1

Xavier Léger Guest April 4, 2014

260394284 ISLA 325

Of Shi‘ism, Mongols, and Religious Proliferation

During the 13th century, invading Mongol hordes began the conquest of modern-day Iran

and Iraq. The second major wave of Mongol invasion, under the command of Hulegu, ushered in

a new epoch for Iran and Western Iraq under the Ilkhanid dynasty. The era-defining siege of

Baghdad saw the end of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate and by most accounts dealt a serious blow to

Islam, particularly for the dominant Sunnis. In relative terms, however, Imami Shiites benefitted

from this new foreign rule, as their social and political position was vastly improved under the

religiously tolerant Ilkhanids. Having previously been repressed under the Abbasids, the Imami,

or Twelver school of Islam was able to gain greater influence in society and introduce important

new doctrines and teachings. As Abbas Amanat explains in his essay, “In Between the Madrasa

and the Marketplace,” the production of Twelver Shiite jurisprudence, and the role of the ‘ulama’

in society varies from taqiyya-like recluse in times of sectarian persecution, to a blossoming of

doctrine and influence during periods of stability and succor like under the Buyids and Safavids.

I will apply this observation to the Ilkhanid period of 1256-1353, under which the Mongolians’

religious tolerance, coupled with the destruction of Baghdad and consequently, Sunni

dominance, had the unintended consequence of strengthening the Imami position within Iran. A

particular focus will be placed on ‘Allama al-Hilli’s treatises on ijtihad, which had radical

implications for Shiite jurisprudence and the socio-political influence of the ‘ulama’.

Historical Background
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The Ilkhanid dynasty, lasting from 1256 until 1353, was characterized by the Mongol

rulers’ religious tolerance and eventual conversion to Islam. Though the first Ilkhanid khan,

Hulegu, never converted to Islam, he viewed Shi‘ism in a favorable light. One of the great

Shi‘ite theologians of the time, Khwaja Nasiru’d-Din Tusi (d. 1274/672), became his close

advisors. Unlike Baghdad, the Imami center of scholarship in modern day Iran at the time, Hilla,

was spared by the advancing Mongol armies, and established a lasting connection with the

Ilkhanid court.1 This period was also marked by religious tolerance, which not only enabled

lively deliberations on the various religions present, but also allowed Imami theology to be

stabilized into its canonical forms, thanks in part to the work of Tusi, Muhaqqiq and ‘Allama al-

Hilli. The Mongol Khan Ghazan (r. 1295-1304), who converted to Islam in 1295, continued the

tradition of royal patronage to religious elites and institutions, especially urban religious centers

like Hilla, Tabriz, Shiraz and Qum. His successor Oljeitu (r. 1304-1316) eventually converted to

Shi‘ism in 1310, partially due to the influence of his (and his successor’s) Persian vizier Rashid

al-Din (1247-1318). As well, the great theologian, the ‘Allama Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli (d.

1326/726) and his son were invited to the court, and were crucial in the conversion of Oljeitu

from Sunni to Imami Islam.2

The Politics of Conversion

An observable historical pattern in the Middle East and Persia from around the 8th

century on is the conversion of invading foreigners to the dominant religion present: Islam. The

arrival of the Mongols was no different. Though the early Ilkhanid elites and rulers did manage

1
Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi‘ism, (New
York: Yale University Press, 1985), 92.
2
Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal
Change in Shi‘ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 29-30.
 3

to remain Buddhist or shamanic, conversion to Islam was soon seen as politically strategic and

morally attractive, due in part to the religion’s complexities. Because the Mongol advance was

eventually stopped by the Mamluks, there existed two competing entities vying for political

control and legitimacy. The Ilkhanid interest in Shi‘ism can therefore be seen in part as a desire

“to establish a claim to Islamic authority that ran counter to the one enjoyed by the Mamluk-

protected Abbasids in Cairo.”3 By the time of Oljeitu’s conversion to Shi‘i Islam in 1310, the

turn to Shi‘ism became an issue of identity and legitimacy. As Krawulsky illustrates, “to be the

supreme ruler of an Islamic Empire, the protector of the Muslim community and the holy cities,”

corresponded to Mongol ideology and its imperialistic nature. Thus “by converting to the Shi‘a,

[Oljeitu] could claim to fulfill God’s promise, i.e., its political role on earth.”4 The absolute right

to rule belonged to the Imam, and his deputy on earth. Ruling as a Shi‘ite could make Oljeitu and

the Ilkhanids into the ‘shadow’ of God. Yet fully expelling the regime in Cairo had failed, and

when the Mamluks seemed to have regained strength and prestige, Oljeitu and his son abandoned

Shi‘ism.

The Mongol elites were also particularly fond of Shi‘ism due to their attachment to the

house of the Prophet. The Imami veneration of ahl-al-bayt found wide popular appeal both with

the Mongols and the Sufi-leaning public, and was then absorbed into Sufism, which was moving

into the Shi‘i camp during this period.5 As Broadridge attests, “Oljeitu’s interest in the nobility

of Alid lineage in particular echoed the Chingizid belief that legitimacy came through descent

from an important ancestor.”6 Thus, Shi‘ism appeared to be a perfect fit, both as fitting with

3
Anne F. Broadridge, Kinship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 70.
4
Dorothea Krawulsky, The Mongol llkhans and their Vizier Rashid al-Din, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2011),
70.
5
Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 30.
6
Broadridge, Kinship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds, 94.
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Mongol traditions concerning ancestry, and as an alternative to the Sunni Mamluks. It is no

surprise then that the Mongol rulers often visited the tombs of the Imams at Kerbala and Najaf,

and provided those holy sites with improvements in infrastructure, like water irrigation.7

It must be highlighted, however, that despite a growth in Shi‘ite religious output and

social confidence, the religion did not spread considerably in Iran or Iraq. The religion itself

fared rather well, but because of strong Sunni resistance (in the public sphere and at the court)

and the appeal of Sufism, widespread conversion to Shi‘ism did not occur until the Safavid

dynasty. Nonetheless, Imami jurists did make an effort to convert the Mongols to Imami Islam in

the hopes that it would lead to the spread of the religion for the greater public. ‘Allama Al-Hilli

must have presumed the Ilkhanid rulers were going to continue enhancing Shi‘ism’s influence in

society, as he had just successfully converted Oljeitu to Shi‘ism, with the help of Taju’d-Din

Muhammad ibn ‘Ali Awi.8 However, it appears that Imami growth was stopped after ‘Allama al-

Hilli’s “attempt to propagate Twelver Shi‘ism through Oljeitu was foiled.”9 Shortly before his

death, Oljeitu was said to have abandoned Shi‘ism and re-converted to Sunni Islam. His son and

heir Abu Sa’id was also staunchly Sunni, and from his rule onwards the Ilkhanid state began its

decline. As Arjomand points out, the fact that Twelver thought did not spread was due “more

fundamentally to a novel religious phenomenon: the spread of Sufism among the masses.”10 The

development of Sufism “produced both dogmatically undisciplined ‘extremist’ Shi‘ite

movements and increasing general devotionalism towards the Imams – the house of the Prophet

– on the part of the rest of the population.”11

7
Krawulsky, The Mongol Ilkhans and their Vizier Rashid al-Din, 70.
8
Momen, Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 92.
9
Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 30.
10
Ibid, 29.
11
Ibid, 31.
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Indeed, the spread of Sufism was largely a plebian phenomenon; Shi‘ism only fared well

with the Mongol and religious elite. The fall of the ‘Abbasids meant an end to political power in

the hands of the Sunni (and the majority of Muslims) elites. As Arjomand explains, “the link

between political power and the custodians of orthodox Islam was… severed.”12 Though

conversion to Islam was a slow process, in the four decades following the fall of Baghdad, large

numbers of Mongol amirs had converted. As well, significant numbers of Mongol troops were

reported to be Muslim by as early as 1256.13 However, as Pfeiffer is quick to note, this

“conversion” was in effect the “selective appropriation of elements that were felt to be

enriching,” and excluded elements that the Mongols did not approve of.14 It is perhaps also

because of the popularity of the more egalitarian Sufism that Shi‘i thought felt compelled to

enter into the larger public sphere and entrench itself further in society.

From the Madrasa to the Marketplace

As Amanat argues in his essay, “In Between the Madrasa and the Marketplace,” the

production of Shi‘ite doctrine that affects society’s relationship with the religion and advances

the faith is dependant on the political and economic conditions of the Shi‘ite leadership. Thus in

times of repression or anarchy, most Imami clerics tend to withdraw to the safety of the madrasa,

or religious school (in this case, the religious sphere). In contrast, when the ruling power views

Shi‘ism favorably, or when the ‘ulama’ are in positions of economic and political power, they

have the freedom and flexibility to interact with society and expand the religion’s scope and

strength.

12
Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 29.
13
Judith Pfeiffer, “Reflections on a ‘Double Rapprochement,’” in Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan,
ed. Linda Komaroff, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 375.
14
Ibid, 372.
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“Whenever the adverse forces of political anarchy… state opposition… or anticlerical

revolt… posed a threat to the religious leadership, [Shi‘ism] tended to retreat to the
madrasa and undertake the safe practices of teaching and scholarship. Greater
involvement in the affairs of the marketplace, however, came whenever there was a
relative degree of social and economic stability, state cooperation, and royal patronage.”15

Amanat examines the Safavid period in particular, where Imami Islam became the official state

religion. During the late 18th century to the middle of the 19th century, among other Shi‘i

developments, religious “academic seniority was transformed into a collective leadership, with

no ultimate place reserved for a supreme authority,”16 showcasing the religion’s strength and

extensive reach. The ‘ulama’ also grew more autonomous, but they stayed loyal to the state due

to internal threats like the rise of the Babis. Another interesting phenomenon is that while under

the ‘Abbasids Shi‘i scholasticism was present in the ‘Atabat cities of Karbala, Baghdad, and

Najaf, the Ilkhanid period sees a shift of influence on Twelver matters from the Arab cities to

Iran.17 Thus the changing climate of religious persecution or freedom help explain the alternating

shifts of leadership between the ‘Atabat and the religious centers of Iran. This shift in turn allows

for more creativity and freedom of practice for the Shi‘a.

‘Allama al-Hilli and ijtihad

Momen defines ijtihad as: “the process of arriving at judgments on points of religious law

using reason and the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh).”18 This method of deciding on

issues of religious law using ‘aql, or reason, became increasingly necessary following the start of

the Lesser Occultation, would later be refined and fully crystallized under Bihbahani and the

Usuli school of Shi‘i jurisprudence. Ijtihad also utilizes the Qur’an, the hadith, and consensus.

15
Abbas Amanat, “In Between the Madrasa and the Marketplace,” in Authority & Political Culture in
Shi‘ism, ed. by Said Amir Arjomand, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 123.
16
Ibid, 111.
17
Ibid, 123.
18
Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 186.
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Until ‘Allama al-Hilli, ijtihad was seen as highly contentious, even ghuluww (heterodox). This

was due to the previous advantage of having Imams to refer to on matter of law or religious

dispute. According to Moussavi, the consequence of notable ‘ulama’s (such as Muhaqqiq and

‘Allama al-Hilli) formal adoption of ijtihad was not only to resolve its disputed status as a legal

method of formulating Islamic laws, but more importantly of setting up a dichotomy of power in

society. The splitting of society into mujtahids (jurists) and muqallids (followers) establishes a

natural power relationship based on knowledge.19 This newly formalized hierarchy of authority

must be seen as a fundamental basis for later developments, such as the creation of the office of

marja’, as well as the gradual strengthening of the ‘ulama’’s political power and social influence

on Persian society. The later creation of the post of marja’ al-taqlid, or “authority to be

followed,” had its roots in the transformation of the function of mujtahids from mere teacher to

an influential figure in the socio-political sphere of urban centers.20 The elevation of the

mujtahid’s social and religious standing is also closely linked to the relationship between

religious power and political power; for issues of legitimacy and good standing, political leaders

needed to maintain good ties with the religious elite. The relationship was reciprocal, as support

from the state meant greater resources and freedoms. As Amanat explains, “cooperation over a

broad range of juristic and political issues guaranteed mutual legitimacy for the Shah and the

mujtahids, and it is largely in this context that their veneration by the state can be fully

understood.”21 ‘Allama Al-Hilli’s official sanctioning of ijtihad was therefore crucial for the

strengthening and crystallization of religious authority for the ‘ulama’. This trend continued

19
Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam: From the Office of Mufti to the
Institution of Marja’, (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996),
269.
20
Amanat, “In Between the Madrasa and the Marketplace,” 102.
21
Ibid, 105.
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under the Timurids and well into the Safavids, where the Shi‘ite jurists had the position of

mujtahid cemented in hierarchal terms.22

‘Allama al-Hilli, besides his official legitimization of ijtihad, was also hugely influential

in his work on classifying degrees of normative authority of hadiths by assessing the reliability

of their transmitters, a system begun by his teacher, the great Abu’l-Fada’il Ahmad ibn Tawus.23

Deductive reasoning in Shi‘i jurisprudence is based on four pillars: the Qur’an, the hadith, ijma‘,

or consensus, and ‘aql (reason). Prior to ‘Allama al-Hilli, the Shi‘ites accepted all hadith without

question. Borrowing from Sunni methodology, and preliminary work from his father and

teachers, al-Hilli established the critical study of these hadith, and elevated the role of ‘aql as the

central aspect of deductive reasoning and criticism.24 Another aforementioned prominent scholar

of the time was Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi. An important astronomer, mathematician, and

theologian, Tusi was also able to contribute to medicine, ethics, history and geography. However

his most important contribution to Shi‘ism, according to Momen, was his incorporation of

“philosophical concepts, from his study of Avicenna and other philosophers, into Shi‘i

theology.” This was due in part to his affiliations with the Isma‘ilis, who did not view philosophy

with suspicion, like most Imami jurists.25

Sectarian Rapprochement

The end of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate, coupled with the religious tolerance of the Ilkhanids,

had a pacifying effect on Sunni-Shiite tensions, especially in the Eastern Middle East and Iran.

This sectarian rapprochement allowed each faction to adopt characteristics or ideas from the

22
Said Amir Arjomand, Authority & Political Culture in Shi‘ism. (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1988), 6.
23
Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 55.
24
Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 185.
25
Ibid, 94.
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other. Shiite methods of teaching, which due in part to persecution under the Abbasids and the

weight put on the Imami line and the occultation, had failed to develop as deeply as the Sunnis.

Perhaps the most important part of this rapprochement on the Shi‘i side was the efforts to

transpose Sufism into Shi‘ism.26 In fact, the rise and evolution of Sufi thought is largely

recognized as the most significant phenomenon of the post-Abbasid, pre-Safavid period. One

reason for this change lies in the Imami emphasis placed on the miraculous aspects of the Imams,

which resonated with Sufi beliefs about the qualities of God and the personal quest to manifest

God’s attributes.

As Momen explains, the easing of tensions meant Sunnis gave more preponderance to

tashayyu’ hasan, which meant praising the virtues of Ali, and allowing condemnations of the

caliphs Mu’awiya and Yazid.27 This brings in an important issue of the legitimacy of political

authority. For the Shi‘a, it was impossible to accept the authority of the ‘just ruler’ according to

the dominant Sunnis (al-sultan al-adil), because the first three Caliphs, the Umayyads and the

‘Abbasids, falsely claimed the position of the Imams (the only true rulers with absolute

legitimacy). Thus, all supposed ‘just rulers’ after ‘Ali were thus illegitimate (ja’ir). According to

Arjomand, this logic led Ibn Tawus to prefer Mongol rule; though Hulegu was considered an

infidel, he was a better ruler than the ‘Abbasid Caliph, “who claimed to be the successor of the

Prophet and thereby usurped the right of the Imams.” Furthermore, “after the overthrow of the

‘Abbasids in 1258, no ruler in Iran claimed Caliphate and the Shi‘ite theory of authority

coexisted with the theories of saltanat and kinship as temporal rule.”28 Thus under the new non-

Mongol, but religiously tolerant Ilkhanate, the Sunni and Shi‘i traditions did not repress each

other. The Sufi evolution from Sunni to more Shi‘ite leanings highlighted the two sects’ capacity

26
Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 95.
27
Ibid, 96.
28
Arjomand, Authority & Political Culture in Shi‘ism, 4.
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for convergence. Greater discussion and communication was able to occur between the two

camps because the ruling foreigners were not deeply connected or committed to one group, and

thus did not hold important implications for either faith. To put it simply, “The religious freedom

at the court of the Ilkhanid Oljeytu inaugurated an era of religious discussions which enabled…

[‘Allama al-Hilli] to write polemical works and to engage the Sunni [‘‘ulama’’] in

discussions.”29

Elite Patronage

During this period, the cities of Hilla, Baghdad, Tabriz, and Maragheh, among others, all

benefitted greatly from patronage and religious activity. In fact, one of Hulegu’s first acts upon

setting up his capital in Maragheh was the construction of an observatory and centre of

international learning for his respected court advisor, Nasir al-Din Tusi,30 and appointed him the

head of the waqf bureau of the empire, a position he held for 15 years.31 The Juwayni family,

which presided over administration for the Ilkhanids, acted as benefactors and patrons of the arts

and literature. They also contributed to science in their own right by creating the educational-

charitable complex, the product of “the madrasa, the hospital, and the Sufi convent, together with

one or two other institutions, as part of a single design and created by a single deed of

endowment”32 Ghazan and Oljeitu also promoted the building of a mosque and public bath in

every town, and as Rizvi points out, “personally encouraged the restoration, rebuilding and

29
Sayid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Iran: Royalty, Religion, and Revolution, (Canberra: Ma‘rifat Publishing,
1980), 124.
30
George Lane, Early Mongol Rule in Thriteenth-Century Iran, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 226.
31
Said Amir Arjomand, “The Law, Agency, and Policy in Medieval Islamic Society: Development of the
Institutions of Learning from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Century,” Comparative Studies in Society and
History 41.2. (1999): 271. http://www.jstor.org/stable/179447.
32
Ibid, 272.
 11

extension of holy mausoleums as well as the building of new mosques.”33 Thus in a more

economic or material sense, Shi‘ism benefited greatly from a religiously tolerant and inclined

government, enabling it to come out into the public sphere.

Conclusion

Under the religiously tolerant Mongol Ilkhanid rule, Shi‘ism was able to expand its

influence and doctrine without fear of retribution. This move from the madrasa, or religious

sphere, to the marketplace, or greater societal sphere, is a historical pattern observed by Abbas

Amanat. Thus, during times of repression or internal strife, Shi‘ism tends to remain scholastic

and secluded, while during times of stability and state patronage (like under the Buyids or

Safavids), the religion can flourish and gain influence politically, economically, and socially.

Thus the merging of philosophy and Sufism into Shi‘ism, in part the work of Tusi, can be seen as

the most important phenomenon during this period. As well, important developments in

jurisprudence took place, especially by ‘Allama al-Hilli. His work on ijtihad and classifying the

authority of hadith not only advanced Shi‘i thought, but also led to the expansion of the role of

the ‘ulama’ in society. This move from the madrasa to the marketplace would not take place

again until the Safavid era, where Shi‘ism became the official state religion and the ‘ulama’

developed an increasingly powerful role, in part due to al-Hilli’s division of mujtahid and

muqallid.

33
Rizvi, Iran: Royalty, Religion, and Revolution, 178.
 12

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645-654. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/il-khanids-i-dynastic-history.

Amanat, Abbas. “In Between the Madrasa and the Marketplace: The Designation of Clerical
Leadership in Modern Shi‘ism.” In Authority & Political Culture in Shi‘ism, edited by
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Arjomand, Said Amir. The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and
Societal Change in Shi‘ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890. Chicago: University of
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Arjomand, Said Amir (ed.). Authority & Political Culture in Shi‘ism. Albany: State University of
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Arjomand, Said Amir. “The Law, Agency, and Policy in Medieval Islamic Society: Development
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Lane, George. Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

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Lang, 2011.

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Civilization, 1996.

Pfeiffer, Judith. “Reflections on a ‘Double Rapprochement’: Conversion to Islam among the

Mongol Elite during the Early Ilkhanate.” In Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan, edited
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Rizvi, Saiyid Athar Abbas. Iran: Royalty, Religion, and Revolution. Canberra: Ma‘rifat
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