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A Leadership Trait Analysis of Osama bin Laden on the Run

Christopher A.D. Charles

University of the West Indies

and

Marie-Helen Maras

John Jay College of Criminal Justice

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A Leadership Trait Analysis of Osama bin Laden on the Run

Abstract

Bin Laden’s personality was measured from a distance with situations on the run to help to

explain why he stayed in one place, which contributed to his death. He was average in his belief in his

ability to control events, conceptual complexity, and power needs, low in self-confidence, task orientation

and in-group bias but high in his distrust of others. He was relationship rather than task focused which led

to loyal friendships and facilitated his escape from Afghanistan because he did not trust outsiders.

Because his conceptual complexity score was higher than his self-confidence score, bin Laden responded

to contextual information and worked with others. He accepted constraints like the Taliban’s defeat, drone

strikes, and the bounty on his head. Therefore, he deemed that a sedentary rather than a mobile life was

safer, which ultimately led to his demise. Counterterrorism professionals can use leadership traits analysis

to help model strategies in response to terrorist behaviors.

Keywords: personality traits, situations, Osama bin Laden, leadership style, terrorism
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Introduction

The spoken and written words of people to some extent reflect their personality including

their needs and defenses. Political psychologists have developed from a distance personality

measures to study the personal characteristics of political leaders (Charles, 2012; Maras, 2012;

Winter, 2005; Winter, 2010). Measuring the personality of political leaders from a distance using

their spoken and written words is very important since these leaders are not available for clinical

interviewing and the decisions they make greatly affect citizens. The from a distance personality

measures are useful like the standard paper and pencil, and computerized personality tests

(Hermann, 1995; Hermann et al., 2001; Winter, 2005, 2013). These personality measures, which

have been used to study political leaders from a distance, can also be used to study terrorist

leaders (Charles, 2009, 2012; Maras, 2012).

Although terrorists spread propaganda in support of their goals their propaganda cannot

mask some of the personal characteristics in their narratives. There have been psychological

studies of terrorists but not much in terms of leadership traits (e.g., Merari et al., 2009; Hermann

& Sakiev, 2011). It is important to American national security interests to understand the

behavior of terrorist leaders that are intent on launching attacks in the United States (Charles &

Maras, 2015). This article uses a leadership trait analysis from the spoken words of Osama Bin

Laden (now deceased) to help identify some aspects of his leadership style, and get some

understanding of his decision to hide in the safe house in Pakistan, rather than move between

safe havens in different countries, and work directly in the field to launch terrorist attacks.

Measuring Personality from a Distance

Winter (2013) defines personality as a constellation of motives, traits, cognition and

social contexts that are observable or inferential and relatively stable across time and situations.
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Personality theories argue that the characteristics of the leader within the context of the situation

he or she faces have some influence on his or her behavior (Winter, 2005).

Several scholars have measured the personality of political leaders from a distance

within situational contexts to help explain their behavior. Langer and Winter (2001) studied four

crises (two of which escalated into war) using government to government documents. This study

reveals that the personal characteristics of the leader such as his or her affiliation motive were

somewhat associated with making concessions. The affiliation motive was negatively associated

with the power motive. Similarly, Winter (2004, 2007) uses diplomatic cables, media reports,

and speeches to assess how the motives of power, affiliation, and achievement, and integrative

complexity, activity inhibition, and responsibility of political leaders played a role in the decision

to go to war. War crises were to some extent driven by the personal characteristics of the leaders

such as power motivation and responsibility compared to peace, which was partly influenced by

achievement motivation and integrative complexity.

Scored verbatim materials of Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin and Franklin

Roosevelt before they engaged in political and military events suggested that heightened risk

taking and aggression were largely predicted by decreases in cognitive complexity and increases

in optimism (Satterfield, 1998). The personality of George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev (their

traits, cognition, and motives) measured from a distance shows that these personality

characteristics had some influence on public policies implemented (Winter et al., 1991). Schmitt

& Winter (1998) used speeches of Mikhail Gorbachev, Leonid Brezhnev, Joseph Stalin and

Nikita Khrushchev from the Communist Party Congress to assess their motive profiles. The

results showed that in the former Soviet Union, the personality of the leaders helped to shape the
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will of the people or the motives of the society. Schafer & Walker’s (2006) comparison of the

operational codes of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair showed that these leaders viewed democracies

as friendly compared to non-democracies and cooperated less with the latter. However, these

leaders managed conflict differently with non-democracies and displayed different leadership

styles in domestic politics.

According to Hermann (1995a), a leader’s ability to change and display flexibility is

partly a function of his personal characteristics and needs, the followers’ images and

expectations, the leader’s constituents, and the relationship the leader has with his followers. The

leadership style of presidents such as how they receive information, their work ethic, the kind of

people they choose to work with them, and how the presidents made up their minds had some

amount of influence on the presidents’ flexibility and how their office and advisory system were

organized (Hermann & Preston, 1994; Hermann, 1995b), and how polices were developed and

implemented (Hermann, 1994). The personal characteristics of the political leaders not only

partly influenced their flexibility but also their risk taking in foreign policy decision-making

(Kowert & Hermann, 1997). The power motive of leaders, particularly authoritative leaders, not

only had some influence on the decision to go to war but also their foreign policy decision

making in general through their inflexible leadership styles (Hermann et al., 2001). Similarly, the

leadership styles of prime ministers reflect various levels of flexibility. Margaret Thatcher was a

crusader, John Major was a pragmatist, and Chancellors like Konrad Adenaeur was crusader and

Helmut Kohl a strategist. The prime ministers’ leadership styles also influenced to some extent

their foreign policy decision making within the environmental constraints and opportunities they

faced (Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998).

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Computerized text analysis of function words used by four radical groups was useful in

the prediction of terrorist attacks (Pennebaker, 2011). The use of automated verbs in context

system which examines the operational code of terrorist groups revealed that there are

coordination and communication pattern of public statements and psychological dispositions of

groups like al Qaeda that are identifiable in the pre-attacks period (Walker, 2011). There were

few significant changes in motive imagery scores of terrorist groups before attacks so motive

imagery scores had limited use in the prediction of terrorist attacks (Winter, 2011).

Hermann (1995b, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c) building on previous work developed a

personality theory for studying the leadership style of leaders by using their spoken and written

words to measure seven personality traits. These are the belief that people can control and

influence events; conceptual complexity, which is the capability to contrast people, objects, and

events in the environment; the need for power and influence; the inclination to focus on solving

problems and accomplishing tasks rather than dealing with the sensitivities and ideas of other

people (relationship with others); the extent of bias toward the in-group; the lack of trust or

suspiciousness of others; and the level of self-confidence. The leadership trait theory holds that

leader behavior is partly a function of these seven personality traits in interaction with the

situation he or she faces (Hermann, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). The personality traits theory of

leadership has been used to study the leadership style of Bill Clinton (Hermann, 2005b) and

Saddam Hussein (Hermann, 2005c). The leadership trait analysis was also used to get some

understanding of how the rhetoric of al Qaeda leaders changed before they engaged in violence

(Hermann & Sakiev, 2011).

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The Psychology of Terrorism

Few studies of terrorists using from a distance personality measures exist. Studies

examining the psychology of suicide bombers reveal their inclination for weapons of mass

destruction (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2009) and their view of suicide bombings as obligations in

the defense of Islam and ultimately, as acts of personal significance (Post, 2009a). Understanding

the suicide bombers of radical Islam requires knowledge of the influence of collective identity

using a multidisciplinary approach (Post, Hall, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff & Weine, 2009).

These Islamic terrorists more often than not are normal people that have been radicalized for

jihad. It is important to understand how the minds of different types of terrorists work anchored

in the historical, cultural, religious, political, and economic contexts so counterterrorism

measures can be developed (Hoffman, 2006; Post, 2005a, 2006, 2007; Sageman, 2008).

Moreover, it is important to understand the changing face of terrorism from the revolutionary,

nationalist or separatist terrorists to the fundamentalist Islamic terrorists. Terrorists can be

inhibited by preventing potential recruits from joining a group, exacerbating rivalries within the

group, creating exit strategies, and isolating the leader and the group. Effective responses to

terrorism require complex reading of the terrorists (Horgan, 2005; Post, 2005b).

Terrorist groups and organizations engage in imitation and innovation for strategic utility

so it is necessary to identify and understand the plethora of factors that spur this creativity in

order to respond effectively to terrorism (Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenbery, 2013). Therefore,

it is useful to uncover the routes of terrorists to, through, and away from terrorism in order to

grasp the process of violent radicalization and the salient creation of meanings by the terrorists as

they engage in this process (Horgan, 2008). These routes also apply to the small breakaway or

splinter groups of terrorists that erodes peace and stability thereby requiring a deconstruction of
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their activities, strategies, motivations, psychology, and history (Horgan, 2013). A distinction

should be made between radicalization and disengagement processes in terrorist routes. A

terrorist may leave terrorism but this does not automatically mean that he or she has experienced

the process of deradicalization (Horgan, 2009; Horgan &Taylor, 2006; Maras, 2012).

Terrorist leaders

Terrorist leaders who are influenced by psychological, social, economic, and political

processes have identity expectations of their followers who tend to manifest these expectations

(Cinoglu, 2009; Goertzel, 2002). Terrorist leaders espouse an ideology which is related to the

socio-economic and political system and the grievances of their society and its relationship with

the international system (Gürses, 2008; Stern, 2003). Charismatic terrorist leaders use their

charisma to influence recruits into a deviant culture of violence. These inspirational leaders

motivate freelance terrorists that make effective use of modern communication and technology in

their operations (Kushner, 1998). The inspirational leaders sometime create a clandestine

message and a group of likeminded believers respond to the inspirational leader’s public

narrative. Accordingly, there is a leaderless resistance ready to attack the enemy (Charles, 2009;

Charles & Maras, 2015; Maras, 2012, 2013; Stern, 2003). Some terrorist leaders are

authoritarians who have the ability to merge their needs with those of their followers (Russell,

2009). The bargaining process with terrorist groups is partly determined by how the group is

organized by its leader (Oots, 1990).

Some leaders use a centralized network so they can communicate effectively and control

what members do, make optimal decisions, and deal with externalities unlike the leaders in

loosely connected networks (Enders & Jindapon, 2010). The terrorist in these networks operate

in weak clusters. Only one member (the leader) is designated to communicate with the other
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members of the cluster so penetration of the cluster by law enforcement is difficult (Maras 2012;

Sageman, 2004). The clusters are cemented by a shared mission driven by trust. Moreover, the

clusters remain weak until the leader authorizes an attack (Charles & Maras, 2015; Charles,

2009; Stern, 2003).

The objective of this article is to help explain the decision of Osama bin Laden to hide in

a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, rather than work in the field by assessing his leadership

style by measuring his personality traits from a distance. Although a terrorist leader like bin

Laden had a strong belief that Allah was protecting him and he was very likely unafraid to die in

jihad because he would become a martyr, it was in the interest of his cause to stay alive to plan

and direct the launching of terrorist attacks. Leadership trait analysis can be used to help explain

the behavior of terrorist leaders that may assist in the development of counterterrorism strategies.

The research question posed is: why did Osama bin Laden choose to hide and direct the terrorist

activities of al-Qaeda from a private home in Pakistan rather than conduct these activities in the

field?
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Method

Sample

A sample of 272 Osama bin Laden speeches, interviews, public statements, and messages

compiled by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) in the United States and a fatwa

were used. The FBIS data source was used because it compiled a very wide range of the spoken

and written words of Osama bin Laden over a decade (before and after the 9/11 terrorist attack).

Procedure

The FBIS report was edited to remove the portion of the text that included words not

attributed to Osama bin Laden. The 272 speeches, interviews, statements, and messages of

Osama bin Laden and the fatwa were entered into the Profiler Plus computer software version

5.8.4 to operationalize the personality of the terrorist leader (Hermann, 2002, 2005a, 2005b,

2005c; Hermann & Sakiev, 2011). It is assumed that the frequencies with which bin Laden used

certain verbs indicate how salient these words were to him. The Profiler Plus software was

developed to code the verbs leaders use into seven traits by taking a frequency count of these

words (Hermann, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). These traits are: (1) the extent of bias toward the

in-group; (2) the lack of trust or suspiciousness of others; (3) the inclination to focus on solving

problems and accomplishing tasks rather than dealing with the sensitivities and ideas of other

people (relationships); (4) the level of self-confidence; (5) conceptual complexity which is the

capability to contrast people, objects and events in the environment; (6) the need for power and

influence; (7) belief that people can control and influence events (Hermann, 2002, 2005a, 2005b,

2005c; Hermann and Sakiev, 2011).

For example, a leader high in need for power and influence would use words like “fight,”

and “unyielding” and so on and the profiler plus would take a frequency count of these kinds of
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words. Hermann (2002:16) points out that, “A score on a need for power is determined by

calculating the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the speaker or

group with whom the speaker identifies have engaged in one of these behaviors. The overall

score for any leader is the average of this percentage across the total number of interview

responses examined.” The documents used in this study generally had more than a thousand

words, which is the minimal word count of a document recommended for use with profiler plus

so that the software had enough potent data to code (Hermann, 2002).

Osama bin Laden’s leadership trait scores were compared with the mean of the trait

scores of 214 political leaders (provided with Profiler Plus) to see if bin Laden was high,

average/moderate or low on each of the seven traits. A point of one or more were used to

determine the differences between bin Laden’s trait scores and the trait scores of the norm group

of political leaders. Bin Laden’s trait scores were interpreted within the context of some of the

situations he faced on the run.

News reports, declassified government intelligence documents, government statements,

and academic publications were used to identify: (1) some major events and situations faced by

bin Laden locally and internationally that provide some explanations for bin Laden fleeing

Afghanistan with Western security agents hunting him; (2) the layout of the Abbottabad

compound to understand the movements of the occupants; (3) Bin Laden’s continued

communication with al-Qaeda leadership which tells us about his desire to influence events in

the field; (4) the situation in Pakistan whether it was conducive for bin Laden to remain in the

country; (5) the daily activities, routines and roles of the occupants of the compound to help

understand their importance in the household and how they operated; (6) the unfolding of
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events/situations when the United States Navy SEALS entered the compound to understand if

the occupants were prepared for an attack and how they responded to the SEALS.

Results

[Table 1 about here]

Table 1 illustrates the seven trait scores of Osama bin Laden and the average trait scores

of 214 political leaders (the norm group) on each trait, which allows for comparison with bin

Laden’s trait scores to determine whether bin Laden is high, average/moderate or low on these

traits. The table shows that Osama bin Laden is average in his belief in his ability to control

events, conceptual complexity, and his need for power. He also ranks low on self-confidence, in-

group bias and task orientation but high in his distrust of others.
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Discussion

This study examined the leadership traits of Osama bin Laden within the context of the

situations he faced on the run to help explain why he settled in the compound in Abbottabad

rather than move around in the field to avoid capture (as he did on previous occasions, such as in

Tora Bora). Some important situational and contextual information that interacted with Laden’s

leadership traits are provided to enhance the discussion about bin Laden’s behavior on the run.

This information was culled from the triangulation of media reports, and academic publications

with government reports because latter is contested information.

Some Major Contextual Situations Faced by Osama bin Laden From 2001-2011

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of

Diplomatic Security Rewards for Justice Program offered $25 million for information leading to

the capture of Osama bin Laden (U.S. Department of State, 2002). The U.S. also engaged in

targeted killings of al-Qaeda’s leadership. Moreover, Operation Enduring Freedom began in

October 2001. Particularly, military action was initiated against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Osama bin Laden was believed to be in Jalalabad at that time. However, by November 2001,

this military action forced bin Laden to leave Jalalabad for the mountains of Tora Bora along the

Afghanistan and Pakistan tribal border (Hastert, 2005; Smucker, 2004). The aerial bombardment

of Tora Bora and the advances of military forces on the ground, ultimately led to bin Laden’s

decision to flee to Pakistan (Hastert, 2005; United States Senate, 2009). Noman Benotman, who

was a senior member in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda),

informed CNN that bin Laden, when considering his exit from Tora Bora, “knew not to trust

local people across the border in Pakistan -- a lawless area where criminals and drug traffickers
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would not have thought twice about trading the al-Qaeda leader for the bounty on offer by the

United States of $25 million” (Lister, 2011).

The Pakistani government in the past has harbored terrorists and provided them with a

safe haven in their country. Intelligence agencies suspected that Osama bin Laden was hiding in

the region (Maddrell, 2009). It turns out that they were right. A Pakistani government report

revealed that Osama bin Laden had lived in the following areas in Pakistan since the terrorist

attacks on 9/11: Abbotabad, South Waziristan, Peshawar, Bajaur, Haripur and Swat (Krishnadev,

2013).

What led intelligence agencies to finding Osama bin Laden?

One of bin Laden’s close associates Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti led his hunters to bin Laden.

The intelligence agencies in the United States first turned their attention toward al-Kuwaiti after

he called an individual in the country who was under wiretap surveillance. During the phone

conversation, al-Kuwaiti mentioned that he was back with the individuals, which he was with

before. Intelligence agencies suspected that this statement meant that al-Kuwaiti was with al-

Qaeda leadership and possibly even bin Laden. Following this conversation, intelligence

agencies began to track the movements of al-Kuwaiti using human and technological resources

(Maras, 2012). This monitoring of al-Kuwaiti led intelligence agencies to a compound in

Abbottabad, Pakistan, which had 12 to 18 feet walls, and was eight times the size of other homes

in the surrounding area (Ross, Cole & Patel, 2011). Osama bin Laden started living in the

Abbottabad compound after it was built in 2005 (Khan, 2012).

The Abbottabad compound had no phone line or Internet access to evade detection by

authorities. Therefore, phone calls including cellular calls were never made or received on or

near the compound. For example, individuals, such as al-Kuwaiti, would drive a substantial
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distance (approximately 90 minutes) away from the compound in order to place a call or even

place batteries in their mobile phones (Woodward, 2011). Those in the compound also burned

their trash instead of allowing it to be collected. This way of living was extremely necessary

because the United States’ counterterrorism establishment was killing members of the al-Qaeda

leadership using unmanned aerial drones.

Satellite imaging was also helpful in identifying bin Laden. This technology was used to

both study the compound and help to determine whether bin laden was in the compound.

Particularly, satellite imagery captured someone who strolled in the courtyard for 1 to 2 hours

each day. This person was dubbed the “the pacer” by intelligence agencies. Even though the

satellite imagery never revealed a clear view of the person’s face, the National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency was able to analyze the images and determine that the person’s height was

between 5 feet 8 inches and 6 feet 8 inches. The majority of men in the world range in height

between 5 feet 7 inches and 6 feet. Since Osama bin Laden was 6 feet 4 inches, intelligence

agencies suspected that this individual might be bin Laden when analyzed with other intelligence

data such as, for e.g. a suspected al Qaeda operative was visiting the compound (Woodward,

2011).

Moreover, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employed Shikal Alfridi, a Pakistani

medical doctor, to conduct a fake Hepatitis B vaccination campaign in Abbottabad in order to

enable Dr. Alfridi to gain entry into (what was suspected to be) bin Laden’s compound and

obtain blood from the residents, which could be matched with the DNA of the bin Laden family

on CIA files. The CIA has not officially commented on whether or not this campaign was

successful (BBC, 2012; Shah, 2011; Mazzetti, 2011).

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Despite the fact that the presence of bin Laden in the compound could not be verified

with certainty, U.S. President Barack Obama authorized a U.S. Navy SEAL team to raid the

compound. This raid was conducted without notifying Pakistani authorities because it was

believed that the integrity of the mission would have been jeopardized (Schmidle, 2011). When

the SEALs entered the compound they reported that they met resistance and killed four

individuals before they reached someone on the top floor, whom they suspected was Osama bin

Laden. The media reported that bin Laden resisted members of the SEAL and was killed.

However, later media reports stated that the mission was not to capture bin Laden to but to kill

him. In a televised address on May 1, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that

Osama bin Laden was shot and killed during the U.S. Navy SEAL raid of his compound. The

foregoing situational sketch will be used to contextualize bin Laden’s personality traits (derived

from his spoken words) to help explain his behavior on the run, specifically his behaviour to

become sedentary.

Distrust of Others and In-group Bias

Bin Laden’s high score for distrust (see Table 1) suggest that he was suspicious of the

motives of others particularly those who did not embrace his cause (Hermann, 2002; Hermann &

Sakiev, 2011). After the United States attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2011, bin

Laden escaped from Tora Bora (Bergen, 2011) through the unstable and lawless border between

Afghanistan and Pakistan without seeking the assistance of the local people because he was very

suspicious of them. The people of the border region were outsiders; and as such, untrustworthy.

However, while bin Laden did not trust the local people he demanded complete loyalty from his

aides and body guards. He also had longstanding contacts in the area that he developed during

the jihad against the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Bodansky, 2001). Bin Laden,
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therefore, trusted and relied on them to live clandestinely in South Waziristan, Bajaur, Peshawar,

Swat, and Haripur in Pakistan between 2001 and 2005. These close aides and contacts were

insiders and thus trustworthy to bin Laden. Because they were trustworthy to bin Laden, he

relied on them to secretly move him from place to place after testing the situation to ensure that

the places he was being led to were safe (Krishnadev, 2013; Maddrell, 2009).

After eluding the United States for four years, bin Laden went to live in the Abbottabad

compound with the continued help of his contacts, where he stayed until he was killed. The fact

that bin Laden stayed in the house for many years suggests that he trusted his aides and contacts

that facilitated his movements and kept his location a secret. Moreover, he was also likely to feel

comfortable and safe at the house with its high walls (that secured him from his neighbors and

passersby) and communications disconnected (which secured him from Western intelligence

agencies). Furthermore, the fact that he spent all of his time in Pakistan after he left Tora Bora

suggests that he felt the country provided a safe clandestine environment in which he could

successfully hide from his hunters and remain relatively near to his aides and courier. Bin Laden

had also developed a close relationship with Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence during the

Afghanistan jihad of the 1980s, which redounded to his advantage during his stay in Pakistan.

What’s more, bin Laden was very popular in Pakistan at the time (Bodansky, 2001; Chipman,

2003; Jo, 2012; Krishnadev, 2013).

Bin Laden’s low in-group bias score (see Table 1) suggest that he did not always see the

world in the “we or them” frame, based on the situation he was facing (Hermann, 2002;

Hermann & Sakiev, 2011). For example, if bin Laden perceived that Muslims were under attack

by western governments his in-group bias would be high in this situation because one of his

major social identity groups was under attack. Therefore, bin Laden would see the world with the
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“we (Muslims) versus them (western governments)” frame. The jihads that bin Laden

participated in were driven by the situation. Bin Laden first participated in the jihad against the

Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980s because the “infidels” invaded a Muslim country. The

young bin Laden did not find another “them” immediately after the Soviet army withdrew from

Afghanistan but returned to Saudi Arabia and got mega construction projects from the

government. Subsequently he provided support to the jihad in the horn of Africa because he

believed Islam was under threat in this region. In 1990 the Saudi Government invited the

American government to send military forces to Saudi Arabia after Iraq invaded Kuwait and this

infuriated bin Laden (Hashim, 2001).

The problem for bin Laden and other Islamic fundamentalists was the fact that the Saudi

Government did not ask the American troops to leave the “holy places” (Saudi Arabia) as it said

it would after Iraq was pushed out of Kuwait by the international military coalition led by the

United States. It was only after this that bin Laden fiercely criticized the Saudi Government’s

decision to keep the “infidels” in the “holy places,” and was forced to leave Saudi Arabia, which

further angered him (Hashim, 2001). He subsequently declared war on the United States. Bin

Laden believed America was a “paper tiger” which could be defeated especially after the United

States military withdrew from Somalia in 1994 without a successful humanitarian intervention

during the famine and defeating the armed clans (Bondansky, 2001: 89; Wright, 2007).

Belief in the Ability to Control Events and the Need for Power

Table 1 shows that bin Laden had a moderate or average belief in his ability to control

events. This score suggests that it was likely that bin Laden was involved in al-Qaeda’s policy-

making process (Hermann, 2002; Hermann & Sakiev, 2011). The table also shows that bin
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Laden was moderate in his need for power. Leaders with this moderate power orientation tend to

want to impact their organizations (Bodansky, 2001; Hermann, 2002; Hermann & Sakiev, 2011).

What are the situations that elevated bin Laden’s need for power?

Leaders with a moderate need for power will develop a high need for power in situations

of conflict because of the perceived threats they are facing (Hermann, 2002; Hermann & Sakiev,

2011). Conflict situations seemed to have elevated bin Laden’s needs for power. Specifically,

several of these situations had some amount of influence on Osama bin Laden’s high need for

power (Chipman, 2003). In fact, these situations seemingly influenced him to challenge the

operational environment by attacking the United States on September 11, 2001. Osama bin

Laden was likely to be high in his need for power near the execution of this and other terrorist

attacks (Chipman, 2003).

Despite al-Qaeda’s success in attacking the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,

and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000, it had yet to achieve a

substantive successful attack in the United States. Even though al-Qaeda bombed the World

Trade Center (WTC) in the United States in 1993, it had failed to destroy the Twin Towers,

which was the goal of the attack (Reeve, 1999). Subsequently, bin Laden and other al-Qaeda

leaders engineered tactics (i.e., crashing commercial jets into the Twin Towers, the Pentagon and

a field in Pennsylvania) to achieve al-Qaeda’s goal of launching major successful terrorist

attacks in the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).

Leaders with a moderate need for power such as bin Laden tend to prefer face-to-face

negotiations (Hermann, 1995b, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Hermann & Sakiev, 2011).

However, Osama bin Laden was not able to interact in one-on-one negotiations with agents of

the U.S government since he was wanted for the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa and other
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terrorist attacks. He had no way of obtaining information from his main adversary, the United

States, to help him with contextual information except the media, his subordinates, and sponsors.

Osama bin Laden, therefore, misinterpreted the intentions and activities of the United States, and

the extent to which the U.S. would respond to the 9/11 attack at home; especially, given

historical responses of the United States to terrorist attacks (e.g., responses to the 1993 WTC

attacks and the 1998 embassy bombings). The American military did not invade Sudan and

Afghanistan that provided critical support for the bombers. President Clinton instead ordered air

strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan (Bodanksy, 2001; Wright, 2007). However, the United

States military invaded Afghanistan in retaliation for the 9/11 attack which forced the retreat of

the Taliban from Afghanistan and bin Laden to flee (Bergen, 2011; Post, 2007). Consequently,

bin Laden was unable to get optimal contextual information after his escape because he was

disconnected from the information provided by the al-Qaeda terrorist network. The American

government’s response to the 9/11 attack separated the al-Qaeda leaders from their followers

(Horgan, 2005; Post, 2005b).

Osama bin Laden had moderate scores on his belief that he could control events and on

his need for power (see Table 1). These scores suggests that since bin Laden believed that he was

not in total control of events, he worked with the situational constraints he was facing (Hermann,

2002; Hermann & Sakiev, 2011), which included the strength of American military power in

Afghanistan (Bergen, 2011). Moreover, drones were being used to target terrorist leaders in the

field and there was a $25 million bounty for bin Laden (U.S. Department of State, 2002). Bin

Laden knew he was at a disadvantage so he adapted to the situation for his survival by fleeing to

the tribal areas and subsequently, to his final destination, the safe house in Pakistan (Hastert,

2005; Smucker, 2005). His successful escape from Afghanistan suggests that his close
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subordinates conformed to his wishes. He was successful again in eluding the United States. Bin

Laden held sway over his followers in the past, partly because of the lure of the successful

terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda against the United States from 1993-2001, and his high power needs

in situations of conflict. Moreover, al-Qaeda had control over the element of surprise in these

situations because although the United States’ security agencies expected attacks they did not

know when the country would be attacked by al-Qaeda (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).

Despite, the al-Qaeda leader’s moderate belief in his ability to control events, he felt he

could adversely impact his chief adversary, the United States some more because of the

successful terrorist attacks against the country from 1993-2001 mentioned earlier (Chipman,

2003; Hermann, 1995b, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Hermann & Sakiev, 2011). To accomplish

this, bin Laden released a statement threatening more terrorist attacks just before the 2004

Presidential Election in the United States in order to influence the elections. This statement

inevitably redounded to the advantage of President George W. Bush who won the election

(Johnson, 2004). This and other similar actions by Osama bin Laden suggest that he received and

responded to feedback in his operational environment before he went to the safe house in

Pakistan. There was no place for a compromise in bin Laden’s worldview given the fatwas that

he issued for attacks against the United States and the constant planning of attacks by al-Qaeda.

There were also al-Qaeda attacks overseas when the proactive measures of the Department of

Homeland Security in the United States in concert with the security agencies of its allies

provided operational constraints for al-Qaeda in the United States and elsewhere. Al-Qaeda, in

response, sought to influence homegrown terrorists through the Internet (Maras 2012; McAuley,

2005; Torres-Soriano, 2012).

 22

In what situation did bin Laden believe he could control events?

Bin Laden desired to control events when he was in a position of safety. Particularly, bin

Laden wanted to have a say in what al-Qaeda operatives did in the field from his safe house in

Pakistan at a time when al-Qaeda was under tremendous pressure from Western security

agencies. Bin Laden was likely very active in the al-Qaeda decision making process through al-

Kuwaiti who visited him. He likely checked with the courier to see how the other terrorist

operatives were doing in the field. Bin Laden became increasingly alarmed over time by the

indiscriminate killing of Muslims in Iraq and elsewhere by al-Qaeda’s affiliates that were

damaging the al-Qaeda brand (Bukay, 2008; Shapiro, 2013). It was bin Laden’s need to control

events when the al-Qaeda leadership had reduced control in the field and his continued

involvement in the decision making process that led to his demise. The U.S. intelligence agents

tracked al-Kuwaiti to the safe house. To these intelligence agents, this indicated the possibility

that a high value target, such as bin Laden, was residing there. Bin Laden with his desire to

influence events in the field from the safe house underestimated the reach of the United States’

intelligence and security agencies (Woodward, 2011).

Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence

A leader’s conceptual complexity and self-confidence scores are suggestive of the

leader’s openness to contextual information (Hermann, 2002; Hermann & Sakiev, 2011). The al-

Qaeda leader was moderate on conceptual complexity and low on self-confidence (see Table 1).

Leaders whose conceptual complexity scores are higher than their self-confidence scores are

usually more pragmatic and responsive to others (Hermann, 2002). Bin Laden’s openness to

contextual information is revealed by the fact that he accepted the operational environment based

on the situations he faced on the run by departing Afghanistan. He departed Afghanistan when he
 23

realized that the Taliban could not withstand the American military assault. Bin Laden knew that

in leaving Afghanistan the people in the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan could not be trusted; and

as such, he relied only on close al-Qaeda insiders. He was responsive to this contextual

information because he was a pragmatist. The American military and intelligence agencies, the

drone attacks, and the $25 million bounty on bin Laden, made it difficult for him to operate in

the field so it was best to become sedentary in a secret location. However, bin Laden did not

have enough contextual information in the safe house because he did not leave the house or use

modern communication equipment and relied instead on visits from his courier (Maras, 2012).

The contextual information bin Laden used in his decision to become a sedentary jihadist

were likely much more than the successful military strategies of the United States, which created

a hostile operational environment (Shapiro, 2013). There were several other possible contextual

factors. These are the fact that there were al-Qaeda affiliates in the field (Shapiro, 2013); as such,

terrorist attacks would continue without bin Laden and the other al-Qaeda leaders being in the

field. Bin Laden was also now much older and possibly could not deal with the rigors of the

field, unlike the 1980s when he was a young jihadist in Afghanistan. Moreover, he also had

several wives and children whose best interests may have dictated a sedentary life (Bodansky,

2001; Wright, 2007). Despite the possibility that the foregoing contextual factors might also have

influenced bin Laden to leave the field, what is certain is that it became increasingly difficult for

bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders to operate openly in any country or region. The United

States was very successful in killing terrorist leaders in the field with drone strikes (Maras,

2012). Bin Laden’s higher conceptual complexity score (see Table 1) suggest that he could

synthesize whatever contextual information and attendant demands that impacted his goals and

adjust his modus operandi in support of these goals. Furthermore, bin Laden’s low self-
 24

confidence score suggest, based on Hermann’s (2002; Hermann & Sakiev, 2011) interpretation

of this trait, that he was influenced to accept and deal with the constraints in the operational

environment rather than try to modify the environment.

Bin Laden was influential among the subordinates around him partly because of his

previous successes in the field and several leadership traits. These are his demand for loyalty

(suggested by his low score in self-confidence) because people low in self-confidence are less

likely to trust others they are working with and demand their loyalty, and his need for conformity

(due to his situational power needs during conflicts mentioned earlier) (Hermann 2002; Hermann

& Sakiev, 2011). Despite his interests in the welfare and needs of other al-Qaeda members he

had lost control over the fighters in the field (Bukay, 2008; Dennis, 2005). Nevertheless, these

al-Qaeda operatives contributed to al-Qaeda’s decision making process by providing the

leadership with contextual information from the field. The al-Qaeda leadership used a case by

case approach to situations and events. This approach was revealed in the use of various methods

of terrorist attack. Car bombs were used for the first attack on the World Trade Center, truck

bombs were used in the attack on the American embassies in Africa, a boat packed with bombs

was rammed into the side of the USS Cole, and hijacked planes were used as missiles in the 9/11

attacks (Maras, 2012, 2013). Bin Laden would have played a role in most or all of these attacks

because he was the leader of al-Qaeda (Wright, 2007).

Task Orientation

Al-Qaeda in addition to launching terrorist attacks had an effective media strategy backed

by the tactics of denial and deception (Ciavacco, 2009; Jesse, 2006). The al-Qaeda leader’s low

task orientation score (see Table 1) suggests that building and maintaining relationships with

subordinates were important to him (Hermann, 1995b, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Hermann &
 25

Sakiev, 2011). Therefore, he was greatly affected when some of the al-Qaeda affiliates (e.g., Al-

Qaeda in Iraq) ignored his instructions (Masters & Laub, 2013). Bin Laden’s low task

orientation score does not mean that the goals of al-Qaeda were not important but that the

concerns, opinions, and needs of the group and the participation of members through

consultations, were priorities that would have factored heavily into decision making. Bin Laden’s

consensual style of leadership was reinforced by the Islamic tradition of Shura Council with its

consensual decision making norms (Bodansky, 2001; Dennis, 2005; Wright, 2007). This

approach not only provided more contextual information for bin Laden and other al-Qaeda

leaders but also enhanced group cohesion which redounded to the advantage of friendship,

commitment, and loyalty in al-Qaeda but without full control in the field. It was the loyalty,

commitment, and friendship in al-Qaeda that facilitated bin Laden’s safe and secretive move

from Afghanistan to Pakistan and the decision of the group members who had knowledge of the

plan to ignore the $25 million bounty on his head.

The foregoing discussion reveals that Bin Laden hid in the safe house in Pakistan for

several plausible interrelated reasons (personality, situations and contexts). These are that bin

Laden was a pragmatic leader who recognized the constraints of his operational environment

because successful American drone strikes against al Qaeda terrorist leaders in the field made it

difficult for bin Laden to operate openly in any country. Moreover the US $25 million bounty on

bin Laden’s head and his distrust of others made it less likely that he would continue operating in

the field. Also, being sedentary did not prevent bin Laden from communicating with the rest of

the al Qaeda leadership also in hiding, and operatives in the field, in keeping with his need to

control events because al Qaeda had trusted couriers that used face-to-face meetings to safely
 26

transmit information. Bin Laden also had several wives and children and he was also getting

older so a sedentary life made better familial and operational sense.

There are limitations to the study. The authors do not know the range of situations that

bin Laden faced that interacted with his personality traits that to some extent influenced his

behavior on the run. Moreover, traits are static. However, this article has contributed to the

literature on terrorism and leadership by conducting a leadership trait analysis of Osama bin

Laden that helped to explain his behavior on the run and his decision to remain sedentary rather

than mobile. This methodology could be helpful to counterterrorism professionals to track and

help predict the behavior of terrorist leaders in the field with if-then situational contingencies.
 27

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 32

Table 1

Osama bin Laden’s Leadership Trait Scores

Traits Bin Laden’s Avg. Trait Scores of Bin Laden’s Traits

Trait Scores 214 World Leaders High/Avg./Low

Distrust 0.28 0.01 High

Belief in Ability to Control Events 0.40 0.34 Average
Conceptual Complexity 0.63 0.65 Average
Need for Power 0.20 0.26 Average
Self Confidence 0.15 0.36 Low
Task Orientation 0.60 0.73 Low
In-group Bias 0.30 0.51 Low