90 NOTES.

Jeffreys, Harold. "The nature of mathematics". Philosophy of Science

5(4), (1938), pp. 434-451. doi: 10.1086/286524

DOES A CONTRADICTION ENTAIL EVERY PROPOSITION T

This question was asked in a paper of mine, and Mr. Karl R. Popper
(Mind , VoL 49, 1940, p. 408) answers it in the affirmative. I was satisfied
a t first, but on further thought am again doubtful. The argument is :
(1) p entails (p or q); (2) not-p and (p or q) entail q ; hence (3) p and not-p
entail q. Now it seems to me th at the interesting question, if we think
a system containing even one contradiction worth discussion, is whether it
can contain only one. The argument considers the situation if the system
contains a particular pair of contradictory propositions p and not-p. But
then in (2) we infer q from not-p and (p or q) by denying the possibility
th a t p and not-p can both be true. This assumes th at the system does not
contain the contradiction (p. not-p) assumed in (3). If we assume p and
not-p, then not-p and (p or q) are together consistent with (p and not-p);
thus q does not follow. My point is th at if we choose to accept both p and
not-p, and wish to consider whether they entail any other proposition, we
must not also consider them inconsistent. To do so assumes a seoond
contradiction (r. not-r), where r is (p. not-p), and the question at issue is
whether there is a second.
I should agree, of course, th at if contradictory propositions appear in a
system, other contradictions can usually be deduced, and th at they can
certainly be deduced if we accept and deny the same contradiction ; and
this would be enough for most of Mr. Popper’s argument. On the other
hand, there is a kernel of truth in the Hegelian contention, th at science
proceeds by discovering contradictions and resolving th e m ; but this can
be dealt with better by constructing a theory of probability including
ordinary logic as its extreme case th*m by rejecting the latter.
 NOTES. 91
The question seems to be relevant to the justification of the use of
mathematics in science ami in the theory of probability. Carnap and
others have given proofs th a t pure mathematics is free from contradiction,
but for epistemological reasons similar to those advanced by Russell in
A n Inquiry into Meaning and Truth I am indisposed to accept the
whole of Carnap's system. Now Carnap is so drastic as to take
'—' p . D * p D ? a s h i s firat primitive sentence. W hat happens if we read
O as “ entails” ? The formalism stands, a.nd Carnap's discovery of a
proposition not entailed in his system, including the unmodified law of
contradiction, is a proof of consistency. But PS1 cannot be interpreted
in this sense in probability theory, since it would have to be read as “ if
p is false, the probability of q on data p is certainty Thus the verifica­
tion of any prediction q oould never support a true hypothesis ^ p against
a false one p, and scientific method would break down completely. The
situation is then th a t PS1 (in this sense) can be assumed without inconsis­
tency but is not part of the scientific use of mathematics. B ut if a
system is consistent when an additional axiom is added it must be con­
sistent without i t ; hence Carnap's result does lead to the conclusion th at
ordinary mathematioe can be used in science without inconsistency.
H arold J o t b it s .