American Educational Research Journal

Fall, 1976, Vol. 13, No. 4, Pp. 255-266

Motivational Effects of Normative

Feedback Following Success-Failure
Experience on Attribute Identification
Performance

SEONG-SOO LEE
University of British Columbia

Each of 42 college subjects performed first on a conjunctive

attribute identification task and then was subjected to one of seven
treatment conditions, six experimental and one filler control. The six
conditions resulted from variations of two nested factors: Experience
(success vs. failure) followed by Reference Group Norm (above- vs.
equal-to- vs. below-RGN). Finally, each subject performed on a conjunc-
tive criterion task similar to the initial one. Having repeatedly succeeded
initially, the subjects given equal-to-RGN feedback performed most
efficiently, while those given above- or below-RGN feedback did not
perform any better than the control subjects. Having repeatedly failed
initially, the subjects given equal-to-RGN feedback showed the most
performance decrement, while those given above- or below-RGNfeedback
did not show any performance decrement. Thesefindings were interpreted
to support the hypothesis that the subjective probability induced by
normativefeedback mediates performance via an experimentally produced
motive-like orientation.

It is a commonly observable sequence of events in or outside of classrooms that

learners encounter unfamiliar learning tasks, and try them out on their own to
see if they can master them (criterion-referenced feedback). Sooner or later, they
would also find out how well they did as compared to others (norm-referenced
feedback). Despite the ubiquity of such a sequence of feedback events and the
apparent need for careful study, the research literature in concept learning
shows that very few studies to date have investigated the role of feedback as

255
LEE

motivational determinants of intellectual performance (cf. Bourne, Ekstrand, &

Dominpwski, 1971, p. 242; Clark, 1971). The role of normative feedback
following criterion feedback certainly merits our careful analysis for pragmatic
as well as theoretical reasons.
Only a few studies have investigated the effects of criterion feedback on
subsequent intellectual performance. For example, Feather (1966, 1968) found
that learners who had five initial successes with easy anagram tasks (a form of
rule identification) performed better on subsequent tasks than those who had
five initial failures with difficult ones. Success vs. failure feedback did not
interact with the learners' initial expectancy induced by verbal instructions and
achievement motive orientation. T h e effects of such criterion feedback, when
given in three repeated successes or failures, appear significant in early trials
only, but not in later trials (Feather & Saville, 1967). These studies seem to
indicate that the enhancing or depressing effect of the initial criterion feedback
on subsequent performance is a function of the amount of prior success or
failure feedback received.
Weiner (1966) and Weiner and Schneider (1971) investigated the effects of
normative feedback delivered while subjects were performing on a paired-
associate and a serial learning task, respectively. In the former study, it is not
possible to assess the effect of such normative feedback (i.e., above vs. below the
reference group average, called success vs. failure by the authors) because it was
confounded with task difficulty. However, it can be gleaned from the latter study
that normative feedback interacts with subjects' achievement motive orientation
(i.e., success- vs. failure-oriented), regardless of task difficulty. That is, subjects
with high achievement orientation performed better when given the below-norm
feedback (failure) than when given the above-norm feedback (success), while
subjects with low achievement orientation did better when given the above-norm
feedback than when given the below-norm feedback.
These studies seem to make at least one point, that is, criterion feedback does
not interact with an individual's achievement motive orientation in the same way
as normative feedback does in affecting the level of subsequent performance.
The relationship of the motivational processes underlying each kind of feedback
to its respective behavioral consequences has received a good deal of attention
(cf. Weiner, 1972, pp. 169-418). However, the processes underlying the two
kinds of feedback as they occur in a natural sequence (criterion followed by
normative feedback), have simply not been studied to date. The purpose of the
present study was to assess the effect of normative feedback, preceded by a series
of criterion feedbacks, on attribute-identification performance. This would be a
first step toward our understanding of motivational consequences of a complex
pattern of feedbacks.
Consider learning situations, in which learners receive a series of four
consecutive criterion-referenced feedbacks in terms of either success or failure.
Subsequently, they receive normative feedback in terms of their performance
being below, equal to, or above the reference group norm (RGN). A basic
question was asked: how would the normative feedback be perceived to affect

256
 EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK

the subsequent performance of learners who have succeeded or failed re-

peatedly. The subjects' prior experience of repeated successes or failures as
induced by criterion feedbacks is assumed to shape up an achievement motive-
like orientation, namely, a typical a p p r o a c h - or avoidance-orientation
(ms — mf > or < 0). This motive-like orientation is conceived to be similar to the
well-known achievement motive orientation (Ms — Mf) based on an individual
difference variable, the motive to approach success Ms) and the motive to avoid
failure (Mf). With this assumption, a hypothesis was advanced that normative
feedback functions as a cue to be used in determining the subjective task
difficulty.
More specifically, the question of our immediate interest is how subjects
would perceive the normative feedback (below, equal to, or above the RGN) and
perform on the criterion task, having received four consecutive success or failure
feedbacks. The experience of such success or failure feedbacks was presumed to
result in an upward shift or a downward shift pattern of subjective probability of
success accompanied by the affective state of hope for success or fear of failure.
The hypothesis stated above can be further specified, although somewhat
atheoretically when viewed from the currently dominant theory of achieve-
ment motivation or attribution. That is to say, when learners receive such
a normative feedback, they will translate it to form their own subjective
probability of success (Ps): above-, equal-to-, and below-RGN translated into Ps of
higher than, approximately equal to, and lower than .50, respectively. If this is
the case, some predictions can be made concerning the motivational effects of
the normative feedback on the basis of the assumed achievement motive-like
orientation.
According to a variant of Atkinson's variable-incentive model (Atkinson &
Feather, 1966) of the achievement motivation formulated here by replacing
Ms - Mf by ms - mf, the individuals of ms - mf > 0 would approach the task with
the maximum positive incentive value given an intermediate-difficult task (i.e.,
sign of [ms - mf] x P s x [ l - Ps] = [+] x .50 x .50) as compared to those with a
task of Ps > or < .50. T h e original model is based upon the assumptions:
Is = 1 — Ps, where Is stands for the incentive value of success (e.g., pride);
Ps+Pf= 1, where Pf stands for the probability of failure; and If - ( 1 —Pf),
where If stands for the incentive value of failure (e.g., shame), hence Is = Pf.
Therefore, individuals with the repeated successes should work harder on the
criterion task when subsequently told that their performance level was about
equal to the RGN than those told either above or below the RGN. In contrast, the
individuals of ms - mf < 0 would avoid the task with the maximum negative
incentive value given an intermediate-difficult task (i.e., sign of [ms — mf] x P s x
[1 -Ps] = [-] x .50 x .50) as compared to those with a task of Ps > or < .50.
Therefore, individuals with repeated failures should disengage from the task
when subsequently told that their performance level was equal to the RGN more
than those told either above or below the RGN. In the context of the present
study, the performance proficiency at the task is assumed to be a monotonically
increasing function of the resultant achievement motivation tendency.

257
LEE

METHOD

Design and Subjects

Two factors (success vs. failure and RGN) were sequentially manipulated
along with a baseline control condition. Upon completion of a warm-up (Pw) and
a main learning task (P1), the success-failure as criterion-referenced feedback
was manipulated by having each subject succeed or fail (to be denoted by S or F
hereafter) at four similar tasks (P2, P3, P4 and P5) in a row. The RGN was
delivered to the subject one minute after either the success or failure experience.
The subject was first informed of his or her own average performance level,
which was actually the amount of time (y) taken to the mastery of the first
learning task (P1) only. T h e n the subject was told that his or her score was above,
equal to, or below the RGN, the actual value of which was (y —1/2y),(y + 0), or
(y +1/2y)—to be denoted by A-RGN, E-RGN, or B-RGN. The manipulation of S
vs. F and RGN was followed by the last criterion task (P6).
The control condition was defined by giving a subject Pw, P1 a filler, and P6
tasks only. It should serve in determining whether the experimental variables
were facilitative or inhibitive of the criterion performance. Thus, a total of seven
treatments were defined: S-A, S-E, S-B, F-A, F-E, F-B, and the control. T h e
subjects' performance on both the first learning (Pt) and criterion (P6) tasks was
observed in terms of the amount of time to the problem solution.
Forty-two students enrolled in two undergraduate education classes were
required to serve as subjects. As each subject reported to the laboratory, he or
she was assigned to one of the seven treatments at random, thus a total of six
subjects was assigned to each.
Stimulus materials
Seven attribute-identification (AI) tasks (Pw, Px through P6) were constructed
by using stimulus p a t t e r n s d r a w n on geometric design cards of size,
3.81 x 5.08 cm. Six binary dimensions represented on the cards were: number
of borders (one or two), number of figures (one or two), color of figures (red or
blue), color of borders (red or blue), shape of figures (round or ellipse), and size of
figures (large and small). Two other dimensions, texture of borders (solid or
spotted) and texture of figures (solid or spotted), were kept constant. A set of 32
cards was sampled at random from the population of 64 cards (2 6 = 64) and used
for all the tasks. An AI task refers to a variant of concept learning task that re-
quires subjects to identify the relevant attributes to be lawfully combined by a
conceptual rule instructed to subjects by the experimenter.
A warm-up problem (Pw) involved a two-dimensional conjunctive rule; the six
other problems all involved a three-dimensional conjunctive rule. All tasks
required subjects to select a card at a time, to identify whether it was a positive or
negative instance, and then to find out what attributes were conjointly shared by
all the identified positive instances.
Apparatus
A set of 32 cards was simultaneously displayed to subjects via a concept
attainment device (CAD). It consists of two major electronic units: a subject's

258
 EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK

display panel and an experimenter's control console (for the detailed descrip-
tions, see Byers, Collins, and Loughborough, 1964). T h e former consists of a
display panel on which all stimulus cards can be mounted, a pair of response-
keys with a feedback-light device located beneath each card, and a set of
lever-type switches along with two hypothesis feedback-lights to be used for
making hypotheses on the relevancy of selected attributes. The latter consists
primarily of both devices for programming the subject's problem and devices for
keeping the records of the subject's card-choices as well as hypothesizing
behavior in terms of the number of correct or incorrect instances and the
amount of time spent. There were two rooms, one for the subject's display panel
and one for the experimenter's control console. The two rooms were separated
by a one-way window; and all the necessary communications between the
experimenter and the subject were carried out through an intercom.

Procedure
Upon each subject's arrival at the laboratory, he was introduced to the display
panel with minimal conversation. All subjects followed through the five stages of
the procedure with respective relevant aspects of the experimental treatments.
Stage 1. The subject was asked to follow through typical AI task instructions
as to the structure of stimulus materials, the conjunctive rule to be used, and the
response requirements. T h e use of the display panel was explained to the
subject, who was then seated in front of the panel. The Pw was given to aid the
subject in understanding the required procedure with the CAD and a conjunc-
tive solution strategy. Upon completion of the Pw, the subject was told that the
amount of time to the solution of the Pw was about the same as typical college
students' average performance level.
Stage 2. The subject was reminded of the importance of the response speed
(time). T h e S- and F-treatment subjects were told that they were to have six more
problems similar to the Pw, but with some variation in their difficulty, and that
they were expected to solve some easier ones faster than others. The control
subjects were simply told that they would have several problems to solve. All
subjects were told that the tasks were highly reliable tests of thinking ability; and
then they performed on the Px.
Stage 3. The four problems (P2 to P5) were successively given to the S- and
F-treatment subjects to induce the success-failure experience. T h e experimenter
manipulated his hypothesis switches on the CAD console, so that the subjects
could get all of the four (P2, P 3 , P4, P5) solved or none (+ + + + or )asa
pattern of success or failure feedbacks. For each problem, all possible caution was
taken not to extinguish what was acquired from the Pw and Px in such a way that
the experimenter signalled the feedback, "right" or "wrong," just before the
subject could have offered and confirmed a correct hypothesis. Also, the
feedback light on the display panel remained until the entire period of 1 min 30
sec terminated. The subjects under the control condition were given a filler task
involving the classifications of a deck of 64 cards. This stage lasted for 6 min,
which was followed by a blank interval of 60 sec used for the purpose of the
experimenter's delivery of an RGN slip to each subject.

259
LEE

Stage 4. For a period of 2 min the RGN slip information was explained to the
subject through the intercom. T h e subject was also told that the norm score was
the average of all those who participated in a series of two experimental testings
previously conducted. Immediately after the delivery of the RGN, the subject
was asked to estimate and write down his expected time score at the P6 on the
bottom of the RGN slip, and then given the task.
Stage 5. Upon completion of the P6 the subject was asked to indicate his or
her feeling experienced during the experiment on a 9-point scale accompanied
by the verbal descriptions: "least-uneasy" for 1, "medium-uneasy" for 5, and
"most-uneasy" for 9. Then the experimenter explained the purpose of the
experiment to the subject before dismissal.

RESULTS
The difference between the time scores for the Pt and P6 (Pt - P6) was used as
the criterion measure for the main analysis of data. T h e difference between the
time score for thePx and the aspiration level (Pt-LA) indicated prior to t h e P 6 ,
and the self-rated feeling was also examined. T h e criterion measure should re-
flect primarily subjects' proficiency in performance; the time score for the P i
should reflect subjects' pre-experimental level of ability as well as approach- or
avoidance-oriented motives (Ms — Mf> or < 0). Since the influence of the pre-
experimental ability and motives were not desired in the criterion measurement,
the time score for the Px was used as a covariate for the analysis of the criterion
performance (Px — PG).
Analysis of the criterion performance. —An outlier of the six observations in the
F-B treatment was detected by a preliminary examination of data; r 10 = .637,
p < .025 (see Dixon & Massey, Jr., 1969, p. 328). It was replaced by the estimated
mean of the treatment. The adjusted mean scores of the Px — P6 and observed
mean scores of Pt-LA for the seven treatment conditions are plotted in Figure 1.
In order to test the hypothesis of the cue function of normative feedback with
the assumption of achievement motive-like orientation, two orthogonal a priori
contrasts for quadratic trend of the treatment means after the covariate
adjustment by the Px were made, each at the level of .025. T h e overall Type I
error was held to .05 for this pair of contrasts. Six Dunnett contrasts, comparing
each experimental condition with the control, were also tested at the same overall
error rate.
As predicted, the S-E subjects performed most proficiently as compared to
the S-A and the S-B subjects. This was indicated by a significant quadratic trend
over the S-A, S-E, and S-B conditions (observed means of 14.67, 99.17, and
25.17, respectively; Mean Square Error of 1425.11),7^(1, 33) = 7.78,/? < .0087.
The Dunnett's method comparing each condition with the control (observed
mean of 26.49) showed that only the S-E condition facilitated the criterion
performance, F(l, 33) = 5.84,/? < .02, whereas the S-A and S-B conditions did
not. As was predicted, the F-E subjects' performance deteriorated significantly as
compared to that of the F-A and the F-B subjects. This was indicated by a
significant quadratic trend over the F-A, F-E, and F-B conditions (observed
means of 8.5, - 1 6 . 8 3 , and 14.0, respectively), F(l, 33) = 9.21,/? < .0046. T h e

260
 EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK

Criterion - References
Feedback

Performance

• • Success
• — • Failure
Aspiration Level

•—--• Success
• - - - • Failure

o
o
CD Base line
CO

c
CD

Above Equal-to Below

Reference-Group Norm
FIGURE 1. Adjusted mean changes of (Pj — P$) and observed mean change of (P^-LA) in
solution time/sec to attribute-identification as a function of normative feedback (RGN)
following continued success or failure.

Dunnett's method also showed that only the F-E condition significantly retarded
the criterion performance, F(\, 33) = 16.95,/? < .003, whereas the F-A and F-B
conditions did not. The findings given the repeated success treatments can be
described as a convex pattern, while the findings given the repeated failure
treatments form a concave pattern. These pattern descriptions in opposite
directions can be clearly seen in Figure 1.
Analyses of expressed level of aspiration and post-experimental self-rated feeling. —
The observed mean difference scores of the P1-LA for the seven treatments are

261
LEE

also shown in Figure 1. When the measure of the P1-LA is analyzed, it is inter-
esting to note a distinctive quadratic trend comparable to the one observed in
performance over the three levels of the RGN (means of - 2 . 6 7 , 32.17, and 12.5
for S-A, S-E, and S-B, respectively; Mean Square Error of 1256.99) after the
continued success, F(\, 35) = 2.36, p < .134. But a more or less stationary trend
(means of - 9 . 8 3 , - 6 . 6 7 , and - 1 . 6 7 for F-A, F-E, and F-B, respectively) instead
of a concave one after the continued failure obtained, as can be seen in Figure 1.
In general, the level of aspiration appears to be lowered after both the success
and the failure experience, being lowered noticeably after the failure as com-
pared to the baseline control (mean = 26.50), F ( l , 35) = 3.79, p < .06.
The self-rated uneasy feeling as the affective residue of the experimental
treatments was examined first by two contrasts, each with the control. Subjects in
the success conditions, in general, indicated that they experienced uneasy feeling
more than the control (means of 3.0, 5.0, 5.3, and 2.5 for S-A, S-E, S-B, and
control, respectively; Mean Square Error of 2.68), F ( l , 35) = 1 3 . 7 1 , p < .0008.
Subjects in the failure conditions indicated more uneasiness than the control
(means of 7.3, 7.0, and 8.5 for F-A, F-E, and F-B, respectively),F (1, 35) = 43.92,
p<.000\. Further, the failure treatments induced a still greater amount of
uneasy feeling than the success, F(\, 35) = 33.72, p < .0001. Given the success
conditions, the S-B subjects indicated the feeling a great deal more than the S-A
subjects did, F(l, 35) = 6.10p><.019, while they were not different from the
S-E subjects in this respect. Given the failure conditions, the F-B subjects tended
to feel uneasy more than the F-A and F-E subjects, the latter two not being
different from each other. Statistically nonsignificant differences are probably
due to the ceiling effect of the scale used. An overall linear trend apparent over
the three levels of the RGN means (5.15, 6.0, and 6.9 corresponding to the
above-, equal-to-, and below-RGN) turns out to be significant, F(l, 35) = 6.64,
p < .015. This means that, in general, the differential degree of uneasy feeling
accompanying the three levels of the normative feedback (RGN) remains present
until after the subsequent task performance is over.

DISCUSSION

The two predicted trends are clearly observed, one convex and one concave,
over the three levels of normative feedback (above-, equal-to-, and below-RGN)
after the repeated success and failure experience, respectively. If one can assume
that the subjects who have succeeded or failed at a series of four similar tasks will
develop the achievement motive-like orientation (ms — mf> or < 0), then this
finding can be taken as supporting the cue function hypothesis. That is to say,
the RGN as normative feedback serves as a cue in determining the subjects' (or
biased) estimate of objective task difficulty, and thereby, the subjective probabil-
ity of success at and the incentive value of the subsequent task (For example, see
Atkinson and Feather's (1966, pp. 23-24) discussion of the distortion of Ps).
Thus, subjects with the prior success experience would approach a task perceived
to be intermediate-difficult with the maximum incentive value and work harder
on the subsequent task than they would given a task perceived as easy or

262
 EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK

difficult. Subjects with the prior failure experience would avoid a task perceived
to be intermediate-difficult and disengage from such a task more than they
would given a task perceived as easy or difficult.
The laboratory-induced achievement motive-like orientation (ms-mf) was
assumed to function similarly to the well-known achievement motive orientation
(Ms —Mf). This assumption can be reduced to the idea that the latter originates
from cumulative success or failure experiences just as the former is induced. It
seems reasonable to make at least two arguments for the validity of the
assumption. First, the consideration of a possible origin of the achievement
motive suggests some validity of the assumption. An individual's achievement
motive can be defined as an energizing drive to compete "with a standard of
excellence" of his own in reference to an external criterion (Heckhausen, 1968,
p. 131). Such a motive should have its origin in the self-reinforcement effects
derived from the mastery of certain tasks, which may have been previously
reinforced by other external reinforcing agents. Positive or negative reinforce-
ments, especially by parents in early childhood, can constitute a powerful agent
in shaping the probability of success and hence the tendency and strength of the
motive to approach success or avoid failure. A close relationship between
mother's positive or negative reinforcements and 4-5-years-old children's
goal-setting behavior as an index of achievement motive is strongly suggested by
r = .64 or -A2,ps <.01 (Heckhausen, 1968, pp. 136-138).
Second, some merit of the assumption is also indicated by the relationship
between the continuous successes or failures with actual tasks and (a) shifts in
cognitive expectancy as a directing component and (b) shifts in affective states as
an energizing component. Feather (1966, 1968) showed the subjects' estimated
probabilities of success as combined from two studies, shifted upwardly (.57, .64,
.69, .73, and .74) over five trials each with an anagram task, as subjects got
continuous success feedbacks. They shifted downwardly (.57, .37, .29, .23, and
.16), however, as the subjects got continuous failure feedbacks. Weiner, Frieze,
Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum (1971) also reported data making the same
point by using eight line-tracing puzzle tasks. That is, the individual subjects'
estimates of the probability of success increase and decrease in upward and
downward patterns remarkably similar to the ones described previously under
the success and failure feedback conditions, respectively. However, the probabil-
ity of success remains relatively constant and near .50 under the random pattern
of success-failure feedbacks.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the subjects' aspiration levels (P1-LA), after
continued success, appear to parallel the pattern of the performance shifts.
However, their aspiration levels after continued failure do not seem to correlate
with the performance shifts. This is primarily due to the F-E subjects' tendency
not to lower their expectancy relative to the equal-to-RGN feedback (actually
their P1 performance level). The reason for this is not apparent. It is interesting
to note, however, that the subjects' expressed level of performance without
regard to the Pl performance, in general, can predict their performance shifts
significantly, r(Pi -P6,LA) = .449, t(35) = 2.89, p < .005. This also suggests some
relationship between continuous successes or failures and shifts in cognitive
expectancy.

263
LEE

There are no data directly bearing on the relationship between the repeated
success-failure experience and its concomitant change in affective states. Sub-
jects' self-rated feeling was not intended to reflect their specific affective state
prior to the task performance. It should reflect some affective residue of the
experimental manipulation of both the criterion-referenced and the normative
feedback, however.
The generally uneasy affective states in the subjects seemed to persist
throughout their performance, especially in those subjects under failure treat-
ments. Such affective states in the present study can neither be separated into
positive and negative affects nor attributed to either repeated criterion feed-
backs or normative feedbacks. This is because a unipolar scale was used (1 to 9
point scale) and the scale was given after the criterion task. However, even such a
post-experimental index does differentiate further the affective effects of the
normative feedback. The above-RGN conditions were associated with less
uneasiness than the below-RGN conditions, the equal-to-RGN being in between
the two. It also appears that the uneasier the subjects felt, the lower their
performance improvement was, as indicated by r(Pi- p6)Feeling) = .243, t(35) =
1.45, p< .10.
The present data do not lend themselves to ready interpretation in other
theoretic frameworks. Social comparison theory does not seem useful for
interpretation in view of the findings of Fishbein, Raven, and Hunter (1963).
They reported that the RGN influences the establishment of goal level (e.g.,
expectancies and minimum goals) only in the absence of objective criteria for
self-evaluation. In the present study the RGN as the normative feedback, in the
form of success or failure, was made available to the subjects; hence, it would not
have influenced the self-evaluation.
The RGN in the present study was hypothesized to be a cue as to task
difficulty. Frieze and Weiner (1971, p. 594) showed that individuals use task
difficulty systematically as a cue. That is, RGNs in accord with one's performance
(criterion feedback) lead to task ease or difficulty attributions, while RGNs at
variance with performance produce effort or ability attributions. Weiner (1972,
p. 392) also suggests that task difficulty is a cue giving rise to differential
attributions to effort as a determinant of performance. This interpretation is
similar to the cue function hypothesis. Thus, effort may be perceived as most
important at an intermediate-difficult task (Ps = .50), while it may be perceived
as "unnecessary" for an easy task and as "waste of energy" for a difficult task
(Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972). The individuals with success
experiences might acquire ability or effort ascription tendency (Frieze 8c Weiner,
1971) as well as an upward pattern of Ps shifts (Weiner, et al., 1971). Such
individuals, given the equal-to-RGN feedback (S-F), might well have decided to
expend their maximum effort to attain the sense of pride (Weiner& Kukla,
1970). In contrast, the individuals with failure experiences might acquire a task
ascription tendency (Frieze 8c Weiner, 1971; Meyer, 1970) as well as a downward
pattern of Ps shifts (Weiner, et al., 1971; Meyer, 1970)—both covarying and
related to slowed performance (r of stable factor ascription with perform-
ance = - . 4 3 ) . Such individuals, given the equal-to-RGN feedback (F-E), might

264
 EFFECTS O F FEEDBACK

well h a v e d e c i d e d t o d i s e n g a g e f r o m a task o f Ps = .50 t o lessen t h e sense o f

shame.
H o w d o e s this f r a m e w o r k d e a l with t h e o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s (S-A, S-B, F-A, a n d
F-B)? A c c o r d i n g to t h e p r i n c i p l e s u g g e s t e d by Frieze a n d W e i n e r (1971), subjects
u n d e r t h e S-B ( + + + + - ) a n d F-A ( +), at least u n d e r t h e f o r m e r , s h o u l d
try h a r d e r t h a n t h e i r controls. T h i s is because t h e S-B would ascribe t h e
below-RGN feedback t o lack of effort which is c o n g r u e n t with t h e i r effort
ascription t e n d e n c y . T h e F-A subjects' ascription direction of t h e above R G N
feedback is n o t evident. A t a n y r a t e , t h e p r e s e n t d a t a a r e n o t consistent with
these e x p e c t a t i o n s , e x c e p t f o r t h e S-A a n d F-B conditions. A m o r e viable
conceptual g r o u n d needs to be sought a n d elaborated to account for the present
findings of n o r m a t i v e feedback effects c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e p a t t e r n s of past
criterion feedbacks.

CONTRIBUTOR

S E O N G - S O O L E E is Associate Professor of E d u c a t i o n a l Psychology, Faculty of

E d u c a t i o n , University of British C o l u m b i a , 2 0 7 5 W e s b r o o k Place, V a n c o u v e r ,
British C o l u m b i a , C a n a d a V 6 T 1W5

REFERENCES

ATKINSON, J. W. & FEATHER, N. T. (Ed.) ,4 theory of achievement motivation. New York: Wiley,
1966.
BYERS, J. L., COLLINS, C. C , & LOUGHBOROUGH, W. B. An apparatus for concept
attainment research. Psychological Reports, 1964, 14, 759-773.
BOURNE, L. E., J R . , EKSTRAND, B. R., & DOMINOWSKI, R. L. The psychology of thinking.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971.
CLARK, D. C. Teaching concepts in the classroom: A set of teaching prescriptions derived
from experimental research. Journal of Educational Psychology Monograph, 1971, 62,
253-278.
DIXON, W. J. 8c MASSEY, J R . , F. J. Introduction to statistical analysis (3rd ed.). New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1969.
FEATHER, N. T. Effects of prior success and failure on expectations of success and
subsequent performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 3, 287-298.
FEATHER, N. T . Change in confidence following success or failure or a predictor of
subsequent performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 9, 38-46.
FEATHER, N. T . & SAVILLE, M. R. Effects of amount of prior success and failure on
expectations of success and subsequent task performance. Journal of Personality and
Soaal Psychology, 1967,5, 226-232.
FISHBEIN, M., RAVEN, B. H., 8C HUNTER, R. Social comparison and dissonance reduction in
self-evaluation. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963, 67, 491-501.
FRIEZE, I. 8c WEINER, B. Cue utilization and attributional judgements for success and
failure. Journal of Personality, 1971,39, 591-606.
HECKHAUSEN, H. Achievement motive research: Current problems and some contributions
towards a general theory of motivation. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, (Vol. 16).
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968.
MEYER, W. U. Selbsterantworklichkeit und Leistungsmotivation. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Ruhr Universitat, Bochum, Germany, 1970.

265
LEE

WEINER, B. Role of success and failure in the learning of easy and complex tasks. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1966,3, 339-344.
WEINER, B. Theories of motivation; from mechanism to cognition. Chicago: Markham, 1972.
WEINER, B., FRIEZE, I., KUKLA, A., REED, L., REST, S., & ROSENBAUM, R. M. Perceiving the
causes of success and failure. New York: General Learning Press, 1971.
WEINER, B., HECKHAUSEN, H., MEYER, W. U., & COOK, R. E. Causal ascriptions and
achievement behavior: A conceptual analysis of effort and reanalysis of locus of control.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 21, 239-248.
WEINER, B. & KUKLA, A. An attributional analysis of achievement motivation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1970,75, 1-20.
WEINER, B. 8C SCHNEIDER, K. Drive versus cognitive theory: A reply to Boor and Harmon.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1971, 18, 258-262.

266