 3-14D. Platoon leader chooses and recommends an alternate COA; platoon

executes the new COA...............................................................................3-24

Figure 3-15. Change of formation drill ..........................................................................3-26

Figure 3-16. Contact drill...............................................................................................3-26

Figure 3-17A. Action drill without enemy contact..........................................................3-27

Figure 3-17B. Action drill without enemy contact (continued) ......................................3-28

Figure 3-17C. Action drill without enemy contact (continued) ......................................3-28

Figure 3-18A. Action drill with enemy contact...............................................................3-29

Figure 3-18B. Action drill with enemy contact (continued) ...........................................3-30

Figure 3-18C. Action drill with enemy contact (continued) ...........................................3-31

Figure 3-18D. Action drill with enemy contact (continued) ...........................................3-32

Figure 3-19. React to indirect fire drill...........................................................................3-33

Figure 3-20. Machine gun aim points ...........................................................................3-34

Figure 3-21. Evading enemy aircraft.............................................................................3-35

Figure 3-22A. Scenarios for destruction of an inferior enemy force .............................3-37

Figure 3-22B. Scenarios for destruction of an inferior enemy force (cont.)..................3-37

Figure 3-23A. Platoon employs attack by fire against a convoy...................................3-38

Figure 3-23B. Platoon uses attack by fire against an enemy reconnaissance platoon

as part of a hasty defense ..........................................................................3-39

Figure 3-24. Platoon supports by fire to suppress an enemy element during a

company assault.........................................................................................3-40

Figure 3-25A. Tank section assaults an inferior force as another section supports by

fire...............................................................................................................3-41

Figure 3-25B. Platoon executes an assault as two other platoons support by fire ......3-42

Figure 3-26A. Bypass ...................................................................................................3-43

Figure 3-26B. Bypass (continued) ................................................................................3-44

viii FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Contents

Figure 4-1. Fighting positions ......................................................................................... 4-4

Figure 4-2. Battle positions............................................................................................. 4-4

Figure 4-3. Considerations for obstacle employment .................................................... 4-6

Figure 4-4. Dug-in firing positions .................................................................................. 4-7

Figure 4-5. Examples of constructed TRP markers ....................................................... 4-9

Figure 4-6A. Turret-down positions .............................................................................. 4-11

Figure 4-6B. Hull-down positions ................................................................................. 4-11

Figure 4-7. Traditional sector sketch card.................................................................... 4-14

Figure 4-8. Traditionally prepared fire plan (handwritten) ............................................ 4-16

Figure 4-9. Sample platoon time line............................................................................ 4-17

Figure 4-10. Using background to prevent skylining .................................................... 4-22

Figure 4-11. Displacement with cover from another element (entire platoon moves at

once) .......................................................................................................... 4-25

Figure 4-12. Displacement without cover from another element (sections move using

bounding overwatch).................................................................................. 4-26

Figure 4-13. Counterattack by fire................................................................................ 4-27

Figure 4-14. Counterattack by fire and movement....................................................... 4-28

Figure 5-1. Example strip map ....................................................................................... 5-3

Figure 5-2. Sectors of fire ............................................................................................... 5-4

Figure 5-3A. Battalion assembly area; company team adjacent to other company

teams ........................................................................................................... 5-7

Figure 5-3B. Company team assembly area independent of the battalion.................... 5-7

Figure 5-4. Tank platoon as part of a larger escort force............................................. 5-10

Figure 5-5A. Platoon performing forward security for a convoy................................... 5-11

Figure 5-5B. Platoon performing flank security for a convoy ....................................... 5-11

Figure 5-5C. Platoon performing rear security for a convoy ........................................ 5-11

Figure 5-6. Platoon performing convoy escort independently...................................... 5-12

Figure 5-7. Platoon escort using modified traveling overwatch ................................... 5-12

Figure 5-8A. Convoy escort actions toward ambush ................................................... 5-13

Figure 5-8B. Convoy continues to move ...................................................................... 5-14

Figure 5-9A. Escort suppresses the ambush to facilitate attack by the reaction force 5-14

Figure 5-9B. Escort assaults the ambush force ........................................................... 5-15

Figure 5-9C. Escort breaks contact.............................................................................. 5-15

Figure 5-10. Convoy escort overwatches an obstacle ................................................. 5-17

Figure 5-11A. Convoy assumes herringbone formation .............................................. 5-18

Figure 5-11B. Convoy moves back into column formation .......................................... 5-18

Figure 5-11C. Convoy escort vehicles rejoin column................................................... 5-18

Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations .................................................................... 5-22

Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations (continued) ................................................. 5-23

Figure 5-13. Antitank ditch ........................................................................................... 5-24

Figure 5-14. Road craters ............................................................................................ 5-24

Figure 5-15. Abatis ....................................................................................................... 5-24

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 ix

Contents

Figure 5-16. Log crib.....................................................................................................5-25

Figure 5-17. Wire obstacle in depth..............................................................................5-25

Figure 5-18. Belly shot created by a tank berm ............................................................5-25

Figure 5-19. Plow tanks create multiple lanes while the section leaders’ tanks

provide overwatch ......................................................................................5-28

Figure 5-20. Sample technique for obstacle lane marking ...........................................5-29

Figure 6-1. Fire support team vehicle .............................................................................6-4

Figure 6-2. FBCB2 SPOTREP (immediate suppression request) ..................................6-4

Figure 6-3. Polar plot method of target location..............................................................6-6

Figure 6-4. Shift from a known point method using direction (in mils)............................6-6

Figure 6-5. Lateral and range shifts from a known point ................................................6-7

Figure 6-6. Target description.........................................................................................6-8

Figure 6-7. OH-58D armed helicopter ............................................................................6-9

Figure 6-8. Army attack helicopters ..............................................................................6-10

Figure 6-9. Combat engineer platoon organization ......................................................6-10

Figure 6-10. M9 armored combat earthmover ..............................................................6-11

Figure 7-1. Example company or troop LOGPAC ..........................................................7-5

Figure 7-2. Tailgate resupply technique .........................................................................7-7

Figure 7-3. Service-station resupply technique ..............................................................7-8

Figure 7-4. Combination of resupply techniques ............................................................7-9

Figure 7-5A. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (front side) ..................................7-15

Figure 7-5B. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (back side) .................................7-15

Figure 7-6. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag....................7-18

Figure 7-7. Sample tag for captured documents and equipment .................................7-19

Figure 8-1. Underground systems ..................................................................................8-2

Figure 8-2. Tank weapon dead space at street level......................................................8-4

Figure 8-3. Tank main gun and coax dead space above street level.............................8-4

Figure 8-4A. Urban hull-down position ...........................................................................8-9

Figure 8-4B. Urban hull-down position ...........................................................................8-9

Figure 8-5. Hide position.................................................................................................8-9

Figure 8-6. Building hide position..................................................................................8-10

Figure 8-7. Favored threat weapons.............................................................................8-12

Figure 8-8. Example task force attack in an urban environment, with tank platoons in

the support and assault forces ...................................................................8-16

Figure 8-9. Simplified area sketch ................................................................................8-20

Figure 8-10. Urban grid technique ................................................................................8-23

Figure 8-11. Checkpoint technique...............................................................................8-23

Figure 8-12. Objective area reference grid technique ..................................................8-24

Figure 8-13. TRP technique..........................................................................................8-24

Figure 8-14. Battalion close fight SITREP ....................................................................8-26

Figure 8-15. Example radio conversation .....................................................................8-26

Figure 8-16. Attack team/maneuver company communications check ........................8-26

x FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

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Figure 8-17. Example request for immediate ACF....................................................... 8-28

Figure 9-1. Example rules of engagement ..................................................................... 9-8

Figure 9-2. Example graduated response card.............................................................. 9-9

Figure 9-3. Battle position and reserve/reaction force missions .................................. 9-13

Figure 9-4. Traffic control point, choke point, blockade, convoy escort, and route

proofing missions ....................................................................................... 9-14

Figure 9-5. Tank section manning a light traffic checkpoint......................................... 9-15

Figure 9-6. Tank platoon manning a heavy traffic checkpoint ..................................... 9-16

Figure 9-7A. Tank platoon roadblock ........................................................................... 9-16

Figure 9-7B. Equipment list for roadblocks and checkpoints ....................................... 9-17

Figure 9-8. Cordon and search operations .................................................................. 9-17

Figure A-1. FBCB2 computer system............................................................................. A-2

Figure A-2. FBCB2 tactical display................................................................................. A-2

Figure A-3. Tank platoon FBCB2 TI architecture diagram............................................. A-3

Figure A-4A. Tank sections maneuvering separately on actual terrain outside of their

direct line of sight of each other................................................................... A-4

Figure A-4B. FBCB2 display of the tank sections maneuvering separately .................. A-4

Figure B-1. Sample platoon WARNO............................................................................. B-2

Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format .................................................................. B-7

Figure B-3. Sample platoon FRAGO.............................................................................. B-8

Figure B-4. Sample FM SALTT report............................................................................ B-8

Figure B-5. Sample FM SITREP .................................................................................... B-9

Figure B-6. MEDEVAC request format......................................................................... B-10

Figure B-7. Sample FM contact report ......................................................................... B-10

Figure C-1. Infantry leads while tank platoon remains stationary ..................................C-6

Figure C-2. Tanks move forward to link up with infantry ................................................C-7

Figure C-3. Infantry guides tanks to the firing position...................................................C-8

Figure C-4. Tanks destroy enemy targets......................................................................C-9

Figure C-5. Sample positions for infantry riding on a tank ...........................................C-10

Figure E-1. MOPP levels ................................................................................................ E-4

Figure E-2. Hand-and-arm signal for CBRN hazard ...................................................... E-8

Figure E-3. Nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK) ......................................................... E-10

Figure E-4. Convulsive antidote nerve agent (CANA) injector..................................... E-10

Figure E-5. CBRN marking devices ............................................................................. E-12

Figure E-6. Using smoke to confuse the enemy and silhouette his vehicles............... E-18

Figure E-7. Using screening smoke to conceal displacement ..................................... E-19

Figure E-8. Using screening smoke to conceal a bypass ............................................ E-20

Figure E-9. Using screening smoke to conceal a breaching operation ....................... E-21

Figure E-10. Tank platoon occupying an alternate battle position that is not obscured

by enemy smoke........................................................................................ E-24

Figure F-1. Combat identification system....................................................................... F-2

Figure F-2. Joint CID marking system (JCIMS) ............................................................. F-3

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 xi

Contents

Figure G-1. Risk levels and impact on mission execution ............................................. G-3

Figure G-2A. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 1 of 2

pages ........................................................................................................... G-4

Figure G-2B. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 2 of 2

pages ........................................................................................................... G-5

Tables
Table 6-1. Characteristics and capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft .................................6-14

Table 8-1. Penetration capabilities of a single 7.62-mm (ball) round .............................8-5

Table 8-2. Number of rounds needed to penetrate a reinforced concrete wall at a 25

-

degree obliquity ............................................................................................8-5

Table 8-3. Structure penetrating capabilities of 7.62-mm round (NATO ball) against

typical urban targets (range 25 meters) .......................................................8-6

Table 8-4. Structure penetrating capabilities of caliber .50 ball against typical urban

targets (range 35 meters).............................................................................8-6

Table 8-5. Marking methods .........................................................................................8-21

Table A-1. Capabilities and limitations of the digitized tank platoon ............................. A-5

Table G-1. Risk assessment matrix............................................................................... G-3

Table G-2. Instructions for completing DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management

Worksheet ................................................................................................... G-6

Table I-1. Abandon tank procedures ...............................................................................I-1

xii FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Preface
This manual describes how the tank platoon fights. It focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to exploit its combat power and minimize its
vulnerabilities while conducting combat operations.
FM 3-20.15 is for leaders and crew members of all M1, M1A1, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP (system enhancement
package) tank platoons. Because weapons and equipment vary among units, users should adapt information to
fit their specific situations. Where capabilities of the various systems differ significantly, this manual examines
alternative considerations and techniques for their use.
This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United
States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
In addition to FM 3-20.15, two publications are critical reference sources for the tank platoon. ARTEP 17-237
10-MTP, the mission training plan for the tank platoon, contains collective platoon tasks and outlines training
procedures and exercises. The other resource, ST 3-20.153, contains a detailed example of tactical standing
operating procedures (TACSOP). Each tank platoon can modify the TACSOP to meet its unique mission
requirements.
Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the
preparing agency is the United States Army Armor Center. Users and readers of this manual are invited to
submit recommendations that will improve its effectiveness. Send comments and recommendations to Director,
Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, U.S. Army Armor
Center, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road Suite 207, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5123. For additional information,
call (502) 624-3294/1779 or DSN 464-3294/1779.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 xiii

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 Chapter 1
Introduction

The fundamental mission of the tank platoon is to close with and destroy the enemy.
The platoon’s ability to move, shoot, and communicate—and do so with armored
protection—is a decisive factor on the modern battlefield. It moves, attacks, defends,
and performs other essential tasks to support the company or troop mission. In
accomplishing its assigned missions, the tank platoon employs firepower, maneuver,
and shock effect, synchronizing its capabilities with those of other maneuver
elements and warfighting functions. When properly supported, the platoon is capable
of conducting sustained operations against any sophisticated threat.

The tank platoon can survive and win in battle only if it is well trained, effectively
led, and highly motivated. Crews must be aggressive, and their tactics must reflect
the tempo and intensity of maneuver warfare. Platoon training must prepare them to
operate effectively in hostile territory with the enemy to their front, flanks, and rear.

SECTION I - ORGANIZATIONS

TANK PLATOON
1-1. By itself, any tank can be vulnerable in the face of diverse battlefield hazards (such as enemy forces
or unfavorable terrain) and situations; these vulnerabilities are significantly reduced when tanks are
employed as units.
1-2. A tank platoon consists of four main battle tanks organized into two sections, with two tanks in each
section. Section leaders are the platoon leader, who is the tank commander (TC) of the vehicle designated
as Tank 1 and the platoon sergeant (PSG), who is the TC of Tank 4. Tank 2 is the wingman in the platoon
leader’s section, and Tank 3 is the wingman in the PSG’s section (see Figure 1-1).

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 1-1

Chapter 1

Figure 1-1. Tank platoon

1-3. The tank platoon is organic to tank companies, armored cavalry troops, and combined arms
battalions. The platoon may be attached to a number of organizations, commonly a mechanized infantry
company, to create company teams. It may also be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of light
infantry organizations.

Note. For information on light infantry organizations and their relationship with the tank
platoon, refer to the discussion in Appendix C of this manual and to FM 7-20. Additional
information concerning task organized company teams is found in Appendix C of this manual
and in FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).

1-4. Under battlefield conditions, the wingman concept facilitates control of the platoon when it operates
in sections. The concept requires that one tank orient on another tank on either its left or right side. In the
absence of specific instructions, wingmen move, stop, and shoot when their leaders do. In the tank
platoon, Tank 2 orients on the platoon leader’s tank, while Tank 3 orients on the PSG’s tank. The PSG
orients on the platoon leader’s tank (see Figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2. The wingman concept

1-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Introduction

SPLIT SECTION CONCEPT

1-5. The tank platoon is considered the smallest maneuver element in the company. It normally fights as
a unified element, with its sections fighting in concert with one another. There may be times, however,
when mission, enemy, terrain (weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC)
will cause the company commander to find it necessary to split the platoon and attach the sections to a
dismounted infantry squad or mechanized infantry section. This concept most likely occurs when the unit
encounters restricted terrain or during urban operations.
1-6. The attachment of sections presents a variety of command and control issues. Leaders must
understand the principles of employing infantry and armored forces to maximize their capabilities and
ensure mutual support. A clear communications plan between the dismounted infantry and the armor
vehicles is essential to this success. Armored vehicles are presented with several disadvantages in an urban
environment. If the crew is operating with closed hatches, the dead space immediately around the vehicle
is increased, and a dismounted infantry squad can easily compensate for this deadspace. The infantry can
also clear intervisibility lines and breach obstacles. The armor section provides the infantry with support
by moving with it along an axis of advance and providing protection. The tank section suppresses and
destroys bunkers, enemy weapons, and tanks by fire and maneuver. Tanks also provide transport when the
situation allows acceptable risk to exposed Soldiers. When attached to a mechanized infantry section with
Bradley fighting vehicles (BFV), the team gains the ability to conduct mounted and dismounted patrols;
fix, suppress, or disrupt enemy vehicles and antiarmor systems out to 2,500 meters; and destroy enemy
tanks with the use of tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile fires. The mechanized
infantry and tank section’s weapons systems used together compliment one another by compensating for
the other system’s limitations. The tank section’s 120-mm main gun can depress only to -10 degrees and
elevate only to +20 degrees, which creates considerable dead space for the tank crews in an urban
environment. The BFV, however, can depress to -10 degrees and elevate to +60 degrees, compensating for
the tank’s dead space (see Figure 1-3).

Figure 1-3. Tank and Bradley main gun and coax dead space above street level

1-7. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant must understand the factors involved with operating in
concert with light and mechanized infantry forces. Gaining dismounted infantry significantly changes the
need to understand the differences in movement rates and communication challenges. The leaders must
have a solid communication plan and conduct rehearsals, including the infantry squad. If the armor section
is attached to the infantry or mechanized infantry section, then the infantry/mechanized infantry leaders
must understand the supply and maintenance needs of heavy armor forces. This poses the biggest

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 1-3

Chapter 1

challenge for the dismounted infantry, because their need for fuel is far less than that of an armor section.
Also, the armor section’s ammunition requirements will pose issues in acquisition and distribution. The
following checklist is not limited to, but should include, the platoon leader’s responsibilities when gaining
an infantry section or losing a tank section.

Section (Losing)
• Section leader receives coordination data: linkup time, location, gaining unit designation,
frequencies, and point of contact from the platoon leader.
• Section is refueled and rearmed.
• Section moves to the linkup point.
• Section leader enters the gaining unit’s radio net.
• Section leader reports to the gaining unit’s point of contact and provides a status report.
• Section leader receives:
• Mission.
• Maps.
• Orders/overlays.
• TACSOP.
• Direct fire and control SOP.
• Digital SOP.
• Casualty evacuation plan.
• Section leader submits:
• Battle roster.
• CS report.
• Sensitive items report.
• Any general issues.
• Section conducts digital communications check.
• Section leader confirms linkup with parent unit.

Section (Gaining)
• Receiving unit issues coordination data to losing unit: linkup time, location, frequencies.
• Receiving unit conducts linkup with attaching unit.
• Receiving unit conducts digital communications check with attaching unit.
• Receiving unit receives status report from attaching unit.
• Receiving unit issues:
• Mission.
• Maps.
• Orders/overlays.
• TACSOP and communications security (COMSEC) information.
• Unit SOP.
• Direct fire and control SOP.
• Digital SOP.
• Casualty evacuation SOP.
• Receiving unit receives:
• Battle roster.
• CS report.
• Sensitive items report.
• Any general issues.
• Receiving unit conducts battle drill rehearsals for all five forms of contact.

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 Introduction

TANK COMPANY
1-8. The tank company is organized, equipped, and trained to fight pure or as a task organized company
team. The tank company consists of a headquarters and three tank platoons. The company headquarters
consists of the commanding officer (CO), executive officer (XO), first sergeant (1SG), and supply section.
The company headquarters is equipped with two tanks, one M113A2/A3 armored personnel carrier (APC),
two M1025 or M998 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), and one cargo truck with a
400-gallon water trailer (see Figure 1-4). A maintenance section from the forward support company (FSC)
is normally attached to the tank company. The maintenance section consists of one APC, one heavy
recovery vehicle, one cargo truck with trailer carrying spare parts based on the prescribed load list (PLL),
and one cargo truck with trailer as a tool truck. A medic team, normally attached from the battalion
medical platoon, travels in a medic APC.

Figure 1-4. Tank company

Note. As part of continued modernization of equipment, units are receiving the forward repair
system (FRS) as a replacement for the maintenance M113.

ARMORED CAVALRY TROOP

1-9. The armored cavalry troop is organized, equipped, and trained to conduct reconnaissance and
security operations. While its primary missions are reconnaissance and security, the cavalry troop may be
called upon to execute attack, defend, and delay missions as part of squadron and regimental missions.
1-10. The armored cavalry troop consists of a headquarters, two tank platoons, two scout platoons, a
mortar section, and a maintenance section. The headquarters section is equipped with one main battle tank,
one M3 cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV), one command post (CP) carrier, one APC, one cargo truck with a
400-gallon water trailer, and two utility trucks. Each scout platoon consists of six M3 CFVs. Equipment
in the mortar section includes two 120-mm mortars mounted in self-propelled carriers. The maintenance
section includes one APC, one heavy recovery vehicle, and two cargo trucks with cargo trailers (see Figure
1-5).

Note. As part of continued modernization of equipment, units are receiving the FRS as a
replacement for the maintenance M113.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 1-5

Chapter 1

Figure 1-5. Armored cavalry troop

SECTION II - CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

1-11. To win in battle, leaders must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of their
equipment. This knowledge assists the tank platoon leader in evaluating transportability, sustainability,
and mobility considerations for their own vehicles and for those with which the platoon may operate as
part of a company team or troop.

CAPABILITIES
1-12. Tanks offer an impressive array of capabilities on the modern battlefield: excellent cross-country
mobility, sophisticated communications, enhanced target acquisition, lethal firepower, and effective armor
protection. In combination, these factors produce the shock effect that allows armor units to close with and
destroy the enemy in most weather and light conditions.
1-13. Today’s tanks can move rapidly under a variety of terrain conditions, negotiating soft ground,
trenches, small trees, and limited obstacles. In addition, global positioning systems (GPS) and inertial
position navigation (POSNAV) systems allow tanks to move to virtually any designated location with
greater speed and accuracy than ever before. Use of visual signals and the single channel ground/airborne
radio system (SINCGARS) facilitates rapid and secure communication of orders and instructions. This
capability allows tank crews to quickly mass the effects of their weapon systems while remaining dispersed
to limit the effects of the enemy’s weapons.
1-14. On-board optics and sighting systems enable tank crews to acquire and destroy enemy tanks,
armored vehicles, and fortifications using the main gun or to use machine guns to suppress enemy
positions, personnel, and lightly armored targets. The tank’s armor protects crew members from small-
arms fire, most artillery, and some antiarmor systems.
1-15. Perhaps the most important technological advance available to the tank platoon is the digital
information capability of its vehicles. Some tank crews now employ the Force XXI battle command
brigade and below (FBCB2) system, to improve situational understanding, command, control, and
navigation. The enhanced capabilities provided by these digitized systems represent a distinct advantage
for the platoon leader. They enable him to gain and maintain the initiative on the battlefield by
synchronizing his elements with other units through the use of faster, more accurate tactical information.
Additional details on the capabilities and operational considerations of FBCB2 are provided in Appendix A
and in discussions throughout this manual.

LIMITATIONS
1-16. Tanks require extensive maintenance, proficient operators, and skilled mechanics, as well as daily
resupply of large quantities of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) products. They are vulnerable to the
weapons effects of other tanks, attack helicopters, mines, antitank guided missiles (ATGM), antitank guns,
and close attack aircraft. When tanks operate in built-up areas, dense woods, or other restricted terrain,

1-6 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Introduction

reduced visibility leaves them vulnerable to dismounted infantry attacks. In such situations, they may be
restricted to trails, roads, or streets; severely limiting maneuverability and observation. Existing or
reinforcing obstacles can also restrict or stop tank movement.

SECTION III - RESPONSIBILITIES

1-17. The tank crew is a tightly integrated team. Though all members have primary duties, success
depends on their effectiveness as a crew. They must work together to maintain and service their tank and
equipment and function as one in combat. Crews must cross-train so each member can function at any of
the other crew positions.

PLATOON LEADER
1-18. The platoon leader is responsible to the commander for the discipline and training of his platoon, the
maintenance of its equipment, and its success in combat. He must be a subject matter expert in the tactical
employment of his section and the platoon, both by itself and in concert with a company team or troop. He
must have a solid understanding of troop-leading procedures and develop his ability to apply them quickly
and efficiently on the battlefield.
1-19. The platoon leader must know the capabilities and limitations of the platoon’s personnel and
equipment; at the same time, he must be well versed in enemy organizations, doctrine, and equipment. He
must serve as an effective TC. Most importantly, the platoon leader must be flexible and capable of using
sound judgment to make correct decisions quickly and at the right times based on his commander’s intent
and the tactical situation. During decentralized operations, the platoon leader cannot rely on the company
commander for guidance and instructions. He must be capable of making decisions based on his unit’s
task and purpose and the commander’s intent.
1-20. Platoon leaders must know and understand the task force mission and the task force commander’s
intent. They must be prepared to assume the duties of the company commander in accordance with the
succession of command.

PLATOON SERGEANT
1-21. The PSG is second in command of the platoon and is accountable to the platoon leader for the
training, discipline, and welfare of the Soldiers in the platoon. He coordinates the platoon’s maintenance
and CS requirements and handles the personal needs of individual Soldiers. The PSG is the most
experienced TC in the platoon. His tactical and technical knowledge allow him to serve as mentor to
crewmen, other noncommissioned officers (NCO), and the platoon leader. His actions on the battlefield
must complement those of the platoon leader. He must be able to fight his section effectively, either in
concert with the platoon leader’s section or by itself.

TANK COMMANDER
1-22. The TC is responsible to the platoon leader and PSG for the discipline and training of his crew, the
maintenance of assigned equipment, the reporting of CS needs, and the tactical employment of his tank.
He briefs his crew, directs the movement of the tank, submits all reports, and supervises initial first-aid
treatment and evacuation of wounded crewmen. He is an expert in using the tank’s weapon systems,
requesting indirect fires, and executing land navigation using both digital systems and more traditional
methods such as terrain association.
1-23. The TC must know and understand the company mission and company commander’s intent. Again
with decentralized operations, the TC may operate as a section and must be able to execute independently.
He must be prepared to assume the duties and responsibilities of the platoon leader or PSG in accordance
with the succession of command. These requirements demand that the TC maintain constant, thorough
situational understanding. He does this by using all available optics for observation, eavesdropping on
radio transmissions, and monitoring the FBCB2 display.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 1-7

Chapter 1

GUNNER
1-24. The gunner searches for targets and aims and fires both the main gun and the coaxial machine gun.
He is responsible to the TC for the maintenance of the tank’s armament and fire control equipment. The
gunner serves as the assistant TC and assumes the responsibilities of the TC as required. He also assists
other crew members as needed. Several of his duties involve the tank’s communications and internal
control systems: logging onto and monitoring communications nets, maintaining digital links if the tank is
equipped with FBCB2, inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays, and monitoring digital
displays during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.

DRIVER
1-25. The driver moves, positions, and stops the tank. While driving, he constantly searches for covered
and concealed routes and for covered positions to which he can move if the tank is engaged. He maintains
his tank’s position in formation and watches for visual signals. If the tank is equipped with a steer-to
indicator, the driver monitors the device and selects the best tactical route. During engagements, he assists
the gunner and TC by scanning for targets and sensing fired rounds. The driver is responsible to the TC
for the automotive maintenance. He assists other crew members as needed.

LOADER
1-26. The loader stows and cares for ammunition, loads the main gun and the coaxial machine gun ready
box, and aims and fires the loader’s machine gun. He is also responsible to the TC for the maintenance of
communications equipment. Before engagement actions are initiated, the loader searches for targets,
maintains rear security, and acts as air guard or ATGM guard. He also assists the TC as needed in
directing the driver so the tank maintains its position in formation. He assists other crew members as
necessary. Because the loader is ideally positioned both to observe around the tank and to monitor the
tank’s digital displays, platoon leaders and TCs should give strong consideration to assigning their second
most experienced crewman as the loader.

1-8 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Chapter 2
Command and Control

Battle command is the process of assimilating information and then using the data to
visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct military action required to
achieve victory. Thinking and acting are simultaneous activities for leaders in battle.

The process known as command and control (C2) is the biggest challenge faced by
combat leaders on the modern battlefield. Command involves directing various
combat, CS, and sustainment elements; control entails the measures taken to make
sure these directions are carried out. Even the most knowledgeable tactician will be
ineffective if he cannot properly use the techniques available to direct and control his
combat elements.

In exercising C2, the tank platoon leader, assisted by the PSG, employs a variety of
techniques to prepare for operations, issue orders, employ the platoon, and
communicate. The success of this process rests mainly on decisive leadership,
realistic training, thoroughly understood SOPs, and the effective use of
communications equipment. For maximum efficiency, the platoon leader must keep
command and control as simple as possible while ensuring that he provides the
platoon with all required information and instructions.

SECTION I - COMMAND
2-1. Command has two vital components: decision-making and leadership. This section examines in
detail how the platoon leader and his subordinate leaders use these elements to develop the flexible,
productive command structure that is the catalyst for success on the battlefield.

DECISION-MAKING
2-2. Decision-making is a conscious process for selecting a course of action (COA) from two or more
alternatives. At platoon level, many decisions are based on SOPs and standard unit drills. SOPs and drills
cover an array of routine and emergency actions, such as evacuation of wounded Soldiers, rearming and
resupply procedures, and individual crew responsibilities; they allow the platoon to operate quickly and
efficiently without constant guidance from the platoon leader. SOPs and checklists are especially critical
in maintaining combat preparedness when leaders are tired or under stress as a result of continuous
operations. Because of this, it is absolutely necessary that everyone in the platoon thoroughly understand
all applicable SOPs. Refer to ST 3-20.153, Tank Platoon SOP, for a sample SOP that can be adapted for
use in various tank platoon organizations. In the modern operational environment, the platoon leader may
operate in a decentralized fashion requiring him to make rapid decisions with minimal guidance.
Additionally, the platoon leader may conduct missions that will transition from combat operations to
stability operations. The enemy will not conform or act in a manner that will fit into the doctrinal named
operations. The platoon leader must understand that the enemy is always adapting his tactics to best defeat
our forces.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 2-1

Chapter 2

TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES
2-3. Troop-leading is a dynamic process that begins when the platoon receives a new mission or is
notified by a warning order (WARNO) that a new mission is imminent. Most tactical decisions are made
by the company or troop commander, who then announces them in the form of orders that include his
intent and concept of the operation. Based on these orders, the platoon leader executes troop-leading
procedures to organize his time during planning and preparation and to develop his platoon’s scheme of
maneuver. Effective use of troop-leading procedures allows the platoon leader to lead his platoon more
effectively in the execution of the mission.
2-4. Whenever possible, the eight steps of troop-leading procedures are integrated and accomplished
concurrently rather than sequentially. Time management is the key. The platoon leader maximizes
available planning time by starting as soon as he receives the first bit of information about the upcoming
operation. He normally uses one-third of the available time to plan, prepare, and issue the order; his TCs
then have the remaining two-thirds of the time available to prepare their tanks and crews for the operation.
This time allocation, known as the “one-third/two-thirds” rule, is applicable in planning and preparation at
all levels and for virtually all tactical situations and must be enforced.
2-5. The troop-leading process, although discussed here with the eight steps in traditional order, is not
rigid, and the steps are not necessarily sequential. The tasks involved in some steps (such as initiate
movement, issue the WARNO, and conduct reconnaissance) may recur several times during the process.
Although listed as the last step, activities associated with supervising and refining the plan and other
preparations occur throughout the troop-leading process.
2-6. The following discussion focuses on the eight steps of troop-leading procedures:
• Receive and analyze the mission.
• Issue the WARNO.
• Make a tentative plan.
• Initiate movement.
• Conduct reconnaissance and coordination.
• Complete the plan.
• Issue the order.
• Supervise and refine.

Step 1—Receive and Analyze the Mission

2-7. The platoon leader receives his orders as an oral operation order (OPORD) or as a fragmentary order
(FRAGO) updating a previously issued OPORD. Graphics are copied from the commander’s overlay or
sent by digital transmission (see the discussion). Initial coordination with other platoon leaders and the
company or troop fire support team (FIST) are accomplished upon receipt of the mission.

Note. Before the OPORD or FRAGO arrives, the platoon leader may receive a series of
WARNOs from the company commander providing advance notice of an impending operation.
The platoon leader should disseminate all pertinent information contained in the WARNOs as
quickly as possible after they are received.

Initial Actions
2-8. Upon receipt of the WARNO, FRAGO, or OPORD, the platoon leader’s first task is to extract his
mission from the commander’s overall plan. The key to understanding the platoon mission as part of the
company team or troop mission lies in two elements of the plan: the commander’s intent and the concept
of operations. One platoon will be designated as the company/troop main effort. This platoon’s task and
purpose accomplishes the company’s stated mission. The other platoons are supporting efforts; their task
and purpose ensures the success of the main effort platoon. The platoon leader’s understanding of the
commander’s intent and his task and purpose allows him to use his initiative, exploit battlefield

2-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Command and Control

opportunities, and accomplish the commander’s plan. If he does not understand the intent or purpose, he
must ask the commander for clarification.
2-9. Although mission analysis is continuously refined throughout the troop-leading process, the platoon
leader’s actions are normally based only on the WARNO from higher. These include an analysis covering
the terrain and enemy and friendly situations. The platoon leader may also conduct his time analysis,
develop a security plan, and issue his own WARNO to provide guidance and planning focus for his
subordinates. At a minimum, the platoon WARNO should cover the enemy and friendly situations,
movement instructions, and coordinating instructions such as a time line and security plan. (Note. The
analysis is normally conducted as quickly as possible to allow the platoon leader to issue the WARNO in a
timely manner. He then conducts a more detailed METT-TC analysis, as outlined in the following
discussion, after the WARNO is issued.)

Note. The technique of using multiple WARNOs is a valuable tool for the platoon leader during
the troop-leading process. He can issue WARNOs for several purposes: to alert subordinates of
the upcoming mission, to initiate the parallel planning process, and to put out tactical
information incrementally as it is received (ultimately reducing the length of the OPORD).
Refer to FM
3-90.1 (FM 71-1) for a discussion of how WARNOs are employed at various stages of the
troop-leading procedures.

METT-TC Analysis
2-10. The platoon leader analyzes the mission using the factors of METT-TC: mission, enemy, terrain
(and weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations. Careful analysis of the company
OPORD allows the platoon leader to identify the platoon’s purpose; the specified, implied, and essential
tasks it must perform; and the time line by which the platoon will accomplish those tasks. The following
outline of METT-TC factors will assist the platoon leader in analyzing the mission and creating a time line.
2-11. Mission. The platoon leader’s analysis includes the following points:
• What is the battalion commander’s intent?
• What are the company or troop commander’s intent and purpose?
• What tasks did the commander say must be accomplished (specified tasks)? In the OPORD,
specified tasks are contained in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5.
• What other tasks must be accomplished to ensure mission success (implied tasks)? Implied
tasks are those that are not specified in the OPORD, but that must be done to complete the
mission. They do not include tasks that are covered in the unit SOP. The platoon leader
identifies implied tasks by analyzing the enemy, the terrain, friendly troops available, and the
operational graphics. As an example, the commander may direct the platoon to occupy a
support-by-fire position near a known enemy observation post (OP). The platoon leader will
immediately recognize that he must occupy the designated position (the specified task).
Through his analysis, he will probably determine that the platoon must also destroy or neutralize
the enemy OP (the implied task) because it can affect the platoon and/or company mission. If
time is available, the platoon leader should confirm implied tasks with the commander.
2-12. Enemy. The analysis of the enemy situation includes these considerations:
• What have been the enemy’s recent activities?
• What is the composition of the enemy’s forces?
• What are the capabilities of his weapons?
• What is the location of current and probable enemy positions?
• What is the enemy’s most probable COA? The platoon leader must apply knowledge of the
enemy’s doctrine and his most recent activities and locations to answer these questions:
• Will the enemy attack or defend?

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Chapter 2

• What is the enemy’s task and purpose?

• What formations will the enemy use?
• How will the enemy defend?
• Where are the enemy’s kill zones?
• Where and when will the enemy execute his operations?
2-13. Enemy information is included in paragraph 1 of the OPORD. It is important that the platoon leader
analyze this information in terms of the platoon’s role in the operation. For example, if the company
commander only identifies platoon-size center-of-mass locations for a defending enemy, the platoon leader
should identify probable enemy locations based on the terrain and the enemy’s doctrine.
2-14. Platoon leaders need to ensure that they use this evaluation of the enemy, whether it is on the high
intensity battlefield (enemy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles [IFV]) or low intensity operations
(guerillas, or destabilizing elements). These skills will allow the platoon to disrupt the enemy operations
and force the enemy to react to the platoon’s actions, ensuring the platoon retains the initiative. With
changing enemy tactics based on their success, an environment can easily evolve where leaders find
themselves reacting to these ever-changing tactics and surrendering the initiative to the enemy. The
platoon leader must ensure he sets the conditions for mission success, retaining the initiative at all times.
2-15. Terrain (and weather). The platoon leader analyzes the terrain using the factors of OAKOC
(observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment).
Elements of the OAKOC and weather analysis include the following:
• Observation and fields of fire. These are influenced by key terrain that dominates avenues of
approach. The following factors may apply:
• Where can the enemy observe and engage the platoon (danger areas)?
• Where are the natural firing positions the platoon can use to observe and engage the enemy,
including locations for battle positions (BP), support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions, and
overwatch positions?
• Avenues of approach. Where are the most favorable avenues of approach (mounted,
dismounted, and air) for enemy and friendly forces?
• Key terrain. These factors may apply:
• Where is the key terrain? (Any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a
marked advantage to either combatant.)
• How can key terrain be used to support the mission?
• Obstacles. These factors may apply:
• Where are natural and existing obstacles located, and how can they affect maneuver?
• Where are likely areas for enemy-emplaced obstacles, and how can they affect maneuver?
• Are there bypasses, or must obstacles be breached?
• Cover and concealment. These factors may apply:
• What routes within the area of operations offer cover and concealment for the platoon or for
enemy elements?
• Do the natural firing positions in the area of operations offer cover and concealment for the
platoon or enemy?
• Weather. The platoon leader can use these questions as he analyzes the impact of weather and
other environmental factors on the mission:
• What are the light conditions (including percentage of night illumination) and visibility?
What are the times for beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), sunrise, sunset, end of
evening nautical twilight (EENT), moonrise, and moonset? How will this effect friendly and
enemy use of night vision equipment? What conditions will favor friendly forces, and what will
favor the enemy forces.

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 Command and Control

• How has recent weather affected trafficability in the area of operations?

• Will weather become better or worse during the mission?
• How will fog, rain, dust, heat, snow, wind, or blowing sand affect the crew and equipment
during the mission?

Note. This analysis should also cover the effects of weather on smoke and chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

2-16. Troops. The analysis of friendly forces and other personnel-related issues includes these
considerations:
• What is the supply status of ammunition, fuel, and other necessary items?
• What is the current physical condition of the Soldiers, as well as of vehicles and equipment?
• What is the training status of the platoon?
• What is the state of morale?
• How much sleep have the Soldiers had?
• How much sleep will they be able to get before the operation begins?
• Does the platoon need any additional assets to support or accomplish its mission?
• What attachments are available to help the platoon accomplish its mission?
2-17. Time available. The platoon leader’s analysis includes the following factors:
• What times were specified by the commander in the OPORD for such activities as movement,
reconnaissance, rehearsals, and logistics package (LOGPAC) operations?
• What priorities of work can the platoon accomplish (examples include security, maintenance,
resupply, coordination, rehearsals, inspections, and sleep) in the time available?
• How much time is available to the enemy for the activities listed in the previous items?
• How does the potential enemy time line for planning and preparation compare with that
developed for friendly forces?
2-18. As part of this analysis, the platoon leader conducts reverse planning to ensure that all specified,
implied, and essential tasks can be accomplished in the time available. He develops a reverse planning
schedule (time line) beginning with actions on the objective and working backward through each step of
the operation and preparation to the present time. This process also helps the platoon in making efficient
use of planning and preparation time.
2-19. Civilian considerations. The platoon leader uses this analysis to identify how the platoon will
handle situations involving civilians and/or nonmilitary agencies or organizations. Considerations that may
affect the platoon mission include the following:
• What are the applicable rules of engagement (ROE) and/or rules of interaction (ROI)? Soldiers
must understand when to fire as much as when not to.
• What procedures and guidelines will the platoon use in dealing with refugees, prisoners, and
other civilians?
• Will the platoon be working with civilian organizations, such as governmental agencies, private
groups, or the media?
• Will the platoon be tasked to conduct stability operations (such as peace operations or
noncombatant evacuation) or support operations (such as humanitarian or environmental
assistance)? The platoon must be prepared for the operation to change based on the situation. A
stability operation could very quickly escalate into a combat mission, as much as a combat
mission can change to a stability operation. Leaders need to be prepared for this and make sure
the platoon understands how the plan may change.

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Chapter 2

Mission Statement
2-20. Once his METT-TC analysis is complete, the platoon leader can then write the platoon mission
statement, including the task and purpose of the mission and answering the questions of WHO, WHAT,
WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. This is a clear, concise statement of the purpose of the operation and the
essential task(s) that will be crucial to its success. The essential tasks (the WHAT) should be stated in
terms that relate to enemy forces, friendly forces, and/or the terrain (for example, “SUPPRESS THE
ENEMY,” “OVERWATCH 2D PLATOON,” or “SEIZE AN OBJECTIVE”). The purpose (the WHY)
explains how the platoon mission supports the commander’s intent. The elements of WHO, WHERE, and
WHEN add clarity to the mission statement (for example, “3D PLT, C CO ATTACKS TO SEIZE OBJ
RAIDERS NLT 152200OCT2006, TO ALLOW THE COMPANY TO COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF
ENEMY FORCES.”).

Note. Simultaneous planning and preparation are key factors in effective time management
during the troop-leading procedures. The next five steps (issue a WARNO, make a tentative
plan, initiate movement, conduct reconnaissance and coordination, and complete the plan) may
occur simultaneously and/or in a different order. As noted, the final troop-leading step,
supervise and refine, is on-going throughout the process.

Step 2—Issue the Warning Order

2-21. The platoon leader alerts his platoon to the upcoming operation by issuing a WARNO that follows
the five-paragraph OPORD format (see Appendix B). Warning orders maximize subordinates’ planning
and preparation time by providing essential details of the impending operation and detailing major time
line events that will support mission execution. The amount of detail included in a WARNO depends on
the available time, the platoon’s communications capability, and the information subordinates need to
initiate proper planning and preparation. The WARNO may include the following information:
• Changes to task organization.
• Updated graphics (platoons equipped with FBCB2 send new overlays).
• Enemy situation.
• Company or troop mission.
• Commander’s intent (if available).
• Platoon mission.
• A tentative time line, to include the following:
• Earliest time of movement.
• Readiness condition (REDCON) and vehicle preparation schedule.
• Reconnaissance.
• Training/rehearsal schedule. (Note. The platoon leader may initiate some individual and
collective training before he issues the OPORD; this technique maximizes preparation time and
allows the platoon to focus on tasks that will support the anticipated operations. For example, a
tank platoon equipped with a plow tank may practice the crew task of dropping the plow, as well
as platoon-level actions at an obstacle.)
• Time and location at which the platoon OPORD will be issued.
• Time of precombat check (PCC)/precombat inspection (PCI).
• Service support instructions (if not included in the time line).
Step 3—Make a Tentative Plan
2-22. The platoon leader begins developing his maneuver plan as he listens to the commander issue the
company OPORD. Based on the commander’s plan and the results of his mission analysis, the platoon
leader develops a tentative plan that addresses all specified, implied, and essential tasks using the OPORD
format (see Appendix B of this manual). The tentative plan also covers reconnaissance and coordination
requirements between the platoon and adjacent and supporting units. The PSG and TCs are excellent

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sources of ideas concerning the platoon plan and war-gaming COAs. Refer to Chapters 3 and 4 of this
manual for more detailed discussions of planning considerations in offensive and defensive operations.

Step 4—Initiate Movement

2-23. Many company-level operations require movement to forward assembly areas and BPs during the
planning phase of an operation. The platoon leader addresses movement in his time line; he orders the
platoon to begin moving in accordance with the company plan. Activities may include sending platoon
representatives to an assembly area with the company quartering party or beginning priorities of work.
Step 5—Conduct Reconnaissance and Coordination
2-24. Effective reconnaissance takes into account the factors of METT-TC and OAKOC from both
friendly and enemy perspectives. If time and security considerations permit and authorization is obtained
from higher headquarters, an on-site ground reconnaissance is the best way to survey the area of
operations. As a minimum, the platoon leader conducts a detailed map reconnaissance. The platoon leader
should take as many TCs as possible on his reconnaissance.
2-25. For offensive operations, the platoon leader should attempt to find a vantage point that will allow
him to see as much of the objective as possible. Ground reconnaissance for offensive operations usually is
limited to checking routes to the start point (SP), the line of departure (LD), and the axis just beyond the
LD. For defensive operations, the platoon leader should conduct a reconnaissance of the engagement area,
all platoon BPs, and the routes to be used.
2-26. During the reconnaissance (or during company-level rehearsals), the platoon leader or his
representative should coordinate routes, movement speed, and sectors of observation and fires with other
platoon leaders and with adjacent and supporting units.
Step 6—Complete the Plan
2-27. The platoon leader refines the plan based on the results of the reconnaissance and coordination. He
then completes the plan using these results and any new information from his commander, other platoon
leaders, and members of his platoon. He should keep the plan as simple as possible, at the same time
ensuring that the platoon scheme of maneuver supports the commander’s intent.
Step 7—Issue the Order
2-28. If possible, the platoon leader issues the order from a vantage point overlooking the terrain on which
the platoon will maneuver. If not, he uses a terrain model, sand table, sketches, or his map to orient the
platoon. He can also build a model of the area of operations using a briefing kit that contains such items as
engineer tape, colored yarn, 3-by-5-inch index cards, and “micro” armor vehicle models.
2-29. As time and security permit, the platoon leader issues the order to as many members of the platoon
as possible. As a minimum, he assembles the TCs and his gunner. He briefs the platoon using the five-
paragraph OPORD format (see Appendix B).
2-30. To ensure complete understanding of the operation, the platoon leader and TCs conduct confirmation
briefings immediately after the OPORD is issued. The TCs brief the platoon leader to confirm their
understanding of his intent, the specific tasks their crews must perform, and the relationship between their
tasks and those of other units in the operation. If time permits, the platoon leader should lead the TCs in a
walk-through using a sand table.
Step 8—Supervise and Refine
2-31. Flexibility is the key to effective operations. The platoon leader must be able to refine his plan
whenever new information becomes available. If he adjusts the plan, he must inform the platoon and
supervise implementation of the changes. Once the operation has begun, the platoon leader must be able to
direct his platoon in response to new situations and new orders.
2-32. Crew orders, rehearsals, and inspections are essential elements of the supervision process as the
platoon prepares for the mission. The following discussion examines these procedures in detail.

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Chapter 2

Crew Orders
2-33. The platoon leader and PSG make sure all crew members have been briefed by their TCs and
understand the platoon mission and concept of the operation through the use of backbriefs.
Rehearsals
2-34. A rehearsal is a practice session conducted to prepare units for an upcoming operation or event. The
platoon leader should never underestimate the value of rehearsals. They are his most valuable tools in
preparing the platoon for the upcoming operation. Effective rehearsals require crewmen to perform
required tasks, ideally under conditions that are as close as possible to those expected for the actual
operation. Participants maneuver their actual vehicles or use vehicle models or simulations while
interactively verbalizing their elements’ actions.
2-35. In a platoon-level rehearsal, the platoon leader selects the tasks to be practiced and controls
execution of the rehearsal. He will usually designate someone to role-play the enemy elements he expects
to face during the operation. Refer to FM 5-0 for a detailed discussion of rehearsal types, techniques, and
procedures.

Note. A rehearsal is different from the process of talking through what is supposed to happen.
For example, in a rehearsal, TCs should actually send spot reports (SPOTREP) when reporting
enemy contact, rather than simply saying, “I would send a SPOTREP now.”

2-36. Rehearsal purposes. The platoon leader uses well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish
the following purposes:
• Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks.
• Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan.
• Synchronize the actions of subordinate elements.
• Confirm coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent units.
• Improve each Soldier’s understanding of the concept of the operation, the direct and indirect fire
plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various situations that
may arise during the operation.
2-37. Rehearsal types. The platoon leader can choose among several types of rehearsals, each designed
to achieve a specific result and with a specific role in the planning and preparation time line. The primary
types of rehearsals available to the tank platoon are the following:
• Confirmation brief. The confirmation brief is, in effect, a reverse briefing process routinely
performed by subordinate leaders immediately after receiving any instructions, such as an
OPORD or FRAGO. They confirm their understanding by repeating and explaining details of
the operation for their leader. The platoon leader should conduct confirmation briefs after his
TCs have received the OPORD, but before other phases of the platoon rehearsal begin.
• Backbrief. The backbrief allows the platoon leader to identify problems in his own concept of
the operation and his subordinates’ understanding of the concept; he also uses the backbrief to
learn how subordinates intend to accomplish their missions.
• Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. This rehearsal, conducted throughout the planning and
preparation time line, is used to ensure that all participants understand a technique or a specific
set of procedures. It does not necessarily cover a published drill or SOP, giving the commander
or leader flexibility in designing the rehearsal. For example, the platoon leader could rehearse
procedures for marking obstacle lanes or establishing local security. This rehearsal is critical
when working with new units/forces (such as light units); it allows all elements to understand
what each will be doing during a specific action and allows heavy and light forces to better mesh
their drills together.

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 Command and Control

2-38. Rehearsal techniques. The platoon leader can choose among several techniques in conducting
rehearsals, which should follow the crawl-walk-run training methodology to prepare the platoon for
increasingly difficult conditions. Considerations in selecting a rehearsal technique include the following:
• Time. How much will be needed for planning, preparation, and execution?
• Multi-echelon. How many echelons will be involved?
• Operations security (OPSEC). Will the rehearsal allow the enemy to gain intelligence about
upcoming operations?
• Terrain. What are the applicable terrain considerations?
• Training. Is this a new skill or something they have never done before, either individually or as
a platoon?
2-39. As noted in FM 5-0, techniques for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the resourcefulness of
the commander or leader; that manual outlines six basic techniques. Listed in descending order in terms of
the preparation time and resources required to conduct them, these techniques are the following:
• Full dress rehearsal. This rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the mission,
but is the most difficult to conduct in terms of preparation and resources. It involves every
Soldier and system participating in the operation. If possible, units should conduct the full dress
rehearsal under the same conditions (such as weather, time of day, terrain, and use of live
ammunition) that they will encounter during the actual operation. The platoon generally will
take part in full dress rehearsals as part of a larger unit.
• Reduced force rehearsal. This rehearsal normally involves only key leaders of the unit and is
thus less extensive than the full dress rehearsal in terms of preparation time and resources. The
commander decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan,
if possible on the actual terrain to be used for the actual operation. The reduced force rehearsal
is often conducted to prepare leaders for the full dress rehearsal.
• Terrain model rehearsal. This is the most popular rehearsal technique, employing an
accurately constructed model to help subordinates visualize the battle in accordance with the
commander’s or leader’s intent. When possible, the platoon leader places the terrain model
where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations or is within walking distance of
such a vantage point. Size of the model can vary, but it should be large enough to depict
graphic control measures and important terrain features for reference and orientation.
Participants walk or move “micro” armor around the table or model to practice the actions of
their own vehicles in relation to other members of the platoon.
• Sketch map rehearsal. Units can use the sketch map technique almost anywhere, day or night.
Procedures are similar to those for the terrain model rehearsal. The sketch must be large enough
to allow all participants to see as each subordinate “walks” through an interactive oral
presentation of his actions. Platoon elements can use symbols or “micro” armor to represent
their locations and maneuver on the sketch.
• Map rehearsal. Procedures are similar to those for the sketch map rehearsal except that the
commander or leader uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and
control the operation. This technique is useful in conjunction with a confirmation brief or
backbrief involving subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders. The platoon leader uses the
map and overlay to guide participants as they brief their role in the operation.
• Radio/digital rehearsal. The leader conducts this rehearsal by sending the OPORD and overlay
digitally (if equipped). He then may review this information by FM radio. The radio rehearsal
may be especially useful when the situation does not allow the platoon to gather at one location.
Subordinate elements check their communications systems and rehearse events that are critical
to the platoon plan. To be effective, the radio rehearsal requires all participants to have working
communications equipment.

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Chapter 2

Inspections
2-40. Precombat inspections allow the platoon leader to check the platoon’s operational readiness. The
key goal is to ensure that Soldiers and vehicles are fully prepared to execute the upcoming mission.
Inspections also contribute to improved morale.
2-41. It is essential that the entire platoon chain of command know how to conduct PCCs and PCIs in
accordance with applicable SOPs (ST 3-20.153 or the platoon’s own SOP) or based on the procedures
outlined in ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Examples of an inspection include the following:
• Perform before-operation maintenance checks, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary.
• Perform communications checks of voice and digital systems.
• Inspect and verify maps and graphics.
• Ensure that crews understand the plan and are in the correct uniform and mission-oriented
protective posture (MOPP) level.
• Review the supply status of rations, water, fuel, oil, all types of ammunition, pyrotechnics, first-
aid kits, and batteries (for such items as flashlights, night-vision devices, and CBRN alarms).
Direct resupply operations as necessary.
2-42. The platoon leader and/or PSG should observe each crew during preparation for combat. They
should conduct the inspection once the TCs report that their crews and vehicles are prepared. It should be
understood that the platoon leader will check items he deems critical for the upcoming operations, but the
TCs need to check all items based on the platoon SOP. Failure at the TC level to check all systems, and
not just the ones the platoon leader is going to check could lead to a critical element or piece of equipment
to fail during operations.
2-43. PCCs differ from PCIs in that they are quick combat checks performed at crew level and designed to
account for individuals and equipment. PCCs do not require formal notification or conduct. They are
designed to be quick and concise in verification that the crew, section, and platoon have all necessary
equipment to accomplish the mission. Examples for PCCs include the following:
• Perform prepare-to-fire checks for all weapons, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary.
Weapons are boresighted, and all sights are referred. Machine guns are test fired, if possible.
Ammunition is checked and stored properly.
• Upload vehicles in accordance with the platoon SOP. The standardization of load plans allows
the platoon leader and PSG to quickly check accountability of equipment. It also ensures
standard locations of equipment in each vehicle; this can be an important advantage if the
platoon leader is forced to switch to a different vehicle during an operation.
• Account for Soldiers’ uniforms and equipment necessary to accomplish the tasks.
CONTINGENCY PLANS
2-44. Leaders must use contingency planning to ensure that the platoon knows what actions to do in the
absence of the leadership. Less experienced crews, or crews faced with unusual, unexpected circumstances
will tend to carry out only their last orders. This tendency could place them in danger as the enemy is
developing tactics of rapid hit and run operations which will capitalize on platoons that are not proactive
and relay on the platoon leader or platoon sergeant to tell them what to do. The basic six-point
contingency plan is used whenever the key leadership is going to be gone from the platoon. Some
examples of when this is to be used: leader’s reconnaissance, dismounted patrols, or coordinating with
other units or local government agencies.

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 Command and Control

Six-Point Contingency Plan

1. Which personnel will be going with the platoon leader?
2. What route is the platoon leader taking?
3. How long will the platoon leader be gone?
4. What to do if the platoon leader fails to return.
5. What to do if the platoon leader makes contact.
6. What to do if the platoon makes contact or if other elements in the area make
contact.

ABBREVIATED TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

2-45. When there is not enough time to conduct all eight troop-leading steps in detail, such as when a
change of mission occurs after an operation is in progress, the platoon leader must understand how to trim
the procedures to save time. Most steps of these abbreviated troop-leading procedures are done mentally,
but the platoon leader skips none of the steps.
2-46. Once the order is received, the platoon leader conducts a quick map reconnaissance, analyzes the
mission using the factors of METT-TC, and sends for the TCs. He makes sure the TCs post the minimum
required control measures on their maps and issues a FRAGO covering the key elements of the enemy and
friendly situations, the platoon mission, and the concept of the operation. The service support and
command and signal paragraphs can be deleted if they are unchanged or covered by SOP. FRAGOs are
discussed in Appendix B. The platoon leader and TCs may also conduct a quick walk-through rehearsal of
critical elements of the maneuver plan using a hastily prepared terrain model or sand table.
2-47. In some cases, there may not be enough time even for these shortened procedures. The platoon may
have to move out and receive FRAGOs by radio or at the next scheduled halt. It then becomes critical for
the platoon leader to send FRAGOs of his own to the TCs explaining the platoon’s purpose within the
overall company maneuver plan.
2-48. Digital systems, such as FBCB2 and GPS devices, are valuable tools when the platoon is forced to
use abbreviated troop-leading procedures and FRAGOs. They allow the platoon leader to designate
waypoints to assist in navigation and target reference points (TRP) to assist in weapons orientation.
2-49. Other keys to success when abbreviated procedures are in effect include a well-trained platoon;
clearly developed, thoroughly understood SOPs; and an understanding by all members of the platoon of the
current tactical situation (situational understanding). The platoon leader and PSG must keep the platoon
informed of the ever-changing enemy and friendly situations. They accomplish this by monitoring the
company or troop net and issuing frequent updates to the other crews using the radio and digital
information systems.

SPECIAL NOTE
Whenever time is available, there is no substitute for effective, thorough rehearsals conducted
prior to an operation, even if time is limited. Successful platoon leaders make the most of
every available minute.

LEADERSHIP
2-50. Competent, confident leadership inspires Soldiers, instilling in them the will to win and providing
them with purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. Leadership involves numerous important personal
principles and traits:
• Taking responsibility for decisions.
• Exemplifying and demanding loyalty.

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Chapter 2

• Inspiring and directing the platoon toward mission accomplishment.

• Fostering a climate of teamwork that will engender success.
• Demonstrating moral and physical courage in the face of adversity and danger.
2-51. FM 6-22 and FM 3-0 further describe the qualities of effective leadership. The following are the
five characteristics of successful combat leaders, as described in the 1984 study titled Leadership in
Combat: An Historical Appraisal conducted by the History Department at the United States Military
Academy:
• Terrain sense. Understand terrain; match tactics and weaponry with the terrain at hand.
• Single-minded tenacity. This is the quality that compels the successful platoon leader to
harness the combat power necessary to overwhelm the enemy. The platoon leader sees the
mission through and never gives up.
• Practical, practiced judgment. Common sense and constant practice allow the platoon leader to
prioritize effectively, enabling him to separate critical tasks from the non-critical and preventing
him from being overwhelmed by the demands of the information-rich battlefield.
• Ferocious audacity. Calculated risk-taking is a must if the platoon is to exploit enemy
weaknesses as they present themselves.
• Physical confidence. Leaders can maintain their ability to meet the demanding requirements of
leadership only if they are in top physical condition.

SECTION II – CONTROL

SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
2-52. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to the common
operational picture to determine the relationship among the factors of METT-TC (FM 3-0). For the
platoon leader, this is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental “picture” of the tactical situation. This
picture includes an understanding of relevant terrain and the relationship between friendly and enemy
forces, as well as an awareness of the culture with which you are interacting. It also includes the ability to
correlate battlefield events as they develop. For platoon leaders and PSGs, situational understanding is the
key to making sound, quick tactical decisions. It allows them to form logical conclusions and to make
decisions that anticipate future events and information. A critical benefit of situational understanding on
the part of TCs is a reduction in fratricide incidents (see Appendix F, this FM, for information about
fratricide prevention). Situational understanding also gives leaders the ability to compress the time
necessary to conduct troop-leading procedures; this is especially critical when there is limited time to plan
and prepare for an operation.
2-53. The commander structures the battlefield based on his intent and the conditions of METT-TC. How
he does this affects the tank platoon leader’s mission planning and his ability to maintain situational
understanding. The framework of the battlefield can vary from a highly rigid extreme, with obvious front
and rear boundaries and closely tied adjacent units, to a dispersed and decentralized structure with few
secure areas and unit boundaries and no definable front and/or rear boundary.
2-54. Between these extremes are an unlimited number of possible variations. Maintaining situational
understanding becomes more difficult as the battlefield becomes less structured. Modern, highly mobile
operations involving small forces lend themselves to a less rigid framework that challenges the platoon
leader’s ability to maintain an accurate picture of the battlefield.

TIME MANAGEMENT (READINESS CONDITIONS)

2-55. Time management is the key to success in continuous operations. During the planning and
preparation phases of an operation, the commander dictates priorities of work, rest, and security. (Note.
OPSEC is discussed in Appendix D.) In conjunction with REDCON levels, these priorities enable the
platoon leader to develop his internal platoon timeline. He then uses troop-leading procedures (discussed
in Chapter 2) to outline time requirements and disseminate them to the platoon.

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 Command and Control

REDCON LEVELS
2-56. REDCON levels allow quick responses to changing situations and ensure completion of necessary
work and rest plans. The commander uses the REDCON status as a standardized way to adjust the unit’s
readiness to move and fight.

REDCON-1. Full alert; the unit is ready to move and fight.

• CBRN alarms and hot loop equipment are stowed; OPs are pulled in.
• All personnel are alert and mounted on vehicles; weapons are manned.
• Engines are started.
• The platoon is ready to move immediately.

Note. A variant of REDCON-1 is REDCON-1(-); the same conditions apply except

that the vehicles are not started in REDCON-1(-).

REDCON-2. Full alert; the unit is ready to fight.

• Equipment is stowed (except hot loop and CBRN alarms).
• Precombat checks are complete.
• All personnel are alert and mounted in vehicles; weapons are manned.

Note. Depending on the tactical situation and orders from the commander,
dismounted OPs may remain in place.

• All (100 percent) digital and FM communications links are operational.

• Status reports are submitted in accordance with company SOP.
• The platoon is ready to move within 15 minutes of notification.
REDCON-3. Reduced alert.
• Fifty percent of the platoon executes work and rest plans.
• Remainder of the platoon executes security plan. Based on the commander’s
guidance and the enemy situation, some personnel executing the security plan
may execute portions of the work plan.
• The platoon is ready to move within 30 minutes of notification.
REDCON-4. Minimum alert.
• OPs are manned; one man per tank is designated to monitor the radio and man
the turret weapons.
• Digital and FM links with company and other platoons are maintained.
• The platoon is ready to move within one hour of notification.

WORK PLAN
2-57. The work plan enables TCs and crewmen to focus their efforts in preparing vehicles, equipment, and
themselves for operations. Activities designated in the timeline include, but are not limited to, the
following:
• Reconnaissance, as required and within capabilities.
• Orders at crew and platoon level.
• Crew- and platoon-level training and rehearsals.
• Vehicle maintenance.
• Vehicle preparation (camouflage, stowage, boresighting, communications checks).

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Chapter 2

• Individual soldier preparation (training, orders, rehearsals).

• Resupply (Classes I, III, and V).
• Preparation of fighting positions.
• Obstacle emplacement.
• Crew- and platoon-level PCCs and PCIs.

REST PLAN
2-58. The rest plan allows some soldiers to sleep while other crewmen conduct priorities of work and
maintain security. To be effective in sustained combat, a soldier should get a minimum of 4 to 6 hours of
uninterrupted sleep every 24 hours. Less than 4 hours of sleep can significantly degrade combat
performance.
2-59. Planning and decision-making are among the skills that suffer most dramatically when soldiers
cannot get enough sleep. The platoon SOP must provide for an adequate division of duties to allow leaders
to get some sleep. This may require the platoon leader, PSG, and one or both of the other TCs to share
duties. When soldiers are tired, confirmation briefings and backbriefs become critical whenever orders are
issued, even for the simplest task.
2-60. Whenever possible, the tank platoon leader should coordinate with the commander to use
infantrymen to assist with security. This coordination may enable the platoon leader to rest more soldiers
for longer periods of time as the infantry mans OPs and conducts dismounted patrols to augment the
security of the platoon.
BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION
2-61. To “see” the battlefield accurately, the platoon leader must have virtually perfect knowledge of the
friendly situation one level higher than his own (the company team or troop situation). It is also important
that he update the TCs periodically regarding the higher situation. The platoon leader must also have a
relatively complete knowledge of the terrain and the enemy situation. He must be able to visualize enemy
and friendly elements through time and to picture how the terrain will affect their actions.

Note. The requirement to maintain a real-time awareness of the battlefield one level higher does
not relieve the platoon leader of his responsibility to understand the situation and commander’s
intent two levels higher than his own. The difference is that his understanding of the situation
two levels higher does not have to be as specific or as timely.

2-62. Most of the information the platoon leader requires comes from what he can observe from his tank
and from reports he receives through his communications systems. Although few voice and digital reports
are specifically addressed to him, particularly on the company team or troop net, the platoon leader must
monitor them by eavesdropping. He then can track enemy and friendly elements and plot all movement on
his map and/or his digital display (FBCB2). This allows him to adjust his own movement so the platoon
makes contact with the enemy from positions of advantage, which are identified during the map/ground
reconnaissance step of the troop-leading procedures. Care must be taken in that inexperienced leaders do
not become dependent on digitalization for their situational understanding. The enemy may employ tactics
to jam digital systems or overload the leader and cause indecision.
2-63. How effectively the platoon leader can keep track of events on the battlefield depends, to some
degree, on experience. No matter what his experience level, the platoon leader is responsible for learning
techniques that allow him to relate the information he receives to his map or display and thereby track the
tactical situation and increase situational understanding.
The Operational Environment
2-64. Joint doctrine describes the operational environment as the air, land, maritime, space, and associated
adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (that is, political, military, economic, social, informational,
infrastructure, legal, and others) that are relevant to a specific Joint operation (JP 1-02). Understanding

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 Command and Control

this environment has always required a broad perspective. Leaders must consider more than the enemy’s
military forces and other combat capabilities.
2-65. The better leaders understand their own forces and capabilities, threats, and the environment, the
better they can employ and integrate the platoon’s actions to create conditions that lead to mission
accomplishment. The key to understanding is determining what information is relevant to the mission and
making informed decisions based on relevant information.
2-66. The structure for visualizing and analyzing the operational environment is METT-TC. The six
factors of METT-TC make up the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for
tactical operations.

Cultural Awareness
2-67. Successful accomplishment of military missions requires that Soldiers and leaders possess an
awareness of the cultures with which they interact. To develop this cultural awareness, and subsequently
apply this knowledge, Soldiers and leaders must first understand the key elements of a culture. These key
elements are the beliefs, values, behaviors, and norms that compose (or are important to) any culture,
whether friendly or enemy, local or foreign. Soldiers and leaders must then take into account these
considerations:
• US culture. They must understand the key elements of the US culture, and how these elements
influence their own perceptions of other cultures. In addition, they must realize how US culture
can affect other cultures, and that these effects influence other cultures’ perceptions of the US
and its people.
• COE culture. They must understand the key elements of the specific cultures within the COE
with which they expect to interact during operations. This includes indigenous populations as
well as multinational partners.
• Impact of culture on military operations. Military personnel must not only know what
cultural awareness is, but must also factor specific cultural information into the decisions and
actions they take to accomplish their missions. Information that may have a direct impact on
military operations includes—
• The influences of religion(s) on how a population behaves.
• The impact of geography on a population.
• Actions or speech that might insult or offend the members of certain cultures.
• The dangers of stereotyping and other biases.
• Differences in what indigenous populations and multinational partners value.
• The influences of social structure and relationships.
• Historical events and how they impact behaviors, beliefs, and relationships.
• How to communicate effectively with multinational partners and indigenous persons.
• The impact of cultural awareness on battle command.
MAPS, OVERLAYS, GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES, AND NAVIGATION
Maps and Overlays
2-68. Purposes. The most important role of maps and the accompanying overlays is to allow the platoon
to understand and visualize the scheme of maneuver. They are the primary tools the platoon leader uses to
organize information concerning the battlefield and to synchronize his assets once the battle begins. Maps
also provide TCs with a visual reference they can consult as needed. The platoon leader must ensure that
each TC has an updated map with the latest graphic control measures posted on the overlays and verify
their accuracy.
2-69. The map and overlays also assist the platoon leader in performing a variety of other functions. He
consults them constantly during reconnaissance operations, which can vary in complexity from a quick
map reconnaissance to a fully mounted ground reconnaissance of the area of operations. The map and
overlays help him to communicate the company or troop commander’s concept while he is issuing the

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Chapter 2

OPORD or briefing the TCs on the plan. During mission execution, the map and overlays play an
invaluable role in helping leaders to maintain situational understanding.
2-70. Types of overlays. Overlays can be prepared either in traditional fashion (written out by hand) or
digitally. The platoon leader may receive one or more types of overlays from the commander covering
such areas as maneuver, enemy forces, obstacles, fire support, and sustainment. All of the information is
important; the key for the platoon leader is to combine, augment, and unclutter the overlays so the
information needed for a specific situation is readily available to the platoon on one simple, combined
overlay.
2-71. Traditional overlays. Copied on acetate, traditional overlays display graphic control measures as
illustrated in Figure 2-1. They are prepared even if a platoon is equipped with FBCB2 digital systems in
the event the platoon loses digital data or has its digital link broken. Overlays allow the TCs to use the
graphic during rehearsals and dismounted operations when they will not have access to digital systems.

Figure 2-1. Traditional overlay

2-72. Digital overlays. FBCB2 allows the platoon leader to receive and transmit graphics virtually on a
real-time basis within the platoon and to and from higher headquarters. When these systems are integrated
with automatic position/location updates, the platoon leader has a nearly perfect situational understanding
“link.” His display shows the positions of his platoon and adjacent units. These positions and locations
are displayed on a menu of overlays using the most recent graphics. The platoon leader can combine,
augment, and unclutter the overlays as needed; when appropriate, he can choose not to display any of them
on his digital screen. Figure 2-2 illustrates a sample FBCB2-generated overlay.

Figure 2-2. Sample FBCB2 with overlay

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2-73. Although fairly accurate, digital systems suffer from minor flaws that detract from their effectiveness
as a stand-alone battle command tool. They serve as an enhancement to, not a substitute for, the platoon
leader’s map with traditional overlays.

Graphic Control Measures

2-74. The following paragraphs and the accompanying illustrations (Figures 2-3 through 2-19) explain and
illustrate graphic control measures commonly used at the company and platoon level. They are entered on
overlays to illustrate the commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver. In addition, they provide clarity
when an order is issued and assist in the battle command process once the tank platoon begins executing
the operation. Exact definitions are found in FM 1-02.
2-75. Graphic control measures are considered rigid and unchangeable; however, placement of platoon
battle positions should be dictated by the terrain and commander’s intent as opposed to battle positions
drawn on the map. The platoon leader fights the battle and terrain not the graphic. For example, if the map
location of a support-by-fire position does not allow the platoon leader to mass direct fires on the enemy,
he can, in most situations, inform the commander and adjust the position as needed to accomplish the
platoon mission. Control measures assist the platoon leader in identifying the necessary coordination that
must be accomplished with adjacent platoons.
2-76. Boundary. Boundaries delineate areas of tactical responsibility between units. Coordination with
adjacent units along boundaries is the key to enhancing synchronization and decreasing the risk of
fratricide. The platoon leader must be aware of adjacent platoons within his company, adjacent companies
within the battalion, and adjacent units along the task force boundary. (See Figure 2-3.)

Figure 2-3. Boundary (graphic control measure)

2-77. Phase line. Phase lines are used to control and coordinate movement and synchronize tactical
actions. Platoons report crossing phase lines, but normally do not halt unless directed to do so. The
abbreviation on overlays is “PL.” (See Figure 2-4.)

Figure 2-4. Phase line (graphic control measure)

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Chapter 2

2-78. Assembly area. Abbreviated “AA” on overlays, this is a location at which the platoon gathers
(usually as part of the company or troop) to conduct maintenance and resupply activities and to make other
preparations for future operations. The platoon must be able to defend from the assembly area. (See
Figure 2-5.)

Figure 2-5. Assembly area (graphic control measure)

2-79. Route. This is the prescribed course of travel from a specific point of origin (the start point [SP]) to
a specific destination, usually the release point (RP). The route should be named, and checkpoints should
be designated at key locations. The abbreviation on overlays is “RTE.” (See Figure 2-6.)

Figure 2-6. Route (graphic control measure)

2-80. Checkpoint. Checkpoints are used to control and direct the maneuver of the tank platoon and tank
section. They are usually placed on identifiable terrain features, such as hilltops, road intersections, or
towers. (See Figure 2-7.)

Figure 2-7. Checkpoint (graphic control measure)

2-81. Attack position. This is the last position the platoon occupies or passes through before crossing the
line of departure (LD). The platoon assumes the proper formation and performs last-minute checks of its
weapons systems. The abbreviation on overlays is “ATK POS.” (See Figure 2-8.)

Figure 2-8. Attack position (graphic control measure)

2-82. Contact point. A contact point is a designated location, usually an easily identifiable terrain feature,
where two or more units are required to physically meet. The headquarters assigning the contact point
must specify what sort of activity is required when the units meet. The platoon leader may be tasked to
man or move to a contact point for coordination. (See Figure 2-9.)

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 Command and Control

Figure 2-9. Contact point (graphic control measure)

2-83. Passage lane. This is the area or route through which a passing unit moves to avoid stationary units
and obstacles. Tank platoons may move on a lane or serve as the overwatch for a passing unit moving
through a lane. (See Figure 2-10.)

Figure 2-10. Passage lane (graphic control measure)

2-84. Passage point. This is the place where a unit physically passes through another unit. Tank platoons
may move through a passage point or overwatch other units moving through a passage point. The
abbreviation for a passage point is “PP.” (See Figure 2-11.)

Figure 2-11. Passage point (graphic control measure)

2-85. Objective. An objective is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations,
facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort (FM 1-02). The objective is the physical
object or area (such as enemy personnel, a man-made object, or a terrain feature) to be seized or held.
Tank platoons usually occupy some portion of the company objective. The abbreviation on overlays is
“OBJ.” (See Figure 2-12.)

Figure 2-12. Objective (graphic control measure)

2-86. Axis of advance. This is the general route and direction of advance extending toward the enemy. It
graphically portrays the commander’s intent, such as envelopment of the enemy. The unit may maneuver
and shoot supporting fires to either side of the axis provided it remains oriented on the axis and the
objective. For example, platoons may maneuver on or to the side of the axis assigned to their company as
long as deviations do not interfere with the maneuver of adjacent units. (See Figure 2-13.)

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-13. Axis of advance (graphic control measure)

2-87. Direction of attack. This is the specific direction and route that the main attack or center of mass of
the unit will follow. Tank platoons move along directions of attack specified by the commander to take
advantage of terrain or to ensure maximum control of the moving unit. The overlay abbreviation is
“DOA.” (See Figure 2-14.)

Figure 2-14. Direction of attack (graphic control measure)

2-88. Assault position. This is the location from which a unit assaults the objective. Ideally, it is the last
covered and concealed position before the objective. Tank platoons may occupy an assault position or
serve as overwatch for occupation of the position by the assault force. The abbreviation on overlays is
“ASLT POS.” (See Figure 2-15.)

Figure 2-15. Assault position (graphic control measure)

2-89. Attack-by-fire position. This is the location from which a unit employs direct fire to destroy the
enemy from a distance. Tank platoons occupy an attack-by-fire position alone or as part of the company or
troop. From this position, the platoon can attack the enemy on the objective when occupation of the
objective is not advisable; the position can also be used in an attack on a moving enemy force. In addition,
this type of position can serve as a counterattack option for a reserve force. The overlay abbreviation is
“ABF.” (See Figure 2-16.)

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 Command and Control

Figure 2-16. Attack-by-fire position (graphic control measure)

2-90. Support-by-fire position. This is another type of position from which a maneuver element can
engage the enemy by direct fire, with the fires providing support for operations by other units. The tank
platoon usually occupies a support-by-fire position when providing supporting fires for an assault or
breach force or when serving as the overwatch for a moving force. The overlay abbreviation is “SBF.”
(See Figure 2-17.)

Figure 2-17. Support-by-fire position (graphic control measure)

2-91. Battle position. This is a defensive location, oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach,
from which a unit defends. Tank platoon BPs and direct-fire orientations are designated in the OPORD.
(See Figure 2-18.)

Figure 2-18. Battle position (graphic control measure)

2-92. Target reference point. This is an easily recognizable point on the ground (either natural or man
made) used to locate enemy forces or control fires. TRPs can designate either the center of an area on
which the platoon can mass its fires or the left or right limit of such an area. The tank platoon leader
controls platoon fires by designating platoon TRPs as necessary to supplement company or troop TRPs
issued by the commander. (See Figure 2-19.)

Figure 2-19. Target reference point (graphic control measure)

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Chapter 2

Navigation
2-93. To protect his platoon, the platoon leader must learn to use terrain to his advantage. Land navigation
of armored vehicles requires him to master the technique of terrain association. This entails the ability to
identify terrain features on the ground by the contour intervals depicted on the map. The platoon leader
analyzes the terrain using the factors of OAKOC and identifies major terrain features, contour changes, and
man-made structures along his axis of advance. As the platoon advances, he uses these features to orient
the platoon and to associate ground positions with map locations.
2-94. The intellectual concept of the area of operations (AO) is vital to the platoon’s survival during
navigation and movement. The platoon leader must constantly be aware of key terrain and enemy fields of
observation and fire that may create danger areas as the platoon advances. This allows him to modify
movement techniques, formations, and routes and to maintain cross talk with overwatch elements to make
sure the enemy does not surprise the platoon.
2-95. Navigation under limited visibility conditions is especially challenging. Vehicle thermal sights and
night-vision devices provide assistance, but leaders nonetheless can easily confuse terrain features and
become disoriented. See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 for a discussion of limited visibility operations.
2-96. The platoon can employ a variety of techniques and equipment to assist in navigation. These are
summarized in the following discussion.
2-97. Fires. Using field artillery (FA) or mortars to fire smoke (during the day) or ground-burst
illumination (day or night) can provide a useful check on estimated locations or preplanned targets.
2-98. Global positioning systems. GPS devices receive signals from satellites or land-based transmitters.
They calculate and display the position of the user in military grid coordinates as well as in degrees of
latitude and longitude. Most GPS navigation readings are based on waypoints, the known positions
entered into the system’s memory. The platoon leader identifies points along the route or at the destination
and designates them as waypoints. Once waypoints are entered in the GPS, the device can display
information such as distance and direction from point to point. Leaders must still know how to employ
terrain association while navigating in case satellite or land signals are inoperative or unavailable.
2-99. Inertial navigation systems. Based on an initial calculation of the vehicle’s location from a known
point, inertial navigation systems use the rotation of the track to determine the location of the vehicle. The
M1A2’s POSNAV system is an example. POSNAV allows the TC to determine his exact location and
gives him the ability to plot up to 99 waypoints. Tank drivers can then use the steer-to function on their
driver’s integrated display (DID) as they move toward the designated waypoints. To compensate for track
slippage that could affect the accuracy of the inertial system, TCs should reinitialize their systems often,
using a GPS or a known point.

Note. In using the GPS or POSNAV, the platoon leader must remember that waypoints are only
one of several navigational tools he can use. He must still be prepared to use terrain association
and map-reading skills in case of digital system failures. In addition, the platoon leader must not
disregard the effects of terrain on the direction of movement. Terrain features that do not show
up on the digital display (such as hills, valleys, and cliffs) may cause deviations in the route the
platoon must take to reach the next waypoint.

2-100. Terrain/Grid Index Reference System (TIRS/GIRS). TIRS/GIRS are convenient tools for the
platoon leader to use as he maneuvers the platoon and disseminates control measures. Known points are
usually previously distributed graphic control measures. Referencing a location from a known point is
done in kilometers. For example, 500 meters is given as “POINT FIVE,” 1,000 meters as “ONE,” and
3,500 meters as “THREE POINT FIVE.” Cardinal directions are used. Shifts to the east or west are given
first, followed by shifts to the north or south. Consider the following transmission: “RED SET FROM
CHECKPOINT SEVEN—EAST ONE POINT EIGHT—NORTH ONE POINT SEVEN.” This means,
“We (the Red element) are set at a position 1,800 meters east and 1,700 meters north from checkpoint 7.”
Figure 2-20 illustrates this example.

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 Command and Control

Figure 2-20. Example of TIRS

2-101. TIRS/GIRS are used routinely to control combat operations; they make reporting of current
platoon and enemy positions easier. The platoon leader could report his location by referencing a graphic
control measure, such as a checkpoint as shown in Figure 2-21, or a grid location. The enemy, however,
will quickly figure out the known points if they are continually used in the clear on a nonsecure net. The
platoon leader should avoid using the same point more than twice. Instead, he should use a different
known point to reference the same location.

Figure 2-21. Platoon reports own position using TIRS (checkpoint)

COMMUNICATIONS
2-102. During combat operations, dispersion forces the tank platoon to rely on effective communications
by means of wire, visual signals, radio, and digital systems. The platoon must understand the proper
procedures for using the available systems; the proper application of operational terms; and procedures for
constructing and sending effective, concise messages using each type of system. The platoon leader is
responsible for planning, training, and employment of the platoon’s communications systems. He is also
responsible for maintaining communications within the company or troop communications system.

Means of Tactical Communications

2-103. The tank platoon has several available means of communications. Whether using messenger,
wire, visual, sound, radio, or digital communications, the platoon must remain flexible enough to react
quickly to new situations. The platoon leader must carefully plan the use of these resources, ensuring there
is redundancy in the platoon’s communications systems while avoiding dependence on any single means.
2-104. SOPs play a critical role in ensuring that platoon communications enhance situational
understanding and contribute to mission accomplishment. They prescribe hand-and-arm and flag signals
that can aid in platoon movement and clear, concise radio transmissions that help to reduce transmission

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Chapter 2

times. On digitally linked vehicles, crews can monitor the commander’s integrated display (CID), with its
standardized graphics; this significantly reduces the need to send voice updates of friendly vehicle
positions.
2-105. Messenger. Use of a messenger is the most secure means of communications available to the tank
platoon. When security conditions and time permit, it is the preferred means. It is generally very flexible
and reliable. A messenger can be used to deliver platoon fire plans, status reports, or lengthy messages.
When possible, lengthy messages sent by messenger should be written to prevent mistakes and confusion.
2-106. Wire. This method of communications is especially effective in static positions. The platoon will
frequently employ a hot loop in initial defensive positions, OPs, and assembly areas. Unit SOPs, tailored
to counter the enemy’s electronic warfare capability, prescribe conditions and situations in which the
platoon will employ wire. Tank crews can communicate directly with dismounted infantry by routing wire
from the vehicle internal communications (VIC)-3 system through the loader’s hatch or vision block to a
field phone attached to the outside of the tank.
2-107. Visual. Visual communications are used to identify friendly forces or to transmit prearranged
messages quickly over short distances. Standard hand-and-arm or flag signals work well during periods of
good visibility. Crews can use thermal paper, flashlights, chemical lights, or other devices during periods
of limited visibility, but they must exercise extreme care to avoid alerting the enemy to friendly intentions.
TCs must clearly understand visual signals as they operate across the battlefield; each TC must be ready to
pass on visual signals from the platoon leader to other vehicles in the platoon. See STP 17-19K1-SM (the
skill level 1 Soldier’s manual for MOS 19K) and FM 21-60 for a description of hand-and-arm signals.
2-108. Pyrotechnics. Pyrotechnic ammunition can be used for visual signaling. The meaning of these
signals is identified in paragraph 5 of the OPORD and in the signal operation instructions (SOI). The main
advantage of pyrotechnics is the speed with which signals can be transmitted. The main disadvantages are
the enemy’s ability to detect and imitate them and to use them to identify friendly positions.
2-109. Radio. The radio is the platoon’s most flexible, most frequently used, and least secure means of
communications. It can quickly transmit information over long distances with great accuracy. Secure
equipment and the ability of the SINCGARS to frequency-hop provide the platoon with communications
security against most enemy direction-finding, interception, and jamming capabilities. Sophisticated
direction-finding equipment, however, can trace almost any radio signal, allowing the enemy to locate and
destroy the transmitter and its operator. Survival of the tank platoon depends on good communications
habits, especially when it is using the radio; the platoon leader must strictly enforce radio discipline. The
most effective way to use the radio is to follow standard radiotelephone procedures (RTP), including
brevity and proper use of approved operational terms; these techniques are covered later in this section.
2-110. Digital. FBCB2 enables the platoon leader to transmit digitally encoded information over the
SINCGARS radio to other similarly equipped vehicles. Linkup refers to the ability of the tank’s radio to
transmit and receive digital information. When properly linked, the platoon leader receives continuously
updated position location information for the platoon’s vehicles, as well as for those of the company or
troop commander and executive officer (XO) and of adjacent platoons. Using the digital link with other
platoon vehicles and the company/troop commander, the platoon leader can also send and receive
preformatted reports and overlays with graphic control measures. ST 3-20.153 provides an example SOP
for use of digital systems.

Tank Platoon Radio Nets

2-111. The platoon leader, PSG, TCs, and crewmen employ and/or monitor the following radio nets.
2-112. Platoon. The tank platoon net is the key to command and control of the platoon and is the primary
net in the conduct of all platoon operations. All tanks within the platoon must monitor and transmit on this
net at all times. Some units do not use platoon radio nets; in such a situation, it is critical that all platoon
vehicles adhere to communications SOPs and observe strict radio discipline. Every crewman in the
platoon should understand net control guidelines, including proper RTP and techniques for effective
communications, discussed later in this section. In addition, every Soldier must be trained to provide the
platoon leader with essential information efficiently and without redundancy.

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 Command and Control

2-113. Company/troop command. The commander uses this net to maneuver the company or troop as
well as to process routine administrative/logistical (A/L) reports. Platoon leaders and PSGs monitor this
net to keep abreast of the current tactical situation from the reports of the commander, XO, and other
platoon leaders. They transmit on the company net to keep the commander informed and to cross talk with
other platoon leaders coordinating the tactical actions of their platoons. Both the platoon leader and PSG
must have the ability to monitor and transmit on this net. All TCs must be able to switch to this net to send
reports and receive guidance if they are unable to contact their platoon leader or PSG.

Net Control
2-114. Each crewman must be an expert in the technical aspects of his voice and digital communications
systems. In particular, he must understand how to maintain each system, how to place it into operation,
and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly. The smooth functioning of
the platoon net allows accurate information to be passed quickly to and from the platoon leader. This
information flow is critical in maintaining the platoon leader’s situational understanding. It becomes
especially important when contact is made and the volume of traffic on the platoon and company/troop nets
increases drastically. To ensure that information flowing over the net is organized and controlled in a
manner that permits the platoon leader to understand it and to issue orders, use the following techniques.

2-115. Radiotelephone procedures. Proper RTP is the cornerstone of effective command and control in
the tank platoon. Every platoon member must be an expert in communications procedures. This ensures
efficient communications within the platoon and allows members of the platoon to communicate
effectively with outside elements such as other platoons or the company or troop headquarters.

2-116. Depending on the enemy’s electronic warfare capability, the company commander may elect to
use standardized call signs to simplify RTP. These call signs allow all users of a net to instantly recognize
the calling station. Examples would be the use of RED, WHITE, and BLUE to designate 1st, 2d, and 3d
platoons, respectively, and the use of bumper numbers to identity tanks within a platoon.

2-117. Techniques of effective communications. The platoon leader and PSG must ensure that every
member of the platoon understands and adheres to the following techniques and guidelines, which can
contribute to more effective, more secure tactical communications.
2-118. Minimize duration. All messages sent within or from the tank platoon must be short and
informative. The longer the message, the greater the opportunity for enemy elements to use electronic
detection to pinpoint the platoon’s location. Message length can be controlled in several ways:
• Write down the message and then eliminate all unnecessary words from the written message
before sending it.
• Read the message as written when sending it.
• Use brevity codes that reduce the need to explain the tactical picture in detail.
• Break long messages into several parts and send each part separately.
2-119. Minimize signature. When sending a message, every tanker must be conscious of the size and
nature of the electronic signature that he is emitting. To reduce the size of the signature, he can use terrain
to mask his transmissions from known or suspected enemy positions. He should set the transmitter to the
lowest possible power that will provide sufficient range.
2-120. Know the system. Each crewman must be an expert in the technical aspects of his voice and
digital communications systems. In particular, he must understand how to maintain each system, how to
place it into operation, and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly.
2-121. Use an effective format. A thorough knowledge of report formats is critical in ensuring timely
reporting of enemy information, especially in fast-moving tactical situations. Every crewman should be
familiar with the report formats that are outlined in Appendix B and know how to use them effectively. At
the same time, however, they must never delay reports only to assure the correct format. ALWAYS
REPORT ACCURATE INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE!

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Chapter 2

2-122. Reporting. In keeping the platoon leader informed, TCs must avoid redundant voice and digital
reports. They monitor the platoon net so they can avoid reporting information the platoon leader has
already received from other TCs. The PSG pays close attention to the company or troop net while the
platoon net is active; he then relays critical information to the platoon. This technique allows the platoon
leader to concentrate on fighting the platoon. Once the platoon leader begins to develop the situation, he is
responsible for reporting the platoon’s tactical situation to the commander using SPOTREPs and situation
reports (SITREP). Refer to Appendix B for information on report formats.
2-123. As a basic guideline, reports of enemy activity should follow the SALUTE format, which covers
these factors:
• Size. This includes the number of sighted personnel, vehicles, or other equipment.
• Activity. This covers what the enemy is doing.
• Location. This is usually reported as the grid coordinates of enemy elements.
• Unit. This covers any indications useful in unit identification, such as patches, signs, and
vehicle markings.
• Time. This item details when enemy activity was observed.
• Equipment. This includes description or identification of all equipment associated with the
enemy activity.
2-124. Initial contact. Any vehicle can alert the platoon to an enemy. The section leader in contact
(platoon leader or PSG) deploys and fights his section according to the platoon leader’s intent. The section
leader not in contact forwards the report to higher headquarters. If the entire platoon is in contact, the
platoon leader fights the platoon while the PSG reports the contact to the commander.
2-125. Routine traffic. The PSG normally receives and consolidates A/L reports and other routine
communications from the TCs and passes the reports to the platoon leader or higher headquarters using the
procedures prescribed in unit SOPs.
2-126. Digital traffic. Digital traffic may precede, replace, or follow voice transmissions; in many cases,
it will reduce the need for and redundancy of voice traffic. Do not duplicate digital traffic with voice
messages if digital transmissions precede or can replace voice traffic in a timely manner. Because digital
systems are not totally reliable, it may be necessary to verify the receipt of critical digital traffic.

FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL

2-127. To maximize the effects of its fires, the platoon must know how to effectively focus, distribute,
and control them. Depending on the situation, fire distribution and control may be accomplished by
individual tanks, by section (each section leader’s tank and his wingman), or by the platoon as a whole.
On many occasions, particularly in defensive operations, the platoon leader will be in a position to direct
the fires of the entire platoon. At other times, especially during offensive operations, fire distribution and
control may begin with the PSG or a wingman; as the situation develops, the platoon leader then takes
control of the platoon fires and distributes them effectively.
2-128. This discussion provides standardized methods for directing and controlling fires applicable to the
individual tank, the section, and the entire platoon. It covers the procedures used from the time targets are
acquired, through the placement of fires on those targets, to the reporting of the effects of those fires to the
company/troop commander. Also included are considerations for fire distribution and control during
offensive and defensive operations. Although the discussion focuses on actions at the platoon and section
level, these actions are always integrated into, and become part of, the company or troop plan.
2-129. Refer to FM 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams) for further information on controlling direct fires,
including a complete explanation of target acquisition and destruction procedures during direct-fire
engagements.

Note. The following discussion focuses on platoon-level operations only. For more information
on company-level operations, see FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).

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FUNDAMENTALS OF DIRECTING AND CONTROLLING DIRECT FIRES

2-130. The platoon’s ability to focus fires on the enemy is critical to combat survival. Proper scanning
techniques and the immediate, violent execution of battle drills (refer to the discussion in Chapter 3) will
initially orient the platoon toward the enemy. At that point, the platoon leader must supplement the drills
using the techniques and considerations covered in the following discussion. These factors include the
following:
• Employment of TRPs to mass the platoon’s fires at one location.
• Knowledge of the wingman concept in controlling platoon and section fires.
• Use of platoon SOPs to aid in controlling fires.

Use of Target Reference Points

2-131. Once he has oriented the platoon, the platoon leader identifies and references each TRP using a
terrain feature or by means of a digital overlay. When TRPs are used to delineate the left and right
planning limits for platoon fires, he should designate a TRP near the center of the sector. The center TRP
roughly divides the left and right sectors in which each section will scan and engage targets. Each section
should have the ability to engage targets in the other section’s sector of fire from its primary, alternate, or
supplementary position. This allows the platoon leader to distribute fires in response to changes in the
enemy situation.
2-132. One section will then scan for and engage targets to the left of the center TRP while the other
section does the same to the right of the TRP. (Note. If he has M1A2 target designation capability, each
TC can lase in the vicinity of the TRP and orient his main gun on the TRP using the commander’s digital
display.) The outer limits of the sector of fire can be supplemented with TRPs identified by the section
leader or can be left to the discretion of individual TCs based on the tactical situation.

Platoon/Section Fires and the Wingman Concept

2-133. As described in Chapter 1 of this manual, the tank platoon is the smallest maneuver element that
conducts operations. Even though platoons may separate into sections as the situation requires (for
example, during execution of traveling overwatch or bounding overwatch), the platoon leader is still
responsible for controlling all four tanks in his platoon. Sections, which consist of a section leader
(platoon leader or PSG) and a wingman, do not normally conduct missions or operations separate from
those of the platoon.
2-134. During combat operations, the platoon leader/PSG must not become absorbed in firing his own
tank; survival of the platoon depends on his ability to command and control the entire platoon. The
platoon leader/PSG should have experienced gunners on his vehicle. The gunner must be able to
understand the fire plan or operation so he can actively participate in the engagement process without the
TC’s direct supervision. During an engagement, the platoon leader must first ensure that the platoon is
firing in concert. He then must pass critical combat information (such as calls for fire, report criteria, and
instructions) to his crews and higher headquarters using the appropriate communications techniques and
nets.

Role of Platoon SOPs

2-135. When specific orders are too time-consuming or not possible, a well-rehearsed platoon SOP
ensures fast, predictable actions by all tank crews. The SOP must be drilled repetitively so each tank
within the platoon will react automatically to any tactical situation. It should precisely cover guidelines
and procedures in such areas as target acquisition responsibilities, drills, reaction procedures, and use of
engagement areas and TRPs. Crewmen must then learn these SOP items by memory to provide direction
in the absence of orders.
2-136. ST 3-20.153 provides standardized methods for operations within the tank platoon. It includes
guidance on the following:
• Command and control.

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Chapter 2

• OPSEC.
• Organizing for combat.
• Tactical operations.
• Personnel.
• CS.
2-137. In addition to guidance in these general categories, ST 3-20.153 covers specific operational factors
that the platoon leader must take into account in fire distribution and control. These additional SOP items
include the following:
• Vehicle positions (for example, Tank 2 will always be the left flank tank).
• TRP marking procedures and materials.
• Sectors of fire for each tank.
• Engagement bands (based on ammunition capabilities and expected enemy forces).
• Procedures for coordination with adjacent units.
• Guidelines for identifying and covering dead space.
2-138. The platoon leader should supplement his SOP by developing standardized procedures for
offensive and defensive fire planning. These procedures should be detailed enough to allow rapid fire
planning after the terrain has been analyzed. This initial planning may be refined and improved as time
permits.

Note. Visual control measures (and the accompanying SOP actions) may be used to start and
stop engagements, shift fires, and signal prearranged actions. On the other hand, an important
consideration for the platoon leader in developing the unit SOP is that the dynamics of battle
will normally require that fires be controlled using the radio. The radio instructions used to
initiate SOPs (as well as issue fire commands) must be brief and precise.

Distribution
2-139. The platoon leader employs two primary methods to ensure effective distribution of direct fires:
fire patterns and firing techniques.

Fire Patterns
2-140. The entire platoon must thoroughly understand the three basic fire patterns: frontal, cross, and
depth. In addition, each tank crew must understand its responsibilities, by SOP, in using the fire patterns
for target engagement. The basic fire patterns cover most situations and promote rapid, effective platoon
fire distribution. They are normally used in the defense, but may be modified for employment with
techniques of movement. They may be used at both platoon and section level.
2-141. Regardless of the fire pattern used, the goal is to engage near targets first, and then shift fires to far
targets. Tanks should engage targets near to far and most dangerous to least dangerous in their sector. A
most dangerous enemy is any enemy antitank system preparing to engage the platoon. The platoon sector
is defined by TRPs, which are used to mass platoon fires at specific locations and to mark the left and right
planning limits for platoon fires. As directed or when he determines it is necessary, the section or platoon
leader may make exceptions to the most dangerous to least dangerous guideline; an example would be
engagement of designated priority targets (such as command and control vehicles).
2-142. Frontal fire pattern. The frontal pattern is used when all tanks within the platoon can fire to their
front (see Figure 2-22). Flank tanks engage targets to their front (right tank shoots right target, left tank
shoots left target) and shift fires toward the center as targets are destroyed. Leader tanks engage targets to
their front and shift fire to the outside as targets are destroyed. The frontal fire engagement rule is near to
far, flank to center, and center to flank.

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 Command and Control

Figure 2-22. Frontal fire pattern

2-143. Cross fire pattern. The cross fire pattern is used when obstructions prevent some or all tanks
within the platoon from firing to the front or when the enemy’s frontal armor protection requires use of
flank shots to achieve penetration. In this pattern, each tank engages targets on the flank of its position.
The right flank tank engages the left portion of the target area while the left flank tank engages the right
portion. As targets are destroyed, tanks shift fires inward. The leader tanks engage the center targets and
shift fire to the outside as targets are destroyed. The cross fire engagement rule is outside in, near to far.
An example of the cross pattern is shown in Figure 2-23.

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-23. Cross fire pattern

2-144. Depth fire pattern. The depth fire pattern is used when targets are exposed in depth.
Employment of depth fire is dependent on the position and formation of both the engaging platoon and the
target. For example, the entire platoon may be required to fire on a column formation in depth; in other
cases, individual tanks engaging in their sector may have to fire in depth. If the whole platoon is firing, it
may be possible for each tank to fire in depth on a portion of the enemy formation (see Figure 2-24). The
far left tank engages the far target and shifts fire toward the center of the formation as targets are
destroyed; the left center tank engages the center target and shifts fire toward the rear as targets are
destroyed. The right center tank engages the closest (front) target and shifts fire to the rear as targets are
destroyed; the far right tank engages the center target and shifts fire to the front as targets are destroyed.

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 Command and Control

Figure 2-24. Depth fire pattern

Firing Techniques
2-145. In addition to employing fire patterns, the platoon leader may choose one of three firing
techniques to distribute and control the direct fires of the platoon: simultaneous, alternating, and observed.
Figures
2-25 through 2-30 illustrate a variety of situations in which the firing techniques are employed; the
illustrations include the applicable fire commands. (Note. Refer to the discussion of fire commands later
in this section.)
2-146. Simultaneous fire. This is the primary firing technique used by the platoon. It is employed
during most offensive engagements when the unit encounters surprise targets. It is also used in most
defensive engagements when the enemy array is numerous enough to require multiple engagements by
each tank in the unit. In that case, all tanks engage simultaneously in their assigned sectors. Figures 2-25
through 2-28 illustrate various simultaneous fire situations.
2-147. Alternating fire. Alternating fire is normally used when the platoon is in a defensive position or
is undetected. Each tank alternates firing and observing in conjunction with the other tank in the section
until both are satisfied that they are hitting the target consistently. Subsequent fire, by command, is then
simultaneous. During alternating fire, Tanks 2 and 3 (the wingmen in each section) are normally the first
to fire at their outside targets. The section leaders (the platoon leader and PSG) provide observation before
firing at their targets. The process continues until all targets are destroyed or the leader switches to
simultaneous fire. Refer to Figure 2-29 for an illustration of how alternating fire is employed.
2-148. Observed fire. Observed fire is normally used when the platoon is in protected defensive
positions and engagement ranges are in excess of 2,500 meters. The first tank to fire in each section
engages designated targets while the second tank observes. The second tank prepares to engage targets in
the event the first tank misses consistently, experiences a malfunction, or runs low on ammunition. This
technique maximizes observation and assistance capabilities for the observing tank while protecting its
location. See Figure 2-30 for an example of observed fire.

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-25. Use of cross fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage enemy PCs
(with platoon leader’s fire command)

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 Command and Control

Figure 2-26. Use of frontal fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage multiple
enemy tanks (with platoon leader’s fire command)

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-27. Use of different fire patterns in each section (with simultaneous fire technique) to
engage enemy targets (with platoon leader’s fire command)

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 Command and Control

Figure 2-28. Use of depth fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique (with section fire
command)

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 2-35

Chapter 2

Figure 2-29. Use of cross fire pattern and alternating fire technique (with section fire
command)

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 Command and Control

Figure 2-30. Use of observed fire technique (with section fire command)

Control
2-149. The platoon leader uses two processes to control fires: fire planning and fire commands. He
decides how to control fires based on the factors of METT-TC, especially the specific tactical situation and
the time available to plan and prepare.

Fire Planning
2-150. The more thoroughly the platoon leader can plan an operation, the more effective the platoon’s
fires are likely to be. The amount of time available for fire planning, however, depends almost entirely on
the collective factors of METT-TC. There are also important considerations based on whether the
operation is offensive or defensive in nature.
2-151. For example, some defensive operations may allow the platoon leader hours or days to conduct
fire planning. Intelligence assets may be able to acquire, track, and report enemy elements as they move
toward the platoon. The platoon leader can then initiate fires with a platoon fire command or a
predetermined event (such as the enemy crossing a trigger line). He can also rely on detailed planning and
preparation to assist him in distributing fires effectively during the fight. Further fire commands may be
required, but the object of the planning phase is to anticipate events and coordinate fires before the fight
starts. A well-planned defense requires minimum radio traffic over the platoon net during execution;
trigger points, priority of engagements, and targets are established in advance.
2-152. In other situations, especially during offensive operations (such as a meeting engagement or in a
movement to contact), the platoon will have only limited time to plan and prepare. At best, the platoon
leader may have time to issue a full platoon fire command; on the other hand, a member of the platoon may

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Chapter 2

acquire and engage a “most dangerous” target before the platoon leader has an opportunity to initiate his
fire command. In the absence of adequate planning time, the platoon leader must initially rely on
preestablished, well-rehearsed SOPs to distribute and control fires and ensure fast, predictable engagement
by all tanks.

Note. Fire planning for offensive and defensive situations is covered in detail in a discussion
later in this section and in Chapters 3 and 4 of this manual.

2-153. No matter what kind of situation it expects to face, the platoon must learn and rehearse target
acquisition responsibilities; use of TRPs and fire patterns; and procedures for initiating, shifting, and
stopping fires. Its survival depends on it.

Fire Commands
2-154. The effective use of fire commands is a function of the leader’s knowledge of the enemy and the
fire control process and of the time available to plan, prepare, and rehearse. Using a standard format for a
platoon or section fire command ensures that all essential information and control measures are given in a
minimum amount of time. It enables the unit to react instantly and effectively, even under the most
adverse conditions. Standardized platoon and section fire command formats must be established by unit
SOP and then practiced by platoon leaders and PSGs (the section leaders) for optimum proficiency.
Brevity and clarity are essential. Abbreviated methods for identifying target locations are encouraged;
however, these methods must be familiar and understandable.
2-155. The platoon leader may provide coordinating instructions or additional information to individual
TCs; this information is not part of the platoon fire command. When one tank sends a contact or spot
report and it is reasonable to believe all other tanks in the section or platoon have received it, the section or
platoon leader issues only the elements needed to complete the fire command. In all cases, a TC has the
freedom to engage a target without a section or platoon fire command if he is under immediate
enemy contact.
2-156. The battlefield situation and/or platoon SOP dictate the number of elements used in a fire
command. The standard platoon fire command includes up to six elements, transmitted in the following
order:
• Alert.
• Weapon or ammunition (optional).
• Target description.
• Orientation.
• Control (optional).
• Execution.
2-157. Alert. The alert element addresses the tanks that are being directed to fire; it does not require the
individual initiating the fire command to identify himself. (Note. Wingman tanks or sections not
designated to engage should sense the target effects and be prepared to engage targets as necessary.)
2-158. The platoon or company/troop SOP may specify code words to be used to standardize the alert
element, as in the following example:
• RED. Entire platoon prepare to fire.
• ALPHA. Platoon leader and his wingman prepare to fire.
• BRAVO. PSG and his wingman prepare to fire.
2-159. Weapon or ammunition (optional). The weapon is not announced unless specific control
measures are required. Ammunition is not announced unless a specific type is dictated by the situation.
The TC selects ammunition based on the platoon SOP, the number and type of enemy targets, and the
supply status of ammunition (how much of each type is on hand).

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 Command and Control

2-160. Target description. This element briefly describes the target in terms of number, type, and
activity (“THREE TANKS MOVING EAST TO WEST”). If the target is stationary, the activity may be
omitted.
2-161. Orientation. Target location is described using one of two methods:
• Reference point or terrain feature. This method is used for most defensive engagements and
can also be applied to offensive situations. If the platoon leader designates separate targets for
each section, he assigns responsibility and clarifies target location in the orientation element.
For example: “ALPHA—TWO TANKS—TRP 3126—BRAVO—BMPs AND TROOPS—
ROAD JUNCTION.”
• Direction of target. This method is used most often in the offense when no TRP or definitive
terrain feature is near the target. Direction is indicated from the projected line of movement
(LOM) of the platoon in the offense or from the center of sector (COS) in the defense (for
example, “LEFT FRONT” or “RIGHT FLANK”). The clock option indicates direction starting
with the LOM or COS at 12 o’clock (for example: “TWO O’CLOCK;” “NINE O’CLOCK”).
The cardinal direction may also be used (for example: “NORTHWEST” or “SOUTHWEST”).
When using the direction method, the platoon leader will announce a range to help his TCs
locate the targets. Examples of this method: “RIGHT FRONT—ONE EIGHT HUNDRED” or
“TEN O’CLOCK—TWO FOUR HUNDRED.”
2-162. Control (optional). The platoon leader can use the control element to provide the platoon with
critical firing information in several areas, including the following:
• Fire pattern. The platoon leader may specify which pattern (frontal, cross, or depth) he has
selected based on his plan for fire distribution. As noted, if the control element is omitted, the
platoon engages targets using frontal fire. Refer to the discussion of fire patterns earlier in this
section.
• Firing technique. The platoon leader may designate which of the three firing techniques
(simultaneous, alternating, or observed) he wants to employ. If no technique is specified, all
tanks engage simultaneously. If the platoon leader wishes to designate a firing tank or section,
he specifies which tanks will fire in the alert element of the fire command. Refer to the
discussion of firing techniques earlier in this section.
• Ammunition or weapon. The platoon leader may designate the amount or type of ammunition
or weapons to be fired. For example, he might direct four bursts from the coax machine gun for
every two main gun rounds fired. (Note. This information may also be provided in the weapon
or ammunition element of the fire command. Refer to the discussion of that element.)
2-163. Execution. The execution element indicates when firing will begin. Normally, this is simply the
command “FIRE.” If simultaneous fire is desired or if the platoon’s fire is to be coordinated with other
direct or indirect fires, the execution element “AT MY COMMAND” is given first. The resulting delay
allows the coordination of all fires to be completed while the individual crews select their targets, issue
their own fire commands, and prepare to engage. If for any reason a tank is not prepared to fire (for
example, because it is conducting ammunition transfer or has experienced an equipment malfunction), the
TC informs the platoon leader or PSG immediately. The TC estimates and reports the time required for the
tank to become ready to fight.
2-164. As he prepares and issues the fire command, the platoon leader must remember that tanks have to
occupy hull-down positions before firing. A pro-word (for example, “TOP HAT”) can be used in the
execution element to signal this move.

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Chapter 2

Note. Once engagement of the enemy begins, the platoon leader controls fires by issuing
subsequent fire commands or individual elements of the fire command; this serves to focus and
distribute the fires of individual tanks, a section, or the entire platoon. Figure 2-31 illustrates an
example of a platoon fire command; note that the optional element specifying the weapon or
ammunition has been omitted. Refer to Figures 2-25 through 2-30 on pages 2-29 through 2-34
for examples of how fire commands are used to control and distribute fires in a number of
tactical situations. The engagement is terminated when all targets are destroyed or when the
platoon leader announces “CEASE FIRE.”

Alert “RED—
Target description THREE TANKS—
Orientation VICINITY TRP ZERO ZERO SIX—
Control (optional) CROSS—
Execution AT MY COMMAND—FIRE”
Figure 2-31. Example platoon fire command

FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL IN THE OFFENSE

2-165. While operating as part of a company team in the offense, a tank platoon conducts three types of
missions:
• Movement to contact.
• Attack (hasty or deliberate).
• Fire and movement. (Note. This mission has been called “advance in contact” in some previous
doctrinal and training publications, including FM 3-90.1 [FM 71-1].)
2-166. Although each of these missions is distinct and serves individual purposes, they all require
coordination of platoon fires (both direct and indirect) and movement, which are the components of the
tactical concept of maneuver. The major difference among the types of missions is the amount of
information about the enemy and preparation time available. Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a
detailed discussion of offensive operations.

FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL IN THE DEFENSE

2-167. The tank platoon is the basic firing unit in defensive operations; therefore, effective control of the
platoon’s fires is critical. Given the unknown number of enemy targets, each tank’s limited on-board
ammunition, and the logistical burdens of resupply, the platoon must make every round count. It must be
proficient in gunnery skills, have operational fire control systems that are ready for instant employment,
and know how to effectively maintain control of its fires during the fight. Refer to Chapter 4 of this
manual for a detailed discussion of defensive operations.

Defensive Fire Planning

2-168. When the platoon leader receives a defensive mission, he immediately analyzes it to determine
how his platoon can best accomplish its assigned objectives. He begins a backward planning process based
on the “defend not later than (NLT)” time specified in the company team OPORD. Establishing priorities
of tasks and managing the available time are critical steps in the process; failure in either of these areas is
likely to result in an uncoordinated effort that is doomed to failure.

Reconnaissance of the Engagement Area

2-169. Based on his knowledge of enemy doctrine or suspected enemy’s goals and the terrain and
weather, the platoon leader visualizes the enemy attacking through the engagement area. He then considers
how the enemy is likely to be equipped and what capabilities his platoon has to defeat the enemy.

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 Command and Control

2-170. If possible, the platoon leader, along with his TCs, physically inspects the ground where the
company team commander has directed him to orient his platoon to engage the enemy. Looking back
toward the BP, the platoon leader selects the platoon’s primary firing positions, alternate positions (50 to
100 meters from each tank’s primary position), and supplementary positions (to orient platoon fires into
another engagement area or TRP).
2-171. As the platoon leader walks the engagement area, he identifies dead space based on how the
enemy is expected to move through the area. He either adjusts the firing positions or plans indirect fires to
cover the dead space. He verifies grids using the GPS.

Firing Positions and Target Reference Points

2-172. The platoon leader then moves to the selected firing positions. He checks the positions for correct
orientation toward the engagement area and determines whether suitable TRPs are available. TRPs must
be visible through both daylight and thermal channels and should be visible to friendly elements only. If
existing terrain or man-made objects are inadequate, a field-expedient TRP must be constructed.

Note. Materials that can be used in constructing TRPs include target panels, heated with Class
VIII heating pads, and caliber .50 or 7.62-mm ammunition cans filled with charcoal or a mixture
of sand and diesel fuel.

2-173. The two main types of firing positions are defilade and keyhole. In defilade positions, tanks are
vulnerable from the flanks and to enemy overwatch fire. Keyhole positions (also called window positions)
provide greater protection by taking advantage of terrain features that create a “keyhole” around the
position. Ideally, the platoon should employ a combination of defilade and keyhole positions whenever
possible to take advantage of their respective advantages and negate their weaknesses.
2-174. Defilade positions. There are three types of defilade positions:
• Turret-down. A turret-down position uses terrain to mask most of the tank, with only the
highest parts of the vehicle (such as the GPS and CITV) exposed to the enemy. Targets cannot
be engaged with the main gun from this position, but can use the turret top mounted machine
guns.
• Hull-down. A hull-down position exposes only as much of the tank as needed to engage targets
with the main gun.
• Hide. The platoon leader may assign a hide position to the rear of the BP for each tank to
occupy after the initial preparation of its firing positions. The hide position serves two
purposes: A well-constructed, effectively camouflaged hide position may delay enemy
acquisition of the platoon; a hide position located away from the prepared position may protect
the platoon from the full effects of enemy artillery fires. (Locations of hide positions are terrain-
dependent, but they should offer cover and concealment.)
2-175. Keyhole positions. Keyhole positions afford the firing tank a measure of protection from enemy
overwatching fires (see Figure 2-33). They restrict observation, and thus limit vulnerability to only one
segment of the platoon’s engagement; therefore, only those targets that can be seen (and engaged) by the
tank can return fire on it. The platoon leader must select each keyhole position carefully so the ability to
interlock fires with other tanks in the platoon is not degraded. Moving into or away from the opening to
the position can vary the width of the field of fire. Weaknesses of keyhole positions are limited sectors of
fire and excessive dead space. In built-up areas, dismounted infantry should be used to provide protection
from infiltration.

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-33. Keyhole firing positions

Weapon Planning Range

2-176. The weapon planning range for a tank is the distance at which the platoon leader intends to begin
engaging enemy targets. In determining this range, he must know the lethality of the kinetic energy rounds
his crews will be firing versus the specific vulnerabilities of the enemy armor he expects to face. Lethality,
and as a result the weapon planning range, is based on the two factors known as probability of hit (PH) and
probability of kill (PK). While actual values of PH and PK are classified, it is obvious that PH decreases as
range increases, as does PK for kinetic energy penetrators. This is because velocity decreases with range;
penetration is largely dependent on velocity.
2-177. Evaluating and determining the planning range. With limited rounds available on board each
vehicle, the platoon leader must weigh the tactical alternatives and try to make every round count. A key
factor in determining the weapon planning range is METT-TC. The commander must consider the
capabilities and limitations of friendly forces as well as those of enemy troops. In addition, the planning
range for a tank cannot be separated from the number of rounds the platoon leader is prepared to expend.
While it is possible to hit an enemy tank at 3,000 meters, the probability of doing so on the first round is
low. Further, even when a hit is made, PK will be very low against turret frontal armor.
2-178. Taking into account these factors, the platoon leader will usually direct his TCs to engage targets
from closer ranges, especially in frontal engagements. Considering only PK, frontal tank engagements
should begin at less than 2,500 meters. Several factors combine to make frontal engagements of enemy
tanks beyond 2,500 meters only marginally effective. If the tactical situation permits, the optimum weapon
planning range against tanks in the frontal 60-degree arc is 1,500 meters. This can be extended with
recognition of degraded PH, of degraded PK against turret frontal armor, and of reduced kills per on-tank
load of ammunition. The planning range can also be reduced based on terrain, weather, and obscuration.
As noted, engagement of enemy fighting vehicles with lighter armor can begin at longer ranges based on

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 Command and Control

the increased PK; however, due to their smaller size, the PH for these vehicles will normally be lower than
that for tanks.

Note. Frontal engagements of enemy fighting vehicles with lighter armor can begin at longer
ranges; the PK is higher due to the difference in protection levels.

2-179. Further consideration on engagement range will be based on enemy capabilities and type of
equipment. Platoons may be faced with a full spectrum of equipment from converted civilian trucks, older
equipment upgrade with new sensors and capabilities, to high level state of the art equipment. Now the
platoon leader must not only understand how far his forces can see and shoot, but how far the enemy can
see and shot. The tank platoon is no longer in an environment where it can see or fire farther than the
enemy: it may even be faced with an enemy with superior equipment.
2-180. Long-range engagement considerations. When the decision is made to engage the enemy at
longer ranges, several additional planning factors must be considered. In choosing long-range
engagement, the platoon leader is almost certain to compromise his positions and loses the element of
surprise. At the same time, however, the forward placement of a platoon may deceive the enemy as to the
location of the main defensive position and cause the enemy to deploy sooner than he had planned. Long-
range engagements require the use of sensing tanks and observed fire techniques; as a result, the platoon
leader should always attempt to conduct them from an elevated firing position. He should task only his
most proficient firing crews and most accurate tanks to execute the long-range gunnery mission.

Note. Refer to FM 3-20.12 for an in-depth discussion of the training issues involved in
preparing crews for long-range engagements.

Final Planning Considerations

2-181. As he conducts his troop-leading procedures, the platoon leader mentally rehearses the battle.
After reconnaissance of the engagement area or sector, he gathers all the TCs (and gunners, if possible)
where they can view the area. He ensures that everyone can identify the assigned TRPs, obstacles, avenues
of approach, prominent terrain features, and dead space.
2-182. Using TRPs, terrain features, or man-made obstacles, the platoon leader ensures that each tank has
a well-defined and well-understood sector of fire. An individual tank sector should be wide enough to
allow some overlap with adjacent vehicles, but narrow enough to prevent overkill of targets. This reduces
the scanning requirements for the gunner and the potential for overkill; it also ensures that the entire
engagement area or platoon sector is covered by main gun fire. Based on the commander’s guidance, the
platoon leader also establishes the trigger line for initiation of the direct-fire fight and takes other actions
that are time- or space-dependent.
2-183. The platoon leader will decide whether to have all his tanks orient on the TRPs assigned by the
company team commander or to have sections or individual tanks orient in slightly different areas (platoon
level targets). For example, if the platoon leader is tasked to orient on TRP 006, he might decide on one of
the following missions for his subordinates, based on the enemy and terrain:
• All tanks orient on TRP 006.
• Alpha section orients to the left of TRP 006 while Bravo section orients to the right.
2-184. When the platoon leader decides how to use his tanks to best execute the company team
commander’s intent, he checks each firing position he has selected, identifying and confirming sectors of
fire to ensure he has mutual support between tanks. The platoon leader must know where friendly infantry
and combat support elements (such as air defense artillery [ADA]), if any, will be positioned. He must
then plan machine gun fires for each tank to protect itself as well as other tanks in the platoon and adjacent
friendly elements. He does this by assigning final protective fires (FPF), with the platoon using its coax
machine guns to fire on dismounted enemy infantry, and by planning for additional indirect fire support.

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Chapter 2

Preparing the Defense

2-185. When he completes his defensive fire planning, the platoon leader’s next step is to conduct
preparation activities. As detailed earlier, he has already oriented his TCs on the engagement area, TRPs,
and supplementary positions and has designated specific sectors of fire for each tank and each position.

Initial Preparation Activities

2-186. The platoon leader directs and oversees a variety of activities designed to ensure the most effective
positioning and preparation of his tanks on the ground. He must remember that if he fails to check an item,
or fails to have another leader check it when necessary; the platoon may not be ready for combat.
2-187. Ammunition prestock. If Class V prestock is available, the platoon leader or PSG determines a
location that is accessible to all platoon tanks. The platoon leader given the constraints of METT-TC will
develop and modify the plan for how the platoon will conduct resupply. Some examples would be
resupply by section (alpha then bravo), resupply one tank per section (odd number tanks then even number
tanks), or resupply one tank at a time. The location should provide cover and concealment for the tanks
while they are uploading the ammunition. The prestock site should be protected from indirect fires, either
by completely digging in the position and preparing overhead cover or by improving existing terrain. A
plan to recover or destroy the prestock is necessary to ensure it is not captured by the enemy.
2-188. Prepare-to-fire checks. When preparing for combat, the platoon leader ensures that crews have
completed their prepare-to-fire checks. Boresighting is one of the most critical tasks in preparing the tank
to kill the enemy. When the tactical situation permits, the platoon leader ensures that tanks are boresighted
daily and after major temperature changes (typically, in the morning, at midday, and at dusk). If a building
or some other man-made object is not available in the engagement area or the platoon is not carrying its
own boresight panel, the platoon leader must prepare a field-expedient target for boresighting. (Note. If
preparation time is limited, the platoon leader may direct the PSG to check prepare-to-fire activities.)

Sketch Cards
2-189. As each tank crew prepares its position, it completes a sketch card, a rough topographical sketch
of the tank’s assigned sector showing its deliberate or hasty defensive fighting position. The sketch card
aids the crew in target acquisition and enables the platoon leader to develop his platoon fire plan. The crew
makes two copies, one to keep and one to send to the platoon leader. Sketch cards are prepared either
traditionally (handwritten) or using the tank’s digital equipment (FBCB2). Refer to Chapter 4, pages 4-11
through 4-16 for additional information about sketch cards.

Platoon Fire Plan Development

2-190. The platoon leader compiles the individual tank sketch cards (by either traditional or digital
means), consolidates them, and develops the platoon fire plan. He then coordinates the fire plan with
adjacent platoons and adjusts the individual tank positions as necessary. An effective platoon fire plan
provides the entire platoon with the information necessary to distribute and control the fires of all available
direct fire and indirect fire weapons, both organic and attached. An important point is that development of
the platoon fire plan within the platoon, as at all levels of fire planning, is conducted from the top down.
Refer to Chapter 4, pages 4-15 and 4-16 for specific information about the platoon fire plan.

Rehearsals
2-191. During rehearsals for defensive operations, the platoon leader ensures the platoon practices the
platoon fire plan. It is absolutely critical that all crewmen understand the complete plan. Each TC must
know what actions he is required to execute at each point in the mission. Each gunner must understand
what his exact sector is and under what conditions engagement priorities will change. (Note. The gunners
on the platoon leader’s and PSG’s tanks should be the most experienced at their positions within the
platoon, capable of executing the plan without further guidance from their TCs. This frees the platoon
leader and PSG to fight the battle rather than spend too much time controlling their individual tanks.)

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Preparation Summary
2-192. The platoon leader must be resourceful and thorough in making sure all crews understand and can
execute the plan under all conceivable conditions. This includes planning, preparing, and conducting
rehearsals for supplementary and successive BPs that he has been directed to prepare. If time does not
permit all of these steps, he must prioritize his preparation activities.
2-193. The end product of the platoon leader’s fire planning and preparation is not merely a thorough,
accurate fire plan, although this is an indispensable component of the defense. To be successful in battle,
he must complete these phases of the defensive operation with tank crews that understand in detail what
they are supposed to do and a platoon that, as a package, is completely prepared to fight.

Executing the Defense

2-194. Once the platoon has completed fire planning and preparation activities, the platoon leader directs
execution of the defense. The following discussion covers a number of key considerations in the
distribution and control of fires during the execution phase.
Observation
2-195. When occupying a prepared defensive position, an observer may be dismounted to acquire targets
while the tanks are in turret-down or hide positions. When the platoon is alerted to targets in its sector, the
tanks move to turret-down, optics-up positions before the observer remounts his tank. A platoon in a hasty
defensive position will already be in a turret-down, optics-up position, and an observer will probably not
be deployed.
Initial Contact
2-196. When targets are identified, the platoon leader or PSG sends a contact or spot report (depending
on the enemy situation and time available) to the company team commander. The platoon leader issues a
fire command with “AT MY COMMAND” as a control element. At this time, TCs take the following
actions:
• Observe the target array and select the target(s) each tank must engage, as indicated by the fire
pattern given in the platoon fire command. (Note. If the fire command does not include a fire
pattern, tanks use the pattern specified in the platoon SOP; if the SOP is not applicable, they use
the frontal pattern).
• Issue a fire command to the crew, using the ammunition element prescribed by SOP and target
description indicated by the platoon fire command.
• Ensure that the gunner acquires and ranges to his first target.
Indirect Fire Support
2-197. While the individual crews select targets, determine ranges, and prepare to engage, the platoon
leader calls for indirect fire (if this responsibility has been assigned to him) and asks for time of flight. He
uses the time of flight to coordinate his fires so the indirect fire arrives at the same time, or just after, the
direct fires of his platoon. If the indirect fire arrives too soon, the enemy will increase speed, change
directions, or take other actions that may degrade the effects of the direct fires. The tank platoon leader has
the responsibility to request indirect fire support using the FBCB2 system first.
Engagement Procedures
2-198. On the command “FIRE,” each tank in the platoon moves to a hull-down firing position and
begins to engage. (Note. The platoon leader may move the platoon to hull-down positions by announcing
“TOP HAT, TOP HAT” before issuing the command to fire.) If a crew receives the command to fire
before it has completed all of its preparations, it must complete the preparations and fire as soon as
possible.
2-199. As the engagement proceeds, thorough planning and preparation helps the platoon to execute the
defense with minimal instructions. Aggressive use of indirect fires slows and confuses the enemy. Each

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Chapter 2

TC adjusts fire and switches targets in accordance with the platoon fire command or platoon SOP. The
commander and/or platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the
mission and other factors. As an example, defensive engagement priorities might be the following:
• Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs).
• Priority 2. Dangerous targets.
• Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas).
• Priority 4. Air defense assets.
• Priority 5. Engineer assets.
• Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles).
2-200. How long each tank can safely remain in a hull-down position will depend on the enemy situation.
Whenever possible, a tank should remain in position to kill enemy targets. Taking the time to move
between a turret-down position and a hull-down position, however, increases the enemy’s probability of a
hit because he will be closing on the tank’s position. If the enemy is within 2,000 meters, relatively
numerous, closing rapidly, and the mission requires a defense (as opposed to delay), a defending tank will
normally be more successful continuing to fire and not moving to his turret-down position. On the other
hand, if the enemy is stationary and/or has tanks or ATGMs in overwatch, the crew should fire no more
than two rounds before returning to a turret-down position. When the crew is not engaging enemy targets,
the tank should return to a turret-down position and provide observation or assistance to other tank crews.

Note. Similar considerations, problems, and criteria also apply to movement between primary
and alternate positions.

Contingencies
2-201. After direct fire has been initiated, platoon fire commands will be used only to cover previously
unanticipated contingencies. For example, the platoon leader might have one section engaging to the left
side of the sector and the other to the right after anticipating an enemy company deployed on line across
the platoon’s sector. If the entire enemy force arrives along the right side, use of a fire command gives the
platoon leader the flexibility to adapt his distribution of fires rapidly and economically to the new situation.
He issues the appropriate fire command to initiate the direct-fire fight.

Ammunition Transfer
2-202. Important considerations as the engagement continues are each tank’s supply of ready ammunition
and the related requirement for ammunition transfer. No tank should totally deplete its ready ammunition
before initiating the transfer of rounds from its semi-ready storage area. The loader must maintain a
running count of ready ammunition available and keep the TC informed of the tank’s ammunition status.
In turn, the platoon leader and PSG must monitor the status of their wingmen. In addition, because all four
tanks cannot transfer ammunition at the same time, the platoon leader must issue guidance on how and
when each tank will conduct the transfer.
2-203. As ready ammunition is depleted, each crew must be ready to transfer rounds. Based on the
platoon leader’s guidance, the tank backs into its hide position and completes ammunition transfer when
the situation allows. The platoon leader needs to ensure that if prestock is available, he takes advantage of
it during low points in the battle to keep his tanks as close as possible to full load of main gun ammunition.

Movement Out of a Defensive Position

2-204. Changes in the mission or battlefield situation may require the platoon to move out of a BP, either
to move to a successive position or to conduct another mission such as a delay.
2-205. Movement considerations. When the situation requires the platoon to move, the platoon leader
and his TCs must make sure the movement does not expose the flank or rear of their tanks to enemy fire. If
a concealed route out of the position is not available, the TC should mask the tank’s movement with terrain

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 Command and Control

before turning around. To accomplish this, he turns over control of the main gun and coax machine gun to
the gunner. He faces the rear and quickly guides the tank backward to a covered route by giving the driver
short commands (for example, “LEFT FAST” or “HARD RIGHT”). The gunner acquires, engages, and
adjusts fire on targets while the TC maintains command of the vehicle’s movement.

Use of Covering Smoke

2-206. The tank smoke systems can be used to screen the move when the unit is in contact. The TC may
use grenade launchers during initial movement, and then switch to the vehicle engine exhaust smoke
system (VEESS) after the tank has built up speed and momentum. The gunner uses battlesight gunnery
while the tank is obscured. He must use exhaust smoke judiciously; however, improper employment or
careless movement techniques may cause the tank to become silhouetted against its own smoke.

Note. If exhaust smoke prevents the crew from seeing where the tank is going and the tank is no
longer screened by the first salvo of smoke grenades, the TC should use a second salvo of
grenade-launched smoke.

CAUTION
VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use
of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.

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 Chapter 3
Offensive Operations

Offense is the decisive form of war. While tactical considerations may call for the
platoon to execute defensive operations for a period of time, defeat of the enemy
requires a shift to offensive operations. To ensure the success of the attack, the tank
platoon leader must understand the fundamentals of offense and apply troop-leading
procedures during the planning and preparation phases of the operation.

SECTION I - FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OFFENSE

PURPOSES OF THE OFFENSE

3-1. The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize an enemy force. Additionally,
offensive operations are undertaken to secure key terrain, gain information, deprive the enemy of
resources, deceive and divert the enemy, fix the enemy in position, disrupt his attack, and set the conditions
for successful future operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE

3-2. FM 3-0 describes the common characteristics of all offensive operations: surprise, concentration,
tempo, and audacity. To maximize the value of these characteristics, tank platoons must apply the
following considerations:

SURPRISE
3-3. Platoons achieve surprise by following OPSEC procedures and making the best possible use of
vehicle speed, covered and concealed routes, vehicle optics, firepower, and stand-off capabilities during
tactical movement.

CONCENTRATION
3-4. Platoons achieve concentration by massing the effects of their weapon systems without necessarily
massing platoon vehicles at a single location. Modern navigation and position location/reporting systems
allow the platoon leader to disperse his vehicles while retaining the ability to quickly mass the effects of
the platoon’s weapon systems whenever necessary. In addition, these advanced systems allow him to
maintain command, control, and OPSEC at all times. The platoon leader must remember that it is more
important to move using covered and concealed routes to positions from which the platoon can mass fires
and engage the enemy than it is to maintain precise formations and predetermined speeds.

TEMPO
3-5. Tempo, the rate of military action, can range from fast to slow. While a fast tempo is preferred, the
platoon leader must remember that synchronization sets the stage for successful platoon operations.
Leaders must understand the different rates of speed when comparing dismounted forces to mounted
forces. To support the commander’s intent, he must ensure that his platoon’s movement is synchronized
with the movement of other company or troop elements as well as with adjacent and supporting units. If
the platoon is forced to slow down because of terrain or enemy resistance, the platoon leader reports this
change so the commander can alter the tempo of company or troop movement to maintain synchronization.

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Chapter 3

AUDACITY
3-6. At the platoon level, audacity is marked by violent execution of the mission and a willingness to
seize the initiative. Knowledge of the commander’s intent two levels up allows the platoon leader to take
advantage of battlefield opportunities whenever they present themselves, enhancing the effectiveness of the
platoon’s support for the entire offensive operation.

FORMS OF OFFENSE
3-7. The four general forms of tactical offense described in FM 3-0 are movement to contact, attack,
exploitation, and pursuit. Characteristics include the following:
• Movement to contact is conducted to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact
with the enemy force.
• An attack is conducted to defeat, destroy, and neutralize the enemy, as well as seize and secure
terrain. The attack can be deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of planning time
available.
• An exploitation extends the destruction of the enemy by maintaining offensive pressure.
• A pursuit is conducted against a retreating enemy force and follows a successful attack to
complete the destruction of the enemy force.
3-8. The company can execute movements to contact and either hasty or deliberate attacks on their own;
the nature of these operations depends largely on the amount of time and enemy information available
during the planning and preparation phases. Companies execute an exploitation or pursuit as part of a
larger force.

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON

3-9. The tank platoon is an integral part of company team or troop maneuver. The platoon conducts
tactical movement, actions on contact, consolidation, and reorganization in support of higher operations. It
can destroy, fix, or bypass an enemy as required by the commander’s intent, the tactical situation, and the
rules of engagement.

WAR-FIGHTING FUNCTIONS
3-10. In conducting his planning and preparation for offensive operations, the platoon leader pays close
attention to the considerations applicable for the war-fighting functions, which are outlined in the
following discussion. The war-fighting functions, which help the platoon leader to logically organize his
thoughts to cover the mission, are the following:
• Movement and maneuver.
• Fire support.
• Intelligence.
• Protection.
• Sustainment.
• Command and control.

Note. Sections II and III of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation
phases of the offense are organized using the war-fighting functions in the order listed above.
Included in each section is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, focusing on
intangible, Soldier-related factors.

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 Offensive Operations

SECTION II - PLANNING
3-11. The planning phase begins when the platoon receives the higher WARNO or OPORD and ends
when the platoon leader issues his own OPORD or FRAGO. During this phase, the platoon leader
conducts troop-leading procedures as outlined in Chapter 2. In developing his OPORD or FRAGO, the
platoon leader must take into account the considerations applicable for the operating systems, which are
outlined in this section.
3-12. After he issues the WARNO, the platoon leader may initiate rehearsals of tactical movement, battle
drills, or breaching actions. These generic rehearsals allow the platoon to begin preparing for the mission.
Once the platoon leader completes his plan, the generic rehearsals are matched to the actual terrain and
anticipated actions on enemy contact.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

3-13. The platoon leader develops the platoon maneuver plan so that it matches the commander’s intent
and specific instructions and supports the company main effort. If working with light forces, the platoon
leader must understand the abilities of the light forces, and be able to explain his capabilities to a light
force commander. He determines the platoon’s route, movement technique, and formation based on his
AO (including terrain factors), the company scheme of maneuver, and the likelihood of enemy contact. He
pays particular attention to fields of observation and fire; these factors can help him to define potential
enemy engagement areas. The platoon leader war-games anticipated actions on contact and execution of
essential tasks. He also addresses actions on the objective and consolidation and reorganization.

DIRECT FIRES
3-14. The platoon leader identifies multiple attack-by-fire and support-by-fire positions along the direction
of attack from which the platoon can engage known or suspected enemy positions. He designates TRPs
and assigns sectors of fire, observation, and weapons orientation. He specifies platoon fire patterns (if
different from those identified by SOP) and addresses restrictions on direct fire imposed by the ROE for
the operation.

OBSTACLE TYPES
3-15. The platoon will encounter two types of obstacles, existing and reinforcing. The platoon leader can
expect the enemy to employ both types in executing his defensive plan.

Existing Obstacles
3-16. Existing obstacles are those that are present on the battlefield but were not emplaced through military
effort. They may be natural (such as streams, lakes, thick forests, and mountains) or cultural (towns or
railroad embankments).

Reinforcing Obstacles
3-17. These are obstacles that are placed on the battlefield through military effort to slow, stop, turn, or
canalize the enemy. Examples include minefields, wire, road craters, log cribs, and tank ditches.

BREACH PLANNING
3-18. The commander will designate each platoon to be part of the support force, the breach force, or the
assault force. The support force usually leads the company during movement and identifies the obstacle. It
then suppresses any enemy overwatching the obstacle. A tank platoon can conduct breach force operations
only if it is equipped with the assets required to breach the type of obstacle encountered; such assets
include demolitions, grappling hooks, rakes, mine plows, and mine rollers. The breach force is responsible
for creating, proofing, and marking a lane through the obstacle and for securing the far side. It then

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Chapter 3

suppresses remaining enemy forces as the assault force moves through the breach to continue the attack.
(See Chapter 5 of this manual for more information on breaching operations.)

FIRE SUPPORT
3-19. Most fire support planning is conducted at company level and higher. The platoon leader reviews
the plan to ensure that responsibilities for initiating, lifting, and shifting indirect fires are designated. As
necessary, he identifies additional indirect fire targets on known or suspected enemy positions and submits
recommendations to the company FIST. When working with light forces the platoon leader must ensure he
has an understanding of the fire support capability inherent within the light force structure. The platoon
leader evaluates and recommends the use of smoke to help conceal or obscure movement and suppress
likely enemy positions while the platoon is moving through danger areas; in addition, he evaluates the need
for illumination or smoke rounds for marking and/or to assist in navigation. See the discussion of
navigation in Chapter 2 of this manual.

INTELLIGENCE
ENEMY
3-20. Most analysis of the enemy situation and probable enemy COAs is done at the battalion and
company level; however, it is the platoon leader’s responsibility to understand how the enemy’s disposition
and possible COAs may affect the platoon’s area of operations and the accomplishment of its mission. The
platoon leader uses what is developed from higher, but must be able to conduct intelligence preparation of
the battlefield (IPB) refining information received from higher. The platoon leader identifies and plots on
his overlay all known and suspected enemy positions that affect his area of operations and identifies
indirect and direct fire range fans of enemy weapon systems. The enemy overlay for FBCB2 should also
be updated to include the latest enemy information.
3-21. The platoon leader then identifies terrain features or determines the standoff distance of friendly
weapon systems that will negate the effects of enemy weapons if possible. Next, he determines the
enemy’s most probable COAs. Using information from his own analysis and from higher headquarters, he
identifies anticipated contact situations. This process includes estimating whether the enemy will defend in
place, delay, or counterattack upon contact; when and where contact is most likely to be made; what type
and size of enemy force the platoon will face; and what is then the enemy’s intent. Finally, the platoon
leader must develop specific plans for the platoon’s actions against the enemy. Refer to the discussion of
enemy analysis in the explanation of troop-leading procedures in Chapter 2 of this manual.

TERRAIN
3-22. The platoon leader conducts a map reconnaissance and uses the factors of OAKOC, as discussed in
Chapter 2, to systematically analyze the terrain in his AO. He pays close attention to key terrain that could
support positions offering unobstructed observation and fields of fire. These are danger areas that can be
used by enemy or friendly forces when contact is made during the execution of the mission. This analysis
is followed by a ground reconnaissance, conducted with the commander as far forward as possible and as
extensively as time and security considerations permit. The ground reconnaissance covers the platoon’s
movement routes to the LD, routes to the objective, and the objective itself. The platoon leader should
check and record the time-distance factors to any SPs or to the LD.

PROTECTION
3-23. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the
commander can apply maximum combat power. Some of the tasks related to protection are:
• Air and missile defense. (Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of planning
considerations for air defense.)
• Countermobility/survivability.

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 Offensive Operations

• CBRN operations.
• Force protection/physical security.

Note. CBRN defensive operations are a critical consideration during offensive operations.
These are discussed in detail in Section V of this chapter (as part of the execution of battle
drills) and in Appendix E of this manual.

SUSTAINMENT
3-24. The platoon leader ensures that Soldiers are familiar with procedures for maintenance and medical
treatment and evacuation; these as outlined in paragraph 4 of the platoon OPORD or in the unit SOP. See
Chapter 7 of this manual for more details concerning sustainment operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-25. The platoon leader’s key function in this operating system is conducting troop-leading procedures.
Immediately after the company order is issued or during the company rehearsal, he should coordinate
unresolved issues with the other platoon leaders, the XO, and the company commander. The coordination
should specify routes, intervals, movement speed, orientations, fire control measures, and signals between
platoons. Coordination will be critical when working with light forces, or units that do not have a habitual
working relationship.

THE HUMAN ASPECT

3-26. The “human aspect” is a crucial factor in the success of any mission. Soldiers are the key to combat
power. They win battles; systems are only their tools. At the same time, Soldiers are human, with
repetitive and predictable physical and emotional needs. A leader who is 100-percent “mission first,” with
no considerations of this human dimension, will see his command degrade quickly. Success in combat
often depends more on the human aspect than it does on numerical and technological superiority.
3-27. Leaders in the tank platoon must strive at all times to ensure that their Soldiers are disciplined,
competent, and confident. They must also understand that Soldiers do not have an unlimited store of
morale and endurance; the constant exposure to the dangers and hardships of combat can drain the fighting
spirit. The guiding principle in handling the human aspect of operations is that leaders can tap their units’
full combat potential only when Soldiers are healthy physically, mentally, and spiritually. Every leader
must take all necessary actions to enhance his troops’ health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness to
fight.

SECTION III - PREPARATION

3-28. The preparation phase ends when the platoon crosses the LD and deploys for the attack. The platoon
leader takes into account the following war-fighting functions.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

3-29. Following the last company rehearsal, the platoon should conduct a final rehearsal of its own to
incorporate any adjustments to the company scheme of maneuver. The platoon rehearsal should follow the
procedures outlined in Chapter 2 of this manual.

STANDARDIZED DRILLS
3-30. If possible the platoon should develop standardized drills for the following that will allow the
platoon to operate in a near automatic mode. It should cover the following subjects:
• Movement from current positions.

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• Routes.
• Platoon and company formations and movement techniques.
• Vehicle positions within the platoon formation.
• Weapons orientation and fire control.
• Triggers.
• Actions on contact.
• Actions on the objective (consolidation and reorganization.)
• Reporting procedures.
• Signals.
• Breaching drills.
3-31. Actions at obstacles should be rehearsed during the preparation phase. Breaching equipment should
be checked durin PCCs and PCIs.

FIRE SUPPORT
3-32. During the rehearsal, the platoon leader should address responsibility for targets in the platoon AO.
He should cover any scheduled indirect fires and the effects of smoke on the battlefield. In addition, he
should discuss the direct-fire plan, with emphasis on platoon responsibilities, known and suspected enemy
locations, friendly unit locations, and applicable ROE.

INTELLIGENCE
3-33. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader will receive updated SPOTREPs listing known and
suspected enemy locations as well as the latest friendly actions. He should plot the updated enemy and
friendly locations on his overlay and on the enemy overlay (digital systems); based on his terrain
reconnaissance, he adjusts the maneuver plan accordingly. It is critical that the platoon has a standard
method of either the PSG or platoon leader relaying this information to the wing tanks to maintain
situational understanding for all crews.

PROTECTION
3-34. Air defense preparations during this phase should include a rehearsal of the react to air attack drill,
which is outlined in Section V of this chapter.

SUSTAINMENT
3-35. During the preparation phase, tank crews conduct resupply operations to replenish their combat
loads. They also perform preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on their vehicles and
equipment.
3-36. Rehearsals should cover aspects of the logistical plan that will support the upcoming operation,
including emergency resupply and personnel and vehicle evacuation procedures. For more information on
sustainment, refer to Chapter 7 of this manual.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-37. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader continues with his troop-leading procedures and
conducts rehearsals and inspections to ensure the platoon is ready for the upcoming operation. Near the
end of the phase, the platoon leader conducts a PCI of his Soldiers and equipment. The Soldier inspection
includes checking each crewman’s personal knowledge of the operation as well as the readiness of his
equipment. All Soldiers must understand the company and platoon schemes of maneuver. The equipment
inspection consists of checking each tank crew’s ability to move, shoot, and communicate. The inspection
should be as thorough as time permits; for a detailed PCI checklist, refer to ST 3-20.153. Rehearsals and
inspections are discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this manual.

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THE HUMAN ASPECT

3-38. Activities aimed at enhancing each Soldier’s health, morale, welfare, and readiness to fight continue
during the preparation phase. Additional discussion of the human dimension of operations is in Section II
of this chapter.

SECTION IV - EXECUTION—TACTICAL MOVEMENT

3-39. The company OPORD may specify company and platoon formations and techniques of movement.
This allows the commander to position his elements where they will optimize the company’s AO and
facilitate execution of his scheme of maneuver. The platoon leader must recommend a different formation
or technique of movement if a change will allow the platoon to more effectively contribute to the
accomplishment of the company mission and protection of the force. If no formation or technique of
movement is given in the order, the platoon leader selects the one that will make the most efficient use of
his AO and that will best support the company scheme of maneuver.

FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL IN THE OFFENSE

3-40. While operating as part of a company team in the offense, a tank platoon conducts three types of
missions:
• Movement to contact.
• Attack (hasty or deliberate).
• Fire and movement.

Note. The fire and movement mission has been called advance in contact in some previous
doctrinal and training publications, including FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).

3-41. Although each of these missions is distinct and serves individual purposes, they all require
coordination of platoon fires (both direct and indirect) and movement, which are the components of the
tactical concept of maneuver. The major difference among the types of missions is the amount of
information about the enemy and preparation time available.
OFFENSIVE FIRE PLANNING
3-42. It is critical to have a fire plan in the offense to reduce the chances of fratricide. It is not possible,
however, to develop fire plans in the offense in the same detail as in a defensive operation. As a result, the
platoon leader must take advantage of the available resources that make it easier for him to effectively
distribute the platoon’s firepower, such as advance planning, reconnaissance (including leader’s and map
reconnaissance), TRPs, platoon targets, and platoon SOPs.
3-43. Before beginning movement, the platoon leader plans how the platoon will engage known or
suspected enemy locations. He identifies and assigns sufficient TRPs and platoon targets to allow him to
adjust fields of fire quickly. In doing this, he considers tactical aspects of the operation, including—
• The mission to be accomplished.
• Enemy strengths and weaknesses.
• Likely or known enemy locations. (Note. The platoon leader will establish additional platoon
targets as the platoon moves during the operation.)
• Indirect fire support and smoke employment (preplanned targets).
• Friendly forces.
• Control measures, including phase lines, checkpoints, the LOA, and TRPs.
• The route.
• The movement technique.
• Section and individual tank sectors of responsibility.
• The operational status of platoon equipment.

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3-44. An important part of offensive fire planning is the assignment of overlapping sectors of fire for each
element in the platoon (see Figure 3-1). These sectors, also called sectors of responsibility, are covered in
the platoon SOP and are based on the formation and movement technique the platoon will use. During the
operation, as the situation requires, the platoon leader then adjusts the sectors he assigned initially. Factors
that may necessitate a change in sectors of fire include the following:
• Changes in terrain or visibility.
• Contact with previously unknown enemy positions.
• Use of fires or smoke to conceal or cover the platoon’s movement.
• The scheme of maneuver of adjacent units.

Figure 3-1. Example sectors of fire in a moving engagement (platoon moving in wedge
formation)

ENGAGING TARGETS
3-45. Once movement begins but before contact is made, the platoon leader maneuvers the unit to take full
advantage of his tanks, whose capabilities are maximized in the offense. Crews should stay aware of
visible TRPs and control points as they come into view. The platoon leader uses these to adjust sectors of
responsibility. He may also use the clock or cardinal direction method to designate sectors of
responsibility. As noted, he modifies assigned sectors of fire as necessary while the platoon is moving.
3-46. Each TC identifies the tank’s sector of fire for his gunner and then monitors the gunner’s target
search to make sure it covers the entire sector and does not stray beyond it. In addition, some offensive
situations may require the platoon to operate in an area where the line of sight between tanks in the
sections is interrupted by terrain or vegetation. The platoon leader and TCs must ensure that each crew
conducts a 360-degree search for air and ground targets and maintains effective communications with the
other tanks.

Moving Engagements
3-47. Most moving engagements begin with one tank in the platoon acquiring surprise targets. These
targets should be engaged immediately. The TC who makes first contact gives a contact report after he has
engaged a target. The other tanks may orient their gun tubes in the direction the tank in contact is firing,
but continue to maintain 360-degree security. The tanks do not change direction unless the platoon leader
orders an action drill; they scan and return fire on additional targets.
3-48. When targets are identified, the platoon leader or PSG sends a contact or spot report (depending on
the enemy situation and the amount of time available) to the company team commander. The commander

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and/or platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the mission and other
factors. As an example, offensive engagement priorities might be the following:
• Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs).
• Priority 2. Dangerous targets.
• Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas).
• Priority 4. Air defense assets.
• Priority 5. Engineer assets.
• Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles).
3-49. After initial contact, the platoon leader controls the platoon fires by issuing fire commands and
additional instructions as appropriate. He keeps the company team commander informed while developing
the situation.

Developing the Situation

3-50. One platoon will normally attack while one or more platoons provide overwatch. The platoon leader
should adjust his tanks’ sectors based on the current or last known enemy positions. Even while attacking,
the platoon must maintain a 360-degree watch for attacking aircraft and targets that may appear between its
position and that of the overwatching element. If overwatching elements are not available, the platoon may
be directed to conduct bounding overwatch.

USE OF TERRAIN FOR COVER AND CONCEALMENT

3-51. While moving, the platoon uses terrain to provide cover and concealment, employing the following
rules:
• Do not move forward from an overwatch position or BP. Back away from your position and go
around on the low ground.
• Stay on low ground as much as possible. Moving on top of ridgelines and over hilltops will
silhouette (skyline) platoon vehicles.
• Scan the ground for disturbed earth, out-of-place features, and surface-laid mines. These are
indicators of an obstacle or minefield.
• Select the formation and movement technique that will maximize the platoon’s AO while
minimizing gaps and dead space.
• If your move is being covered by an overwatch element, remember that the overwatch element
cannot cover all of the platoon’s gaps and dead space.
• If the move is being overwatched, also keep in mind that the distance of each move (or bound)
must not exceed the direct-fire range of the overwatch element.
• Always plan actions at danger areas. If necessary, direct the TC or loader to dismount and either
observe around blind spots or check the trafficability of a route or defile before the tank moves
over or through these locations.

TECHNIQUES OF MOVEMENT
3-52. The commander or platoon leader selects a technique of movement based on several battlefield
factors:
• The likelihood of enemy contact.
• The availability of another element to provide overwatch for the moving element.
• The terrain over which the moving element will pass.
3-53. In open terrain, such as deserts, one company will normally overwatch the movement of another
company. In close terrain, such as rolling hills or countryside, platoons will normally overwatch other
platoons. In restricted terrain, such as mountains, forests, or urban areas, a tank section will rely on
another tank section or dismounted infantry to overwatch movement.

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3-54. The tank platoon must be able to employ any of the following techniques of movement:
• Traveling. Characterized by continuous movement of all elements, traveling is best suited to
situations in which enemy contact is unlikely and speed is important.
• Traveling overwatch. Traveling overwatch is an extended form of traveling that provides
additional security when contact is possible but speed is desirable. The lead element moves
continuously. The trail element moves at various speeds and may halt periodically to overwatch
the movement of the lead element. The trail element maintains dispersion based on its ability to
provide immediate suppressive fires in support of the lead element. The intent is to maintain
depth, provide flexibility, and sustain movement in case the lead element is engaged.
• Bounding overwatch. Bounding overwatch is used when contact is expected. It is the most
secure, but slowest, movement technique. Bounding may be no greater than one-half the
weapon’s planning range. This allows the overwatch section to have effective fires forward of
the bounding section. There are two methods of bounding:
• Alternate bounds. Covered by the rear element, the lead element moves forward, halts,
and assumes overwatch positions. The rear element advances past the lead element and takes up
overwatch positions. The initial lead element then advances past the initial rear element and
takes up overwatch positions. Only one element moves at a time. This method is usually more
rapid than successive bounds. (Refer to Figure 3-2.)

Figure 3-2. Movement by alternate bounds

• Successive bounds. In this method, the lead element, covered by the rear element,
advances and takes up an overwatch position. The rear element advances to an overwatch
position abreast of the lead element and halts. The lead element then moves to the next position,
and so on. Only one element moves at a time, and the rear element avoids advancing beyond the
lead element. This method is easier to control and more secure than the alternate bounding
method, but it is slower. (Refer to Figure 3-3.)

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Figure 3-3. Movement by successive bounds

FORMATIONS
3-55. Formations are used to establish tank positions and sectors of responsibility during tactical
operations. They facilitate control; alleviate confusion, and increase protection, speed, and the
effectiveness of fires.
3-56. Formations are not intended to be rigid, with vehicles remaining a specific distance apart at every
moment. The position of each tank in the formation depends on the terrain and the ability of the wingman
driver to maintain situational understanding in relation to the lead tank. At the same time, individual tanks
should always occupy the same relative position within a formation. This will ensure that the members of
each crew know who is beside them, understand when and where to move, and are aware of when and
where they will be expected to observe and direct fires. Weapons orientation for all tanks should be
adjusted to ensure optimum security based on the position of the platoon in the company formation.
3-57. The following paragraphs and illustrations describe the six basic movement formations the platoon
will use.

Note. In these examples, vehicle numbers are used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the
field, the location and sequence of vehicles in the formation will be prescribed in the platoon
SOP and/or the OPORD. The tactical situation will also influence vehicle location.

COLUMN
3-58. The column formation provides excellent control and fire to the flanks, but permits less fire to the
front (see Figure 3-4). It is used when speed is critical, when the platoon is moving through restricted
terrain on a specific route, and/or when enemy contact is not likely.

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-4. Column formation

STAGGERED COLUMN
3-59. The staggered column formation is a modified column formation with one section leading and one
section trailing to provide overwatch (see Figure 3-5). The staggered column permits good fire to the front
and flanks. It is used when speed is critical, when there is a limited area for lateral dispersion, and/or when
enemy contact is possible.

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 Offensive Operations

Figure 3-5. Staggered column formation

WEDGE
3-60. The wedge formation permits excellent firepower to the front and good firepower to the flanks (see
Figure 3-6). It is employed when the platoon is provided with overwatch by another element and is
moving in open or rolling terrain. Depending on the platoon location within the company formation, the
platoon leader and PSG (with wingmen) can switch sides of the formation. When the platoon leader’s tank
is slightly forward, one flank has more firepower.

Figure 3-6. Wedge formation

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Chapter 3

ECHELON
3-61. The echelon formation permits excellent firepower to the front and to one flank (see Figure 3-7). It
is used to screen an exposed flank of the platoon or of a larger moving force.

Figure 3-7. Echelon formation

VEE
3-62. The vee formation provides excellent protection and control, but limits fires to the front (see Figure
3-8). This formation is used when terrain restricts movement or when overwatch within the platoon is
required.

Figure 3-8. Vee formation

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LINE
3-63. The line formation provides maximum firepower forward (see Figure 3-9). It is used when the
platoon crosses danger areas and is provided with overwatch by another element or when the platoon
assaults enemy positions.

Figure 3-9. Line formation

COIL AND HERRINGBONE

3-64. These formations are employed when the platoon is stationary and 360-degree security is essential.
Coil
3-65. When it is operating independently, the platoon uses the coil formation to establish a perimeter
defense during extended halts or lulls in combat (see Figure 3-10). The lead vehicle will halt his vehicle in
the direction of travel (12 o’clock) while the other vehicles position themselves to form a circular
formation covering all suspected enemy avenues of approach.

Figure 3-10. Coil formation

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Chapter 3

Herringbone
3-66. The herringbone formation is used when the platoon must assume a hasty defense with 360-degree
security while remaining postured to resume movement in the direction of travel (see Figure 3-11). It is
normally employed during scheduled or unscheduled halts in a road march. If terrain permits, vehicles
should move off the route and stop at a 45-degree angle, allowing passage of vehicles through the center of
the formation.

Figure 3-11. Herringbone formation

OVERWATCH
3-67. Overwatch is the tactical mission in which an element observes and provides direct fire support for a
friendly moving element. Situational understanding is a crucial factor in all overwatch missions, whose
objective is to prevent the enemy from surprising and engaging the moving unit.
3-68. The overwatch force must maintain communications with the moving force and provide early
warning of enemy elements that could affect the moving force. It also scans gaps and dead space within
the moving element’s formations. If the overwatch is unable to scan dead space and engage the enemy, it
must alert the moving element of the lapse in coverage. The overwatch must also be able to support the
moving force with immediate direct and indirect fires.
3-69. The overwatch element can be either stationary or on the move. Figure 3-12 suggests what to look
for and where to look during an overwatch mission.

Note. While the main function of overwatch is to provide early warning and/or timely
supporting fires for a moving element, overwatch crews must also maintain 360-degree
observation and security for themselves.

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Figure 3-12. Overwatch locations and techniques

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Chapter 3

STATIONARY OVERWATCH
3-70. The section or platoon occupies hull-down firing positions that provide effective cover and
concealment, unobstructed observation, and clear fields of fire. (Note. Firing positions are discussed in
Chapter 4 of this manual.)
3-71. The section or platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. Individual crews aggressively scan their sectors
using applicable search techniques to identify enemy positions. They employ all available sights, including
the thermal channel (using various polarities) and daylight channel of the gunner’s primary sight,
binoculars, PVS-7s, and CITV. (Note. See FM 3-20.12 for a discussion of search techniques.)
3-72. The overwatch element scans the area of operations of the moving element, paying close attention to
gaps and dead space. If contact is made, the overwatch element initiates a high volume of direct and
indirect suppressive fires; it moves as necessary between primary and alternate positions to avoid being
decisively engaged.

OVERWATCH ON THE MOVE

3-73. The trail section or platoon maintains a designated location in the formation. It continuously scans
the lead element’s area of operations, closely monitoring gaps and dead space. The trail element maintains
an interval dictated by the capabilities of its weapon systems and the effects of terrain. As needed, it can
execute a short halt on key terrain to provide more effective overwatch.

SECTION V - EXECUTION—ACTIONS ON CONTACT

3-74. In both offensive and defensive operations, contact occurs when any member of the platoon observes
enemy personnel or vehicles, observes or receives direct or indirect fire, or encounters any situation that
requires an active or passive response to the enemy. This includes reports of enemy contact through the
chain of command or from an adjacent friendly element. The platoon initiates actions on contact when it
recognizes one of the defined contact situations or on order from higher headquarters.
3-75. As discussed in Section II of this chapter, the platoon leader should use the planning process to
anticipate the actions on contact that the platoon may be required to execute based on the enemy situation.
The platoon can then rehearse these potential actions during the preparation phase of the operation.
3-76. The commander’s OPORD will assist the platoon leader in two ways. The most important thing the
platoon leader must understand is the commander’s intent. Understanding the commander’s intent allows
the platoon leader to execute without constant supervision and also in the event that the enemy situation
changes during the mission. The commander’s scheme of maneuver will direct the platoon leader in
planning how to kill the templated or anticipated enemy force. The scheme of maneuver will define the
platoon’s role in maneuver and direct fire as part of the company or task force plan. The commander’s
coordinating instructions should specify for the platoon leader the actions on contact that, based on the size
and activity of the anticipated enemy force, are related to the maneuver plan. These specific instructions
may include engagement criteria, bypass criteria, displacement criteria, and the COAs the commander
expects to employ. By learning and planning for these details in advance, the platoon leader will be able to
develop contact situations rapidly and determine the most effective COA.

THE FOUR STEPS OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT

3-77. The following four steps allow the platoon leader to execute actions on contact using a logical, well-
organized decision-making process:
• Deploy and report.
• Evaluate and develop the situation.
• Choose a COA.
• Execute the selected COA.

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3-78. The four-step process is not a rigid, lockstep response to the enemy contact. Rather, the goal is to
provide an orderly framework that enables the platoon to survive the initial contact, and then apply sound
decision-making and timely actions to complete the operation. In simplest terms, the platoon must react
instinctively and instantly to the contact, and the platoon leader must decide, with equal dispatch, whether
to execute a preplanned battle drill or COA or to recommend and execute an alternate drill or action.
3-79. At times, the platoon leader, and the platoon, will have to execute several of the steps
simultaneously. This makes thorough preparation an absolute requirement in contact situations. To ensure
the platoon functions as a team, reacting correctly and yet instinctively, the platoon leader must establish
SOPs and conduct comprehensive training and rehearsals covering each step.

DEPLOY AND REPORT

3-80. The platoon leader deploys the platoon when he recognizes one of the general categories of initial
contact or receives a report of enemy contact. No matter how thoroughly the platoon leader prepares for an
operation, direct contact with the enemy is still a possibility, usually as a result of chance contact. In all
types of operations, contact occurs when an individual soldier, squad, or section of the platoon encounters
any situation that requires an active or passive response to the threat. These situations may entail one or
more of the following eight forms of contact:
• Visual contact (friendly elements may or may not be observed by the enemy).
• Physical contact (direct fire) with an enemy force.
• Indirect fire contact.
• Contact with obstacles of enemy or unknown origin.
• Contact with enemy or unknown aircraft.
• Situations involving CBRN conditions.
• Situations involving electronic warfare tactics (such as jamming, interference, and imitative
deception).
• Situations involving nonhostile elements (such as civilians).
3-81. When the platoon makes contact with the enemy, it responds according to the circumstances of the
situation. This covers a range of actions that correspond to the nature of the contact. Most critically, if the
contact entails enemy antitank fire, the platoon in contact returns fire immediately. Tanks returning fire
alert the rest of the platoon with a contact report (see ST 3-20.153 for report formats).
3-82. The platoon leader has several choices in deploying the platoon. In many cases, he will initiate one
of the seven battle drills. This is usually a contact or action drill, with the platoon attempting to acquire
and engage the enemy. (Note. Refer to the discussion and illustrations of the battle drills in this section of
this chapter.) The platoon leader can also order his tanks to immediately seek the best available covered
and concealed position. The position should afford unobstructed observation and fields of fire and allow
the platoon to maintain flank security. Tank crews also seek cover and concealment in the absence of a
deployment order from the platoon leader.
3-83. This step concludes with the platoon leader or PSG sending a contact report to the commander,
followed as soon as possible by a SPOTREP.

EVALUATE AND DEVELOP THE SITUATION

3-84. While the platoon deploys by executing a battle drill or occupying a covered and concealed position,
the platoon leader must begin to evaluate and develop the situation. His primary focus is on determining
and/or confirming the size (inferior or superior), composition (available weapon systems), activity, and
orientation of the enemy force. He analyzes how obstacles and terrain in the area of operations will affect
enemy and friendly capabilities and possible COAs. The platoon leader uses SPOTREPs from the TCs,
other platoon leaders, the company commander, and the XO to make his evaluation.
(Note. Because the tank platoon usually operates as part of a company team or cavalry troop, additional
infantry, scout, or tank platoons will usually be available to assist the commander and platoon leader in
developing and confirming the enemy situation.)

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Chapter 3

3-85. There are no hard and fast rules for determining the superiority or inferiority of an enemy; the result
is dependent on the situation. An inferior force is defined as an enemy element that the platoon can destroy
while remaining postured to conduct further operations. A superior force is one that can be destroyed only
through a combined effort of company- or combined arms battalion-level combat and CS assets.
3-86. The platoon leader bases his evaluation on the enemy’s capabilities, especially the number of lethal
weapon systems the enemy force is known to have, and on the enemy’s current activity. Lethality varies;
the enemy may employ rapid-fire antitank weaponry, slow-firing wire-guided systems, or dismounted
Soldiers with automatic weapons. Likewise, enemy activity can range from an entrenched force using
prepared fighting positions to a unit conducting refueling operations with little security.
3-87. After making contact and evaluating the situation, the platoon leader may discover that he does not
have enough information to determine the superiority or inferiority of the enemy force. To make this
determination, he can further develop the situation using a combination of techniques, including maneuver
(fire and movement), reconnaissance by direct and/or indirect fire, and dismounted surveillance. In such a
situation, however, the platoon leader must exercise caution, ensuring that his actions support the
commander’s intent. Mission accomplishment and the survivability of the platoon are crucial
considerations. Once he develops the situation sufficiently, the platoon leader sends an updated SPOTREP
to the commander.

CHOOSE A COURSE OF ACTION

3-88. Once the platoon leader develops the situation and determines that he has enough information to
make a decision, he selects a COA that both meets the requirements of the commander’s intent and is
within the platoon’s capabilities. He has several options in determining the COA:
• Direct the platoon to execute the original plan. The platoon leader selects the COA specified by
the company commander in the OPORD.
• Based on the situation, issue FRAGOs to refine the plan, ensuring it supports the commander’s
intent.
• Report the situation and recommend an alternative COA based on known information in
response to an unforeseen enemy or battlefield situation.
• Direct the platoon to execute tactical movement (employing bounding overwatch and support by
fire within the platoon) and reconnaissance by fire to further develop the situation and gain the
information the platoon leader needs to clarify a vague battlefield picture.

Considerations in Choosing a COA

3-89. Because he will have little time for analysis, the platoon leader develops a clear understanding of the
available COAs during the planning phase. The platoon leader can then evaluate various responses to
possible enemy actions during the planning phase, in the company rehearsal, and in information war
gaming and rehearsals with the platoon.
3-90. If a predetermined COA is not the best option, the platoon leader analyzes the commander’s intent.
In most cases, the commander identifies the criteria for anticipated actions on contact in terms of the
enemy’s capabilities (that is, whether the enemy is a superior or inferior force). The commander specifies
criteria for destroying, fixing, and bypassing the enemy, as well as the applicable disengagement criteria.
Based on the commander’s intent and these criteria, the platoon may develop a new COA.
3-91. Refinements to the original plan or development of a new COA may change the scheme of
maneuver. In most situations, the intent of maneuver is to gain positions of advantage over the enemy,
forcing him to fight in two directions. One element moves to the position of advantage while another
element overwatches and supports.
3-92. If necessary, the platoon leader should issue a revised set of graphic control measures as part of the
FRAGO. Examples include waypoints to assist in navigation along desired routes to a position of
advantage and TRPs to help the platoon orient weapons and fires.

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Use of Platoon Tasks as COAs

3-93. During execution of actions on contact, the platoon collective tasks described in Section VI of this
chapter are available as COAs. These include—
• Destroy an inferior force.
• Attack by fire.
• Overwatch/support by fire.
• Assault.
• Bypass.
• Reconnaissance by fire.
• Hasty defense.
• Breach.
3-94. If the commander’s plan has already addressed the situation adequately, the platoon leader directs the
platoon to execute the specified task or COA. If the situation dictates adjustments to the plan, he can
recommend an alternative COA to the commander.

EXECUTE THE SELECTED COURSE OF ACTION

3-95. If contact is anticipated and falls within the commander’s original scheme of maneuver, the platoon
executes as directed in the OPORD. If the situation dictates a change to the scheme of maneuver specified
in the original plan, however, the platoon leader must recommend a new COA to the commander. If the
commander concurs, he directs the platoon to execute the new COA. The platoon leader cross-talks with
other platoon leaders, as necessary, to obtain support in accordance with the commander’s intent.
3-96. More information will become available as the platoon executes the COA. The platoon leader and/or
PSG keep the company commander abreast of the situation with SPOTREPs and SITREPs; accuracy of
these reports is critical because the task force commander and S2 use them to confirm or deny the
situational template.
3-97. Key information the commander needs includes the number, type, and location of enemy elements
the platoon has observed, engaged, destroyed, or bypassed. Additionally, the platoon leader must inform
the commander of the platoon’s current location (or that he is moving to or set at a particular location).
Finally, he must inform the commander of any changes in the platoon’s combat power or logistical status.
3-98. Based on details of the enemy situation, the platoon leader may have to alter his COA during
execution. For example, as the platoon maneuvers to destroy what appears to be a lone enemy tank, it
discovers six more tanks in prepared fighting positions; in this situation, the platoon leader would inform
the commander and recommend an alternate COA, such as an attack by fire against the enemy tank
company. (Figures 3-14A through 3-14D on pages 3-23 and 3-24 illustrate a similar situation in which
changes to the COA become necessary.)
3-99. The platoon continues to execute the selected or refined COA until it accomplishes the original
mission, receives a FRAGO from the commander changing the mission or COA, or is ordered to execute
consolidation and reorganization on the objective.

EXAMPLES OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT

3-100. The following examples illustrate actions on contact for two potential situations. The illustrations
are organized to show the four-step process for executing actions on contact.

ACTIONS ON CONTACT WITH AN ANTICIPATED INFERIOR FORCE

3-101. Figures 3-13A and 3-13B illustrate actions on contact when the platoon encounters an inferior
enemy force. In this case, the commander and platoon leader anticipated contact with such a force and
planned for actions on contact by including possible COAs in their OPORDs and/or rehearsals.

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-13A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys using an action drill, and reports

Figure 3-13B. Platoon develops the situation

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ACTIONS ON CONTACT WITH AN UNANTICIPATED SUPERIOR FORCE

3-102. Figures 3-14A through 3-14D illustrate actions on contact when the platoon unexpectedly
encounters a superior enemy force.

Figure 3-14A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys, and reports

Figure 3-14B. Platoon executes a battle drill; platoon leader evaluates the situation as the drill
is executed

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-14C. Platoon develops the situation and identifies a superior enemy force

Figure 3-14D. Platoon leader chooses and recommends an alternate COA; platoon executes
the new COA

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 Offensive Operations

BATTLE DRILLS
3-103. When the tank platoon makes contact with the enemy, the platoon leader usually initiates a battle
drill. Drills can be initiated following reports or observation of enemy activity or ordered upon receipt of
enemy fires.
3-104. Battle drills provide virtually automatic responses to situations in which the immediate, violent
execution of an action is vital to the platoon’s safety or its success in combat. Drills allow the platoon
leader to protect the platoon from the effects of enemy fires, quickly mass the platoon’s combat power and
fires, or move the platoon to a position of advantage over the enemy.
3-105. Drills are standardized collective actions, executed by each tank crew with minimal instruction and
without application of a deliberate thought process. They can be carried out under almost any type of
battlefield conditions and from any formation or technique of movement, although execution can be
affected by the factors of METT-TC.
3-106. The platoon can expect to execute any of the following standard battle drills:
• Change of formation drill.
• Contact drill.
• Action drill.
• React to indirect fire drill.
• React to air attack drill.
• React to a nuclear attack drill.
• React to a chemical/biological attack drill.
3-107. Commanders and leaders at all levels must be ready to augment or adjust these seven basic drills
based on the enemy, terrain, and ROE. In addition, they must ensure their platoons rehearse battle drills
until they are able to execute the drills perfectly no matter what command and control problems arise.

Note. In the figures that accompany the following discussion of the seven battle drills, vehicle
numbers are used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the field, the location and sequence of
vehicles during the drill will be prescribed in the platoon SOP, OPORD, or tactical situation.

CHANGE OF FORMATION DRILL

3-108. This drill is executed to accomplish a rapid change of formation in response to a change in terrain
or enemy situation. The platoon leader must ensure that each TC knows the new formation and the relative
position of each tank in the new formation. He uses visual signals and/or the radio to initiate the drill.
Figure 3-15 illustrates the movement of individual tanks during a change of formation from column to
wedge to line.

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-15. Change of formation drill

CONTACT DRILL
3-109. The contact drill enables the platoon to orient weapon systems and engage an enemy without
changing its direction or speed of movement along the axis of advance. This drill is used when contact is
made with small arms fire, non-armor-defeating weapons, or when the platoon sights the enemy without
being engaged and does not want to stop or slow its movement. The platoon leader initiates the contact
drill using visual signals and/or the radio. Over the radio, he uses the contact report format and adds the
execution element “FIRE” as a platoon fire command.
3-110. Figure 3-16 illustrates a contact drill from a wedge formation. Note the main gun orientation for
wingman Tank 2. If a tank’s weapon systems are masked by another tank, the masked tank maintains
weapons orientation and flank security as prescribed in the OPORD; this helps to prevent fratricide.

Figure 3-16. Contact drill

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 Offensive Operations

ACTION DRILL
3-111. The action drill permits the entire platoon to change direction rapidly in response to terrain
conditions, obstacles, FRAGOs from the commander, or enemy contact. The platoon leader uses visual
signals or the radio to order the action drill, which can be initiated with or without enemy contact.
Action Drill Without Enemy Contact
3-112. The platoon leader can execute an action drill to avoid a danger area or obstacle or to respond to
FRAGOs from the commander. When the platoon leader initiates the action drill, tanks come on line and
continue to move in the prescribed direction unless the platoon leader directs a change of formation.
Figures 3-17A through 3-17C illustrate tanks’ relative positions during various action drills without
contact.

Figure 3-17A. Action drill without enemy contact

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-17B. Action drill without enemy contact (continued)

Figure 3-17C. Action drill without enemy contact (continued)

Action Drill With Enemy Contact

3-113. Following a contact report alerting the platoon that enemy contact involves antitank weapon
systems, the platoon leader can direct an action drill to orient his platoon’s frontal armor toward the
antitank fire while moving to cover and concealment. If the platoon cannot reach a covered and concealed
position or achieve weapon standoff, the platoon leader directs the platoon to assault the enemy. Figures 3
18A through 3-18D illustrate examples of action drills in reaction to enemy contact.

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 Offensive Operations

Figure 3-18A. Action drill with enemy contact

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-18B. Action drill with enemy contact (continued)

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 Offensive Operations

Figure 3-18C. Action drill with enemy contact (continued)

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-18D. Action drill with enemy contact (continued)

REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE DRILL

3-114. When the platoon receives unexpected indirect fire, it moves out of the impact area, unless it is
also engaged in direct fire contact or is directed to remain stationary. TCs place their hatches in the open
protected position; other crewmen close their hatches. Crews also close ballistic doors. Gunners will
begin scanning with the gunner’s auxiliary sight (GAS). M1A2 and M1A2 SEP crews move the
commander’s independent thermal viewer (CITV) to the shielded position (do not stow it as it will require
time to cool down and function again when turned back on). Crew members mask based on the automatic
masking criteria established in the OPORD or if they suspect the use of chemical agents. The platoon
leader sends a SPOTREP to the commander.
3-115. If the platoon is moving when it receives suppressive artillery fire, it executes an action drill to
avoid the impact area or increases speed to move to clear the impact area and continue the mission (see
Figure 3-19). If it is stationary, the platoon should attempt to clear the impact area. (Note. Several factors,
such as the commander’s orders or the enemy situation, may prevent the platoon from moving during
direct-fire engagements or defensive operations. For example, the commander may require the platoon to
occupy hide or turret-down positions while continuing the mission. In such a case, the platoon leader must
request permission from the commander before clearing the impact area.) Once the platoon clears the

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artillery impact area, individual crews place their hatches in the appropriate position, open ballistic doors
(M1A2 and M1A2 SEP crews scan with CITV), check antennas, and return to positions or continue the
mission.

Figure 3-19. React to indirect fire drill

3-116. The commander should address the platoon’s reaction to anticipated indirect fires in the actions on
contact subparagraph of the OPORD. When the platoon receives anticipated indirect fires, it reacts
according to the commander’s guidance. It is important to note the different drills conducted by mounted
forces and light forces, and address the differences. If the platoon needs to execute a COA different from
that directed by the commander, the platoon leader should request permission from the commander before
executing the alternate action.

REACT TO AIR ATTACK DRILL

3-117. When the platoon observes high-performance aircraft, helicopters, or unmanned aircraft system
(UAS) that could influence its mission, it initially takes passive air defense measures unless the situation
requires immediate active measures. In a passive air defense, the platoon disperses or stops, to avoid
detection altogether and/or to minimize the aircraft’s target acquisition capability. The platoon also
prepares for active air defense measures. (Note. When the platoon is operating as part of a company team
or troop, tank crews must be familiar with required actions in the company-level battle drill.) Passive air
defense involves three steps:
• Step 1. Alert the platoon with a contact report.
• Step 2. Deploy or take the appropriate actions. If the platoon is not in the direct path of an
attacking aircraft, the platoon leader orders tanks to seek cover and concealment and halt with at
least a 100-meter interval between vehicles; the platoon also may be ordered to continue moving
as part of the company.

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Chapter 3

• Step 3. Prepare to engage. TCs and loaders get ready to engage the aircraft with machine-gun
and/or main-gun fire on order of the platoon leader.
3-118. If the platoon leader determines that the platoon is in the direct path of an attacking aircraft, he
initiates the active react to air attack drill, which entails these actions:

• Step 1. The platoon initiates fire. The primary intent is to force aircraft to take self-defense
measures that alter their attack profile and reduce their effectiveness. The platoon leader may
use a burst of tracers to designate an aim point for platoon machine gun antiaircraft fires (see
Figure 3-20). Volume is the key to effectiveness of these fires; tanks throw up a “wall of steel”
through which aircraft must fly. The main gun is effective against hovering attack helicopters.
The platoon leader may also direct some vehicles to engage high-performance aircraft with
multipurpose antitank (MPAT) main gun rounds.
• Step 2. Tanks create a nonlinear target by moving as fast as possible at a 45-degree angle away
from the path of flight and toward attacking aircraft (see Figure 3-21). The platoon maintains an
interval of at least 100 meters between tanks, forcing aircraft to make several passes to engage
the entire platoon.
• Step 3. Tanks move quickly to covered and concealed positions and freeze their movement for
at least 60 seconds after the last flight of aircraft has passed.
• Step 4. The platoon leader sends a SPOTREP to update the commander.

Figure 3-20. Machine gun aim points

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 Offensive Operations

Figure 3-21. Evading enemy aircraft

REACT TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK DRILL
3-119. When the platoon observes a brilliant flash of light and a mushroom-shaped cloud, crew members
must act quickly to minimize the effects of a nuclear detonation. This drill involves the following four
steps:
• Step 1. Take immediate protective actions, including the following:
• If mounted, close hatches and close the breech and ballistic doors (M1A2 and M1A2 SEP
crews stow the CITV). If time permits, position the vehicle behind a protective terrain feature,
and turn off the master power until the effects of the blast have passed.
• Dismounted crewmen drop to the ground and cover exposed skin until blast effects have
passed.
• Step 2. Implement SOPs and accomplish related actions in the following areas:
• Reestablish communications.
• Prepare and forward a (nuclear, biological, and chemical) NBC-1 report.
• Implement continuous monitoring.
• Submit a SITREP to the commander.
• Step 3. Reorganize the platoon, taking the following actions:
• Evacuate casualties and fatalities.
• Redistribute personnel as needed.
• Conduct essential maintenance.
• Step 4. Continue the mission.
REACT TO A CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL ATTACK DRILL
3-120. The platoon initiates this drill during an operation whenever an automatic masking event occurs,
the chemical agent alarm sounds, M8 detection paper indicates the presence of chemical agents, or a
Soldier suspects the presence of chemical or biological agents. (Note. Refer to Appendix E of this manual
for more information on CBRN operations.) This drill involves the following four steps:
• Step 1. Crewmen recognize and react to the hazard, taking these actions:
• Put on protective mask (and hood) within 15 seconds.
• Alert the remainder of the platoon and company.
• Button up and/or activate the tank overpressurization system.
• Conduct decontamination, as necessary.

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Chapter 3

• Within 8 minutes, assume MOPP 4 (refer to the discussion in Appendix E).

• Step 2. Implement SOPs in these areas:
• Administer self-aid and buddy-aid to crewmen with symptoms of chemical/biological agent
poisoning (see Appendix E).
• Ensure individual crewmen decontaminate their skin.
• Conduct operator’s spraydown and decontamination of equipment as necessary.
• Initiate continuous monitoring with M256/M256A1 detection kits, and submit NBC-1 and
follow-up reports as needed.
• Step 3. Continue the mission.
• Step 4. Monitor for chemical/biological agents; as the situation warrants, initiate actions to
reduce MOPP levels and discontinue agent monitoring. (Note. See Appendix E for additional
information.)

Note. If the M256/M256A1 detection kit records a negative reading inside an overpressurized
M1A1, M1A2, or M1A2 SEP tank, the crew can initiate unmasking procedures.

SECTION VI - EXECUTION—PLATOON TACTICAL TASKS

3-121. The commander may direct the platoon to execute the collective tactical tasks described in this
section as part of the company’s planned scheme of maneuver. He will cover employment of the tasks in
the company OPORD. In addition, the platoon can use the tactical tasks as COA when it executes actions
on contact (refer to the discussion in Section V of this chapter).

DESTROY AN INFERIOR FORCE

3-122. To maintain the tempo of an attack, the commander may order the platoon to destroy an inferior
force, based either on his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader. The platoon leader
usually employs maneuver techniques (fire and tactical movement) in executing this task or COA. When
the platoon is in contact with the enemy, he designates one section to overwatch or support by fire to
suppress and/or destroy the enemy while the other section moves.
3-123. The moving element uses appropriate movement techniques as well as covered and concealed
routes to move to a position of advantage over the enemy. This position may offer dominating terrain that
allows the platoon to attack enemy positions by direct fire, or it may provide covered routes that enable the
section to close with and assault the enemy.
3-124. After the platoon leader designates the route to the next possible overwatch position, the
overwatch leader identifies graphic control measures and assigns responsibility for suppression of
identified enemy positions. Cross-talk among sections and vehicles is important in ensuring mutual
support while the overwatch is providing supporting fires during the other section’s movement to the
position of advantage.
3-125. After successfully destroying the inferior enemy force, the platoon positions itself where it can
most effectively prepare for subsequent actions. Figures 3-22A and 3-22B illustrate two potential
situations in which a platoon is ordered to destroy an inferior force.

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 Offensive Operations

Figure 3-22A. Scenarios for destruction of an inferior enemy force

Figure 3-22B. Scenarios for destruction of an inferior enemy force (cont.)

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Chapter 3

ATTACK BY FIRE
3-126. The commander may order the platoon to execute this task, either as specified in his original plan
or on recommendation of the platoon leader. The task is to destroy the enemy using long-range fires from
dominating terrain or using standoff of the main gun. The platoon can use an attack by fire to destroy
inferior forces when the platoon leader does not desire to close with the enemy or when the platoon is part
of a company-level effort. In addition, the platoon may occupy an attack-by-fire position as part of a
company-level hasty defense with the goal of destroying a superior force.
3-127. In executing this task, the platoon uses tactical movement to move to a position that allows it to
employ weapon standoff or that offers cover for hull-down firing positions. It also must be ready to move
to alternate firing positions for protection from the effects of enemy direct and indirect fires.
3-128. As time permits, the platoon leader designates TRPs and assigns sectors of fire and tentative firing
positions for individual tanks. He issues a platoon fire command specifying the method of fire, firing
pattern, and rate of fire the platoon must sustain to accomplish the task in support of the company.
3-129. A successful attack by fire destroys the enemy force. Figures 3-232A and 3-23B illustrate attack-
by-fire situations.

Figure 3-23A. Platoon employs attack by fire against a convoy

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 Offensive Operations

Figure 3-23B. Platoon uses attack by fire against an enemy reconnaissance platoon as part of
a hasty defense

OVERWATCH/SUPPORT BY FIRE
3-130. Either as specified in his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the
commander may order the platoon to provide overwatch or support by fire during the movement of a
friendly force. The purpose is to suppress the enemy using long-range direct and indirect fires from a
dominating piece of terrain or using the standoff of the main gun. This support sets the conditions that
allow moving (supported) friendly elements to engage and destroy the enemy.
3-131. The techniques involved in occupying an overwatch or support-by-fire position and in focusing
and controlling fires are similar to those for an attack by fire. Some specific considerations exist, however.
As noted, the overwatch/support-by-fire task is always tied directly to the movement and/or tactical
execution of other friendly forces. In executing overwatch or support by fire, the platoon must maintain a
high level of situational understanding relative to the supported force so it can lift and shift direct and
indirect fires as required to prevent fratricide. Throughout this type of operation, the supporting platoon
maintains cross talk with the moving force on the company net. In addition to reducing fratricide risk,
cross talk allows the platoon to provide early warning of enemy positions it has identified and to report
battle damage inflicted on the enemy force.
3-132. A successful overwatch/support-by-fire operation suppresses the enemy, permitting the moving
(supported) force to conduct tactical movement, breaching operations, or an assault. Figure 3-24 illustrates
a support-by-fire situation in support of an assault.

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-24. Platoon supports by fire to suppress an enemy element during a company
assault

ASSAULT
3-133. The commander may direct the platoon to execute an assault, either on its own or as part of a
larger assault force. The purpose of the assault is to seize key terrain or to close with and destroy the
enemy while seizing an enemy-held position. Designation of the platoon as the assault force may be made
as part of the commander’s original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader.
3-134. The platoon usually assaults the enemy while receiving supporting fires from an overwatch
element. If supporting fire is not available, the platoon conducts tactical movement to a position of
advantage over the enemy, and then conducts the assault. A successful assault destroys the enemy
elements or forces them to withdraw from the objective.
3-135. To prepare for the assault, the assault force occupies or moves through an assault position. This
should be a predetermined covered and concealed position that provides weapon standoff from the enemy.
The platoon leader receives updated enemy information from support-by-fire elements. He assigns targets
or weapons orientations and confirms the axis of advance and the LOA for the assault. On order, the
platoon assaults on line, moving and firing as quickly as possible to destroy the enemy and seize the
objective.
3-136. The assault must be extremely violent. If the platoon assaults buttoned up, machine gun fire from
the support force or wingman tanks can provide close-in protection against dismounted enemy elements on
the objective. If tanks are unbuttoned, the TCs and loaders use personal weapons, hand grenades, and
machine guns to provide close-in protection.
3-137. Following a successful assault, the assault force occupies a defensible position, either on the
objective or on the far side of it, and begins consolidation and reorganization procedures. Figures 3-25A
and 3-25B illustrate two assault situations.

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Figure 3-25A. Tank section assaults an inferior force as another section supports by fire

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-25B. Platoon executes an assault as two other platoons support by fire

BYPASS
3-138. As part of his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the commander may order
the platoon to bypass the enemy to maintain the tempo of the attack. This COA can be taken against either
an inferior or superior force. The commander may designate one platoon to suppress the enemy, allowing
the other platoons to use covered and concealed routes, weapon standoff, and obscuration to bypass known
enemy locations. (Note. Units may have to execute contact drills while conducting the bypass.)
3-139. Once clear of the enemy, the supporting platoon hands the enemy over to another force, breaks
contact, and rejoins the company. If necessary, the platoon leader can employ tactical movement to break
contact with the enemy and continue the mission; he can also request supporting direct and indirect fires
and smoke to suppress and obscure the enemy as the platoon safely breaks contact. See Figures 3-26A and
3-26B for an example of a bypass.

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Figure 3-26A. Bypass

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-26B. Bypass (continued)

RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE
3-140. Based on his original plan or a recommendation from the platoon leader, the commander may
direct the platoon to execute reconnaissance by fire when enemy contact is expected or when contact has
occurred but the enemy situation is vague. The platoon then conducts tactical movement, occupying
successive overwatch positions until it makes contact with the enemy or reaches the objective.
3-141. At each overwatch position, the platoon leader may designate TRPs. He then either requests
indirect fires or employs direct fires on likely enemy locations to cause the enemy force to return direct fire
or to move, thus compromising its positions. He directs individual tanks or sections to fire their caliber .50
and/or coax machine guns into targeted areas. (Note. In some situations, main-gun fire can also be used.)
3-142. Individual tanks and sections not designated to reconnoiter by fire observe the effects of the firing
tanks and engage enemy forces as they are identified. Focus of the reconnaissance by fire is on the key
terrain that dominates danger areas, on built-up areas that dominate the surrounding terrain, and on wooded
areas not yet cleared.

Note. A disciplined enemy force may not return fire or move if it determines that the pattern or
type of fires employed will be nonlethal. The platoon leader must analyze the situation and
direct the use of appropriate fires on suspected positions. For example, he would use small-arms
fire against suspected dismounted elements but employ main guns to engage bunkers or other
fortified positions.

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HASTY OCCUPATION OF A PLATOON BATTLE POSITION (HASTY

DEFENSE)
3-143. The platoon may use this task if it is fixed or suppressed by enemy fire and no longer has the
ability to move forward or bypass. It may also set up a hasty defense when the enemy executes a hasty
attack. The platoon maintains contact or fixes the enemy in place until additional combat elements arrive
or until it is ordered to move. When the platoon must conduct a hasty defense, the commander has
responsibility for continuing to develop the situation.

BREACHING OPERATIONS
3-144. When they expect to make contact with enemy obstacles, the commander and platoon leader must
plan and rehearse actions at an obstacle, tailoring their preparations to templated locations for the expected
obstacles. They must ensure the platoon knows how to accomplish early detection of both anticipated and
unexpected obstacles and how to react instinctively when contact is made.
3-145. A critical consideration is that the tank platoon has only limited ability to deal independently with
an obstacle or restriction. If it is equipped with mine plows or other breaching assets, the platoon can
create track-width lanes through most wire, mine, and other reinforcing obstacles. The commander and
platoon leader must keep in mind, however, that the platoon cannot internally accomplish all of the
SOSRA elements of the breach (suppress the enemy; obscure the breach; secure the far side; reduce the
obstacle; and assault through the obstacle). Refer to the discussion of breaching operations, including
SOSRA procedures, in Chapter 5 of this manual.
3-146. When tanks encounter an unexpected obstacle, crew members must assume that the enemy is
covering the obstacle with observation and fire. They must immediately seek cover and establish an
overwatch to evaluate the situation. The overwatch tanks scan for evidence of enemy forces in and around
the obstacle and on dominant terrain on the far side of the obstacle. They attempt to locate a bypass so the
operation can continue without delay. If no bypass is found, the overwatch determines the dimensions of
the obstacle and sends a report to the commander so he can designate a COA.

Note. It is critical that the tank platoon initially remain under cover while evaluating the
situation. The platoon must NEVER attempt to approach the obstacle area or breach the
obstacle without first killing or obscuring enemy elements overwatching the obstacle.

3-147. If he needs to develop the situation further, the commander ideally will use scouts or infantry to
reconnoiter the obstacle, with the tanks continuing to provide overwatch. This usually requires him to
move mounted or dismounted elements to the far side. If this reconnaissance locates a bypass route, the
commander often will order the unit to execute a bypass as the preferred COA. If a bypass is not possible,
he may order a breaching operation, with the tanks either executing an in-stride breach within their
capabilities or supporting a deliberate breach.
3-148. Deliberate breaching operations are conducted at the company or higher level and require engineer
augmentation. The HBCT has one engineer company for mobility support that is capable of establishing,
proofing, and marking two lanes through a complex wire and mine obstacle. Tank platoons generally
operate in support of deliberate breaching operations by overwatching engineer forces, providing
suppressive fires, and/or assaulting to the far side of the obstacle to establish a foothold. Tank platoons
may also be called upon to serve as a breaching or proofing force if BCT assets are unavailable or disabled.

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Chapter 3

SECTION VII - EXECUTION—CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION

3-149. The platoon executes consolidation and reorganization on the objective to ensure that it is
prepared to destroy an enemy counterattack or is prepared to resume the attack as soon as possible.

CONSOLIDATION
3-150. Consolidation consists of actions taken to secure an objective and to defend against an enemy
counterattack. The company commander designates platoon positions and weapons orientations. The
platoon takes these steps:
• Eliminate remaining enemy resistance and secure detainees.
• Establish security and coordinate mutual support with adjacent platoons.
• Occupy positions on defensible terrain as designated in the OPORD or FRAGO. Tanks move to
hull-down positions, and the platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. If the location designated in
the OPORD/FRAGO is not defensible, the platoon leader notifies the commander and searches
for terrain that is defensible and supports the commander’s intent. The platoon leader informs
the commander of the new location.
• Execute procedures for a hasty defense to prepare for possible counterattacks (see Chapter 4 of
this manual for details on hasty defense).

REORGANIZATION
3-151. Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is normally accomplished by
SOP. Responsibilities during reorganization include the following:
• TCs take these actions:
• Reload machine guns and redistribute main gun ammunition to ready areas.
• Move crewmen who are wounded in action (WIA) to a covered position and provide first
aid.
• Send a SITREP to the PSG reporting casualties and supply status of equipment,
ammunition, and fuel.
• Conduct essential maintenance.
• The PSG takes these actions:
• Compile SITREPs from TCs and, as required by unit SOP, submit a consolidated report to
the platoon leader or 1SG.
• Direct cross-leveling of supplies within the platoon.
• Oversee evacuation of casualties.
• Coordinate the movement of detainees to the detainee collection point.
• The platoon leader takes these actions:
• Forward a consolidated SITREP to the commander.
• Redistribute personnel as necessary to maintain combat readiness.
• Oversee consolidation of Soldiers who have been killed in action (KIA).
• Reestablish communications with elements that are out of contact.

Note. SITREPs are sent using voice or digital format (or a combination). Refer to ST 3-20.153
and unit SOPs for additional information.

SECTION VIII – LIMITED VISIBILITY OPERATIONS

3-152. Units conduct limited visibility operations for various reasons, such as to achieve surprise against
the enemy or gain a position of advantage by means of stealth. Darkness obviously has the most dramatic

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effect on the ability of Soldiers to see the battlefield. There are, however, other conditions that restrict
visibility; the most common are the following:
• Dust, smoke, and other obscuration factors caused by weapon firing and movement of Soldiers
and equipment.
• Weather conditions, including rain, snow, fog, and blowing sand and dust.
3-153. If it is to use its superior technology and basic combat skills to sustain continuous operations and
destroy the enemy, the tank platoon must train to fight effectively in all types of visibility conditions. The
platoon must first master the execution of tasks under optimum visibility conditions and then continue its
training in progressively more difficult situations.

EQUIPMENT
3-154. The tank platoon is equipped with the following types of equipment for use in limited visibility
conditions:
• Driver’s night-vision viewer. This sight is either passive (the vehicle visualization system
(VVS)-2/driver’s vision enhancer [DVE]) or thermal (the driver’s thermal viewer [DTV]). It
enhances the driver’s ability to move the tank and enables him to assist in target acquisition and
to observe rounds in darkness or other limited visibility conditions.
• PVS-7. This passive-vision device enables the TC to observe from his opened hatch to control
movement and provide close-in security. There are normally two PVS-7s per tank.
• Gunner’s primary sight and commander’s extension. This integrated thermal sight gives the
gunner and TC the capability to see and engage targets under almost any visibility condition.
• CITV. This is a fully integrated, full-target engagement sight on the M1A2. It provides the TC
with a redundant target acquisition and surveillance capability equivalent to that of the gunner’s
primary sight and the TIS. The CITV extends the TC’s field of view, giving him 360-degree
observation capability independent of the gunner’s primary sight.

NAVIGATION
3-155. The platoon leader uses the GPS and/or POSNAV (if available), terrain association, and the
compass and odometer method to navigate in limited visibility conditions. When they are fired to create a
ground-burst effect, artillery or mortar illumination rounds can be helpful in confirming locations. Refer to
Chapter 2 of this manual for a detailed discussion of navigation techniques.

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION
3-156. The problem of vehicle identification is compounded in limited visibility conditions. TCs must be
able to distinguish vehicles of their platoon and company/troop and of other friendly elements from those
of the enemy. Most unit SOPs cover vehicle marking and identification procedures. In addition, the
platoon can use the following techniques to enhance command and control and to help prevent fratricide
(see also Appendix F, this FM, for information about fratricide prevention):
• Attach color-coded lights or chemical lights to the rear of the turret or the hull.
• Replace the brake light cover with color-coded plastic.
• Use luminous or thermal tape to “outline” vehicles or to make battle boards.
• Use radio and digital systems (if available) to provide the platoon with frequent updates of
friendly unit locations.

TACTICAL MOVEMENT AND ATTACKS

3-157. The fundamentals for executing tactical movement and attacks discussed elsewhere in this manual
are applicable during periods of limited visibility. The following paragraphs cover additional
considerations for the planning, preparation, and execution of these operations when visibility is restricted.

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Chapter 3

PLANNING
3-158. During the planning phase, the platoon leader must pay particular attention to routes, formations,
and navigational aids. He must conduct a thorough reconnaissance to identify locations where the platoon
could become disoriented. The reconnaissance must also focus on finding rough or restricted terrain that
will be even more difficult to negotiate with limited visibility. Such terrain may require a change in
formation or movement technique or employment of dismounted ground guides.

PREPARATION
3-159. In the preparation phase, the platoon leader conducts rehearsals in as many types of adverse
conditions as possible to prepare the platoon for potential command and control problems. He must stress
light discipline. During PCCs and PCIs, the platoon leader or PSG views each tank using a passive sight to
ensure that sources of light have been dimmed or covered so they are not visible to the enemy. During
confirmation briefs and rehearsals, the platoon leader must ensure that all personnel understand the
platoon’s projected actions during each phase of the operation. One technique is to designate waypoints or
phase lines as trigger points for platoon actions.

EXECUTION
3-160. During the execution phase, TCs use the PVS-7 and the CITV (if available) to assist their drivers
with navigation and to enhance situational understanding. The platoon leader must assume that the enemy
possesses the same limited visibility observation capabilities as friendly units. Use of terrain to mask
movement and deployment remains critical since limited visibility may create a false sense of protection
from observation. During movement, the distance between platoon vehicles is reduced to allow vehicles to
observe each other and to decrease the time necessary to react to enemy contact.
3-161. When the platoon encounters enemy elements, an effective technique is to have the vehicle that
makes contact fire a steady burst of machine gun fire in the direction of the enemy to orient the rest of the
platoon. The platoon must adhere strictly to applicable control measures, especially those covering the
employment of direct fires and maintain strict situational understanding of friendly force locations.

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 Chapter 4
Defensive Operations

The immediate purpose of any defensive operation is to defeat an enemy attack.

Military forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Additionally,
defensive operations are undertaken for purposes that include the following:
• To gain time.
• To hold key terrain.
• To fix the enemy so friendly forces can attack elsewhere.
• To erode enemy resources at a rapid rate while reinforcing friendly operations.

SECTION I - FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE

4-1. FM 3-0 describes several characteristics of an effective defense: preparation; security; disruption,
mass, and concentration; and flexibility. To optimize these characteristics in the defense, the tank platoon
leader must consider the factors examined in the following discussion.

PREPARATION
4-2. The critical element affecting preparation is time management, beginning with receipt of the
WARNO, OPORD, or FRAGO. Effective use of the available time allows the platoon leader to conduct a
thorough reconnaissance of engagement areas, BPs, displacement routes, and the axis for possible
counterattacks. Section III of this chapter describes preparation at the platoon level in detail.

SECURITY
4-3. The OPSEC measures discussed in Appendix D of this manual will assist the platoon leader in
maintaining security during the planning, preparation, and execution of the defense. The platoon leader
must integrate his security plan with that of the company or troop. He enhances the platoon’s early
warning capability by identifying potential mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and then
positioning early warning devices and OPs to cover these avenues.

DISRUPTION, MASS, AND CONCENTRATION

4-4. Augmenting the platoon’s direct fires with reinforcing obstacles and indirect fires is a key step in
disrupting enemy operations. Platoons achieve mass and concentration by maximizing the number of tanks
that can fire into an engagement area or that can move from primary positions to alternate and
supplementary positions to concentrate fires on the enemy.

FLEXIBILITY
4-5. The platoon leader contributes to the flexibility of company or troop operations by developing a
thorough understanding of the company/troop plan, including on-order and be-prepared missions. He must
be alert to any possible contingencies that have not been addressed by the commander. During the
preparation phase of the defense, the platoon increases flexibility by conducting thorough reconnaissance
and mounted rehearsals of all possible plans. A crucial indicator of platoon flexibility is the ability to

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Chapter 4

move quickly under all battlefield conditions, between primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting
positions as well as subsequent BPs.

DEFENSIVE PATTERNS, MISSIONS, AND TASKS

4-6. The two patterns described in FM 3-0 are mobile and area defenses. A mobile defense is executed to
destroy the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to
counterattack by a mobile reserve. The focus of area defenses is on retention of terrain; defending units
engage the enemy from an interlocking series of positions and destroy him, largely by direct fires. In
support of mobile and area defenses, a company team may be tasked to execute one or more of these
missions and tasks:
• Defend BPs.
• Defend in sector.
• Defend a strongpoint.
• Counterattack.
• Screen.
• Delay.
• Execute a reserve mission.
• Withdraw.

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON

4-7. Tank platoons participate in the company team or troop defense by performing one or more of the
following operations:
• Defend a BP.
• Displace.
• Counterattack.
• Perform reserve missions.
4-8. When defending a BP, the platoon may be tasked to destroy, block, or canalize enemy forces; to
retain terrain; or to displace to occupy subsequent BPs based on the commander’s intent. In a
counterattack or reserve mission, the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to occupy BPs or attack-by
fire positions; it executes hasty attacks, assaults, or other actions on contact based on the commander’s
intent for the counterattack.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
4-9. In conducting planning, preparation, and execution of defensive operations, the platoon leader must
pay close attention to the considerations applicable for the war-fighting function (WFF), which help him to
logically organize his thoughts to cover the mission. The WFFs are the following:
• Movement and maneuver.
• Fire support.
• Intelligence.
• Protection.
• Sustainment.
• Command and control.

Note. Sections II and III of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation
phases of the defense, are organized using the WFFs in the order listed above. Included in each
section is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, focusing on intangible, Soldier-related
factors.

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 Defensive Operations

SECTION II - PLANNING
4-10. The planning phase of a defensive operation is a continuous process that begins when the platoon
leader receives the higher order (WARNO, FRAGO, or OPORD). It ends when the platoon leader issues
his own OPORD or FRAGO. Planning may continue into the preparation phase as the platoon gains more
information through the plan of the higher headquarters and from further reconnaissance and rehearsals.

RECONNAISSANCE AND TIME MANAGEMENT

4-11. The keys to a successful, coordinated platoon defense that is effectively integrated into the company
or troop scheme of maneuver are reconnaissance and efficient time management during the planning phase.
Whether time permits a thorough ground reconnaissance or only a quick map reconnaissance, it is critical
that the platoon leader understand where the commander wants to kill the enemy. It is also essential
that he identify platoon sectors of fire and tentative platoon BPs, as well as TRPs that define the
company/troop engagement area.
4-12. Ideally, the platoon leader takes part in two reconnaissance operations during the planning phase.
He is normally part of the commander’s reconnaissance, along with the XO, other platoon leaders, the
FIST, and the 1SG. The platoon leader’s own reconnaissance includes his TCs and PSG.
4-13. During the commander’s reconnaissance, the platoon leader must identify, record, and mark the
tentative TRPs, fighting positions, and routes he thinks the platoon will use in executing the defense. It is
important for him to have sufficient day and night marking materials such as engineer stakes and tape,
chemical lights, or thermal paper. He records the eight-digit grid coordinates of each position; this will
allow him to provide precise locations that the platoon can use in navigation or orientation. Ideally, the
platoon leader can record positions electronically, using a hand-held GPS or the POSNAV system; if
neither is available, he must rely on his map-reading skills to manually identify and record accurate
position locations.

WAR-FIGHTING FUNCTION CONSIDERATIONS

4-14. As planning progresses, it is important that the platoon leader make a careful evaluation of the
considerations outlined in the following discussion, which is organized using the WFF.

MANEUVER AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-15. The platoon leader must understand the company or troop plan and triggers; he develops his plan
based on these factors as well as the commander’s intent. The commander normally determines
operational considerations such as OPSEC, occupation of firing positions, initiation of direct fires, primary
and supplementary platoon sectors of fire, and disengagement criteria; however, he may allow the platoon
leader to make decisions covering some or all of these areas.
4-16. The primary concern in selecting fighting positions is the platoon’s ability to concentrate and mass
lethal fires into its sectors of fire. Whenever possible, primary and alternate fighting positions should
allow engagement of the enemy in the flank and from two directions. Supplementary fighting positions are
planned to allow the platoon to defend against enemy forces that penetrate adjacent platoon positions or
that move along additional avenues of approach for which the commander has assumed risk. Dispersion
among fighting positions reduces vulnerability of platoon vehicles to enemy fires; however, dispersion
increases the demands for local security in the area between vehicles.
4-17. Ideally, the platoon will occupy hull-down firing positions as the enemy crosses the direct-fire
trigger line. The trigger line should optimize weapon standoff, while the firing positions and the
designated firing pattern should be selected to create the opportunity for flank engagements.

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Chapter 4

Note. Primary and alternate fighting positions are oriented on the same sectors of fire.
Supplementary fighting positions orient on different sectors of fire (see Figure 4-1). Subsequent
BPs are oriented on sectors of fire along the same avenue of approach as the primary/alternate
positions. Supplementary BPs are oriented on sectors of fire along different avenues of
approach (see Figure 4-2).

Figure 4-1. Fighting positions

Figure 4-2. Battle positions

FIRE SUPPORT
4-18. The platoon leader posts targets on his overlays (in both traditional and digital format). Although
most fire support planning is done by the company or troop FIST, the platoon leader can, if necessary,

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 Defensive Operations

provide the FIST with nominations for additional targets for inclusion in the company fire support plan.
As these targets are approved, the platoon leader plots them on his overlays. If a target is disapproved, he
notes its grid coordinates so he can, if needed, submit a speedy call for fire using the grid method. See
Chapter 6 of this manual for methods of transmitting calls for fire.
4-19. The platoon leader should plan and request artillery targets on potential avenues of approach, at
choke points along the avenues of approach, at possible enemy support by fire positions, at obstacles, and
in dead space within the platoon’s AO. He should also be prepared to request a mix of smoke and dual-
purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) rounds in front of his BP to disrupt an enemy assault
or behind his BP to help the platoon disengage from the enemy.
4-20. Each artillery target should have a trigger line overwatched by at least a crew or section. The trigger
line triggers the call for fire on a target to ensure that the impact of the rounds coincides with the enemy’s
arrival. The platoon’s laser range finders or target designation capabilities (on digitally equipped tanks)
enhance its effectiveness in requesting artillery fires using trigger lines. The location of the trigger line is
based on the enemy’s expected rate of advance over the terrain, the time of flight of the rounds, and the
priority of fires. The company or troop FIST should assist in determining all trigger points.
4-21. The platoon leader should plan and coordinate mortar targets on dismounted avenues of approach.
In addition, because mortar smoke is generally more responsive than smoke delivered by FA, he may be
able to gain a tactical advantage by employing mortar support in certain situations. Mortars should be the
platoon leader’s first choice as indirect fire due to the probability of the company’s or troop’s low priority
of FA fires. (See Appendix E of this manual for information on smoke operations.)

INTELLIGENCE
4-22. Security decisions are based on enemy capabilities. Platoons use OPs to provide early warning of
the enemy’s actions; their REDCON status and other OPSEC preparations then enable them to respond in a
timely manner. See Appendix D of this manual for more information on OPSEC measures.
4-23. OPSEC is especially critical during the platoon leader’s ground reconnaissance. The platoon leader
ensures that he provides security for the reconnaissance based on the commander’s guidance. Because it is
probable that enemy elements are already in the area, he must ensure that platoon reconnaissance elements
have the capability to protect themselves effectively.
4-24. As he conducts the reconnaissance, the platoon leader orients his map and references graphic control
measures to the terrain. He conducts a terrain analysis, using the results in conjunction with his knowledge
of possible enemy COAs to identify key terrain that may define potential enemy objectives. He identifies
mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and determines the probable formations the enemy will use
when occupying support-by-fire positions or when assaulting the platoon’s position. Based on his analysis
and available fields of observation and fire, the platoon leader confirms vehicle positions that will allow
the platoon to mass fires into the company or troop engagement area.
4-25. The platoon leader should complete his reconnaissance by conducting initial coordination with
adjacent platoons to establish mutual support and to cover dead space between the platoons. At the
conclusion of the reconnaissance, he may leave an OP to report enemy activity in the area of operations.

PROTECTION

Survivability
4-26. The platoon leader may be responsible for supervising engineer efforts. He should incorporate plans
for linkup, supervision, and handoff of engineer assets into his time line.

Countermobility Considerations (Obstacles)

4-27. Key factors for the platoon leader to consider in countermobility planning are a thorough
understanding of the commander’s intent for each planned obstacle and knowledge of the time and
personnel he must allocate to supervise or assist emplacement of the obstacle. He must keep in mind that

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Chapter 4

both the platoon and the company or troop have only limited ability to transport and emplace obstacles.
This means that in most situations the platoon will have to depend on the task force or squadron for
obstacle planning and transport and on engineers for emplacement.
4-28. The commander’s intent will guide the emplacement of obstacles based on the following principles
and characteristics:
• Obstacles are integrated with and reinforce the scheme of maneuver and the direct fire plan.
• They are integrated with existing obstacles.
• They are employed in depth and positioned where they will surprise enemy forces.
• They should be covered by direct and indirect fires at all times.
4-29. In general, obstacles are used to disrupt, turn, fix, and block the enemy based on the factors of
METT-TC. Figure 4-3 illustrates considerations for obstacle employment in relation to platoon BPs. If the
commander does not specify the intent for obstacles, the platoon leader should analyze the situation and
plan hasty or engineer-emplaced obstacles to meet these purposes:
• To block the final assault of an enemy force to the front of the platoon.
• To block the seams between vehicles or between adjacent platoons.
• To disrupt enemy forces that are assaulting on the flanks of the platoon.
• To shape the engagement area by forcing enemy elements to turn, slow down, stop, or flank
themselves at known ranges in the engagement area.

Figure 4-3. Considerations for obstacle employment

Survivability Considerations
4-30. The platoon leader must plan the priority of survivability efforts. His plan should specify the
sequence (first through fourth) in which his tanks will receive digging assets. When designating priorities,
he considers the survivability of unimproved positions and the relative importance of each firing position
within the BP. The engineer platoon leader, section leader, or dozer operator can estimate how much time
it will take to improve firing positions. These estimates will range from 45 minutes to 2 hours depending

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 Defensive Operations

on soil and light conditions and the type and amount of engineer equipment available. Figure 4-4
illustrates dug-in positions and lists considerations for their construction and use.

Figure 4-4. Dug-in firing positions

Air Defense
4-31. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of air defense planning and employment.

SUSTAINMENT
4-32. The platoon leader conducts resupply operations to replenish basic loads in accordance with the
company or troop plan. Ammunition may be pre-positioned on the battlefield to facilitate resupply once
the battle begins. The platoon leader determines prestock requirements based on the commander’s intent
and scheme of maneuver. He discusses prestock requests with the commander, identifying resupply
locations, the types (usually ammunition) and amounts of supplies involved, the time required to conduct
resupply, and any necessary security considerations.

THE HUMAN ASPECT

4-33. As noted previously, the “human aspect” is not considered a formal WFF, but it is a crucial factor in
the success of the defensive mission. The platoon leader must plan for and conduct activities aimed at
enhancing each Soldier’s health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness. For a more complete discussion of
the human dimension of operations, refer to Section II in Chapter 3 of this manual.

SECTION III – PREPARATION

4-34. Preparation of a BP begins after the platoon leader has issued his order and ends at the “defend not
later than” time specified in the OPORD. (Note. Some preparation activities may occur while the platoon
leader is preparing his order.) The platoon leader designates these preparations as priorities of work and
identifies them in the platoon WARNO or OPORD. He must weigh competing demands of security, firing
position and obstacle preparation, rehearsals, and coordination against the amount of time available for the
preparation; this requirement places a premium on effective troop-leading procedures and time
management during the preparation process.

PHASE OF PREPARATION
4-35. The commander may designate the phase of preparation for each BP. There are three phases, listed
here in descending order of thoroughness and time required: (Note. The platoon leader may raise but not
lower the phase of preparation directed by the commander.)

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Chapter 4

• Reconnoiter. This phase of preparation consists of the steps conducted during the ground
reconnaissance of the planning phase.
• Prepare. This phase includes the steps conducted during the planning and preparation phases
for the deliberate occupation of a BP.
• Occupy. This is complete preparation of the position from which the platoon will initially
defend. The position is fully reconnoitered, prepared, and occupied prior to the “defend NLT”
time specified in the OPORD.

PREPARATION TASKS
HASTY OCCUPATION
4-36. Tank platoons conduct a hasty occupation under a variety of circumstances. During a movement to
contact, the platoon may prepare to destroy a moving enemy force by conducting a hasty occupation of
BPs or attack-by-fire positions in defensible terrain. During defensive operations, hasty occupation may
take place during counterattack missions, after disengagement and movement to subsequent BPs, or in
response to FRAGOs reflecting a change of mission.

Initial Occupation Activities and Information

4-37. Hasty occupation of a BP usually occurs in response to a prearranged signal or a FRAGO. Often,
only a minimum of planning time and information is available prior to execution, although in some
situations, such as after disengagement, the platoon may occupy prepared positions it has previously
reconnoitered. As a minimum, the platoon leader must have the following information when he
orders a hasty occupation:
• Where the commander wants to kill the enemy. The commander designates company or troop
TRPs either to define the company/troop engagement area and platoon sectors of fire or to
identify locations where the platoon will mass its fires.
• The tentative location of the BP.
4-38. The platoon leader must pass this information to the platoon. He may supplement it with
tentative section or vehicle fighting positions within the BP and platoon TRPs defining section sectors of
fire. As an alternative, he can elect to use the company or troop TRP alone to mass platoon fires to the left
and to the right of the TRP. Depending on the situation, the platoon leader issues the information in
person, over the radio, or by digital overlay (if available).
4-39. A TRP is a recognizable point on the ground that leaders use to orient friendly forces and to focus
and control direct fires. In addition, when TRPs are designated as indirect fire targets, they can be used in
calling for and adjusting indirect fires. Leaders designate TRPs at probable enemy locations and along
likely avenues of approach. These points can be natural or man-made. A TRP can be an established site,
such as a hill or building, or an impromptu feature designated as a TRP on the spot, like a burning enemy
vehicle or smoke generated by an artillery or mortar round. Friendly units can also construct markers to
serve as TRPs (see Figure 4-5). TRPs should be visible in three observation modes (unaided, passive-
infrared (IR), and thermal) so all forces can see them. Examples of TRPs include the following features
and objects:
• Prominent terrain feature (for example, a large hill mass).
• Distinctive man-made structure (for example, a grain silo).
• Observable enemy position.
• Destroyed vehicle.
• Ground-burst illumination.
• Smoke round.
• Laser point.

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 Defensive Operations

Figure 4-5. Examples of constructed TRP markers

Approaching the Position

4-40. The platoon leader then directs the platoon to approach the position from the flank or rear. Based on
terrain factors, the platoon assumes a modified line formation facing the center of the engagement area.
Vehicle dispersion is generally 100 to 250 meters between tanks, again based on engagement area and
terrain considerations. TCs automatically move to turret-down positions; they execute a short halt and
overwatch the engagement area.

Developing the Situation

4-41. The platoon leader continues to develop the situation. He identifies additional TRPs defining the
company or troop engagement area and/or platoon or section sectors of fire; he also designates tentative
vehicle positions (as necessary), routes into and out of the BP, and the location of subsequent BPs. As time
permits, the platoon leader establishes the following fire control measures:
• The trigger line and engagement criteria.
• The fire pattern to be used.
• Disengagement criteria and the disengagement plan.
4-42. The platoon is now ready to move to hull-down firing positions to engage the enemy. The platoon
leader reports “ESTABLISHED” to the company/troop commander. If the enemy has not reached the
trigger line and time is available, the platoon leader initiates the steps necessary for a deliberate occupation
of the BP.

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Chapter 4

DELIBERATE OCCUPATION
4-43. The tank platoon can conduct deliberate occupation of a BP when all of the following conditions
exist:
• Time is available.
• The enemy is not expected or has not been located within direct fire range.
• A friendly element is forward of the BP with the mission of providing security for the occupying
force.
4-44. The platoon begins by occupying a hide position behind the BP. It assumes a formation that will
provide 360-degree security based on considerations of METT-TC and OAKOC. TCs move to the platoon
leader’s vehicle and prepare to reconnoiter the position. The platoon leader briefs his gunner on actions to
take if the reconnaissance group does not return by a specified time or if contact occurs.

Reconnaissance of the Battle Position

4-45. The platoon leader, TCs, and a security element (usually the loaders from the wingman tanks)
dismount and move to the BP. If possible, platoon vehicles provide overwatch for the reconnaissance
group; otherwise, the platoon leader positions dismounted OPs, as necessary. The reconnaissance group
can then move mounted or dismounted around the BP and engagement area.
4-46. If the platoon leader has already conducted a leader’s reconnaissance with the commander, he uses
information from his own reconnaissance to acquaint his TCs with the BP, briefing his OPORD from an
advantageous location within the BP. If there has been no prior leader’s reconnaissance, the platoon leader
should, if possible, conduct a complete ground reconnaissance with the TCs. This allows him to confirm
his map reconnaissance and tentative plan before he issues the OPORD. (Note. If he is unable to issue the
full OPORD during the reconnaissance, the platoon leader should, as a minimum, issue a detailed
WARNO.)
4-47. Members of the reconnaissance party should use marking materials (for daylight and limited
visibility recognition) to indicate key locations. They should record the eight-digit grid coordinates for
these locations, either manually on their maps or by using electronic means such as the GPS or POSNAV
system (if available).
4-48. To be most effective, the reconnaissance begins from the enemy’s perspective in the engagement
area, with the party looking toward the BP. (Note. The platoon leader must receive permission from the
commander to move in front of the BP.) The platoon leader should explain the enemy situation, outlining
probable COAs and the effects of terrain on enemy movement. He also identifies the enemy’s potential
support by fire positions as well as assault avenues through the platoon’s BP.
4-49. The platoon leader and TCs then mark the company/troop engagement area with platoon and section
sectors of fire. They may also mark TRPs and tentative obstacle locations. As necessary, fire control
measures may be designated and/or marked using easily identifiable terrain features.
4-50. When reconnaissance of the engagement area is complete and all TCs are sure of where the platoon
leader wants to kill the enemy, the platoon leader and TCs move back to the BP. They discuss details of
the platoon fire plan, including the trigger line, engagement criteria, fire pattern, disengagement criteria
and disengagement plan, and routes to supplementary or subsequent BPs. They also make plans to identify
and mark primary and alternate fighting positions.
4-51. Prior to departing the BP, the platoon leader briefs the OPs on actions to take if the platoon does not
return on time or if contact is made with the enemy. He also must coordinate with adjacent platoons to
establish overlapping fields of fire and to eliminate gaps and dead space between the platoons. More
information on coordination is found later in this section.

Occupation Procedures
4-52. After completing the reconnaissance and coordination, the platoon leader and TCs move back to
their vehicles. The TCs remount, start vehicles simultaneously, and move to hide positions behind their

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 Defensive Operations

primary fighting positions. On order, the platoon moves simultaneously into turret-down firing positions
(see Figure 4-6A). These positions allow the tanks to fire only their caliber .50 or loader’s M240 machine
gun. Observation can be executed using the CITV (if available); the gunner’s primary sight also provides
observation capability.

Figure 4-6A. Turret-down positions

4-53. The platoon leader checks with the OPs to ensure that the enemy situation has not changed, then
orders platoon vehicles to occupy their primary hull-down firing positions (see Figure 4-6B). Tank crews
orient on the engagement area and complete their sketch cards. Each crew sends its completed sector
sketch to the platoon leader, either by messenger or by digital transmission (FBCB2, if available); the crew
retains a copy of the sketch card for its own reference. Tanks then move individually to their hide
positions and assume the appropriate REDCON status. (Note. See Chapter 2 of this manual for a
discussion of REDCON levels.)

Figure 4-6B. Hull-down positions

Sector Sketches and Platoon Fire Plan

4-54. As each tank crew prepares their vehicle for deliberate or hasty defensive operations, they will be
required to develop a sector sketch card (see Figure 4-7 on page 4-15). This is a rough topographical
sketch of the tank’s assigned sector, which may be prepared traditionally (handwritten) or using the tank’s
digital equipment (FBCB2). The sketch card aids the crews in target acquisition and paints a better picture
of the battlefield for the platoon leader to be able to develop his platoon fire plan (see Figure 4-8 on page

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Chapter 4

4-17). The fire plan should provide information necessary to distribute and control the fires of all available
direct and indirect fire weapons, both organic and attached. It is prepared using the same two methods
(handwritten or FBCB2).
4-55. Traditional sketch card development. The ability to create traditional, handwritten sketch cards,
while important for all tank crewmen, is especially critical for crews of the M1 and M1A1. These tanks
lack the digital capabilities that provide valuable assistance to crews of later-model vehicles in preparing
their sketch cards. The process begins with the platoon leader designating the primary and supplementary
positions for his tanks and each TC selecting his alternate fighting position. After the positions have been
designated and reconnoitered (time permitting), the platoon leader will designate the sector limits of fire
for each tank and the TRPs within the sector. The platoon leader must give the TC the number designators
for the TRPs.
4-56. As the positions are prepared, the TC and gunner will prepare the sketch cards for each position.
When the cards are completed (normally within 20 minutes), one copy will be sent to the platoon leader
and the other copy will be kept with the tank.
4-57. When the tank is moved into position, and before engineer assets are released from the position, the
crew will make sure the target areas and obstacles within the sector can be fired upon, and determine if
assigned TRPs can be engaged. A TRP that could be engaged before the position was prepared may be
masked when the tank is dug in. The platoon leader must be informed of any inability to engage assigned
TRPs and may direct a change in position. If time permits, the TC will make physical contact with his
wing or flanking elements to determine overlapping fire within the sectors and the position of friendly OPs.
4-58. As a minimum, the traditionally drawn sketch card, which is illustrated in Figure 4-7 on page 4-14,
will depict the following:
• All key terrain features.
• TRPs. TRPs should be marked with a cross and their assigned number in the upper right
quadrant of the cross. Mark all TRPs that are visible, whether they are in your sector or not.
• High-speed avenues of approach.
• Symbol indicating north.
• Preplanned fires (direct and indirect). These may be added after the platoon leader receives this
information from the FIST officer and constructs a platoon fire plan. These should be marked
with a cross, with the letter designation in the top left block and numeric designation in the top
right.
• Range bands. These will help when the LRF fails. The number of bands will be determined by
the terrain or mission. (If terrain permits, range bands of 1,200, 1,800, and 2,400 meters will be
used.) A minimum of three range bands should be used.
• Right and left limits of assigned sector. These limits are marked by double lines beginning at
the tank’s position and extending through the terrain feature that designates the boundary limit.
• Reference point. This is located near the center of the sector and, ideally, at or beyond the
tank’s maximum engagement range. The reference point should be a prominent, immovable,
and readily identifiable feature; it should not be a target and should not be easily destroyed. The
reference point should be depicted using a military map symbol, sketch of feature, or brief word
description, and marked with the letters Ref Pt inside a circle.
• Obstacles and dead space. Obstacles should be marked on the sketch card using approved
military symbols. Dead space should be marked using diagonal lines with the words “DEAD
SPACE.”
• The positions of elements to the left and right and of friendly OPs/listening posts (LPs). These
positions should be marked with standard symbols. (This information will be omitted if the
tactical situation does not allow enough time to make contact with wing and flank elements, or
otherwise determine their exact location).
• Identification data. This consists of the vehicle bumper number, placed directly below the tank
symbol, and the firing position (primary, alternate, or supplementary), marked with a capital P,
A, or S and placed below the vehicle bumper number.

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 Defensive Operations

• Marginal information. Placed in the bottom left third of the sketch card, this information
includes the following:
• List of TRPs.
• Range to TRPs.
• Reference points.
• Description of TRPs.
• Description of obstacles and other likely target areas visible to your position.
• Range to obstacles and other likely targets.
• Legend. The legend, placed in the bottom right third of the sketch card, includes an explanation
of symbols used on the card and other control measures and pertinent information, as required.
4-59. Creating sketch cards using FBCB2 (M1A1D and M1A2 SEP). While FBCB2 currently does not
have the capability to produce a tank sketch card, crews can use the range card tool to produce a rough,
nondoctrinal sketch card. Upon receipt of these tank sketch cards, the platoon leader must redraw them
onto the platoon fire plan before forwarding it to the commander. Future software upgrades of the FBCB2
will include the sketch card function.
4-60. Sketch card verification. As he receives the platoon’s sketch cards, the platoon leader must verify
them. Either he or the PSG mounts each tank and views its sector through the gunner’s primary sight,
gunner’s primary sight extension (GPSE), or CITV. The sketch card check should ensure that the TCs
have covered each of the following considerations:
• Tank sectors are mutually supporting and overlapping.
• Each tank crew understands and has recorded the designated TRPs and FPF.
• All TRPs assigned to the platoon are covered by fire.
• Each crew has marked ranges to all TRPs or identifiable targets within the tank’s sector. These
ranges are especially critical in limited visibility or degraded (LRF) operations.
• The risk of fratricide between platoon tanks and adjacent elements has been evaluated and
appropriate adjustments or restrictions implemented. (Note. Each crew member needs to know
the location of adjacent vehicles and OPs and what they look like through the tank’s sights.
Using pickets to indicate left and right limits for individual tank main gun fire can help TCs to
observe their limits of fire. Rehearsals are the best method of achieving fratricide reduction.)
• The sketches show friendly obstacles, with each obstacle covered by machine gun or main gun
fire from at least one tank.
• Dead space is covered by indirect fire or alternate positions.
• Each tank and the platoon as a whole has identified alternate positions that cover the same area
as the primary positions and supplementary positions that cover additional areas of
responsibility assigned to the tank or platoon.

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Chapter 4

Figure 4-7. Traditional sector sketch card

4-61. Backbriefs. The sketch card verification process provides an optimum opportunity for the platoon
leader to conduct backbriefs to confirm that each TC understands his mission. If time permits, the
backbrief includes a field-expedient sand table or chalkboard exercise (using a chalked side-skirt, “micro”
armor, or a rough terrain model scratched in the dirt). The platoon leader can use the exercise to reinforce
operational considerations for the mission, including the following:

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 Defensive Operations

• Individual tank responsibilities (which tank will engage where within the platoon sector).
• Tactical contingencies, such as which tank will pick up a sector if another tank is knocked out or
what happens if a particular tank’s sector is overloaded with targets.
• Adjustments to positions, such as when a tank is unable to cover its entire assigned sector.
(Note. This should be verified immediately after the position has been prepared, while engineer
assets are still on site.)
4-62. Graphics, maps, and overlays. These are critical elements of fire plan development. As discussed
earlier in this chapter, they are the platoon leader’s primary tool for organizing information and
synchronizing his assets on the battlefield. They assist him in depicting the fire plan accurately.
4-63. The platoon leader must have both maneuver and fire support graphics posted on his map and make
sure that all the TCs have done the same. He then prepares the overlay, which, like the fire plan, can be
developed by either traditional (handwritten) or digital means. The overlay technique eliminates the
tedious process of recopying operational graphics onto a sketch. As an example, if the platoon leader
believes a TRP should be added to the company graphics, he marks it on his overlay. He also places at
least two reference marks on the overlay to ensure proper alignment with his map.
4-64. The platoon leader prepares two copies of the overlay. He gives one copy to the company
commander during the OPORD confirmation brief. The commander can then apply the platoon overlays to
ensure his assigned engagement area is covered. After evaluating the platoon overlays, he may wish to
adjust platoon positions or assign supplementary positions if the entire engagement area is not covered by
either observation or direct fire. If a portion of the engagement area appears as dead space on all platoon
overlays, the commander may wish to plan indirect fires to cover the area.
4-65. Depiction of the fire plan. With the information from the individual tank sector sketches, the
platoon leader uses the available tools to prepare the platoon fire plan. As with other tactical products, the
fire plan product can be handwritten or displayed on the tank’s digital display. Figure 4-8 shows a
handwritten fire plan.
4-66. To enhance the platoon’s understanding of the fire plan and the operation itself, the platoon leader
must know how to make effective use of marginal data. These notations cover numerous types of tactical
information. They may vary according to mission, means of fire plan development (handwritten or
digital), and higher unit guidance. As an example, marginal data required on the fire plan for an M1 or
M1A1 platoon might include the following types of entries:
• Unit designation.
• Date.
• Type of position (primary, alternate, or supplementary).
• Information on TRPs (description, range, list of tanks that can engage each TRP).
• Additional notes as necessary, covering such areas as specific coordination with adjacent units
and engagement criteria and priority.

Note. On digitally equipped vehicles, much of the information normally included in marginal
data can be developed and transmitted using FBCB2.

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Chapter 4

Figure 4-8. Traditionally prepared fire plan (handwritten)

Priorities of Work
4-67. At this point, the platoon executes its defensive priorities of work. (Note. Some tasks will be
performed simultaneously. Figure 4-9 is an example of a platoon time line to assist the platoon leader in
managing the defensive preparation and division of labor based on the “defend NLT” time.) Priorities of
work include, but are not limited to, the following tasks:

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• Maintain platoon OPSEC and surveillance of the engagement area. (Note. See Appendix D for
more information.)
• Verify each vehicle’s location, orientation, and sector of fire.
• Supervise any allocated engineer assets.
• Conduct reconnaissance and mark supplementary engagement areas and subsequent BPs as time
permits.
• Conduct rehearsals.
• Oversee vehicle maintenance and prepare-to-fire checks.
• Improve the position by emplacing M8/M22 alarms and hot loops and by upgrading camouflage
protection.

Figure 4-9. Sample platoon time line

BUILDING THE ENGAGEMENT AREA

4-68. The engagement area is where the commander intends to trap and destroy an enemy force using the
massed fires of all available weapons. The success of any engagement depends on how effectively the
commander can integrate the obstacle plan, the indirect fire plan, and the direct-fire plan within the
engagement area to achieve the company tactical purpose.
4-69. At the company level, engagement area development is a complex function, demanding parallel
planning and preparation if the company is to accomplish the myriad tasks for which it is responsible.

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Chapter 4

Despite this complexity, however, engagement area development resembles a drill in that the commander
and his subordinate leaders use an orderly, fairly standard set of procedures. Beginning with evaluation of
METT-TC factors, the development process covers these steps:
• Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.
• Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver.
• Determine where to kill the enemy.
• Plan and integrate obstacles.
• Emplace weapon systems.
• Plan and integrate indirect fires.
• Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area.
4-70. Tank leaders need to be experts in building their sectors of the company engagement area using the
same seven steps outlined above. By doing this, they will be able to destroy the enemy force where the
command wants. A detailed discussion of each of the seven steps can be found in FM 3-90.1.

FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL

4-71. Effective fire distribution and control requires a unit to rapidly acquire the enemy and mass the
effects of fires to achieve decisive results in the close fight. When planning and executing direct fires, the
commander and subordinate leaders must know how to apply several actions of subordinates. Applied
correctly, they help the company/troop to accomplish its primary goal in any direct-fire engagement: to
both acquire first and shoot first; they give subordinates the freedom to act quickly upon acquisition of the
enemy. This discussion focuses on the following principles:
• Mass the effects of fire.
• Destroy the greatest threat first.
• Avoid target overkill (double tapping targets).
• Employ the best weapon for the target.
• Minimize friendly exposure.
• Employ combat identification (CID) process.
• Prevent fratricide.
• Plan for extreme limited visibility conditions.
• Develop contingencies for diminished capabilities.

Mass the Effects of Fire

4-72. The platoon must mass its fires to achieve decisive results. Massing entails focusing fires at critical
points and distributing the effects. Random application of fires is unlikely to have a decisive effect. For
example, concentrating the platoon’s fires at a single target may ensure its destruction or suppression;
however, that fire control COA will probably not achieve a decisive effect on the enemy formation or
position.

Destroy the Greatest Threat First

4-73. The order in which the platoon engages enemy forces is in direct relation to the danger it presents.
The threat posed by the enemy depends on his weapons, range, and position. Presented with multiple
targets, a unit will, in almost all situations, initially concentrate fires to destroy the greatest threat, and then
distribute fires over the remainder of the enemy force.
Avoid Target Overkill
4-74. Use only the amount of fire required to achieve necessary effects. Target overkill wastes
ammunition and ties up weapons that are better employed acquiring and engaging other targets. The idea
of having every weapon engage a different target, however, must be tempered by the requirement to
destroy the greatest threats first. In most situations, however, it is necessary for the platoon to overwhelm
the enemy with a tremendous volume of fire to compensate for its lack of direct-fire assets.

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Employ the Best Weapon for the Target

4-75. Using the appropriate weapon for the target increases the probability of rapid enemy destruction or
suppression; at the same time, it saves ammunition. The platoon has many weapons with which to engage
the enemy. Target type, range, and exposure are key factors in determining the weapon and ammunition
that should be employed, as are weapons and ammunition availability and desired target effects.
Additionally, leaders should consider individual crew capabilities when deciding on the employment of
weapons. The platoon leader arrays his forces based on the terrain, enemy, and desired effects of fires.
Minimize Friendly Exposure
4-76. Units increase their survivability by exposing themselves to the enemy only to the extent necessary
to engage him effectively. Natural or man-made defilade provides the best cover from kinetic-energy
direct-fire munitions. Crews minimize their exposure by constantly seeking effective available cover,
attempting to engage the enemy from the flank, remaining dispersed, firing from multiple positions, and
limiting engagement times.
Employ Combat Identification Process
4-77. Combat identification is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in
the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. The CID process has three key
purposes:
• Identify and classify targets in the operational environment.
• Allow for the timely processing of engagement decisions on targets classified as enemy.
• Mitigation of fratricide and collateral damage to noncombatants.
4-78. The CID process is a series of progressive and interdependent steps (or actions) that lead to the
decision process to engage or not engage:
• Target search.
• Detection.
• Location.
• Identification.
4-79. Effective CID for a crew requires a constant combined effort from each crew member.
Prevent Fratricide
4-80. The platoon leader must be proactive in reducing the risk of fratricide and noncombatant casualties.
He has numerous tools to assist him in this effort: identification training for combat vehicles and aircraft;
the unit’s weapons safety posture; the weapons control status; recognition markings; FBCB2 and
situational understanding (see also Appendix F, this FM, for additional information about fratricide
prevention). Situational awareness and employment of applicable ROE are the primary means of
preventing noncombatant casualties. (Note. Because it is difficult to distinguish between friendly and
enemy dismounted Soldiers, the commander must constantly monitor the position of friendly dismounted
squads.)
Plan for Extreme Limited Visibility Conditions
4-81. At night, limited visibility fire control equipment enables the platoon to engage enemy forces at
nearly the same ranges that are applicable during the day. Obscurants such as dense fog, heavy smoke, and
blowing sand, however, can reduce the capabilities of thermal and infrared equipment. The platoon leader
should, therefore, develop contingency plans for such extreme limited visibility conditions. Although
decreased acquisition capabilities have minimal effect on area fire, point target engagements will likely
occur at decreased ranges. Typically, firing positions (whether offensive or defensive) must be adjusted
closer to the area or point where the platoon leader intends to focus fires. Another alternative is the use of
visual or infrared illumination when there is insufficient ambient light for passive light intensification
devices. (Note. Vehicles equipped with thermal sights can assist dismounted scout and infantry squads in
detecting and engaging enemy infantry forces in conditions such as heavy smoke and low illumination.)

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Chapter 4

Develop Contingencies for Diminished Capabilities

4-82. Leaders initially develop plans based on their units’ maximum capabilities; they make backup plans
for implementation in the event of casualties or weapon damage or failure. While leaders cannot anticipate
or plan for every situation, they should develop plans for what they view as the most probable occurrences.
Building redundancy into these plans, such as having two systems observe the same sector, is an invaluable
asset when the situation (and the number of available systems) permits. Designating alternate sectors of
fire provides a means of shifting fires if adjacent elements are knocked out of action.

COORDINATION
4-83. Throughout the preparation phase, the platoon leader coordinates with adjacent platoons and other
elements to ensure that platoon sectors of fire overlap and that CS and sustainment requirements are met.
Coordination is initiated from left to right and from higher to lower. The platoon leader, however, should
initiate coordination through the chain of command if he desires support not specified in the company or
troop OPORD. He must also ensure that the platoon conducts necessary internal coordination.

Adjacent Unit Coordination

4-84. The information that the platoon exchanges with adjacent elements includes the following:
• Locations of primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions and locations of flanks.
• Overlapping fields of observation and direct fire.
• Locations and types of obstacles.
• Locations of any dead space between units and procedures for how dead space is to be covered.
• Indirect fire targets and SOI information.
• Locations of OPs and patrol routes.
• Routes into and out of BPs and routes to subsequent BPs.

Platoon Coordination
4-85. Effective internal coordination within the platoon enhances the situational understanding of tank
crews and alerts them to the actions needed to prepare the defense. One method of ensuring this
coordination is dissemination of enemy and friendly information in the form of intelligence updates, which
were discussed earlier in this chapter. In addition, sector sketches and the platoon fire plan facilitate
coordination of fires before the fight begins.
4-86. Rehearsals are especially effective in helping the platoon to practice and coordinate necessary
tactical skills, including these:
• Occupation procedures.
• Calls for fire.
• Initiation, distribution, and control of direct and indirect fires.
• Movement to alternate and supplementary fighting positions.
• Displacement to subsequent BPs.
4-87. Rehearsals can begin as soon as the platoon receives the company or troop WARNO, with individual
crews practicing berm drills, snake board exercises, and ammunition transfer drills. Initial walk-through
rehearsals on a sand table can focus on deliberate or hasty occupation procedures, fire distribution, and the
disengagement plan. The platoon can then conduct mounted movement rehearsals and force-on-force
rehearsals, continually raising the level of difficulty by conducting the rehearsals at night and at various
MOPP levels. The platoon leader should integrate voice and digital radio traffic as well as calls for fire
during all rehearsals.

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 Defensive Operations

WAR-FIGHTING FUNCTION CONSIDERATIONS

FIRE SUPPORT
4-88. The platoon leader should confirm locations of artillery and mortar targets, adjust them as necessary,
and mark them for daylight and limited visibility recognition. He should also mark triggers that will be
used to request artillery on moving targets; these locations are based on the enemy’s doctrinal rates of
movement, the terrain, the time of flight of artillery rounds (the company FIST has this information), and
the priority of the target. Marking of triggers also may be necessary when readily identifiable terrain
features are not available.
4-89. The platoon leader can use either of two methods to accurately mark triggers and target locations. In
one method, a member of the platoon moves to the locations using the map, GPS, or POSNAV and marks
the sites. In the second, a member of the platoon notes the impact location of rounds during artillery
registration and moves to and marks these target locations. In both methods, markings must be visible
under daylight and limited visibility conditions.

INTELLIGENCE
4-90. OPSEC is critical during defensive preparations. The platoon should adhere to the procedures
outlined in Appendix D of this manual to limit the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance efforts.
4-91. Intelligence is constantly updated by higher headquarters as the battlefield situation develops, such
as when the enemy fights through a screening or covering force. The platoon leader keeps the platoon
informed with periodic intelligence updates. The updated information may force him to reevaluate and
adjust his time line to ensure preparations are as complete as possible. For example, the platoon leader
may determine that engineer assets only have time to dig hull-down firing positions rather than turret-down
and hide positions; in another situation, he may direct the engineers to prepare fighting positions for only
one section because the other section has access to terrain that provides excellent natural hull-down firing
positions.
4-92. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader may conduct reconnaissance of subsequent or
supplementary BPs. Simultaneous planning for these positions during the preparation of initial positions is
a critical component in effective time management.

PROTECTION
4-93. Because engineer assets are at a premium during defensive preparations, they should never be
allowed to remain idle for any reason other than maintenance checks and services. A member of the
platoon, either the platoon leader or a designated TC, must physically link up with the engineers as directed
in the platoon OPORD and escort them to each firing position. The escort provides local security and
instructions to the engineers.

Survivability Considerations
4-94. Engineers improve the platoon’s survivability by digging or improving hide, turret-down, or hull-
down positions (see Figure 4-4 on page 4-7). Each TC should be responsible for the improvement of his
firing position. He must make sure that the location, orientation, and depth of the hole are correct before
the engineer departs for the next fighting position. He should also be aware of the importance of selecting
a site with a background that will break up the silhouette of his vehicle (see Figure 4-10); this helps to
prevent skylining.

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Chapter 4

Figure 4-10. Using background to prevent skylining

4-95. Several factors can help the platoon to significantly increase the number of kills it achieves while
executing the defense. Firing positions should maximize weapon standoff and/or the platoon’s ability to
mass fires from survivable positions. As discussed previously, firing positions and obstacles should be
complementary. The platoon leader must coordinate with engineers to ensure that the platoon’s direct fires
can cover the entire area of any obstacle that the commander intends to emplace in the platoon’s sector of
fire. Additionally, the platoon should know the exact location of the start point, end point, and turns of the
obstacle. This knowledge contributes to the accuracy of calls for fire. The platoon leader can also locate a
TRP on the obstacle to ensure more accurate calls for fire.

Engineer Considerations
4-96. Engineer mobility operations in the defense normally are of lower priority than those involving
survivability and countermobility. Engineers can improve routes from the platoon’s hide position to its
primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions as well as to subsequent BPs. Such efforts are
labor-intensive, however, and should be evaluated carefully based on the commander’s priority of work for
the engineers.

SUSTAINMENT
4-97. Resupply methods and procedures are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of this manual. If the
commander authorizes pre-positioning, the platoon leader determines the amount and type of prestock
(normally ammunition) that will be required for the operation. For example, to calculate ammunition
requirements, he evaluates the number and type of enemy vehicles the platoon expects to engage and the
amount of time available to conduct resupply between engagements. He then directs the PSG to select and
prepare the prestock location and coordinate the delivery of the prestock supplies.
4-98. Prestock resupply can be accomplished successfully in virtually any location where supplies can be
hidden and protected, such as in or behind the primary fighting position, along the displacement route, or
in the firing positions of a subsequent BP. Preparation of the site includes providing cover, concealment,
and protection for platoon and delivery personnel and vehicles during the transfer process. The site must
also protect the supply materials from enemy observation and the effects of artillery and weather.

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 Defensive Operations

4-99. Once the supplies are delivered, the prestock site should be concealed. The platoon should conduct
periodic security checks or keep the site under constant surveillance to ensure safekeeping of the prestock.

THE HUMAN ASPECT

4-100. Activities aimed at enhancing each Soldier’s health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness to fight
continue during the preparation phase. Refer to the discussion of the human aspect of operations included
in Section II of Chapter 3.

SECTION IV - EXECUTION
4-101. This section contains a “best case,” chronological discussion of the procedures and considerations
that apply during the execution of a typical tank platoon defensive mission.

HIDE POSITION
4-102. The platoon’s hide positions are located behind its primary battle and/or fighting positions. The
platoon occupies hide positions in one of two ways: either as a unit, using perimeter defense techniques
discussed in Chapter 5 (this method is used when hide positions are behind the BP), or with individual
vehicles occupying hide positions behind their primary fighting positions.
4-103. While in the hide position, the platoon employs all applicable OPSEC measures to limit aerial,
thermal, electronic, and visual detection. It deploys OPs as discussed in Appendix D of this manual to
provide surveillance of its sectors of fire and early warning for vehicles in the hide position. It also
maintains the REDCON status prescribed in the OPORD. The hide position should not be located on or
near obvious artillery targets.

Note. The platoon leader may decide to occupy turret-down positions rather than hide positions
based on terrain considerations, such as availability of cover and concealment, or if the enemy
situation is vague and observation of the engagement area is necessary.

OCCUPATION OF FIRING POSITIONS

4-104. The platoon leader monitors intelligence reports provided on the company or troop net and
upgrades the platoon’s REDCON status as the enemy approaches or as directed. When previously
identified occupation criteria are met, he orders the platoon to occupy its primary fighting positions. Based
on reconnaissance, rehearsals, and known time-distance factors, each TC moves to his position along a
previously reconnoitered route. If the GPS or POSNAV is available, TCs use waypoints to assist in
controlling movement. Ideally, the platoon occupies turret-down positions with enough time to orient
weapon systems and acquire and track targets before the enemy crosses the direct fire trigger line.
4-105. Because the observation range of OPs is usually limited to the engagement area, OP reports should
not be the sole criterion triggering the platoon’s occupation of fighting positions. If the enemy situation
becomes unclear, the platoon leader may request permission to occupy turret-down positions for the
purpose of scanning the engagement area.

INDIRECT FIRES
4-106. As the enemy approaches the direct-fire trigger line, the platoon leader updates his crews on the
situation reported on the company or troop net. He monitors the SPOTREPs and calls for fire being sent
on the company/troop net and compares these reports with the SPOTREPs from his platoon net. He reports
any new enemy information higher using the SPOTREP format (see ST 3-20.153). The platoon leader
employs available artillery to engage targets that are not being requested by other platoon leaders or the
company/troop commander. He initiates calls for fire on moving enemy elements using previously

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Chapter 4

identified triggers and the “AT MY COMMAND” method of control (calls for fire are discussed in
Chapter 6 of this manual).
4-107. Crews of M1A2 SEP tanks can track enemy vehicle movement toward a target location by
employing the vehicle’s far target designate capability; they can use this information to initiate artillery
fires. Additionally, they can use the far target locator capability to determine the location of stationary
targets and to quickly process a tactical fire (TACFIRE) direction system or FBCB2 call-for-fire message
to attack unplanned targets.

DIRECT FIRES
FIRE COMMANDS
4-108. The platoon leader initiates tank direct fires using a fire command as discussed in Chapter 2 of this
manual. The fire command enables him to engage single targets (for example, a reconnaissance vehicle)
using a single section or an individual vehicle without exposing the entire platoon. It also allows the
platoon to maintain the element of surprise by simultaneously engaging multiple targets with a lethal initial
volley of tank fires. Sectors of fire and the preplanned fire pattern should be selected to help prevent target
overkill and the resulting waste of ammunition.

TRIGGER LINE
4-109. The trigger line is a backup to the fire command. In the absence of communications from the
platoon leader, a preestablished direct-fire trigger line allows each TC to engage enemy vehicles in his
sector of fire. The criteria for the direct-fire trigger line should specify the number of enemy vehicles that
must pass a designated location before the TC can engage without any instructions from the platoon leader.
Selection of the trigger line is dependent on METT-TC factors. Considerations might include the
following:
• A maximum range or a point, such as an obstacle, at which the platoon will initiate fires to
support the company or troop scheme of maneuver.
• The survivability of enemy armor.
• The fields of fire that the terrain allows.
• The planning ranges for the platoon’s weapon systems. The planning range for the 105-mm
main gun is 2,000 meters; for the 120-mm main gun, it is 2,500 meters.

MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
4-110. Individual TCs move from hull-down to turret-down firing positions within their primary and
alternate positions based on two considerations: the necessity to maintain direct fire on the enemy and the
effectiveness of enemy fires. Influencing each TC’s decision to move between firing positions are such
factors as enemy movement rates, the number of advancing enemy vehicles, the accuracy with which the
enemy is acquiring and engaging friendly fighting positions, and the lethality of enemy weapon systems.

REPORTING
4-111. During the direct-fire fight, TCs describe the situation for the platoon leader, who in turn describes
what is happening for the commander. Contact reports, SPOTREPs, and SITREPs are used as appropriate.
In the defense, contact reports are used to alert the platoon to previously unidentified enemy targets.
SPOTREPs and SITREPs are sent to list the number, types, and locations of enemy vehicles
observed, engaged, and/or destroyed and to provide the strength and status of friendly forces.
Everyone involved in the reporting process must avoid sending redundant or inflated descriptions of the
situation. Such reports not only are confusing, but also may trigger unnecessary, and possibly dangerous,
actions by higher headquarters.

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 Defensive Operations

RESUPPLY
4-112. The platoon may expend main gun ammunition quickly in a direct-fire fight. Based on the terrain
and expected enemy situation, the platoon leader must develop and execute resupply procedures to
maintain a constant supply of main gun rounds. He must balance the necessity of maintaining direct fires
on the enemy against the demands imposed on the platoon’s crews by the ammunition transfer process and
the retrieval of prestock supplies.

DISPLACEMENT
4-113. Displacement may become necessary in several types of situations. For example, a numerically
superior enemy may force the platoon to displace to a subsequent BP. In another situation, a penetration or
enemy advance on a secondary avenue of approach may require the platoon or section to occupy
supplementary BPs or fighting positions.

DISENGAGEMENT CRITERIA AND DISENGAGEMENT PLAN

4-114. The company commander establishes disengagement criteria and develops the disengagement plan
to support the company or troop scheme of maneuver. Disengagement criteria are primarily based on a
specified number and type of enemy vehicles reaching a specified location (normally called the break
point) to trigger displacement. Other considerations, such as ammunition supplies and friendly combat
power, also influence the decision to displace.
METHODS OF DISPLACEMENT
4-115. The platoon leader chooses between two methods of displacement depending on whether or not
the move is conducted with overwatch (and cover) by an adjacent platoon.
Displacement With Cover
4-116. If the displacement is covered, the entire platoon usually displaces as a whole (see Figure 4-11). It
employs smoke grenades and on-board smoke generators to screen the displacement.

CAUTION
On-board smoke (VEESS) will be used only when the vehicle is
burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel
will cause a fire hazard.

Figure 4-11. Displacement with cover from another element (entire platoon moves at once)

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Chapter 4

4-117. The platoon leader issues instructions or uses a prearranged signal to initiate movement. The
platoon simultaneously backs down to hide positions, keeping front hulls toward the enemy until adequate
cover protects each tank. Individual tanks orient weapon systems toward the enemy as they move to the
subsequent or supplementary positions along previously identified and reconnoitered routes.

Displacement Without Cover

4-118. If the displacement is not covered by another element, the platoon leader designates one section to
overwatch the displacement of the other section. The overwatch section is responsible for providing
suppressive fires covering the entire platoon sector of fire. It also initiates artillery calls for fire, mixing
smoke with tank-killing munitions, to help cover the displacement. When overwatch is no longer
necessary to cover the displacing section’s movement, the overwatch section may request one last artillery
call for fire in front of its own position, then displace to the subsequent BP.

Note. In some instances, the platoon may have to use bounding overwatch to the rear during
tactical movement to the subsequent or supplementary position (see Figure 4-12). This may
become necessary when such factors as the distance to the new position, the enemy’s rate of
advance, and terrain considerations (fields of fire) do not allow the original overwatch section to
displace without the benefit of an overwatch of its own.

Figure 4-12. Displacement without cover from another element (sections move using
bounding overwatch)

COMPLETION OF DISPLACEMENT
4-119. The displacement is complete when the platoon has occupied the subsequent BP and all vehicles
are prepared to continue the defense. If the platoon leader and TCs were able to reconnoiter and rehearse
the disengagement and occupation, the occupation should go quickly. If reconnaissance and rehearsals
were not possible, the platoon leader must conduct the steps of a hasty occupation outlined earlier in this
chapter.

COUNTERATTACKS
4-120. The platoon is capable of conducting limited counterattacks, either alone or as part of a larger
force (usually the company team). It can employ one of two methods: counterattack by fire and
counterattack by fire and movement.

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 Defensive Operations

PURPOSES
4-121. The platoon may conduct (or take part in) a counterattack to accomplish the following purposes:
• Complete the destruction of the enemy.
• Regain key terrain.
• Relieve pressure on an engaged unit.
• Initiate offensive operations.
COORDINATION AND CONTROL
4-122. Coordination and control are critical to the success of the counterattack. Locations of routes and
positions must be planned and disseminated to all units; this assists the counterattack force and other
elements in controlling indirect and direct fires. If adjustments to any route or position become necessary,
the counterattack force must take immediate action to ensure that other forces lift and shift fires; otherwise,
fratricide becomes a distinct danger.
COUNTERATTACK METHODS
Counterattack By Fire
4-123. When the company team executes a counterattack by fire, one platoon conducts tactical movement
on a concealed route to a predetermined BP or attack-by-fire position from which it can engage the enemy
in the flank and/or rear. The remaining platoons hold their positions and continue to engage the enemy
(see Figure 4-13). The intent of this method is to use weapon standoff and/or cover to full advantage and
destroy the enemy by direct fires.

Figure 4-13. Counterattack by fire

Counterattack By Fire and Movement

4-124. The intent of this method is to close with and destroy the enemy. The counterattack force uses
tactical maneuver to gain a position of advantage from which it attacks the enemy (from the flank,
whenever possible) (see Figure 4-14). It conducts hasty attacks and assaults based on the particular
situation and the factors of METT-TC.

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Chapter 4

Figure 4-14. Counterattack by fire and movement

CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION

4-125. Once an enemy assault is defeated, leaders must ensure their Soldiers are ready to continue with
defensive operations, to shift to the offense, or to displace. If the platoon is directed to hold its current
positions, it must consolidate and reorganize quickly so it will be ready to destroy follow-on enemy forces
and to execute any other required tasks.

Consolidation
4-126. To consolidate a defensive position, the platoon takes these steps:
• Eliminate remaining enemy resistance by conducting a counterattack as directed by the
commander.
• Reestablish communications.
• Ensure positions are mutually supporting; check all sectors of fire to eliminate gaps and dead
space that result when tanks are disabled.
• Secure detainees.
• Reestablish OPSEC by emplacing OPs and early warning devices (such as M8 alarms) and
enhancing camouflage for platoon positions.
• Replace, repair, or fortify obstacles.
• Improve positions in accordance with procedures for a deliberate defense and established
priorities of work.

REORGANIZATION
4-127. Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is usually conducted by unit SOP.
Reorganization in the defense is accomplished in the same manner as in the offense. Refer to Section VII
in Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion.

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 Defensive Operations

LIMITED VISIBILITY DEFENSE

4-128. The defensive fundamentals covered previously are applicable in limited visibility situations;
additional considerations for planning, preparation, and execution of the defense in limited visibility are
covered in the following paragraphs.

PLANNING
4-129. In the planning phase, the commander, the platoon leader, and the TCs conduct a thorough
reconnaissance, usually during daylight hours, to mark positions and routes. They must keep in mind that
obscurants that limit visibility may also degrade the effectiveness of their thermal sights and laser range
finders. This may force them to designate engagement areas that are closer than anticipated to the unit’s
BPs. In marking their positions, they use materials that will facilitate occupation either in daylight or under
limited visibility conditions.

PREPARATION
4-130. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader ensures that TRPs and artillery targets are
“thermalized” to allow for positive identification during limited visibility. Used with a sector sketch
during direct fire engagements, thermalized TRPs also help TCs to more accurately estimate the range to
their targets when smoke or other factors inhibit the use of the LRF. Ideally, rehearsals of occupation and
displacement are conducted in limited visibility conditions; the same applies to preparation and occupation
of fighting positions and to any necessary repositioning.
4-131. OPSEC is strictly enforced during all phases of defensive preparation. OPs are critical in
providing security and early warning of enemy activities. The platoon leader emplaces mounted OPs to
take advantage of the capabilities of his vehicles’ thermal sights in scanning the engagement area and the
platoon’s assigned sector. Dismounted OPs provide local security and augment mounted OPs with shorter-
range observation and the ability to listen for approaching enemy elements.

EXECUTION
4-132. As the platoon enters the execution phase, the platoon leader must ensure that all crewmen
thoroughly understand the occupation and displacement criteria and TCs strictly enforce all fire control
measures. TCs use sketch cards and the CITV (if available) to estimate target range when visibility factors
prevent use of the LRF.

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 Chapter 5
Other Tactical Operations

This chapter describes additional tasks the tank platoon may conduct to complement
or support its primary operations of move, attack, and defend. The platoon executes
these additional tasks separately or as part of a larger force.

SECTION I - TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

5-1. Tank platoons conduct tactical road marches to move long distances and position themselves for
future operations. The main purpose of the road march is to relocate rapidly, not to gain contact. Tactical
road marches are conducted using fixed speeds and timed intervals. Road marches are planned at the
battalion and company levels and executed by platoons.

PREPARATION AND SOPs

5-2. The success of a road march depends on thorough preparation and sound SOPs.
5-3. Platoon preparations should address the following considerations:
• Movement to the SP.
• Speed control.
• Formations.
• Intervals.
• Weapons orientation.
• Actions at scheduled halts.
• Actions at the RP.
5-4. SOPs should cover the following factors:
• Actions at unscheduled halts.
• Actions in case a vehicle becomes lost.
• Actions if a vehicle becomes disabled.
• Actions on contact.

COMPOSITION
5-5. A road march is composed of three elements:
• The quartering party (or advance party).
• The main body.
• The trail party.
5-6. The tank platoon normally travels as a unit in the main body. Before the march begins, the platoon
may provide individual Soldiers or a vehicle and crew to assist with quartering party activities (see Section
II of this chapter).

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Chapter 5

MARCH COLUMNS
5-7. The following discussion focuses on the three primary road march techniques. (Note. The
commander bases his decision on the formation used during the march on which technique is employed.
The road march is usually executed in column or staggered column formation.)

OPEN COLUMN
5-8. The open column technique is normally used for daylight marches. It can be used at night with
blackout lights or night-vision equipment. The distance between vehicles varies, normally from 50 meters
to 200 meters depending on light and weather conditions.

CLOSE COLUMN
5-9. The close column technique is normally used for marches conducted during periods of limited
visibility. The distance between vehicles is based on the ability to see the vehicle ahead; it is normally less
than 50 meters.

INFILTRATION
5-10. Infiltration involves the movement of small groups of personnel or vehicles at irregular intervals. It
is used when sufficient time and suitable routes are available and when maximum security, deception, and
dispersion are desired. It provides the best possible passive defense against enemy observation and
detection. (Note. Infiltration is most commonly used by dismounted elements.)

CONTROL MEASURES
5-11. The following discussion covers control measures the platoon leader can use in effectively
controlling his platoon during the conduct of a road march.

MAP WITH OVERLAY

5-12. As a minimum, the overlay must show the SP, the RP, and the route. The SP location represents the
beginning of the road march route. It should be located on easily recognizable terrain, far enough away
from the unit’s initial position to allow the platoon to organize into the march formation at the appropriate
speed and interval. If time is available, the platoon leader should determine the time to reach the SP. This
ensures the platoon arrives at the SP at the time designated in the commander’s OPORD. The RP location
is at the end of the route of march. It also is located on easily recognizable terrain. Elements do not halt at
the RP, but continue to their respective positions with assistance from guides, waypoints, and/or graphic
control measures. The route is the path of travel connecting the start and release points.

DIGITAL OVERLAYS
5-13. When available, digital overlays serve as the platoon’s primary source of graphic control measures,
although the traditional hard-copy map and overlay must be maintained as a backup. Digital overlays
display waypoints and information concerning unit locations along the route of march that can assist TCs
in navigation and help them in maintaining situational understanding.

CHECKPOINTS
5-14. Locations along the route of march where interference with movement may occur or where timing is
critical are represented using checkpoints. The SP, RP, and all checkpoints are considered critical points.

STRIP MAPS
5-15. A strip map can be used to assist in navigation. It must include the SP, RP, and checkpoints and
must list the distances between these points. Detailed blow-up sketches should be used for scheduled halt

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 Other Tactical Operations

locations and other places where confusion is likely to occur. Strip maps are included as an annex to the
movement order; if possible, a copy should be provided to all TCs. See Figure 5-1 for an example of a
strip map.

Figure 5-1. Example strip map

VISUAL SIGNALS
5-16. Hand-and-arm signals provide an alternate means of passing messages between vehicles. This
becomes important because the enemy may have the ability to interfere with FM communication. Leaders
must understand that this is a perishable skill.

TRAFFIC CONTROL
5-17. Road guides and traffic signs may be posted at designated traffic control points by the headquarters
controlling the march. At critical points, guides assist in creating a smooth flow of traffic along the march
route. Military police, members of the battalion scout platoon, or designated elements from the quartering
party may serve as guides. They should have equipment that will allow march elements to identify them
during periods of limited visibility.

ACTIONS DURING THE MARCH

MOVING TO THE START POINT
5-18. The platoon must arrive at the SP at the time designated in the company or troop OPORD. Some
commanders will designate a staging or marshaling area that enables platoons to organize their march

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Chapter 5

columns and conduct final inspections and briefings before movement. Other units require platoons to
move directly to the column from their current positions. To avoid confusion during the initial move, the
platoon leader and TCs conduct a reconnaissance of the route to the SP, issue clear movement instructions,
and conduct thorough rehearsals, paying particular attention to signals and timing.

MARCH SPEED
5-19. An element’s speed in a march column will change as it encounters variable routes and road
conditions. This can produce an undesirable accordion effect. The movement order establishes the speed
of march and maximum catch-up speed. During the march, the platoon’s lead vehicle must not exceed
either the fixed march speed or the top catch-up speed. In addition, it should accelerate slowly out of turns
or choke points; this allows the platoon to gradually resume the speed of march after moving past the
restriction.

ORIENTATION
5-20. Each tank in the platoon has an assigned sector of fire (see Figure 5-2). TCs assign sectors of
observation to crewmen both to cover their portion of the platoon sector and to achieve 360-degree
observation.

Figure 5-2. Sectors of fire

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 Other Tactical Operations

HALTS
5-21. While taking part in a road march, the platoon must be prepared to conduct both scheduled and
unscheduled halts.

Scheduled Halts
5-22. These are executed to conduct maintenance, refueling, and personal relief activities and to allow
other traffic to pass. The time and duration of halts are established in the movement order; unit SOP
specifies actions taken during halts. The first priority at a halt is to establish and maintain local security
(see Appendix D of this manual). A maintenance halt of 15 minutes is usually taken after the first hour of
the march, with a 10-minute break every two hours thereafter.
5-23. During long marches, the unit may conduct a refuel-on-the-move (ROM) operation. Depending on
the tactical situation and the company or troop OPORD, the platoon may conduct ROM for all vehicles
simultaneously or by section. The OPORD will specify the amount of fuel or the amount of time at the
pump for each vehicle. It will also give instructions for security at the ROM site and at the post-fueling
staging area.

Unscheduled Halts
5-24. Unscheduled halts are conducted under a variety of circumstances, such as when the unit encounters
obstacles or contaminated areas or if a disabled vehicle blocks the route. The platoon conducts actions on
contact and establishes 360-degree security.
5-25. A disabled vehicle must not be allowed to obstruct traffic. The crew moves the vehicle off the road
immediately (if possible), reports its status, establishes security, and posts guides to direct traffic. If
possible, the crew repairs the vehicle and rejoins the rear of the column. Vehicles that drop out of the
column should return to their original positions only when the column has halted. Until then, they move at
the rear just ahead of the trail element, usually comprised of the maintenance team with the M88 recovery
vehicle and some type of security. If the crew cannot repair the vehicle, the vehicle is recovered by the
maintenance element.

ACTIONS AT THE RELEASE POINT

5-26. The platoon moves through the RP without stopping. The platoon leader picks up the assigned guide
or follows the guide’s signals to the assembly area. Depending on terrain and the equipment available
(GPS or POSNAV), guides and marking materials may be posted at or near exact vehicle locations. (Note.
Refer to the discussion of assembly area procedures in Section II of this chapter.)

SECTION II - ASSEMBLY AREAS

5-27. An assembly area is a site at which maneuver units prepare for future operations. A well-planned
assembly area will have the following characteristics:
• A location on defensible terrain.
• Concealment from enemy ground and air observation.
• Good drainage and a surface that will support tracked and wheeled vehicles.
• Suitable exits, entrances, and internal roads or trails.
• Sufficient space for dispersion of vehicles and equipment.

QUARTERING PARTY ACTIONS

5-28. Normally, a quartering party assists the platoon in the occupation of an assembly area. Established
in accordance with company or troop SOP, the quartering party may consist of one or two Soldiers from
each platoon or even one tank per platoon with the prescribed equipment and uniform. It is led by the

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Chapter 5

company/troop XO or 1SG or by a senior NCO. The quartering party takes these actions in preparing the
assembly area:
• Reconnoiter for enemy forces, CBRN contamination, condition of the route to the assembly
area, and suitability of the area (covering such factors as drainage, space, and internal routes). If
the area is unsatisfactory, the party contacts the commander and requests permission to find a
new location for the site.
• Organize the area based on the commander’s guidance. This includes designating and marking
tentative locations for the platoon, trains, and CP vehicles.
• Improve and mark entrances, exits, and internal routes.
• Mark and/or remove obstacles (within the party’s capabilities).
• Mark tentative vehicle locations.

OCCUPATION PROCEDURES
5-29. Once the assembly area has been prepared, the quartering party awaits the arrival of the company or
troop, maintaining surveillance and providing security of the area within its capabilities. Quartering party
members guide their elements (including the platoon) from the RP to their locations in the assembly area.
SOPs and prearranged signals and markers (for day and night occupation) should assist the TCs in finding
their positions. The key consideration is to move quickly into position to clear the route for follow-on
units.
5-30. Once in position, the platoon conducts hasty occupation of a BP as described in Chapter 4 of
this manual. It establishes and maintains security (see the OPSEC discussion in Appendix D) and
coordinates with adjacent units. These actions enable the platoon to defend from the assembly area
as necessary. The platoon can then prepare for future operations by conducting troop-leading procedures
and the priorities of work in accordance the company or troop OPORD. Priorities of work are:
• Establish and maintain security (REDCON status).
• Position vehicles.
• Emplace OPs.
• Emplace CBRN alarms.
• Establish lateral communications/flank coordination.
• Prepare range cards and fire plans.
• Establish wire communication (if directed by unit SOP).
• Camouflage vehicles.
• Select alternate, supplementary positions, and rally points.
• Develop an obstacle plan.
• Conduct troop-leading procedures.
• Perform maintenance activities on vehicles, communications equipment, and weapon systems.
• Verify weapon system status; conduct boresighting, muzzle reference system (MRS) updates,
test-firing, and other necessary preparations.
• Conduct resupply, refueling, and rearming operations.
• Conduct rehearsals and training for upcoming operations.
• Conduct PCCs and PCIs.
• Eat, rest, and conduct personal hygiene.
• Establish field sanitation.
5-31. Normally, the platoon occupies an assembly area as part of a company team or troop. The team or
troop may be adjacent to or independent of the task force or squadron (see Figures 5-3A and 5-3B). The
company or troop commander assigns a sector of responsibility and weapons orientations for each platoon.
If the platoon occupies an assembly area alone, it establishes a perimeter defense (explained later in this
chapter).

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 Other Tactical Operations

Figure 5-3A. Battalion assembly area; company team adjacent to other company teams

Figure 5-3B. Company team assembly area independent of the battalion

OCCUPATION BY FORCE
5-32. In some cases, a company or troop will occupy an assembly area without first sending out a
quartering party. During this “occupation by force,” the platoon leader orders a hasty occupation of a BP
at the platoon’s designated location. He establishes local security, directs adjacent unit coordination,
begins troop-leading procedures, and establishes priorities of work.

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Chapter 5

SECTION III - ACTIONS AT A CONTACT POINT

5-33. Actions at a contact point entail the meeting of friendly ground forces. It may occur in, but is not
limited to, the following situations:
• Advancing forces reaching an objective area previously secured by air assault or airborne forces.
• Units conducting coordination for a relief in place.
• Cross-attached units moving to join their new organization.
• A tank platoon moving forward during a follow and support mission with dismounted infantry
or scouts.
• A unit moving to assist an encircled force.
5-34. Platoons conduct actions at a contact point independently or as part of a larger force. Within a larger
unit, the tank platoon may lead the linkup force. The linkup consists of three phases; the following actions
are critical to the execution of a speedy, safe operation:
• Phase 1—Far recognition signal. During this phase, the two units should establish
communications before they reach direct-fire range. The lead element of the linkup force should
monitor the radio frequency of the other friendly force.
• Phase 2—Coordination and movement to the linkup point. The forces coordinate the
following information:
• Known enemy situation.
• Type and number of friendly vehicles.
• Disposition of stationary forces (if either unit is stationary).
• Routes to the linkup point.
• Fire control measures.
• Near recognition signal.
• Finalized location for the linkup point.
• Any special coordination, such as maneuver instructions or requests for medical support.
• Phase 3—Linkup. The units enforce strict fire control measures to help prevent fratricide. If
both units are moving, the controlling headquarters designates a location in the formation for the
subordinate unit. If one unit is stationary, the moving unit moves through the linkup point to a
predetermined location.

SECTION IV - CONVOY ESCORT

5-35. This mission requires the tank platoon to provide the convoy with security and close-in protection
from direct fire while on the move. The platoon is well suited for this role because of its vehicles’
mobility, firepower, and armor protection against mines and direct and indirect fires. Depending on a
variety of factors (size of the convoy, escort assets available, METT-TC factors), the platoon may perform
convoy escort either independently or as part of a larger unit’s convoy security mission.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

5-36. Battle command is especially critical because of the task organization of the convoy escort mission.
The relationship between the platoon and the convoy commander must provide for unity of command and
effort if combat operations are required during the course of the mission. In most cases, the tank platoon
will execute the escort mission under control of the security force commander, who is usually OPCON or
attached to the convoy commander. At times, however, the platoon will be OPCON or attached directly to
the convoy commander. This occurs when the platoon is providing security for tactical operations centers
(TOC) or when it is operating independently with a small convoy.
5-37. The convoy commander should issue a complete OPORD to all vehicle commanders in the convoy
prior to execution of the mission. This is vital because the convoy may itself be task organized from a

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 Other Tactical Operations

variety of units and because some vehicles may not have tactical radios. The order should follow the
standard five-paragraph OPORD format, but special emphasis should be placed on the following subjects:
• Route of march (with a strip map provided for each vehicle commander).
• Order of march.
• Actions at halts.
• Actions if a vehicle becomes disabled.
• Actions on contact.
• Chain of command.
• Communications and signal information.

TACTICAL DISPOSITION
5-38. During all escort missions, the convoy security commander and tank platoon leader must establish
and maintain security in all directions and throughout the length of the convoy. They can adjust the
disposition of the platoon, either as a unit or dispersed, to fit the security requirements of each particular
situation. As noted, several factors, including convoy size and METT-TC, affect this disposition. Perhaps
the key consideration is whether the platoon is operating as part of larger escort force or is executing the
escort mission independently.

LARGE-SCALE ESCORT MISSIONS

5-39. When sufficient escort assets are available, the convoy commander will usually organize the convoy
into three distinct elements: advance guard, close-in protective group, and rear guard. Figure 5-4 shows a
convoy in which the tank platoon is part of a company team-size escort force.
5-40. The tank platoon will normally be task organized to operate within the close-in protective group.
This element provides immediate, close-in protection for the vehicle column, with escort vehicles
positioned either within the column or on the flanks. The convoy commander’s vehicle is located within
this group.
5-41. The advance guard reconnoiters and proofs the convoy route. It searches for signs of enemy activity,
such as ambushes and obstacles. Within its capabilities, it attempts to clear the route and provides the
convoy commander with early warning before the arrival of the vehicle column. In some cases, an
individual tank platoon vehicle, a section, or the entire platoon may be designated as part of the advance
guard. The platoon leader may also be required to attach a tank with a mine plow or mine roller to this
element.
5-42. The rear guard follows the convoy. It provides security in the area behind the main body of the
vehicle column, often moving with medical and recovery assets. Again, an individual vehicle, a section, or
the entire tank platoon may be part of this element.

Note. The convoy commander may also designate the tank platoon as part of a reaction force
for additional firepower in the event of enemy contact. The reaction force will either move with
the convoy or be located at a staging area close enough to provide immediate interdiction
against the enemy.

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Chapter 5

Figure 5-4. Tank platoon as part of a larger escort force

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 Other Tactical Operations

5-43. When the platoon is deployed as a unit during a large-scale escort operation, it can provide forward,
flank, or rear close-in security. In such situations, it executes tactical movement based on the factors of
METT-TC. Figures 5-5A through 5-5C illustrate the platoon using various formations while performing
escort duties as a unit.

Figure 5-5A. Platoon performing forward security for a convoy

Figure 5-5B. Platoon performing flank security for a convoy

Figure 5-5C. Platoon performing rear security for a convoy

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Chapter 5

INDEPENDENT ESCORT OPERATIONS

5-44. When the tank platoon executes a convoy escort mission independently, the convoy commander and
platoon leader will disperse the tanks throughout the convoy formation to provide forward, flank, and rear
security. Whenever possible, wingman tanks should maintain visual contact with their leaders. Tanks
equipped with mine plows or mine rollers (and engineer assets, if available) should be located near the
front to react to obstacles. At times, these assets may be required to move ahead of the convoy, acting as
the reconnaissance element or moving with scouts to proof the convoy route. Figure 5-6 illustrates this
kind of escort operation.

Figure 5-6. Platoon performing convoy escort independently

5-45. In some independent escort missions, variations in terrain along the route may require the platoon to
operate using a modified traveling overwatch technique. Figure 5-7 illustrates such a situation. It shows
one section leading the convoy while the other trails the convoy. Dispersion between vehicles in each
section is sufficient to provide flank security. Depending on the terrain, the trail section may not be able to
overwatch the movement of the lead section.

Figure 5-7. Platoon escort using modified traveling overwatch

ACTIONS ON CONTACT
5-46. As the convoy moves toward its new location, the enemy may attempt to interdict it. This contact
will usually occur in the form of an ambush, often with the use of a hastily prepared obstacle or improvised
explosive device (IED). The safety of the convoy then rests on the speed and effectiveness with which
escort elements can execute appropriate actions on contact.
5-47. Based on the factors of METT-TC, portions of the convoy security force, such as the tank platoon or
a tank section, may be designated as a reaction force. The reaction force performs its escort duties,
conducts tactical movement, or occupies an assembly area as required until enemy contact occurs; it then is
given a reaction mission by the convoy commander.

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 Other Tactical Operations

ACTIONS AT AN AMBUSH
5-48. An ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a convoy. Conversely, reaction to an
ambush must be immediate, overwhelming, and decisive. Actions on contact must be planned for and
rehearsed so they can be executed as a drill by all escort and convoy elements, with care taken to avoid
fratricide.
5-49. In almost all situations, the platoon will take several specific, instantaneous actions when it must
react to an ambush. These steps, illustrated in Figures 5-8A and 5-8B, include the following:
• As soon as they acquire an enemy force, the escort vehicles conduct action toward the enemy
(see Figure 5-8A). They seek covered positions between the convoy and the enemy and
suppress the enemy with the highest possible volume of fire permitted by the ROE. Contact
reports are sent to higher headquarters as quickly as possible.
• The convoy commander retains control of the convoy vehicles and continues to move them
along the route at the highest possible speed (see Figure 5-8A).
• Convoy vehicles, if they are armed, may return fire only if the escort has not positioned itself
between the convoy and the enemy force.
• Security forces must plan to secure all damaged or disabled vehicles and equipment. The
platoon leader or the convoy commander may request, as a last resort, that any damaged or
disabled vehicles be abandoned and pushed off the route (see Figure 5-8B).
• The escort leader (in the example included here, this is the tank platoon leader) uses SPOTREPs
to keep the convoy security commander informed. If necessary, the escort leader or the convoy
security commander can then request support from the reaction force; he can also call for and
adjust indirect fires.

Figure 5-8A. Convoy escort actions toward ambush

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Chapter 5

Figure 5-8B. Convoy continues to move

5-50. Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the escort element executes one of the following COAs
based on the composition of the escort and reaction forces, the commander’s intent, and the strength of the
enemy force:
• Continues to suppress the enemy as combat reaction forces move to support (see Figure 5-9A).
• Assaults the enemy (see Figure 5-9B).
• Breaks contact and moves out of the kill zone (see Figure 5-9C).
5-51. In most situations, tanks continue to suppress the enemy or execute an assault to destroy enemy
forces. Contact should be broken only when the tactical situation requires.

Figure 5-9A. Escort suppresses the ambush to facilitate attack by the reaction force

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 Other Tactical Operations

Figure 5-9B. Escort assaults the ambush force

Figure 5-9C. Escort breaks contact

ACTIONS AT AN OBSTACLE
5-52. Obstacles are a major threat to convoys. Obstacles can be used to harass the convoy by delaying it
or stopping it altogether. In addition, obstacles may canalize or stop the convoy to set up an enemy
ambush.
5-53. The purpose of the route reconnaissance ahead of a convoy is to identify obstacles and either breach
or bypass them. In some cases, however, the enemy or its obstacles may avoid detection by the
reconnaissance element. If this happens, the convoy must take actions to reduce or bypass the obstacle.

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Chapter 5

5-54. When an obstacle is identified, the convoy escort faces two problems: reducing or bypassing the
obstacle and maintaining protection for the convoy. Security becomes critical, and actions at the obstacle
must be accomplished very quickly. The convoy commander must assume that the obstacle is overwatched
and covered by the enemy. To reduce the time the convoy is halted and thus to reduce its vulnerability, the
following actions should occur when the convoy escort encounters a point-type obstacle:
• The lead element identifies the obstacle and directs the convoy to make a short halt and establish
security. The convoy escort overwatches the obstacle (see Figure 5-10) and requests that the
breach force move forward.
• The convoy escort maintains 360-degree security of the convoy and provides overwatch as the
breach force reconnoiters the obstacle in search of a bypass.
• Once all reconnaissance is complete, the convoy commander determines which of the following
COAs he will take:
• Bypass the obstacle.
• Breach the obstacle with the assets on hand.
• Breach the obstacle with reinforcing assets.
• The convoy security commander relays a SPOTREP higher and requests support by combat
reaction forces, engineer assets (if they are not part of the convoy), and/or aerial reconnaissance
elements.
• Artillery units are alerted to be prepared to provide fire support.

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 Other Tactical Operations

Figure 5-10. Convoy escort overwatches an obstacle

5-55. Tanks equipped with mine plows are ideal for breaching most obstacles encountered during convoy
escort missions. If the convoy escort is required to breach limited obstacles using plow tanks, the platoon
leader must maintain the security of the convoy, ensuring that adequate support forces are in place to
overwatch the breach operation.

ACTIONS DURING HALTS

5-56. During a short halt, the convoy escort remains at REDCON-1 regardless of what actions the convoy
vehicles are taking. (Note. Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for more information on REDCON levels.)
If the halt is for any reason other than an obstacle, the following actions should be taken:
• The convoy commander signals the short halt and transmits the order via tactical radio. All
vehicles in the convoy assume a herringbone formation.
• If possible, escort vehicles are positioned up to 100 meters beyond the convoy vehicles, which
are just clear of the route (see Figure 5-11A). Escort vehicles remain at REDCON-1, but
establish local security based on the factors of METT-TC.
• When the order is given to move out, convoy vehicles reestablish the movement formation,
leaving space for escort vehicles (see Figure 5-11B).

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Chapter 5

• Once the convoy is in column, local security elements (if used) return to their vehicles, and the
escort vehicles rejoin the column (see Figure 5-11C).
• When all elements are in column, the convoy resumes movement.

Figure 5-11A. Convoy assumes herringbone formation

Figure 5-11B. Convoy moves back into column formation

Figure 5-11C. Convoy escort vehicles rejoin column

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 Other Tactical Operations

SECTION V - PASSAGE OF LINES

5-57. The tank platoon participates in a passage of lines, in which one unit moves through the stationary
positions of another, as part of a larger force. If it is part of the stationary force, the platoon occupies
defensive positions and assists the passing unit. If it is part of a passing unit, the platoon executes tactical
movement through the stationary unit. A passage may be forward or rearward, depending on whether the
passing unit is moving toward (forward) or away from (rearward) an enemy unit or area of operations.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
5-58. Units are highly vulnerable during a passage of lines. Vehicles may be concentrated, and fires may
be masked. The passing unit may not be able to maneuver and react to enemy contact.
5-59. Detailed reconnaissance and coordination are critical in overcoming these potential problems and
ensuring the passage of lines is conducted quickly and smoothly. The commander normally conducts all
necessary reconnaissance and coordination for the passage. At times, he may designate the XO, 1SG, or a
platoon leader to conduct liaison duties for reconnaissance and coordination. The following items of
information are coordinated (Note. An asterisk indicates items that should be confirmed by
reconnaissance):
• Unit designation and composition, including type and number of passing vehicles.
• Passing unit arrival time(s).
• Location of attack positions or assembly areas. *
• Current enemy situation.
• Stationary unit’s mission and plan (to include OP, patrol, and obstacle locations). *
• Location of contact points, passage points, and passage lanes. (Note. The use of
GPS/POSNAV waypoints will simplify this process and, as a result, speed the passage.) *
• Guide requirements.
• Order of march.
• Anticipated and possible actions on enemy contact.
• Supporting direct and indirect fires, including location of the restrictive fire line (RFL). *
• CBRN conditions.
• Available CS and sustainment assets and their locations. *
• Communications information (to include frequencies, digital data, and near and far recognition
signals).
• Chain of command, including location of the battle handover line (BHL).
• Additional procedures for the passage.

CONDUCTING A PASSAGE OF LINES

FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES
5-60. For a forward passage, the passing unit first moves to an assembly area or an attack position behind
the stationary unit. Designated liaison personnel move forward to link up with guides and confirm
coordination information with the stationary unit. Guides then lead the passing elements through the
passage lane.
5-61. As the passing unit, the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to maximize its AO within the
limitations of the passage lane. Radio traffic is kept to a minimum. Disabled vehicles are bypassed. The
platoon holds its fire until it passes the BHL. Once clear of passage lane restrictions, the platoon conducts
tactical movement in accordance with its orders.

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Chapter 5

REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

5-62. Because of the increased chance of fratricide during a rearward passage, coordination of recognition
signals and direct-fire restrictions is critical. The passing unit contacts the stationary unit while it is still
beyond direct-fire range and conducts coordination as discussed previously. RFLs and near recognition
signals are emphasized.
5-63. As the passing unit, the tank platoon then continues tactical movement toward the passage lane. Gun
tubes are oriented on the enemy, and the platoon is responsible for their own security until it passes the
BHL. If guides are provided by the stationary unit, the passing unit may conduct a short halt to link up and
coordinate with them. The platoon moves quickly through the passage lane to a designated location behind
the stationary unit.

ASSISTING A PASSAGE OF LINES

5-64. As noted, the tank platoon provides this assistance while it is in stationary defensive positions. This
can occur after the platoon has consolidated on an objective or has occupied a BP. Coordinating
instructions may be in the form of a company or troop OPORD or a FRAGO issued over the radio. The
platoon leader may or may not have coordinated directly with the passing unit.
5-65. The platoon leader ensures that the platoon understands the points of coordination listed previously
in this section. If the platoon is to provide guides to assist the passing unit, he selects the personnel and
briefs them on the points of coordination. The guides are responsible for linking up with and guiding the
passing unit through the passage lane and for closing obstacles as necessary.
5-66. Control of direct fires is a critical role for the element that is assisting the passage of lines. In a
forward passage, the stationary unit engages known enemy targets until the passing unit moves past the
BHL. During a rearward passage, the passing unit contacts the stationary unit by radio at a point beyond
the direct-fire range of weapon systems. The stationary unit then holds all fires until the passing unit
reaches the BHL.

SECTION VI - BREACHING OPERATIONS

5-67. Obstacle breaching entails the employment of a combination of tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) and equipment to project combat power to the far side of an obstacle. The platoon leader must
understand the challenges presented by various types of obstacles and the capabilities and limitations of the
assets the platoon and its parent unit can employ to defeat them. He must further understand the basic
tenets of breaching operations and roles the platoon may be tasked to play in a breach. FM 3-34.2 (FM
90-13-1) contains a more detailed discussion of breaching operations and enemy obstacle employment.

TYPES OF OBSTACLES
5-68. Obstacles are any obstructions that stop, delay, divert, or restrict movement. They are usually
covered by observation and enhanced by direct or indirect fires and as such the platoon leader needs to
plan for this possibility. This discussion examines the two categories of obstacles.

EXISTING OBSTACLES
5-69. Existing obstacles are already present on the battlefield and are not emplaced through military effort.
They fall into two major classifications:
• Natural obstacles, which include these types:
• Ravines, gullies, gaps, or ditches over 3 meters wide.
• Streams, rivers, or canals over 1 meter deep.
• Mountains or hills with a slope in excess of 60 percent (30 degrees).
• Lakes, swamps and marshes over 1 meter deep.
• Tree stumps and large rocks over 18 inches high.

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 Other Tactical Operations

• Forests or jungles with trees 8 inches or more in diameter and with less than 4 meters of
space between trees on a slope.
• Man-made obstacles, which include built-up areas such as towns, cities, or railroad
embankments.

REINFORCING OBSTACLES
5-70. Reinforcing obstacles are placed on the battlefield through military effort and are designed to slow,
stop, or canalize the enemy. Whenever possible, both friendly and enemy forces will enhance the
effectiveness of their reinforcing obstacles by tying them in with existing obstacles. The following
discussion focuses on several types of reinforcing obstacles.

Minefields
5-71. The minefield is the most common reinforcing obstacle the platoon will encounter on the battlefield.
It is easier and quicker to emplace than other obstacles and can be very effective in destroying vehicles.
The minefield may be emplaced in several ways: by hand, by air or artillery delivery using scatterable
mines, or by mechanical means (the Volcano system). It can be used separately or in conjunction with
other obstacles; refer to Figure 5-12 for possible minefield locations.

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Chapter 5

Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations

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 Other Tactical Operations

Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations (continued)

Antitank Ditch
5-72. The antitank ditch, illustrated in Figure 5-13, may be reinforced with wire and/or mines to make it
more complex and more difficult for the attacker to overcome. In addition, soil from the ditch can be built
up into a berm on the emplacing unit side.

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Chapter 5

Figure 5-13. Antitank ditch

Road Craters
5-73. Road craters can be rapidly emplaced and are especially effective where restricted terrain on the
sides of a road or trail prevents a bypass (refer to Figure 5-14). Craters are at least 1.5 meters in depth and
6 meters in diameter and are usually supplemented with mines and/or wire.

Figure 5-14. Road craters

Abatis
5-74. An abatis provides an effective barrier against vehicle movement. Trees are felled either by sawing
or by use of explosives; the cut is made at least 1.5 meters above the ground, with the main trunks
crisscrossed and pointed toward the enemy at approximately a 45-degree angle. The abatis is usually about
75 meters in depth and ideally is located on trails where there is no bypass; the trunk of each tree should
remain attached to the stump to form an obstacle on the flanks of the abatis (see Figure 5-15). Abatis are
usually mined or booby-trapped.

Figure 5-15. Abatis

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 Other Tactical Operations

Log Crib
5-75. A log crib is a framework of tree trunks or beams filled with dirt and rock (see Figure 5-16). It is
used to block roads or paths in wooded and mountainous terrain.

Figure 5-16. Log crib

Wire Obstacles
5-76. Wire obstacles provide an effective and flexible antipersonnel barrier; they are frequently employed
on dismounted avenues of approach in the form of tanglefoot, double- or triple-strand concertina, and four-
strand fences. Employed in depth or in conjunction with mines, wire obstacles are also very effective
against tanks and similar vehicles (see Figure 5-17). A single wire obstacle, however, will have little effect
on armored vehicles; the sprocket of M1-series tanks is designed to cut wire.

Figure 5-17. Wire obstacle in depth

Tank Wall and Tank Berm
5-77. Tank walls and berms are constructed of dirt and rock to slow or canalize enemy tanks. They can
also create “belly” shots for the defender while the attacker is unable to engage (see Figure 5-18).

Figure 5-18. Belly shot created by a tank berm

Road Blocks in Urban Terrain

5-78. Road blocks can be constructed of any local material, to include overturned vehicles. These
obstacles would also create “belly” shots when the platoon tries to climb over the obstacle. In addition, the
use of burning tires or trash will cause this to be a more complex obstacle hindering thermal and optical
scanning.

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Chapter 5

BREACHING PROCEDURES
5-79. Breaching operations entail the coordinated efforts of three task-organized elements: the support
force, the breach force, and the assault force. The discussion in this section covers the actions and
responsibilities of these elements, as well as the tank platoon’s role in the operation.

SOSRA STEPS
5-80. The following actions, known by the abbreviation SOSRA, occur during a breaching operation:
• Sufficient support elements are employed to suppress enemy elements that are overwatching the
obstacle. The support force uses direct and indirect fires to accomplish its mission.
• The support force requests immediate or preplanned smoke to obscure the enemy and prevent
observation of the breach operation.
• The breach force must organize in such a manner as to secure the reduction area to prevent the
enemy from interfering with the obstacle reduction.
• The breach force takes actions to reduce the obstacle and allow follow-on forces to assault
enemy forces beyond the obstacle after the lane is proofed and marked.

BREACHING ORGANIZATION
5-81. The commander in charge of the breaching operation will designate support, breach, and assault
forces. He may task the tank platoon to serve in any of these elements, as detailed in the following
discussion. During operations with light forces the platoon leader may need to be prepared to cover any
one or several of the above missions. The light forces will not have the capability to create a breach large
enough for a tank force.

Support Force
5-82. This element usually leads movement of the breach elements. After identifying the obstacle, it
moves to covered and concealed areas and establishes support-by-fire positions. The support force leader
sends a voice or digital SPOTREP to the commander. This report must describe the location and
complexity of the obstacle, the composition of enemy forces that are overwatching the obstacle, and the
location of possible bypasses. The commander decides whether to maneuver to a bypass or to breach the
obstacle. (Note. He must keep in mind that a bypass may lead to an enemy kill zone.)
5-83. In either case, the support force suppresses any enemy elements that are overwatching the obstacle to
allow the breach force to breach or bypass the obstacle. The support force should be in position to request
suppressive artillery fires and smoke for obscuration. As the breach and assault forces execute their
missions, the support force lifts or shifts supporting fires. Because the enemy is likely to engage the
support force with artillery, the support force must be prepared to move to alternate positions while
maintaining suppressive fires.

Breach Force
5-84. The breach force receives a voice or digital SPOTREP identifying the location of the obstacle or
bypass. It then must organize internally to fulfill these responsibilities:
• Provide local security for the breach site as necessary.
• Conduct the actual breach. The breach force creates, proofs, and marks a lane through the
obstacle or secures the bypass.
• Move through the lane to provide local security for the assault force on the far side of the
obstacle. In some instances, the breach force may move to hull-down firing positions that allow
it to suppress enemy elements overwatching the obstacle. At other times, it may assault the
enemy, with suppressive fires provided by the support force.

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 Other Tactical Operations

Breaching Methods
5-85. The tank platoon can create a lane by itself if it is equipped with the assets required to breach the
type of obstacle encountered. If the platoon does not have this capability, it may be required to provide
close-in protection for attached engineers with breaching assets. Three breaching methods are available to
the platoon:
• Mechanical breaching, usually with mine plows or mine rakes.
• Explosive breaching, employing such means as the mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC), M173
line charge, or 1/4-pound blocks of TNT.
• Manual breaching, with Soldiers probing by hand or using such items as grappling hooks,
shovels, picks, axes, and chain saws. Manual breaching is the least preferred method for the
tank platoon.

Note. In extreme cases, the commander may order the platoon to force through an obstacle.
This technique requires the breach force to move in column formation through the obstacle
location. If available, a disabled vehicle can be pushed ahead of the lead breach vehicle in an
attempt to detonate mines.

Creating and Proofing the Lane

5-86. The mine plow is the breaching device most commonly employed by the tank platoon. The battalion
or company commander may allocate one to three plows per platoon. When properly equipped and
supported, the platoon can create up to two lanes through an obstacle.
5-87. Plow tanks lead the breach force. Immediately following them are vehicles that proof the lane; these
are usually tanks equipped with mine rollers. This process ensures that the lane is clear.

Note. If the location and/or dimensions of the obstacle are unknown, the platoon leader may
choose to lead with tanks equipped with mine rollers to identify the beginning of the obstacle.)

5-88. If the platoon is allocated one plow, the PSG’s wingman normally serves as the breach tank. The
PSG follows immediately behind to proof the lane and provide overwatch. The platoon leader’s section
follows the PSG.
5-89. If the platoon has two or more plows, it can create multiple lanes, usually 75 to 100 meters apart.
The wingman tanks are normally equipped with the plows, with the section leader’ tanks following to
proof the lanes and provide overwatch (see Figure 5-19).

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Chapter 5

Figure 5-19. Plow tanks create multiple lanes while the section leaders’ tanks provide
overwatch

Marking the Lane

5-90. After the lane is created and proofed, it can then be marked to ensure safe movement by vehicles and
personnel; this is critical for follow-on forces that may not know the exact location of the cleared lane.
Distinctive markers must show where the lane begins and ends. A visible line down the center is effective.
Another technique is to mark both sides of the breached lane. Figure 5-20 shows a sample marking
method. To minimize the necessary breaching time, the proofing vehicle may simultaneously mark the
lane. Unit SOPs will dictate marking methods and materials, which commonly include the following:
• Cleared lane mechanical marking system (CLAMMS).
• Pathfinder system.
• Engineer stakes with tape.
• Guides.
• Chem lights.
• Expended shell casings.

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 Other Tactical Operations

Figure 5-20. Sample technique for obstacle lane marking

Completing the Breach

5-91. Throughout the operation, the platoon leader provides continuous updates of the breach force’s
progress to higher headquarters and other elements involved in the breach. He also coordinates with the
support force for suppressive fires.
5-92. After marking is complete, the platoon leader uses voice and digital systems to report the location of
the lane and the method of marking to expedite the movement of the assault force. Digital overlays enable
units to move quickly to the breach lanes using the POSNAV or GPS.

Note. The assault force will often move behind the breach force and closely follow the breach
vehicles through the new lane.)

Assault Force
5-93. While the breach is in progress, the assault force assists the support force or follows the breach force
while maintaining cover and dispersion. Once a lane is cleared through the obstacle, the assault force then
moves through the breach. It secures the far side of the obstacle by physical occupation and/or continues
the attack in accordance with the commander’s intent.
5-94. Tank units, including the tank platoon, are ideally suited for assault force operations against mobile
enemy defenses in open terrain. Consideration should have mechanized infantry as an assault force
attacking dug-in enemy positions in close terrain.

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Chapter 5

SECTION VII - PERIMETER DEFENSE

5-95. The purpose of the perimeter defense is to protect the force or hold key terrain when the force is not
tied in with adjacent units. It is generally conducted in the same manner as a defense from a BP (hasty or
deliberate) except that it orients on a full 360-degree sector, normally through use of the coil formation.
(Note. For information on the coil formation, refer to the discussion of tactical movement in Chapter 3 of
this manual.) Common situations for the use of the perimeter defense include the following:
• Defense of assembly areas.
• Defense of specific installations, sites, or equipment (such as a TOC, downed aircraft, tactical
bridge, or roadblock).
• Defense of key terrain (such as a bridge, hilltop, pickup zone, or landing zone).
• When a unit has been isolated or bypassed by the enemy.
• As part of a larger force’s perimeter defense; examples include the defense of lodgment areas
(forward operating base), airfields, or assembly areas.
5-96. The tank platoon will normally execute a perimeter defense while attached to company- or battalion-
size dismounted infantry units. The platoon may also establish a perimeter defense when it is operating
alone and requires 360-degree security, such as during screen missions or while occupying platoon hide
positions. Considerations for the execution of a perimeter defense include the following:
• One section or the entire platoon orients on the most likely mounted avenues of approach.
• A section or the entire platoon may occupy an assembly area within the perimeter as a reserve or
reaction force. Missions of this force include the following:
• Moving to BPs that block potential areas of enemy penetration.
• Conducting counterattacks to repel or destroy an enemy penetration.
• Moving to BPs that add firepower to a portion of the defense.
• To avoid disrupting other fighting positions, the platoon must carefully coordinate, reconnoiter,
and conduct rehearsals on mounted movement routes to positions within the perimeter.
• Tanks must never fire over the heads of unprotected personnel. The concussion of the main gun
as well as discarded sabot petals can endanger these troops.
• Close coordination with dismounted infantry is critical. The tank platoon must know the
location and routes of dismounted OPs and patrols to help prevent fratricide. Additionally, the
platoon must rely on dismounted infantry to provide security against enemy infiltration of the
perimeter as well as close-in protection from dismounted enemy attacks.

SECTION VIII – SCREEN

5-97. The screen is a common security mission for cavalry troops and company teams. Cavalry troops
conduct stationary or moving flank screens. Company teams usually establish screen lines (for counter
reconnaissance purposes) in front of a task force as part of a defense. Purposes of the screen include the
following:
• Provide early warning of enemy approach.
• Provide real-time information, reaction time, and maneuver space to the protected force.
• Impede and harass the enemy.
• Facilitate counter reconnaissance operations, allowing the screening force, within its capability,
to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements.
5-98. During stationary screens, the tank platoon will normally occupy a hide position or a hasty defensive
position in depth behind OPs. The OPs are provided by scout or mechanized infantry platoons. When the
OPs identify the enemy, the commander issues FRAGOs for the tank platoon to conduct tactical movement
and occupy a hasty defensive position or an attack-by-fire position; the platoon also may conduct a hasty
attack to destroy the enemy. At times, the tank platoon may occupy a hasty BP as part of the screen line,
acquiring and killing the enemy forward of the position. During the conduct of a stationary screen, the

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 Other Tactical Operations

tank platoon may be required to break contact or conduct a withdrawal and then execute a passage of lines.
These tasks are discussed in other sections of this chapter.
5-99. In a moving flank screen (platoons normally execute this as a follow and support operation,
discussed earlier in this chapter), the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to the rear of scout platoons.
It may periodically occupy hasty BPs. When the scouts identify enemy elements, the commander issues a
FRAGO for the tank platoon to occupy a hasty defensive position or attack-by-fire position or to conduct a
hasty attack to destroy the enemy.
5-100. It is critical that the tank platoon leader keep these considerations in mind during all screen
operations:
• OPSEC requirements. During screen missions, the platoon may be required to operate apart
from other units.
• Location and identification of friendly forces. The platoon leader should know all patrol
routes and OP locations within the platoon’s AO. The platoon should maintain voice and digital
(if available) communications with the OPs.
• Engagement criteria. To reduce the potential for fratricide, engagement criteria should be as
specific as possible when friendly units operate to the front and flanks of the tank platoon as it
executes a screen mission.

SECTION IX – DELAY
5-101. A delay operation is a continuous series of defensive actions over successive positions in depth.
The purpose is to trade the enemy space for time while retaining freedom of action. Units involved in a
delay maximize the use of terrain and obstacles, maintaining contact with the enemy but avoiding decisive
engagement. In some instances, local counterattacks are used to assist units during disengagement or to
take advantage of battlefield opportunities.
5-102. The tank platoon conducts the delay as part of a company team. In some cases, it will occupy
either a hasty or deliberate BP; it will then disengage and occupy successive BPs in depth as part of the
delaying force. The platoon may also be required to conduct local counterattacks or to support the
movement of other platoons during the delay. The considerations involved in planning and executing a
delay at platoon level are the same as for offensive operations (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual) and
defensive operations (refer to Chapter 4).

SECTION X - RELIEF IN PLACE

5-103. A relief in place occurs when one unit assumes the mission and positions of another unit. It may
be accomplished during either offensive or defensive operations, preferably during periods of limited
visibility. There are two methods by which to conduct a relief in place:
• Simultaneous. All elements are relieved simultaneously.
• Sequential. The relief takes place one element at a time (by individual vehicle or by section).
5-104. A relief in place requires detailed planning, coordination, and reconnaissance before the operation
is executed and precise movement and effective communications once execution begins. OPSEC is critical
throughout the operation.

COORDINATION AND RECONNAISSANCE

5-105. When time is available and the situation permits, the incoming platoon leader coordinates with the
in-place platoon leader and conducts a reconnaissance to confirm details of the relief. The two leaders
should coordinate and exchange the following information:
• The enemy situation and other pertinent intelligence.
• The platoons’ maneuver and fire support plans. Who will provide fire support and for how
long?

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Chapter 5

• Unit level obstacle plans.

• Routes to be used during the operation
• The location of weapons and fighting positions.
• Sketch cards and fire plans (including grid locations for input into digital systems).
• Details of the relief, to include the sequence, the use of recognition signals and guides, and the
time of change of responsibility for the area.
• Procedures for transferring excess ammunition, POL, wire lines (hot loops), and other materiel
to the incoming unit.
• Command and signal information.
5-106. Reconnaissance of relief positions is the same as for any BP. The incoming platoon leader should
obtain information on the following:
• The engagement area, to include triggers, and trigger lines, TRPs, obstacles, and the break point.
• Primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions.
• Routes to and within the BP.
• Hide positions.
• Location of guides.

RELIEF PROCEDURES
5-107. After reconnaissance and coordination are complete, the platoon leaders continue with their troop-
leading procedures and prepare to execute the relief. Initially, the relieving unit moves to an assembly area
behind the unit to be relieved. Final coordination is conducted, and information is exchanged between the
two units.
5-108. The relieving unit links up with guides or finalizes linkup procedures. Individual vehicles then
relieve forward positions using one of three techniques:
• The relieving vehicles occupy primary positions after the relieved unit has moved to alternate
positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit can withdraw.
• The relieving vehicles occupy alternate positions while the relieved unit remains in primary
positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws. The platoon leader then orders
the relieving unit to occupy primary positions as necessary.
• The relieving unit occupies a hide position while the relieved unit occupies hide, primary, or
alternate positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws.

SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS

5-109. As noted, OPSEC is critical in preventing enemy reconnaissance and intelligence assets from
identifying the weaknesses and vulnerabilities that occur during the relief. Net discipline is the key to an
effective, and secure, relief operation. Before beginning the relief, the relieving unit changes to the
outgoing unit’s frequency and the two units operate on the same net throughout the relief. The
incoming unit observes radio listening silence while the outgoing unit maintains normal radio traffic.
5-110. By monitoring the same frequency and maintaining digital links, leaders at all levels have the
ability to contact other units involved in the relief to warn of emergency situations, such as enemy contact.
Because of the proximity of the relieved and relieving elements, however, leaders must remember that the
net will be crowded with many stations and digital links competing for limited availability of “air time.”
5-111. Once the relief is complete, there are two methods for returning to separate unit frequencies. One
technique is to have the incoming unit switch back to its original frequency. The other is to have the
outgoing unit switch to an alternate frequency. The latter technique offers several advantages:
• The relieving unit establishes voice and digital communications and is prepared to defend
immediately upon the exit of the relieved unit.

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 Other Tactical Operations

• The relieving unit never loses the digital link (if applicable) as it assumes the new mission.
Once the relief is complete, the relieved unit simply logs off the digital net and switches to an
alternate FM frequency; it can then reestablish a digital link after leaving the relief site.
• Maintaining radio traffic on the same frequency before, during, and after the operation will help
deceive the enemy as to whether a relief has occurred.

SECTION XI - WITHDRAWAL
5-112. The purpose of this retrograde operation is to free a force in contact with the enemy so it can
execute a new mission. Conducting a withdrawal at platoon level is identical to disengagement (see the
discussion in Chapter 4 of this manual). The withdrawal may be conducted under pressure (with direct or
indirect fire enemy contact) or with no pressure.

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 Chapter 6
Combined Arms Operations

The tank platoon must take full advantage of available combined arms assets to
accomplish its mission and to reduce its vulnerability on the battlefield. Combined
arms integration may include mortars, FA, combat engineers, ADA, and aviation
units. These assets are not organic to the tank platoon, but they may be available to
through its parent battalion, company, or troop. The platoon leader must understand
the capabilities and limitations of each combined arms asset in order to effectively
employ them in combat.

SECTION I - FIRE SUPPORT

6-1. Mortars and FA are the primary means of indirect fire support available to tank platoons. In addition
to understanding the capabilities and limitations of these assets, platoon leaders and their TCs must know
what fire request channels to use to request fires. They must also understand how to work with the FIST at
company team/troop level to plan and coordinate indirect fires. FM 6-30 explains how to call for and
adjust fires.

MORTAR SUPPORT
6-2. Mortars afford immediate and responsive indirect fire support to maneuver forces. Each combined
arms battalion (CAB) has four 120-mm mortar systems organized into two sections. Each reconnaissance
squadron has six 120-mm mortar systems organized with two systems organic to each troop.

CAPABILITIES
6-3. With a maximum effective range of 7,200 meters, 120-mm mortars can provide a heavy volume of
accurate, sustained fires. They are ideal weapons for attacking a variety of targets, including the following:
• Infantry in the open.
• Targets on reverse slopes.
• Targets in narrow ravines or trenches.
• Targets in forests, towns, and other areas that are difficult to strike with low-angle fires.
6-4. In addition to these highly flexible targeting options, mortars have the following capabilities and
advantages:
• Rapid response time.
• Effective against low-density targets.
• Highly destructive target effects.

LIMITATIONS
6-5. Mortars are limited in the following ways:
• Maximum range is limited in comparison to the indirect fire support capability of FA elements.
• They cannot be used against targets inside their minimum indirect fire effective range (200
meters from the mortar tube position).
• Only limited types of ammunition are available.

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Chapter 6

• Mortar elements carry limited amounts of ammunition.

• Their fire direction center (FDC) and tubes are not linked to the TACFIRE system.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
6-6. Mortars can be extremely effective when used for the purposes outlined in the following discussion.

Destruction
6-7. High-explosive (HE) rounds, mounted with variable-time (VT) fuses, can be used to destroy or
disperse dismounted infantry and vehicles that are in the open. HE mortar rounds have the capability to
destroy or disable some armored vehicles.

Suppression
6-8. HE rounds can be used to force the enemy to button up or move to less advantageous positions.

Smoke
6-9. Mortar smoke builds up more rapidly than artillery smoke. White phosphorus (WP) rounds are used
for obscuration and screening. See Appendix E of this manual for detailed information on the use of
smoke.

Illumination
6-10. Illumination rounds are used to light an area or enemy position during periods of limited visibility.
Illumination can increase the effectiveness of the tank platoon’s image intensification devices (passive
sights). This helps the platoon in gathering information, adjusting artillery fire, and engaging enemy
targets. Ground-burst illumination can also be used to mark enemy positions and to provide a thermal TRP
for control of fires.
6-11. Units must be careful, however, not to illuminate friendly positions. Also, because U.S. night-vision
devices may or may not be superior to those of most potential adversaries, illuminating the battlefield may
be unnecessary or even counterproductive.

FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT

6-12. Tank platoon leaders must fully understand how to use artillery support to their best advantage. It is
often their primary means of delaying and disrupting enemy formations and suppressing enemy positions.
FA can provide immediate, responsive, accurate fires with a wide variety of munitions.
6-13. FA support is provided by an artillery (fires) battalion of the brigade (BCT). Each ground squadron
in the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) has its own organic howitzer battery to provide dedicated indirect
fire support. The platoon generally receives FA support through its attached company or troop FIST.

CAPABILITIES
6-14. In support of the tank platoon, FA elements can accomplish the following tasks:
• Provide immediate suppression on unplanned targets.
• Provide continuous fire support on planned targets in all weather conditions and types of terrain.
• Allow commanders and platoon leaders to shift and mass fires rapidly.
• Offer a variety of conventional shell and fuse combinations.
• Provide obscuration and screening smoke to conceal movement.
• Fire battlefield illumination rounds as necessary.

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 Combined Arms Operations

LIMITATIONS
6-15. FA support has the following limitations:
• Limited capability against moving targets.
• Limited capability to destroy point targets without considerable ammunition expenditure or use
of specialized munitions.
• Highly vulnerable to detection by enemy target acquisition systems.

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM

6-16. The FIST is attached to companies or troops for combat operations or assigned as part of the
company in the CAB. It may be positioned forward with a security force in support of operations when
on-target designation is required for special munitions engagements. The FIST, however, is a valuable
resource because of its command and control link with the artillery; it should not be exposed to direct fire
except when absolutely necessary.

SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
6-17. FISTs are organized, equipped, and trained to provide the following personnel and support to the
company or troop:
• A fire support advisor and coordinator.
• A communications link to all available indirect fire support assets.
• On-the-spot support for infantry companies (ten-man team) or for armor companies and cavalry
troops (four-man team).

COMMUNICATIONS
6-18. The armor or mechanized infantry FIST normally monitors the following radio nets:
• Attached unit command net (battalion, company team, or troop).
• Battalion mortar fire direction net.
• Direct support (DS) battalion fire direction net (digital).
• Battalion fire support net (voice).
6-19. The armored cavalry troop FIST normally monitors these radio nets:
• Troop command net.
• Troop fire support net.
• Supporting artillery fire direction net (digital and voice).
• Squadron fire support net.
6-20. The FIST serves as the net control station (NCS) on the unit fire support net, while the fire support
element (FSE) serves as the NCS on the maneuver battalion fire support net. The FIST relays calls for fire
to supporting artillery on a digital net (TACFIRE) or sends the fire mission to the mortar platoon or
section. The command net allows the FIST to monitor operations and links the FIST to the commander
and platoon leaders for planning and coordination.

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM VEHICLE

6-21. The FIST will operate from one of two vehicles; the M981, known as the fire support team vehicle
(FISTV) or the M7 Bradley fire support team (BFIST) vehicle. Refer to Figure 6-1 for an illustration.

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Chapter 6

Figure 6-1. Fire support team vehicle

FIRE REQUEST CHANNELS

6-22. In a tank company, all requests for indirect fire support are normally sent through the FIST on the
company or troop command net. The commander approves the request using a prearranged method (oral
approval or silence). The FIST selects the best available fire support asset to engage the target.
Adjustments of the fire mission normally are also sent to the FIST, which then relays the message to the
artillery unit on a digital fire direction net or to the battalion mortars on the fire support net. In cavalry
troops, the FIST may pass the fire mission to the troop mortars; all adjustments are sent directly to the
mortars.
6-23. Besides specific requests sent to the FIST, the platoon can request fire support in several other ways:
• Calls for fire can result from SPOTREPs sent on the company or troop command net; the
company FIST eavesdrops on the net and requests fires on targets of opportunity and on targets
approved by the commander.
• Requests for fire can be “tagged” onto preformatted SPOTREPs and contact reports sent via
FBCB2. The TC presses the button for “request fire,” “immediate suppression,” or “immediate
smoke” when sending a FBCB2 report (see Figures 6-2).
• Requests for fire support can be entered directly into the TACFIRE system using FBCB2.
Using the digital system, the platoon leader can exit a communications net and link into the
TACFIRE system. Once the request is complete, the platoon leader exits the TACFIRE system
and reenters the unit’s net. Unit SOP will dictate the use of this TACFIRE capability; see ST 3
20.153 for details.

Figure 6-2. FBCB2 SPOTREP (immediate suppression request)

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 Combined Arms Operations

FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

INITIAL CALL-FOR-FIRE
6-24. The standard call for fire consists of three basic transmissions, which in turn comprise six elements:
• Observer identification and WARNO (first transmission).
• Target location (second transmission).
• Target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control (third transmission).

Observer Identification and Warning Order (First Transmission)

6-25. Observer identification tells the FDC who is calling. It also clears the net for the duration of the call.
The WARNO tells the FDC the type of mission and the method of locating the target. The types of indirect
fire missions are the following:
• Adjust fire. This is used when the observer is uncertain of the exact target location. The
observer says, “ADJUST FIRE.”
• Fire for effect. The observer should always attempt first-round fire for effect if he is sure his
target location is correct. He should also be sure the rounds of the first volley will have the
desired effect on the target so little or no adjustment will be required. The observer announces,
“FIRE FOR EFFECT.” (Note. On FBCB2-equipped vehicles, properly updated POSNAV data
and an accurate lase to the target provide extremely accurate target location. This enables
observers to call “FIRE FOR EFFECT” on the first transmission.)
• Suppression. The word “SUPPRESS” is used to quickly bring fire on a preplanned target when
unable to observe. This is a simplified call for fire and is sent in one transmission. Example:
“G24—THIS IS G59—SUPPRESS AF2401—OVER.” Target description is not announced.
• Immediate suppression. This is used to bring fire quickly on a planned target or a target of
opportunity that is firing at a friendly unit or aircraft. As an example, the observer says, “G24—
THIS IS G57—IMMEDIATE SUPPRESSION AF2402—OVER.” Target description is not
announced.
• Immediate smoke. This is used to place smoke quickly on a planned target or a target of
opportunity that is firing at a friendly unit. Sample transmission: “G24—THIS IS G54—
IMMEDIATE SMOKE AF2405—OVER.”
6-26. The polar and shift methods are announced to the FDC as part of the first transmission. They will be
covered more in the following paragraph.

Target Location (Second Transmission)

6-27. Following the type of mission, the method of target location is announced; this prepares the FDC to
receive the data sent by the observer and apply it to locate the target. The three methods for locating
targets are grid, polar plot, and shift from a known point. The polar and shift methods are announced to the
FDC. If the observer does not specify either polar or shift, the FDC knows the grid method is being used;
the word “grid” is not announced. Example: “H24—THIS IS H67—FIRE FOR EFFECT—POLAR—
OVER.”

Grid Method
6-28. In the grid method, the target location normally consists of a two-letter grid zone identifier with eight
digits (example: “AB180739”). The direction from the observer to the target (in mils, if possible) must be
given to the FDC after the call for fire, but before the first adjusting rounds are shot.

Note. With the likelihood of operating in built-up areas, crew members should call for fire
using eight- or ten-digit grids to reduce collateral damage.

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Chapter 6

Polar Plot Method

6-29. This method requires that the observer and the FDC know the observer’s exact location. The
observer determines the direction (to the nearest 10 mils) of the observer-target (OT) line and the distance
(to the nearest 100 meters) from his position to the target (see Figure 6-3).

Figure 6-3. Polar plot method of target location

Shift From a Known Point Method
6-30. This method can be used if the observer and the FDC have a common known point (see Figure 6-4).
Normally, this point is an artillery target. To locate the target, the observer must first determine the
direction to the known point to the nearest 10 mils. If the observer has no compass, he can determine the
direction by using a map and protractor or by using his binocular reticle pattern and a known direction to
the known point. He then determines direction to the target using the RALS rule (right add, left subtract).

Figure 6-4. Shift from a known point method using direction (in mils)
6-31. The observer then determines the lateral and range shifts (see Figure 6-5). Lateral shifts are left or
right from the known point to the OT line and are given to the nearest 10 meters. Range shifts are given as
“ADD” (when the target is beyond the known point) or “DROP” (when the target is closer than the known

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 Combined Arms Operations

point). Range shifts are given to the nearest 100 meters. FM 6-30 explains in detail how to determine
lateral and range shifts.

Figure 6-5. Lateral and range shifts from a known point

Target Description, Method of Engagement, and Method of Fire and Control (Third
Transmission)
6-32. The observer includes the target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control
in his call for fire using the guidelines discussed in the following paragraphs.

Target Description
6-33. The observer describes the target to the FDC; see Figure 6-6 for examples. The FDC then
determines the type and amount of ammunition needed. The target description should be brief but
accurate. This is the last required element in the call for fire.

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Chapter 6

Figure 6-6. Target description

Method of Engagement
6-34. The observer tells how he wants to attack the target (including type of ammunition, fuse, and
distance from friendly troops). The FDC may change the ammunition type and fuse based on availability
or other constraints. If the target is within 600 meters of friendly troops, the observer announces
“DANGER CLOSE” to supporting mortars and artillery.
Method of Fire and Control
6-35. The observer will state who will give the command for fire to begin firing. If the observer wants to
control the time of firing, he will say, “AT MY COMMAND.” The FDC will tell the observer when the
unit is ready to fire. At the proper time, the observer will say, “FIRE.” If the observer does not say, “AT
MY COMMAND,” the FDC will fire as soon as the platoon or battery is ready.

ADJUSTING INDIRECT FIRE

6-36. Once the call for fire has been made, the observer’s next concern is to get the fire on the target. If he
can locate the target accurately, he will request fire for effect in his initial call for fire. When the observer
cannot accurately locate the target, for any reason such as deceptive terrain, lack of identifiable terrain
features, or poor visibility, he must execute an adjustment to bring fires on the target. Normally, one
artillery piece or mortar is used in adjustment.
6-37. The observer must first pick an adjusting point. For a destruction mission (precision fire), the target
is the adjusting point. For an area target (area fire), the observer must pick a well-defined adjusting point
at the center of the area or close to it. The observer must spot the first adjusting round and each successive
round and send range and deviation corrections, as required, back to the FDC until fire hits the target. The
observer spots by relating the burst or group of bursts to the adjusting point. For a further discussion of
adjusting mortar and artillery fire, see FM 6-30.

TANK PLATOON FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

6-38. The fire support plan is developed along with the scheme of maneuver supports. It discusses the use
of all available indirect and direct fires. The goal is to destroy as many enemy elements as possible and to
suppress any others to keep them from firing on friendly forces. The company commander and FIST plan
indirect fires; however, the platoon leader may plan and request more targets if needed.

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 Combined Arms Operations

6-39. After receiving the company offensive fire plan, the platoon leader checks it to ensure that targets are
planned on all known or suspected enemy positions in front of, on, behind, and to the flanks of the
objective. The company defensive fire plan should list planned targets in front of, on, behind, and to the
flanks of BPs; likely areas for these targets include observed choke points, avenues of approach, obstacles,
and likely support-by-fire positions. If more targets are necessary for either the offensive or defensive
plan, the platoon leader coordinates them with the commander and the FIST.

SECTION II - ARMY AVIATION

6-40. Army aviation forces may be employed organic to a division or higher level of command to conduct
maneuver or provide support. Aviation forces may also be attached or OPCON to another command.
Army aviation units normally will not be OPCON to echelons below battalion level; however, attack
helicopters may conduct direct air-to-ground coordination with companies and platoons during combat
operations.

AIR CAVALRY
6-41. Armed reconnaissance, found in combat aviation brigades, is organized, equipped, and trained to
conduct reconnaissance and security missions.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS
6-42. Attack helicopter units operate either as a separate element within a division or as part of the air
cavalry. Attack helicopter companies are maneuver units and are normally integrated into the ground
scheme of maneuver. When working with ground maneuver units, the attack helicopter unit may be placed
OPCON to the ground force. Normally, it is OPCON to a maneuver brigade or regiment; on rare
occasions, it can be OPCON to a battalion or squadron.
6-43. The primary aircraft in air cavalry units is the OH-58D. This helicopter provides substantial limited-
visibility and all-weather acquisition capability. The aircraft features a stabilized mast-mounted sight
(MMS) with a low-light TV camera, TIS, and laser range finder/designator. It can acquire armored vehicle
targets at night at ranges up to 10 kilometers. It can be armed with a wide assortment of weapons and thus
can be configured for a variety of threat situations (see Figure 6-7).

Figure 6-7. OH-58D armed helicopter

6-44. Aeroscouts usually arrive before attack aircraft, establish communications with ground forces, and
coordinate the situation and mission with the commander. Aeroscouts identify targets, choose general BPs,
and control attack helicopter fires.
6-45. The attack helicopter is primarily employed as an anti-armor weapon system. Figure 6-8 shows the
type of attack aircraft in the Army’s inventory, the AH-64 Apache.

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Chapter 6

Figure 6-8. Army attack helicopters

SECTION III - COMBAT ENGINEERS

6-46. Brigade/regiment and battalion/squadron commanders decide how best to employ their engineer
assets: as a distinct unit, attached to their subordinate elements, or in direct support of the subordinate
elements. In the heavy BCT, the maneuver battalions have an engineer company assigned to the battalion.
In fast-moving offensive operations, one technique is to place engineers OPCON to the lead company team
or troop to support breaching operations. In the defense, commanders generally keep engineer units intact
to construct major obstacles and execute survivability operations, designating the priority of work to be
accomplished. Engineers are trained to fight as infantry as a secondary mission; however, they are
employed as infantry only if absolutely necessary.

CAPABILITIES
6-47. The combat engineer platoon is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct mobility,
countermobility, and survivability missions in support of ground operations. The higher unit commander
determines the engineers’ specific tasks and responsibilities in these three roles.
ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT
Organization
6-48. The combat engineer platoon consists of three squads mounted in M113s or M2 IFV (see Figure
6-9). Every squad has a demolition set, chain saw, and two mine detectors. The platoon headquarters is
authorized one M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE), which is highly mobile, armored, and amphibious
(see Figure 6-10).

Figure 6-9. Combat engineer platoon organization

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 Combined Arms Operations

Figure 6-10. M9 armored combat earthmover

Equipment
6-49. The platoon may also be supplemented with equipment from the engineer company.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
6-50. In mobility operations, the engineer platoon can provide the following support:
• Obstacle reduction. The engineers can reduce or negate the effects of obstacles, thereby
improving their supported unit’s maneuver capability.
• Route construction. The engineers can construct, improve, and maintain roads, bridges, and
fords.
6-51. In a countermobility role, engineers can assist with obstacle construction to obstruct the enemy’s
scheme of maneuver. They can reinforce terrain and existing obstacles to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the
enemy force.
6-52. Engineers can improve survivability by constructing dug-in positions and overhead protection to
reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapons.

ENGINEER SUPPORT TO THE TANK PLATOON

6-53. Combat engineers normally support the company team as a platoon under the direction of the
company team commander. During planning for mobility, countermobility, and survivability work, the
engineers can advise the commander on construction time and materials needed; the company normally
must order much of the material through battalion supply channels.
6-54. The tank platoon leader frequently will be tasked to provide security while the engineer platoon
conducts its missions. To speed up the construction process, the engineers may need the help of armor
crewmen. Additional details on engineer support and employment are in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this
manual.

SECTION IV - AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

6-55. Air and missile defense assets are scarce; maneuver units can expect not to receive any air and
missile defense protection. As a result, the tank platoon must be able to protect itself from enemy air
attacks during all combat operations. Air and missile defense measures include actions to avoid enemy air
attack, actions to limit the damage if an attack occurs, and (as necessary) actions required to engage enemy
aircraft.

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Chapter 6

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE WARNINGS

6-56. Local air and missile defense warnings are used to indicate the air threat. They are used in
conjunction with the weapon control status (discussed in the active air and missile defense portion of this
section) to provide early warning of and planned responses to enemy aircraft. There are three local air and
missile defense warning levels:
• DYNAMITE. Aircraft are inbound or attacking locally now.
• LOOKOUT. Aircraft are in the area of interest but are not threatening. They may be inbound,
but there is time to react.
• SNOWMAN. There are no aircraft posing a threat at this time.

Note. Air and missile defense warnings of RED, YELLOW, and WHITE are established at
levels higher than division. These roughly parallel the local warning levels, but they cover a
larger area of operations, such as a theater.

PASSIVE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

6-57. Passive air and missile defense is the tank platoon’s first line of defense against enemy air attack. It
includes all measures, other than active defense, taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action. There
are two types of passive air and missile defense: attack avoidance and damage-limiting measures.

ATTACK AVOIDANCE
6-58. If an enemy pilot cannot find friendly elements, he cannot attack them. The platoon should use
concealment, camouflage, deception, communications security, and any other necessary action to prevent
enemy detection. Refer to the discussion of OPSEC in Appendix D of this manual.
6-59. Whenever possible, static positions must provide effective overhead concealment. When
concealment is not available, vehicles must be camouflaged to blend into the natural surroundings. Track
marks leading into the position must be obliterated. All shiny objects that could reflect light and attract
attention must be covered.

DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES

Dispersion
6-60. Dispersion is one of the most effective ways to reduce the effects of enemy air attack. It is essential
when a unit is occupying static positions such as assembly areas or is preparing to cross a water obstacle or
pass through a breached obstacle. When the platoon is on the move and air guards identify an enemy air
attack, vehicles disperse quickly, move to covered and concealed positions if possible, and stop (a
stationary vehicle is more difficult to see than a moving vehicle). Refer to the discussion of the react to air
attack battle drill in Chapter 3 of this manual. An early warning system that includes both visual and
audible signals can help to limit damage by enabling the platoon to begin dispersion at the earliest possible
moment.

Cover
6-61. Another damage-limiting measure is the use of natural or man-made cover to reduce the effects of
enemy munitions. Folds in the earth, depressions, buildings, and sandbagged positions can provide this
protection.

ACTIVE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

6-62. Although passive measures are the first line of defense against air attack, the tank platoon must be
prepared to engage enemy aircraft. The decision to fight back against an air threat is based on the situation

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 Combined Arms Operations

and the capabilities of organic weapon systems. All platoon members must understand that they can
defend against a direct attack but cannot engage aircraft that are not attacking them unless the weapon
control status allows it.

WEAPON CONTROL STATUS

6-63. The weapon control status describes the relative degree of control in effect for air and missile
defense fires. It applies to all weapon systems. The platoon leader receives the status from the company or
troop commander. The three control statuses are the following:
• WEAPONS FREE. Crews can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly. This
is the least restrictive weapon control status.
• WEAPONS TIGHT. Crews can fire only at air targets positively identified as hostile
according to the prevailing hostile criteria.
• WEAPONS HOLD. Crews are prohibited from firing except in self-defense or in response to a
formal order from the unit commander. This is the most restrictive control status.

PLATOON AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE FIRES

6-64. When it must fight back, the platoon can use the tank’s main gun and machine guns against attacking
aircraft.

Machine Gun Fires

6-65. Engaging aircraft with volume fire is the key to effective use of the machine guns. These fires must
be coordinated to be effective. Delivered on the platoon leader’s command, they are directed at an aim
point; gunners do not attempt to track the target with machine guns. Refer to Chapter 3, Figure 3-20 of this
manual for guidelines and procedures for selecting machine gun aim points. These rules are simple and
logical; everyone in the platoon must learn and retain them.

Main Gun Fires

6-66. Several types of main gun ammunition are effective against helicopters, including MPAT, high-
explosive antitank (HEAT), and armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) rounds. The main gun aim point
is always center of mass.

Note. Refer to the battle drill for reaction to air attack in Chapter 3 of this manual. For further
information on MPAT ammunition, refer to FM 3-20.12.

SECTION V - AIR SUPPORT

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

6-67. Close air support (CAS), provided by the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps, can be employed to
destroy large enemy armor formations or when using smart weapons can be effective against point targets.
CAS strikes can be either preplanned (at brigade, battalion, or squadron level) or requested on an
immediate-need basis through the battalion enlisted terminal air controller (ETAC). The ETAC on the
ground or the forward air controller (FAC) in the air acts as a link between the ground element and the
CAS aircraft.
6-68. Army air cavalry is best equipped to coordinate with U.S. Air Force assets in joint air attack team
(JAAT) and attack helicopter operations. The air cavalry can see the battlefield and the target better than
ground forces can, and it has the radio equipment needed to talk to U.S. Air Force aircraft. The attack
aircraft organic to air cavalry units can assist CAS aircraft in suppressing the enemy ADA threat.

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Chapter 6

Table 6-1. Characteristics and capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft

AIRCRAFT SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS (Typical Munitions)
AV-8B USMC Vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) CAS aircraft;
subsonic; typical load 4,000 lbs. Maximum load 9,200 lbs; 25
mm Gatling gun.
A-10 or USAF, USAF Specialized CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 6,000 lbs.
O/A-10 Reserve, Maximum load 16,000 lbs; 30-mm gun.
USAF NG
F-15E USAF Multi-role aircraft; priority is air-to-ground; supersonic; maximum
load 24,500 lbs; 20-mm cannon with 512 rounds.
F-16 USAF, USAF Multi-role aircraft; complements the F-15 in an air-to-air role;
Reserve, most accurate air-to-ground delivery system in the inventory;
USAF NG supersonic; typical load 6,000 lbs. Maximum load 10,500 lbs.
F/A-18 USN, USMC Multi-role fighter; wide variety of air-to-surface weapons; typical
load 7,000 lbs. Maximum load 17,000 lbs; 20-mm gun mounted
in the nose and air-to-air missiles.
AC-130 USAF, USAF Specialized CAS/rear area combat operations (RACO) aircraft,
Reserve propeller driven, two models. The A-model is equipped with two
40-mm guns, two 20-mm guns, and two 7.62-mm mini guns.
The H-model is similar, except it has no 7.62 mini guns and one
of the 40-mm guns is replaced with a 105-mm howitzer. Both
models have advanced sensors and a target acquisition system
including forward-looking infrared and low-light TV. Weapons
employment accuracy is outstanding. This aircraft is vulnerable
to threat air defense systems and must operate in a low ADA
threat environment.
Note. Typical load is average load for typical support mission; maximum load is the amount the aircraft
can carry in an ideal situation.
Ammunition load is for information purposes only, as the platoon has no control of aircraft
configurations. This will help platoon leaders understand which aircraft would best be able to support the
platoon for a certain type of mission.

MARKING FRIENDLY POSITIONS

6-69. Whenever possible, friendly positions should be marked during close air strikes, especially when
friendly troops are within 300 meters of the target. Resources for marking positions include the following:
• Smoke. The smoke grenade is the most commonly used marker, but it has limitations. Wind
may cause smoke to drift above trees, and some colors can blend with the background. Violet or
white smoke shows up well against most background colors.
• Flares. Rocket or 40-mm flares are useful for attracting attention at night; they can sometimes
be employed effectively during the day.
• Mirrors and signal panels. Signal mirrors are probably the best ground-to-air devices for
attracting attention. If the sun is shining and the operator is skillful, pilots can see a mirror’s
flash miles away. VS-17 signal panels are also good visual references for pilots.
• Lights. Pocket-size, battery-powered strobe lights produce brilliant white or blue flashes at
about 1-1/2-second intervals. The flash is visible at night for 1 to 3 miles. Vehicle lights, such
as an unshielded red taillight, are visible to a pilot for several miles at night. Chemical glow
lights can also be used to mark friendly positions. One technique that can be used at night is to
tie an infrared or green chemical light on a 10-foot string. When aircraft are in the area, a
crewman can swing the light in a circular motion to mark the location.

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SECTION VI - MILITARY POLICE

6-70. Military police (MP) operations play a significant role by assisting the commanders in meeting the
challenges associated with conducting combat operations. MPs provide a wide range of diverse support in
urban terrain, to include area damage control, area security, detainee operations, and noncombatant
operations. MP operations require continuous coordination with host-nation civilian police to maintain
control of the civilian population and to enforce law and order. These MP assets may be attached or
OPCON to combat units for the duration of a specific mission and then will be released to the control of
their parent unit. Their training in urban operations can be of great assistance for help in crowd control,
roadblocks/checkpoints, marking and controlling routes, and detainee control.

MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT

6-71. The maneuver and mobility support (MMS) function involves numerous measures and actions
necessary to support the commander’s freedom of movement in his area of responsibility (AOR). The MPs
expedite the forward and lateral movement of combat resources and ensure that commanders get forces,
supplies, and equipment when and where they are needed. This is particularly important in the modern
battlefield where there is a greater geographical dispersal of forces and lengthened lines of communication.
6-72. The MPs maintain the security and viability of the strategic and tactical lines of communication to
ensure that the commander can deploy and employ his forces. The MPs support the commander and help
expedite military traffic by operating traffic-control points (TCPs), defilades, or mobile patrols; erecting
route signs on main supply routes (MSR) or alternate supply routes (ASR); or conducting a reconnaissance
for bypassed or additional routes. The MPs move all units quickly and smoothly with the least amount of
interference possible.
6-73. As part of the MMS function, the MPs support river-crossing operations, breaching operations, and a
passage of lines. They also provide straggler control, dislocated-civilian control, route reconnaissance and
surveillance (R&S), and MSR regulation enforcement.

AREA SECURITY
6-74. The MPs perform the area security (AS) function to protect the force and enhance the freedom of
units to conduct their assigned missions. The MPs, who provide AS, play a key role in supporting forces
in operations outside main battle area. The MPs act as a response force that delays and defeats enemy
attempts to disrupt or demoralize military operations in the AO. The MPs’ mobility makes it possible for
them to detect the threat as they aggressively patrol the AO, MSRs, key terrain, and critical assets. The
MPs’ organic communications enable them to advise the appropriate headquarters, bases, base clusters, and
moving units of impending enemy activities. With organic firepower, the MPs are capable of engaging in
decisive operations against a Level II threat and delaying (shaping) a Level III threat until commitment of
the tactical combat force (TCF).

DETAINEE OPERATIONS
6-75. The Army is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) executive agent for all detainee operations.
Additionally, the Army is DOD’s executive agent for long-term confinement of U.S. military prisoners.
Within the Army and through the combatant commander, the MPs are tasked with coordinating shelter,
protection, accountability, and sustainment for all types of detainees. A detained person in the custody of
US armed forces who has not been classified as an RP (retained person) or a CI (civilian internee) is
treated as an EPW until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority.
6-76. The I/R function is of humane as well as tactical importance. In any conflict involving U.S. forces,
safe and humane treatment of detainees is required by international law. Military actions on the modern
battlefield will result in many detainees. Entire units of enemy forces, separated and disorganized by the
shock of intensive combat, may be captured. This can place a tremendous challenge on tactical forces and
can significantly reduce the capturing unit’s combat effectiveness. The MPs support the battlefield

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Chapter 6

commander by relieving him of the problem of handling detainees with combat forces. The MPs perform
their I/R function of collecting, evacuating, and securing detainees throughout the AO. In this process, the
MPs coordinate with military intelligence (MI) to collect information that may be used in current or future
operations.

LAW AND ORDER

6-77. The law and order (L&O) function consists of those measures necessary to enforce laws, directives,
and punitive regulations. The MPs’ L&O function extends the battlefield commander’s C2. The MPs, in
close coordination with the Criminal Investigative Division (CID), work to suppress the chance for
criminal behavior throughout the AO.

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 Chapter 7
Sustainment

Sustainment elements arm, fuel, fix, feed, clothe, and provide transportation and
personnel for the platoon. The platoon leader is responsible for supervising
sustainment within the platoon. The PSG is the sustainment operator for the platoon,
as the 1SG is for the company and troop. The PSG advises the platoon leader of
logistical requirements during preparation for combat operations. He also keeps the
platoon leader informed of the platoon’s status. During combat operations, the PSG
coordinates directly with the 1SG, informing him of the platoon’s supply,
maintenance, and personnel requirements. The PSG is assisted by the other TCs and
the gunners on the platoon leader’s and PSG’s vehicles.

SECTION I - ORGANIZATION
7-1. The platoon has no organic sustainment assets. The PSG coordinates directly with his 1SG for all
sustainment assets. The PSG is also the primary recipient of all maintenance, supply, and personnel reports
within the platoon. He is assisted by the TCs, but it is his responsibility to keep the platoon leader
informed of the current status of the platoon.
7-2. Most routine sustainment functions are accomplished by SOP. These procedures and services
include the following:
• Accountability, maintenance, and safeguarding of the unit’s assigned equipment.
• Reporting of the status of personnel, equipment, and classes of supply.
• Requests for resupply.
• Turn-in of equipment for repair.
• Evacuation of personnel (WIA, KIA, detainees).
• Evacuation of equipment and vehicles for replacement and/or repair.

SECTION II - SUPPLY OPERATIONS

7-3. Each platoon has a large amount of equipment and requires frequent resupply to accomplish its
mission. All leaders must make periodic checks to ensure that the platoon’s equipment, especially high-use
items, is accounted for and ready to use. They must anticipate supply expenditures and request resupply
before an operation begins.
7-4. The company or troop delivers supplies to the platoon. Priorities for delivery are established by the
company/troop commander. The PSG distributes supplies within the platoon.

BASIC AND COMBAT LOADS

BASIC LOAD
7-5. For supply classes other than ammunition, the basic load covers supplies kept by units for use when
combat is initiated. The quantity of each item of supply in a basic load is based on the number of days the
unit may have to sustain itself in combat without resupply.

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7-6. For ammunition (Class V), the basic load is the quantity of ammunition required to be on hand to
meet combat needs until resupply can be accomplished. The basic ammunition load is specified by the
theater army and is expressed in rounds, units, or units of weight, as appropriate.

COMBAT LOAD
7-7. The combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the platoon must have on hand to
sustain operations in combat for a prescribed number of days. The platoon’s parent unit must be capable of
moving the combat load, using organic transportation assets, into combat in a single delivery. Like the
basic load, the platoon’s combat load is specified by higher headquarters.

CLASSES OF SUPPLY
CLASS I
7-8. Class I includes subsistence items (rations, water, and ice) as well as gratuitous issue of items related
to health, morale, and welfare.
7-9. Each vehicle maintains a supply of rations, usually a three- to five-day stock, in the form of meals,
ready-to-eat (MRE). Hot meals are brought forward whenever possible. All meals should be eaten in
shifts, and they should never be served at one centralized location. The platoon leader and PSG must make
sure not only that the platoon is fed, but also that their Soldiers eat nutritious meals to maintain the energy
levels required in combat. During continuous or cold-weather operations, Soldiers will eat more than three
meals per day. This extra allowance must be planned and requested.
7-10. Potable water should be replenished daily, either by refilling from the water trailer or by rotating 5
gallon cans with the 1SG or supply sergeant. Each combat vehicle should maintain a minimum of 10
gallons of potable water, more during operations in arid climates or in MOPP gear. The platoon should
also maintain a minimum amount of nonpotable water for vehicle and equipment maintenance; one
technique is to recycle water previously used for personal hygiene.

CLASS II
7-11. Class II includes items of equipment, other than principal items, that are prescribed in authorization
and allowance tables. Among these items, which are requested through the supply sergeant, are individual
tools and tool sets, individual equipment and clothing items, chemical lights, batteries, engineer tape,
tentage, and housekeeping supplies. Supply sergeant should also keep 10-percent overage of central issue
facility (CIF) items in order to replace Soldier’s equipment that is lost or damaged during operations.

CLASS III
7-12. Class III comprises all types of POL products. Rearming and refueling usually occur daily or at the
conclusion of major operations; for optimum security, they should be executed simultaneously under the
cover of limited visibility. The two techniques of refueling and rearming and tailgate and service-station
resupply are covered later in this section.
7-13. The platoon leader must control redistribution of fuel and ammunition when these supplies cannot be
delivered or when only limited quantities are available. The PSG continually monitors the platoon’s
supply status through CS reports and, on digitally equipped vehicles, automated SITREPs. Refer to ST
3-20.153 for report formats. The PSG notifies the platoon leader before a specific vehicle or the platoon as
a whole is critically short of these major classes of supply.
7-14. In planning for refueling operations, the platoon leader should balance the range and fuel capacity of
his vehicles against the requirements of future operations. The platoon must top off vehicles whenever the
tactical situation permits. When time is limited, however, the platoon leader must choose between topping
off vehicles that need the most fuel first and giving limited amounts to each vehicle. Vehicle crews must
maintain a stock of oil, grease, and hydraulic fluid, replenishing these POL products every time they refuel.

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CLASS IV
7-15. Class IV includes construction and barrier materials used by the platoon to construct OPs and
obstacles and to improve fighting positions. Barrier materials include lumber, sandbags, concertina or
barbed wire, and pickets. Based on unit SOP, some Class IV materials may be part of the tank load plan;
other materials are requested through the company or troop headquarters. Prior planning for resupply is
required due to long delivery and large amounts of haul assets required.

CLASS V
7-16. Class V is ammunition, to include small arms, artillery and tank rounds, mines and demolitions,
fuses, missiles, and bombs.
7-17. He should take steps to ensure ammunition is equally distributed throughout the platoon before the
start of any tactical operation, after direct-fire contact with the enemy, and during consolidation on an
objective.

CLASS VI
7-18. Class VI covers personal-demand items. Tobacco products, candy, and toiletry articles are normally
sold through the exchange system during peacetime or for units not in a combat environment. In a combat
environment, these items are sent with Class I as health and comfort packs.

CLASS VII
7-19. Class VII includes major-end items. These are major pieces of equipment, assembled and ready for
intended use, such as combat vehicles, missile launchers, artillery pieces, and major weapon systems.
Major-end items that are destroyed are reported immediately by means of CS reports (see ST
3-20.153 for report formats). The items will be replaced by the parent unit as they are reported and as
available.

CLASS VIII
7-20. Class VIII includes medical supplies, which are provided through the battalion or squadron medical
platoon and ordered through the medical team supporting the platoon, company, or troop. Included are
individual medical supplies such as first-aid dressings, refills for first-aid kits and combat lifesaver bags,
water purification tablets, and foot powder.

CLASS IX
7-21. Class IX comprises repair parts carried by the maintenance team. These basic-load supplies are part
of the PLL. PLL items carried by the platoon usually include spare track, road wheels, assorted bolts,
machine gun parts, and light bulbs. Class IX supplies are requisitioned through the company or troop
maintenance section by using the DA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet.

METHODS OF RESUPPLY
7-22. The tank platoon uses three methods in conducting supply operations: pre-positioning, routine
resupply, and emergency resupply. The method to be used is determined after an analysis of the factors of
METT-TC.

PRE-POSITIONING
7-23. Pre-positioning of supplies, also known as prestock resupply, may be required in some defensive
operations. Normally, only Class V items will be prestocked, but Class I and Class III supplies may be
included in some situations. Prestock operations are fairly rare in the offense and generally are limited to
refueling.

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Operational Considerations
7-24. The location and amount of a prestock must be carefully planned and then verified through
reconnaissance and rehearsals. Each TC must be informed of prestock locations. The following
considerations influence selection of prestock sites and execution of the resupply operation:
• Availability of overhead cover for the prestock location.
• Cover and concealment for the location and routes that vehicles will take to reach it.
• Security procedures required to safeguard the resupply operation.
• Procedures for protecting friendly personnel and vehicles in the event prestock ammunition is
ignited.

Prestock in the Defense

7-25. There are several techniques for accomplishing prestock resupply in the defense. Normally, Class V
(ammunition) is positioned next to or within a vehicle’s fighting position. This enables the tank crew to
resupply during an engagement without displacing. Another technique is to locate Class V supplies en
route to or within a successive BP. Use of this method requires consideration of security procedures to
safeguard the prestock. Resupply of Class III (specifically fuel) is usually accomplished behind a unit’s
current BP or en route to a successive BP. When the platoon must conduct this type of resupply in the
defense, the platoon leader directs the PSG to rotate vehicles or sections through prestock positions based
on the enemy situation and shortages within the platoon. Security will require planning to prevent enemy
dismounted/guerilla forces from destroying or sabotaging prestocked supplies.

Prestock in the Offense

7-26. As noted, pre-positioning of supplies in the offense is normally limited to refueling. The ROM
technique is planned and organized at battalion or higher level to sustain vehicles during long movements.
The goal of the ROM is to ensure that vehicles are topped off prior to possible contact with the enemy.
Security for ROM sites is normally maintained using battalion assets. If enough fuel-hauling vehicles are
available, individual vehicles, sections, platoons, or companies/troops proceed directly to their specified
fuel vehicle and either top off or receive an amount of fuel specified in the OPORD. If the number of fuel
vehicles is limited, vehicles either assume a herringbone formation or occupy hasty defensive positions
until they can top off.

Destruction or Removal of Supplies

7-27. In all prestock operations, the unit must have a plan for the destruction or removal of supplies to
prevent their capture by the enemy. The plan should include information about the location of and routes
to prestock sites.

ROUTINE RESUPPLY
7-28. These operations include regular resupply of items in Classes I, III, V, and IX and of any other items
requested by the company or troop. Routine resupply is planned at battalion level and normally takes place
at every opportunity. The LOGPAC comprises company/troop and battalion/squadron assets that transport
supplies to the company or troop (see Figure 7-1).

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 Sustainment

Figure 7-1. Example company or troop LOGPAC

7-29. The company or troop supply sergeant assembles his LOGPAC in the battalion/squadron field trains
area under the supervision of the support platoon leader from the FSC and the company 1SG.
Replacements and hospital returnees travel to company/troop locations on LOGPAC vehicles as required.
7-30. Once the LOGPAC is prepared for movement, the supply sergeant moves the vehicles forward from
the field trains as part of the battalion/squadron resupply convoy to the logistics resupply point (LRP). The
1SG or his representative meets the LOGPAC and guides it to the company or troop resupply point. The
company or troop then executes tailgate or service-station resupply; refer to the discussion of these
resupply techniques later in this section.

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Chapter 7

EMERGENCY RESUPPLY
7-31. Emergency resupply, normally involving Class III and Class V, is executed when the platoon has
such an urgent need for resupply that it cannot wait for the routine LOGPAC. Emergency resupply
procedures start with immediate redistribution of ammunition in individual vehicles, followed by cross-
leveling of ammunition within the platoon. It is better to have four tanks with 20 rounds of ammunition
each than two tanks with 40 rounds and two others with none.
7-32. Once requested through the commander or 1SG, emergency supplies are brought forward by the
battalion/squadron support platoon. Based on the enemy situation, the tank platoon may have to conduct
resupply while in contact with the enemy. Two techniques are used to resupply units in contact:
• Limited supplies are brought forward to the closest concealed position, where the tailgate
technique of resupply is used.
• Individual vehicles or sections disengage and move to a resupply point, obtain their supplies,
and then return to the fight. This is a version of the service-station technique.

Note. Refer to the following discussion of the tailgate and service-station resupply techniques.

TECHNIQUES OF RESUPPLY
7-33. The tactical situation will dictate which technique of resupply the platoon will use: tailgate, service
station, a variation of one type, or a combination of both types. The situation will also dictate when to
resupply. Generally, the platoon should attempt to avoid resupply during the execution of offensive
operations; resupply should be done during mission transition. Resupply is unavoidable during defensive
missions of long duration.

TAILGATE RESUPPLY
7-34. In the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition are brought to individual tanks by the 1SG or another
responsible individual who is assisting him (see Figure 7-2). This method is used when routes leading to
vehicle positions are available and the unit is not under direct enemy observation and fire. It is time-
consuming, but it is useful in maintaining stealth during defensive missions because tanks do not have to
move. If necessary, supplies can be hand carried to vehicle positions to further minimize signatures.

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 Sustainment

Figure 7-2. Tailgate resupply technique

SERVICE-STATION RESUPPLY
7-35. In the service-station technique, vehicles move to a centrally located point for rearming and
refueling, either by section or as an entire platoon (see Figure 7-3). Service-station resupply is inherently
faster than the tailgate method; because vehicles must move and concentrate, however, it can create
security problems. During defensive missions, the platoon must be careful not to compromise the location
of fighting positions.

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Chapter 7

Figure 7-3. Service-station resupply technique

VARIATIONS AND COMBINATIONS

7-36. The platoon leader can vary the specifics of the two basic techniques, or he can use them in
combination. During a defensive mission, for example, he may use the tailgate technique for a mounted
forward OP and the service-station method for the remainder of the platoon located in hide positions (see
Figure 7-4).

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 Sustainment

Figure 7-4. Combination of resupply techniques

SECTION III - MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

7-37. Proper maintenance keeps equipment and materiel in serviceable condition. It includes PMCS, as
well as inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning, recovering, and evacuating equipment and
materiel when necessary.
7-38. There are two maintenance echelons in the tank platoon:
• Field maintenance, which consists of crew tasks, organizational tasks, and direct-support (DS)
tasks.
• Sustainment maintenance, which consists of general support (GS) tasks and some DS tasks.
7-39. The tank platoon maintenance structure is designed to support the “replace forward, repair rear”
concept. This concept focuses on the combat repair team (CRT) replacing nonserviceable line replaceable
units (LRU), and evacuating systems to higher levels for repair. Field maintenance primarily involves
system tasks that are performed on or nearby a system to return it to mission-capable status. These tasks do
not require disassembly of components after removal from the system.
7-40. Sustainment maintenance involves off-system tasks that support the supply system. These tasks
generally require disassembly of components away from the combat system and, when repaired, are
returned to the supply system rather than the user.
7-41. Repair and recovery take place as far forward as possible. When personnel cannot repair the
equipment on site within two hours, they move the equipment to the nearest rear unit maintenance
collection point (UMCP).

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Chapter 7

7-42. The platoon leader is concerned primarily with supervising operator maintenance. He also must
ensure that personnel perform scheduled services as part of organizational maintenance. In addition, he
must ensure that personnel provide support for DS maintenance elements when equipment must be
evacuated.

LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
PLATOON LEADER
7-43. The platoon leader has ultimate responsibility for the condition and performance of the platoon’s
equipment and materiel. In that role, his duties include the following:
• Ensuring, within the platoon’s maintenance capabilities, that all platoon vehicles, weapon
systems, and equipment such as night-vision devices, mine detectors, and communications
equipment are combat ready at all times. The platoon leader also ensures that equipment that
cannot be repaired at platoon level is reported to organizational maintenance as soon as possible
using DA Form 2404.
• Knowing the status of current platoon maintenance activities, including corrective actions for
equipment faults, job orders to DS maintenance elements, and requisition of repair parts. The
platoon leader keeps his commander informed of the platoon’s maintenance status.
• Coordinating with the maintenance officer in planning, directing, and supervising unit
maintenance for the platoon.
• Developing and supervising an ongoing maintenance training program.
• Ensuring that tank crews have appropriate technical manuals on hand and are trained and
supervised to complete operator maintenance properly.
• Ensuring that unit-level PMCS are performed on all assigned equipment in accordance with
appropriate operator’s manuals.
• Ensuring that drivers are trained and licensed to operate platoon vehicles and equipment.
• Planning and rehearsing a maintenance evacuation plan for every mission.

PLATOON SERGEANT
7-44. The PSG has primary responsibility for most of the platoon’s maintenance activities. His duties
include the following:
• Directing and supervising unit maintenance of platoon equipment, vehicles, and weapon
systems. Because time constraints will not allow all equipment to be PMCS’d every day, the
PSG will need to develop a schedule to ensure all equipment is checked in a reasonable time. At
a minimum, weapons and vehicles must be checked daily.
• Helping the platoon leader to comply with his responsibilities and assuming these
responsibilities in his absence.
• Coordinating with the 1SG to arrange organizational or DS maintenance.
• Supervising and accounting for platoon personnel during maintenance periods.
• Ensuring that repair parts are used or stored as they are received.
• Collecting reports of the platoon’s maintenance status in the field and sending the appropriate
consolidated reports to maintenance personnel.
• Ensuring that vehicles are always topped off with fuel in garrison and that they receive adequate
fuel in the field.
• Keeping the platoon leader informed of the platoon’s maintenance and logistics status.

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TANK COMMANDERS AND PLATOON LEADER’S GUNNER

7-45. The TCs and the gunner from the platoon leader’s tank are the platoon’s first-line maintenance
supervisors. In large part, the platoon’s maintenance status, and thus its combat readiness, depends on their
commitment to proper maintenance procedures. Their duties in this area include the following:
• Ensuring that the equipment inspection and maintenance worksheet is filled out accurately and
updated in accordance with DA Pam 750-8.
• Ensuring that dispatch records are completed accurately and turned in on schedule.
• Ensuring that the crew is properly trained in PMCS procedures and that PMCS are performed on
the vehicle in accordance with the appropriate technical manuals. Soldiers must be made to use
the book, to ensure correct checks are being completed. (See special note after paragraph 7-45,
below.)
• Ensuring that, as a minimum, the assigned driver for each vehicle is properly trained and
licensed. In preparing for continuous operations, the TC must ensure that all crew members are
trained and licensed as drivers.
• Ensuring that repair parts are installed upon receipt or are stored in authorized locations.
• Ensuring that all tools and basic issue items (BII) are properly marked, stored, maintained, and
accounted for.
• Ensuring that each vehicle is always topped off in garrison and that it receives as much fuel as
possible at every opportunity in the field.
• Constantly updating the PSG on the maintenance and logistics status of the vehicle.

LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE
FIELD MAINTENANCE—OPERATOR
7-46. Operator maintenance includes proper care, use, and maintenance of assigned vehicles and crew
equipment such as weapons, CBRN equipment, and night-vision devices. Checks and services prescribed
for the automotive system, weapon systems, and turret are divided into three groups:
• Before-operation.
• During-operation.
• After-operation.
7-47. The driver and other crew members perform daily checks and services on their vehicle and
equipment, to include inspecting, servicing, tightening, performing minor lubrication, cleaning, preserving,
and adjusting. The driver and gunner are required to record the results of checks and services, as well as
all equipment faults and deficiencies that they cannot immediately correct, on the equipment inspection and
maintenance worksheet (DA Form 2404). The worksheet is the primary means of reporting equipment
problems through the TC to the PSG and platoon leader and ultimately to organizational maintenance
personnel.
7-48. The M1A2 is equipped with embedded nonintrusive and intrusive diagnostic test capabilities; these
include the built-in test (BIT) and fault isolation test (FIT). These tests enable crews to identify and isolate
many system and component failures prior to the arrival of organizational mechanics. Unit SOP should
specify how to report the results of these tests as well as identify the duties of organizational mechanics.

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Special Note
Detailed vehicle and equipment checks and services are outlined in every operator’s
manual and should always be conducted as stated in the manual. Although
operators must learn to operate equipment without referring to the manual,
maintenance must be performed using the appropriate technical manual—not from
memory!

FIELD MAINTENANCE—FIELD MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS

7-49. Organizational maintenance is the responsibility of the unit assigned the equipment. It is performed
by the operators and mechanics provided by the FSC of the brigade support battalion. Because the tank’s
design allows rapid modular replacement of parts, many faults can be corrected, and the vehicle returned to
the platoon, with minimum delay.
7-50. When the operator identifies a problem that is beyond his level of maintenance capability, he notifies
his chain of command so the problem can be isolated and corrected. The company or troop maintenance
team provided by the FSC has trained mechanics who are authorized to perform field maintenance tasks as
prescribed in the technical manuals for the vehicle.
7-51. The built-in diagnostic tests on the M1A2 SEP (BIT/FIT) facilitate rapid replacement of defective
components and systems. When the crew isolates a problem using these tests, the organizational mechanic
can verify the fault as soon as he arrives on site and replace the component without further diagnostic
testing.
7-52. Other functions performed by field maintenance technicians either at the FSC or BSB consist of
repair and/or replacement of parts, assemblies, components, and limited fabrication. Maintenance support
teams from DS units are usually located forward with the battalion or squadron field trains. These support
teams may go forward to fix disabled equipment on site, but they are limited in what they can fix and
where they can go.
SUSTAINMENT MAINTENANCE
7-53. Sustainment maintenance entails operations employing job shops or bays or production lines; it gives
units the capability to task-organize to meet special mission requirements. Sustainment maintenance assets
operate at echelons above corps (EAC). Based on METT-TC factors and the tactical situation, platoon- or
team-size elements may be moved as far forward as necessary to fulfill support requirements.

RELATED OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

EVACUATION
7-54. Evacuation is necessary when a damaged vehicle cannot be repaired on site within two hours or
when evacuation is the only means (besides friendly destruction) available to prevent capture or destruction
by the enemy. When a vehicle needs to be evacuated, the platoon leader or PSG reports its exact location,
the vehicle type, and the extent of damage, if known, on the company or troop net to personnel designated
in the unit SOP. The crew should remain with the vehicle to assist in evacuation and repair, to provide
security, and to return the repaired vehicle to the platoon as soon as possible.
7-55. A recovery vehicle from the company/troop or battalion/squadron maintenance team will evacuate
the damaged vehicle. It is vital that the crew move the damaged vehicle to a covered position that allows
the recovery vehicle to reach it without exposing the recovery crew to enemy fire. The vehicle is
evacuated to an LRP, to the MSR, or to the UMCP as necessary.
7-56. The recovery team normally employs an M88A1/A2 recovery vehicle. This vehicle travels with the
company or troop maintenance team under the direction of the 1SG. The location of the maintenance team
during operations is designated in the company/troop OPORD.

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 Sustainment

7-57. If a recovery vehicle is not available or if time is critical, other platoon vehicles can evacuate the
damaged vehicle for short distances. The decision to do this rests with the platoon leader. Towing
procedures are outlined in the operator’s manual. Self-evacuation by the platoon is a last resort that should
be considered only to prevent losing the damaged vehicle to the enemy.
7-58. If the damaged vehicle will be lost for an extended period, the platoon can replace other vehicles’
damaged equipment (such as weapons and radios) with properly functioning items from the damaged
vehicle within the commander’s controlled substitution policy. Damaged equipment can then be repaired
or replaced while the vehicle is being repaired.

SECTION IV - PERSONNEL OPERATIONS

PERSONNEL SERVICES
7-59. Many of the personnel services required by the platoon are provided automatically by higher-level
support elements; nonetheless, the platoon leader is ultimately responsible for coordinating personnel
services and providing them to his platoon. These services are nearly always executed and supervised by
the PSG and TCs and include the following:
• Personal needs and comfort items, such as clothing exchange and showers.
• Awards and decorations.
• Leaves and passes.
• Command information.
• Mail.
• Religious services.
• Financial services.
• Legal assistance.
• Rest and relaxation.
• Any other service designed to maintain the health, welfare, and morale of the Soldier.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
7-60. Personnel management includes classification, assignment, promotions, and reenlistments. Although
the platoon leader requests these actions through the company or troop, they are normally performed by the
battalion or squadron staff or by a division-level organization. The platoon leader must submit accurate
strength reports to ensure that crew positions, in which critical shortages exist, such as TCs and gunners,
are filled with qualified personnel.

SECTION V - MEDICAL TREATMENT AND EVACUATION

HEALTH AND HYGIENE

7-61. Leaders must emphasize high standards of health and hygiene. Soldiers must shave daily so their
protective masks will seal; bathing and changing clothes regularly are essential in preventing disease. Each
crewman should carry shaving equipment, soap, a towel, and a change of clothing in a waterproof bag
inside his pack.
7-62. During cold weather, Soldiers must check their hands and feet regularly to prevent such conditions
as frostbite, trench foot, and immersion foot. They must also learn that the effects of windchill on exposed
skin are equal to those of temperatures much lower than the thermometer shows. A moving vehicle will
cause a windchill effect even if the air is calm.
7-63. Field sanitation teams are trained in preventive medicine measures (PMM) and in treatment of
disease and nonbattle injuries (DNBI). They may advise the company/troop commander and platoon
leader on the implementation of unit-level procedures for PMM and DNBI. For additional information,

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Chapter 7

refer to FM 21-10. Each platoon should have an NCO designated a field sanitation representative to ensure
the platoon follows proper procedure when operating in a decentralized environment.

SOLDIERS WOUNDED IN ACTION

CREW RESPONSIBILITIES
7-64. It is the TC’s responsibility to make sure that WIA crewmen receive immediate first aid and that the
platoon leader or PSG is notified of all casualties. The platoon has to have a plan to ensure sections keep
eyes on each other so that if one is damaged or destroyed, the platoon leadership will know about it without
having to relay on radio traffic. The use of crewmen who are trained as combat lifesavers is absolutely
critical. As a minimum, one member of each tank crew must be a trained combat lifesaver. Ideally,
however, each crewman should be a combat lifesaver. As per unit SOP, TCs will need to mark their
vehicles so that the unit medics can identify where casualties are located and who has priority.

EVACUATION PROCEDURES
7-65. If wounded crewmen require evacuation, the platoon leader or PSG takes one of the following steps:
• Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop aidman for ground evacuation.
• Coordinate with the company or troop commander for self-evacuation using organic platoon
assets.
• Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop commander for aerial evacuation.
7-66. Regardless of the method of evacuation, all TCs must have the necessary sustainment graphics
available, including casualty collection points for the company/troop and/or combined arms
battalion/squadron. Evacuation procedures must be included in the platoon plan and should be rehearsed
as part of mission preparation.
7-67. Aerial evacuation, if it is available, is preferred because of its speed. The platoon leader or PSG
coordinates with higher headquarters and then switches to the designated frequency to coordinate directly
with aerial assets for either MEDEVAC or casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) services. He must pick a
relatively flat, open, and covered and concealed position for the aircraft’s landing zone. The location
should be given to the aircraft by radio and marked with colored smoke as the aircraft approaches the area.
The tank platoon provides local security of the landing zone until the evacuation is complete.

ACTIONS FOLLOWING EVACUATION

7-68. After evacuation is complete, the PSG compiles and submits witness statements and casualty feeder
reports in accordance with unit SOP. See Figure 7-5A, DA Form 1156 (Casulaty Feeder Card [front side])
and Figure 7-5B, DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Card [back side]) for a sample casualty feeder report.
The platoon leader redistributes crewmen and, as necessary, directs TCs to take the actions necessary to
prepare for operations at reduced manpower levels. (Note. It is extremely difficult, but not impossible, for
the platoon to sustain continuous operations with three-man crews.)

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 Sustainment

Figure 7-5A. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (front side)

Figure 7-5B. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (back side)

7-69. A wounded crewman’s individual weapon becomes the responsibility of the TC, or senior remaining
crewmen. Personal effects, weapons, and equipment are turned in to the company or troop supply sergeant
at the earliest opportunity. The crewman’s protective mask stays with him at all times. All sensitive items
remain with the vehicle; these include maps, overlays, and SOPs.

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

7-70. The company/troop commander will designate a location for collection of KIA personnel. The
remains of each KIA Soldier are placed in a body bag or sleeping bag or rolled in a poncho and are
evacuated by the PSG or 1SG. The lower dog tag is removed and retained by the PSG or 1SG. The

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Chapter 7

personal effects of the KIA Soldier remain with the body. The Soldier’s weapon, equipment, and issue
items become the responsibility of the TC until they can be turned over to the supply sergeant or 1SG.
7-71. As a rule, the bodies of KIA Soldiers should not be placed on the same vehicle as wounded Soldiers.
If the PSG or 1SG cannot expedite evacuation, however, a vehicle may have to carry dead and wounded
personnel together to its next stop. In the attack, this may be the objective. In the defense, it may be the
next BP.

SECTION VI - DETAINEES
7-72. If enemy soldiers want to surrender, it is the tank crew’s responsibility to take them into custody and
control them until they can be evacuated. Detainees are excellent sources of combat intelligence; however,
this information will be of tactical value only if the prisoners are processed and evacuated to the rear
quickly.
7-73. The unit SOP or company/troop OPORD should designate specific detainee handling procedures,
such as collection points, responsibilities for safeguarding prisoners, and procedures for moving prisoners.
The following discussion focuses on considerations that may apply when the platoon must deal with
detainees, captured equipment and materiel, and civilians. (See FM 3-19.40 for additional information on
the handling of detainees.)

HANDLING DETAINEES
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
7-74. The basic principles for handling detainees are covered by the “five-S’s and T” procedures (search,
segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag) outlined below.

“Five-S’s and T” Procedures for Handling Detainees

SEARCH Remove and tag all weapons and documents. Return to the
detainee all personal items with no military value. Detainees
are allowed to keep their helmet, protective mask, and other
gear that will protect them from the immediate dangers of the
battle area.
SEGREGATE Break the chain of command; separate detainees by rank, sex,
and other suitable categories (keep the staunch fighter away
from those who willingly surrender).
SILENCE Prevent detainees from giving orders, planning escapes, or
developing false “cover stories.”
SPEED Speed detainees to the rear to remove them from the battle
area and to quickly obtain and use their information.
SAFEGUARD Prevent detainees from escaping. Protect them from violence,
insults, curiosity, and reprisals of any kind.
TAG Tag detainees with a DD Form 2745, (Enemy Prisoner of War
(EPW) Capture Tag) or a field-expedient capture tag that
includes the following information:
y Date of capture.
y Location of capture (grid coordinates).
y Capturing unit.

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 Sustainment

y Special circumstances of capture (how the person was

captured, if he resisted, if he gave up, and so forth).
Note. The capturing unit must complete a capture tag because failure to do so
hinders further processing and disposition.

7-75. The first rule that platoon members must keep in mind is that they must never approach an enemy
soldier, even when it appears certain that he wants to surrender. He may have a weapon hidden nearby, or
he may be booby-trapped. The following procedures apply for taking the prisoner into custody:
• Gesture for him to come forward, and then wait until it is clear that he is honestly surrendering
and not trying to lure friendly troops into an ambush.
• Use a thermal sight to locate possible ambushes.
• When searching the prisoner, always have another friendly Soldier cover him with a weapon.
• Do not move between the enemy and the Soldier covering him.
7-76. As directed by the platoon leader, crewmen take the detainees to an area designated by the
commander. The prisoners are then evacuated to the rear for interrogation. If a detainee is wounded and
cannot be evacuated through medical channels, the platoon leader notifies the XO or 1SG. The detainee
will be escorted to the company or troop trains, or the 1SG will come forward with guards to evacuate him.

DETAINEE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

7-77. The rights of detainees have been established by international law, and the United States has agreed
to obey these laws. Once an enemy soldier shows he wants to surrender, he must be treated humanely. It
is a court-martial offense to physically or mentally harm or mistreat a detainee or to needlessly expose him
to fire. In addition, mistreated detainees or those who receive special favors are not good interrogation
subjects.
7-78. The senior officer or NCO on the scene is legally responsible for the care of detainees. If the unit
cannot evacuate a prisoner within a reasonable time, he must be provided with food, water, and medical
treatment.

TAGGING OF DETAINEES
7-79. Before evacuating the detainee, attach a DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture
Tag to him listing all pertinent information and procedures. DD Form 2745 tags are not available by
electronic media, but may be obtained through supply channels or made from materials available on the
battlefield. An example is illustrated in Figure 7-6.

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Chapter 7

Figure 7-6. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

7-80. Captured enemy documents (such as maps, orders, records, and photographs) and equipment are
excellent sources of intelligence information. If captured items are not handled properly, however, the
information in them may be lost or delayed until it is useless. These items must be evacuated to the next
level of command as rapidly as possible.

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 Sustainment

7-81. The platoon should tag each captured item (see Figure 7-7 for an example). If the item is found in
the detainee’s possession, include the prisoner’s name on the tag and give the item to the guard. The guard
delivers the item with the detainee to the next higher headquarters. Platoons may find themselves in a fast-
paced operation where equipment that is not of significant intelligence value may not be transported or
recovered. In such cases, the platoon needs to have a plan on destroying the equipment so it will not fall
back into the enemy’s hands. (Note. Enemy medical equipment will never be destroyed.)

Figure 7-7. Sample tag for captured documents and equipment

CIVILIANS
7-82. Civilians who are captured as the result of curfew violations or suspicious activities are treated the
same other detainees. The platoon evacuates them quickly to higher headquarters using the “five-S’s and
T” principles discussed earlier in this section.

CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

7-83. Civil affairs (CA) units and psychological operations (PSYOP) have essential roles during urban
operations (UO). They are critical force multipliers that can save lives. The battle in urban terrain is won
through effective application of necessary combat power, but CA and PSYOP can help facilitate mission
accomplishment. CA and PSYOP offer the possibility of mission accomplishment in urban terrain without
the destruction, suffering, and horror of battle. These units may become key factors in shaping the urban
battlefield and facilitating movement from shaping directly to transition, thus minimizing the amount of
close combat conducted by companies, platoons, and squads (see Chapter 4, Sections IV and V).

EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS
7-84. If the brigade or battalion task force is tasked to facilitate the evacuation of civilians from the AO,
the unit is normally augmented by CA personnel. Infantry units may provide security and command and
control for the execution of this operation, which is accomplished in two separate but supporting actions.
• CA personnel coordinate with the military police and local police officials for evacuation
planning. They plan for establishing evacuation routes and thoroughfare crossing control, and
for removing civilians from the MSRs.
• CA personnel coordinate with U.S. Army PSYOP assets, local government officials, radio and
television stations, newspapers, and so on, to publicize the evacuation plan.

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Chapter 7

HEALTH AND WELFARE OF CIVILIANS

7-85. CA assets will also conduct coordination for the health and well-being of civilians. They can include
the reestablishment of water systems; distribution of available food stocks and clothing; and establishment
of displaced persons, refugee, and evacuee (DPRE) camps. Again, brigades and battalion task forces may
be tasked to provide security and command and control for some of these missions.

TACTICAL PSYOP
7-86. Tactical PSYOP in support of urban operations are planned and conducted to achieve immediate and
short-term objectives. PSYOP are an integral and coordinated part of the overall tactical plan. They
provide the tactical commander with a system that can weaken the enemy soldier’s will to fight, thereby
reducing his combat effectiveness. They can also help prevent civilian interference with military
operations. PSYOP are designed to exploit individual and group weaknesses. For example, infantry units
may be given the mission to clear a specific urban objective where it has been determined that a graduated
response will be used. The PSYOP unit would be in support of the unit conducting this mission, and they
use loudspeakers to broadcast warnings and or incentives not to resist.

OTHER PSYOP
7-87. PSYOP units also provide support during urban operations using television, radio, posters, leaflets,
and loudspeakers to disseminate propaganda and information. Television, including videotapes, is one of
the most effective media for persuasion. It offers many advantages for PSYOP and is appropriate for use
during urban operations. In areas where television is not common, receivers may be distributed to public
facilities and selected individuals.

Note. See FM 3-05.40 for further discussion on civil affairs.

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 Chapter 8
Urban Operations

The platoon may take part in large-scale urban operations as part of a larger force.
This chapter examines the basic characteristics of urban operations as well as special
planning considerations and techniques of offensive and defensive operations as well
as employment of attack and assault/cargo helicopters. For more detailed
information, refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) or FM 3-06.11 (FM 90-10-1).

SECTION I - URBAN OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

8-1. Built-up areas consist mainly of man-made features such as buildings, streets, and subterranean
systems. These features of urban terrain create a variety of tactical problems and possibilities. To ensure
that the platoon can operate effectively in an urban environment, the platoon observation and direct-fire
plans must address the ground-level fight (in streets and on the ground floor of buildings), the above-
ground fight (in multistoried buildings), and the subterranean fight. The following considerations apply:
• An important aspect of the urban environment is that built-up areas complicate, confuse, and
degrade command and control.
• Streets are usually avenues of approach. Forces moving along a street, however, are often
canalized by buildings and have little space for off-road maneuver. Obstacles on urban streets
thus are usually more effective than those on roads in open terrain since they are more difficult
to bypass.
• Buildings offer cover and concealment and severely restrict movement of military elements,
especially armored vehicles. They also severely restrict fire distribution and control, especially
fields of fire. Every street corner and successive block becomes an intervisibility line, requiring
careful overwatch. Thick-walled buildings provide ready-made, fortified positions.
• Subterranean systems found in some built-up areas can be easily overlooked, but they may
prove critical to the outcome of urban operations. Figure 8-1 illustrates examples of
underground systems, which include subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems.

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Chapter 8

Figure 8-1. Underground systems

CATEGORIES OF URBAN AREAS

8-2. There are six types of urban terrain (see also FM 34-130 for more information):
• Dense, random construction. Dense, random construction is typical of the old inner-city
pattern with narrow, winding streets radiating from a central area in an irregular manner.
Buildings are located close together and frequently close to the edge of a roadway.
• Closed-orderly block. This type of city block typically has wider streets that form rectangular
patterns. The buildings frequently form a continuous front along the blocks. Inner-block
courtyards are common.
• Dispersed residential area. Dispersed residential areas are normally adjacent to closed-orderly
block areas in Europe. The pattern consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with
yards, gardens, trees, and fences. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving.
• High-rise area. High-rise areas are typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns. It
consists of multistoried apartments, separated open areas, and single-story buildings. Wide
streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. These areas are often adjacent to industrial or
transportation areas or interspersed with closed-orderly block areas.
• Industrial-transportation. These areas are generally located on or along major rail and
highway routes in urban complexes. Older complexes may be located within dense, random
construction or closed-orderly block areas. New construction normally consists of low, flat-
roofed factory and warehouse buildings. High-rise areas providing worker housing is normally
located adjacent to these areas throughout the orient. Identification of transportation facilities
within these areas is critical. These facilities, especially rail facilities, pose significant obstacles
to military movement.
• Permanent or fixed fortifications and other military installations. Permanent-type
fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any
combination of the above. Some of the latest variants have been built underground and employ
heavy tank or warship armor, major caliber and other weapons, internal communications,
service facilities, and CBRN overpressure systems. This category also includes other military

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 Urban Operations

installations (examples, Camp Lejeune, Fort Huachuca, Travis Air Force Base, and Norfolk
Navy Base).

VEHICLES, WEAPONS, AND MUNITIONS

8-3. Numerous factors related to vehicles and their organic weapons and munitions affect the tank
platoon’s urban operation planning and execution, including the following:
• The preferred main gun rounds in the urban environment are HEAT, MPAT (ground mode),
MPAT-OR (obstacle-reducing) (M908), and canister (M1028). These all perform much better
than sabot rounds against bunkers and buildings.
• HEAT ammunition will open a larger hole in reinforced concrete or masonry structures than
MPAT or MPAT-OR (M908). Both MPAT and MPAT-OR, however, offer greater
incapacitation capability inside the structure.
• HEAT ammunition arms approximately 60 feet from the gun muzzle. It loses most of its
effectiveness against urban targets at ranges of less than 60 feet.
• MPAT and MPAT-OR rounds arm approximately 100 feet from the muzzle of the gun. Because
of the shape and metal components of the projectiles, however, this ammunition remains
effective at ranges of less than 100 feet.
• Canister (M1028) ammunition is used primarily against troop formations from 100 to 500
meters, but can be used effectively against light-skinned vehicles (technical) and to reduce
simple obstacles at ranges of less than 200 meters.
• Sabot petals, including those on MPAT and MPAT-OR, endanger accompanying infantry
elements. They create a hazard area extending 70 meters on either side of the gun-target line,
out to a range of 1 kilometer.
• Hard, smooth, flat surfaces are characteristics of urban terrain. The effect of the rounds is
reduced by their tendency to strike at an oblique angle and increase the threat of ricochets.
• Engagement ranges will tend to be less then 200 meters, and could be as little as 35 meters when
engaging enemy troops.
• There will tend to be large amounts of flammable material in the urban area, and leaders should
understand that engagements have the chance of causing large fires.
• The tank’s main gun can depress to -10 degrees and can elevate to +20 degrees. This creates
considerable dead space for the crew at the close ranges that are typical in the urban
environment.
• The external M2 HB (heavy barrel) machine gun can elevate to +36 degrees; however, the TC
must be exposed to fire the M2 on the M1A2 or M1A2 SEP.
• The M240 coax machine gun can effectively deliver suppressive fires against enemy personnel
and against enemy positions that are behind light cover.
• The loader’s M240 machine gun can effectively deliver suppressive fire against enemy
personnel and against enemy positions that are behind light cover; however, the loader must be
exposed to operate it. This weapon may be dismounted and used in a ground role if units are
equipped with the M240 dismount kit.
• When operating with hatches closed, the tank crew has limited visibility to the sides and rear
and no visibility to the top. Figures 8-2 and 8-3 illustrate the dead space associated with tank
operations in an urban environment.
• FM 3-20.12 explains special uses for tank-mounted machine guns in the urban environment.

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Chapter 8

Figure 8-2. Tank weapon dead space at street level

Figure 8-3. Tank main gun and coax dead space above street level

MEDIUM AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS (7.62-MM AND CALIBER .50)

8-4. In the urban environment, the caliber .50 machine gun and the 7.62-mm M240 machine gun provides
high-volume, long-range, automatic fires for the suppression or destruction of targets. They provide final
protective fire along fixed lines and can be used to penetrate light structures; the caliber .50 machine gun is
most effective in this role. Tracers from both machine guns are likely to start fires.

Employment
8-5. The primary consideration that impacts the employment of machine guns within urban areas is the
limited availability of long-range fields of fire.
8-6. The caliber .50 machine gun is often employed on its vehicular mount during both offensive and
defensive operations. The caliber .50 machine gun can be used as an accurate, long-range weapon and can
supplement sniper fires.
8-7. The M240 machine gun is useful to suppress and isolate enemy defenders.

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 Urban Operations

8-8. The M240 is less effective against masonry targets than the caliber .50 machine gun because of its
reduced penetration power.

Weapon Penetration
8-9. The ability of the 7.62-mm and caliber .50 rounds to penetrate is also affected by the range to the
target and type of material fired against. The 7.62-mm round is affected less by close ranges than the 5.56
mm; the caliber .50 round’s penetration is reduced least of all.
8-10. At 50 meters, the 7.62-mm ball round cannot reliably penetrate a single layer of well-packed
sandbags. It can penetrate a single layer of sandbags at 200 meters, but not a double layer. The armor-
piercing round does only slightly better against sandbags. It cannot penetrate a double layer but can
penetrate up to 10 inches at 600 meters.
8-11. The penetration of the 7.62-mm round is best at 600 meters. Most urban targets are closer. The
longest effective range is usually 200 meters or less. Table 8-1 explains the penetration capabilities of a
single 7.62-mm (ball) round at closer ranges.

Table 8-1. Penetration capabilities of a single 7.62-mm (ball) round

Range Penetration (inches)

(meters) Pine Board Dry, Loose Sand Cinder Block Concrete
25 13 5 8 2
100 18 4.5 10 2
200 41 7 8 2
8-12. The caliber .50 round is also optimized for penetration at long ranges (about 800 meters). For hard
targets, obliquity and range affect caliber .50 penetration. Both armor-piercing and ball ammunition
penetrate 14 inches of sand or 28 inches of packed earth at 200 meters, if the rounds impact perpendicular
to the flat face of the target. Table 8-2 explains the effect of a 25-degree obliquity on a caliber .50
penetration.

Table 8-2. Number of rounds needed to penetrate a reinforced concrete

wall at a 25-degree obliquity
Thickness (feet) 100 Meters (rounds) 200 Meters (rounds)
2 300 1,200
3 450 1,800
4 600 2,400

Protection
8-13. Barriers that offer protection against 5.56-mm rounds are also effective against 7.62-mm rounds with
some exceptions. The 7.62-mm round can penetrate a windowpane at a 45-degree obliquity, a hollow
cinder block, or both sides of a car body. It can also penetrate wooden frame buildings easily. The caliber
.50 round can penetrate all the commonly found urban barriers except a sand-filled 55-gallon drum.

Wall Penetration
8-14. Continued and concentrated machine gun fire can breach most typical urban walls. Such fire cannot
breach thick, reinforced-concrete structures or dense, natural-stone walls. Internal walls, partitions, plaster,
floors, ceilings, common office furniture, home appliances, and bedding can be penetrated easily by both
7.62-mm and caliber .50 rounds (Tables 8-3 and 8-4).

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Chapter 8

Table 8-3. Structure penetrating capabilities of 7.62-mm round (NATO ball)

against typical urban targets (range 25 meters)
Type Thickness Hole Diameter Rounds
(inches) (inches) Required
Reinforced concrete 8 7 100
Triple brick wall 14 7 170
Concrete block with single brick veneer 12 6 and 24 30 and 200
Cinder block (filled) 12 * 18
Double brick wall 9 * 45
Double sandbag wall 24 * 110
Log wall 16 * 1
Mild steel door 3/8 * 1
* Penetration only, no loop hole. (A small hole or slit in a wall, especially one through
which small arms may be fired.)

Table 8-4. Structure penetrating capabilities of caliber .50 ball against typical
urban targets (range 35 meters)
Type Thickness Hole Diameter Rounds
(inches) (inches) Required
Reinforced concrete 10 12 50
18 24 100
7 140
Triple brick wall 12 8 15
26 50
Concrete block with single brick veneer 12 10 25
33 45
Armor plate 1 * 1
Double sandbag wall 24 * 5
Log wall 16 * 1
* Penetration only, no loop hole. (A small hole or slit in a wall, especially one through
which small arms may be fired.)

COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-15. The following command and control considerations will affect the platoon’s urban operations
planning and execution:
• Communications problems. The low-level task organization that may take place during urban
operations will require elements to establish additional communications links, which can be
disrupted by buildings and other urban terrain features.
• Fire control. Extensive direct-fire planning and restrictive fire control measures are an absolute
requirement in urban operations.
• Proximity and visibility. Friendly elements often must operate in confined and restrictive areas
during urban operations, and they may not be able to see other nearby friendly forces. These
factors significantly increase the danger of fratricide.
• Personnel factors. Urban operations impose significant, and often extreme, physical and
psychological demands on Soldiers and leaders.

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 Urban Operations

• ROE/ROI and civilians. The ROE and/or ROI may restrict the use of certain weapon systems
and TTPs. As an integral part of urban operations, noncombatants create special operational
problems. To deal with these concerns, units operating in urban terrain must know how to
effectively employ linguists and counterintelligence and civil affairs teams.
• The slow pace of urban operations. This will usually prevent the platoon from taking full
advantage of the speed and mobility of its tanks. When buttoned up, the tank platoon’s
command and control and freedom of maneuver will be reduced due to limited visibility.

MANEUVER
PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
8-16. The following factors related to maneuver will affect the platoon’s urban operations planning and
execution:
• The need for detailed centralized planning and decentralized execution. Urban operations
are usually executed as a deliberate attack, demanding extensive intelligence activities and
rehearsals.
• Requirements for cooperation. Urban operations are most successful when close cooperation
is established between dismounted forces, armored vehicles, and aviation elements at the lowest
level.
• Formation of combined arms teams at the lowest levels. Whereas task organization normally
is done no lower than platoon level, urban operations may require task organization of squads
and sections. The tank platoon may face a variety of organizational options, such as a tank
section or an individual tank working with an infantry platoon or squad. Leaders must strive to
employ armored vehicles in sections at a minimum. Whether conducting operations as a two-
tank section or a tank/Bradley section, armored vehicles must work together to overwatch
movements and defeat threats outside the capabilities of dismounted forces. Integration of
aviation assets and their ability to communicate and act in coordination with small-unit ground
forces greatly increases the chances of mission success. For a detailed discussion of
employment of Army aviation in an urban environment, see Section IV of this chapter.
• Vulnerability of friendly forces. Tanks can provide firepower to effectively support
accompanying infantry squads, but they are, in turn, vulnerable to attack from enemy infantry.
The attacking force in urban operations must also guard against local counterattacks.
• Absolute necessity to maintain all-around security and situational awareness. When
conducting urban operations, it is absolutely imperative that leaders and units at all levels
maintain all-around situational awareness and security. The ability of the enemy to move
rapidly within an urban environment to gain positions above, behind, or below friendly forces
necessitates an active and vigilant reconnaissance and IPB of the tank platoon’s area of
operations and area of interest. In addition, individual tanks, sections, and platoons must be
extremely vigilant in conducting local security of their vehicles and formation as well as
providing overwatch for attached mechanized or dismounted elements.
• The role of infantry. Infantry squads are employed extensively during urban operations as part
of the combined arms team. They can be employed against both enemy vehicles and enemy
dismounted elements.
8-17. Additionally, the infantry can help the tank platoon by—
• Locating targets for tanks to engage.
• Destroying antitank weapons.
• Assaulting enemy positions and clearing buildings with tank support.
• Protecting tanks from antitank fires.

Light Infantry Limitations

8-18. Light infantry limitations include the following:

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Chapter 8

• Light infantry forces lack heavy supporting firepower, protection, and long-range mobility.
• Exposed light infantry forces are subject to a high number of casualties between buildings.
• Light infantry forces are more vulnerable to fratricide-related casualties from friendly direct and
indirect fire.

Light Infantry Strengths

8-19. Light infantry strengths include:
• Infantry small-arms fire within a building can eliminate resistance without seriously damaging
the structure.
• Infantrymen can use stealth to move into position without alerting the enemy. Infantrymen can
move over or around most urban terrain, regardless of the amount of damage to buildings.
• Infantrymen have excellent all-around vision and can engage targets with small-arms fire under
almost all conditions.
8-20. How does armor support the infantry?
• Use main-gun fire to reduce obstacles or entrenched positions for the infantry.
• Take directions from the infantry ground commander (platoon leader/PSG/squad leader) to
support their fire and maneuver.
• Provide reconnaissance by fire for the infantry.
• Know and understand how the infantry clears and marks the cleared buildings, as well as the
casualty evacuation plan, signal methods, engagement criteria for tank main gun, front line trace
reporting, and ground communication from the tank with the dismounted personnel.
8-21. How does the infantry support the tank?
• Provide local flank and rear security for each vehicle.
• Increase crew member’s situational understanding by reporting sights and sounds masked by
track noise and movement.
• Provide reconnaissance and fire direction of enemy positions for main gun engagement.
8-22. Considerations for dismounted tank security include the following:
• Each tank will require a four-man team of dismounted infantry to provide local security to the
flanks and rear for the vehicle.
• The security element can ride on the tank, but when the tank stops for more than 5 minutes, the
tank commander should direct the troops to dismount along likely avenues of ATGM/rocket
propelled grenade (RPG) attack.
• Tank crewmen should rehearse the mounting and dismounting of the security element from their
vehicle, briefing the infantrymen on safety procedures for the vehicle and weapon systems.
• If possible, the security element should have two members attempt to observe from a second
floor window to provide greater situational understanding.
• Tank commanders need to rehearse communicating with dismounted Soldiers via the infantry
phone or TA-1 and DR-8 in the bustle rack.

ARMORED VEHICLE POSITIONS

8-23. Fighting positions for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are essential to a complete and effective
defensive plan in urban areas. Armored vehicle positions are selected and developed to obtain the best
cover, concealment, observation, and fields of fire while retaining the vehicle’s ability to move.

HULL DOWN
8-24. If fields of fire are restricted to streets, hull-down positions should be used to gain cover and fire
directly down streets (Figures 8-4A and 8-4B). From those positions, tanks and BFVs are protected and

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 Urban Operations

can move to alternate positions rapidly. Buildings collapsing from enemy fires are a minimal hazard to the
armored vehicle and crew if operating in a closed hatch configuration.

Figure 8-4A. Urban hull-down position

Figure 8-4B. Urban hull-down position

HIDE
8-25. The hide position (Figure 8-5) covers and conceals the vehicle until time to move into position for
target engagement. Since the crew will not be able to see advancing enemy forces, an observer from the
vehicle or a nearby infantry unit must be concealed in an adjacent building to alert the crew. The observer
acquires the target and signals the armored vehicle to move to the firing position and to fire. After firing,
the tank or BFV moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising one location.

Figure 8-5. Hide position

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Chapter 8

BUILDING HIDE
8-26. The building hide position (Figure 8-6) conceals the vehicle inside a building. If basement hide
positions are inaccessible, engineers must evaluate the building’s floor strength and prepare for the vehicle.
Once the position is detected, it should be evacuated to avoid enemy fires.

Figure 8-6. Building hide position

INTELLIGENCE
8-27. Threats to the U.S. have one common goal: to coerce the U.S. military or a U.S.-led multinational
force to redeploy out of the theater of operations. The primary means of accomplishing this goal is for the
threat to cause a politically unacceptable level of casualties to friendly forces. Urban areas provide a
casualty-producing and stress-inducing environment ideally suited for threat operations. Moreover, urban
areas provide the threat with an unmatched degree of cover and concealment from friendly forces.

TYPES OF THREATS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

8-28. Active threats to U.S. Army forces operating in an urban environment include terrorists, paramilitary
forces, mercenaries, disgruntled civilians, and conventional military units. Further, urban environments
may also expose Army forces to many passive dangers such as psychological illnesses, hazardous
materials, and disease from unsanitary conditions.

URBAN THREAT TACTICS

8-29. While active threats vary widely, many techniques will be common to all. This discussion examines
several operational and tactical tenets that can be used against U.S. forces in the urban environment.

Use the Population to Advantage

8-30. The populace of a given urban area represents key terrain: the side that manages it best has a distinct
advantage. Future urban battles may see large segments of the populace remain in place as they did in
Budapest and Grozny. Army forces involved in stability operations will certainly conduct missions in and
among the residents of the area.
8-31. Threat forces may use the population to provide camouflage, concealment, and deception for their
operations. Guerilla and terrorist elements may look no different from any other member of the

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 Urban Operations

community. Even conventional and paramilitary troops may often have a “civilian” look. Western
military forces adopted the clean-shaven, close-cut hair standard at the end of the nineteenth century to
combat disease and infection, but twenty-first-century opponents might very well sport beards as well as
civilian-looking clothing and other “non-military” characteristics. The civil population may also provide
cover for threat forces, enhancing their mobility in proximity to friendly positions. Allowing the enemy to
shoot and then disappear into the crowd.
8-32. Threat forces may take advantage of U.S. moral responsibilities and attempt to make the civil
population a burden on the Army’s logistical and force-protection resources. They may herd refugees into
friendly controlled sectors, steal from U.S.-paid local nationals, and hide among civilians during offensive
operations.
8-33. The civil population may also serve as an important intelligence source for the threat. Local hires
serving among U.S. Soldiers, civilians with access to base camp perimeters, and refugees moving through
friendly controlled sectors may be manipulated by threat forces to provide information on friendly
dispositions, readiness, and intent. In addition, threat SPF and hostile intelligence service (HOIS) assets
may move among well-placed civilian groups.

Use All Dimensions

8-34. Upper floors and roofs provide the urban threat with excellent observation points and BPs above the
maximum elevation of many weapons. Shots from upper floors strike armored vehicles in vulnerable
points. Basements also provide firing points below many weapons’ minimum depressions and strike at
weaker armor. Sewers and subways provide covered and concealed access throughout the area of
operations.
8-35. The threat will think and operate throughout all dimensions of the urban environment. Conventional
lateral boundaries will often not apply as threat forces control some stories of the same building while
friendly forces control others.

Employ Urban-Oriented Weapons

8-36. Whether they are purpose-built or adapted, many weapons may have greater than normal utility in an
urban environment while others may have significant disadvantages. Urban threat weapons are much like
the nature of urbanization and the urban environment: inventive and varied. Small, man-portable weapons,
along with improvised munitions, will dominate the urban environment. Figure 8-7 lists examples of threat
weapons favored in urban operations.

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Chapter 8

Figure 8-7. Favored threat weapons

Engage the Entire Enemy Force

8-37. Threat forces may “hug” high-tech conventional forces operating in an urban area to avoid the
effects of high-firepower standoff weapon systems. Additionally, they may attempt to keep all or
significant portions of Army forces engaged in continuous operations to increase their susceptibility to
stress-induced illnesses. Urban operations, by their nature, produce an inordinate amount of combat stress-
casualties and continuous operations exacerbate this problem. Threat forces that employ this tactic often
maintain a large reserve to minimize the psychological impacts on their own forces.

Focus Attacks on Service Support and Unprotected Soldiers

8-38. Threat forces may prey on Soldiers poorly trained in basic infantry skills. Ambushes may focus on
these type Soldiers conducting resupply operations or moving in poorly guarded convoys. Urban
operations are characterized by the isolation of small groups and navigational challenges, and the threat
may use the separation this creates to inflict maximum casualties even when there is no other direct
military benefit from the action.

FIRE SUPPORT
8-39. The urban operations environment affects how and when indirect fires are employed. The following
factors may have an impact on planning and execution of indirect fire support:
• When taking part in urban operations, the platoon must always keep in the mind that the urban
operations environment creates unique requirements for centrally controlled fires and more
restrictive fire control measures.
• An urban operation requires the careful use of VT ammunition to prevent premature arming.
• Indirect fire may cause unwanted rubble.
• The close proximity of friendly troops to enemy forces and other indirect fire targets requires
careful coordination.
• WP ammunition may create unwanted fires or smoke.
• Artillery may be used in direct fire mode against point targets.
• Fuse delay should be used to ensure rounds penetrate fortifications as required.

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 Urban Operations

• VT and ICM rounds are effective for clearing enemy positions, observers, and antennas on
rooftops.
• Illumination rounds can be effective in the urban setting; however, employment must be
carefully planned to ensure friendly positions remain in the shadows while enemy positions are
highlighted. Tall buildings may mask the effects of illumination rounds.
• Mortars are the most responsive indirect fires available to the platoon in the urban environment.
They are well suited for combat in built-up areas because of their high rate of fire, steep angle of
fall, and short minimum range. In employing mortars, however, the platoon faces difficulties in
target acquisition and the effects of the rounds (rubble).

SUSTAINMENT
8-40. Guidelines for providing effective sustainment to units fighting in built-up areas include the
following:
• Plan for a higher consumption rate of supplies when operating in an urban environment due to
the slow pace.
• Plan the locations of casualty collection points and evacuation sites.
• Plan for the use of carrying parties and litter bearers.
• Plan for and use host-country support and civil resources when authorized and practical.
• Develop plans for requesting and obtaining special equipment such as ladders and toggle ropes
with grappling hooks.

SECTION II - OFFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS

8-41. Offensive operations in a built-up area are planned and executed based on the factors of METT-TC
and established doctrine. This section focuses on the unique problems and challenges that offensive urban
operations pose for the tank platoon.

HASTY AND DELIBERATE ATTACKS IN AN URBAN

ENVIRONMENT
8-42. The platoon may be employed in an urban offensive mission as part of a larger force, usually a
company team and task force. Offensive urban operations take the form of either a hasty or deliberate
attack. Both types of attacks require the friendly force to conduct as much planning, reconnaissance, and
coordination as time and the situation permit.

HASTY ATTACK
8-43. Task forces and company teams conduct hasty attacks in a variety of tactical situations:
• As a result of meeting engagements.
• When unexpected contact occurs and bypass has not been authorized.
• When the enemy is in a vulnerable position and can be quickly defeated through immediate
offensive action.
8-44. The following special considerations apply for hasty attacks in the urban environment:
• In built-up areas, incomplete intelligence and concealment may require the maneuver unit to
move through, rather than around, the unit fixing the enemy in place (the base of fire element).
Control and coordination become important factors in reducing congestion at the edges of the
built-up area.
• Once its objective is secured, an urban hasty attack force may have to react to contingency
requirements, either by executing on-order or be-prepared missions or by responding to
FRAGOs.

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Chapter 8

DELIBERATE ATTACK
8-45. A deliberate attack is a fully integrated operation that employs all available assets against the
enemy’s defense. It is employed when enemy positions are well prepared, when the built-up area is large
or severely congested, or when the element of surprise has been lost. Deliberate attacks are characterized
by precise planning based on detailed information and reconnaissance and thorough preparations and
rehearsals.
8-46. Given the nature of urban terrain, the techniques employed in the deliberate attack of a built-up area
are similar to those used in assaulting a strongpoint. The attack avoids the enemy’s main strength, instead
focusing combat power on the weakest point in the defense. A deliberate attack in a built-up area is
usually conducted in four phases: reconnoiter the objective, isolate the objective, secure a foothold, and
clear the built-up area. The following discussion examines these phases in detail.

PHASES OF OFFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS

RECONNOITER THE OBJECTIVE
8-47. The reconnaissance phase of urban operations must provide the platoon and other friendly elements
with adequate intelligence to stage a deliberate attack. Communications with friendly elements in or near
the urban area is essential to gain up-to-date information on the objective.

WARNING

Friendly elements may still be operating in the area; therefore,

extra caution must be taken to prevent fratricide.

MOVE TO THE OBJECTIVE

8-48. Once the objective has been reconnoitered, forces move to the objective by the most expedient,
covered, and concealed route to prevent detection of the force by the enemy.

ISOLATE THE OBJECTIVE

8-49. Isolating the objective involves seizing terrain that dominates the area so that the enemy cannot
supply or reinforce his defensive forces. This step may be taken at the same time as securing a foothold. If
isolating the objective is the first step, the subsequent steps should be carried out quickly so that the
defender has no time to react.

GAIN A FOOTHOLD
8-50. Gaining a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides attacking forces with
cover from enemy fire as well as a place at which they can enter the built-up area. When the tank platoon
is operating with the company, the foothold is normally one to two city blocks. As the platoon attacks to
gain the foothold, it should be supported by direct and indirect suppressive fires and by obscuring or
screening smoke.

CLEAR THE URBAN AREA

8-51. In determining the extent to which the urban area must be cleared, the commander of the attacking
force must consider the factors of METT-TC. He may decide to clear only those parts of the area
necessary to the success of his mission if any of the following factors apply.
• An objective must be seized quickly.

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 Urban Operations

• Enemy resistance is light or fragmented.

• Buildings in the area are of light construction with large open areas between them. In this
situation, the commander would clear only those buildings along the approach to his objective or
those necessary to ensure the unit’s security.
8-52. On the other hand, the attacking unit may have a mission to systematically clear an area of all enemy
forces. Through detailed analysis, the commander may anticipate that the unit will be opposed by a strong,
organized resistance or will be operating in areas where buildings are close together. The platoons move
slowly through the area, clearing systematically from room to room and building to building. Other
maneuver elements support the clearing elements and are prepared to assume their mission as necessary.

CONSOLIDATE AND REORGANIZE

8-53. Once the objective is secure, the unit must consolidate and reorganize equipment, supplies, and
personnel quickly to prepare for counterattack or continue the mission.

TASK ORGANIZATION
8-54. The task organization of a platoon taking part in an attack during an urban operation may vary
according to the specific nature of the built-up area and the objective. In general, the parent task force
and/or company team will employ an assault force, a support force, and a reserve; in some cases, a security
force is also used. Normally, there is no separate breach force; however, breaching elements may be part
of the assault or support force, depending on the type and location of anticipated obstacles.

SUPPORT FORCE
8-55. Most mounted elements of the urban unit, such as the tank platoon, are generally task organized in
the support force. This allows the task force/company team commander to employ the firepower of the
fighting vehicles without compromising their survivability, a distinct danger when heavy forces move into
an urban area. The support force isolates the area of operations and the actual entry point into the urban
area, allowing assault forces to secure a foothold.

ASSAULT FORCE
8-56. The assault force is the element that gains a foothold in the urban area and conducts the clearance of
actual objectives in the area. This force is normally a dismounted element task organized with engineers,
with specific augmentation by armored vehicles.

RESERVE FORCE
8-57. The reserve force normally includes both mounted and dismounted forces. It should be prepared to
conduct any of the following tasks:
• Attack from another direction.
• Exploit friendly success or enemy weakness.
• Secure the rear or flank of friendly forces.
• Clear bypassed enemy positions.
• Maintain contact with adjacent units.
• Conduct support by fire or attack by fire as necessary.

OFFENSIVE TECHNIQUES IN URBAN OPERATIONS

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON
8-58. During the attack of a built-up area, the commander must employ his tanks to take advantage of their
long-range lethality. The tank platoon may provide support by fire while lead elements are seizing a
foothold. The platoon then can provide overwatch or serve as a base of fire for the infantry until the area
has been secured.

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Chapter 8

8-59. The commander may position the platoon outside the built-up area, where it will remain for the
duration of the attack to cover high-speed avenues of approach. This is especially true during the isolation
phase. (Note. Before providing support for the attack, tanks must be able to maneuver into overwatch or
base-of-fire positions; this will normally require support from organic infantry weapons to suppress enemy
strongpoints and ATGM assets.) Additionally, the tank platoon can conduct the following urban offensive
operations:
• Neutralize enemy positions with machine gun fire.
• Destroy enemy strongpoints with main gun fire.
• Destroy obstacles across streets.
• Force entry of infantry into buildings.
• Emplace supporting fires as directed by the infantry.
• Establish roadblocks and barricades.

MUTUAL SUPPORT
8-60. In house-to-house and street fighting, tanks move down the streets protected by the infantry, which
clears the area of enemy ATGM weapons. The armored vehicles in turn support the infantry by firing their
main guns and machine guns from a safe standoff range to destroy enemy positions. Particular attention
must be paid to the layout of the urban area. Streets and alleys provide ready-made firing sectors and
killing zones for tanks to use.

Note. Figure 8-8 illustrates a situation in which two tank platoons are participating in a task
force attack in an urban operations environment.

Figure 8-8. Example task force attack in an urban environment, with tank platoons in the
support and assault forces

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 Urban Operations

SECTION III - DEFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS

8-61. Like offensive urban operations, defensive urban operations require thorough planning and precise
execution based on METT-TC and established doctrine. This section examines urban operations
considerations that affect the platoon in the defense.

ENEMY FORCES OUTSIDE THE URBAN AREA

8-62. While positioned in an urban area as part of a larger force, the platoon may be tasked to defend
against an enemy approaching from outside the area. In general, procedures and considerations are the
same as those for defensive operations in open terrain. For example, the commander designates BPs that
take advantage of all available weapon systems. Objectives are similar as well; these may include
preventing the enemy from isolating the defensive position, conducting reconnaissance of the defensive
position, and/or gaining a foothold in the urban area. This type of urban operation may transition into an
in-depth defense of the urban area, as described in the following paragraph, if the attacker continues to
commit forces to the battle and the defending force fails to divert or destroy them.

ENEMY FORCES WITHIN THE URBAN AREA

8-63. When it faces enemy forces within the urban area, the platoon may be called upon to take part in any
of several types of defensive operations, including defend in sector, defend a strongpoint, and defend a BP.
Procedures and considerations for these defensive operations are generally similar to those used in more
conventional open terrain situations. (Note. Refer to FM 3-90.1 [FM 71-1] for detailed information on
these operations. The commander should designate engagement areas that take advantage of integrated
obstacles and urban terrain features and that can be covered by direct and indirect fires.

DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES IN URBAN OPERATIONS

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON
8-64. In the defense, tanks provide the urban operations commander with a mobile force that can respond
quickly to enemy threats. They should be located on likely enemy avenues of approach in positions that
allow them to take advantage of their long-range fires. Effective positioning allows the commander to
employ the armored vehicles in a number of ways, such as the following:
• On the edge of the city in mutually supporting positions.
• On key terrain on the flanks of towns and villages.
• In positions from which they can cover barricades and obstacles by fire.
• As part of the reserve.
8-65. Tanks are normally employed as a platoon. The commander also has the alternative of employing
sections or individual vehicles with infantry platoons and squads; this allows the tanks to take advantage of
the close security provided by the infantry and to provide immediate direct-fire support to the infantry.
FIGHTING POSITIONS AND FIRING POSITIONS
8-66. Careful selection of fighting positions and firing positions for tanks is an essential component of a
complete and effective defensive plan in built-up areas. Vehicle positions must be selected and developed
to afford the best possible cover, concealment, observation, and fields of fire; at the same time, they must
not restrict the vehicles’ ability to move when necessary. These considerations apply:
• If fields of fire are restricted to the street area, hull-down positions should be used to provide
cover and to enable tanks to fire directly down the streets. From these positions, the tanks are
protected while retaining their ability to rapidly move to alternate positions. Buildings
collapsing from enemy fires are a minimal hazard to tanks and their crews.
• Before moving into position to engage the enemy, a tank can occupy a hide position for cover
and concealment. Hide positions may be located inside buildings or underground garages,

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Chapter 8

adjacent to buildings (using the buildings to mask enemy observation), or in culverts. Refer to
Figure 8-5 on page 8-9 for an example of a tank using an urban hide position.
• Since the crew will not be able to see the advancing enemy from the hide position, an observer
from the tank or a nearby infantry unit must be concealed in an adjacent building to alert the
crew (see Figure 8-5 on page 8-9). When the observer acquires a target, he signals the tank to
move to the firing position and, at the proper time, to fire.
• After firing, the tank moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising its location.
EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY SQUADS
8-67. Infantry squads are usually employed abreast so that they all can fire toward the expected direction
of attack. In a company team defense, however, the limited number of available infantrymen may require
squad positions to be interspersed with tank positions for mutual support.
EMPLOYMENT OF THE RESERVE FORCE
8-68. The commander’s defensive scheme of maneuver in an urban operation must always include the
employment of a reserve force. This force should be prepared to counterattack to regain key positions, to
block enemy penetrations, to protect the flanks of the friendly force, or to provide a base of fire for
disengaging elements. For combat in built-up areas, the reserve force has these characteristics:
• It normally consists of infantry elements.
• It must be as mobile as possible.
• It may be supported by tanks.
• In platoon-level urban operations, the reserve force may be a section or squad.

SECTION IV – EMPLOYMENT OF ATTACK AND ASSAULT/CARGO

HELICOPTERS
8-69. Ground maneuver commanders must understand that aviation forces can provide a significant
advantage during urban operations. In addition, ground maneuver planners must understand that the
unique capabilities of Army aviation also require unique planning and coordination. Army aviation forces
must be fully integrated in the military decision-making process to ensure effective combined arms
employment. Effective combined arms employment also requires that aviation and ground maneuver
forces synchronize their operations by operating from a common perspective. This section highlights some
possible procedures that will aid in creating a common air-ground perspective.

SUPPORT FOR GROUND MANEUVER UNITS

8-70. Ground units may receive support from a variety of attack helicopters including (but not limited to)
the AH-64, OH-58D, and AH-6. Attack helicopters can provide area fire to suppress targets, and precision
fire to destroy specific targets or breach structures. Attack helicopters can also assist with intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and communications using their advanced suite of sensors and
radios. Other supporting (lift) helicopters, such as the UH-60 and CH-47, may have weapon systems
(7.62-mm machine gun, caliber .50 machine gun, 7.62-mm minigun) that aid in the suppression of enemy
forces when operating in urban terrain; however, their primary role is to transport personnel, equipment,
and supplies to those critical urban areas. Lift helicopters can provide a distinct advantage by placing
personnel and weapon systems at critical locations at critical times to surprise and overwhelm the enemy.
Lift helicopters can also transport needed supplies to urban areas that may be inaccessible to ground
transportation or serve as CASEVAC platforms if ground evacuation is not feasible or timely.

ROLE DURING URBAN OPERATIONS

8-71. Army aviation’s primary role during urban operations is to support the ground maneuver force’s
operations. Army aviation is normally most effective conducting shaping operations. Aviation forces
operating on the urban periphery effectively enhance isolation, reconnaissance, resupply, troop movement,

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 Urban Operations

evacuation, and support by fire for ground forces. Army aviation also enhances the combined arms team’s
ability to quickly and efficiently transition to new missions.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-72. Army aviation forces may be employed organic to a division or higher level of command to conduct
maneuver or provide support. Aviation forces may also be attached or OPCON to another command.
Army aviation units normally will not be OPCON to echelons below battalion level; however, attack
helicopters may conduct direct air-to-ground coordination with companies and platoons during combat
operations.

MANEUVER GRAPHIC AIDS

8-73. The greatest strength of aviation is the ability to maneuver in the third dimension. In an urban
environment, this strength can be a detriment due to associated challenges. One associated challenge is
that air crews have different visual cues and perspectives than do ground forces. Common graphics and
sketches can help alleviate these differences.
• A network route structure of air control points (ACP) and routes (preferably surveyed) may be
used to facilitate route planning, navigation, and command, control, and communications.
• Sketches help correlate air and ground control measures with predominate urban features. The
area sketch offers the ground commander and the aircrew a means of identifying friendly and
enemy locations for planning and coordination. It is best used for smaller towns and villages but
can be applied to a certain engagement area or specific area of operations in a larger city. The
area sketch captures the natural terrain features, man-made features, and key terrain in an area
and designates a letter or numeral code to each. Buildings are coded and each corner of the
building is coded. This gives the air crews an accurate way to identify specific buildings as
requested by the ground unit commander or to identify friendly locations.
• Inclusion of maneuver graphic, fire support control measures (FSCM), and airspace control
measures (ACM) further allow air crews and maneuver elements to better visualize the urban
portion of the area of operations. It is the responsibility of both the aviation unit and the ground
maneuver unit to ensure they use the same area sketch for accurate coordination (see Figure 8
9).

IDENTIFYING FRIENDLY POSITIONS, MARKING LOCATIONS,

AND ACQUIRING TARGETS
8-74. In the urban environment, friendly and enemy forces, along with noncombatants, may operate in
close vicinity to one another. Furthermore, structures and debris can cause problems with the identification
of precise locations. Reliable communication is essential to ensure air crews know the locations of all
participants in urban operations. To further enhance air-ground coordination, methods must be established
to allow air crews to visually identify key locations.

MARKING METHODS
8-75. Table 8-5, page 8-21 describes different marking methods.

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Chapter 8

Figure 8-9. Simplified area sketch

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 Urban Operations

Table 8-5. Marking methods

Method Day/ Assets Friendly Target Remarks
Night Marks Marks
Smoke D All Good Good Easily identifiable, but may
compromise friendly position, obscure
target, or warn of fire support
employment. Placement may be
difficult due to structures.
Smoke (IR) D/N All Good Good Easily identifiable, but may
NVD AT compromise friendly position, obscure
target, or warn of fire support
employment. Placement may be
difficult due to structures. Night
marking is greatly enhanced by the
use of IR reflective smoke.
Illumination, D/N All NA Good Easily identified, but may wash out
Ground Burst NVDs.
Signal Mirror D All Good NA Avoids compromise of friendly
location. Dependent on weather and
available light and may be lost in
reflections from other reflective
surfaces (windshields, windows,
water, etc.).
Spotlight N All Good Marginal Highly visible to all. Compromises
friendly position and warns of fire
support employment. Effectiveness is
dependent on degree of urban
lighting.
IR Spotlight N All NVD Good Marginal Visible to all with NVGs. Less likely to
compromise than overt light.
Effectiveness dependent on degree of
urban lighting.
IR Laser Pointer N All NVG Good Marginal Effectiveness dependent on degree of
(below .4 watts) urban lighting.
IR Laser Pointer N All NVD Good Good Less affected by ambient light and
(above .4 watts) weather conditions. Highly effective
under all but the most highly lit or
worst weather conditions. The
infrared zoom laser illuminator
designtor (IZLID)-2 is the current
example.
Visual Laser N All Good Marginal Highly visible to all. Risk of
compromise is high. Effectiveness
dependent on degree of urban
lighting.
Laser Designator D/N PGM or NA Good Highly effective with PGM. Very
LST restrictive laser acquisition cone, and
equipped requires line of sight to target. May
require precoordination of laser codes.
Tracers D/N All NA Marginal May compromise position. May be
difficult to distinguish mark from other
gunfire. During daytime use, may be
more effective to kick up dust
surrounding target.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 8-21

Chapter 8

Table 8-5. Marking methods

Method Day/ Assets Friendly Target Remarks
Night Marks Marks
Electronic Beacon D/N See Excellent Good Ideal friendly marking device for AC
remarks 130 and some USAF fixed wing (not
compatible with Navy or Marine
aircraft). Least impeded by urban
terrain. Can be used as a TRP for
target identification. Coordination with
air crews essential to ensure
equipment and training compatibility.
Strobe (Overt) N All Marginal NA Visible by all. Effectiveness
dependent on degree of urban
lighting.
Strobe (IR) N All NVD Good NA Visible to all NVDs. Effectiveness
dependent on degree of urban
lighting. Coded strobes aid in
acquisition.
Flare (Overt) D/N All Good NA Visible by all. Easily identified by air
crew.
Flare (IR) N All NVD Good NA Visible to all NVDs. Easily identified
by air crew.
GLINT/IR Panel N All NVD Good NA Not readily detectable by enemy.
Very effective, except in highly lit
areas.
Combat ID Panel D/N All FLIR Good NA Provides temperature contrast on
vehicles or building. May be obscured
by urban terrain.
VS-17 Panel D All Marginal NA Only visible during daylight. Easily
obscured by structures.
Chemical Heat D/N All FLIR Poor NA Easily masked by urban structures
Sources and lost in thermal clutter. Difficult to
acquire, can be effective when used to
contrast cold background or when
aircraft knows general location.
Spinning Chem N All Marginal NA Provides unique signature. May be
Light (Overt) obscured by structures. Provides a
distinct signature that is easily
recognized.
Effectiveness dependent on degree of
urban lighting.
Spinning Chem N All NVD Marginal NA Provides unique signature. May be
Light (IR) obscured by structures. Effectiveness
dependent on degree of urban
lighting.

TARGETING GRIDS AND REFERENCE TECHNIQUES

8-76. Ground maneuver elements generally use a terrain-based reference system during urban operations.
Military grid reference system (MGRS) coordinates have little meaning at street level. To facilitate
combined arms operations, aviation and ground maneuver forces must use common control methods.
Possible techniques include urban grid, checkpoint targeting, objective area reference grid, and TRPs.
These techniques are based on the street and structure pattern present, without regard to the MGRS pattern.
Using common techniques allows air crews to transition to the system in use by the ground element upon
arrival in the objective area. For example, references to the objective or target may include local landmarks

8-22 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Urban Operations

such as, “The third floor of the Hotel Caviar, south-east corner.” This transition should be facilitated by
using a “big to small” acquisition technique.

Figure 8-10. Urban grid technique

Figure 8-11. Checkpoint technique

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 8-23

Chapter 8

Figure 8-12. Objective area reference grid technique

Figure 8-13. TRP technique

ATTACK HELICOPTER TARGET ENGAGEMENT

8-77. Attack helicopters will conduct a variety of TTPs to engage targets in the urban area. Techniques
range from support-by-fire/attack-by-fire at maximum standoff ranges to running/diving fire and close-
combat attack at minimum engagement ranges. Coordination is imperative to ensure positive identification
of the target as well as friendly locations.

8-24 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Urban Operations

Note. Ground forces should make every attempt to pass along accurate 8-digit grid coordinates.
The AH-64D can easily and accurately engage targets using this method.

WEAPONS MIX
8-78. Armed helicopters can carry a mix of weapons. Commanders must choose the weapons to use on a
specific mission based on the effects on the target, employment techniques, and the target’s proximity to
ground forces. Leaders must consider proportionality, collateral damage, and noncombatant casualties.
Leaders and air crew must consider the following when choosing weapons:
• Hard, smooth, flat surfaces with 90-degree angles are characteristic of man-made targets. Due
to aviation delivery parameters, munitions will normally strike a target at an angle less than 90
degrees. This may reduce the effect of munitions and increase the chance of ricochets. The
tendency of rounds to strike glancing blows against hard surfaces means that up to 25 percent of
impact-fused rounds may not detonate when fired onto rubbled areas.
• Identification and engagement times are short.
• Depression and elevation limits create dead space. Target engagement from oblique angles,
both horizontal and vertical, must be considered.
• Smoke, dust, and shadows mask targets. Additionally, rubble and man-made structures can
mask fires. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct.
• Urban fighting often involves units attacking on converging routes. The risks from friendly
fires, ricochets, and fratricide must be considered during the planning of operations.
• The effect of the weapon and the position of friendly and enemy personnel with relation to
structures must be considered. Chose weapons for employment based on their effects against
the building’s material composition rather than against enemy personnel.
• Munitions can produce secondary effects, such as fires.

AIR/GROUND INTEGRATION IN THE HASTY ATTACK/CLOSE

FIGHT
8-79. Attack helicopter employment in urban operations will typically involve the close fight and often, the
hasty attack. The hasty attack in the close fight, historically, lacks proper coordination between air and
ground elements to ensure mission success. The key to success for enhancing air-ground coordination, and
the subsequent execution of the tasks involved, begins with standardizing techniques and procedures. The
end-state is a detailed SOP between air and ground maneuver units that addresses the attack in a close
combat situation.
8-80. Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with the ground maneuver force. When the
aviation brigade or task force receives a mission to provide assistance to a ground unit engaged in close
combat and planning time is minimal, the initial information provided by the unit in contact should be
sufficient to get the aviation attack team out of the aviation tactical assembly area to a holding area to
conduct direct coordination with the engaged maneuver unit. The attack teams utilized in this procedure
are under aviation brigade control. This procedure contains five major steps:
• Battalion close-fight SITREP.
• Attack team check-in.
• Coordination for aviation close fires (ACF).
• Battle damage assessment/reattack.

BATTALION CLOSE FIGHT SITREP

8-81. En route to the holding area, the attack team leader contacts the ground maneuver battalion on its FM
command net to receive a close-fight SITREP (Figure 8-14). This SITREP verifies the location of the
holding area and a means to conduct additional coordination. The attack team leader receives an update

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 8-25

Chapter 8

from the ground maneuver battalion on the enemy and friendly situations. The battalion also verifies
frequencies and call signs of the unit in contact. By this time, the ground maneuver battalion has contacted
the ground maneuver unit leader in contact to inform him that attack aviation is en route to conduct a hasty
attack. Figure 8-15 shows an example of radio traffic and what may occur.

Battalion Close Fight SITREP

1. Enemy situation. Focusing on ADA in the AO, type of enemy
vehicles/equipment position (center mass) and direction of movement if dispersed
provide front-line trace.
2. Friendly situation. Location of company in contact, mission assigned to them,
method of marking their position.
3. Call sign/frequency verification.
4. Holding area verification. If intended to be used for face-to-face coordination, a
sign counter-sign must be agreed upon; i.e., using a light/heat source to provide a
recognizable signature, answered by either aircraft IR lights or visible light flashes to
signify which aircraft to approach.

Figure 8-14. Battalion close fight SITREP

Attack Team
“BULLDOG 06, THIS IS BLACKJACK 26, OVER.”
“BULLDOG 06, BLACKJACK 26 EN ROUTE TO
HOLDING AREA AT GRID VQ 98454287, REQUEST
SITREP, OVER.”
Ground Maneuver Battalion
“BLACKJACK 26, THIS IS BULLDOG 06, L/C, OVER.”
“BLACKJACK 26, THIS IS BULLDOG 06, ENEMY
SITUATION FOLLOWS, HARDROCK 06 IS TAKING
DIRECT FIRE FROM A PLATOON-SIZE ARMOR
ELEMENT AT GRID VQ 96000050, HOLDING AREA
VQ 94004000. EXPECT RADIO COORDINATION
ONLY. CONTACT HARDROCK 06 ON FH 478,
OVER.”

Figure 8-15. Example radio conversation

8-82. Upon receiving the required information from the ground maneuver battalion, the attack team leader
changes frequency to the ground company’s FM command net to conduct final coordination before
progressing on attack routes to BPs or ABF/SBF positions. Coordination begins with the ground maneuver
company commander and ends with the leader of the lowest-level unit in contact.
8-83. Regardless of which key leader the attack team leader conducts coordination with, the ground
command net is the most suitable net on which both air and ground elements can conduct the operation. It
allows all key leaders on the ground, including the FIST chief and the attack team leader and his attack
crews, to communicate on one common net throughout the operation. Operating on the command net also
allows the attack team to request responsive mortar fire for either suppression or immediate suppression of
the enemy. The AH-64 Apache and the AH-1 Cobra are limited to only one FM radio due to aircraft
configuration; however, the OH-58 is dual-FM capable, which gives the attack team leader the capability to
maintain communications with the ground maneuver company, as well as its higher headquarters or a fire
support element (see Figure 8-16).
Attack Team Ground Maneuver Battalion
“HARDROCK 06, THIS IS BLACKJACK 26 ON FH “BLACKJACK 26, THIS IS HARDROCK 06, L/C,
478, OVER.” OVER.”

Figure 8-16. Attack team/maneuver company communications check

8-26 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Urban Operations

ATTACK TEAM CHECK-IN

8-84. Upon making initial radio contact with the ground maneuver unit in contact, the attack team leader
executes a succinct check-in. This check-in includes a SITREP with the following check-in information—
• The attack team’s present location, which is normally the ground or aerial holding area.
• The composition of the attack team.
• The armament load and weapons configuration.
• Total station time.
• The night-vision device capability of the attack team.
8-85. In the event a ground holding area is not used because of METT-TC considerations, the attack team
will select and occupy an aerial holding area within FM communications range until all required
coordination is complete.
8-86. The attack team leader and ground unit’s key leaders must consider the effects on friendly forces of
the various weapons carried by the attack aircraft prior to target selection and engagement. Weapon
systems and munition selection for a given engagement is METT-TC dependent. Point target weapon
systems, such as Hellfire or TOW, are the preferred system for armor or hardened targets when engaging
targets in the close fight. The gun systems and the 2.75-inch rockets are the preferred system/munition for
engaging troops in the open and for soft targets such as trucks and trenchworks. These area fire weapon
systems pose a danger to friendly soldiers who may be in the lethality zone of the rounds or rockets. In this
case, the leader on the ground must be very precise in describing the target he wants the aircraft to engage.
COORDINATION FOR AVIATION CLOSE FIRES
8-87. Time is the primary constraining factor for coordinating ACF in the hasty attack. When possible,
ACF should be coordinated face-to-face using the following ACF coordination checklist:
• Enemy situation-specific target ID.
• Friendly situation location and method of marking friendly positions.
• Ground maneuver mission/scheme of maneuver.
• Attack aircraft scheme of maneuver.
• Planned engagement area and BP/SBF.
• Method of target marking.
• Fire coordination and restrictions.
• Map graphics update.
• Request for immediate ACF should be used for targets of opportunity or for ground-to-air target
handoff.
8-88. If time is not available to accomplish face-to-face coordination, then radio-only communications will
be the means for coordination using the request for immediate ACF (see Figure 8-17 for a sample request
for immediate ACF).

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 8-27

Chapter 8

Attack Team Ground Maneuver Battalion

“HARDROCK 06, BLACKJACK 26, GOOD COPY.
STANDING BY AT HOLDING AREA FOR ACF
REQUEST, OVER.”
“HARDROCK 16, BLACKJACK. ELEMENTS WILL
ATTACK FROM THE SOUTHEAST. TURN ON IR
STROBES AT THIS TIME. WE WILL ESTABLISH A
BP 100 METERS TO THE WEST OF YOUR
POSITION, OVER.”
“ROGER HARDROCK, BLACKJACK HAS YOUR
POSITION, EN ROUTE FOR ATTACK, 30 SECONDS,
OVER.”
“BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 06. STAND BY FOR
UPDATE. FRIENDLY PLATOON IN CONTACT
LOCATED AT VQ 96000050, MARKED BY IR
STROBES. ENEMY PLATOON-SIZE ARMOR
ELEMENT IS 800 METERS DUE NORTH. THERE
HAS BEEN SPORADIC HEAVY MACHINE GUN FIRE
AND MAIN TANK GUN FIRE INTO OUR POSITION.
FIRE APPEARS TO BE COMING FROM ROAD
INTERSECTION VICINITY VQ 96204362. NEGATIVE
KNOWLEDGE ON DISPOSITION OF ENEMY ADA.
I’LL BE HANDING YOU DOWN TO HARDROCK 16
FOR THE ACF REQUEST, OVER.”

“HARDROCK 16, BLACKJACK 26, ENGAGEMENT
COMPLETE, TWO T-80s DESTROYED, OVER.”
“ROGER BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16.
REQUEST FOLLOWS. FRIENDLY LOCATION VQ
96000050, 360-DEGREES TO TARGET, 800
METERS, TWO T-80S AT THE ROAD
INTERSECTION, TARGET LOCATION VQ 96000850,
AN/PAQ-4 SPOT ON, NO FRIENDLIES NORTH OF
THE 00 GRID LINE, LOW WIRES DIRECTLY OVER
OUR POSITION, OVER.”
“BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16, STROBES ON AT
THIS TIME, OVER.”
“HARDROCK 16, ROGER.”
“BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16, ROGER TWO T
80s DESTROYED, END OF MISSION, OUT.”

Figure 8-17. Example request for immediate ACF

8-89. After receipt of a request for immediate ACF, the attack team leader informs the ground unit leader
of the BP, SBF, or the series of positions his team will occupy that provide the best observation and fields
of fire into the engagement or target area.
• The BP or SBF is a position from which the attack aircraft will engage the enemy with direct
fire. It includes a number of individual aircraft firing positions and may be preplanned or
established as the situation dictates. Size will vary depending on the number of aircraft using
the position, the size of the engagement area, and the type of terrain.
• The BP or SBF is normally offset from the flank of the friendly ground position, but close to the
position of the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handoffs. This also ensures that rotor
wash, ammunition casing expenditure and the general signature of the aircraft does not interfere
with operations on the ground. The offset position also allows the aircraft to engage the enemy
on its flanks rather than its front, and lessens the risk of fratricide along the helicopter gun target
line.
8-90. The attack team leader then provides the ground maneuver unit leader with his concept for the
team’s attack on the objective. This may be as simple as relaying the direction the aircraft will be coming
from or attack route, time required to move forward from their current position, and the location of the BP.
Only on completion of coordination with the lowest unit in contact does the flight depart the holding area
for the battle position. As the attack team moves out of the holding area, it uses nap of the earth (NOE)
flight along attack routes to mask itself from ground enemy observation and enemy direct fire systems.
The attack team leader maintains FM communications with the ground unit leader while he maintains
internal communications on either his very high frequency (VHF) or ultra high frequency (UHF) net.

Note. Grid locations may be difficult for the ground maneuver, depending on the intensity of
the on-going engagement, and actual FM communications between the ground and air may not
work this well.

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 Urban Operations

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND REATTACK

8-91. After completing the requested ACF, the attack team leader provides a battle damage assessment
(BDA) to the ground maneuver commander. Based on his intent, the ground maneuver commander will
determine if a reattack is required to achieve his desired endstate. Requests for ACF can be continued until
all munitions or fuel is expended. Upon request for a reattack, the attack team leader must consider the
effects on duration and strength of coverage he can provide the ground maneuver commander. The attack
team may be required to devise a rearming and refueling plan, maintaining some of his aircraft on station
with the unit in contact, while the remainder returns to the forward arming and refueling point (FARP). In
addition to coordinating with the ground maneuver unit in contact, the attack team leader is required to
coordinate this effort with his higher headquarters.

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 Chapter 9
Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests during stable peace
by influencing the operational environment in ways that reduce the likelihood of
conflict. They do this through a combination of peacetime developmental,
cooperative activitied and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is
supported by a balanced approach that enhances government and economic
prosperity.

Civil support operations are operations conducted to address the consequences of

natural or man-made disasters, accidents, and incidents within the United States and
its territories. There are many similarities between civil support and stability
operations. The purposes, considerations, and characteristics are related; however,
U.S. laws carefully circumscribe the actions that military forces, particularly the
regular Army, can conduct within the United States and its territories. The local
population is composed of U.S. citizens, whose security and protection is the reason
the Armed Forces exist. Local and national agencies normally are the lead, and Army
forces cooperate and synchronize their efforts closely with them.

SECTION I – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

9-1. The tank platoon has unique capabilities that make it an important asset to Army units executing
missions as part of stability operations and civil support operations. The platoon may be called upon to
perform a variety of missions in a wide range of political, military, and geographical environments and in
both combat and noncombat situations. These operations will almost always be decentralized and can
require the tank platoon leader to make immediate decisions that may have strategic or operational
consequences. The distinction between these roles and situations will not always be clear, presenting
unique challenges for the platoon, its leaders, and its crewmen.

Note. U.S. Army policy normally does not allow a unit to modify its warfighting mission-
essential task list (METL) unless and until the unit is selected for stability operations or civil
support operations. Only then should a unit train for specific mission-related tasks. Chief
among these are operations with very restrictive ROE/ROI and orientation on the area, its
culture, and the nature of the conflict.

BALANCED MINDSET
9-2. A balance must be achieved between the mindset of peacetime military engagement in areas of stable
peace through major combat operations during general war. Soldiers cannot become too complacent in
their warrior spirit, but also must not be too eager to rely on the use of force to resolve conflict. This
balance is the essence of full-spectrum operations and the fundamental aspect that will enable the company
team to perform its mission successfully and avoid an escalation to combat. Proactive leaders that are
communicating and enforcing the ROE are instrumental to achieving this mindset.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 9-1

Chapter 9

COMBAT SKILLS TRAINING

9-3. If the stability or civil support operation extends over prolonged periods of time, training should be
planned that focuses on the individual and collective tasks that would be performed during transition to
offensive and or defensive missions.

PEACETIME
9-4. In peacetime, a variety of measures are employed to achieve national objectives; these include
political, economic, and informational measures, as well as military actions short of combat operations or
active support of warring parties. Within this environment, U.S. forces may conduct training exercises to
demonstrate national resolve; conduct peacekeeping operations; participate in nation-building activities;
conduct disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; provide security assistance to friends and allies; or
execute shows of force. Confrontations and tensions may escalate during peacetime to reach a point of
transition into a state of conflict.

CONFLICT
9-5. Conflict can encompass numerous types of situations, including the following:
• Clashes or crises over boundary disputes and land and water territorial claims.
• Situations in which opposing political factions engage in military actions to gain control of
political leadership within a nation.
• Armed clashes between nations or between organized parties within a nation to achieve limited
political or military objectives.
9-6. While regular military forces are sometimes involved, the use of irregular forces frequently
predominates in conflict actions. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and
limited in weaponry and level of violence. In this state, military response to a threat is exercised indirectly,
usually in support of other elements of national power. Limited objectives, however, may be achieved by
the short, focused, and direct application of military force. Conflict approaches the threshold of a state of
war as the number of nations and/or troops, the frequency of battles, and the level of violence increase over
an extended time.
9-7. Stability operations and civil support operations involving tank platoons often occur in the state of
peacetime. Refer to Section IV of this appendix for examples of stability and support situations in which
the tank platoon may participate.

SECTION II – STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-8. Stability operations are operations that occur in conjunction with offensive and defensive operations
to restore, establish, preserve, or exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources.
Stability operations are executed outside the United States. Stability operations involve both coercive and
cooperative actions by the military force. They are operations designed to establish a safe and secure
environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, social, and
economic institutions; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local government. Army forces engaged in
stability operations establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until the host nation is
capable of providing these services. They act in support of other governmental and host-nation agencies.
When the host nation or other agency is unable to accomplish their role, Army forces may provide basic
civil functions directly. Stability operations contribute to an environment in which the other instruments of
national power can predominate. Most stability operations are multiagency and multinational.

TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-9. Stability operations include—
• Civil security. Protecting the populace from serious external and internal threats.

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 Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

• Civil control. Regulating the behavior and activity of individuals and groups to reduce risk to
individuals or groups and to promote security. Control channels the population’s activity to
allow for the provision of security and essential services while coexisting with a military force
conducting operations. A curfew is an example of civil control.
• Essential services. Essential services include emergency life-saving medical care, the
prevention of epidemic disease, provision of food and water, provision of emergency shelter
from the elements, and the provision of basic sanitation (sewage and garbage disposal).
• Governance. The provision of societal control functions that include regulation of public
activity, taxation, maintenance of security, control and essential services, and normalizing means
of succession of power.
9-10. The degree to which Army forces engage in these types of stability operations is circumstantial. In
some operations, the host nation is capable of carrying out these types of operations and Army forces are
engaged in civil-military operations to minimize the impact of military presence on the populace. Army
forces located in Kuwait but supporting operations in Iraq is an example of this. On the other hand, Army
forces within Iraq may be responsible for the well-being of the local population, while working with other
agencies to restore basic capabilities to the area or region. (Note. See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for detail on
stability operations.)

PURPOSES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-11. Stability operations complement offensive and defensive operations. They may be the decisive
operation within a phase of a campaign or major combat operation. Although military forces set the
conditions for success, the other instruments of national power are decisive. The purposes of stability
operations are—
• Isolate adversaries from the local population.
• Gain support for the indigenous government.
• Shape for interagency and host-nation success by providing the necessary security and control
for the host nation and interagency elements to function.
• Develop an indigenous capacity for a viable market economy, rule of law, and democratic
institutions. This requires security, control, essential services, and governance provided by the
military, host nation, or both.
9-12. Stability operations seek to reduce the level of violence and establish order by working with the local
population and their government. They employ military capabilities to restore or establish essential
services and support civilian agencies. Stability operations conducted in the absence of a local civil
government provide the necessary security and control for the local population. By providing security and
control to stabilize the AO, these operations provide a foundation for transitioning control to other
governmental agencies and eventually to the host nation. Once this transition is complete, the operation
focuses on transferring regional control to a legitimate civil authority according to the desired end state.
The goal of these combined military and civil efforts is to strengthen legitimately recognized governance,
rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions to establish sustainable peace and security fostering a
sense of confidence and well-being, and support the conditions for economic reconstruction. Stability
operations seek to manage the level of violence and establish order by working with the local population.
The goal is to enable local institutions to assume their civic responsibilities. They occur simultaneously
with offensive and defensive operations. Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host
government, an interim government, or a part of an occupation when no government exists. By providing
security and control to stabilize the AO, these operations provide a foundation for transitioning control to
other governmental agencies. Once this transition is complete, the operation focuses on transferring
regional control to a legitimate civil authority according to the desired end state.
9-13. During hostilities, stability operations help prevent armed conflict from spreading. The first aim is to
limit the influence on disaffected populations. Isolation in stability operations is usually indirect; that is, it
aims to redirect, compel, and influence the attitudes and civil activity away from supporting adversaries
and toward supporting the legitimate government. Concurrently, they secure the support of local

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 9-3

Chapter 9

populations in unstable areas. They support this by isolating irregular forces from the population. Forces
engaged in an operation where stability predominates may have to defend themselves. Conversely, they
may conduct defensive and offensive operations to physically isolate, defeat, or destroy forces seeking to
undermine the effectiveness or credibility of the stability mission. Following conventional hostilities,
forces conduct stability operations to provide a secure environment for civil authorities. Security is vital to
achieving reconciliation, providing governance, rebuilding lost infrastructure, and resuming vital services.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-14. Commanders and staffs consider several factors when conducting stability operations. These
include:
• Understand the operational environment, particularly civil considerations.
• Establish HUMINT networks early.
• Use IO, to engage and influence the local population and isolate adversaries.
• Use PA to inform local and regional populations.
• Display the capability to use overwhelming force, but use minimum lethality consistent with
rules of engagement and proportional to the mission requirements.
• Be impartial.
• Be transparent when dealing with the local population.
• Be consistent and credible with the local population.
9-15. To establish a stable and lasting peace, stability operations capitalize on the coordination,
cooperation, integration, and synchronization with nonmilitary organizations. This allows all participants
to exploit their capabilities and conduct operations simultaneously, with increased endurance and in depth
across the AO.
9-16. Coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization between host-nation elements and Army
forces are enhanced by impartiality, transparency, and credibility. Impartiality is not neutrality.
Impartiality does not imply that force will affect all sides equally. Force will be used against threats not
because of who they are but because they are violating the law. Fair and even-handed treatment of all sides
in the conflict, recognizing neither aggressor nor victim, can improve the prospects for lasting peace,
stability, and security even within ongoing combat operations. The commander uses transparency to make
the populace aware of mandates, intentions, and techniques used to ensure security and control.
Transparency serves to reinforce impartiality and credibility. Credibility reflects the local populations and
host nation’s assessment of the capability of the force to accomplish its mission. The force must have the
proper structure and resources with appropriate ROE to accomplish the mission and discharge its duties
swiftly and firmly, leaving no doubt as to its will and intensions.
9-17. Stability operations take a different form during contingencies. As offensive operations clear
populated areas of hostile forces, part of the force secures critical infrastructure and population areas. As
civil security is established, the force returns territory to civil authorities’ control. Facilitating the
transition to the civil authority promotes the coordination, integration, and synchronization of civil and
military efforts to build the peace. Effective stability operations focus on the population’s essential needs.
This produces a secondary effect of preventing the populace from becoming disillusioned and offering
support and sanctuary to irregular forces. Properly focused and effective stability operations prevent
population centers from degenerating into recruiting areas for insurgencies, opposition movements, and
civil unrest.

APPLY FORCE SELECTIVELY AND DISCRIMINATELY

9-18. Commanders must make sure their units apply force consistent with and adequate to assigned
objectives and employ combat power selectively in accordance with assigned missions and prescribed legal
and policy limitations. Commanders use the rules of engagement to guide the tactical application of
combat power. The commander on the ground is best qualified to estimate the correct degree of force that
must be used, consistent with the ROE.

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 Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

ACT DECISIVELY TO PREVENT ESCALATION

9-19. Army forces must always be prepared to act with speed and determination when carrying out
assigned tasks. Opponents of stability may perceive hesitation to act decisively as weakness. Units and
individuals must pursue military objectives energetically and apply military power forcefully. By doing so,
Army forces assure friend and foe alike that they not only can protect themselves and the people and
facilities under their charge but also achieve stability objectives.

UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL AND

SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS
9-20. Individual and small-unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command
or amount of force involved. In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic
impact. Recognizing and avoiding these potential problems requires trained, disciplined, and
knowledgeable leaders and Soldiers at every level. Every Soldier must be aware of the operational and
strategic context of the mission. Additionally, each Soldier must understand the potential military,
political, and legal consequences of the actions they take or fail to take. Dissemination of this information
throughout the force minimizes any possible confusion regarding desired objectives.

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON

9-21. The tank platoon has unique capabilities that make it an important asset to U.S. and combined forces
executing missions in stability operations and civil support operations. Whether it is operating organic to
the company or task organized to a light or heavy force, the platoon may be called upon to support a wide
range of operations in various political and geographical environments. Examples of these operations are
included in Section IV of this appendix.

USING THE PLATOON’S CAPABILITIES

9-22. Because of the resources necessary to deploy, operate, and sustain armored forces, tank platoons are
usually used to execute stability and support activities that take maximum advantage of their inherent
capabilities of firepower, maneuver, shock effect, and survivability. They execute move, attack, and
defend missions using procedures similar to those described throughout this manual.
9-23. On the other hand, the factors of METT-TC and the operational considerations prevalent in stability
operations and civil support operations may modify the conditions for successful mission accomplishment.
This means the tank platoon occasionally may be assigned operations that are normally handled by
specially trained and equipped elements. For example, the platoon could be tasked for crowd and riot
control if a shortage of military police exists.
9-24. Several problems arise when armored forces are used in this type of role. To perform with complete
effectiveness and efficiency, crewmen should receive special equipment and training before executing
such operations. In addition, dismounted missions effectively negate the tank platoon’s inherent
advantages (lethality, mobility, and survivability).

TRAINING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AND CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-25. Disciplined, well-trained, combat-ready leaders and crewmen can adapt to the specialized demands
of stability operations and civil support operations. To achieve this degree of readiness, however, the
platoon must be thoroughly trained before deployment on such factors as the operational environment, the
ROE and ROI, force protection, and individual Soldier responsibilities. A discussion of these operational
considerations is included later in this section. The training must be updated continuously after
deployment.

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Chapter 9

LEADER REQUIREMENTS
9-26. Flexibility and situational understanding are paramount requirements, especially for the tank platoon
leader. The platoon’s role and/or objectives in stability operations and civil support operations will not
always be clear. The platoon leader will sometimes be called upon to make on-the-spot decisions that
could have an immediate, dramatic effect on the strategic or operational situation. In this uniquely tense
setting, leaders who disregard the will of belligerent parties and the lethality of these groups’ weapons
compromise the success of their mission and risk the lives of their Soldiers.

PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

9-27. Although stability operations can take place in any part of the world, they are most likely to occur in
third world countries, where social, political, economic, and psychological factors contribute to political
instability. Each country or region is unique, with its own history, culture, goals, and problems. U.S.
forces deployed to these areas can be subject to rapid and dramatic changes in situations and missions. The
tank platoon leader must understand this environment; he must plan for rapid changes in the situation or
mission and constantly be prepared to adapt to them. In addition, the platoon must be prepared to operate
in any type of terrain and climate.
9-28. To deal effectively with the diverse situations they may face, U.S. forces must undergo orientation
training on the complex conditions and factors at work in a specific region. Each Soldier must understand
the political and economic situation, as well as the cultures, climates, and terrain of the region. He should
understand the military situation, especially the doctrine, tactics, and equipment that are employed by
hostile forces or civil unrest. Orientation training should also clarify the following environmental factors
as well as the planning and operational considerations discussed in the remainder of this section.
Tempo
9-29. The speed of military action can vary widely, from fast, violent tactical movement by a reaction
force for the purpose of relieving encircled friendly forces to the deliberate occupation of stationary
defensive positions to provide overwatch at traffic control points. Although extreme tension may underlie
stability operations and civil support operations, the tempo of these operations is generally slow.
9-30. Throughout stability operations and civil support operations, belligerents can be expected to execute
both overt and covert operations to test friendly reaction times and security procedures. Units that are
predictable or that lack sound OPSEC leave themselves susceptible to attack. For the tank platoon, the key
to a secure environment is not only to maintain the highest possible level of OPSEC, but also to vary the
techniques by which security procedures are executed.
Role of U.S. Forces
9-31. All crewmen should be aware of the role U.S. forces will play in the overall mission. This is
especially vital when Americans are part of a combined force that requires constant interaction and
coordination with the Soldiers of foreign nations. In all cases, the commander’s intent and projected end
state should be simplified and presented in a way that gives Soldiers the guidance they need to accomplish
the mission.
INTELLIGENCE
9-32. Intelligence is crucial during the planning, preparation, and execution of stability operations and civil
support operations. The threats faced by military forces in these operations are more ambiguous than those
in other situations because combatants, guerrillas, and terrorists can easily blend with the civilian
population. Before forces are committed, intelligence must be collected, processed, and focused to support
all planning, training, and operational requirements. (Note. See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for additional
information.)

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 Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
9-33. Although stability operations are normally centrally planned, execution takes the form of small-
scale, decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. Responsibility for making decisions on the
ground will fall to junior leaders. Effective command guidance and a thorough understanding of the
applicable ROE and/or ROI (refer to the following discussions) are critical at each operational level.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
9-34. ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military operations. The ROE are directed by higher
military authorities based on the political and tactical situations and the level of threat. For example, these
restrictions may require that the forces involved limit their use of firepower to a certain geographical area
or that they limit the duration of their operations. Refer to Figure 9-1 for an example of ROE for one
possible situation.
9-35. While ROE must be considered during the planning and execution of all operations, understanding,
adjusting for, and properly executing ROE are especially important to success in stability operations and
civil support operations. The unit’s SOP will require adjustment based on each particular situation’s
ROE. The restrictions change whenever the political and military situations change; this means ROE must
be explained to friendly Soldiers continuously.
9-36. ROE provide the authority for the Soldier’s right to self-defense. Each Soldier must understand
the ROE and be prepared to execute them properly in every possible confrontation. In addition, ROE
violations can have operational, strategic, and political consequences that may affect national security; the
enemy can be expected to exploit such violations.

All enemy military personnel and vehicles transporting enemy personnel or their
equipment may be engaged subject to the following restrictions:
A. Armed civilians will be engaged only in self-defense.
B. Civilian aircraft will not be engaged, except in self-defense, without approval
from division level.
C. All civilians should be treated with respect and dignity. Civilians and their
property should not be harmed unless necessary to save U.S. lives. If possible,
civilians should be evacuated before any U.S. attack. Privately owned property
may be used only if publicly owned property is unavailable or its use is
inappropriate.
D. If civilians are in the area, artillery, mortars, AC-130s, attack helicopters, tube-
launched or rocket-launched weapons, and main tank guns should not be used
against known or suspected targets without the permission of a ground
maneuver commander (LTC or higher).
E. If civilians are in the area, all air attacks must be controlled by FAC or FO, and
CAS, WP weapons, and incendiary weapons are prohibited without approval
from division.
F. If civilians are in the area, infantry will shoot only at known enemy locations.
G. Public works such as power stations, water treatment plants, dams, and other
public utilities may not be engaged without approval from division level.
H. Hospitals, churches, shrines, schools, museums, and other historical or cultural
sites will be engaged only in self-defense against fire from these locations.
I. All indirect fire and air attacks must be observed.
J. Pilots must be briefed for each mission as to the location of civilians and friendly
forces.
K. Booby traps are not authorized. Authority to emplace mines is reserved for the
division commander. Riot control agents can be used only with approval from
division level.

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Chapter 9

L. Prisoners should be treated humanely, with respect and dignity.

M. Annex R to the operational plan (OPLAN) provides more detail. In the event
this card conflicts with the OPLAN, the OPLAN should be followed.

Distribution: One for each Soldier deployed (all ranks).

Figure 9-1. Example rules of engagement

RULES OF INTERACTION/GRADUATED RESPONSE

9-37. ROI and graduated response embody the human dimension of stability operations and support
operations; they lay the foundation for successful relationships with the myriad of factions and individuals
that play critical roles in these operations. ROI encompass an array of interpersonal communication skills,
such as persuasion and negotiation. Graduated response deals with the process of applying greater levels
of force to a situation in response to the changes in that situation. These are tools the individual Soldier
will need to deal with the nontraditional threats that are prevalent in stability operations, including political
friction, unfamiliar cultures, and conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI enhance the Soldier’s survivability in
such situations. Refer to Figure 9-2 for an example of a graduated response card.

Figure 9-2. Example graduated response card

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 Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

9-38. ROI are based on the applicable ROE for a particular operation; they must be tailored to the specific
regions, cultures, and/or populations affected by the operation. Like ROE, the ROI can be effective only if
they are thoroughly rehearsed and understood by every Soldier in the unit.

FORCE PROTECTION
9-39. Because of the influence of local politics and news media in stability operations and civil support
operations, precautions and operations required to minimize casualties and collateral damage become a
particularly important operational consideration during these operations. At the same time, however, force
protection must be a constant priority. Armored forces are commonly deployed in a force protection role.
9-40. In attempting to limit the level and scope of violence used in stability operations and civil support
operations, leaders must avoid making tactically unsound decisions or exposing the force to unnecessary
risks. On the other hand, an overpowering use of force correctly employed and surgically applied, can
reduce subsequent violence or prevent a response from the opposing force. These considerations must be
covered in the ROE and the OPORD from the battalion or brigade.
9-41. OPSEC, tempered by restrictions in the ROE and ROI, is an important tool for the platoon leader in
accomplishing his force protection goals. Security procedures should encompass the full range of
antiterrorist activities for every Soldier and leader. Examples include proper RTP; strict noise, light, and
litter discipline; proper wear of the uniform; display of the proper demeanor for the situation; as well as
effective use of cover and concealment, obstacles, OPs and early warning devices, the protection afforded
by armor vehicles, and safe locations for eating and resting.
9-42. A final consideration in force protection is hygiene. Proper field sanitation and personal hygiene are
mandatory if Soldiers are to stay healthy.

TASK ORGANIZATION
9-43. Because of the unique requirements of stability operations and civil support operations, the tank
platoon may be task organized to operate with a variety of units. As noted, this may include armor or
mechanized company team or a light infantry company or battalion. In addition, the platoon may operate
with other elements with linguists, counterintelligence teams, and civil affairs teams.

SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS
9-44. The operational environment that the platoon faces during stability operations and civil support
operations may be very austere, creating special sustainment considerations. These factors include, but are
not limited to, the following:
• Reliance on local procurement of certain items.
• Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts, Class IV supplies (barrier materials),
and lubricants.
• Special Class V supply requirements, such as pepper spray.
• Reliance on bottled water.

OPERATIONS WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

9-45. U.S. Army units may conduct certain stability operations and civil support operations in coordination
with a variety of outside organizations. These include other U.S. armed services or government agencies
as well as international organizations, including private volunteer organizations (PVO) (such as Doctors
Without Borders), nongovernmental organizations (NGO) (such as the Red Cross), and United Nation
(UN) agencies.

SOLDIERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
9-46. U.S. Soldiers may have extensive contact with civilians during stability operations and civil support
operations. As a result, their personal conduct has a significant impact on the opinions, and thus the

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Chapter 9

support, of the local population. As noted, Soldiers must understand that misconduct by U.S. forces (even
those deployed for only a short time) can damage rapport that took years to develop. U.S. Soldiers must
treat local civilians and military personnel as personal and professional equals, affording them the
appropriate customs and courtesies.
9-47. Every Soldier must be updated continuously on changes to operational considerations (such as
environment, ROE/ROI, media, and force protection). Such changes can have an immediate impact on his
freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the Soldier informed of changes enhances his situational
understanding and his ability to adapt to changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate this information
quickly and accurately.
9-48. Every individual is an intelligence-collecting instrument. The collection of information is a
continuous process, and all information must be reported. Intelligence is provided by many sources,
including friendly forces, enemy elements, and the local populace. From the friendly standpoint, each
Soldier must be familiar with the local PIR and other applicable intelligence requirements. At the same
time, enemy Soldiers or other outside countries’ intelligence agencies will be continuously seeking
intelligence on U.S. actions, often blending easily into the civilian population. U.S. Soldiers must be aware
of this and use OPSEC procedures at all times.
9-49. To emphasize Soldier responsibilities, leaders conduct PCCs and PCIs that focus on each Soldier’s
knowledge of the environment and application of the ROE. These checks and inspections should also
identify possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could place the Soldier and his equipment at risk.
Leaders should stress that terrorists and thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or mount vehicles either
to steal equipment and supplies or to cause harm to U.S. forces or facilities.
9-50. To enhance civilian cooperation and support, the tank platoon leader is responsible for obtaining a
key word and phrase card from the S2 to assist in translation of key english phrases into the language of
the host nation. These phrases should apply specifically to the area of operations.

SECTION III – CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-51. Civil support operations are operations conducted to address the consequences of natural or man-
made disasters, accidents, and incidents within the United States and its territories. Army forces engage in
civil support operations when the size and scope of events exceed the capabilities of domestic civilian
agencies. The Army National Guard often acts as a first responder on behalf of state authorities when
functioning under Title 32 U.S. Code authority or while serving on State active duty. The National Guard
is uniquely suited to perform these missions; however, the scope and level of destruction may require the
use of additional active military forces to respond to the disaster, accident, or incident. There are many
similarities between civil support and stability operations. The purposes, considerations, and
characteristics are related; however, U.S. laws carefully circumscribe the actions that military forces,
particularly the regular Army, can conduct within the United States and its territories. The local population
is composed of U.S. citizens, whose security and protection is the reason the Army forces exist. Local and
national agencies normally are the lead and Army forces cooperate and synchronize their efforts closely
with them.

TYPES OF CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-52. Civil support encompasses three types: support civil law enforcement, support civil authority, and
restore essential services. These types are similar to the stability types of operations. They differ because
they are conducted within the U.S. and its territories and are executed under U.S. law. Within the U.S.,
National Guard forces under state control have law enforcement authorities not granted to regular Army
units. In addition to legal differences, operations conducted within the U.S. are conducted in support of
other government agencies. These agencies are trained, resourced, and equipped far more extensively than
counterpart agencies involved in many stability operations overseas. In stability operations, multinational
operations are typical; in civil support operations, they are the exception.

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 Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

SUPPORT CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT

9-53. When authorized and directed, Army forces provide support to local, state, and federal law
enforcement officers. In extreme cases, when directed by the President of the United States, regular Army
forces maintain law and order under martial law.

SUPPORT CIVIL AUTHORITY

9-54. The civil authorities within the U.S. and its territories are dedicated and experienced civil servants.
They are manned, funded, and equipped to provide governance and essential serivces to the citizens. As a
result of disaster or attack, the capacity of government may be reduced or overextended. Army forces
provide C2, protection, and sustainment to government officials at all levels to support governance until
these agencies are able to function without Army support.

RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

9-55. In response to natural or man-made disaster, Army forces provide essential services to an affected
area. Essential services include rescue, emergency medical care, prevention of epidemic disease, provision
of food and water, provision of emergency shelter from the elements, and the provision of basic sanitation
(sewage and garbage disposal). Army forces work directly with local and federal officials to restore and
return control of services to civilian control as rapidly as possible.

PURPOSES OF CIVIL OPERATIONS

9-56. Army forces conduct civil support operations as part of Homeland Security. Homeland Security
provides the nation its strategic flexibility by protecting its citizens, critical assets, and infrastructure from
conventional and unconventional threats. It has two related elements. The first is homeland defense. If
the United States comes under direct attack or is threatened by hostile armed forces, Army forces under
Joint Command conduct offensive and defensive operations against enemy elements while simultaneously
providing civil support. The other is civil support. The purposes of civil support operations are:
• Save lives.
• Maintain or restore law and order.
• Protect infrastructure and property.
• Maintain or restore local government.
• Shapte for interagency success.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-57. Commanders and staffs consider and incorporate several factors into civil support operations. These
include the following:
• Provide essential services and support to the largest number of people.
• Respond quickly to save lives and alleviate suffering.
• Use C2 capabilities and forces to complement civilian jurisdictions.
• Use defensive capabilities to secure critical assets and key infrastructure.
• Hand over responsibility to civilian agencies as soon as possible.
• Display the capability to use overwhelming force, but use deadly force only as a last resort and
in self-defense.
• Treat all civilians as U.S. citizens.
9-58. Most operations conducted within the U.S. have only minor offensive and defensive components;
however, Homeland Security employs complementary offensive and defensive capabilities. Defensive
capabilities employed in Homeland Security missions include the protection of critical assets and key
infrastructure during crises. The ability to conduct offensive operations, though maintained only as a
potential for homeland defense, is also present. Discipline, endurance, and unit cohesion developed during

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Chapter 9

training prepare Soldiers and units to address the ambiguities and complexities inherent in civil support
operations.

SECTION IV – EXAMPLES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-59. The following discussion and accompanying figures examine several situations the tank platoon may
face during stability operations and civil support operations. The list is not all-inclusive; assessment of
METT-TC factors and the operational considerations applicable in the area of operations may identify
additional mission requirements.
9-60. The platoon leader must keep in mind that the relatively simple situations illustrated here cannot
adequately portray the ever-changing, often confusing conditions of the stability operations and civil
support operations. As noted, flexibility is a key to success (and survival) under such conditions. To the
extent possible, the platoon leader should attempt to shape the role or mission to match the platoon’s
unique characteristics and capabilities.

Note. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of urban operations. As noted, these
operations often provide the operational framework for stability operations and civil support
operations.

ESTABLISH A BATTLE POSITION

9-61. The platoon establishes a BP or conducts a relief in place at a platoon BP as part of a company
perimeter or strongpoint defense (the circled “A” in Figure 9-3) (see Chapter 4 for detailed information on
defensive operations). Dismounted infantry should be integrated with the tank platoon. Coordination with
dismounted patrols and OPs outside the perimeter is critical for situational understanding. Signs, in the
local language, should be posted as necessary within the engagement area to identify movement restrictions
on the local populace.

Figure 9-3. Battle position and reserve/reaction force missions

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 Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

CONDUCT RESERVE OPERATIONS

9-62. As part of the battalion or company reserve, the tank platoon occupies an assembly area or sets up a
perimeter defense (the circled “B” in Figure 9-3). Potential missions include linkup with and relief of
encircled friendly forces (the circled “B1”); linkup and movement to secure an objective in an operation to
rescue a downed helicopter or stranded vehicle (the circled “B2”); and tactical movement to destroy enemy
forces attacking a convoy (the circled “B3”). In all three scenarios, the platoon conducts tactical
movement and operations in contact. Tasks such as linkup, support by fire, attack by fire, assault, hasty
attack, and consolidation and reorganization are also critical to the reserve mission. For more information
on these operations, refer to Chapters 3 and 5.

OVERWATCH A TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT

9-63. The tank platoon (or section) overwatches an infantry or MP traffic control point (the circled “C” in
Figure 9-4). In turn, the overwatch element must ensure its own local security; it usually does this by
coordinating with dismounted infantry for OPs and dismounted patrols from the company. Overwatch is
covered in Chapter 3, occupation of a defensive position in Chapter 4. Also see Figures 9-5 and 9-6 for
manning of light and heavy traffic checkpoints.

Figure 9-4. Traffic control point, choke point, blockade, convoy escort, and route proofing
missions

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Chapter 9

DEFEND A CHOKE POINT

9-64. The tank platoon (supported by infantry) occupies a perimeter defense to protect traffic and facilitate
movement through a choke point along the MSR (the circled “D” in Figure 9-4). Infantry is integrated into
the perimeter defense to augment the platoon’s firepower and to provide early warning and OPSEC for the
defense by means of dismounted patrols and OPs. For detailed information on defensive operations, see
Chapter 4.

OVERWATCH A BLOCKADE/ROADBLOCK
9-65. The tank platoon (or section) overwatches a blockade or roadblock, either a manned position or a
reinforcing obstacle covered by fires only (the circled “E” in Figure 9-4). It coordinates with dismounted
infantry from the company for local security (OPs and dismounted patrols). Positions are improved using
procedures for deliberate occupation of a BP (see Chapter 4). Also see Figures 9-7A and 9-7B for
examples of tank platoon roadblocks set up and a list of equipment needed to conduct the operation.

CONDUCT CONVOY ESCORT

9-66. The tank platoon conducts convoy escort duties (the circled “F” in Figure 9-4) using procedures
covered in Chapter 5.

CONDUCT PROOFING/BREACHING OPERATIONS

9-67. The tank platoon (or section) overwatches breaching operations along the MSR or provides
overwatch to engineer elements as they clear the route (the circled “G” in Figure 9-4). In doing so, the
platoon conducts tactical movement as outlined in Chapter 3 of this manual.
9-68. Based on METT-TC factors, the tank platoon may use tactical movement techniques to provide
overwatch for the proofing vehicle, which can be a tank (equipped with a mine roller, if available) or an
engineer vehicle. If mines are detected, the platoon continues to overwatch the breaching unit until all
mines have been detected and neutralized. If the obstacle is not within the breaching unit’s capability,
engineers are called forward. At all times, overwatch vehicles should take notice of anything that is out of
the ordinary, such as new construction, repairs to damaged buildings, plants or trees that seem new or out
of place, and freshly dug earth. These conditions may indicate the presence of newly emplaced or
command-detonated mines. At no time will tanks conduct breaching or proofing operations.

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 Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

Figure 9-5. Tank section manning a light traffic checkpoint

Figure 9-6. Tank platoon manning a heavy traffic checkpoint

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Chapter 9

Figure 9-7A. Tank platoon roadblock

Figure 9-7B. Equipment list for roadblocks and checkpoints

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 Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

9-69. During cordon and search operations, the tank platoon occupies overwatch and/or hasty defensive
positions to isolate a search area (see Figure 9-8). Close coordination and communication with the search
team are critical, as is employment of OPs and patrols to maintain surveillance of dead space and gaps in
the cordoned area.

Figure 9-8. Cordon and search operations

9-70. The tank platoon (or section) must be prepared to take immediate action if the search team or OPs
identify enemy elements. Enemy contact may require the platoon to execute tactical movement and linkup;
it would then coordinate with other units to destroy the enemy using techniques discussed in Chapter 3 of
this manual.
9-71. Additionally, the tank platoon may support the infantry by conducting vehicle and personnel
searches as part of the search operation or traffic control points. Refer to FM 3-20.98 (FM 17-98),
Appendix E, for a detailed discussion on vehicle and personnel search procedures.

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 Appendix A
Digitization

Army digitization is the result of the desire to employ existing and emerging
technology to enhance Army operations from the strategic to the tactical level by
providing its Soldiers an automated, near real-time capability for planning,
coordinating, monitoring, controlling, and executing operations. At the tactical level,
the Army is capitalizing on this technology by digitizing its vehicles, weapons, and
equipment. Digitized systems enhance operational effectiveness in many ways.
Providing the user the ability to take the initiative on the battlefield and achieve
combat superiority over an enemy through increased situational understanding
especially enhances it. Situational understanding is the ability to maintain a constant,
clear mental picture of relevant information and the tactical situation. This picture
includes the knowledge of both the friendly and threat situation and of relevant
terrain. (Note. Even with the addition of these digital enablers, the basic combat
skills of tankers must be mastered and reinforced in the event digital technology is
compromised or fails. Once the basic skills are mastered, the digital enablers can be
exploited to their fullest capabilities.)

As outlined throughout this manual, the tank platoon’s primary tools on the digitized
battlefield is the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system.
This appendix focuses on the impact of these systems on various phases of platoon
operations and on the duties and responsibilities of platoon leaders and crewmen
employing these systems while conducting tactical operations. This appendix also
provides a brief overview of the structure of the tactical Internet (TI) and its major
subcomponents.

SECTION I – THE TACTICAL INTERNET AND FBCB2

THE TACTICAL INTERNET

A-1. The TI is designed to provide users with near real-time, shared situational understanding. It consists
of tactical radios linked with routers that use commercial protocols to allow digital systems to interoperate
in a dynamic battlefield environment. The TI provides reliable, seamless communications connectivity to
deliver situational understanding and command, control, and intelligence (C2I) data to digital systems.
A-2. The TI is comprised of two echelons: the upper TI and the lower TI. Company level and below
operate on the lower TI. The upper TI passes situational understanding and C2I between the command
posts at the task force level and higher.

FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW

A-3. The FBCB2 is a battle command information system designed for units performing missions at the
tactical level. FBCB2 is a system of computers, global-positioning equipment, and communication
systems that work together to provide unprecedented amounts of real-time information to combat leaders.
FBCB2 integrates with the Army tactical command and control system (ATCCS) to provide complete,
seamless battle command capability with increased battlefield awareness. It provides command and
control capabilities relevant to each of the BFAs, increasing the effectiveness of their capabilities in

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Appendix A

relation to the mission. Both the lower and upper TIs support FBCB2 communications. (Figure A-1
shows the FBCB2 system.)

Figure A-1. FBCB2 computer system

A-4. FBCB2 displays the relevant information regarding the situational understanding environment. This
information shows the user his location, the location of other friendly forces, reported enemy locations, and
known enemy and plotted friendly battlefield obstacles. The warfighter receives data “pushed” from all the
battlefield systems to maintain real-time battle information. (Figure A-2 shows the FBCB2 tactical
display.)

Figure A-2. FBCB2 tactical display

A-5. FBCB2 receives data across the TI via the Internet controller (INC). The INC is a tactical router
built into the SINCGARS. The enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) data radio, blue
force tracker (BFT), and SINCGARS data/voice radio transmit and receive digital information between
vehicles. Each FBCB2 derives its own location via the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR).
Utilizing these interfaces, the FBCB2 automatically updates and broadcasts its current location to all other
FBCB2 and embedded battle command (EBC) platforms. EBC platforms, such as selected M1A2s and
M2A3s, are not installed with FBCB2 hardware, but are equipped with software capabilities that allow
them to share situational understanding and command and control information with the FBCB2 platforms.
(Figure A-3 shows the tank platoon FBCB2 TI architectural diagram.)

A-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Digitization

Figure A-3. Tank platoon FBCB2 TI architecture diagram

A-6. Digital systems on the battlefield pass messages using the joint variable message format (JVMF).
The JVMF is a Department of Defense standardized message format. It prescribes uniform message
formats for all branches of the armed services.

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A-7. This section focuses on several areas in which FBCB2 affect tank platoon operations.

WINGMAN CONCEPT
A-8. The FBCB2 system allows tank sections and platoons to maneuver outside their direct line of sight
of each other and still maintain situational understanding and mutual support (see Figures A-4A and A
4B). Even as they improve command and control within the platoon, however, these digital systems
increase the command and control demands on the individual TC. They require the platoon to make more
effective use of the wingman concept.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 A-3

Appendix A

Figure A-4A. Tank sections maneuvering separately on actual terrain outside of their direct
line of sight of each other

Figure A-4B. FBCB2 display of the tank sections maneuvering separately

A-9. The M1A1D, M1A2, or M1A2 SEP platoon must be able to operate as two independent sections.
This capability provides the platoon leader and company/troop commander with the flexibility to maneuver
using sections. (Note. Although FBCB2 allows the ability to spread forces over a large area, the platoon
leader must still consider mutual support between sections.)

A-4 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Digitization

NAVIGATION
A-10. The POSNAV system (a built-in navigational system on digitally-equipped tanks that operates
through FBCB2) significantly improves navigation for the company team and platoon. This inertial
navigation system allows the unit to maintain greater depth and dispersion. It also enhances the ability of
the company team commander or platoon leader to maneuver his unit on the battlefield.
A-11. On the M1A2, the navigation system must be periodically updated to increase accuracy; however,
the POSNAV system on the M1A2 SEP automatically updates itself with a GPS built into the system. This
allows the platoon leader and TCs to use waypoints to orient vehicles during movement. The tank driver
can then steer to these waypoints to maintain orientation and dispersion within the company team or
platoon.
A-12. One method of controlling platoon movement is for the platoon leader to preselect checkpoints and
add them to the FBCB2 overlay. He then sends the overlay to the remainder of the platoon. Each TC uses
the CID or commander’s display unit (CDU) to designate these checkpoints as waypoints for the driver in
accordance with the platoon leader’s guidance, movement orders, and designated movement technique.
Once the TC selects a waypoint to which he wants the driver to steer, the DID will display direction and
distance information to that waypoint. (Note. The DID does not display terrain relief. The driver must not
become ‘fixed’ on driving the tank via the DID only, but should maneuver the tank visually and
periodically check the DID to apply course corrections as needed. Also, the platoon leader’s driver, using
his DID steer-to capability, can lead the platoon via the waypoint designated by the platoon leader. The
remainder of the tanks will orient on the lead tank and maintain their position in the formation.)
A-13. Unless the tank is in contact, the loader should be up in the hatch to assist the driver and provide
security. The TC must ensure that the loader is knowledgeable of tank platoon formations and active in
acquiring targets. This loader’s assistance will give the TC more freedom to send and receive digital traffic
and monitor the CID or CDU. As a result, the TC can focus more effectively on the tactical situation and
maintain better overall command of the tank.

SECTION III – CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

A-14. Digitized equipment has the potential to improve the platoon’s effectiveness in several areas,
including situational understanding, command and control, intelligence, and navigation. These enhanced
capabilities allow the platoon leader to more effectively synchronize his elements with other units through
the employment of timelier and more accurate information. In turn, digital enhancements assist the platoon
leader and other friendly leaders and commanders in gaining and maintaining the initiative against enemy
forces. At the same time, however, the platoon leader must keep in mind several areas in which digitized
equipment imposes limitations on the platoon and other friendly units. Table A-1 summarizes the
limitations and capabilities of the digitized tank platoon.

Table A-1. Capabilities and limitations of the digitized tank platoon

Capabilities
Digitized equipment provides these tactical
advantages:
• Provides accurate locations of
friendly units with respect to known
enemy locations. This information
reduces the chance of fratricide and
enhances situational understanding.
• Allows platoon leaders to increase
dispersion among the platoon.
• Enhances survivability through
enhanced awareness of known
enemy locations.
Limitations
Digitized equipment has or causes these tactical
limitations:
• Units not equipped with the SINCGARS SIP
INC radio (SINCGARS with system
improvement program and Internet
controller) cannot send digital and voice
traffic simultaneously.
• Users must physically manipulate digital
controls or visually read digital information
causing a loss of focus on enemy
acquisition and destruction and situational
understanding.
• Users must be aware that the size of

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 A-5

Appendix A

Table A-1. Capabilities and limitations of the digitized tank platoon

Capabilities
• Enables leaders to receive, process,
and distribute information (including
WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs)
in near real time.
• Greatly improves maneuver capability
on the battlefield through the use of
the POSNAV system.
Limitations
graphics (if too large) could cause the
system to run at a slower speed or crash.
• If the net server is lost, the platoon will lose
situational understanding until they conduct
net join procedures (EPLRS).

A-15. Battle command of the tank platoon is significantly enhanced through the use of FBCB2. It allows
the platoon to—
• Maintain friendly situational understanding (Blue SU).
• Track actual and templated enemy positions and obstacles (Red SU).
• Submit preformatted, standardized reports (SALUTE, SITREP, MEDEVAC, NBC, call-for-fire,
and so forth).
• Rapidly disseminate graphic overlays and written FRAGOs.
• Maneuver in dispersed formations.
• Enhance situational understanding and decrease dependency on graphic control measures.

SECTION IV – DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A-16. As with all tactical organizations, the effectiveness of the digital unit depends on the synergy of its
subordinate elements (individual tanks and tank sections) as well as its relationship with higher
headquarters and support elements. Together, these components create a broad array of capabilities.
Individually, however, the platoon has a number of vulnerabilities. Effective application of the platoon
within the combined arms force can capitalize on its strengths and enhance the capabilities of its parent
unit. This section discusses factors that affect the platoon’s organization and its relationship with other
elements.

ROLE OF TRAINING
A-17. The skills required to operate and maintain the highly technical systems on the M1A1D, M1A2, and
M1A2 SEP are extremely perishable. To ensure combat effectiveness of their units, leaders in both the
company team and platoon must place special emphasis on the training of individual tank crews. Constant
sustainment training is a must in order to remain proficient on the digital systems particular to their vehicle.
A-18. A comprehensive training program must include cross training. Even though each crewman has
specific duties and responsibilities, success in battle often depends on his ability to function at any position
on the tank. Every crewman must be proficient in the operation of all tank systems, including the FBCB2,
CITV, and SINCGARS. In addition, tank crew members must have a thorough understanding of how to
maintain and service the tank and its component parts to keep the vehicle fully mission capable.
(Note. Training programs for digitized units must be coordinated with the training programs of
nondigitized units. Digital units must understand that they need to push situational understanding
information to nondigitized units and attachments.)

LEADER AND CREW RESPONSIBILITIES

A-19. In general, members of the M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP company team and platoon hold the
same functional responsibilities as their counterparts in other tank units. This discussion focuses on
responsibilities specific to the unique capabilities and employment considerations of digitized tanks.

A-6 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Digitization

COMPANY TEAM RESPONSIBILITIES

Company Team Commander
A-20. The company team commander plans and coordinates tactical operations for the team. He uses
FBCB2 to quickly disseminate information and begin parallel planning. He can streamline the planning
process by preparing and sending FBCB2 overlays. The digital systems offer him a variety of overlays
(operations, fire support, obstacle, and other areas) that can reduce the clutter of a combined overlay.
A-21. During offensive operations, the commander receives FBCB2 reports from his platoon leaders.
Looking at his display screen, he develops the situation and evaluates COAs. When executing a particular
COA, he monitors the movement of the company team, both visually (limited) and on the display, and
makes sure that combat power is massed at the proper point on the battlefield. The commander can use
FBCB2 to quickly establish platoon sectors of fire in overwatch positions or during consolidation.
A-22. In the defense, the company team commander exercises command and control of the company team
using his FBCB2 fire plan. He lases to known or suspected enemy positions to create enemy icons on the
FBCB2 display. He then uses the grid coordinates generated by this process to initiate calls for fire and
mass indirect fires when the enemy is outside direct-fire range. He uses FBCB2-generated TRPs and
trigger lines to shift and mass the team’s fires to destroy the enemy. At the conclusion of tactical
operations, the commander uses FBCB2 to gather and consolidate updated CS status reports from his
platoons.
Executive Officer
A-23. Before the battle, the XO conducts tactical coordination with higher, adjacent, and supporting units
as required or directed. Acting as the company team NCS, he assists in the command and control of the
team’s maneuver. He receives tactical FBCB2 reports from the platoons, and then submits consolidated
reports via digital means (FBCB2) and FM voice to the task force S3 and/or commander as required.
A-24. The XO performs most of his sustainment responsibilities before and after the battle. In coordination
with the 1SG, he plans and supervises the team’s sustainment preparations.
A-25. The FBCB2 system also enables the XO to receive, verify, and consolidate other required reports
from the platoons. He can forward the company team’s consolidated reports digitally (with FM voice
confirmation) to the task force XO, S3, S4, and/or commander. (Note. In the event that the task force
TOC does not possess FBCB2 capability, these reports will have to be sent by FM voice.)
A-26. If units that are cross attached to the company team lack digital capabilities, the XO must coordinate
with that unit to ensure it remains informed throughout the attachment.
First Sergeant
A-27. The 1SG’s sustainment role in the digital company team is to consolidate all of the A/L reports and
send them digitally (with FM confirmation) to the battalion S4/combat trains command post (CTCP). After
the battle, the 1SG consolidates the FBCB2 situation rollup reports (covering ammunition, fuel, personnel,
and vehicle status) from the platoon leaders and directs cross leveling, as necessary. He forwards the
company team’s consolidated FBCB2 situation rollup report to the company team commander, XO, and
battalion S4/CTCP.
Fire Support Team
A-28. The intervehicular information system (IVIS) and FBCB2 allow units to send fast, accurate call-for
fire requests with a ten-digit grid location. It also gives the position of friendly elements, which can
decrease the possibility of fratricide from indirect fires. If the FIST lacks FBCB2 compatibility, the XO
can provide periodic position updates to the FIST on the forward trace of the company team.
Master Gunner
A-29. The master gunner’s specific responsibilities include assisting the crews of the M1A1D, M1A2, and
M1A2 SEP platoons in establishing or coordinating boresight lines, plumb and synchronization berms, and

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 A-7

Appendix A

using live-fire screening ranges and zero ranges. During the planning and preparation phases of an
operation, the master gunner may be called upon to help coordinate and execute the sustainment
operations, to serve as NCOIC of the command post, and to help the company team commander with his
troop-leading procedures. In combat operations, the master gunner may serve as the gunner on one of the
command tanks, as a sustainment operator riding on the APC, or as a section NCOIC in the company
team’s wheeled vehicles with responsibility for handling communications with the task force.

PLATOON RESPONSIBILITIES

Platoon Leader
A-30. Platoon leaders in M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP units inform the company team commander and
XO on the tactical situation by forwarding FBCB2 contact reports and SITREPs. Prior to contact, they
keep FM voice communications to a minimum to facilitate the timely transmission and receipt of FBCB2
reports. The platoon leaders act as forward observers (FO) for the commander and FIST, using the
interface between the POSNAV system and LRF to identify targets and initiate calls for fire. They transmit
digital reports, overlays, and the ammunition and fuel status of their platoons to the commander and XO as
required by unit SOP.
A-31. As applicable (either as directed by unit SOP or at the conclusion of the battle), each platoon leader
receives a situation rollup report from his PSG containing consolidated individual tank CS reports for the
platoon. The platoon leader reviews the situation rollup report and forwards the platoon report to the 1SG
and XO.

Platoon Sergeant
A-32. All TCs, including the platoon leader, use the FBCB2 to forward SITREPs to the PSG. The PSG
consolidates these reports and forwards an FBCB2 situation rollup report to the platoon leader. He then
sends the same report and any other A/L reports to the 1SG, either digitally or via FM voice.
A-33. In general, although the PSG’s duties will lean more heavily toward sustainment activities, he must
be prepared to handle the tactical aspects of digitized operations as well. If the platoon leader’s vehicle is
destroyed or disabled and standard FBCB2 routing is affected, the PSG must log on as the platoon leader to
receive operations overlays from the company team commander or XO. (Note. With custom routing, the
commander or XO can send FBCB2 operations overlays to the PSG at any time.)

Tank Commander
A-34. The TC monitors the FBCB2 screen for friendly vehicle position updates, digital overlay updates,
and digital reports. He uses FBCB2 to transmit reports as requested by the platoon leader or PSG. He
employs the CITV (along with such nondigitized equipment as binoculars and/or the PVS-7) to scan his
assigned sector and to assist the driver as necessary during limited visibility. The TC also lases to possible
indirect-fire targets and forwards FBCB2 call-for-fire requests to the platoon leader as necessary.
A-35. The TC can use waypoints from his digital system to mark his map with key positions that will be
critical to mission accomplishment. Examples include checkpoints, the battalion aid station, and rally
points.

Gunner
A-36. The gunner’s duties include many communications tasks that are applicable to digitized operations,
including the following:
• Monitoring both digital and radio traffic.
• Logging onto nets.
• Inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays.
• Monitoring digital displays during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.

A-8 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Digitization

A-37. The gunner also assists the TC in performing other digitized functions. In turn, this allows the TC to
participate directly (on the ground) in such activities as orders drills, leader’s reconnaissance, and
rehearsals. These digital-related duties include the following:
• Entering graphics into FBCB2 overlays.
• Sending FBCB2 reports.
• Building FBCB2 sketch and range cards.
• Monitoring the CID or CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.

Driver
A-38. In the M1A2 and M1A2 SEP tanks, the driver can monitor the DID steer-to indicator and select the
best tactical route using preselected waypoints as designated by the TC. It is the driver’s responsibility to
maneuver the tank to the next waypoint, with the loader’s assistance, but with minimal guidance from the
TC. He uses terrain to conceal the tank’s movement at all times.

Loader
A-39. The loader’s duties include logging into unit radio nets and being an expert in operating and
manipulating the SINCGARS radio and VIC-3 intercom system. Because the loader is ideally positioned
to assist the TC in maintaining battlefield awareness, platoon leaders and TCs should give strong
consideration to assigning their second-most experienced crewman as the loader. (Note. The loader may
assist the TC in entering graphics on FBCB2 overlays, sending FBCB2 reports, and monitoring the CID or
CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.)
A-40. Once an operation is under way, the loader performs a variety of functions when the TC is occupied
with digital traffic on the FBCB2 screen or CITV. These duties include the following:
• Assisting the driver in keeping the tank in its position in formation.
• Assisting in acquiring targets for the gunner.
• Acting as the air guard or ATGM guard.
• Dismounting for local reconnaissance and security as required.

SECTION V – DIGITAL VERSUS FM OPERATIONS

A-41. Commanders should not rely on digital communications alone. Presently, digitization does not
eliminate the requirement for maps and FM communications. The decision of when to use digital and/or
FM depends on the situation, unit SOP, and level of unit training. Some message traffic should be sent
digitally followed by an FM alert directing recipients to check their message queues.

DIGITAL TRANSMISSIONS
USES OF DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS
A-42. Digital messaging at the individual, platoon, and company level is recommended as the primary
means of communication for the following purposes:
• Transmitting graphics and orders, when the situation allows.
• Sending routine reports, such as personnel and CS status or requests.
• Sending contact reports (vehicles not in contact).
• Requesting MEDEVAC support.
• Sending enemy SPOTREPs when not in contact (FBCB2 creates an enemy icon).
• Transmitting planned call-for-fire missions (follow up via FM).
• Sending digital NBC-1 reports. (This creates a contaminated area icon across the network.
Follow up with an FM report on the company team or battalion task force command net.)

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 A-9

Appendix A

A-43. Some other types of orders and reports that can be sent via FBCB2 include the following:
• Fragmentary orders. A digital FRAGO can be used to provide changes to existing OPORDs.
It should include all five paragraphs of the OPORD. Each paragraph should state either “No
Change” or give the new information to ensure that recipients know they have received the
entire FRAGO.
• Free-text messages. A free-text message can be used to send an unstructured digital message to
other FBCB2 or Army battle command systems (ABCS) (like an e-mail message).

THREADED MESSAGES
A-44. Certain messages require specific routing for them to be effective. These are called “threaded
messages.” The exception to this is the personnel status report and the task management message. The
routing for these is SOP driven.

Note. Users may add to the threaded message addressee list but should not delete from it.
These defaults are dictated by Army doctrine and communication architecture; for example, the
size, activity, location, type of resource, and time frame (SALTT) report feeds into the all-source
analysis system (ASAS) intelligence database for correlation into the joint common database for
higher situational understanding and analysis.

A-45. Most threaded messages must follow specific paths for information to reach intended personnel or
communication systems or to feed into the correct databases. For example, the call-for-fire (CFF) message
must be threaded properly to interface with the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS).
The CFF message originator may add as many recipients as desired to the addressee list; however, if he
alters any of the default recipients, the message may not reach AFATDS, and the fire mission will not be
processed. If all addressees are not kept on the thread, “orphan” fire missions will occur. An orphan
mission is where a mission task order and target number was not received from AFATDS.
A-46. The following are threaded messages:
• SALTT reports.
• NBC-1 reports.
• Obstacle reports.
• Fire support messages.

FM TRANSMISSIONS
A-47. FM radio remains the primary means of communication after crossing the LD because it is more
responsive. Multiple stations can monitor the net, and parties can convey emotion during the
transmission—a critical tool in assessing and understanding the battlefield situation. Light discipline in
night operations may dictate the use of FM communications; for example, brigade cavalry troop Soldiers
may go to blackout light FBCB2 operations and send SPOTREPs via FM to a vehicle (usually the troop
CP, which is stationary and postured to use the FBCB2 display while maintaining light discipline). The CP
can generate and manage FBCB2 SPOTREPs based on FM SPOTREPs and updates.
A-48. FM radio is recommended as the primary means of communication for—
• Making initial contact report.
• Coordinating operations when in contact or moving.
• Calling for fire on targets of opportunity.
• Making subsequent adjustment of fires on planned and unplanned targets.
• Requesting urgent MEDEVAC support.
• Transmitting enemy air reports.

A-10 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Appendix B
Orders and Reports

Orders and reports are the means by which the tank platoon receives and transmits
information, from the earliest notification that an operation will occur through the
final phases of execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success. In a
tactical situation, the platoon leader and PSG work with these vital tools on a daily
basis; obviously, they must have precise knowledge of orders formats and reporting
procedures. At the same time, they must ensure that every member of the platoon
understands how to receive and respond to the various types of orders and how to
compile and submit accurate, timely reports.

SECTION I – ORDERS
B-1. The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the formats of WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs.
He must be able to convert these into concise, yet thorough, orders for the platoon.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
B-2. Before the commander issues the OPORD, the platoon leader may receive one or more WARNOs.
He analyzes all information in these orders and transmits important details to the platoon as soon as
possible.
B-3. When the higher headquarters issues a complete five-paragraph OPORD, analysis of the order is a
fairly simple, straightforward process for the platoon leader. Commanders, however, do not always have
the time to issue a full OPORD; instead, they may have to issue a FRAGO.
B-4. The tank platoon leader normally issues instructions to his platoon in the OPORD format. He
derives much of the content from the higher order he received during execution of his troop-leading
procedures. He should always plan to issue his own five-paragraph order when time permits. When time
is short, he still issues as complete an order as possible, but he does so using a FRAGO.
B-5. Once an operation begins, FRAGOs become the normal method of issuing orders. Digital systems
allow commanders and leaders to supplement oral orders with overlays and a limited text capability; these
items can enhance their subordinates’ understanding of the FRAGOs.
B-6. Units may find themselves conducting the same type of operations on a repeat basis, such as route
clearance. There will tend to be a point where units will want to stop using the combat orders process.
This must be avoided; all operations are combat missions and must be planned as such, to do otherwise
leads to the Soldiers not having the combat focus.

WARNING ORDERS
B-7. During the planning phase of an operation, commanders and leaders use WARNOs as a shorthand
method of alerting their units and individual Soldiers (see Figure B-1 for a sample of a platoon WARNO).
The company or troop commander usually sends a series of WARNOs to his platoon leaders. These orders
help subordinates to prepare for new missions by providing directions and guidelines for platoon-level
planning and preparation. Each platoon leader immediately analyzes the information, and then issues a
WARNO of his own to alert the platoon to the upcoming operation. This allows the platoon to conduct
parallel planning and perpetrations.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 B-1

Appendix B

B-8. Warning orders generally follow the five-paragraph OPORD format (illustrated in Figure B-2). The
key consideration is that they should be as brief as possible while giving units and Soldiers the information
they need to begin preparing for the operation. A company-level WARNO normally includes these
elements:
• Enemy situation.
• Higher headquarters’ mission.
• Commander’s intent (if available).
• Earliest time of movement.
• Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals,
training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements).
• Time and place at which the company or troop OPORD will be issued.
B-9. Before he issues his own WARNO, the platoon leader should send graphics to the TCs, either by
traditional overlay or by using their digital systems (if available). The order is almost always given orally
and in person, but it may be issued by radio or, on digitally equipped tanks using the free-text message
capability of FBCB2. As a minimum, the platoon WARNO includes the following information:
• Updated enemy situation.
• Company and platoon mission statement.
• Company or troop commander’s intent (if available).
• A tentative time line, including the following:
• Earliest time of movement.
• Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals,
training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements).
• Time and location at which the platoon OPORD will be issued.
B-10. If he knows other times, events, or details related to the operation, the platoon leader may include the
information in the WARNO. (Figure B-1 shows an example of a platoon WARNO.)

“RED, THIS IS RED ONE, WARNING ORDER FOLLOWS, PREPARE TO COPY.”

“SUSPECTED SQUAD-SIZE ELEMENT OF INSURGENTS IS REPORTED IN SAFE
HOUSE VICINITY NK77368900. WHITE IS MOVING TO PHASE LINE BULLDOG
TO PROVIDE OVERWATCH AND SECURE INNER CORDON. BLUE IS MOVING
TO CHECKPOINT 32 TO STAGE AND, ON ORDER, ATTACK TO CLEAR
COMPOUND.”
“OUR MISSION IS TO BLOCK ROAD JUNCTIONS ALONG AXIS THUNDER
VICINITY CHECKPOINTS 24 AND 26 TO ESTABLISH OUTER CORDON.”
“WE WILL MOVE IN A STAGGERED COLUMN FORMATION THROUGH
WAYPOINTS TWO AND FIVE. ALPHA SECTION DEFENDS NORTHWEST FROM
CHECKPOINT 24; BRAVO SECTION DEFENDS TO THE SOUTH FROM
CHECKPOINT 26.”
“SP IN FIVE MINUTES. REPORT RECON 1. ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER.”

Figure B-1. Sample platoon WARNO

OPERATION ORDERS
B-11. When time and information are available, the company or troop commander will normally issue a
complete OPORD as part of his troop-leading procedures. The OPORD provides platoon leaders with the

B-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Orders and Reports

essential information required to conduct the operation and to carry out the commander’s intent. The
commander should distribute graphics (traditional and digital) before issuing the OPORD.

FIVE-PARAGRAPH OPORD FORMAT

B-12. Whenever possible, the OPORD is issued orally and in writing in the five-paragraph format. This
helps to ensure that required information is presented in a logical manner. Although the five-paragraph
format is straightforward, every commander and leader will develop techniques that allow him to make a
clearer, more concise OPORD presentation. The platoon leader should request a copy of his commander’s
OPORD format to facilitate note-taking. See FM 5-0 for more information concerning company OPORDs.
Refer to Figure B-2 for a sample platoon OPORD in the five-paragraph format.

ISSUING THE PLATOON OPORD

B-13. Issuing the OPORD is, in effect, a type of drill, with contents and delivery procedures covered by
SOPs and other guidelines. The platoon leader must understand, however, that simply reading off the five
paragraphs word for word is usually ineffective. His foremost consideration is effective communication.
He must fully understand all aspects of the operation and know how to describe and discuss them. He must
integrate the friendly and enemy situations and the effects of terrain and weather into the platoon maneuver
plan.
B-14. To make the order even more understandable, the platoon leader should use visual aids to illustrate
key points. He can take advantage of a number of pre-made and field-expedient materials, including the
following:
• The operation map and accompanying overlays.
• Terrain models or impromptu sand tables.
• Sketches on dry-erase boards, MRE boxes, butcher paper, or the back of a map.
B-15. As far as possible, the platoon leader must establish optimum physical conditions that will allow
effective presentation of the OPORD. For example, the site at which the platoon order will be issued
should afford adequate security and minimum distractions. At night, this may require gathering the TCs in
one tank or under a tarp supported by gun tubes. The platoon leader must ensure that the TCs post accurate
graphics on their overlays and/or digital displays. TCs should arrive at the OPORD site early to study
maps and post graphics. Units with digital capability should post the graphics on their vehicle displays
before the platoon leader issues the order.

TASK ORGANIZATION (company or troop and allocation of forces to support the

concept of operations).
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy forces.
(1) Use SALTT report format (see Figure B-4, page B-10) for reporting likely
and known location of enemy forces and their composition.
(2) Other enemy information critical to the upcoming operation, to include the
following:
(a) Chemical and nuclear capabilities.
(b) ADA.
(c) Aviation, including helicopters.
(d) Electronic warfare.
(e) Type and condition of enemy vehicles.
(f) Most probable enemy COA.
(g) Most dangerous enemy COA.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 B-3

Appendix B

b. Friendly forces (include the following items as applicable).

(1) Mission and intent of higher headquarters two levels above (company
team/troop and battalion/squadron), including concept of the operation.
(2) Identification (ID)/mission of adjacent units (left, right, front, rear).
(3) ID/mission of reserves in higher headquarters.
(4) ID/mission of supporting units with a direct support/reinforcing (DS/R) role
to higher headquarters (field artillery, engineer, ADA).
(5) Which higher headquarters element has priority of fires.
(6) CAS allocated to higher headquarters, including number of sorties
available.
c. Terrain.
(1) Obstacles, hills, valleys, road types and conditions, streams, rivers,
bridges, and built-up area.
(2) Avenues of approach.
(a) Size unit that can be supported.
(b) Start and end point.
(c) Objective.
(3) Key terrain (discuss how friendly and/or enemy forces may attempt to use
it to their advantage).
(4) Observation and fields of fire.
(5) Cover and concealment.
(6) Engagement areas.
(7) Overall effect of terrain on the operation.
d. Weather and light data.
(1) Light conditions: (for all the days of the operation).
BMNT: _____; Sunrise: _____;
Sunset: _____; EENT: _____;
Moonrise: _____; Moonset: _____;
Percent Illumination: _____.
(2) Weather forecast for the operation.
(3) Effects of weather and light conditions on the operation.
(a) Trafficability.
(b) Visibility.
(c) Effect on lasers/thermals.
(d) Effects on air operations.
e. Attachments and detachments to the platoon and higher.
2. MISSION. This is the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. State the
essential task(s) to be accomplished by the entire unit, to include on-order missions.
Clearly define the platoon’s objective. Task and purpose?
3. EXECUTION.
a. Commander’s intent. Using the commander’s intent as a guideline, the
platoon leader may issue his own intent to define the purpose, method, and end state
of the operation. The purpose is the WHY of the operation. The method tells how
the platoon leader visualizes achieving success with respect to the company/troop
mission as a whole and outlines, in general terms, use of combat multipliers. The
end state specifies final disposition of forces and explains how the end state will
facilitate future operations.

B-4 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Orders and Reports

b. Concept of the operation. This paragraph further explains and expands on

the platoon leader’s (and/or commander’s) intent, particularly his vision of HOW he
will conduct the operation and WHO he will assign to execute it. The platoon leader
uses a concept statement when he feels more detail is necessary to ensure
subordinates will take the appropriate actions in the absence of additional
communications or further orders. The sequence of subparagraphs is as follows:
(1) Scheme of maneuver. This is how the platoon will maneuver to kill the
enemy or to accomplish its mission. It conforms to the commander’s intent. In
offensive operations, it specifies the platoon’s formation, movement technique,
routes or avenues of advance, and plans for direct fire and overwatch. In defensive
operations, it specifies the platoon engagement plan, BPs, orientation of weapons,
and the plan for movement to supplementary or successive positions.
(2) Fires.
(a) Purpose for FA and mortar fires (how fires will be used to support the
maneuver).
(b) Priority of fires within the platoon and company/troop.
(c) Allocation of FPF.
(d) Preparation starting time and duration of fires.
(e) Triggers (trigger line/point or event).
(f) Description of enemy fires in the area of operations.
(g) Special fire allocation/use (smoke, illumination, CAS).
(h) Restrictions.
(i) Target overlay annex.
(3) Engineer support (obstacles, mines, and fortifications).
(a) Priority of engineer effort (mobility, countermobility, survivability).
(b) Priority of engineer support.
(c) Obstacle overlay.
(d) Obstacle list.
(e) Logistical constraints.
(f) On-order missions.
c. Specific instructions. List the specific missions, in “battle sequence,” for
each tank, including the attached elements. Include movement techniques, flank
coordination requirements, other details, and be-prepared missions. Dismount team,
detainee team, CBRN team, obstacle team, and bridge team.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time schedule for critical events.
(a) Rehearsals.
(b) Confirmation briefs and backbriefs.
(c) PCCs and PCIs.
(d) First movement.
(e) Arrival of any attachments/detachments.
(f) Boresighting.
(2) Movement instructions.
(a) SP/RP times.
(b) Formation and movement technique.
(c) Order of march.
(d) Route of march.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 B-5

Appendix B

(3) Passage of lines.

(a) Contact points.
(b) Passage points.
(c) Lanes (to include identification/markings).
(4) Actions at danger areas.
(5) Actions on expected contact.
(6) Rally points.
(7) ROE/ROI.
(8) Intelligence requirements (IR), to include priority intelligence requirements
(PIR).
(9) Air defense warning and weapons control status.
(10) MOPP level and operational exposure guidance (OEG).
(11) Any changes regarding battlesight and battlecarry ranges.
(12) Be-prepared tasks or other general information not provided in concept of
the operation or specific instructions.
(13) Actions on the objective.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Trains. Location and movement plan of the company/troop trains (initial and
subsequent grids).
b. Material and services.
(1) Supply.
(a) Priorities of supply.
(b) Resupply points and prestock sites.
(c) Ration cycle.
(d) Location of task force trains.
(e) LOGPAC instructions.
(2) Transportation.
(a) Supply routes.
(b) LRPs.
(c) Priorities established on MSRs.
(3) Services. Handling of KIA personnel.
(a) Location of water points.
(b) Location of deliberate decontamination sites.
(4) Maintenance.
(a) Maintenance procedures.
(b) Vehicle evacuation.
(c) Task force UMCP location.
c. Medical evacuation and treatment.
(1) Location of company/troop medics.
(2) Location of battalion/squadron aid station.
(3) Procedures for treatment and evacuation of WIA personnel.
(4) Aero medical evacuation information.
(5) Location of ambulance exchange points (AXP).
(6) Handling of contaminated WIA personnel.

B-6 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Orders and Reports

d. Personnel.
(1) Handling and disposition instructions for detainees.
(2) Detainee guard instructions.
(3) Location of detainee collection point.
(4) Instructions for interaction with local civil populace (ROI).
(5) Number of expected replacements.
(6) Cross-leveling procedures.
e. Miscellaneous.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command.
(1) Location of commander, XO, TOC, and/or tactical command post (TAC
CP).
(2) Succession of command.
b. Signal.
(1) SOI/ANCD index and edition in effect.
(a) Key frequencies.
(b) Key call signs.
(c) Current item number identifier.
(2) KY-57/ANCD fill and changeover data.
(3) Listening silence instructions.
(4) Challenge and password.
(5) Special signals, to include use of pyrotechnics.
(6) Code words.
(7) Digital traffic instructions (digital systems only).
(8) Actions to counteract jamming or “hot mike” situations.
6. TIME CHECK (for synchronization).
Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format

FRAGMENTARY ORDERS
B-16. The FRAGO is a brief oral or written order that can serve any of the following purposes:
• Implement timely changes to existing orders.
• Provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders.
• Provide instructions until a detailed order is developed.
• Provide specific instructions to subordinates who do not require a complete order.
B-17. There is no specific format for a FRAGO. For simplicity and complete clarity, it normally follows
the five-paragraph OPORD structure; however, it includes only the information required for subordinates
to accomplish their mission. To enhance understanding of voice FRAGOs, digitally equipped units can
quickly develop hasty graphics and transmit digital overlays.
B-18. Platoon FRAGOs normally include the following information:
• Updated enemy or friendly situation.
• Mission. (Note. The platoon leader must ensure that platoon tasks and purpose are clearly
stated.)
• Scheme of maneuver.
• Specific instructions as necessary.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 B-7

Appendix B

B-19. Figure B-3 illustrates a platoon FRAGO transmitted by voice over a secure net.

“RED, THIS IS RED ONE—FRAGO FOLLOWS.

WHITE IS IN CONTACT AND ENGAGING TWO T80s VICINITY NK77368900.
BLUE IS MOVING TO CHECKPOINT 26 TO FIX THE T80s.
OUR MISSION IS TO ASSAULT AND DESTROY THE T80s AND ALLOW BRAVO
COMPANY TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK NORTH.
WE WILL MOVE IN A PLATOON WEDGE THROUGH WAYPOINTS 2 AND 5,
MANEUVER TO FLANK THE T80s, AND ASSAULT FROM EAST TO WEST.
RED 4, ENSURE THAT BLUE AND WHITE SHIFT FIRES WEST AS WE BEGIN
OUR ASSAULT, OVER.”

Figure B-3. Sample platoon FRAGO

SECTION II – REPORTS
B-20. Reports are the unit’s primary means of providing information for plans and decisions. They must
be accurate, timely, and complete.
B-21. Procedures for preparing, transmitting, and safeguarding reports will vary from unit to unit and from
situation to situation. Among the factors influencing tank platoon report procedures are the preferences
and requirements of the chain of command, the tactical environment in which the platoon is operating,
available equipment, terrain, and the electronic warfare situation. Digital systems, for example, enable the
transmission of accurate preformatted reports.
B-22. For leaders at all levels, two guidelines remain constant throughout the reporting process: the
importance of compiling timely, accurate information and the need to relay that information by the clearest,
quickest, and most secure method possible. The tank platoon leader, along with the PSG and TCs, can
save time, ensure completeness, and reduce confusion by developing and implementing thorough SOPs
covering report procedures. Refer to ST 3-20.153 for an extensive sample SOP that includes line-by-line
descriptions of voice and digital report formats used by the platoon. (See Figures B-4 through B-7 for
sample reports/sample formats.)

“BLACK SIX; THIS IS BLUE ONE—SALTT REPORT—OVER.” “BLUE ONE, THIS

IS BLACK SIX—SEND IT—OVER.”
“BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONE—REPORT FOLLOWS:
SIZE: ONE BMP.
ACTIVITY: MOVING SOUTH.
LOCATION: GRID CG100456.
TIME: 180640MAY99 ZULU.
TROOPS: TEN DISMOUNTED TROOPS.
CONTINUING TO OBSERVE—OVER.“
“BLUE ONE; THIS IS BLACK SIX —ROGER—CONTINUE OBSERVATION—OUT.“

Figure B-4. Sample FM SALTT report

B-8 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Orders and Reports

“BLACK SIX; THIS IS BLUE ONE—SITREP—OVER.”

“BLUE ONE; THIS IS BLACK SIX—SEND IT—OVER.”
“BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONE—REPORT FOLLOWS:
LINE 1 (As of DTG): 181217MAY99 ZULU.
LINE 2 (Enemy Activity in Brief): OBSERVING FOUR ENEMY SOLDIERS.
LINE 3 (Friendly Locations): CP 28.
LINE 4 (FMC Vehicles): FOUR.
LINE 5 (Defense Obstacles): NONE.
LINE 6 (Personnel Status): GREEN.
LINE 7: CLASS THREE AMBER—CLASS FIVE GREEN.
LINE 8: CONTINUING MISSION.
OVER.“
“BLUE ONE; THIS IS BLACK SIX—ROGER—OUT.”

Figure B-5. Sample FM SITREP

Medical Evacuation/Aero-Medical MEDEVAC

MEDEVAC FREQ:
Line 1 Grid
Line 2 Unit frequency, Call Sign, Suffix
Line 3 Number of Patients by Precedence:
Urgent
Urgent/Surgical
Priority
Line 4 Special Equipment:
Aircraft Rescue Hoist
Jungle/Forest Penetrator
Semirigid Litter
Strokes Basic Litter
Kendrick Extraction Device
Jaws of Life
Line 5 Number of Patients by Type:
L = Litter
A = Ambulatory
Note. Once complete with Lines 1 through 5, the MEDEVAC can fly. Continue
with remainder of report when you can.
Line 6 If in Wartime:
N = No Enemy in Area
P = Possible Enemy in Area
E = Enemy in Area
X = Enemy in Area, Escort Required
If in Peacetime: (Type of injury)
Gunshot
Broken Bones
Illness, etc.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 B-9

Appendix B

Medical Evacuation/Aero-Medical MEDEVAC

Line 7 Method of Marking Site:
A = VS-17
B = Pyro
C = Smoke
D = None
E = Other
Line 8 Patient Nationality and Status (Military/Nonmilitary)
Line 9 CBRN Contamination:
Y = Yes
N = No
Description of Terrain at Pick-Up Site
Figure B-6. MEDEVAC request format

“BLACK SIX; THIS IS BLUE ONE—CONTACT—TROOPS, EAST—OUT.”

Figure B-7. Sample FM contact report

B-10 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Appendix C
Infantry/Armor Operations

Tank units, including the platoon, almost never fight alone. Open terrain such as
desert, plains, and flat countryside is conducive to the employment of massed armor
formations. In such terrain, mechanized infantry supports the forward movement of
the armor units by providing local security, retaining key terrain, clearing dug-in
enemy positions, and enhancing direct fires with organic small arms and antitank
fires. On the other hand, restricted terrain (such as built-up areas, forests, and
jungles) increases the vulnerability of armor units. In close terrain, it is more
advantageous for tanks to take a supporting role in the forward movement of the
infantry. Armor provides close-in direct fire support against hard and soft targets that
could slow the infantry’s advance.

This appendix examines, in detail, how both elements are employed to support each
other. Regardless of terrain, infantry and armor units fight as part of a combined
arms team to maximize their respective capabilities and minimize their limitations.
Leaders of both tank (heavy) and infantry (light) forces must understand the TTP
employed by their operational counterparts. The principles of offense, defense, and
movement discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are applicable. Covered here will be the
employment of the tank platoon as part of an infantry organization. To cover the
employment of an infantry platoon in use in an armor unit would be out of the scope
of this manual and is covered as part of the company team manual FM 3-90.1 (FM
71-1).

Tanks support the infantry by—

• Leading movement.
• Using firepower, mobility, and the ability to protect the infantry by quickly developing
the situation on contact.
• Leading the assault to provide protection for following infantry when enemy antitank
capability is limited.
• Destroying enemy armored vehicles, especially tanks.

Infantry supports tanks by—

• Clearing or breaching obstacles and marking lanes, especially in minefields, to allow
tanks to exploit their speed and mobility.
• Destroying, suppressing, or neutralizing antitank weapons or by destroying bunkers.
• Following the tank assault closely to protect the rear and flanks of the tanks from hand
held HEAT weapons, to clear the objective, or to reduce bypassed enemy forces.
• Securing or clearing choke points such as towns, forests, stream crossings, or narrow
defiles.
• Providing close security at night or in restricted terrain.
• Conducting reconnaissance to support the tank unit’s maneuver.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 C-1

Appendix C

SECTION I – TASK ORGANIZATION

C-1. When an armor unit is task organized to support infantry, the mix of units is referred to as
light/heavy. For example, light battalion/heavy platoon refers to a light infantry battalion supported by a
tank platoon; this is the most common type of light/heavy task organization. (Note. Conversely, a
heavy/light operation is one in which the controlling headquarters is a heavy unit, either armor or
mechanized infantry, with light infantry in support.) Light company/heavy section refers to a light infantry
company supported by a tank or MGS platoon.

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON

C-2. When the tank platoon is task organized to support a light infantry battalion task force, the
controlling commander will determine the role of the platoon based on METT-TC factors. The platoon
may perform one of several functions, including the following:
• As the primary maneuver element (main effort).
• In a DS role when infantry is the primary maneuver element.
• As part of the task force reserve, often with a reactive role in an antiarmor defense (AAD)
mission.

Note. In some situations, the armor platoon also may be used as a separate special platoon, or it
may be attached to one of the infantry companies in a DS role.

C-3. The platoon is the lowest level at which the armor leader must be trained to interact with a
controlling headquarters. The platoon leader must act as the armor force advisor to the battalion
commander. He must rely on the infantry staff for immediate support.

Note. If the platoon’s parent company or troop is in the vicinity, he may be able to coordinate
some assistance through the company/troop commander or XO; however, this support may not
be available.

C-4. It is important that the tank platoon leader understand the infantry unit he supports; this generally
will be a light infantry, air assault, or airborne battalion. Characteristics of these battalions vary by the
composition and mission of the forces involved, as outlined in the following discussion.

INFANTRY ORGANIZATIONS
LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION
C-5. This is the most austere conventional combat battalion. The light infantry battalion has only three
rifle companies and a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). Of the three types of infantry units
described in this section, the organization of the light infantry battalion differs most from that of the armor
battalion.
C-6. There are also differences among this battalion and the air assault and airborne battalions, the
greatest being the organization of support and logistics. The light infantry battalion has no trucks larger
than its 27 cargo HMMWVs. The battalion has only 18 long-range radios. It has limited antiarmor
capability: four HMMWV-mounted TOW systems in one platoon at battalion level and six Dragon
(Javelin) launchers at company level.
C-7. Infantry leaders must understand the tactical doctrine for employing a heavy company team (as
prescribed in FM 3-90.1), a tank platoon (refer to this FM), and a mechanized infantry platoon (refer to FM
7-7 and FM 3-21.71). To effectively employ any armored vehicle, leaders must know the specific
capabilities and limitations of the vehicle and its weapon systems. The platoon leader must be able to brief
the battalion leadership on how to best use the tank platoon. He is the subject matter expert, and must

C-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Infantry/Armor Operations

ensure the battalion understands the capabilities and limitations of the tank platoon. For example, M1
series tanks provide rapid mobility as well as excellent protection and lethal, accurate direct fires. These
tanks are most effective in open terrain with extended fields of fire.

AIR ASSAULT BATTALION AND AIRBORNE BATTALION

C-8. The air assault battalion and airborne battalion are similarly organized, with three rifle companies, an
antiarmor company (with five AT platoons of four vehicles each), and a headquarters company. Tactical
movement for both is usually accomplished by a combination of air insertion and foot marches. A major
difference is in the number and types of wheeled vehicles available in each type of battalion.
C-9. The air assault battalion has 6 5-ton cargo trucks and 45 HMMWVs. There is a mess section and a
17-person maintenance platoon. Communications are served by 29 long-range radios. In the line
companies, a Javelin- or Dragon-equipped section within the company headquarters provides AT
capability.
C-10. Once inserted, the airborne battalion performs tactically much like a light infantry battalion; walking
is the principal means of transportation. The battalion does have 10 2-1/2-ton trucks and 36 cargo
HMMWVs, allowing it to execute nontactical movement by truck. It has a mess section and a 16-member
maintenance platoon. The airborne battalion has 30 long-range radios. Its rifle squads also have antiarmor
capability.

SECTION II – LIAISON ACTIVITIES

C-11. Light/heavy operations demand effective coordination between the tank platoon and the infantry unit
it is supporting. The following discussion covers several important areas on which light/heavy liaison
activities should focus.

TANK PLATOON CONSIDERATIONS

C-12. The tank platoon leader’s first responsibility is to have a thorough tactical and technical knowledge
of his tank’s systems and its logistical needs; he must understand precisely the vehicle’s capabilities as well
as its limitations (see Chapter 1 of this manual). Based on these factors, he then works with the infantry
commander and S3 to formulate plans to support the infantry. They maximize use of the tank’s capabilities
for lethal firepower, enhanced target acquisition (including night sights), and effective armor protection.
The most common limitations they must overcome are the tank’s relative lack of mobility and the need for
close-in security in restricted terrain situations and urban operations and stability and support
environments.

INFANTRY CONSIDERATIONS
C-13. Besides understanding the capabilities and limitations of his tanks, the armor platoon leader must
appreciate the tactical assets and liabilities of the infantry. He must realize that infantry elements move
much more slowly than tanks over certain types of terrain. At the same time, he will learn that infantry can
use terrain very effectively to gain a positional advantage over the enemy and that terrain has a direct
impact on survivability for the infantryman.
C-14. The tank platoon leader must ensure that the controlling infantry headquarters understands that
considerations for positioning and control of the tank’s crew-served direct-fire weapon systems are the
same as those for the infantry’s crew-served and AT weapons. In addition, he must be able to anticipate
the effects of his weapon systems on both friendly and enemy forces. As an example, he must remember
that sabot ammunition cannot be fired over the heads or flanks of unprotected infantry because of the
danger created by the concussion of the main gun and the discarding sabot petals of tank rounds.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 C-3

Appendix C

ROLE OF TRAINING
C-15. Finally, light/heavy liaison activities must emphasize the importance of combined arms training.
Armor and infantry elements must train together, or they will not be able to execute combined arms
operations smoothly in combat. Ideally, this training is conducted prior to deployment. To enhance
coordination and execution, however, light/heavy forces must take advantage of every training opportunity
that arises.
C-16. An important aspect of training is teaching leaders of light and heavy elements how to work together
and how their forces can support each other. For example, leaders must know how to communicate by
digital, radio, phone, and visual means. Other areas of the training include the following:
• Infantrymen help heavy forces by finding and breaching or marking antitank obstacles. They
detect and destroy or suppress enemy antitank weapons. The infantry may also designate targets
for armored vehicles and protect them in close terrain.
• Heavy forces lead infantrymen in open terrain and provide them with a protected, fast-moving
assault weapon system. Tanks can suppress and destroy enemy weapons, bunkers, and tanks by
fire and maneuver. They can also transport infantrymen when the enemy situation permits.

SECTION III – OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

C-17. The following considerations apply when the tank platoon operates in support of dismounted
infantry.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

C-18. As previously discussed, the tank platoon leader becomes the principal advisor to the infantry
battalion commander regarding the employment of his tanks. They may consolidate the platoon to provide
a larger antiarmor force; in some instances, the platoon or a section may be placed OPCON to support a
company.

Note. A section should normally be OPCON to a company for only a limited time to
accomplish a specific direct-fire support mission. In longer-duration operations, the logistical
demands of the armor section would overwhelm the separate infantry company’s sustainment
capabilities.

C-19. The tank platoon leader and PSG maintain communications with the controlling infantry battalion
headquarters. When attached at lower levels, the platoon leader or PSG gains and maintains contact with
the company commander and talks to other platoon leaders on the company net. Individual tanks and
dismounted infantry communicate with each other using one of these techniques:
• FBCB2 (digital). The TI provides situational understanding at company/troop level and above.
Leaders are responsible for ensuring proper connectivity of digital assets, which enhance their
ability to send and receive OPORDs and FRAGOs, friendly graphics, locations of adjacent
units, and known and templated threat locations.
• FM radio. The infantry platoon leader uses his SOI information and contacts supporting tanks
on the tank platoon frequency. This is a fast, reliable method of communications that does not
require any additional assets.
• Wire. Tank crewmen can route WD-1 wire from the VIC-1 through the loader’s hatch or vision
block and attach it to a field phone on the back of the tank. (Note. The field phone must be
rigged inside a protective container, such as an ammunition can, which is then welded, bolted, or
otherwise affixed to the tank.) The platoon leader needs to understand this is only a stop gap
method and should only be used when all other methods fail.
• Hand-held radios. Infantry squad radios or other short-range hand-held radios can be
distributed during the linkup to provide a reliable means of communications between infantry
and supporting TCs. These radios allow the infantry to use terrain more effectively in providing

C-4 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Infantry/Armor Operations

close-in protection for the tank; infantrymen can watch for enemy elements while limiting
exposure to enemy fires directed against the tank. The use of nonsecure radios is not
recommended.
• Visual signals. Visual signals, as prescribed by SOP or coordinated during linkup, can facilitate
simple communications. Platoon leader needs to remember that tanks and infantry use different
visual signals, so without prior coordination and training, this method will cause confusion and
lead to either infantry or tank leader exposing them selves to enemy fire in an attempt to
understand what the other element requires.

INTELLIGENCE
C-20. The tank platoon leader must obtain information from the battalion S2 on enemy capabilities,
especially those of antiarmor assets. He should focus not only on direct fire capabilities, but also on the
capacity of the enemy’s mines, artillery, and mortar fires to disable his vehicles.
C-21. Terrain analysis is another area of supreme importance in which the platoon leader must work
closely with the S2. Platoon leaders must understand and account for the fact that infantry do not view the
terrain in the same manner as a mounted element. They determine trafficability of the terrain, examining
the effects of weather, obstacles, and limited visibility on the speed and mobility of armored vehicles.
Following this detailed analysis, TCs and section leaders conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area of
operations. The reconnaissance confirms the trafficability of routes and aids in the effective positioning of
weapon systems. The terrain analysis and subsequent reconnaissance also confirm whether the platoon
needs to employ ground guides who are knowledgeable of the terrain and the limitations it will impose on
tracked vehicle movement.

MANEUVER
C-22. When the light/heavy operation begins, either the tanks or the infantry can lead. The following
discussion of moving with infantry covers a situation in which terrain and other factors of METT-TC
clearly favor the use of infantry in the lead, supported by armor.
TANK PLATOON EMPLOYMENT
C-23. When operating with infantry, the tank platoon may execute missions “pure,” either on its own or as
part of a tank company or cavalry troop. In such a situation, the platoon can perform one of several roles,
including the following:
• Execute reserve/reaction force missions.
• Attack separate objectives.
• Support the advance of infantry with close-in direct fires.
C-24. When infantry leads, the platoon can be employed in one of three ways:
• It can remain stationary at the battalion or company command post until called forward.
• It can follow and support the infantry, staying close enough to provide direct-fire support when
requested.
• During company-level tactical movement, it can overwatch forward movement of the infantry
from stationary positions.

MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
C-25. Infantrymen conduct tactical movement until they identify an enemy force that halts their progress
(see Figure C-1). They deploy into position, suppress enemy AT weapons with direct and indirect fires,
and request tank support to destroy the enemy. The tanks move forward and link up with the infantry (see
Figure C-2). At the linkup point, the tank platoon or section leader (depending on the size of the
supporting armor element) dismounts and coordinates the following information with the infantry leader:
• Enemy disposition.
• Friendly disposition.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 C-5

Appendix C

• The tentative maneuver plan.

• Any additional tactical information not already covered in the OPORD or maneuver plan,
including the use of guides, control of direct and indirect fires, close-in protection for the tank,
and communications and signal information.

Figure C-1. Infantry leads while tank platoon remains stationary

C-6 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Infantry/Armor Operations

Figure C-2. Tanks move forward to link up with infantry

C-26. The armor leader (either the platoon or section leader) conducts a ground reconnaissance of the route
to the final firing position and finalizes the plan with the infantry leader. He then returns to the platoon or
section and briefs the plan to his platoon or section.
C-27. Depending on task organization and terrain factors, the tank platoon or section moves forward to the
firing position, using guides provided by the infantry (see Figure C-3). If the entire platoon is involved,
one section overwatches the movement of the lead section to the firing position. If a single section is used,
the trail vehicle must overwatch the movement of the lead vehicle to the firing position.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 C-7

Appendix C

Figure C-3. Infantry guides tanks to the firing position

C-28. Depending on the amount of suppressive fires received, the firing tank may move to the position
buttoned up, with the ballistic doors closed (M1A2 crews may stow the CITV). This provides better
protection for the crew and helps to prevent damage to the gunner’s sights. At the same time, however, it
degrades the tank’s target acquisition capability and makes it easier for dismounted enemy forces to attack
the tank with small arms or machine gun fires.

ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
C-29. If tank crews cannot immediately identify targets when they reach the firing position, the infantry
designates each target using tracers, mortars, smoke, or grenades fired from the M203 grenade launcher.
TCs open the ballistic doors as necessary to acquire and lase to their targets; tanks then suppress or destroy
targets using main gun or machine gun fire. When targets are destroyed, the infantry signals the tanks to
cease fire (see Figure C-4).

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 Infantry/Armor Operations

Figure C-4. Tanks destroy enemy targets

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
C-30. Tank and infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of the safety considerations involved in
light/heavy operations. Leader awareness and involvement is particularly important if the infantry unit has
had little training with armored vehicles. All personnel in both the light and heavy units must be aware of
these considerations to prevent unnecessary casualties.
C-31. Tank crewmen are often unable to see infantry Soldiers operating close to their vehicle. This
limitation is worse during limited visibility and when the hatches are closed; in these conditions, the crew
is focused on the enemy or on potential enemy locations rather than any nearby infantrymen. It is the
infantry’s responsibility to stay alert and to maintain a safe position in relation to the vehicle.
C-32. Infantry Soldiers operating near tanks are exposed to the effects of any fires the enemy directs
against the vehicles. This is true whether the infantry and vehicles are moving or stationary. Proximity
also severely degrades the infantry’s to avoid detection by the enemy. It therefore becomes the
responsibility of infantry leaders to maintain sufficient distance to avoid the effects of fires directed against
the tanks, even when they are required to provide security or close support.
C-33. Tanks fire high-velocity, armor-piercing, discarding sabot rounds that pose hazards to infantry.
Dismounted Soldiers should be at 70 meters to the left or right of the line of fire and/or at least 1,000
meters to the front of a firing tank. Any infantry within this danger area must have overhead cover and
protection (a berm or tree) from the rear.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 C-9

Appendix C

C-34. The exhaust from an M1-series tank may reach more than 1,700˚F. Dismounted Soldiers following
behind the tank must position themselves either to the side of the exhaust grill or, if they are directly
behind the vehicle, at a safe distance away. The use of exhaust shield will overcome this problem. The
shield is a critical element in tanks recovering other tanks, so they should be readily available in the tank
platoons. Consideration should be given to fabricating enough for all tanks as a leader will not know when
he will be working with the infantry.
C-35. Infantrymen may ride on tanks if conditions allow, but they must be aware of the serious safety
concerns involved.

TRANSPORTING INFANTRY
C-36. At times, the tank platoon may be required to transport infantrymen on its tanks (as illustrated in
Figure C-5). This is done only when contact is not expected. This is the least preferred method of
transporting infantry and should only be used when both the mounted and dismounted element have had
time to train and have a firm understanding of how each element will work. If the platoon is moving as
part of a larger force and is tasked to provide security for the move, the lead section or element should not
carry infantry.

Figure C-5. Sample positions for infantry riding on a tank

C-37. Infantry and armor leaders must observe the following procedures, precautions, and considerations
when infantrymen ride on tanks:
• Infantry teams should thoroughly practice mounting and dismounting procedures and actions on
contact.
• Passengers must always alert the TC before mounting or dismounting. They must follow the
commands of the TC.
• Infantry platoons should be broken down into squad-size groups, similar to air assault chalks,
with the infantry platoon leader on the armor platoon leader’s vehicle and the infantry PSG on
the armor PSG’s vehicle.
• Platoon leaders, PSGs, and team leaders should position themselves near the TC’s hatch, using
the external phone (if available) to talk to the TC and relay signals to the unit.
• If possible, the lead vehicle should not carry infantrymen. Riders restrict turret movement and
are more likely to be injured or killed on initial contact.
• Tank crewmen must remember that the vehicle cannot return fire effectively with infantry on
board.
• Whenever possible, passengers mount and dismount over the left front slope of the vehicle.
This ensures that the driver can see the infantrymen and that the infantrymen do not pass in front
of the coax machine gun. Passengers must ensure that they remain behind the vehicle’s smoke
grenade launchers. This will automatically keep them clear of all weapon systems.

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 Infantry/Armor Operations

• Passengers must always have three points of contact with the vehicle; they must watch for low-
hanging objects like tree branches.
• All passengers should wear hearing protection.
• Infantrymen should not ride with anything more than their battle gear. Rucksacks and B-bags
should be transported by other means.
• Infantrymen should scan in all directions. They may be able to spot a target the vehicle crew
does not see.
• Passengers should be prepared to take the following actions on contact:
• Wait for the vehicle to stop.
• At the TC’s command, dismount immediately (one fire team on each side). Do not move
forward of the turret.
• Move at least 5 meters to the sides of the vehicle. Do not move behind or forward of the
vehicle.
• Do not move in front of vehicles unless ordered to do so.
• Do not dismount a vehicle unless ordered or given permission to do so.
• Do not dangle arms or legs, equipment, or anything else off the side of a vehicle; they could get
caught in the tracks, causing death, injury, or damage to the equipment or vehicle.
• Do not carry too many riders on the vehicle.
• Do not fall asleep when riding. The warm engine may induce drowsiness; a fall could be fatal.
• Do not smoke when mounted on a vehicle.
• Do not stand near a moving or turning vehicle at any time. Tanks have a deceptively short
turning radius.

CONSIDERATIONS WHEN TANKS LEAD

C-38. Certain situations may require that tanks lead the infantry; this is, however, the least preferred
method of light/heavy employment. Tanks must move very slowly when they lead infantrymen
(approximately
2-1/2 miles per hour). This hinders their ability to use speed as a survivability tool.
C-39. In addition, restricted terrain severely limits the mobility of the tank platoon. It further increases the
platoon’s vulnerability by limiting visibility for tank crews. Without the aid of infantrymen serving as
guides and providing security, tanks have a much greater chance of becoming stuck in close terrain or of
being the target of enemy fires. In these situations, the infantry must provide close-in protection and early
warning against dismounted and mounted threats. The infantry’s antitank assets should stay close enough
to overwatch the tanks during tactical movement. Tank crews maintain constant communications with the
infantry so they do not outrun the ground force.
C-40. When tanks lead, the infantry maintains a standoff distance to prevent injury from the “splash” and
ricochet of enemy AT weapons and small-arms fire aimed at the tanks. Additionally, the light/heavy force
can expect tanks to attract the attention of mortar and artillery gunners. The enemy will use indirect fires
to strip away supporting infantry and to force tank crews to button up, further reducing their ability
to acquire targets. All armor and infantry leaders must plan actions to counter the effects of these
fires.

FIRE SUPPORT
C-41. The use and control of indirect and direct fires are critical to the effective employment of armor with
infantry.

INDIRECT FIRES
C-42. Indirect fires are used to suppress enemy AT weapons and dismounted infantry in the area of
operations. The tank platoon uses its optics to detect targets and its communications systems to initiate

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 C-11

Appendix C

calls for fire in support of infantry. In addition, the noise of mortar and artillery fires, combined with the
use of smoke, helps to conceal the movement of tanks moving forward, adding the element of surprise to
the operation. The platoon leader needs to have an understanding of the light force’s indirect capabilities
and limitations. He must understand they do not have the same capabilities and limitations as a self
propelled artillery unit.

DIRECT FIRES
C-43. One of the primary assets that tanks offer in working with infantry is their ability to provide accurate,
lethal direct fires from a mobile, survivable platform. The weapon systems on each tank offer unique
capabilities and limitations that must be considered in relation to infantry support; these characteristics are
covered later in this discussion.
Target Acquisition
C-44. The target acquisition capabilities of the tank exceed the capabilities of all systems in the infantry
battalion. The thermal sight provides a significant capability for observation and reconnaissance. It can
also be used during the day to identify heat sources (personnel and vehicles), even through light vegetation.
Infantry units can take advantage of the tank’s laser range finder to enhance their capabilities in
establishing fire control measures (such as trigger lines and TRPs) and in determining exact locations on
the battlefield.
Machine Guns
C-45. The TC’s caliber.50 machine gun is effective against both personnel and materiel. The 7.62-mm
coax machine gun is an effective AP weapon. These machine guns provide a high volume of supporting
fires for the infantry.
Main Gun
C-46. The main gun remains the best antitank weapon on the battlefield. The main gun is extremely
accurate and lethal at ranges up to 2,500 meters. Tanks with stabilized main guns can fire effectively even
when moving at high speeds across country.
C-47. All current tanks fire sabot, MPAT, and HEAT rounds. These have great penetrating power against
armored vehicles, but may not have the destructive capability necessary to destroy prepared fighting
positions or penetrate walls in built-up areas. High explosive, obstacle-reducing with tracer (HE-OR-T)
rounds (the M908) have enough destructive power to destroy most prepared positions and to create large
holes in walls. The canister is an AP round that is extremely effective for area suppression.
Tank Capabilities
C-48. The Army’s tanks have the following firepower capabilities and limitations:
• M1A1 and M1A2. Both vehicles are limited in ammunition storage capacity (40 rounds in the
M1A1, 42 in the M1A2). They can fire sabot, HEAT, and MPAT ammunition, as well as the
HE-OR-T and canister rounds. On the M1A1, the TC can fire the M2 caliber .50 without
exposing himself. The M1A2 TC must expose himself to fire the M2, unless equipped with
common remotely operated weapons station (CROWS). Both vehicles consume fuel at a high
rate, and their mobility is limited in terrain that does not support heavy tracked vehicles.

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

C-49. Although the mobility and survivability of the tank are well known, these capabilities suffer
significantly when tanks are employed by themselves in close terrain. This discussion lists techniques the
tank platoon can use to operate more safely and effectively under these conditions.
C-50. The following factors can help to enhance the tank platoon’s mobility in restricted terrain:
• Information from the S2. As previously discussed, the S2 must provide mobility information to
the platoon leader.

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 Infantry/Armor Operations

• Ground reconnaissance. The platoon leader should use ground reconnaissance by a

knowledgeable member of the platoon (preferably a section leader or TC) to confirm or deny the
S2’s estimate.
• Ground guides. In restricted terrain, the use of ground guides is critical in leading tanks to their
firing positions, especially during periods of limited visibility. The ground guide can be either
an infantryman or the section leader who conducted the reconnaissance.
• Knowledge of vehicle capabilities. The tank has an awesome ability to bull or force through
walls, small trees (up to 12 inches in diameter), wire obstacles, and other hasty barricades such
as cars or trucks blocking a road or trail. The addition of a mine plow or mine roller enhances
the tank’s breaching capability, but also hinders movement in rough terrain.
• Engineer support. Engineers can enhance tank mobility by spanning unfordable rivers or gaps,
reducing obstacles, and cutting down larger trees to construct hasty tank trails.
C-51. The survivability of the Army’s tanks differs by system. They offer varying degrees of protection
against small arms fire, time-fused artillery, and AT weapons. The tank platoon can enhance the
survivability of the various systems using these techniques:
• Terrain driving. The old maxim still holds true: “What can be seen can be hit; what can be hit
can be killed.” Every potential enemy has the ability to employ weapons that can disable or
destroy any tank. Terrain driving techniques, discussed in Chapter 3 of this manual, are still
extremely important for the tank platoon.
• Overwatch. Wingman tanks or sections scannot only their sector of fire, but also the area
around moving vehicles. This enables overwatch vehicles to fire their coax machine guns to
protect the moving vehicles if they are attacked by dismounted forces.
• Moving into the attack-by-fire position buttoned up. When tanks move into an attack-by-fire
position to engage a prepared enemy position, they will face intense small arms, artillery,
mortar, sniper, or AT fires. In addition to the factors listed previously, the survivability of the
crew depends on its ability to take full advantage of the armor protection of the vehicle.
• Suppression. Suppression of enemy AT assets and dismounted infantry forces by artillery and
close infantry support is critical.
• Having individual weapons ready. Crew members must be ready to use their M4 carbine,
M16A2, and/or 9-mm personal weapons, as well as grenades, to repulse close-in dismounted
attacks.

AIR DEFENSE
C-52. The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the air defense considerations applicable to light/heavy
operations, including ADA capabilities and employment considerations. Refer to the discussion in Chapter
6 of this manual.

SUSTAINMENT
C-53. When attached to infantry, the tank platoon must prepare to operate under austere conditions. The
key to effective combat support in this situation is to maintain a constant flow of reports updating the
platoon’s supply status and requirements.
C-54. In an infantry task force, the tank platoon leader and PSG will do much of their logistical
coordination directly through the battalion staff. They coordinate reporting procedures within the platoon
and notify the staff when classes of supply fall below the levels of 80 percent (identified by the code word
AMBER), 70 percent (RED), and 60 percent (BLACK). When a class of supply falls below 70 percent,
the platoon leader or PSG requests resupply.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 C-13

Appendix C

C-55. Fuel, ammunition, recovery, and maintenance are the primary concerns of the attached platoon.
Other logistical needs are usually handled through the normal sustainment functions of the battalion.
These considerations apply:
• Fuel. Fuel conservation must be a priority at all times. Engines should be shut down whenever
possible. REDCON status should be used to help regulate engine start-up requirements and to
assist in operational preparations. The tank platoon can normally support infantry operations for
24 hours before refueling. Infantry units normally do not understand the amount of fuel that
tanks will consume. If fuel support is coming through the infantry battalion only, it will be
critical that fuel requests are forecasted in advance so that the battalion will have the required
amounts on hand or request support from their parent brigade.
• Ammunition. The tank platoon’s ammunition requirements present a unique challenge for the
infantry battalion. The type of rounds requested should be based on the S2’s analysis to fit the
needs for direct fire support of the light/heavy mission. A basic load of ammunition should be
on hand to provide for emergency resupply during periods of heavy contact. Infantry battalions
will not be able to support the requirements of main gun ammunition, but can support the
platoon for small arms and grenade requirements. Platoon sergeants must constantly think about
CS constraints, and not limit themselves to only one area (the parent company) for support.
• Recovery and maintenance. When a tank is disabled, the platoon should first attempt self-
recovery. If this is not possible, the crew makes the necessary coordination to secure the vehicle
until recovery and maintenance personnel reach it. Infantry personnel can be employed to
provide local security during recovery operations or to protect the vehicle as the attack
progresses. Recovery and maintenance assets may be part of the infantry battalion’s attached
slice within the brigade forward support battalion, or they may be on call from the tank
platoon’s parent company or troop headquarters.

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 Appendix D
Operational Security

Throughout the area of operations, the enemy will, at any given moment, be
attempting to acquire intelligence information and gain a tactical advantage.

Tank platoon leaders must understand the demands of continuous operations under all
possible conditions. They then must provide their Soldiers with the training and
leadership they will need to meet the challenges of the battlefield.

SECTION I – OPERATIONS SECURITY

D-1. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly actions attendant to
military operations and other activities, including:
• Identifying those actions that can be observed by enemy intelligence systems.
• Determining which indicators enemy intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted
or pieced together to derive critical intelligence in time to be useful to the enemy.
• Selecting and executing measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the
vulnerabilities of friendly actions to enemy exploitation.
D-2. OPSEC measures consist of countersurveillance, information security (INFOSEC), signal security,
and physical security.

COUNTERSURVEILLANCE
D-3. Maneuver units use countersurveillance measures to protect against surprise, observation, and
infiltration. In future operations, tank platoons may find themselves to be high-value targets for the enemy.
One destroyed M1-series tank would not be a large military victory, but would be a large victory from a
propaganda standpoint. The enemy will continue to further his use of precision weapons in place of
massed artillery fire. As was true in the past is even more so now, what can be seen, can be hit, and what
can be hit will be destroyed. The following considerations and procedures will assist the tank platoon in
executing countersurveillance operations:
• Enforce noise and light discipline. Follow these procedures:
• Turn off the circuit breaker for the brake lights.
• Dim or cover all sources of light in the turret. Use a passive night observation device
(NOD) to check vehicles for light leaks before operations begin.
• Move only when necessary.
• Use headsets or the combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmet to monitor the radio; do not use
the radio’s external speakers.
• Do not slam hatches.
• Use short-count procedures to start engines simultaneously.
• Use terrain to mask resupply and maintenance areas.
• Use hand-and-arm signals and digital communications whenever possible.
• Do not allow smoking outdoors at night.
• Collect and turn in all garbage during LOGPAC. As a last resort, garbage will be burned
and buried.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 D-1

Appendix D

• Use camouflage to best advantage. Follow these procedures:

• Place vegetation on vehicles to break up their “profile.”
• Drape camouflage nets over gun tubes and turrets.
• Park vehicles in natural concealment, such as shadows.
• Cover all headlights and optics whenever possible.
• Consider the effects of dust and exhaust smoke when moving.
• Minimize track, tire, and foot trails that could be detected from the air or from enemy
positions.
• Drive vehicles in previously made tracks when possible.
• In heavily used areas such as CPs and trains, ensure that vehicles travel on existing tracks or
roadways.
• Maintain effective concealment. Follow these procedures:
• Disperse vehicles and personnel under foliage or inside structures whenever possible.
• Conceal vehicles and personnel behind objects that block the thermal “line of sight” of
enemy devices.
• Ensure vehicles in hide positions protect against aerial observation by minimizing or
eliminating their thermal signatures.
• Tie antennas down.
• Use challenges and passwords.

INFORMATION SECURITY
D-4. INFOSEC entails the protection of all materials, both classified and unclassified, that may be of
intelligence value to the enemy. Refer to the discussion in Appendix A of this manual. The following
procedures will assist the platoon in maintaining INFOSEC:
• Ensure that Soldiers do not put critical information in the mail. This includes unit identification,
location, and capabilities; the commander’s name; and information on combat losses or morale.
• Before leaving an area, police it to make sure items of intelligence value are not left behind.
• Garbage will be turned in with LOGPAC or burned to prevent the enemy from gathering any
type of information.
• As operations are conducted near and around foreign nationals, care must be taken in
exchanging information between Soldiers. Soldiers tend to assume that local people do not
speak English and could inadvertently give up details of operations to enemy agents who appear
as local population.

SIGNAL SECURITY
D-5. The discussion of communications in Chapter 2 of this manual outlines considerations and
procedures for establishing and maintaining signal security. Refer to the discussion of INFOSEC in
Appendix A.

PHYSICAL SECURITY AND LOCAL SECURITY

D-6. Physical security is the protection of materiel and equipment. (Note. Physical security is also an
important component of INFOSEC, as discussed in Appendix A of this manual.) Local security is the
active measures used by the platoon to protect itself from enemy attack. The following considerations and
procedures can help the platoon maintain physical security:
• When stationary, employ anti-intrusion devices, trip flares, and concertina wire.
• Maintain the prescribed REDCON status. The platoon should assume REDCON-2 each
morning and evening to ensure that all crewmen are ready for action and to allow them to adjust
to the changing light conditions. As a minimum, the platoon goes to REDCON-2 from 30
minutes before BMNT until 30 minutes after BMNT and again for a similar period at EENT.

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 Operational Security

• Conducting area sweeps right before or right after BMNT/EENT will allow the platoon to
destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, and or dismounted elements. This when used in a
varied method will keep the enemy off guard and will force him to react to the platoon and not
the other way around.
• Do not allow foreign nationals and unauthorized observers in or near the unit’s area or positions
during operations. In accordance with ROE/ROI and the company or troop commander’s intent,
establish procedures for handling civilian intruders. In urban areas, the platoon will not be able
to stop every person walking in the area. Attention must be paid to ensure the civilians stay out
of a stand off zone to prevent them from placing explosives on the vehicles. Also, platoons
need to be observant of civilians taking too much interest in unit actions or missions.
• During all operations and especially during areas of close-in terrain, it is critical that the
platoon’s tanks have an M4 rifle positioned on the turret, ready to be used rapidly. Close-in
terrain, or more restrictive ROE, will allow the enemy to get closer to the tank prior to the crew
being able to engage him. Due to dead space of the turret machine guns and limited stopping
power of the pistol, the M4 will allow the crew to engage and destroy dismounted threats as they
approach the tank.
• Crews must ensure that the caliber .50 machine gun and tank radios are manned at all times, and
the Soldier is looking around to prevent the enemy or unknown personnel from getting too close
to the tank. The enemy will constantly be watching vehicles to detect a period of low security in
which to conduct attacks.
• Local vehicles will not be allowed to park near or place objects close to the platoon. An IED or
a VBIED could, but may not, cause catastrophic damage to the tank itself, but would be deadly
to exposed crewmen or supporting infantry.
• Crews faced with multi-echelon threats will need to ensure they wear their protective equipment.
The wearing of interceptor body armor (IBA) with the small arms protective inserts (SAPI) by
the loader and TC will reduce their vulnerability to small-arms fire when they are exposed out of
the turret hatches. In addition, crews may be required to conduct dismounted operations or OPs
and will be required to wear IBA as a force protection measure.
• Employ OPs to maintain surveillance on avenues of approach into the platoon’s AO.

OBSERVATION POSTS
D-7. OPs are especially important in maintaining the platoon’s OPSEC and enhancing its AO. They help
to protect the platoon when long-range observation from current positions is not possible; this can occur
when the platoon is in a hide position or when close terrain offers concealed avenues of approach to the
platoon’s position. OPs can be employed either mounted or dismounted.

SELECTION OF THE OBSERVATION POST SITE

D-8. Before deploying an OP, the platoon leader analyzes the terrain in his sector; he also coordinates
with adjacent platoons to discover ways to enhance his own AO and eliminate gaps in the AO between
units. Next, he decides on the type of OP necessary to observe the avenue of approach based on
requirements for early warning and platoon security. The platoon leader must consider the platoon’s
reaction time based on the REDCON status. An OP should have the following characteristics:
• Clear observation of the assigned area or sector. Ideally, the fields of observation of adjacent
OPs and/or units will overlap to ensure full coverage of the sector.
• Effective cover and concealment. Positions with natural cover and concealment help to reduce
the OP’s vulnerability to enemy observation and attack.
• Covered and concealed routes to and from the OP. Soldiers must be able to enter and leave their
OPs without being seen by the enemy.
• A location that will not attract enemy attention. An OP should not be in a site that would
logically be the target of enemy observation or that would serve as artillery TRPs.
• A location that does not skyline observers. Avoid hilltops. Position the OP farther down the
slope of the hill.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 D-3

Appendix D

• A location that is within range of platoon small-arms fire. This enables the platoon to cover the
OP if withdrawal becomes necessary.

MOUNTED OBSERVATION POSTS

D-9. Mounted OPs are used when the platoon has access to hull-down or turret-down positions that afford
unobstructed surveillance of mounted avenues of approach in the platoon sector. They allow the platoon
leader to take advantage of his vehicles’ capabilities: magnified thermal and daylight optics, sophisticated
communications, lethal weapon systems, and enhanced survivability.
D-10. The CITV on the M1A2 is especially valuable in the mounted OP. The M1A2 can occupy a turret-
down position and use the CITV to scan the designated sector without moving its turret. All other types of
vehicles must occupy turret-down or hull-down positions that allow them to move their turrets when
scanning the sector.
D-11. A common mounted OP technique is to position one vehicle to observe an engagement area or
obstacle while the remainder of the platoon occupies hide positions. Even when the mounted OP has clear
fields of observation, it is advisable to dismount one or two members of the crew to provide close-in local
security for the vehicle. The dismounted crewmen occupy positions far enough away that sounds from the
vehicle do not prevent them from hearing an approaching enemy. Another method of enhancing local
security is to coordinate with infantry elements. The infantry can conduct patrols and occupy dismounted
OPs in accordance with the company or troop commander’s OPSEC plan.

DISMOUNTED OBSERVATION POSTS

D-12. Dismounted OPs provide local security along dismounted avenues of approach whenever the platoon
must halt and occupy vehicle positions from which the terrain impedes observation or early warning of
enemy activities. During urban operations, TCs will need to place OPs to protect blind spots. Use of
supporting infantry is the best answer, but loaders may be required to fill this mission if infantry is not
available. They also augment or replace mounted OPs based on the commander’s OPSEC plan. The tank
platoon uses the following steps to occupy, staff, and improve a dismounted OP:
• The platoon leader or PSG determines the need for the OP and identifies the location based on
the physical characteristics outlined previously in this section.
• The platoon leader or PSG assembles OP personnel at his vehicle.

Note. OP personnel are designated in the unit SOP, but are normally the loaders from wingman
tanks. In two-man OPs, one crewman observes the sector while the other provides local
security. Some short-duration OPs may consist of one crewman providing local security for
individual vehicles in close terrain.

• The platoon leader or PSG briefs the OP personnel to ensure that they are trained in reporting
procedures and individual camouflage techniques and that they have the proper equipment as
designated in the unit SOP. Equipment will normally include the following:
• Individual weapons, M4 rifle, and grenades.
• Communications equipment (such as wire, flag set, flashlight, and/or radio). (Note. The
use of nonsecure radios, to include hand-held types, is not recommended. If used; however,
platoons must exercise extreme caution.)

Note. Flag use will be based on local SOP, but a general rule of thumb is green flag for friendly
elements, yellow flag for unknown elements, and red flag for enemy elements.

• Seasonal uniform with load-bearing equipment (LBE) and appropriate MOPP gear.
• Binoculars and NODs.
• Paper and pen/pencil for making a sector sketch.

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 Operational Security

• Map with overlay, protractor and compass.

• Local security measures such as trip flares and claymore mines.
• The platoon leader or PSG leads OP personnel to the OP site and briefs them on the following
information:
• Ensure OP personnel understand that their mission is to see and report and not become
engaged with the enemy dismounts.
• When and how to report.
• When and how to withdraw. The withdrawal criteria should be specific; examples include
withdrawal when a CBRN attack is detected, when an enemy tank section crosses a phase line,
or when enemy dismounted infantrymen approach to within 300 meters of the OP.
• Challenge and password.
• When they will be replaced. As a general rule, OP personnel should be replaced every 2
hours. During cold weather, this rotation may be done more frequently.
• OP personnel must execute a plan for night-vision operations. Rotating between Soldiers
with one Soldier not scanning for longer than 20 minutes, will allow them to keep their night
vision and maintain good scanning techniques.
• Once in place, OP personnel take these steps to improve the position:
• Establish communications.
• Camouflage the position and routes into and out of it.
• Prepare a sector sketch based on the platoon fire plan (see Chapter 4 of this manual).
• Dig in to provide protection from indirect and direct fires. A good rule of thumb is to dig
when dismounted infantry dig. If possible, emplace hasty obstacles for additional protection.

MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS
D-13. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts everyone conducting military operations. All
leaders and Soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of the growth of news
coverage via international television and radio broadcasts and the Internet. They must realize that
operations that run counter to official U.S. policy may damage the nation’s interests and international
standing.
D-14. Tank platoon crewmen must learn how to deal effectively with broadcast and print reporters and
photographers. Training should cover any information restrictions imposed on the media. Soldiers must
also gain an understanding of which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer
to higher authorities, such as their chain of command or the public affairs office (PAO). PAOs usually
issue daily guidance dealing with these subjects.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 D-5

Appendix D

Actions when Approached by the Media during Operations

1. Soldiers must stop and check the reporter’s identifications and authorization to be
working in the sector.
2. Escort the media to the platoon leader; avoid taking them past any sensitive areas
if possible.
3. If not authorized to be in the area, detain the media in accordance with the ROE
until given further guidance.
4. Platoon leader informs unit commander.
5. If given permission from the commander to conduct filming and interviews, the
platoon leader will designate someone to escort and observe the media.
6. Unless given clearance, do not allow the media to take pictures of the unit,
equipment, or near-by land marks.
7. When filming is authorized, pay attention to what is being filmed and the
background.

Soldier Tips when Dealing with the Media

1. Should stay within the boundaries of their job, mission, or personal feelings.
2. Tell the truth; if they don’t know, say that.
3. Do not degrade the unit, the Army, or the government, to include allies or host
nations.
4. Don’t speculate about policy or future events.
5. Do not cover any secure information.
6. Everything is “on the record” and will be used by the media. This is especially
important when dealing with the embedded media. After a short period of time,
Soldiers will come to see the reporter as a member of the unit, and will be more likely
to release information.
7. Do not answer questions about the unit’s mission, equipment capabilities, or any
upcoming operations.
8. Answer questions in broad, open terms; do not become bogged down in a series
of details.
9. Always maintain military bearing.

D-6 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Appendix E
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and
Smoke Operations

Because many potential adversaries have the capability to employ nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons, the tank platoon must prepare to fight in a CBRN
environment. Faced with the contemporary operating environment it is as likely now
as at any point for enemy forces to use CBRN weapons, both at the small unit level
as well as strategic level. Collecting, processing, and disseminating needed CBRN
hazard information are also vital functions. To survive and remain effective on the
integrated battlefield, the tank platoon must be proficient in the three fundamentals of
CBRN defense: contamination avoidance, CBRN protection, and decontamination. A
thorough understanding of CBRN capabilities and unit detection equipment will
allow the platoon to function and operate. It’s has been proven that a units fear of
CBRN weapons is as disabling as the weapons themselves.

Additional-duty CBRN personnel should be designated by the platoon SOP for

operations in a CBRN environment. Selected crews should be designated and trained
as chemical agent detection teams and radiological survey and monitoring teams.

Smoke has a variety of uses on the battlefield; it is employed extensively by enemy

and friendly elements in both offensive and defensive operations. The effectiveness
of smoke depends on the type that is used and the weather at the time it is employed.
The tank platoon’s success on the battlefield may depend on how well crewmen
understand the effects of smoke on enemy and friendly acquisition systems in various
weather conditions.

SECTION I – CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE

E-1. Avoidance is the most important fundamental element of CBRN defense because the best way to
survive is to avoid being the object of a chemical or nuclear attack. Avoiding contaminated areas
minimizes the risk of additional casualties; it also prevents the degradation of combat power that results
when a unit must operate in MOPP level 3 or 4 for extended periods of time. In addition, the unit is not
required to spend the time and resources needed for decontamination.

GENERAL AVOIDANCE MEASURES

E-2. Contamination avoidance measures include the following:
• Using passive avoidance techniques.
• Locating contaminated areas.
• Identifying CBRN agents.
• Warning other members of the platoon as well as other units.
• Reporting CBRN threats to higher headquarters.
E-3. Passive avoidance measures can decrease the possibility of CBRN attack or reduce the effects of an
attack already under way. Effective use of concealment, dispersion, prepared positions, OPSEC, and

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-1

Appendix E

signal security reduces the chances of being acquired as a target. The tank platoon should continually
analyze its vulnerability to chemical or nuclear attack and take appropriate protective measures.
E-4. Attacks and contamination must be detected quickly and reported to adjacent units and headquarters
elements. The tank platoon must have an effective method of quickly giving the alarm in the event of a
CBRN attack. Alarms can be passed by radio, audible signals, or hand-and-arm signals. The unit SOP
should specify criteria and automatic procedures for employing detection teams and submitting the
required CBRN reports following a CBRN attack or when contamination is encountered.
E-5. Whenever possible, all movement routes and future positions should be reconnoitered for CBRN
contamination. Quartering party personnel should be prepared to conduct monitoring operations; if they
detect contaminated areas, they identify, report, and mark them. The quartering party can then evaluate the
location and type of hazard (nuclear radiation or chemical/biological agent) to determine the best plan for
bypassing, crossing, or operating in the contaminated area. Based on the situation, the platoon leader and
company commander must be able to implement protective measures specified in the SOP to minimize
personnel losses and limit the spread of contamination.

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS BEFORE AN ATTACK

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
E-6. The key protective measure against a biological attack is maintaining a high order of health, personal
hygiene, and sanitation discipline. Biological attacks are difficult to detect. If an attack occurs, the
chances of survival are better if crew members are healthy and physically fit and maintain good personal
hygiene. Keeping the body clean helps to prevent ingestion of biological agents. Small cuts or scratches
should be covered and kept germ-free by means of soap, water, and first-aid measures. Since insects may
carry biological agents, Soldiers should prevent insect bites by keeping clothes buttoned and skin covered.
The platoon will only consume water and food that has come through approved sources. Leadership must
ensure all Soldiers understand the risk from getting food or water from local sources.

NUCLEAR DEFENSE
E-7. The best defense against a nuclear attack is to dig in. Unit defensive positions, which range from
individual foxholes to full-scale improved fighting positions, should be prepared whenever the tactical
situation permits. Personnel should keep their individual weapons, equipment, clothing, and other issue
items in their vehicles. Inside the vehicle, equipment and any loose items must be secured because the
blast wave can turn unsecured objects into lethal missiles. Supplies, explosives, and flammable materials
should be dispersed and protected.
E-8. Reverse slopes of hills and mountains give some nuclear protection. The initial radiation and the
heat and light from the fireball of a nuclear blast tend to be absorbed by hills and mountains. The use of
gullies, ravines, ditches, natural depressions, fallen trees, and caves can also reduce nuclear casualties.
E-9. Equipment that would be damaged in the explosion must be safe guarded. One technique is not
using all night-vision goggles at the same time, if not required by the mission, to prevent damage to the
image enhancing mechanism by the flash.

CHEMICAL DEFENSE

General Guidelines
E-10. Make sure all personnel have their protective masks available, and make sure each mask fits and
functions properly. All personnel should wear the proper protective clothing in accordance with the MOPP
level designated by the commander. Inform everyone to remain alert and to be constantly aware of the
chemical threat. Protect all equipment and supplies from liquid chemical contamination by keeping them
organized and covered with a tarp. Exposed gear will not be decontaminated and will be destroyed and

E-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

deprive the platoon of its equipment. The platoon must have a standardized plan for placing M9 tape on
the vehicles as part of the early warning process.

Automatic Alarm System

E-11. The automatic alarm system is the primary means of detecting an upwind chemical attack. The
system provides two essential elements of survival: detection of a toxic agent cloud and early warning to
troops in the monitored position.
E-12. The platoon leader decides where to place the chemical alarm. In stationary operations, he first
determines the wind direction, and then places available detector units upwind of the nearest position to be
protected. The detector unit should be no more than 400 meters upwind from the alarm unit. The optimum
distance is 150 meters. Operation of the alarm can be affected by blowing sand or dust, rain, sleet, snow,
tropical conditions, and temperatures below 40 degrees Fahrenheit (4.5 degrees Celsius).
E-13. Space the available detector units approximately 300 meters apart, and make sure each detector unit
is connected to each alarm unit by telephone cable (WD-1). Position the alarm units near radiotelephone
communications; this makes it easy to alert the unit to an attack. Platoons must remember that although the
M8A1 could be installed in the platoon hot loop the new M22 cannot. Attempt to do so will cause the M43
alarm not to sound in the event of an attack.
E-14. During movement operations the platoon should place the alarm on the exterior of the CBRN vehicle
to give the platoon as much early warning as possible.
E-15. The platoon sergeant and CBRN tank commander must ensure the platoon has sufficient batteries to
support continuous operation of the chemical agent alarm. The PSG also needs to ensure that normal
PMCS is being conducted on the platoons CBRN equipment and corrective action is taken when
deficiencies are identified.

SECTION II – CBRN PROTECTION

E-16. Soldiers on the integrated battlefield face a combination of nuclear, biological, chemical, and
conventional attacks. If the tank platoon cannot avoid a CBRN hazard, it must be prepared to protect
personnel and equipment from the effects of exposure. The type and degree of protection required will be
based on the unit’s mission and the hazard. Note that the line between contamination avoidance and
protection is not distinct. Many actions contribute to both areas of CBRN defense.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES AND MOPP LEVELS

E-17. The key to effective protection in a CBRN environment is the tank platoon’s proficiency in
automatically and correctly implementing CBRN defense SOPs. Individual and unit protection against
chemical attack or contamination hinges on effective use of the MOPP and on individual proficiency in
basic CBRN skills. The six levels of MOPP, illustrated in Figure E-1, should be listed in the SOP.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-3

Appendix E

Figure E-1. MOPP levels

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS DURING AND AFTER AN ATTACK

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
E-18. After a biological attack, crewmen must assume that all surfaces have been exposed to germs. Do
not eat food or drink water that may be contaminated. Eat or drink only food or water that has been stored

E-4 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

in sealed containers; consume it only after washing and cleaning the outside of the container. All water
must be boiled for at least 15 minutes. Leaders continue to monitor for signs of delayed acting agents.

Note. Refer to the battle drill for reaction to a chemical/biological attack in Chapter 3 of this
manual.

NUCLEAR DEFENSE
Defense During a Nuclear Attack
E-19. This discussion focuses on defensive measures the platoon must be prepared to take to protect tank
crewmen, whether they are in their vehicle or have dismounted.
Mounted Defensive Actions
E-20. If time permits, the platoon should take the following actions:
• Position each vehicle behind the best available cover with the front of the vehicle toward the
blast.
• Point the gun away from the blast.
• Lock the brakes.
• Secure loose equipment inside the vehicle to prevent injuries and equipment damage.
• Secure all exterior components that could be damaged by the blast (such as water cans, duffel
bags, and antennas) inside the vehicle.
• Turn off all radios as well as turret and master power.
• Close and lock all hatches, including ballistic shields.
• Take actions to protect the head and eyes. As necessary, wear helmets and eye protection
whenever possible.

Note. Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a
nuclear attack.

Dismounted Defensive Actions

E-21. Never run for cover! Immediately drop flat on the ground (face down) or to the bottom of a foxhole,
facing away from the fireball. Cover as much exposed skin as possible. Keep eyes tightly closed. Remain
down until the blast wave has passed and debris has stopped falling. Stay calm, check for injury, check
weapons and equipment for damage, and prepare to continue the mission.
Defense After a Nuclear Attack
E-22. Once the attack has ended, forward a NBC-1 nuclear report, organize survivors, secure and organize
equipment, repair and reinforce the BP, assist casualties, improve protection against possible fallout, and
begin continuous monitoring. If the radiation dose rate reaches a hazardous level after fallout has ended,
be prepared to move, on order, to a less hazardous area.
General Guidelines
E-23. When operating in or crossing radiologically contaminated areas, vehicles should be closed tightly.
Crewmen cover their faces with a handkerchief or cloth; cargoes should be covered by tarps or tenting.
Mission permitting, vehicles should keep their speed down to prevent dust and should maintain adequate
following distance to stay out of the dust raised by preceding vehicles. After the unit exits a contaminated
area, personnel, equipment, and cargo should be checked for contamination and decontaminated, if
necessary. Dose rates will be monitored closely to ensure compliance with the applicable OEG. Radiation
exposure status (RES) will be updated, if appropriate.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-5

Appendix E

Fallout Warning
E-24. The first person to detect the arrival of fallout is usually a member of the radiological survey and
monitoring team. As soon as the recorded dose rate reaches 1 centigray per hour (cGy/hr) or higher, issue
a fallout warning. All personnel hearing the warning relay it to others. If the mission allows, Soldiers
should get into a shelter with overhead cover and stay there until given an “ALL CLEAR” signal or until
otherwise directed to move. If the mission does not allow the unit to take cover, decontamination becomes
more important and, in many cases, more difficult.
Supervision of Radiological Monitoring
E-25. Designate a point in the platoon area where readings will be taken, and note the grid coordinates of
that point. Check the monitor operator to make sure that he takes readings at least once each hour from this
point, that he zeroes the radiacmeter (AN/VDR-2) before taking each reading, and that he uses the device
properly. Have the operator monitor continuously if any of the following conditions occur:
• A reading of 1 cGy/hr or more is obtained.
• A fallout warning is received.
• A nuclear burst is seen, heard, or reported.
• An order to monitor is received.
• The unit begins to move.
E-26. Ensure that the operator immediately reports all readings showing the presence of radiation, as well
as the time of these readings. Use this information and the location of the readings to prepare a NBC-4
report. Continue these operations until monitoring shows a dose rate of less than 1 cGy/hr or until directed
to stop.
Supervision of Tactical Dosimetry
E-27. The tank platoon is normally issued two dosimeters. Select two Soldiers, one from each section, to
wear them ideally the TC but at a minimum a loader that is outside the armor to get an accurate reading.
Before the operation begins, check all dosimeters; any that do not read zero should be turned in for
recharging if applicable. If a charger is not available, note the original reading on the dosimeter and adjust
subsequent readings accordingly. Make sure dosimeter readings are reported accurately. Collect readings
at least once daily. Average these readings, round to the nearest 10, and report this average to higher
headquarters.
CHEMICAL DEFENSE
Defense During a Chemical Attack
E-28. Give the alarm. Have all unmasked Soldiers put on their protective masks and other MOPP gear.
All personnel should move inside their tanks; in most cases, they should place their hatches in the closed
position to protect against gross contamination. Direct the crews of vehicles that are equipped with CBRN
overpressurization to turn the system on. Use M256 chemical agent detector kits to determine the type of
agent, and forward a NBC-1 chemical report. Continue the mission.

Notes. Tactical and safety considerations (such as observation of the terrain, enemy disposition,
and the amount of gross contamination that may be spread inside the vehicle) may outweigh the
need to keep the tank’s hatches closed. Depending on the tactical situation and unit SOP,
platoon members may be required to keep their hatches in the open or open-protected position.
Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a
chemical/biological attack.

Defense After a Chemical Attack

E-29. As directed by unit SOPs, forward follow-up NBC-1 chemical reports, treat casualties, perform
immediate decontamination as required, and mark the contaminated area.

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 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

ALARMS AND SIGNALS

E-30. When a CBRN attack is recognized, everyone must receive the warning and assume the appropriate
MOPP level (see Figure E-1). Soldiers in immediate danger need warnings they can see or hear. The
alarm or signal must be simple and unmistakable if it is to produce a quick and correct reaction. Units that
are not immediately affected need the information as well, either to prepare for the hazard or to change
plans. If a CBRN hazard is located, the contaminated area should be marked. The CBRN warning and
reporting system (CBRNWRS) and standardized contamination markers contribute to orderly warning
procedures.
VOCAL ALARMS
E-31. To give a vocal alarm for any chemical or biological hazard or attack, the person detecting the
hazard stops breathing, masks, and shouts “GAS, GAS!” as loudly as possible. Everyone hearing this
alarm must immediately mask, repeat the alarm, and take cover from agent contamination and
fragmentation of munitions. It may also be necessary to pass the alarm over the radio or telephone. Visual
signals must supplement vocal alarms.
AUTOMATIC ALARMS
E-32. If an M8/M22 automatic chemical agent alarm sounds or flashes, the first person to hear or see it
stops breathing, masks, and yells “GAS, GAS!” This alarm is relayed throughout the unit by vocal and
visual signals and radio.
NONVOCAL ALARMS
E-33. One person yelling “GAS, GAS!” to warn unit personnel may be drowned out by the sounds of the
battlefield; therefore, sound signals by means other than voice may be required. These signals must
produce noise that is louder than, and not easily confused with, other sounds of combat. The unit SOP
should specify nonvocal alarms for CBRN hazards. Following are some suggestions:
• Rapid and continuous beating together of any two metal objects to produce a loud noise.
Sample SOP entry: “The audible warning of a chemical attack is rapid and continuous beating of
metal on metal.”
• A succession of short blasts on a vehicle horn or other suitable device. Sample SOP entry:
“While in convoy, five short blasts on a vehicle horn is the audible signal for a chemical attack.”
• An intermittent warbling siren sound. Sample SOP entry: “The audible alarm for impending
chemical attack is the sounding of the installation siren as follows: 10 seconds on, 5 seconds off;
sequence repeated for 2 minutes.”
VISUAL SIGNALS
E-34. Visual signals may replace sound alarms when the sound may be lost amid battlefield noises or when
the situation does not permit the use of sound signals. The standard hand-and-arm signal for a CBRN
hazard is illustrated in Figure E-2. Signaling is done by extending both arms horizontally to the sides with
the fists closed and facing up, then rapidly moving the fists to the head and back to the horizontal position.
This is repeated until other elements react. Colored smoke or flares may also be designated as visual
signals for a CBRN hazard, but these must be specified in unit SOPs.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-7

Appendix E

Figure E-2. Hand-and-arm signal for CBRN hazard

SYMPTOMS AND TREATMENT OF CBRN CASUALTIES
E-35. Soldiers must be able to recognize CBRN-related symptoms and conduct self-aid and buddy-aid.
The basic steps of first aid apply in any combat environment.
BIOLOGICAL AGENT CASUALTIES
E-36. Casualties resulting from live biological agents or toxins require medical treatment as quickly as
possible. One indication of a live biological agent attack is large numbers of Soldiers developing an
unexplained illness over a short period of time. Soldiers showing symptoms of disease must be isolated to
prevent infection from spreading to others.
E-37. A wide variety of toxins is available to potential adversaries for use on the modern battlefield. These
can be dispensed alone or with other carriers or agents. Symptoms associated with some toxins mimic
those of other types of illness or of exposure to chemical agents. Toxin symptoms may include any of the
following:
• Dizziness, mental confusion, or double or blurred vision.
• Formation of rashes or blisters.
• Coughing.
• Fever, aching muscles, and fatigue.
• Difficulty in swallowing.
• Nausea, vomiting, and/or diarrhea.
• Bleeding from body openings or blood in urine, stool, or sputum (spit).
• Shock.
E-38. These symptoms may appear within minutes after the toxin attack, or they may be delayed several
hours. Appropriate self-aid and buddy-aid measures vary, depending on the agent. Soldiers should first
mask to prevent inhaling or ingesting additional agents; then they should remove agents from exposed skin,
either by washing with soap and water or by using the M291 kit. Soldiers use buddy-aid procedures to
help each other clean exposed skin, to observe each other for early symptoms of toxic exposure, and to
request medical assistance.
NUCLEAR CASUALTIES
E-39. Blast injuries. These can range from minor cuts and broken bones to severe lacerations and critical
damage to vital organs. The first-aid treatment will be the same as that used for conventional combat
casualties suffering similar injuries.
E-40. Thermal radiation injuries. The intense heat generated by a nuclear detonation can cause burn
injuries. As with other types of burns, there are three degrees of injury:
• First-degree burns should heal without special treatment, and there will be no scar formation.
• Second-degree burns resemble severe sunburn with blistering; they should be treated as a burn
to prevent infection.
• In third-degree burns, the full thickness of the skin is destroyed; the victim should be treated as a
burn casualty and evacuated.

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 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

CHEMICAL AGENT CASUALTIES

E-41. Chemical agents fall into four major categories: nerve, blister, blood, and choking. Their primary
routes of attack upon the body are through the respiratory system and the skin. These agents create an
especially dangerous situation because they can kill or incapacitate quickly. The first, and most important,
step in dealing with them effectively is to recognize symptoms so proper treatment can be administered.
Nerve Agents
E-42. Nerve agent poisoning can lead to a quick death; for this reason, quick recognition of its symptoms
is crucial. Immediate self-aid or buddy-aid is needed if most or all symptoms appear.

Poisoning Symptoms
E-43. Early symptoms usually appear in the following progression:
• Runny nose.
• Redness and tearing of the eyes.
• Sudden headache.
• Excessive flow of saliva (drooling).
• Tightness in the chest, leading to breathing difficulty.
• Impaired vision.
• Muscular twitching in the area of exposed or contaminated skin.
• Stomach cramps.
• Nausea.
E-44. Severe nerve agent poisoning is likely when any of the early symptoms are accompanied by all or
most of the following symptoms:
• Strange or confused behavior.
• Gurgling sounds when breathing.
• Severely pinpointed pupils.
• Loss of bladder and/or bowel control.
• Vomiting.
• Convulsions.
• Breathing that becomes extremely labored or stops.

Self-Aid Procedures
E-45. No effective drug exists to remedy the effects of nerve agents on vision. If Soldiers experience any
of the other mild symptoms of nerve agent poisoning, they must perform the following self-aid measures,
which are covered in more detail in FM 4-25.11 (FM 21-11):
• Step 1. Immediately put on the protective mask.
• Step 2. Remove a Mark I nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK) from the protective mask
carrier (see Figure E-3).
• Step 3. Inject one thigh with the first injector from the kit (atropine in the small auto-
injector). Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds. Remove the injector.
• Step 4. Immediately inject the thigh with the second injector (pralidoxime chloride in the
large injector). Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds.
• Step 5. Remove the injector and place each injector needle through the jacket pocket flap of
the overgarment, bending each needle to form a hook.
• Step 6. Massage the injection area, if time permits and the overgarment suit is not
contaminated.
• Step 7. If symptoms persist or recur, wait 10 to 15 minutes and repeat both injections.
Repeat a third time if needed. Allow 10 to 15 minutes between each set of injections. Do not

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-9

Appendix E

administer more than three NAAK sets. Medical support personnel must authorize the
administration of more than three sets.

Figure E-3. Nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK)

Buddy-Aid Procedures
E-46. If a Soldier experiences severe symptoms from nerve agent poisoning and is unable to administer
self-aid, another Soldier must perform the following buddy-aid measures, which are covered in more detail
in FM 4-25.11 (FM 21-11):
• Step 1. Mask the casualty.
• Step 2. Using the victim’s NAAK, administer three sets immediately and in rapid succession
in the thigh muscle of either leg. Do not wait between injections.
• Step 3. Administer the back-pressure armlift method of artificial respiration if the casualty’s
breathing is labored or has stopped.
• Step 4. Hook the expended autoinjectors to the casualty’s overgarment jacket pocket flap.
• Step 5. If necessary to stabilize the casualty’s heart rate, administer the convulsive antidote
nerve agent (CANA) injection Diazepam (see Figure E-4). Use the following procedure:
• Tear open the protective plastic packet and remove the injector.
• Grasp the injector with the needle (black) end extending beyond the thumb and two fingers
(index plus next finger).
• With the other hand, pull the safety cap off the injector base to arm the injector.
(CAUTION: Do not touch the black portion, which is the injector needle. You could
accidentally inject yourself.)
• Place the black end of the injector against the casualty’s injection site.
• Push the injector into the muscle with firm, even pressure until it functions.
• Hold the injector in place for at least 10 seconds.
• Push the needle of each used injector (one at a time) through one of the pocket flaps of the
casualty’s protective overgarment and, being careful not to tear protective gloves or clothing;
bend each needle to form a hook.
• Step 6. Obtain immediate medical attention for the victim.

Note. This information is covered in task 031-503-1013, Decontaminate Yourself and

Individual Equipment Using Chemical Decontamination Kits.

Figure E-4. Convulsive antidote nerve agent (CANA) injector

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 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

Blister Agents
E-47. Casualties resulting from blister agents may not be noticeable immediately. Symptoms may take
several hours or days to appear. They include the following:
• Redness or inflammation of the eyes.
• Temporary blindness or, with severe poisoning, permanent blindness.
• Itching, burning, or reddening of the skin.
• Welts or, in an advanced state, blisters on the skin.
• Hoarseness.
• Coughing.
• Difficult or labored breathing.
• Stomach pain.
• Nausea.
• Vomiting.
• Diarrhea.
E-48. If a blister agent comes in contact with skin or eyes, remove it immediately. To remove an agent
from the eyes, flush repeatedly with plain water. Decontaminate the skin using the M258A1/M291 kit. If
severe blisters form, seek medical attention as soon as possible.
Blood Agents
E-49. A seemingly mild case of blood agent poisoning can progress to death within 10 minutes. Symptoms
include the following:
• Rapid or shallow respiration (panting).
• Headache.
• Dizziness or giddiness.
• Red or pink color change in light-colored skin.
• Convulsions.
• Coma.
E-50. There is no self-aid or buddy-aid treatment for blood agent poisoning. When hit with blood agent
the platoon must mask as soon as possible. Victims must receive immediate medical attention. Blood
agent leads to a break down of protective mask filters and leaders must plan actions accordingly.
Choking Agents
E-51. These agents produce casualties by means of inhaled vapors. They damage blood vessels in the lung
walls, causing body fluid to slowly fill the lung cavity. Ordinary field concentrations do not cause death,
but prolonged exposure to high concentrations of the vapor, coupled with neglect or delay in masking, can
be fatal. Maximum damage will occur between 12 and 24 hours after exposure. In most cases, the excess
fluid in the lungs will absorb back into the body. Slow recovery will begin approximately 48 hours after
exposure.
E-52. During and immediately after exposure, choking agent symptoms may include the following:
• Coughing.
• Choking.
• Tightness in the chest.
• Nausea.
• Headache.
• Tearing of the eyes.
E-53. Following the early symptoms, a symptom-free period of 2 to 24 hours is likely. This will be
followed by these signs of fluid collecting in the lungs:
• Rapid, shallow breathing.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-11

Appendix E

• Painful coughing.
• Blue lips and fingernails.
• In severe cases, clammy skin and rapid heartbeat.
E-54. No self-aid or buddy-aid treatment exists for choking agent symptoms. If only minimum amounts
were inhaled, the Soldier may continue with normal duties. If definite symptoms occur, the Soldier should
keep warm and seek immediate medical attention and rapid evacuation to an aid station.

MARKING CONTAMINATED AREAS

E-55. Contamination must be marked so unsuspecting personnel will not be exposed to it. When platoon
monitoring teams detect or suspect a CBRN hazard, they mark all likely entry points into the area and
report the contamination to higher headquarters. The only exception to this policy is if marking the area
would help the enemy. If this exception is made by the commander, the hazard must still be reported to
protect friendly units.

TYPES OF MARKERS
E-56. U.S. forces use NATO standard markers (illustrated in Figure E-5) to make it easier for allies to
recognize the hazards. These markers are in the standard CBRN marking set. The colors and inscriptions
on a marker indicate the type of hazard. Additional information is written on the front of the sign.

Figure E-5. CBRN marking devices

MARKING PROCEDURES
E-57. Markers face away from the contamination. For example, if markers are placed on the edge of a
contaminated area to mark a radiological hot spot, they face away from the point of the highest
contamination reading. Markers are placed along roads and trails and at other likely points of entry. When
time and mission permit, additional markers should be emplaced. The distance between signs varies. In
open terrain, they can be placed 25 to 100 meters apart; in hilly or wooded areas, they should be placed
more frequently. An observer should be able to stand in front of a marker and see the markers to the left
and right of it.

E-12 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

E-58. Units discovering a marked contaminated area do not have to conduct elaborate, time-consuming
surveys. They simply check the extent of contamination and use the information to adjust their plans, if
necessary. If the size of the hazard has changed, they relocate the signs. If the hazard is gone, they remove
the signs. Changes are reported to higher headquarters.

UNMASKING PROCEDURES
E-59. Soldiers should unmask as soon as possible except when a live biological or toxin attack is expected.
Use the following procedures to determine if unmasking is safe.

UNMASKING WITH M256/M256A1 KIT

E-60. If an M256/M256A1 detector kit is available, use it to supplement the unmasking procedures. The
kit does not detect all agents; therefore, proper unmasking procedures, which take approximately 15
minutes, must still be used. If all tests with the kit (including a check for liquid contamination using M8
detector paper) have been performed and the results are negative, use the following procedures:
• The senior person should select one or two Soldiers to start the unmasking procedures. If
possible, they move to a shady place; bright, direct sunlight can cause pupils in the eyes to
constrict, giving a false symptom.
• The selected Soldiers unmask for 5 minutes, then clear and reseal their masks.
• Observe the Soldiers for 10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, request permission from higher
headquarters to signal “ALL CLEAR.”
• Watch all Soldiers for possible delayed symptoms. Always have first-aid treatment immediately
available in case it is needed.

Note. Time to complete the M256/M256A1 detector kit, including using M8 detector paper for
liquid, takes approximately 20 minutes. Two kits completed simultaneously along with
unmasking procedures with the M256/M256A1 detector kit will take approximately 35 minutes
to complete.

UNMASKING WITHOUT M256/M256A1 KIT

E-61. If an M256/M256A1 kit is not available, the unmasking procedures take approximately 35 minutes.
When a reasonable amount of time has passed after the attack, find a shady area. Use M8 paper to check
the area for possible liquid contamination. Conduct unmasking using these procedures:
• The senior person selects one or two Soldiers. They take a deep breath and break their mask
seals, keeping their eyes wide open.
• After 15 seconds, the Soldiers clear and reseal their masks. Observe them for 10 minutes.
• If no symptoms appear, the same Soldiers break the seals, take two or three breaths, and clear
and reseal their masks. Observe them for 10 minutes.
• If no symptoms appear, the same Soldiers unmask for 5 minutes, and then remask.
• If no symptoms appear in 10 minutes, request permission from higher headquarters to signal
“ALL CLEAR.” Continue to observe all Soldiers in case delayed symptoms develop.
ALL-CLEAR SIGNAL
E-62. Units pass the all-clear signal by word of mouth through their chain of command. Leaders initiate
the signal after testing for contamination proves negative. The commander designates the specific all-clear
signal and includes it in the unit SOP or the OPORD. If required, standard sound signals may be used,
such as a continuous, sustained blast on a siren, vehicle horn, or similar device. When “ALL CLEAR” is
announced on the radio, the receiving unit must authenticate the transmission before complying.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-13

Appendix E

WARNING AND REPORTING SYSTEMS

E-63. The CBRNWRS is a rapid means of sending reports of a CBRN attack. These reports inform other
affected units of clean areas and possible contamination. They are also used to provide this information up
and down the chain of command and to adjacent units.
E-64. Each report has a specific purpose and uses standard codes to shorten and simplify the reporting
process. For a detailed outlined of the formats and letter codes for the standard CBRN (NBC) reports, refer
to ST 3-20.153.

SECTION III – DECONTAMINATION

E-65. During continuous operations in areas of nuclear or chemical contamination, decontamination is
essential in preventing casualties and severe combat degradation. The tank platoon gains maximum benefit
from the available time and decontamination resources by observing these considerations:
• The platoon should execute decontamination as soon as possible and as far forward as possible.
• Decontamination should be conducted only to the extent that is necessary to ensure the platoon’s
safety and operational readiness.
• Decontamination priorities with regard to unit safety and mission accomplishment should be
strictly observed.
E-66. These principles are consistent with doctrine that places the burden of decontamination at battalion
or company level. For this reason, the tank platoon must develop a thorough SOP covering
decontamination methods and priorities, using all available assets to the maximum extent possible.
E-67. Refer to FM 3-11.5 (FM 3-5) for a more detailed examination of CBRN decontamination
procedures.

IMMEDIATE DECONTAMINATION
E-68. Immediate decontamination is a basic Soldier survival skill. Any contact between chemical or toxic
agents and bare skin should be treated as an emergency. Some agents can kill if they remain on the skin
for longer than a minute.

SKIN DECONTAMINATION KIT

E-69. The best technique for removing or neutralizing these agents is to use the M258A1/M291 skin
decontamination kit. Leaders must ensure that their Soldiers are trained to execute this technique
automatically, without waiting for orders.

PERSONAL WIPE DOWN

E-70. Personal wipe down should begin within 15 minutes of contamination. The wipe down removes or
neutralizes contamination on the hood, mask, gloves, and personal weapon. For chemical and biological
contamination, Soldiers use packets from the M280 decontamination kit. For radiological contamination,
Soldiers wipe the contamination off with a cloth or simply flush or shake it away.

OPERATOR’S SPRAY DOWN

E-71. Operator’s spray down of equipment should begin immediately after completion of personal wipe
down. The spray down removes or neutralizes contamination on the surfaces operators must touch
frequently to perform their mission. For chemical and biological contamination, operators can use on
board decontamination apparatuses like the M100 Sorbent Decontamination System (SDS) or the
M11/M13. For radiological contamination, they brush or scrape the contamination away with whatever is
at hand or flush it with water and wipe it away.

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 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

OPERATIONAL DECONTAMINATION
E-72. Operational decontamination allows a force to continue fighting and sustain momentum after being
contaminated. It limits the hazard of transferring contamination by removing most of the gross
contamination on equipment and nearly all the contamination on individual Soldiers.
E-73. Operational decontamination speeds the weathering process and allows clean areas (people,
equipment, and terrain) to stay clean. When they complete the decontamination process, Soldiers who
have removed sources of vapor contamination from their clothing and equipment can use hazard-free areas
to unmask temporarily and eat, drink, and rest.
E-74. Operational decontamination is accomplished using assets of the parent unit. It makes use of two
decontamination techniques:
• Vehicle wash down.
• MOPP gear exchange.
E-75. These procedures can be performed separately from each other; both are best performed at crew
level. Uncontaminated vehicles and personnel should not go through either technique.
VEHICLE WASH DOWN
E-76. Vehicle wash down is conducted as far forward as possible and is performed by the battalion
decontamination specialist with assistance from the company or troop decontamination team. It is most
effective if started within one hour after contamination. There are two steps in vehicle wash down:
• Step 1. Button up the vehicle and secure equipment.
• Step 2. Wash down the vehicle and equipment with hot, soapy water for two to three minutes.
E-77. Because speed is important, do not check vehicles for contamination after the vehicle has been
washed down. Remove only gross contamination.
MOPP GEAR EXCHANGE
E-78. There are eight steps in a MOPP gear exchange:
• Step 1. Decontaminate gear and set it aside.
• Step 2. Decontaminate hood and gloves, and roll up hood.
• Step 3. Remove overgarment.
• Step 4. Remove overboots and gloves.
• Step 5. Put on new overgarment.
• Step 6. Put on new overboots and gloves.
• Step 7. Secure hood.
• Step 8. Secure gear.
E-79. MOPP gear exchange is best performed using the buddy system. Both Soldiers perform Step 1.
Steps 2 through 7 are performed first by one Soldier, then by the other. Both Soldiers perform Step 8. The
company or troop assists the platoon by bringing replacement overgarments and decontaminants to the
exchange site.

THOROUGH DECONTAMINATION
E-80. Thorough decontamination operations restore the combat power of maneuver units by removing
nearly all contamination from Soldiers and individual equipment. Executed promptly and correctly, these
detailed procedures reduce the danger of contamination exposure to negligible risk levels. Just as
important, they allow Soldiers to operate equipment safely for extended periods at reduced MOPP levels.

PROCEDURES
E-81. Contaminated units conduct detailed troop decontamination (DTD) for their crewmen under the
supervision of the chemical unit. When detailed equipment decontamination (DED) operations are

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-15

Appendix E

required, the chemical unit usually selects a site, sets it up, and performs detailed procedures with
assistance from the contaminated unit.
E-82. After completing thorough decontamination, the unit moves into an adjacent assembly area for
reconstitution. Support elements from the brigade, division, or corps support area replenish combat stocks,
refit equipment, and replace personnel and equipment. The newly reconstituted unit leaves the assembly
area fully operational and fit to return to battle. A small risk from residual contamination remains, so
periodic contamination checks must be made following this operation.

LIMITATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

E-83. Thorough decontamination is usually conducted as part of an extensive reconstitution effort in
brigade, division, and corps support areas; support sites at lower levels cannot provide the quantities of
decontamination resources (such as water, decontaminants, and time) required for such an extensive
process. In some cases, a contaminated unit can conduct a thorough decontamination operation with
organic assets, but armor units usually must depend on support from a chemical unit.
E-84. Thorough decontamination does the most complete job of getting rid of contamination and related
hazards, but as noted, it requires large quantities of valuable resources that may not be immediately
available. In addition, under a variety of tactical or operational conditions, it will be impossible to execute
such a major effort. The next best solution is to decontaminate only to the extent necessary to sustain the
force and allow it to continue the mission. This entails using a combination of immediate and operational
decontamination procedures.

SECTION IV – MOVEMENT IN A CBRN ENVIRONMENT

E-85. As with other combat elements, one of the basic tactical requirements for the tank platoon is to be
able to move through and operate in a contaminated area. To do so safely, the platoon should follow the
procedures outlined in this section.

CROSSING A CHEMICALLY OR BIOLOGICALLY CONTAMINATED

AREA
E-86. Upon identifying a contaminated area, each tank crew makes preparations to cross. While one
section provides security, the other section, positioned in a covered and concealed location, removes all
externally stowed equipment. Crews mount and test M8A1/M22 alarms and M9 paper. They adopt MOPP
level 4 and prepare the vehicle’s overpressure system (if it is available and METT-TC factors permit).
Once the section’s preparations are complete, it moves into an overwatch position; the other section moves
to a covered and concealed position and follows the same procedures.
E-87. When both sections have been prepared, they use standard tactical movement techniques (such as
bounding overwatch) to cross the contaminated area. During this movement, the crews continuously
monitor the M8A1/M22 and the M9 paper.
E-88. Drivers and TCs take precautions to avoid low ground, overhanging branches, and brushy areas as
much as possible. While the platoon is in the contaminated area, all personnel observe each other for signs
of chemical poisoning.
E-89. Once the platoon has successfully crossed the contaminated area, it makes a temporary halt. During
the halt, detection teams monitor for the presence of chemical agents. Each crew in turn executes
operational decontamination of its vehicle and, with higher headquarters’ approval, initiates unmasking
procedures. Once these procedures are complete, the platoon continues its mission.

E-16 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

CROSSING A RADIOLOGICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA

E-90. The procedures involved in crossing a radiologically contaminated area are similar to those for a
chemically or biologically contaminated area, with the following additional considerations:
• Vehicle preparation. Crews may store external equipment in the turret or cover it with a tarp.
This prevents contaminated dust particles from accumulating on the equipment. Place wet
sandbags or other materials on the turret floor to increase the amount of radiation shielding.
When available, turn on the turret overpressurization system to protect the crew compartment
from contaminated dust.
• Movement. Vehicles should limit their speed to minimize dust. In addition, they must maintain
the correct dust interval.
• Monitoring. Ensure IM-93/UDR-13 and VDR-2 dosimeters are zeroed (if not zeroed, follow
instructions that are included with the equipment to zero). Conduct continuous monitoring and
report the results of dosimeter and radiacmeter surveys to higher headquarters and adjacent
units.
• Decontamination. During decontamination, each crewman should cover his nose and mouth
with a handkerchief or cloth to avoid breathing contaminated dust particles.

SECTION V – SMOKE OPERATIONS

E-91. One of the key features of the modern battlefield is the extensive use of smoke. Effectively
employed, smoke is a combat multiplier. It can be used for identification, signaling, obscuration,
deception, or screening. At the same time, employment of smoke must be carefully planned and
coordinated to prevent interference with friendly units.
E-92. As it prepares for an operation, the tank platoon should plan to take advantage of smoke from all
available sources. Mission accomplishment, however, should never depend on smoke for success; the
platoon must develop alternative plans in case smoke delivery systems are not available.

USES OF SMOKE
E-93. Smoke has four general uses on the battlefield, as described in the following discussion.

IDENTIFICATION AND SIGNALING

E-94. Smoke is used to identify (mark) targets, supply and evacuation points, and friendly positions during
CAS operations. As a means of prearranged battlefield communications, it can be employed to initiate
such operations as displacement.

OBSCURATION
E-95. Smoke can be fired on enemy positions to degrade the vision of gunners and known or suspected
OPs, preventing them from seeing or tracking targets and thereby reducing their effectiveness. Employed
against an attacking force, nonthermal smoke (white phospherous) can cause confusion and disorientation
by degrading the enemy’s command and control capabilities; at the same time, friendly units retain the
ability to engage the enemy using thermal sights and from your sketch card. In addition, enemy vehicles
become silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. If smoke employment is planned and executed
correctly, this will occur as the enemy reaches the trigger line. (Figure E-6 illustrates this use of smoke.)

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-17

Appendix E

Figure E-6. Using smoke to confuse the enemy and silhouette his vehicles

DECEPTION
E-96. Smoke can mislead the enemy regarding friendly intentions. For example, it can be employed on
several avenues of approach at once to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the main attack. In the
defense, smoke may be fired at a remote location for the sole purpose of attracting attention and confusing
the enemy.

SCREENING
E-97. Smoke is used in friendly areas of operation or in areas between friendly and enemy forces to
degrade enemy ground and aerial observation and to defeat or degrade enemy acquisition systems.
Screening smoke helps to conceal the platoon as it displaces from a BP or as it conducts tactical movement
approaching enemy positions. Smoke can also be employed to conceal a platoon as it conducts a bypass,
breach, or assault mission. Figures E-7 through E-9 illustrate uses of screening smoke.

E-18 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

Figure E-7. Using screening smoke to conceal displacement

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-19

Appendix E

Figure E-8. Using screening smoke to conceal a bypass

E-20 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

Figure E-9. Using screening smoke to conceal a breaching operation

SOURCES OF SMOKE
E-98. There are a number of sources of smoke on the battlefield, including the residual effects of burning
vehicles, equipment, and storage facilities. Depending on availability, the tank platoon can employ the
following smoke delivery systems during tactical operations.

MORTARS
E-99. Mortar support, provided by the CAB mortar platoon or cavalry troop mortar section, is the most
rapid and responsive means of indirect smoke delivery. The tank platoon leader coordinates the planning
and execution of mortar smoke missions with the commander and the company or troop FIST. Mortars use
WP rounds, which can degrade the effectiveness of thermal sights and can also produce casualties to
friendly troops. Refer to FM 3-11.11 (FM 3-11).

FIELD ARTILLERY
E-100. FA can place smoke on distant targets. Artillery-delivered smoke is not as responsive as mortar
smoke support and may not be available if it is not planned and coordinated well in advance. Artillery
smoke is made up of hexachloroethane (HC) and has less effect on thermal sights than does WP smoke.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-21

Appendix E

SMOKE POTS
E-101. These produce a large volume of white or grayish-white smoke that lasts for extended periods.
The smoke has minimal effect on thermal sights. This is the only system that floats on water and that can
be delivered by hand or vehicle. The tank platoon will normally employ smoke pots to screen
displacement or breaching operations.

HAND-HELD SMOKE GRENADES

E-102. These can produce white or colored smoke. White smoke grenades are most often used to screen
individual vehicles. Colored smoke grenades are primarily used to signal displacement and other critical
events or to identify (mark) friendly unit positions and breach and evacuation locations. Smoke from
hand-held grenades has minimal effect on thermal sights.

VEHICLE SMOKE GRENADE LAUNCHERS

E-103. Grenade launchers, which can produce a limited amount of smoke, are used as a self-defense
measure to screen or conceal the vehicle from enemy antitank gunners. They can also be used to screen
individual vehicle displacement. Smoke from vehicle-launched grenades can degrade thermal sights.

VEHICLE ENGINE EXHAUST SMOKE SYSTEM

E-104. The VEESS injects diesel fuel into the engine exhaust to produce smoke. It serves primarily as a
self-defense measure for individual vehicles, but a tank crew can also employ it to screen other friendly
vehicles if wind conditions and the direction of vehicle movement allow. This system consumes fuel at the
rate of 1 gallon per minute of operation.

CAUTION
VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use
of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire
hazard.

TACTICAL SMOKE GENERATORS

E-105. These wheel- or track-mounted devices are available through the division chemical company.
Their use is prescribed at brigade or battalion level. This type of smoke normally does not affect thermal
sights.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SMOKE OPERATIONS

WEATHER
E-106. The effectiveness of smoke in tactical situations (including the time required to build the cloud and
cloud duration) depends in large measure on the weather. Wind direction, wind speed, humidity, and cloud
cover are important considerations. If the wind is strong or blowing in the wrong direction, it may be
impossible to establish an effective smoke screen. Smoke clouds build up faster and last longer the higher
the humidity and the greater the cloud cover (refer to FM 3-50). The best time to use smoke is when the
ground is cooler than the air.

FACTORS IN SELECTING THE TYPE OF SMOKE EMPLOYED

E-107. Certain types of smoke will degrade visual, infrared, and thermal sights. Enemy capabilities and
the desired effect of the smoke (such as screening or obscuration) will dictate what type is requested.

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 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations

Note. Even types of smoke that do not affect thermal sights may prevent the tank’s laser range
finder from computing an accurate ballistic solution. Under such conditions, crewmen must rely
on such techniques as range bands, range estimation, and battlesighting.

NAVIGATION
E-108. Navigational aids such as POSNAV, GPS, and thermal sights assist individual vehicles during
movement through smoke, while FBCB2 and other digital systems help the platoon leader to maintain
situational understanding and control of the platoon. The platoon leader also decreases the interval
between vehicles to further enhance control of the platoon.

MANEUVER

Offense
E-109. A defending enemy may employ smoke to confuse and disorient the attacker. Whenever the
platoon is traveling through smoke, whether it is of friendly or enemy origin, the platoon leader must
remember that his tanks will be silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. The critical consideration is
for all vehicles to emerge at the same time. The navigational tools discussed previously enable the platoon
leader to maintain command and control during movement and to ensure that the platoon is postured, as it
exits the smoke, to mass fires against previously unidentified enemy vehicles.
E-110. During an assault, friendly smoke should be shifted in advance of the arrival of the assault
element. The use of multispectral smoke for obscuration must be carefully planned. The duration of the
effects of the smoke should be controlled based on the capability of enemy and friendly units to acquire
and engage targets through the smoke and on the ability of friendly units to maintain situational
understanding during movement.

Defense
E-111. An attacking enemy may employ smoke on the tank platoon’s positions or in the platoon’s
engagement area. As noted, this may not only “blind” thermal sights but also prevent laser range finders
from accurately computing ballistic data. One solution is to occupy alternate BPs that conform to the
commander’s intent but that are not obscured by smoke (see Figure E-10).

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 E-23

Appendix E

Figure E-10. Tank platoon occupying an alternate battle position that is not obscured by
enemy smoke

E-112. If multispectral smoke does not disable thermal sights, the TC can use sector sketches with grid
lines, range bands, and TRPs to estimate the target range in the absence of a laser-computed range. On the
M1A2, the choke sight of the CITV enables the TC to estimate and input ranges for a ballistic solution.

E-24 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Appendix F
Combat Identification

Fratricide and collateral damage adversely affect combat operations. In addition to

the loss of life and materiel, fratricide can have a devastating effect on operational
effectiveness and morale. The advent of continuous operations of highly mobile
forces, extended range of operations, and weapon systems of greatly increased range,
lethality, and autonomy exacerbates the challenge of combat identification. Based on
empirical data from Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the
Combat Readiness Center, as well as Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
fratricide remains a significant issue.

Identification of unknown entities, such as friendly, enemy, or neutral/noncombatant,

is increasingly important as weapon system ranges extend beyond visual recognition
in the fog of war and the prospect of commonality of friendly and enemy systems
increases.

It is highly unlikely that US Army forces will operate independent of other US

ground, air or naval forces in future combat operations. Combat operations within
Joint Task Force structures will invariably place with US Army units in close
proximity to other US and multinational units with potentially dissimilar equipment
and uniforms. Effective combat identification measures and TTPs will be even more
important within this context.

CID MEASURES
F-1. Combat identification measures must be established early in all operational orders and planning
cycles to ensure subordinates fully understand and have opportunity to implement all established measures
prior to combat operations.
F-2. Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE and not interfere unduly with unit and
individual rights and responsibilities to engage adversary forces.
F-3. There is no perfect combat identification system, but by analyzing combat identification
requirements from planning to execution, friendly forces can be more effective in combat and reduce the
potential for fratricide and undesired collateral damage. Soldiers make the engage/don’t engage decision at
the point of engagement and must be fully proficient in all aspects of CID. This includes situational
awareness and TI systems and understanding of doctrine, TTPs, and ROE. Figure F-1 depicts the complete
combat identification system. Noncooperative TI does not always work at optimum ranges due to climatic
conditions and equipment status. Noncoperative TI systems require no response, equally support friendly,
enemy, and neutral ID, and include optics. Cooperative TI (CTI) only identifies friendly entities that have
an operational CTI device; it does not identify enemy or neutral entities. Cooperative systems also directly
address fratricide avoidance and expedite force sorting for improved combat effectiveness. Other
limitations pertain to how many entities are equipped with a blue force tracker (BFT) or similar device.
BFT does not automatically report enemy or neutral entities. Accuracy of SA systems and latency is
another limitation.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 F-1

Appendix F

DEFINITIONS
F-4. Combat identification is “the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in
the joint battlefield to the extent that high confidence, timely application of military options, and weapons
resources can occur.”
F-5. Target identification is “the accurate and timely characterization of a detected object on the
battlefield as friend, neutral, or enemy. This aspect of combat identification is time sensitive and directly
supports a combatant’s shoot or don’t-shoot decision for detected objects on the battlefield.” TI is shooter-
focused for “shoot/don’t shoot” decisions with friendly identification systems like the joint combat
identification marking system (JCIMS) that requires no response from either platform observed.

Figure F-1. Combat identification system

F-6. Situational awareness is a “...general knowledge of the dynamic, operational, and tactical situation
and the events occurring on the battlefield...” within their area of operations.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
F-7. Tank and infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of the safety considerations involved in
light/heavy operations. Leader awareness and involvement is particularly important if the infantry unit has
had little training with armored vehicles. All personnel in both the light and heavy units must be aware of
these considerations to prevent unnecessary casualties.
F-8. Tank crewmen are often unable to see dismounted infantry soldiers operating close to their vehicle.
This limitation is worse during limited visibility and when the hatches are closed. In these conditions, the
crew is focused on the enemy or on potential enemy locations rather than any nearby infantrymen. The use
of JCIMS CID marking systems like the dismounted soldier combat identification marking system
(DCIMS) and Phoenix IR lights can help identify and illuminate other friendly vehicles and dismounted
infantrymen at night. Employment of JCIMS will assist TCs/gunners and allow the driver to assist in
positive identification.
F-9. JCIMS is used to reduce the risk of fratricide. JCIMS devices include combat identification panels
(CIP), thermal identification panels (TIP), DCIMS, Phoenix IR lights, and IR tape. JCIMS marking
devices are used in conjunction with forward looking infrared (FLIR) optics and image intensification

F-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Combat Identification

devices (such as night-vision goggles [NVG]) to assist in identifying friendly vehicles and soldiers at the
point of engagement. The markings must be installed, turned on, and visible on friendly vehicles and
dismounted soldiers to be effective and operational status in accordance with the unit TACSOP and
specifics contained in the OPORD must be included in precombat inspection procedures.

Figure F-2. Joint CID marking system (JCIMS)

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 Appendix G
Risk Management

Risk is the chance of injury or death for individuals and damage to or loss of vehicles
and equipment. Risks, and/or the potential for risks, are always present in every
combat and training situation the tank platoon faces. Risk management must take
place at all levels of the chain of command during each phase of every operation; it is
an integral part of all tactical planning. The tank platoon leader, his NCOs, and all
other platoon soldiers must know how to use risk management, coupled with
fratricide reduction measures, to ensure that the mission is executed in the safest
possible environment within mission constraints.

The primary objective of risk management is to help units protect their combat power
through accident prevention, enabling them to win the battle quickly and decisively,
with minimum losses. This appendix outlines the process that leaders can use to
identify hazards and implement a plan to address each identified hazard. It also
includes a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of the platoon’s leaders and
individual soldiers in implementing a sound risk management program. For
additional information on risk management, refer to FM 3-100.14 (FM 100-14).

SECTION I – RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

G-1. This section outlines the five steps of risk management. Leaders of the tank platoon must always
remember that the effectiveness of the process depends on situational understanding. They should never
approach risk management with “one size fits all” solutions to the hazards the platoon will face. Rather, in
performing the steps, they must keep in mind the essential tactical and operational factors that make each
situation unique.
G-2. There are two types of hazards: tactical and accident. Tactical hazards deal with hazards imposed
upon us by the enemy (such as ATGM positions or untemplated enemy positions on our flanks). Accident
hazards are those hazards imposed upon us due to terrain, weather, or mission requirements (such as
traveling an unimproved road at night in a snow storm).

STEP 1 – IDENTIFY HAZARDS

G-3. A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential condition that could entail injury,
illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment and property; or some other sort of mission
degradation. Tactical and training operations pose many types of hazards.
G-4. The tank platoon leader must identify the hazards associated with all aspects and phases of the
platoon’s mission, paying particular attention to the factors of METT-TC. Risk management must never be
an afterthought; leaders must begin the process during their troop-leading procedures and continue it
throughout the operation.
G-5. The following lists possible sources of risk that the tank platoon might face during a typical tactical
operation. The list is organized according to the factors of METT-TC.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 G-1

Appendix G

SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK

MISSION
• Duration of the operation.
• Complexity/clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well developed and easily
understood?)
• Proximity and number of maneuvering units.
ENEMY
• Knowledge of the enemy situation.
• Enemy capabilities.
• Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
• Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, and smoke.
• Precipitation and its effect on mobility.
• Extreme heat or cold.
• Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, and water obstacles).
TROOPS
• Equipment status.
• Experience the units conducting the operation have working together.
• Danger areas associated with the platoon’s weapon systems.
• Soldier/leader proficiency.
• Soldier/leader rest situation.
• Degree of acclimatization to environment.
• Impact of new leaders and/or crew members.
TIME AVAILABLE
• Time available for troop-leading procedures and rehearsals by subordinates.
• Time available for PCCs/PCIs.
CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS
• Applicable ROE and/or ROI.
• Potential stability and/or support operations involving contact with civilians (such
as NEOs, refugee or disaster assistance, or counterterrorism).
• Potential for media contact/inquiries.

STEP 2 – ASSESS HAZARD TO DETERMINE RISKS

G-6. Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct impact of each hazard on an operation (in
the form of hazardous incidents). Use the following steps:
• Determine which hazards can be eliminated or avoided.
• Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated or avoided to determine the probability that the
hazard can occur.
• Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated or avoided. Severity, defined as the
result or outcome of a hazardous incident, is expressed by the degree of injury or illness
(including death), loss of or damage to equipment or property, environmental damage, or other
mission-impairing factors (such as unfavorable publicity or loss of combat power).

G-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Risk Management

• Taking into account both the probability and severity of a hazard, determine the associated risk
level (extremely high, high, moderate, and low). Figure G-1 summarizes the four risk levels.
• Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability, severity, and risk level, as well as the
operational factors unique to the situation), complete the composite risk management worksheet.
Refer to Table G-1 for an outline of the risk assessment matrix used to determine the level of
risk. Figure G-2A and B show an example of a composite risk management worksheet (pages 1
and 2). Refer to Table G-2 for instructions on completing the worksheet. (Note. DA Form
7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, can be found on the AKO website, Self-Help,
DA Pubs and Forms.)

LEVELS OF RISK
EXTREMELY HIGH
• Someone will die or suffer permanent disability.
HIGH
• More often than not, someone will suffer an injury that requires less than 3
months to heal.
MODERATE
• More often than not, someone will require first aid or minor medical treatment.
LOW (WORST CASE)
• Someone is likely to need first aid or minor medical treatment.

Figure G-1. Risk levels and impact on mission execution

Table G-1. Risk assessment matrix

Probability
Severity Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely
Catastrophic E E H H M
Critical E H H M L
Marginal H M M L L
Negligible M L L L L
E – Extremely High Risk
H – High Risk
M – Moderate Risk
L – Low Risk

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 G-3

Appendix G

Figure G-2A. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 1 of 2 pages

G-4 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Risk Management

Figure G-2B. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 2 of 2 pages

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 G-5

Appendix G

Table G-2. Instructions for completing DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management
Worksheet
Item Instruction
1 through 4 Self explanatory.
5 Subtask relating to the mission or task in block 1.
6 Hazards — Identify hazards by reviewing METT-TC factors for the mission or task.
Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment,
equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations.
7 Initial Risk Level — Includes historical lessons learned; intuitive analyses,
experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings; and environmental
considerations. Determine initial risk for each hazard by applying the risk
assessment matrix (Table G-1). Enter the risk level for each hazard.
8 Controls — Develop one or more controls for each hazard that will either eliminate
the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident.
Specify who, what, where, why, when, and how for each control. Enter controls.
9 Residual Risk Level — Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the
risk assessment matrix (Table G-1). Enter the residual risk level for each hazard.
10 How to Implement — Decide how each control will be put into effect or
communicated to the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal
instruction; tactical, safety, garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls.
11 How to Supervise (Who) — Plan how each control will be monitored for
implementation (continuous supervision, spot-checks) and reassess hazards as the
situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if they can be improved.
Pass on lessons learned.
12 Was Control Effective — Indicate “Yes” or “No.” Review during AAR.
13 Overall Risk Level — Select the highest residual risk level and circle it. This
becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides whether
the controls are sufficient to accept the level of residual risk. If the risk is too great
to continue the mission or task, the commander directs development of additional
control or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA.
14 Risk Decision Authority — Signed by the appropriate level of command.

STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS

DEVELOPING CONTROLS
G-7. After assessing each hazard, develop one or more controls that will either eliminate the hazard or
reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of potential hazardous incidents. When developing controls,
consider the reason for the hazard, not just the hazard by itself.

MAKING RISK DECISIONS

G-8. A key element in the process of making a risk decision is determining whether accepting the risk is
justified or, conversely, is unnecessary. The decision-maker (the tank platoon leader, if applicable) must
compare and balance the risk against mission expectations. He alone decides if the controls are sufficient
and acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If he determines the risk is unnecessary,
he directs the development of additional controls or alternative controls; as another option, he can modify,
change, or reject the selected COA for the operation.

G-6 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Risk Management

STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

G-9. Controls are the procedures and considerations the unit uses to eliminate hazards or reduce their risk.
Implementing controls is the most important part of the risk management process; this is the chain of
command’s contribution to the safety of the unit. Implementing controls includes coordination and
communication with appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and with individuals executing
the mission. The tank platoon leader must ensure that specific controls are integrated into operational plans
(OPLAN), OPORDs, SOPs, and rehearsals. The critical check for this step is to ensure that controls are
converted into clear, simple execution orders understood by all levels.
G-10. If the leaders have conducted a thoughtful risk assessment, the controls will be easy to implement,
enforce, and follow. Examples of risk management controls include the following:
• Thoroughly brief all aspects of the mission, including related hazards and controls.
• Conduct thorough PCCs and PCIs.
• Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels.
• Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as possible (at least 4 hours in any 24
hour period).
• Use buddy teams.
• Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety.
• Establish recognizable visual signals and markers to distinguish maneuvering units.
• Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and on dangerous terrain.
• Establish marked and protected sleeping areas in assembly areas.
• Limit single-vehicle movement.
• Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel.

STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

G-11. During mission execution, it is imperative for leaders to ensure that risk management controls are
properly understood and executed. Leaders must continuously evaluate the unit’s effectiveness in
managing risks to gain insight into areas that need improvement.

SUPERVISION
G-12. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that effective risk management controls are
implemented. All leaders are responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure
standards and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce established safety policies as well
as controls developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques include spot checks, inspections,
SITREPs, confirmation briefs, buddy checks, and close supervision.
G-13. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk management controls, both to
determine whether they are effective and to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate,
identify, and assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger issues are addressed on the spot and
that ongoing planning and execution reflect changes in hazard conditions.

EVALUATION
G-14. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also include an after-action review (AAR)
to assess unit performance in identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should then
incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and plans for future missions.

SECTION II – IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES

G-15. Leaders and individuals at all levels are responsible and accountable for managing risk. They must
ensure that hazards and associated risks are identified and controlled during planning, preparation, and
execution of operations. The tank platoon leader and his senior NCOs must look at both tactical risks and

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 G-7

Appendix G

accident risks. The same risk management process is used to manage both types. The platoon leader alone
determines how and where he is willing to take tactical risks. With the assistance of his PSG, NCOs, and
individual soldiers, the platoon leader manages accident risks.
G-16. Sometimes, despite the need to advise higher headquarters of a risk taken or about to be assumed, the
risk management process may break down. Such a failure can be the result of several factors; most often, it
can be attributed to the following:
• The risk denial syndrome in which leaders do not want to know about the risk.
• A soldier who believes that the risk decision is part of his job and does not want to bother his
platoon leader or section leader.
• Outright failure to recognize a hazard or the level of risk involved.
• Overconfidence on the part of an individual or the unit in the capability to avoid or recover from
a hazardous incident.
• Subordinates not fully understanding the higher commander’s guidance regarding risk decisions.
G-17. The tank platoon leader gives the platoon direction, sets priorities, and establishes the command
climate (values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power requires him to embed
risk management into individual behavior. To fulfill this commitment, the platoon leader must exercise
creative leadership, innovative planning, and careful management. Most important, he must demonstrate
support for the risk management process. The tank platoon leader and others in the platoon chain of
command can establish a command climate favorable to risk management integration by taking the
following actions:
• Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management behavior through leading by example
and by stressing active participation throughout the risk management process.
• Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every leader is responsible for obtaining the
assets necessary to mitigate risk and for providing them to subordinate leaders.
• Understand their own and their soldier’s limitations, as well as their unit’s capabilities.
• Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them.
• Prevent a “zero defects” mindset from creeping into the platoon’s culture.
• Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of their trade and their ability to execute a
chosen COA.
• Keep subordinates informed.
• Listen to subordinates.
G-18. For the platoon leader, his subordinate leaders, and individual soldiers alike, responsibilities in
managing risk include the following:
• Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly communicate risk decision criteria and
guidance.
• Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals.
• Train the risk management process. Ensure that subordinates understand the “who,” “what,”
“when,” “where,” and “why” of managing risk and how these factors apply to their situation and
assigned responsibilities.
• Accurately evaluate the platoon’s effectiveness, as well as subordinates’ execution of risk
controls during the mission.
• Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed established limits.

G-8 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Appendix H
Fratricide Prevention

Fratricide is defined as the employment of friendly weapons that results in the

unforeseen and unintentional death or injury of friendly personnel or damage to
friendly equipment. Fratricide prevention is the commander’s responsibility. He is
assisted by all leaders across all operating systems in accomplishing this mission.

This appendix focuses on actions the tank platoon leader and his subordinate leaders
can take with current resources to reduce the risk of fratricide.

Special Note. Prior to all missions, commanders must ensure that their units conduct
detailed planning and rehearsals emphasizing fratricide prevention.

In any tactical situation, situational understanding on the part of all crewmen,

particularly the platoon leader, is critical not only to mission success but also to
survival. It is critical that leaders know where other friendly elements are operating.
With this knowledge, they must anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps to
either avoid or mitigate them. With the new technology becoming more common at
all levels the ability to maintain situational understanding is better enhanced, but the
platoon leader cannot solely depend on this and must have an understanding of how
the different units are moving. The platoon leader must always be vigilant of
changes and developments in the situation that may place his elements in danger.
When he perceives a potential fratricide situation, he must personally use the higher
net to coordinate directly with the friendly element involved.

SECTION I – THE ROLE OF TRAINING

H-1. The underlying principle of fratricide prevention is simple: Leaders who know where their soldiers
are and where they want them to fire, can keep those soldiers alive to kill the enemy. At the same time,
leaders must avoid, at all costs, any reluctance to employ, integrate, and synchronize all required operating
systems at the critical time and place. They must avoid becoming tentative out of fear of fratricide; rather,
they must strive to eliminate fratricide risk through tough, realistic, combined arms training in which each
soldier and unit achieves the established standard.
H-2. Training allows units and soldiers to make mistakes, with the goal of reducing or eliminating the risk
of errors occurring in combat. A key role of the tank platoon training program is to teach crews which
targets to engage and when to engage them. Just as important, crews must learn and practice restraint in
what and when to engage; for example, every TC must know that he must confirm the target as hostile
before issuing and executing any fire command.
H-3. Eliminating the risk of fratricide is no less critical as a training standard than are other mission
requirements. All leaders must know all aspects of the applicable training standard, including fratricide
prevention, and then make sure their soldiers train to that standard.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 H-1

Appendix H

SECTION II – EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE

H-4. Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it almost always
affects the unit’s ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:
• Loss of confidence in the unit’s leadership.
• Increasing self-doubt among leaders.
• Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.
• Over-supervision of units.
• Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.
• Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver (fire and movement).
• Loss of initiative.
• Disrupted operations.
• General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.

SECTION III – CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE

H-5. The following paragraphs discuss the primary causes of fratricide. Leaders must identify any of the
factors that may affect their units and then strive to eliminate or correct them.

FAILURES IN THE DIRECT-FIRE CONTROL PLAN

H-6. These occur when units do not develop effective fire control plans, particularly in the offense. Units
may fail to designate target engagement areas or adhere to target priorities, or they may position their
weapons incorrectly. Under such conditions, fire discipline often breaks down upon contact.
H-7. The tank platoon can use a number of techniques and procedures to help prevent such incidents. An
example is “staking in” vehicle and individual positions in the defense, using pickets to indicate the left
and right limits of each position. An area of particular concern is the additional planning that must go into
operations, requiring close coordination between the platoon and infantry squads. For example, because of
the danger posed by discarding petals, sabot rounds should be fired over friendly infantry elements only in
extreme emergencies or when the friendly infantry elements are under adequate cover.

LAND NAVIGATION FAILURES

H-8. Units often stray out of assigned sectors, report wrong locations, and become disoriented. Much less
frequently, they employ fire support weapons from the wrong locations. In either type of situation, units
that unexpectedly encounter an errant unit may fire their weapons at the friendly force.

FAILURES IN COMBAT IDENTIFICATION

H-9. TCs and gunners cannot accurately identify thermal or optical signatures near the maximum range of
their systems. In limited visibility, units within that range may mistake one another for the enemy.

INADEQUATE CONTROL MEASURES

H-10. Units may fail to disseminate the minimum necessary maneuver fire control measures and fire
support coordination measures; they may also fail to tie control measures to recognizable terrain or events.
As the battle develops, the plan then cannot address obvious branches and sequels as they occur. When
this happens, synchronization fails.

FAILURES IN REPORTING AND COMMUNICATIONS

H-11. Units at all levels may fail to generate timely, accurate, and complete reports as locations and tactical
situations change. This distorts the tactical “picture” available at each level and can lead to erroneous
clearance of supporting fires.

H-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Fratricide Prevention

WEAPONS ERRORS
H-12. Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These incidents include charge errors,
accidental discharges, mistakes with explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.

BATTLEFIELD HAZARDS
H-13. A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on the battlefield: unexploded
ordnance; unmarked or unrecorded minefields, including scatterable mines; booby traps. Failure to mark,
record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to casualties.

SECTION IV – FRATRICIDE PREVENTION PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

Special Note. In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive target
identification. To prevent fratricide incidents, commanders and leaders at all levels must ensure
positive target identification before they issue commands to fire. In addition, all units must
accurately report their locations during combat operations, and all TOCs and CPs must carefully
track the location of all subordinate elements in relation to all friendly forces.

H-14. The measures outlined in this section, including those listed in the special note above, provide the
platoon with a guide to actions it can take to reduce and/or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not
directive in nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative by the tank platoon’s leaders and crewmen.
Rather, commanders and leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation
and METT-TC factors.

PRINCIPLES OF FRATRICIDE PREVENTION

H-15. At the heart of fratricide reduction and prevention are the five key principles covered in the
following discussion.

IDENTIFY AND ASSESS POTENTIAL FRATRICIDE RISKS

H-16. Identify risks and conduct a risk assessment while developing the estimate of the situation. Explain
these risks thoroughly in the OPORD and/or applicable FRAGOs.

MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

H-17. Focus on such areas as current intelligence; unit locations/dispositions; denial areas (minefields/
scatterable mines); contaminated areas, such as ICM and CBRN; SITREPs; and METT-TC factors.

ENSURE POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION

H-18. Review vehicle and weapons ID cards. Become familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly
and enemy vehicles, including their silhouettes and thermal signatures. Know at what ranges and under
what conditions positive identification of various vehicles and weapons is possible. (Note. Refer to the
special note at the start of this section.)

MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE FIRE CONTROL

H-19. Ensure that fire commands are accurate, concise, and clearly stated. Make it mandatory for crewmen
to ask for clarification of any portion of the fire command that they do not completely understand. Stress
the importance of the chain of command in the fire control process; ensure that crewmen get in the habit of
obtaining target confirmation and permission to fire from their leaders before engaging targets they assume
are enemy elements.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 H-3

Appendix H

ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE COMMAND CLIMATE

H-20. Enforce fratricide prevention measures at all times, placing special emphasis on the use of doctrine.
Ensure that leaders maintain constant supervision in the execution of orders and in the performance of all
tasks and missions to standard.

FRATRICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES

H-21. Commanders, leaders, and crewmen should adhere to the following guidelines, considerations, and
procedures in ensuring fratricide reduction and prevention:
• Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit cohesion by taking quick, effective
action to alleviate stress.
• Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training covering fratricide awareness, target
identification and recognition, and fire discipline.
• Develop a simple, decisive plan.
• Give complete and concise mission orders.
• To simplify mission orders, use SOPs that are consistent with doctrine. Periodically review and
update SOPs as needed.
• Strive to provide maximum planning time for leaders and subordinates.
• Use common language/vocabulary and doctrinally correct standard terminology and control
measures, such as fire support coordination line (FSCL), zone of engagement, and RFL.
• Ensure that thorough coordination is conducted at all levels.
• Plan for and establish effective communications.
• Plan for collocation of CPs whenever it is appropriate to the mission, such as during a passage
of lines.
• Designate and employ liaison officers (LO) as appropriate.
• Make sure ROE and ROI are clear.
• Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows the platoon adequate time to do so.
• Be in the right place at the right time. Use position location/navigation devices (GPS and
POSNAV); know your location and the locations of adjacent units (left, right, leading, and
follow-on); and synchronize tactical movement. If the platoon or any element becomes lost or
disoriented, leaders must know how to contact higher headquarters immediately for instructions
and assistance.
• Include a discussion of fratricide incidents in all AARs.

SECTION V – STOPPING A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

H-22. This section covers actions that leaders and crewmen must be prepared to take when they encounter
a friendly fire incident. The tank platoon may become involved in such a situation in one of several ways:
• As the victim of the fire.
• As the firing element.
• As an observer intervening in an attack of one friendly element on another.

ACTIONS AS THE VICTIM OF FRIENDLY FIRE

H-23. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the platoon, section, or
individual tank falls victim to friendly fires:
• React to contact until you recognize friendly fire.
• Cease fire.
• Take immediate actions to protect soldiers and vehicles.
• Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to cease fire.

H-4 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Fratricide Prevention

• Report the following on the next higher unit net:

• Announce that the unit or vehicle is receiving friendly fire.
• Request medical assistance as needed.
• Give the location and direction of the firing vehicles.
• Warn the higher unit not to return fire if the firing unit is positively identified as friendly.

ACTIONS AS THE FIRING ELEMENT

H-24. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level when the platoon, section, or
individual vehicle has engaged friendly forces:
• Cease fire.
• Report the following on the next higher net:
• Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is unidentified, report the number
and types of vehicles).
• The location of the incident.
• Direction and distance to the engaged force.
• The type of fire.
• The target effects.

ACTIONS AS AN OBSERVER OF FRIENDLY FIRE

H-25. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the platoon, section, or
individual vehicle observes a friendly fire incident:
• Seek cover and protect all crewmen and vehicles.
• Use a visual recognition signal to direct the firing unit to cease fire.
• Report the following on the next higher net:
• Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is unidentified, report number and
types of vehicles).
• The location of the incident.
• Direction and distance to the victim and the firing unit.
• The type of fire.
• The target effects.
• Provide assistance as needed (when safe to do so).

LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
H-26. In all situations involving the risk of fratricide and friendly fire, leaders must be prepared to take
immediate actions to prevent casualties as well as equipment damage or destruction. Recommended
actions in fratricide situations include the following:
• Identify the incident and order the parties involved to cease fire.
• Conduct an in-stride risk assessment.
• Identify and implement controls to prevent the incident from recurring.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 H-5

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 Appendix I
Battle Damaged Tank

If the tank sustains a hit making it impossible to move and remaining in the tank will
jeopardize the safety of the crew, the TC should consider abandoning the tank. The
procedures in Table I-1 are used to abandon and disable a crippled tank.

Note. The crew cannot totally destroy all parts of a tank; therefore, the chain of command must
make every effort to recover the disabled tank. The following procedures are just a guideline to
ensure all sensitive items are properly accounted for and or destroyed. Crews may deviate from
these procedures if the tactical situation allows. For example, the crew may want to keep the
loader’s machine gun and ammunition. METT-TC will dictate the actions of the crew in the
event of abandon tank. Also the wingman or platoon should assist in security of the crew as
they perform these tasks.

Table I-1. Abandon tank procedures

TC Gunner Loader Driver
Reports crew status.
Commands “ABANDON Zeros out the radio to Announces “CLEAR” so
TANK⎯ ASSEMBLE remove fill. the TC knows he is clear
RIGHT (LEFT) REAR.” and can traverse the
turret.
Traverses turret to 3 Sets radio to unused
o’clock position. frequency.
Ensures main gun is Opens breech and removes
level. main gun round. Stows
round (leaves ammunition
door open).
Removes caliber .50 Removes coax machine
machine gun back plate gun back plate and places
and places it in breech. it in breech.
Secures protective mask, Secures protective mask, Secures protective mask, Secures protective mask,
individual weapon, individual weapon, rations, individual weapon, M4 rifle, individual weapon,
rations, and automated and all grenades, to include ammunition, rations, and ammunition, and rations.
network control device four thermite grenades. loader’s mittens.
(ANCD).
Places ANCD in breech Passes two thermite Places one thermite grenade Ruptures heater fuel line,
and receives two thermite grenades to TC and two in breech and stands by. turns on heater, and
grenades from gunner. thermite grenades to dismounts tank.
loader. Before exiting
station, removes and gives
EPLRS to TC (if equipped).
Exits through TC’s hatch, Exits through TC’s hatch,
and moves to back deck. secures loader’s machine
gun and two boxes of
ammunition, and dismounts
tank.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 I-1

Appendix I

Table I-1. Abandon tank procedures

TC
Opens right top grille
doors to expose fuel cell.
If equipped, places
EPLRS on top of fuel cell.
Commands “PULL PIN.”
Pulls pin on one thermite
grenade (as loader exits
tank) and places both
grenades on top of fuel
cell.
Dismounts tank and
conducts personnel
accountability.
Gunner
Moves to area announced
by TC and establishes
security watch.
Loader Driver
Moves to area announced
by TC and establishes
security watch.
On command, pulls pin on
remaining thermite grenade,
places it in the breech, and
closes breech.
Exits through loader’s hatch
and dismounts tank.
Moves to location
announced by TC and
provides security watch.

WARNING
Crews should take additional safety measures because of the use of depleted uranium (DU)
if they are―
• In, on, or near (within 50 meters) a vehicle at the time of impact by DU ammunitions
or a DU armored vehicle at the time of impact by munitions.
• Near (within 50 meters) actively burning fires involving DU.
• Routinely entering vehicles with penetrated DU armor or that have been struck by DU
munitions.

Good safety procedures to take in the event of the occurrences listed above are:
• Wear a protective mask as long as it does not degrade your ability to fight or protect
yourself.
• Cover exposed skin; an increase in MOPP is not required.
• Dust off your uniform after you leave the vehicle or area. Observe standard field
hygiene, including washing your hands before eating.

Crews should follow the three basic principles of hazard avoidance, which are:
• Minimize the time near the radioactive source.
• Maximize the distance between crew members and the radioactive source.
• Improve the shielding (use cardboard, tape, and so forth).

TB 9-1300-278, Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling, Storage, and Transportation

Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions or Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium,
currently provides operational guidance for incidents involving DU munitions, armor, and
battlefield damage.

DISABLING TANK PROCEDURES

I-1. If time permits, discharge fixed and portable fire extinguishers prior to disabling the vehicle.
I-2. If thermite grenades are not available to disable the tank, a sledge hammer and other heavy
instruments should be used to destroy sensitive equipment (computer, optical instruments, communication
equipment, and gauges). The main gun firing pin and machine gun back plates should be taken from the

I-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Battle Damaged Tank

tank and destroyed. Pour fuel, engine oil, and other combustible liquid over the TA-50 inside the turret
and ignite it by lighting it or using hand grenades. The crew must download all main gun ammunition to
another vehicle if the situation permits; otherwise, the ammunition must be destroyed.
I-3. If enemy contact or capture is imminent, the TC will destroy the ANCD.

Note. For training purposes, use practice grenades and simulate rupturing heater fuel lines.

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 I-3

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 Glossary

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym/Term Definition

1SG first sergeant

A alternate (position)

A/L administrative/logistical

AAD antiarmor defense

ABCS Army battle command system

ABF attack by fire
ACE armored combat engineer; armored combat earthmover (M9)
ACF aviation close fires
ACM airspace control measure

ACP air control point

ACR armored cavalry regiment

ADA air defense artillery

ADC area damage control

AFATDS advanced field artillery tactical data system

ammo ammunition

ANCD automated network control device

AOR area of responsibility

AP antipersonnel
APC armored personnel carrier
APDS armor-piercing discarding sabot (ammunition)
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program
AS area security
ASAS all-source analysis system
ASIP advanced system improvement program (also known as SIP, system
improvement program)
aslt pos assault position
ASR alternate supply route
ATCCS Army tactical command and control system

ATGM antitank guided missile

atk pos attack position

AVLB armored vehicle launched bridge

AVLM armored vehicle launched MICLIC

AXP ambulance exchange point

BCT brigade combat team

BDA battle damage assessment

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 Glossary-1

Glossary

BFIST Bradley fire support team

BFT blue force tracker

BFV Bradley fighting vehicle

BHL battle handover line

BII basic issue item

BIT built-in test

BMNT beginning of morning nautical twilight

BP battle position

C2 command and control

C2I command, control, and intelligence

CA civil affairs

CAB combined arms battalion

CANA convulsive antidote nerve agent

CAS close air support

CASEVAC casualty evacuation

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CBRNWRS CBRN warning and reporting system

cdr commander

CDU commander’s display unit

CFF call-for-fire

CFV cavalry fighting vehicle

cGy/hr centigray per hour

CI counterinsurgency
CID commander’s integrated display; Criminal Investigative Division (U.S.)
CIF central issue facility
CINC commander in chief

CIP combat identification panel

CITV commander’s independent thermal viewer

CLAMMS cleared lane mechanical marking system

cm centimeter(s)

CO commanding officer

COA course of action

COMSEC communications security

COS center of sector

CP command post

CROWS common remotely operated weapon station

CRT combat repair team

CS combat support

CTCP combat trains command post

CVC combat vehicle crewman

DA Department of the Army

Glossary-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Glossary

DCIMS dismounted soldier combat identification marking system

DD Department of Defense
DED detailed equipment decontamination
DID dirver’s integrated display
DNBI disease and nonbattle injuries

DOA direction of attack

DOD Department of Defense

DPICM dual-purpose improved conventional munitions

DPRE displaced persons, refugee, and evacuee
DS direct support

DS/R direct support/reinforcing

DSO domestic support operations

DTD detailed troop decontamination

DTV driver’s thermal viewer

DU depleted uranium

DVE driver’s vision enhancer

EA engagement area

EAC echelons above corps

EBC embedded battle command

EENT end of evening nautical twilight

EN enemy (graphic overlay abbreviation)

EPLRS enhanced position location reporting system

EPW enemy prisoner of war

FA field artillery

FAC forward air controller

FARP forward arming and refueling point

FBCB2 Force XXI battle command brigade and below

FDC fire direction center

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance

FIST fire support team

FISTV fire support team vehicle

FIT fault isolation test

FLIR forward-looking infrared

FM field manual

FO forward observer

FPF final protective fires

FRAGO fragmentary order
FRS forward repair system
FSC forward support company
FSCM fire support control measure

FSE fire support element

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 Glossary-3

Glossary

GAS gunner’s auxiliary sight

GIRS grid index reference system

GPS global positioning system

GPSE gunner’s primary sight extension

GS general support

HB heavy barrel

HC hexachloroethane

HE high explosive

HEAT high-explosive antitank (ammunition)

HE-OR-T high explosive obstacle-reducing with tracer (ammunition)
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HOIS hostile intelligence service
HQ headquarters
HRP high-risk personnel
IBA interceptor body armor
ICM improved conventional munitions
ID identification

IED improvised explosive device

IFV infantry fighting vehicle

INC Internet controller

INFOSEC information security

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
I/R internment/resettlement (U.S. DOD)
IR infrared; intelligence requirement
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IVIS intervehicular information system

IZLID infrared zoom laser illuminator designator

JAAT joint air attack team

JP joint publication

JVMF joint variable message format

KIA killed in action

km kilometer(s)

KY Kentucky

L&O law and order

LBE load-bearing equipment

lbs pound(s)

LD line of departure

LOA limit of advance

LOGPAC logistics package
LOM line of movement

Glossary-4 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Glossary

LP listening post

LRF laser range finder

LRP logistics resupply point

LRU line replaceable unit

LST laser spot tracker

LT Lieutenant (U.S. Army rank)

LTC Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army rank)
METL mission-essential task list
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain (weather), troops, time available, and civilian
considerations (factors taken into account in situational awareness and in the
mission analysis process)
MGRS military grid reference system
MI military intelligence
MICLIC mine-clearing line charge
MLC military load class
mm millimeter(s)

MMS mast-mounted sight, maneuver and mobility support

MOS military occupational specialty (U.S. Army)

MP Military Police
MPAT multipurpose antitank (ammunition)

MRE meals, ready-to-eat

MRS muzzle reference system

MSR main supply route

MTP mission training plan

MTT military training teams

MTW major theatres of war

MWD military working dog

NAAK nerve agent auto-injector kit

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAV navigation (FBCB2 display push button)

NCO noncommissioned officer

NCS net control station

NEO noncombatant evacuation operations

NG National Guard

NGO nongovernmental organizations

NLT not later than

NOD night observation device

NOE nap of the earth

NVG night-vision goggle

OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and
cover and concealment

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 Glossary-5

Glossary

obj objective

OEG operational exposure guidance

OP observation post

OPCON operational control

OPORD operation order

OPSEC operations security

OR obstacle-reducing (MPAT-OR)

OT observer-target

P primary (position)

Pam pamphlet

PAO public affairs office

PCC precombat inspection

PGM precision guided missile/munition

PH probability of hit

PK probability of kill

PLGR precision lightweight GPS receiver

plt platoon
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
PME peacetime military engagement
PMM preventive medicine measures
PO peace operations
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POSNAV position navigation
PP passage point
PSG platoon sergeant
PSYOP psychological operations

PVO private volunteer organization

PVS passive-vision system

R&S reconnaissance and surveillance

RACO rear area combat operations

RALS right add, left subtract
RDL Reimer Digital Library
REDCON readiness condition
ref pt reference point

RES radiation exposure status

RFL restrictive fire line

ROE rules of engagement

ROI rules of interaction

ROM refuel on the move

RPG rocket-propelled grenade

RTP radiotelephone procedures

Glossary-6 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Glossary

S supplementary (position)

S2 security/intelligence officer (U.S. Army)

S3 operations officer (U.S. Army)

S4 supply officer (U.S. Army)

SALTT size, activity, location, type of resource, and time frame

SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment

SAPI small arms protective inserts

SAW semiautomatic assault weapon

SBF support by fire

SDS (M100) sorbent decontamination system

SDZ surface danger zone

SEP system enhancement package

SFC Sergeant First Class (U.S. Army rank)

SGT Sergeant (U.S. Army rank)

SINCGARS single-channel ground/airborne radio system

SINCGARS SIP SINCGARS with system improvement program and Internet controller
INC
SITREP situation report

SM Soldier’s manual

SOI signal operation instructions

SOP standing operating procedures

SOSRA suppress the enemy; obscure the breach; secure the far side; reduce the
obstacle; and assault through the obstacle
SP start point

SSC smaller-scale contingency

SSG Staff Sergeant (U.S. Army rank)

ST special text

STP Soldier’s training publication

SU situational understanding

TAC CP tactical command post

TACFIRE tactical fire

TACSOP tactical standing operating procedures

TB technical bulletin

TC tank commander

TCF tactical combat force

TEP theater engagement plan

TI tactical Internet

TIP thermal identification panel

TIRS terrain index reference system

TIS thermal imaging system

TNT trinitrotoluene (explosive)

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 Glossary-7

Glossary

TOC tactical operations center

TOT time on target

TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (missile)

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TTT time to target
TV television
U.S. United States (of America)

UAS unmanned aircraft system

UHF ultra high frequency

UMCP unit maintenance collection point

UN United Nations

UO urban operations

USAF United States Air Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosve device

VEESS vehicle engine exhaust smoke system

VHF very high frequency

VIC vehicle internal communications
VSTOL vertical/short takeoff and landing
VT variable time (proximity fuse)
VVS vehicle visualization system
WARNO warning order
WIA wounded in action
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WP white phosphorus

Glossary-8 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 References

These sources were quoted or paraphrased in this publication, are needed in conjunction with this manual,
and/or contain relevant supplemental information. For the latest dates and versions of these references, refer to
DA Pam 25-30 or the Reimer Digital Library (RDL).

SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (ARTEP)

ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Tank Platoon, 15 October 2002

DA PAMPHLET (DA PAM)

DA Pam 750-8, The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS) User Manual, 22 August 2005

FIELD MANUAL (FM)

FM 1-02 (FM 101-5-1), Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004
FM 3-0 (FM 100-5), Operations, 14 June 2001
FM 3-05.40 (FM 41-10), Civil Affairs Operations, 29 September 2006.
FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, 28 February 2002
FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, 20 February 2003
FM 3-11.5, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination, 4 April 2006
FM 3-11.11, Flame, Riot Control, and Herbicide Operations, 19 August 1996 w/Change 1, 10 March
2003
FM 3-19.40 (FM 19-40), Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001
FM 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams), 15 August 2005
FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, 2 December 2002
FM 3-21.71 (FM 7-7J), Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley), 20 August 2002
FM 3-34.2 (FM 90-13-1), Combined-Arms Breaching Operations, 31 August 2000 w/Change 3, 11
October 2002

FM 3-50, Smoke Operations, 4 December 1990 w/Change 1, 11 September 1996

FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1), Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, 9 December 2002

FM 4-25.11, First Aid, 23 December 2002 w/Change 1, 15 July 2004

FM 5-0 (FM 101-5), Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 January 2005

FM 6-22 (FM 22-100), Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile, 12 October 2006

FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, 16 July 1991

FM 7-7, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (APC), 15 March 1985

FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, 6 April 1992

FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, 21 June 2000

FM 21-60, Visual Signals, 30 September 1987

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 8 July 1994

JOINT PUBLICATION (JP)

JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, 17 March 1998

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 References-1

References

SOLDIER’S TRAINING PLAN (STP)

STP 17-19K1-SM, Soldier’s Manual, M1/M1A1/M1A2/M1A2 SEP, Abrams Armor Crewman, MOS
19K, Skill Level 1, 30 July 2004

SPECIAL TEXT (ST)

ST 3-20.153, Tank Platoon SOP, January 2002

TECHNICAL BULLETIN (TB)

TB 9-1300-278, Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling, Storage, and Transportation Accidents
Involving Army Tank Munitions or Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium, 21 July 1996

DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card.
DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet.
DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet.
DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag.

READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information. The source listed in parenthesis is the superceded
manual under the old numbering system.

ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (ARTEP)

ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company, 1 June
2003

FIELD MANUAL (FM)

FM 1-05 (FM 16-1), Religious Support, 18 April 2003
FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations, 2 April 1997
FM 1-114, Air Cavalry Squadron and Troop Operations, 1 February 2000
FM 3-06 (FM 90-10), Urban Operations, 1 June 2003
FM 3-11.3 (FM 3-3), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance, 2
February 2006
FM 3-11.4 (FM 3-4), Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) Protection, 2 June 2003
FM 3-11.19 (FM 3-19), Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Reconnaissance, 30 June 2004
FM 3-19.40 (FM 19-40), Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001
FM 3-21.91 (FM 7-91), Tactical Employment of Antiarmor Platoons and Companies, 26 November
2002
FM 3-34 (FM 5-100 and FM 5-114), Engineer Operations, 2 January 2004
FM 3-50, Smoke Operations, 4 December 1990 w/Change 1, 11 September l996
FM 3-90, Tactics, 4 July 2001
FM 3-90.2 (FM 71-2), The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, 11 June 2003
FM 3-100.12, Risk Management for Multiservices Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 15 February
2001

References-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 References

FM 4-0 (FM 100-10), Combat Service Support, 29 August 2003

FM 4-25.12 (FM 21-10-1), Unit Field Sanitation Team, 25 January 2002
FM 5-33, Terrain Analysis, 11 July 1990 w/Change 1, 11 September 1992
FM 5-102, Countermobility, 14 March 1985
FM 5-103, Survivability, 10 June 1985
FM 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions, 30 July 1998
FM 6-20, Fire Support in the Airland Battle, 17 May 1998
FM 6-20-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Light), 5
January 1990
FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, 16 July 1991
FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, 14 December 1990 w/Change 1, 31 October 2000
FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, 6 April l992 w/Change 1, 29 December 2000
FM 7-90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, 9 October 1992
FM 7-92, The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry), 23
December 1992 w/Change 1, 13 December 2001
FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, 19 October 1992
FM 8-42, Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations, 27 October 1997
FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, 29 May 1998 w/Change 5, 1 April 2005
FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, 21 June 2000
FM 21-60, Visual Signals, 30 September 1987
FM 22-100, Army Leadership, 31 August 1999
FM 31-70, Basic Cold Weather Manual, 12 April 1968 w/Change 1, 17 December 1968
FM 34-2-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and
Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance, 19 June 1991
FM 44-8, Combined Arms for Air Defense, 1 June 1999
FM 71-100, Division Operations, 28 August 1976
FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion
Task Force, and Company Team, 30 September 1992
FM 90-3, Desert Operations, 24 August 1993
FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations, 16 March 1987
FM 90-13, River Crossing Operations, 26 January 1998
FM 90-26, Airborne Operations, 18 December 1990
FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, 1 August 1999
Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal, U.S. Military Academy, History Department, 1984

JOINT PUBLICATION (JP)

JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, 12 February 1999

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 References-3

This page intentionally left blank.

 Index

marking friendly positions,

situational understanding, 2

A 6-14
12

Abrams tank
collective tactical tasks (see
time management, 2-12

capabilities, 1-6
platoon tactical tasks), 3-36
counterattack, 4-28

limitations, 1-7

combat engineer assets, 6-10

crew responsibilities, 1-7

actions on contact
communications, 2-26

battle drills, 3-25

combat identification

measures, F-1
driver, 1-8

eight forms of contact, 3-19

gunner, 1-8

examples of, 3-21

situational awareness, F-2

target identification, F-2

loader, 1-8

four steps of, 3-18

platoon leader, 1-7

offense, 3-18
combat service support (see
platoon sergeant, 1-7

air and missile defense assets,

sustainment), 7-1
reporting initial contact, 2-27

6-11
combat support (see combined
tank commander, 1-7

armored cavalry troop

arms operations), 6-1
using fire patterns, 2-29

organization, 1-5
combined arms operations, 6-1
cultural awareness, 2-15

Army aviation forces, 6-9

air and missile defense, 6

11
D
B Army aviation, 6-9
defensive operations, 4-1

battle drills, 3-25

close air support, 6-13
actions on contact, 3-18

action drill, 3-27

combat engineers, 6-10
building the EA, 4-18

actions on contact, 3-25

fire support, 6-1
combat identification

change of formation drill, 3

infantry/armor (see
process, 4-20

25
infantry/armor
coordination for fires, 4-21

contact drill, 3-26

operations), C-1
deliberate occupation of BP,

react to air attack drill, 3-33

military police assets, 6-15
4-11

react to chemical/biological
command, 2-1
execution, 4-24

attack drill, 3-35

contingency plans, 2-10
fire distribution and control,

react to indirect fire drill, 3

decision-making, 2-1
2-41, 4-19

32
leadership, 2-11
fundamentals of, 4-1

react to nuclear attack drill,

troop-leading procedures
hasty occupation of a BP, 4

3-35
(see also troop-leading
8

procedures), 2-2
planning, 4-3

C command and control

preparation of BP, 4-8

CBRN operations, E-1

preparing the defense (fire

command, 2-1

alarms and signals, E-7

distribution and control),

control, 2-12

avoidance, E-1
2-45

communications, 2-24
priorities of work, 4-17

chemical defense, E-6

company/troop command

decontamination, E-14
deliberate occupation of BP, 4

net, 2-26

marking contaminated
11

digital, 2-25

areas, E-12
platoon fire plan, 4-13

platoon radio net, 2-26

MOPP levels, E-3

platoon time line, 4-18

techniques and guidelines

movement in CBRN
priorities of work, 4-17

for effectiveness, 2-26

environment, E-16
procedures for, 4-12

use of messengers, 2-25

nuclear defense, E-5

sector sketch card, 4-13

use of pyrotechnics, 2-25

protection, E-3
detainees

use of radio, 2-25

smoke operations, E-17

handling principles and

use of wire, 2-25

symptoms and treatment of

procedures, 7-16

visual, 2-25

casualties, E-8

unmasking procedures, E
consolidation and
digital communications, 2-25

13
reorganization, 3-46
digitization, A-1

civil support operations, 9-1, 9

control
capabilities and limitations,

11
fire distribution and control
A-5

considerations for, 9-12

(see also fire distribution
digital vs FM operations, A

role of tank platoon, 9-5

and control), 2-27
9

readiness conditions, 2-12

duties and responsibilities,

close air support, 6-13

A-6

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 Index-1

Index

tactical Internet and FBCB2,

fratricide prevention, 2-12, 2
L
A-1
17, 3-7, 3-26, 3-39, 3-47, 4
light/heavy operations (see

displacement, 4-26
14, 4-20, 4-28, 5-8, 5-13, 5
infantry/armor operations),

methods, 4-26
20, 5-30, 5-31, 8-6, 8-8, 8
C-1

14, A-5, A-7, H-1

driver responsibilities, 1-8

causes of, H-2
limited visibility operations, 3

digitization, A-9
combat identification

47

measures, F-1

additional considerations for

E tactical movement and

effects of, H-2

EPWs (see detainees), 7-16

leader responsibilities, H-5
attacks during, 3-48

prevention measures, H-4

considerations, 4-30

F defensive planning for

principles of, H-3

FBCB2, A-1
safety considerations, F-2
extreme conditions, 4-20

operational considerations,
situational awareness, F-2
equipment for use during, 3

A-3
stopping friendly fire
47

fire commands, 2-39

incident, H-4
navigation methods during,

alert element for fire control,

target identification, F-2
3-47

2-39
vehicle ID techniques

control element for fire

G during, 3-47

control, 2-40
graphic control measures, 2-17
loader responsibilities, 1-8

execution element for fire

assault position, 2-21
digitization, A-9

control, 2-40
assembly area, 2-18

orientation element for fire

attack position, 2-19
M
control, 2-40
attack-by-fire position, 2-21
maintenance operations, 7-9

target description element

axis of advance, 2-20
evacuation of damaged

for fire control, 2-40

battle position, 2-22
vehicle, 7-12

weapon or ammunition
boundries, 2-17

levels of, 7-11

element for fire control, 2

- checkpoint, 2-19

maps and overlays

39
contact point, 2-19

digital overlays, 2-16

fire distribution and control, 2- direction of attack, 2-20

types of overlays, 2-16

28
objective, 2-20
use of, 2-15

control, 2-38
passage lane, 2-19

passage point, 2-20

maps, overlays, graphic control

distribution, 2-29
measures, navigation, 2-15

during defensive operations,

phase line, 2-18

route, 2-18
graphic control measures,

4-19
2-17

in defense, 2-41
support-by-fire position, 2

21
navigation, 2-22

in offense, 2-41, 3-7

target reference point, 2-22

medical treatment and

fire patterns
evacuation operations, 7-13

cross, 2-30
gunner responsibilities, 1-8

(gunner on plt ldr tank)

detainees, 7-16

depth, 2-31
KIA actions, 7-15

effective distribution of
maintenance operations,

direct fires, 2-29

7-11
METT-TC analysis

frontal, 2-30
digitization, A-8
civilian considerations, 2-5

enemy, 2-3

fire support, 6-1

H mission, 2-3

channels for fire request, 6

terrain and weather, 2-4

hasty occupation of BP, 4-8

4
time available, 2-5

initial occupation activities,

FA, 6-2
troops, 2-5

4-9

fire direction and control, 6

-
must-have information, 4-9
missions

FIST, 6-3
overwatch, 3-16

mortar, 6-1

MOPP levels, E-3

infantry/armor operations, C-1

planning, 6-8

considerations when tanks

N
firing techniques, 2-32
lead, C-11

navigation, 2-22

formations
infantry organizations, C-2

use of fires, 2-23

during tactical operations, 3

- liaison activities, C-3

use of GPS devices, 2-23

11
operational considerations,

use of inertial navigation

forms of contact, 3-19

C-4

systems, 2-23

role of tank platoon, C-2

fragmentary orders, B-7

use of TIRS/GIRS, 2-23

safety considerations, C-9

sample, B-8
transporting infantry, C-10

Index-2 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 Index

O characteristics of successful
using maps and overlays, 2
observation posts, D-3
combat leader, 2-12
16

combined arms operations,

verifying sketch card, 4-14

offensive operations
6-1
when gaining an infantry

characteristics, 3-1
communications, 2-24
section or losing a tank

execution (actions on
communications guidance,
section, 1-4

contact), 3-18
2-26
WIA evacuation, 7-14

execution (consolidation
conducting backbrief, 4-15

and reorganization), 3-46

platoon sergeant

contingency plans, 2-10

responsibilities, 1-7

execution (platoon tactical

controlling fires, 2-38

tasks), 3-36
coordinating sustainment

defensive fire planning (fire

assets, 7-1

execution (tactical
distribution and control in
movement), 3-7
digitization, A-8

the defense), 2-41

infantry/armor operations,

fire distribution and control,

defensive planning, 4-3

2-41
C-4

defensive preparation of
maintenance operations, 7

fundamentals, 3-1
BP, 4-8

general forms of tactical

10

digitization, A-8
operating with light and

offense, 3-2
executing the defense

limited visibility, 3-47

mechanized infantry

(defensive fire planning),

forces, 1-3

planning using war-fighting

2-46

functions, 3-3
precombat inspections, 2-10

execution of defensive
reporting, 2-27

preparation using war-

mission, 4-24

fighting functions, 3-5

WIA evacuation, 7-14

fire coordination, 4-21

war-fighting functions, 3-2

fire distribution and control,
platoon tactical tasks, 3-36

operation orders, B-2

2-27
assault, 3-40

five-paragraph format, B-3

firing techniques, 2-32
attack by fire, 3-38

sample, B-3
graphics, maps, overlays, 4
breaching operations, 3-45

16
bypass, 3-42

operational environment
destroy an inferior force, 3

cultural awareness, 2-15

infantry/armor operations,

C-4
36

operational security, D-1

knowledge of equipment, 1
hassty occupation of a

orders and reports, B-1

6
platoon battle position

fragmentary orders, B-7

leadership principles, 2-11
(hasty defense), 3-45

operation orders, B-2

maintenance operations, 7
overwatch/support by fire,

orders, B-1
10
3-39

reports, B-8
offensive fire planning, 3-7
reconnaissance by fire, 3-44

warning orders, B-1

offensive operations
preparation of a BP, 4-8

organizations
(technique of movement),
phases, 4-8

armored cavalry troop, 1-5

3-7
prisoners of war

light infantry, 1-2

operating with infantry and
captured civilians, 7-19

tank company, 1-5

armored forces, 1-3
captured documents and

tank platoon, 1-1, 1-2

operating with light and
equipment, 7-18

mechanized infantry

overwatch, 3-16
prisoners of war (see

forces, 1-3

detainees), 7-16

P planning offensive
operations, 3-3
R
personnel operations, 7-13

precombat inspections, 2-10

planning
REDCON levels, 2-13

preparing the defense

six-point contingency plan,

(defensive fire planning), reports, 2-27, B-8

2-10
2-45
digital traffic, 2-27

platoon fire plan, 4-13

rehearsals, 2-8
initial contact, 2-27

critical elements for

reporting, 2-27
routine, 2-27

development, 4-16
troop-leading procedures
SALUTE format, 2-27

sample, 4-17
(see also troop-leading
rules of engagement, 9-7

platoon leader responsibilities,

procedures), 2-2

understanding operational
S
1-7
actions on contact, 3-18
environment, 2-15
sector sketch card, 4-13

battle drills, 3-25

use of fire commands in fire
sample, 4-15

battlefield visualization, 2-14

control, 2-39
using FBCB2, 4-14

characteristics of effective
use of terrain (see also
verification of, 4-14

defense, 4-1
navigation), 2-22
situational understanding, 2-12

22 February 2007 FM 3-20.15 Index-3

Index

battlefield visualization, 2-14

attached to, 1-2
W
communicaitons, 2-24
OPCON to, 1-2
war-fighting functions

cultural awareness, 2-15

organization, 1-1
defensive preparation

maps, overlays, graphic

split section concept, 1-3
considerations, 4-22

control measures,
wingman concept, 1-2

navigation, 2-15
war-fighting functions

tank platoon (see also split

defensive planning

operational environment, 2
section concept), 1-3

15
considerations, 4-3

tank platoon tasks

offense, 3-2

smoke operations, E-17

actions at a contact point, 5

sources of, E-21

war-fighting functions

8
urban operations, 8-6

tactical considerations, E-22

breaching operations, 5-20

uses of, E-17

convoy escort, 5-8
war-fighting functions

split section concept delay, 5-31

urban operations, 8-7

principles of employing
other tactical operations, 5
war-fighting functions

infantry and armored

1
urban operations, 8-10

forces, 1-3
passage of lines, 5-19
war-fighting functions

tank sections attached to

perimeter defense, 5-30
urban operations, 8-12

dismounted infantry
planning and occupying

squad or mechanized
assembly area, 5-5
war-fighting functions

infantry section, 1-3

relief in place, 5-31
urban operations, 8-13

stability operations, 9-1, 9-2

screen, 5-30
war-fighting functions

considerations for, 9-4

tactical road march, 5-1
infantry/armor operations,

examples of, 9-12

withdrawal, 5-33
C-4

role of tank platoon, 9-5

tank sections warning orders, B-1

supply operations, 7-1

attached to dismounted
sample, B-2

classes of supply, 7-2

infantry squad, 1-3
wingman concept, 1-2

methods of resupply, 7-4

attached to mechanized

techniques of resupply, 7-6

infantry section, 1-3

sustainment, 7-1
target identification, F-2

maintenance operations, 7
target reference points

9
use of for directing and

medical treatment and

controlling direct fires, 2

evacuation, 7-13
28

personnel operations, 7-13

terrain reference points, 4-9

supply operations, 7-1

troop-leading procedures

T abbreviated procedures, 2

tactical Internet, A-1

11

eight steps of, 2-2

tactical movement
METT-TC factors to analyze

engaging targets, 3-8

mission (see also METT-

execution in offensive, 3-7

TC analysis), 2-3

formations, 3-11
precombat inspections, 2-10

overwatch, 3-16
rehearsals, 2-8

techniques of, 3-9

use of terrain for cover and

U
concealment, 3-9
urban operations, 8-1

tactical road march, 5-1

armored vehicle fighting

control measures, 5-2

positions, 8-8

strip map sample, 5-3

categories of, 8-2

tank commander
command and control, 8-6

responsibilities, 1-7
defensive operations, 8-17

digitization, A-8
fire support, 8-12

maintenance operations, 7
intelligence, 8-10

11
maneuver, 8-7

reporting, 2-27
offensive operations, 8-13

treatment of WIA, 7-14

sustainment, 8-13

vehicles, weapons,

tank company
munitions, 8-3

organization, 1-5

tank platoon

Index-4 FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007

 *FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

0703202

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the
initial distribution number (IDN) 111029, requirements for FM 3-20.15.
PIN: 079435-000