G.R. No.

195549 September 3, 2014

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744.

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:

[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint for
damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware
Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive
parts similar to those of [respondent].

[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since
its registration in 1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing
throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged
in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that
of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to
[respondent’s] office, and in view of the fact that some of the [respondent’s] employeeshad transferred to
[petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic-made
automotive parts.

That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and
distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling
these products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers.

[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture
ofautomotive underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorberbushing,
center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic
materialwas taken from [respondent’s] idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner]
deliberately copied [respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms
oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as of the date of [respondent’s]
complaint.

Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this action and thereby to
incur expenses in the way of attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00).

In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the following facts: that it
is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that
there’s physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent]’s office, and that someof [respondent’s]
employees had transferred to [petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity with
[respondent’s] products, especially its plastic made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made
automotive parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their construction and composition merely
conforms to the specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus,
[respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming
for the sake of argument that [respondent] indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it
still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these as it has no patent over these products.
Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-made automotive parts
as there are other establishments which were already openly selling them to the public. 3

After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the
rights or interest of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition.
The RTC further opined that under the circumstances, in order for respondent’s property rights to be
preserved, petitioner’s acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of
respondent’s and the selling of the sameproducts to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated over the
years, will have to be enjoined. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million
(₱2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s
fees and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The court hereby
permanently [enjoins] defendant from manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as those
manufactured by plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.4

Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.

On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging to
another,the copying thereof for production and selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition
is promoted by law to benefit consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure away respondent’s
employees to get trade secrets. It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in
the market and the copying of these can be done by simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.

Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair
competition case to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair
competition are present in the instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts are contrary
to good conscience for deliberately copying its products and employing its former employees.

In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant
portions of said decision read:

Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing its business interest against
Jesichris, however, the Court finds no basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled
to actual damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was engaged by Jesichris in
2001 to audit its business, only revealed that there was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from
2001 to 2002. No amount was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income
statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in comparison with those
made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the other products
of Jesichris like plates.

In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced
Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s award of attorney’s
fees and exemplary damages is also maintained.
xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million
Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal
damages is awarded.

SO ORDERED.5

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for lack of merit by the
CA in a Resolution dated February 10, 2011.

Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:

(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not
competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?

(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and attorney’s
fees?

(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been
established?

(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive parts, should it be considered
in the light of the said copyrights were considered to be void by no less than this Honorable Court
in SC GR No. 161295?

(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has established
"goodwill?"6

In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on
humanrelations, and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293, 7 as the present suit is a damage
suit and the products are not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration
is immaterial in the present case.

The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual
property laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in
American jurisdictions, the term coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of
his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts,
or any malicious interference with the latter’s business. 8

With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting tounfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not competitionper sebut the use
of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in
business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where
the means usedare fair and legitimate.

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong
perpetrated by unconscionable means.9

Here, both characteristics are present.

First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made
automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner
admitted having employed respondent’s formeremployees, deliberately copied respondent’s products and
even went to the extent of selling these products to respondent’s customers. 10

To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring of the former employees of
respondent and petitioner’s act of copying the subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair
competition, viz.:

The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the business
of [respondent].1âwphi1[Petitioner’s] acts can be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle
calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that [petitioner] is
engaged in the production of plastic kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare
parts, it engaged the services of the then mold setter and maintenance operator of [respondent], De
Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De Guzman was hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its
machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being made. It baffles the Court why
[petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter and maintenance operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioner’s]
engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his experience gained from working for
[respondent].

Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of [respondent],
was fired because he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get
angry. Later on, he applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same position he occupied with
[respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the
situation with De Guzman.11

Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting
his business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of
the respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.12

Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but
regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can
take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong. 13 As aptly observed
by the courta quo, the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with
the business of respondent, to wit: [Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted that
it was never engaged in the business of plastic-made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:

Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not?
Manufacturer of kitchenware and distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista:
And you said you have known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have known it to be
manufacturing plastic automotive products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have
been (sic) physically become familiar with these products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr.
Salinas: Yes, sir.

How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size, shape and composition
as those sold by Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris’ employees to Willaware.

Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing Company?

Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.

Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I don’t know the exact date.

Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your
company, is it not?

Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.

Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?

Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).

Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?

Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.

Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?

Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one, just one month ago.

That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by the testimony of
[petitioner’s] witness, Joel Torres:

Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?

A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.

Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform this court what
unusual even (sic) transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?

A: There was, sir.

Q: What is that?

A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I passed by the place
where they were having a drinking spree, sir.
Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?

A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.

Q: And who else was there?

A: William Salinas, sir.

Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?

A: Jun Molina called me, sir.

Q: And what happened after that?

A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered
something, sir.

Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?

A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"

Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?

A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na
siya."

Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be referred to as your
"amo"?

A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14

In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and
in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's
fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution
dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 203284

NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN** B. MATUDAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1seeks to set aside the January 31, 2012 Decision 2 and August 23,
2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CA·G.R. CV No. 95392 and the
Motion for Reconsideration,4 thus affirming the December 18, 2009 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were married in
Laoang, Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children.

In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with her; she had
not been seen nor heard from again.

Twenty-three years later, or on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,6 docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94. Petitioner
alleged that before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically incapable of
fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently neglected and failed to provide petitioner
and her children with the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance, and even so
after leaving for work abroad; that based on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L.
Tayag (Dr. Tayag), Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable; that petitioner's
consent to the marriage was obtained by Marilyn through misrepresentation as she concealed her condition
from him; and that Marilyn is "not ready for a lasting and pennanent commitment like marriage" 7 as she
"never (gave) him and their children financial and emotional support x x x and for being selfish through their
six (6) years of cohabitation;"8 that Marilyn became "so despicably irresponsible as she has not shown love
and care upon her husband, x x x and that she cannot properly and morally take on the responsibility of a
loving and caring wife x x x."9

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the Petition.

The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined that there is no collusion between the
parties, proceedings were conducted in due course. However, trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence.

Apart from the testimonies of the petitioner, his daughter Maricel B. Matudan (Maricel), and Dr. Tayag, the
following documents were submitted in evidence:

1. Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit10 (Exhibit "A") which was adopted as his testimony on direct
examination;

2. The Judicial Aftidavit11 of Maricel (Exhibit "D"), which was adopted as part of her
testimony on direct examination;

3. The Sworn Affidavit12 of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"), which was considered part of her
testimony on direct examination;
 4. Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the Psychological Condition of
NICOLAS T. MATUDAN, the petitioner for Nullity of Marriage against respondent
MARILYN BORJA-MATUDAN''13 (Exhibit "C"); and

5. Other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage contract/certificate and respective

birth certificates of his children, and a Letter/Notice, with Registry Return Receipt, sent by
Dr. Tayag to Marilyn requesting evaluation/interview relative to petitioner's desire to file a
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage (Exhibits "E" to "G").

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its Decision14 dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827
on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological
incapacity. It held, thus:

Petitioner, his daughter Maricel Matudan and psychologist Nedy L. Tayag testified.
Petitioner offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to ''G" which were admitted by the Court.

The State and the respondent did not present any evidence.

From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the petitioner, the Court gathered the
following:

Petitioner and respondent were roamed on October 26, 1976 x x x. They begot four (4)
children x x x. Petitioner and respondent lived together with their children. On June 25,
1985, petitioner asked respondent [sic] for permission to work and left the conjugal
dwelling. Since then she was never heard of [sic]. Respondent never communicated with
the petitioner and her children. Petitioner inquired from the relatives of the respondent but
they did not tell him her whereabouts.

In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony, petitioner claimed that
respondent failed to perform her duties as a wife to him. Respondent never gave petitioner
and their children financial and emotional support, love and care during their cohabitation.
She was irresponsible, immature and exhibited irrational behavior towards petitioner and
their children. She was self-centered, had no remorse and involved herself in activities
defying social and moral ethics.

On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and the respondent had a happy married
life and they never had a fight. The only reason why he filed this case was because
respondent abandoned him and their children.

Maricel Matudan was only two (2) years old when respondent left them. She corroborated
the testimony of the petitioner that since respondent left the conjugal dwelling she never
provided financial support to the family and never communicated with them.

Nedy L. Tayag, Psychologist, testified on the 'Report on the Psychological Condition of

Nicolas Matudan' which she prepared (Exhibit "C''). She subjected petitioner to
psychological test and interview. She likewise interviewed Maricel Matudan. She came up
with the findings that petitioner is suffering from Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder
and respondent has Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits. The features
of petitioner's disorder are the following: negativistic attitude, passive resistance, lacks the
ability to assert his opinions and has great difficulty expressing his feelings.
The root cause of his personality condition can be attributed to his being an abandoned
child. At a young age, his parents separated and he was left in the custody of his paternal
grandmother. He lacked a support system and felt rejected. He developed a strong need
for nurturance, love and attention and that he would do anything to attain such.

As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as follows: Preoccupation with
pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants
to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a
good life.

Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial environment. She came from
an impoverished family. Her parents were more pre-occupied with finding ways to make
ends meet to such extent that they failed to give adequate attention and emotional support
to their children.

Ms. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of the parties are grave and
characterized by juridical antecedence as the same already existed before they got
married, their disorders having been in existence since their childhood years are
permanent and severe.

The sole issue to be resolved is whether x x x respondent is psychologically incapacitated

to perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:

'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapicity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.'

Article 68 of the same Code provides:

'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.'

In the case of Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, January 4, 1995, G.R. No. 112019, the
Honorable Supreme Court held:

'Justice Alicia Sempio Dy, in her commentaries on the Family Code cites
with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso a former Presiding Judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
x x x, who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same must

be serious, grave and 'so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.' x x x.
 In the case of Santos, it was also held that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.'

It must be emphasized that the cause of action of petitioner is the alleged psychological
incapacity of the respondent. During the pre-trial, the sole issue raised is whether or not
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under Article
36 of the Family Code. The alleged personality disorder of the petitioner is clearly not an
issue in this case.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds that the totality of the evidence adduced by
petitioner has not established the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability. Again, it must be emphasized that this petition was filed on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of respondent and not the petitioner.

Respondent is said to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial

traits. The salient features of her disorder were enumerated by Nedy Tayag in her report
as follows: pre-occupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a high
sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions;
lacks empathy; wants to have a good life. Her personality disorder is considered
permanent, grave and incurable. It has its root cause in her unhealthy familial environment
during her early developmental years.

In petitions for declaration of marriage (sic), the testimony of the petitioner as to the physical
manifestation of the psychological incapacity is of utmost importance. Unfortunately,
petitioner's testimony particularly his affidavit which was considered as his direct
examination contained only general statements on the supposed manifestations of
respondent's incapacity. Respondent was described therein as irresponsible, immature,
self -centered, lacks remorse, got involved with activities defying social and moral ethics.
Petitioner however miserably failed to expound on these allegations. In fact during his
cross-examination, he even contradicted the allegations in his petition and affidavit. He
clearly stated that he had a happy marital relationship with the respondent and never had
a fight with her (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 8).

Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even admitted that this the [sic]
only reason why he wants their marriage dissolved (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 9).
Abandonment of spouse however is not psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for
legal separation.

Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage are sui generis, the allegations therein must
be supported by clear and convincing evidence that would warrant the dissolution of the
marriage bond. Absent such proof, the Court will uphold the validity of the marriage for 'the
rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bond.' (Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31,
2006).

In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage is on the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for insufficiency of

evidence.

SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner moved to reconsider, 16 but in a May 12, 2010 Order,17the RTC held its ground reiterating its
pronouncement that petitioner failed to demonstrate Marilyn's psychological incapacity, and that the petition
is anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment of the marriage and family, which by itself is not equivalent
to psychological incapacity.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R CV No. 95392. However, in its assailed
January 31, 2012 Decision, the CA instead affirmed the RTC judgment, declaring thus:

Petitioner-appellant asserts that the ETC should not have denied the petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Marilyn x x x. He maintains that, contrary to the conclusion
reached by the trial court, he was able to establish by the quantum of evidence required,
the claimed psychological incapacity of his wife.

The argument of Nicolas R. Matudan fails to persuade Us.

Verily, instead or substantiating the alleged psychological incapacity his wife, petitioner-
appellant revealed during his cross examination that it was actually his wife's act of
abandoning the family that led him to seek the nullification of their marriage. In fact, during
his cross-examination, he readily admitted that they were happily married and that they
never engaged in bickering with each other.

xxxx

Q: But how would you describe your marital relations [sic]? Were there moments that you
were happy with your wife?

A: Yes, ma' am, that is why we begot four children.

COURT

And so, you so you [sic] had a happy married life then?

FISCAL

I would presume that you had a happy married life, how come your wife just left you like
that? Do you have any idea why your wife just left you like that?

A: She did not communicate with us to tell her whereabouts.

Q: Did you ever have a fight with your wife?

A: None, ma'am.

xxxx

COURT

All right, you stated in this Affidavit that you are filing this case for the declaration of nullity
of marriage because of the psychological incapacity of your wife, what do you mean by
that?
WITNESS

'Pinabayaan lang kmning pamilya niya, hindi naman niya sinasabi kung saan siya
hahanapin.' She did not inform us of her whereabouts.

COURT

Is that the only reason why you want your marriage with her dissolved?

WITNESS

Yes, your honor.

As correctly observed by the RTC, abandonment by a spouse, by itself, however, does not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
It must be shown that such abandonment is a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes the spouse concerned completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.

Indeed, the term 'psychological incapacity' to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less
than a mental not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the following definitive
guidelines were laid down in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based
on Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff: Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the

celebration' of the marriage,

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles

68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements established in Santos v. Court of

Appeals that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the
grant of a petition for nu1lity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be
confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Using the above standards, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence
insufficient to prove that the respondent-appellee is psychologically unfit to discharge the
duties expected of her as a wife.

Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical
psychologist cannot be relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the
psychological incapacity of his wife.

It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical
psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the
information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their
daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of
age at the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother
well. Also, Maricel would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case
because she could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not
have been expected to know what was happening between her parents until long after her
birth. On the other hand; as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature
would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided
description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.Angelita
Suazo, et al., is illuminating on this score:

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert

opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological
evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in
open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition
only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from
information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of
course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary
worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more
rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is
grave, severe and incurable.

xxxx
 From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using
meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have
secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively
formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelita's psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect
to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to
be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion
that psychological incapacity exists.

In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly

declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'

At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological
condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she
perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee was really
incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
nature.

xxxx

Dr. Tayag's testimony during her cross-examination as well as her statements in the Sworn
Affidavit are no different.

When asked to explain the personality disorder of Marilyn, Dr. Tayag simply replied:

Q: On her case you assessed her as, likewise, suffering from a personality disorder
characterized by Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Anti-Social Trait. Will you please
tell to the Court what do you mean by that personality disorder?

A: In layman's term, once you are being labeled as a narcissistic [sic], this is a person
whose preoccupation are all toward his own self satisfaction both materially or emotionally
at the expense of somebody. They have what you called [sic] strong sense of entitlement
thinking that she can get away whatever [sic] she wants to in pursuit of her own satisfaction
at the expense of somebody. And this is what happened to the respondent. She gave more
consideration to her own satisfaction material wise at the expense of social embarrassment
of the children because of what happened to her.

On the other hand, in her Sworn Affidavit, Dr. Tayag stated:

7. Without a doubt, Marilyn is suffering from a form of personality disorder

that rooted [sic] the downfall of their marriage. As based on the DSM-IV,
respondent's behavioral disposition fits with individuals with
NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-social traits, as
characterized by her disregard for and violation of the rights of others as
well as her failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful
 behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are clearly
immoral and socially despised. Such is also depicted through his [sic]
deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying and conning methods she
used upon others in order to achieve personal profit or pleasure. In
addition, her consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by her repeated
failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations
and her lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing
having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another. x x x. And such condition
is considered to [sic] grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any
treatment available.

Accordingly, even if We assume that Marilyn is really afflicted with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with anti-social traits, in the absence of any showing that the same actually
incapacitated her from fulfilling her essential marital obligations, such disorder cannot be a
valid basis for declaring Nicolas' marriage to Marilyn as null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code. To be sure, jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological
illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity under Article 36.
'[T]he meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.'

All told, We find that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in rendering its
assailed Decision:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 23, 2012 Resolution, the CA stood its
ground. Hence, the instant Petition.

In a November 19, 2014 Resolution,19 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.

Issue

Petitioner mainly questions the CA's appreciation of the case, insisting that he was able to prove Marilyn's
psychological incapacity.1âwphi1

Petitioner's Arguments

In his Petition and Reply,20 petitioner argues that contrary to the CA's findings, he was able to prove
Marilyn's psychological incapacity which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which existed even before their marriage, and continued to subsist
thereafter; that her illness is grave, serious, incurable, and permanent as to render her incapable of
assuming her marriage obligations; that the nullification of his marriage to Marilyn is not an affront to the
institutions of marriage and family, but will actually protect the sanctity thereof because in effect, it will
discourage individuals with psychological disorders that prevent them from assuming marital obligations
from remaining in the sacred bond;21 that the issue of whether psychological incapacity exists as a ground
to nullify one's marriage is a legal question; and that the totality of his evidence and Marilyn's failure to
refute the same despite due notice demonstrate that he is entitled to a declaration of nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
Respondent's Arguments

In its Comment22 praying for denial, the Republic argues that the Petition calls for an evaluation of facts,
thus violating the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should be confined to legal questions.
Citing Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,23which decrees as follows-

Tue issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is
not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination. It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,
save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the
case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in
the instant case. (Citations omitted)

the State argues that the instant case should be dismissed instead.

The public respondent adds that allegations and proof of irresponsibility, immaturity, selfishness,
indifference, and abandonment of the family do not automatically justify a conclusion of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders - existing at the time of the
marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage, and depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond
he/she is about to assume; that petitioner failed to show how each of Marilyn's claimed negative traits
affected her ability to perform her essential marital obligations; that the supposed psychological evaluation
of Marilyn was in fact based on the one-sided, self-serving, and biased information supplied by petitioner
and Maricel - which renders the same unreliable and without credibility; that petitioner's real reason for
seeking nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the family; and that all in all, petitioner failed to prove the
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals24taught us that psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus,
the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved." 25 In this connection, the burden of
proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of Appeals,26or
the Molina case.

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential
guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the
Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly
on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.
Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during
trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the
psychological incapacity. 27
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that
the totality of petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn was psychologically unfit to enter
marriage - in short, while petitioner professed psychological incapacity, he could not establish its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability.

The Court agrees.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and
testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the
psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of Marilyn's psychological
condition was based solely on petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not participate in the proceedings.

Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition."28 "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage." 29 Petitioner's judicial
affidavit and testimony during trial, however, fail to show gravity and juridical antecedence. While he
complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and was involved in "activities defying social and moral
ethics,"30 and that she was, among others, irrational, irresponsible, immature, and self-centered, he
nonetheless failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the degree of
Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness. This is compounded by the fact that petitioner
contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and never had a fight,
which is why they begot four children; and the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 was
Marilyn's complete abandonment of the marriage and family when she left to work abroad.

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family

Code, should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article
68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity'
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 31

If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently
establish the degree of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years old when Marilyn left the family.
Growing up, she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment - such as the lack of emotional and
financial support; but she could not have any idea of her mother's claimed psychological incapacity, as well
as the nature, history, and gravity thereof.

Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's psychological condition were not
based on actual tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on the personal
accounts of petitioner. This fact gave more significance and importance to petitioner's other pieces of
evidence, which could have compensated for the deficiency in the expert opinion which resulted from its
being based solely on petitioner's one-sided account. But since these other pieces of evidence could not
be relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well. In one decided case with a similar factual
backdrop and involving the very same expert witness, this Court held:

It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven
years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as
spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace's departure from their home in
2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with
her obligation to live with her husband.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there
arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of the former's condition. Glenn, however, failed in this
respect. Glenn's testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a
blood relative of Glenn. Glenn's statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and
Rodelito both referred to MaryGrace's traits and acts, which she exhibited during the
marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace's alleged
incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each
other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-] educated person" in Mary
Grace.

Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded. Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz.:

We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the
respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information fed
to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause
cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in
the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did
not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would
have reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations,

and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered,
egocentric, and unremorseful person who 'believes that the world revolves
around him'; and who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the
confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.' x x x

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and

comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed
at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological,
not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's
conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder
declared to be grave and incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a
necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of
the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner
could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological
condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only
 one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.32

Finally, the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts should be given due respect and finality. This
Court is not a trier of facts.

The issue of whether or not psychological inq1pacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is
not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination. It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,
save for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x x.33

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to resolve the other issues raised. They have become
irrelevant.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2012 Decision and August 23, 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95392 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B. G.R. No. 180572

ABRENICA

Petitioners,
Present:

CARPIO, Chairperson,
- versus -
BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and
LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and TIBAYAN,
REYES, JJ.
ATTYS. ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN and DANILO N.
TUNGOL,

Respondents. Promulgated:

June 18, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

SERENO, J.:

The present case is a continuation of G.R. No. 169420[1] decided by this Court on 22 September 2006. For
brevity, we quote the relevant facts narrated in that case:

Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents, Attys. Danilo
N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan (the firm).

In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases
against petitioner. The first was SEC Case No. 05-98-5959, for Accounting and Return and Transfer
of Partnership Funds With Damages and Application for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment,
where they alleged that petitioner refused to return partnership funds representing profits from
the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas. The second was SEC Case No. 10-98-6123, also for
Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds where respondents sought to recover
from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the
cash advance that he obtained in 1997.

The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-
corporate controversies from the SEC to the courts. In a Consolidated Decision dated November
23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, held that:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948

1. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render full accounting of

the amounts he received as profits from the sale and resale of the Lemery property in the
amount of ₱4,524,000.00;

2. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the
said amount of ₱4,524,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum from the time he received
the same and converted the same to his own personal use or from September 1997 until
fully paid; and

3. To pay the costs of suit.

CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959

1. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render a full accounting of the amounts he

received under the retainer agreement between the law firm and Atlanta Industries Inc.
and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount of ₱320,000.00.

2. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the amount received
by him under the Retainer Agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. and Atlanta Land
 Corporation in the amount of ₱320,000.00 plus interests of 12% per annum from June
1998 until fully paid;

3. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to pay the law firm his balance on his cash
advance in the amount of ₱25,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date this
decision becomes final; and

4. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 17, 2004. On December 21, 2004,
he filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41 and paid the required appeal fees.

Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution pursuant to
A.M. 01-2-04-SC, which provides that decisions in intra-corporate disputes are immediately
executory and not subject to appeal unless stayed by an appellate court.

On January 7, 2005, respondents filed an Opposition (To Defendant's Notice of Appeal)

on the ground that it violated A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC[2]prescribing appeal by certiorari under Rule 43
as the correct mode of appeal from the trial courts decisions on intra-corporate disputes.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition to Defendant's
Notice of Appeal) and an Opposition to respondents motion for execution.

On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to show cause why
it should take cognizance of the notice of appeal in view of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Petitioner did not
comply with the said Order. Instead, on June 10, 2005, he filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion
for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Respondents opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion in its assailed Resolution dated June 29,
2005 x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

The Court of Appeals also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its August 23,
2005 Resolution.

Given the foregoing facts, we dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 169420 on the ground that the appeal filed
by petitioner was the wrong remedy. For that reason, we held as follows:[3]

Time and again, this Court has upheld dismissals of incorrect appeals, even if these were
timely filed. In Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc., this Court affirmed the
dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a petition for review under Rule 43 to question a decision
because the proper mode of appeal should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. x x x.

xxxxxxxxx
 Indeed, litigations should, and do, come to an end. Public interest demands an end to
every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve
no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice. In the instant case, the trial court's
decision became final and executory on January 3, 2005. Respondents had already acquired a
vested right in the effects of the finality of the decision, which should not be disturbed any longer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated June 29,
2005 and August 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 denying admission of petitioners Petition for
Review are AFFIRMED.

Thus, respondents sought the execution of the judgment. On 11 April 2007, G.R. No. 169420 became final
and executory.[4]

Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 169420, petitioners Erlando and
Joena subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98679.
The Petition for Annulment of Judgment assailed the merits of the RTCs Decision in Civil Case Nos. Q-01-42948 and
Q-01-42959, subject of G.R. No. 169420. In that Petition for Annulment, Petitioners raised the following grounds:

I. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not
present direct documentary evidence to substantiate [their] respective claims.

II. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly
on testimonial evidence to prove their respective position[s].

III. The lower court erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said
petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a
law partnership transaction.

IV. The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible.

V. The lower court erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was ₱3
million and not ₱8 million.

VI. The lower court erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with Atlanta
Industries, Inc. was a law partnership transaction.

VII. The lower court erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive counterclaim
relative to the various personal loans secured by respondents.

VIII. The lower court not only erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction but more importantly it
acted without jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction. [5]
 We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998 and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando only. It was with the
filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena joined Erlando as a co-petitioner.

On 26 April 2007, the CA issued a Resolution[6]dismissing the Petition. First, it reasoned that the remedy of
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is available only when the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
petitioners.[7] Considering that the dismissal of the appeal was directly attributable to them, the remedy under Rule
47 was no longer available.

Second, the CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved on the merits of the case and the
appreciation by the trial court of the evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the grounds for annulment
are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Lastly, the CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated as a special commercial court did
not mean that the latter had no jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court stated that, in any event, petitioners
could have raised this matter on appeal or through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but they did not do so.

Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated 2 May 2007, but the CA had by
then already issued the 26 April 2007 Resolution dismissing the Petition.

On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 became final and executory.[8]

Petitioners did not give up. They once again filed a 105-page Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the
CA dated 25 May 2007[9] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. This time, they injected the ground of extrinsic fraud
into what appeared to be substantially the same issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The following were the
grounds raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719:

A. Extrinsic fraud and/or collusion attended the rendition of the Consolidated Decision x x x based
on the following badges of fraud and/or glaring errors deliberately committed, to wit:

I. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and
respondents did not present direct documentary evidence to substantiate their
respective claims, as it relied purely on the gist of what its personnel did asregards
the transcript of stenographic notes the latter [sic] in collusion with the respondents.

II. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and
respondents relied mainly on testimonial evidence to prove their respective
positions by relying totally on what was presented to it by its personnel who drafted
the Consolidated Decision in collusion with the respondents.

III. The lower court deliberately erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered
into by said petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal
 transaction and not a law partnership transaction for the same reasons as stated in
Nos. 1 and II above.

IV. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents
are credible as against the petitioner Erlando Abrenica and his witnesses for the same
reasons as stated in Nos. I and II above.

V. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot
involved was ₱3 million and not ₱8 million for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1
and II above.

VI. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with
Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law partnership transaction for the same reasons as
stated in Nos. 1 and II above.

VII. The lower court deliberately erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive
counterclaim relative to the various personal loans secured by respondents also for
the same reasons as the above.

B. As an incident of the extrinsic fraud[,] the lower court[,] despite full knowledge of its
incapacity[,] rendered/promulgated the assailed Consolidated Decision x x x without
jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction.[10] (Underscoring in the original.)

On 2 August 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution [11] dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
99719, which held the Petition to be insufficient in form and substance. It noted the following:

x x x. Readily noticeable is that CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 practically contained the prayer for
the annulment of the subject consolidated Decision premised on the very same allegations,
grounds or issues as the present annulment of judgment case.

xxxxxxxxx

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional

cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, 430
SCRA 96[2004]). Under Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court, the only grounds for an
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA
167 [2004]). Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

xxxxxxxxx

x x x. In the case at bar, not only has the court a quo jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the persons of the parties, what petitioner is truly complaining [of] here is only a possible
error in the exercise of jurisdiction, not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where there is jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter (as in this case), the decision on all other questions arising
in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
 exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of
an appeal (Republic vs. G Holdings, supra, citing Tolentino vs. Leviste, supra). (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, petitioners filed a Humble Motion for Reconsideration[12] on 28 August 2007.

While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007, petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion[13] with Branch 226, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and
petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial court still had to determine the manner of distribution of
the firms assets and the value of the levied properties. Lastly, he insisted that the RTC still had to determine the
issue of whether the Rule 41 appeal was the correct remedy.

On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim[14] also with Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon
City, alleging that she[15] and her stepchildren[16] owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied.
She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community of property. She likewise alleged
that the real property, being a family home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping having a
depreciated combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) were exempt from execution pursuant to
Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and release and likewise the immediate
remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any.

Accordingly, the RTC scheduled[17] a hearing on the motion. On 17 October 2007, however, petitioner
Erlando moved to withdraw his motion on account of ongoing negotiations with respondents. [18]

Thereafter, petitioner Erlando and respondent Abelardo Tibayan, witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de Guzman,
Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, executed an agreement to postpone the auction sale of the property
covered by TCT No. 216818 in anticipation of an amicable settlement of the money judgment. [19]

Finally, on 30 October 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 issued the second assailed
Resolution[20] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, as the last day for
filing was on 27 August 2007. Moreover, the CA found that the grounds stated in the motion were merely recycled
and rehashed propositions, which had already been dispensed with.

Petitioners are now assailing the CA Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. They insist that there is still a pending issue that has not been resolved by the RTC. That issue
arose from the Order[21] given by the trial court to petitioner Erlando to explain why it should take cognizance of the
Notice of Appeal when the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Further, petitioners blame the trial and the appellate courts for the dismissal of their appeal despite this
Courts explanation in G.R. No. 169420 that the appeal was the wrong remedy and was thus correctly dismissed by
the CA. Instead of complying with the show-cause Order issued by the RTC, petitioners went directly to the CA and
insisted that the remedy they had undertaken was correct.

Petitioners also contend that there was extrinsic fraud in the appreciation of the merits of the case. They
raise in the present Petition the grounds they cited in the three (3) Petitions for Annulment of Judgment (including
the Amended Petition) quoted above.

Next, they assert that petitioner Joenas right to due process was also violated when she was not made a
party-in-interest to the proceedings in the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute community of property was
included in the execution of the judgment rendered by Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City.

Finally, they insist that their Humble Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time, since 27 August 2007
was a holiday. Therefore, they had until 28 August 2007 to file their motion.

Since then, it appears that a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm
for the sum of ₱5 million for the property covered by TCT No. 216818.

On 18 March 2009, while the case was pending with this Court, petitioners filed a Complaint[22] with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Marikina City against herein respondents and
Sheriff Nardo I. de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-
1323-MK and was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City. [23] Petitioners sought the nullification of the
sheriffs sale on execution of the Decision in the consolidated cases rendered by Branch 226, as well as the payment
of damages. They alleged that the process of the execution sale was conducted irregularly, unlawfully, and in
violation of their right to due process.

On 2 July 2009, Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
respondents and/or their agents, and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City from consolidating TCT No. 216818. [24]

The filing of the Complaint with the RTC of Marikina City prompted respondents to file a Motion[25] before
us to cite for contempt petitioner spouses and their counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista. This Motion was on the
ground that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the Complaint pending with Branch 273 of the
RTC of Marikina City, while the present case was also still pending.

Meanwhile, on 22 September 2009, respondents filed before Branch 226 an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Possession.[26] That Motion was granted by Branch 226 through a Resolution [27] issued on 10 November
2011. This Resolution then became the subject of a Petition for Certiorari[28] under Rule 65 filed by petitioners before
the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.

Soon after, on 6 March 2012, petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (T.R.O.)[29] after Sheriff De Guzman, Jr. served on them a Notice to Vacate within five days from
receipt or until 11 March 2012. As of the writing of this Decision, the CA has not resolved the issue raised in the
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.

Our Ruling

Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were allegedly denied due process when the CA
rejected their second attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble Motion for
Reconsideration.

We DENY petitioners claims.

The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not to thwart them. Petitioners may
not defy the pronouncement of this Court in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer available to
them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment of judgment was no longer available to them,
because they had already filed an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that appeal was dismissed.

It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and executory through the fault of petitioners
themselves when petitioner Erlando (1) filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2) filed a Petition for
Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the resolution by the RTC of the issues still pending before the trial
court.

In Enriquez v. Court of Appeals,[30] we said:

It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities should be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory
right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)

With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due process was violated, it must be
recalled that after she filed her Affidavit of Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner Erlando filed his
Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues contained in that third-party claim, he subsequently filed two
Motions withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Joena, meanwhile, no longer pursued her third-party
claim or any other remedy available to her. Her failure to act gives this Court the impression that she was no longer
interested in her case. Thus, it was through her own fault that she was not able to ventilate her claim.
 Furthermore, it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline
Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria Monica
Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April 1990).

After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got married on 28 May 1998. [31] In her
Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties in particular, a
piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table were owned by the latter. We note that two of these
stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over
him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children,
her claim cannot be sustained.

Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the
house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3)
of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse
who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither
these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.

We now proceed to discuss the Motion for contempt filed by respondents.

Respondents claim that petitioners and their present counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, were guilty of
forum shopping when the latter filed Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK with the RTC of Marikina City while the case was
still pending before us. In Executive Secretary v. Gordon,[32]we explained forum shopping in this wise:

Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. Thus, it has been held that there is forum-shopping

(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or

(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before
the Court of Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even as one
case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy)
would still be open, or

(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing
to obtain the same from the original court.

Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed to question the proceedings undertaken by the sheriff in executing the
judgment in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. On the other hand, the present case questions the merits of
the Decision itself in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. These cases have different causes of action. Thus, it
cannot be said that petitioners were clearly guilty of forum shopping when they filed the Complaint before the RTC
of Marikina City.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 2 August 2007
and 30 October 2007 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice