SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-19342. May 25, 1972.]

LORENZO T. OÑA, and HEIRS OF JULIA BUNALES, namely:

RODOLFO B. OÑA, MARIANO B. OÑA, LUZ B. OÑA, VIRGINIA
B. OÑA, and LORENZO B. OÑA, JR., petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

Orlando Velasco for petitioners.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R.
Rosete and Special Attorney Purificacion Ureta for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. TAXATION; INTERNAL REVENUE CODE; CORPORATE TAX;

UNREGISTERED PARTNERSHIP; FORMATION THEREOF WHERE INCOME
FROM SHARES OF CO-HEIRS CONTRIBUTED TO COMMON FUND. — From
the moment petitioners allowed not only the incomes from their respective shares of
the inheritance but even the inherited properties themselves to be used by Lorenzo T.
Oña (who managed the properties) as a common fund in undertaking several
transactions or in business, with the intention of deriving profit to be shared by them
proportionally, such act was tantamount to actually contributing such incomes to a
common fund and, in effect, they thereby formed an unregistered partnership within
the purview of the provisions of the Tax Code.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN HEIRS NOT CONSIDERED AS

UNREGISTERED CO-PARTNERS AND NOT SUBJECT TO SUCH TAX. — In
cases of inheritance, there is a period when the heirs can be considered as co-owners
rather than unregistered co-partners within the contemplation of our corporate tax
laws. Before the partition and distribution of the estate of the deceased, all the income
thereof does belong commonly to all the heirs, obviously, without them becoming
thereby unregistered co-partners.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMVENTIONS OF SECTIONS 24 AND 84(b) OF

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 TAX CODE WHEN HEIRS CONTINUE AS CO-OWNERS. — For tax purposes, the
co-ownership of inherited properties is automatically converted into an unregistered
partnership, for it is easily conceivable that after knowing their respective shares in
the partition, they (heirs) might decide to continue holding said shares under the
common management of the administrator or executor or of anyone chosen by them
and engage in business on that basis. Withal, if this were not so, it would be the
easiest thing for heirs in any inheritance to circumvent and render meaningless
Sections 24 and 84(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

4. ID.; ID.; ID., HEIRS AS UNREGISTERED CO-PARTNERS;

PARTNERSHIP CONTEMPLATED IN CIVIL CODE NOT APPLICABLE. —
Petitioners' reliance on Article 1769, par. (3) of the Civil Code, providing that: "The
sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the
persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from
which the returns are derived," and, for that matter, on any other provision of said
code on partnerships is unavailing. In Evangelista (102 Phil. 140), this Court clearly
differentiated the concept of partnerships under the Civil Code from that of
unregistered partnerships which are considered as "corporations" under Sections 24
and 84(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEGREGATION OF INCOME FROM BUSINESS

FROM THAT OF INHERITED PROPERTIES, NOT PROPER. — Where the
inherited properties and the income derived therefrom were used in business of buying
and selling other real properties and corporate securities, the partnership income must
include not only the income derived from the purchase and sale of other properties but
also the income of the inherited properties.

6. ID.; ID.; INCOME TAX; ACTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT SUBJECT

TO PRESCRIPTION. — A taxpayer who has paid the wrong tax, assuming that the
failure to pay the corporate taxes in question was not deliberate, has the right to be
reimbursed what he has erroneously paid, but the law is very clear that the claim and
action for such reimbursement are subject to the bar of prescription. And since the
period for the recovery of the excess income taxes in the case of herein petitioners has
already lapsed, it would not seem right to virtually disregard prescription merely upon
the ground that the reason for the delay is precisely because the taxpayers failed to
make the proper return and payment of the corporate taxes legally due from them.

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 DECISION

BARREDO, J : p

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case
No. 617, similarly entitled as above, holding that petitioners have constituted an
unregistered partnership and are, therefore, subject to the payment of the deficiency
corporate income taxes assessed against them by respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue for the years 1955 and 1956 in the total sum of P21,891.00, plus 5%
surcharge and 1% monthly interest from December 15, 1958, subject to the provisions
of Section 51 (e) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 2343 and the costs of the suit, 1(1) as well as the resolution of said
court denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said decision.

The facts are stated in the decision of the Tax Court as follows:

"Julia Buñales died on March 23, 1944, leaving as heirs her surviving
spouse, Lorenzo T. Oña and her five children. In 1948, Civil Case No. 4519 was
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of her estate.
Later, Lorenzo T. Oña, the surviving spouse was appointed administrator of the
estate of said deceased (Exhibit 3, pp. 34-41, BIR rec.). On April 14, 1949, the
administrator submitted the project of partition, which was approved by the
Court on May 16, 1949 (See Exhibit K). Because three of the heirs, namely Luz,
Virginia and Lorenzo, Jr., all surnamed Oña, were still minors when the project
of partition was approved, Lorenzo T. Oña, their father and administrator of the
estate, filed a petition in Civil Case No. 9637 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila for appointment as guardian of said minors. On November 14, 1949, the
Court appointed him guardian of the persons and property of the aforenamed
minors (See p. 3, BIR rec.).

"The project of partition (Exhibit K; see also pp. 77-70, BIR rec.) shows
that the heirs have undivided one-half (1/2) interest in ten parcels of land with a
total assessed value of P87,860.00, six houses with a total assessed value of
P17,590.00 and an undetermined amount to be collected from the War Damage
Commission. Later, they received from said Commission the amount of
P50,000.00, more or less. This amount was not divided among them but was
used in the rehabilitation of properties owned by them in common (t.s.n., p. 46).
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 Of the ten parcels of land aforementioned, two were acquired after the death of
the decedent with money borrowed from the Philippine Trust Company in the
amount of P72,173.00 (t.s.n., p. 24; Exhibit 3, pp. 34-31, BIR rec.).

"The project of partition also shows that the estate shares equally with
Lorenzo T. Oña, the administrator thereof, in the obligation of P94,973.00,
consisting of loans contracted by the latter with the approval of the Court (see p.
3 of Exhibit K; or see p. 74, BIR rec.).

"Although the project of partition was approved by the Court on May 16,
1949, no attempt was made to divide the properties therein listed. Instead, the
properties remained under the management of Lorenzo T. Oña who used said
properties in business by leasing or selling them and investing the income
derived therefrom and the proceeds from the sales thereof in real properties and
securities. As a result, petitioners' properties and investments gradually
increased from P105,450.00 in 1949 to P480,005.20 in 1956 as can be gleaned
from the following year-end balances:
"Year Investment Land Building
Account Account Account
1949 P 87,860 P 17,590.00
1950 P 24,657.65 128,566.72 96,076.26
1951 51,301.31 120,349.28 110,605.11
1952 67,927.52 87,065.28 152,674.39
1953 61,258.27 84,925.68 161,463.83
1954 63,623.37 99,001.20 167,962.04
1955 100,786.00 120,249.78 169,262.52
1956 175,028.68 135,714.68 169,262.52
(See Exhibits 3 & K; t.s.n., pp. 22, 25-26, 40, 50, 102-104)

"From said investments and properties petitioners derived such incomes

as profits from installment sales of subdivided lots, profits from sales of stocks,
dividends, rentals and interests (see p. 3 of Exhibit 3; p. 32, BIR rec.; t.s.n., pp.
37-38). The said incomes are recorded in the books of account kept by Lorenzo
T. Oña, where the corresponding shares of the petitioners in the net income for
the year are also known. Every year, petitioners returned for income tax
purposes their shares in the net income derived from said properties and
securities and/or from transactions involving them (Exhibit 3, supra; t.s.n., pp.
25-26). However, petitioners did not actually receive their shares in the yearly
income. (t.s.n., pp. 25-26, 40, 98, 100). The income was always left in the hands
of Lorenzo T. Oña who, as heretofore pointed out, invested them in real
properties and securities. (See Exhibit 3, t.s.n., pp. 50, 102-104).

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 "On the basis of the foregoing facts, respondent (Commissioner of
Internal Revenue) decided that petitioners formed an unregistered partnership
and therefore, subject to the corporate income tax, pursuant to Section 24, in
relation to Section 84(b), of the Tax Code. Accordingly, he assessed against the
petitioners the amounts of P8,092.00 and P13,899.00 as corporate income taxes
for 1955 and 1956, respectively. (See Exhibit 5, amended by Exhibit 17, pp. 50
and 86, BIR rec.). Petitioners protested against the assessment and asked for
reconsideration of the ruling of respondent that they have formed an
unregistered partnership. Finding no merit in petitioners' request, respondent
denied it (See Exhibit 17, p. 86, BIR rec.). (See Pp. 1-4, Memorandum for
Respondent, June 12, 1961).

"The original assessment was as follows:

"1955
"Net income as per investigation P40,209.89
——————
Income tax due thereon 8,042.00
25% surcharge 2,010.50
Compromise for non-filing 50.00
——————
Total P10,102.50
==========
"1956
"Net income as per investigation P69,245.23
——————
Income tax due thereon 13,849.00
25% surcharge 3,462.25
Compromise for non-filing 50.00
——————
Total 17,361.25
==========
(See Exhibit 13, page 50, BIR records)

"Upon further consideration of the case, the 25% surcharge was

eliminated in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Collector v. Batangas
Transportation Co., G.R. No. L-9692, Jan. 6, 1958, so that the questioned
assessment refers solely to the income tax proper for the years 1955 and 1956
and the 'Compromise for non-filing,' the latter item obviously referring to the
compromise in lieu of the criminal liability for failure of petitioners to file the
corporate income tax returns for said years. (See Exh. 17, page 86, BIR

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 records)." (Pp. 1-3, Annex C to Petition).

Petitioners have assigned the following as alleged errors of the Tax Court:

"I

"THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

PETITIONERS FORMED AN UNREGISTERED PARTNERSHIP;

"II

"THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

THE PETITIONERS WERE CO-OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES
INHERITED AND (THE) PROFITS DERIVED FROM TRANSACTIONS
THEREFROM (sic);

"III

"THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR CORPORATE INCOME TAXES FOR
1955 AND 1956 AS AN UNREGISTERED PARTNERSHIP;

"IV

"ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PETITIONERS

CONSTITUTED AN UNREGISTERED PARTNERSHIP, THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
WERE AN UNREGISTERED PARTNERSHIP TO THE EXTENT ONLY
THAT THEY IN VESTED THE PROFITS FROM THE PROPERTIES
OWNED IN COMMON AND THE LOANS RECEIVED USING THE
INHERITED PROPERTIES AS COLLATERALS;.

"V

"ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WAS AN UNREGISTERED

PARTNERSHIP, THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DEDUCTING THE VARIOUS AMOUNTS PAID BY THE PETITIONERS
AS INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX ON THEIR RESPECTIVE SHARES OF
THE PROFITS ACCRUING FROM THE PROPERTIES OWNED IN
COMMON, FROM THE DEFICIENCY TAX OF THE UNREGISTERED
PARTNERSHIP."

In other words, petitioners pose for our resolution the following questions: (1)
Under the facts found by the Court of Tax Appeals, should petitioners be considered
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 as co-owners of the properties inherited by them from the deceased Julia Buñales and
the profits derived from transactions involving the same, or, must they be deemed to
have formed an unregistered partnership subject to tax under Sections 24 and 84(b) of
the National Internal Revenue Code? (2) Assuming they have formed an unregistered
partnership, should this not be only in the sense that they invested as a common fund
the profits earned by the properties owned by them in common and the loans granted
to them upon the security of the said properties, with the result that as far as their
respective shares in the inheritance are concerned, the total income thereof should be
considered as that of co-owners and not of the unregistered partnership? And (3)
assuming again that they are taxable as an unregistered partnership, should not the
various amounts already paid by them for the same years 1955 and 1956 as individual
income taxes on their respective shares of the profits accruing from the properties they
owned in common be deducted from the deficiency corporate taxes, herein involved,
assessed against such unregistered partnership by the respondent Commissioner?

Pondering on these questions, the first thing that has struck the Court is that
whereas petitioners' predecessor in interest died way back on March 23, 1944 and the
project of partition of her estate was judicially approved as early as May 16, 1949, and
presumably petitioners have been holding their respective shares in their inheritance
since those dates admittedly under the administration or management of the head of
the family, the widower and father Lorenzo T. Oña, the assessment in question refers
to the later years 1955 and 1956. We believe this point to be important because,
apparently, at the start, or in the years 1944 to 1954, the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue did treat petitioners as co-owners, not liable to corporate tax, and it
was only from 1955 that he considered them as having formed an unregistered
partnership. At least, there is nothing in the record indicating that an earlier
assessment had already been made. Such being the case, and We see no reason how it
could be otherwise, it is easily understandable why petitioners' position that they are
co-owners and not unregistered co-partners, for the purposes of the impugned
assessment, cannot be upheld. Truth to tell, petitioners should find comfort in the fact
that they were not similarly assessed earlier by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

The Tax Court found that instead of actually distributing the estate of the
deceased among themselves pursuant to the project of partition approved in 1949, "the
properties remained under the management of Lorenzo T. Oña who used said
properties in business by leasing or selling them and investing the income derived
therefrom and the proceeds from the sales thereof in real properties and securities," as
a result of which said properties and investments steadily increased yearly from
P87,860.00 in "land account" and P17,590.00 in "building account" in 1949 to
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 P175,028.68 in "investment account," P135.714.68 in "land account" and P169,262.52
in "building account" in 1956 And all these became possible because, admittedly,
petitioners never actually received any share of the income or profits from Lorenzo T.
Oña, and instead, they allowed him to continue using said shares as part of the
common fund for their ventures, even as they paid the corresponding income taxes on
the basis of their respective shares of the profits of their common business as reported
by the said Lorenzo T. Oña.

It is thus incontrovertible that petitioners did not, contrary to their contention,

merely limit themselves to holding the properties inherited by them. Indeed, it is
admitted that during the material years herein involved, some of the said properties
were sold at considerable profit, and that with said profit, petitioners engaged, thru
Lorenzo T. Oña, in the purchase and sale of corporate securities. It is likewise
admitted that all the profits from these ventures were divided among petitioners
proportionately in accordance with their respective shares in the inheritance. In these
circumstances, it is Our considered view that from the moment petitioners allowed not
only the incomes from their respective shares of the inheritance but even the inherited
properties themselves to be used by Lorenzo T. Oña as a common fund in undertaking
several transactions or in business, with the intention of deriving profit to be shared by
them proportionally, such act was tantamount to actually contributing such incomes to
a common fund and, in effect, they thereby formed an unregistered partnership within
the purview of the above-mentioned provisions of the Tax Code.

It is but logical that in cases of inheritance, there should be a period when the
heirs can be considered as co-owners rather than unregistered co-partners within the
contemplation of our corporate tax laws aforementioned. Before the partition and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, all the income thereof does belong
commonly to all the heirs, obviously, without them becoming thereby unregistered
co-partners, but it does not necessarily follow that such status as co-owners continues
until the inheritance is actually and physically distributed among the heirs, for it is
easily conceivable that after knowing their respective shares in the partition, they
might decide to continue holding said shares under the common management of the
administrator or executor or of anyone chosen by them and engage in business on that
basis. Withal, if this were to be allowed, it would be the easiest thing for heirs in any
inheritance to circumvent and render meaningless Sections 24 and 84(b) of the
National Internal Revenue Code.

It is true that in Evangelista vs. Collector, 102 Phil. 140, it was stated, among
the reasons for holding the appellants therein to be unregistered co-partners for tax
purposes, that their common fund "was not something they found already in
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 existence" and that "[i]t was not a property inherited by them pro indiviso," but it is
certainly far fetched to argue therefrom, as petitioners are doing here, that ergo, in all
instances where an inheritance is not actually divided, there can be no unregistered
co-partnership. As already indicated, for tax purposes, the co-ownership of inherited
properties is automatically converted into an unregistered partnership the moment the
said common properties and/or the incomes derived therefrom are used as a common
fund with intent to produce profits for the heirs in proportion to their respective shares
in the inheritance as determined in a project partition either duly executed in an
extrajudicial settlement or approved by the court in the corresponding testate or
intestate proceeding. The reason for this is simple. From the moment of such partition,
the heirs are entitled already to their respective definite shares of the estate and the
incomes thereof, for each of them to manage and dispose of as exclusively his own
without the intervention of the other heirs, and, accordingly he becomes liable
individually for all taxes in connection therewith. If after such partition, he allows his
share to be held in common with his co-heirs under a single management to be used
with the intent of making profit thereby in proportion to his share, there can be no
doubt that, even if no document or instrument were executed for the purpose, for tax
purposes, at least, an unregistered partnership is formed. This is exactly what
happened to petitioners in this case.

In this connection, petitioners' reliance on Article 1769, paragraph (3), of the

Civil Code, providing that: "The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a
partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or
interest in any property from which the returns are derived," and, for that matter, on
any other provision of said code on partnerships is unavailing. In Evangelista, supra,
this Court clearly differentiated the concept of partnerships under the Civil Code from
that of unregistered partnerships which are considered as "corporations" under
Sections 24 and 84(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code. Mr. Justice Roberto
Concepcion, now Chief Justice, elucidated on this point thus:

"To begin with, the tax in question is one imposed upon 'corporations',
which, strictly speaking, are distinct and different from 'partnerships'. When our
Internal Revenue Code includes 'partnerships' among the entities subject to the
tax on 'corporations', said Code must allude, therefore, to organizations which
are not necessarily 'partnerships', in the technical sense of the term. Thus, for
instance, section 24 of said Code exempts from the aforementioned tax 'duly
registered general partnerships', which constitute precisely one of the most
typical forms of partnerships in this jurisdiction. Likewise, as defined in section
84(b) of said Code, 'the term corporation includes partnerships, no matter how
created or organized.' This qualifying expression clearly indicates that a joint
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 venture need not be undertaken in any of the standard forms, or in conformity
with the usual requirements of the law on partnerships, in order that one could
be deemed constituted for purposes of the tax on corporation. Again, pursuant to
said section 84(b), the term 'corporation' includes, among other, 'joint accounts,
(cuentas en participacion)' and 'associations', none of which has a legal
personality of its own, independent of that of its members. Accordingly, the
lawmaker could not have regarded that personality as a condition essential to the
existence of the partnerships therein referred to. In fact, as above stated, 'duly
registered general co-partnerships' — which are possessed of the
aforementioned personality — have been expressly excluded by law (sections
24 and 84 [b]) from the connotation of the term 'corporation.' . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"Similarly, the American Law

'. . . provides its own concept of a partnership. Under the term

'partnership' it includes not only a partnership as known as common law
but, as well, a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization which carries on any business, financial
operation, or venture, and which is not, within the meaning of the Code,
a trust, estate, or a corporation. . . .' (7A Merten's Law of Federal Income
Taxation, p. 789; emphasis ours.).

'The term "partnership" includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint

venture or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of
which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on. . . .' (8
Merten's Law of Federal Income Taxation, p. 562 Note 63; emphasis
ours.)

"For purposes of the tax on corporations, our National Internal Revenue

Code, includes these partnerships — with the exception only of duly registered
general co-partnerships — within the purview of the term 'corporation.' It is,
therefore, clear to our mind that petitioners herein constitute a partnership,
insofar as said Code is concerned, and are subject to the income tax for
corporations."

We reiterated this view, thru Mr. Justice Fernando, in Reyes vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G. R. Nos. L-24020-21, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 198, wherein the
Court ruled against a theory of co-ownership pursued by appellants therein.

As regards the second question raised by petitioners about the segregation, for
the purposes of the corporate taxes in question, of their inherited properties from those
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 acquired by them subsequently, We consider as justified the following ratiocination of
the Tax Court in denying their motion for reconsideration:

"In connection with the second ground, it is alleged that, if there was an
unregistered partnership, the holding should be limited to the business engaged
in apart from the properties inherited by petitioners. In other words, the taxable
income of the partnership should be limited to the income derived from the
acquisition and sale of real properties and corporate securities and should not
include the income derived from the inherited properties. It is admitted that the
inherited properties and the income derived therefrom were used in the business
of buying and selling other real properties and corporate securities. Accordingly,
the partnership income must include not only the income derived from the
purchase and sale of other properties but also the income of the inherited
properties."

Besides, as already observed earlier, the income derived from inherited properties may
be considered as individual income of the respective heirs only so long as the
inheritance or estate is not distributed or, at least, partitioned, but the moment their
respective known shares are used as part of the common assets of the heirs to be used
in making profits, it is but proper that the income of such shares should be considered
as the part of the taxable income of an unregistered partnership. This, We hold, is the
clear intent of the law.

Likewise, the third question of petitioners appears to have adequately resolved

by the Tax Court in the aforementioned resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the decision of said court. Pertinently, the court ruled this Wise:

"In support of the third ground, counsel for petitioners allege:

'Even if we were to yield to the decision of this Honorable Court

that the herein petitioners have formed an unregistered partnership and,
therefore, have to be taxed as such, it might be recalled that the
petitioners in their individual income tax returns reported their shares of
the profits of the unregistered partnership. We think it only fair and
equitable that the various amounts paid by the individual petitioners as
income tax on their respective shares of the unregistered partnership
should be deducted from the deficiency income tax found by this Honor
able Court against the unregistered partnership.' (page 7, Memorandum
for the Petitioner in Support of Their Motion for Reconsideration, Oct.
28, 1961.)

In other words, it is the position of petitioners that the taxable income of the

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 partnership must be reduced by the amounts of income tax paid by each
petitioner on his share of partnership profits. This is not correct; rather, it should
be the other way around. The partnership profits distributable to the partners
(petitioners herein) should be reduced by the amounts of income tax assessed
against the Partnership. Consequently, each of the petitioners in his individual
capacity overpaid his income tax for the years in question, but the income tax
due from the partnership has been correctly assessed. Since the individual
income tax liabilities of petitioners are not in issue in this proceeding, it is not
proper for the Court to pass upon the same."

Petitioners insist that it was error for the Tax Court to so rule that whatever
excess they might have paid as individual income tax cannot be credited as part
payment of the taxes herein in question. It is argued that to sanction the view of the
Tax Court is to oblige petitioners to pay double income tax on the same income, and,
worse, considering the time that has lapsed since they paid their individual income
taxes, they may already be barred by prescription from recovering their overpayments
in a separate action. We do not agree. As We see it, the case of petitioners as regards
the point under discussion is simply that of a taxpayer who has paid the wrong tax,
assuming that the failure to pay the corporate taxes in question was not deliberate. Of
course, such taxpayer has the right to be reimbursed what he has erroneously paid, but
the law is very clear that the claim and action for such reimbursement are subject to
the bar of prescription, And since the period for the recovery of the excess income
taxes in the case of herein petitioners has already lapsed, it would not seem right to
virtually disregard prescription merely upon the ground that the reason for the delay is
precisely because the taxpayers failed to make the proper return and payment of the
corporate taxes legally due from them. In principle, it is but proper not to allow any
relaxation of the tax laws in favor of persons who are not exactly above suspicion in
their conduct vis-a-vis their tax obligation to the State.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Tax

Appeals appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioners.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ ., concur.

Concepcion, C . J ., is on official leave.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C . J ., and Teehankee, JJ ., in the result.

Castro, J ., took no part.

Footnotes
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 1. In other words, the assessment was affirmed except for the sum of P100.00 which
was the total of two P50-items purportedly for "Compromise for non-filing" which
the Tax Court held h be unjustified, since there was no compromise agreement to
speak of.

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 Endnotes

1 (Popup - Popup)
1. In other words, the assessment was affirmed except for the sum of P100.00 which
was the total of two P50-items purportedly for "Compromise for non-filing" which
the Tax Court held h be unjustified, since there was no compromise agreement to
speak of.

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