Jose S. Santos, Jr., petitioner vs.

National Labor Relations Commission, Hagonoy

Institute Inc., Its Directress, Marta B. Zuniga and Principal B. Banag, respondent
G.R. No. 115795. March 6, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner, a married man, was employed as a teacher by the private
respondent Hagonoy Institute Inc. from June 1980 until his dismissal on June 1, 1991.
Likewise working as a teacher for the private respondent was Mrs. Arlene T. Martin,
also married. In the course of their employment, the couple fell in love. Thereafter,
rumors regarding the couples relationship spread, especially among the faculty
members and school officials.
Concerned about the rumors, on November 3, 1990, the private respondent
advised Mrs. Martin to take a leave of absence which she ignored, as she continued
to report for work. Consequently, on November 9, 1990, she was barred from
reporting for work and was not allowed to enter the private respondents premises,
effectively dismissing her from her employment.
Labor Ariel Santos rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. On appeal,
the NLRC in a decision reversed the labor arbiters ruling. The reversal was anchored
on the failure by the private respondent, in dismissing Mrs. Martin, to accord her the
necessary procedural due process.
A committee was formed to investigate the veracity of the rumors. After two
weeks of inquiry, the committee rendered its report confirming the illicit relationship
between the petitioner and Mrs. Martin.
In an effort to seek the reversal of the labor arbiters decision, petitioner file
an appeal before the NLRC, which, however, did not find any substantial reason to
overturn the labor arbiters ruling.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration suffered the same fate. Thus, this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the illicit relationship between the petitioner and Mrs.
Martin could be considered immoral as to constitute just cause to terminate an
employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code.

Ruling:
The petition is hereby DISMISSED.
To constitute a valid dismissal, two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal
must be for any causes expressed in Art. 282 of the Labor Code, and (b) the
employees must be accorded due process, basic of which are opportunity to be
heard and defend himself.
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, the following are deemed
just causes to terminate an employee:
(a) Serious conduct or wilful disobedience by the employees of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

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 (c) Fraud or wilful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of
his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorize
representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Private respondent, in justifying the termination of the petitioner, contends
that being a teacher, he must live up to the high moral standards required of his
position. In other words, it asserts that its purpose in dismissing the petitioner was
to preserve the respect of the community towards the teachers and to strengthen
the educational system.
It cannot be emphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an affront to the
sanctity of marriage which is basic institution of society. As a teacher, petitioner
serves as an example to his pupils, especially during their formative years and stands
in loco parentis to them. To stress their importance in our society, teachers are given
substitute and special parental authority under our laws.
Accordingly, teachers must be abide by a standard of personal conduct which
not only proscribes the commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behaviour
creating a suspicion of immorality because of the harmful impression it might have
on the students. Likewise, they must observe a high standard of integrity and
honesty.
From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in extra-
marital relationship, especially when the parties are both married, such behaviour
amounts to immorality, justifying his termination form employment.

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 Danilo Dimabayao, petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations Commision, Island
Biscuit Inc. and Cheng Suy EH, respondent
G.R. No. 122178. February 25, 1999

Facts:
Private respondent Island Biscuit, Inc. is engaged in the manufacture of
biscuits with private respondent Cheng Suy Eh as its General Manager. On 5 April
1983 it employed petitioner with the specific task of operating the roller, cutting
biscuits, sorting out rejects, mashing flour and feeding the flour mass into its
thinning machine.
On 30 July 1992, while petitioner was assigned to sort out rejects, with prior
permission first obtained from his checker, he went to the comfort room to answer
the call of nature and relieve himself, after which he returned from his work place.
But private respondent Cheng Suy Eh was unhappy seeing petitioner away from his
work station and immediately demanded, from him a written explanation allegedly
for abandoning his work. As a matter of policy, respondent company discourages its
employees form going to the comfort room during working hours for sanitary or
hygienic purposes as the company is engaged in the food business.
The following day, 31 July 1992, Marcela Lok, respondent company’s
Personnel Manager, handed petitioner a letter asking him to explain in writing why
he left his work station on 17 and 30 July he only went to the comfort room for a
short while to answer the call of nature. Believing that this denial was enough he did
not anymore submit any written explanation. But, for his inability to submit a written
explanation, petitioner was suspended for fifteen (15) days which he contested
before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
On 20 October 1992 petitioner requested a fellow worker to replace him in
his work station so he could go to the comfort room to relieve himself. Again private
respondent Cheng Suy Eh noticed petitioner’s brief absence and so, upon his return,
his manager berated him again and required him to submit once more a written
explanation for allegedly abandoning his work. Petitioner complied.
Finding petitioner’s explanation not satisfactory, respondent company
through its Personnel Officer Marcela Lok served petitioner a notice of termination.
On 21 September 1994 the Labor Arbiter declared the suspension of
petitioner valid and legal not because he left his production area to relieve himself
but for his utter disregard of the directive of the manager to submit his written
explanation.
On 15 March 1995 the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but
sustained the grant of separation pay as a measure of compassion taking into
consideration petitioner’s length of service in the company, and on 23 June 1995
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

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Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding
the legality of petitioner’s dismissal.

Ruling:
The petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the 15 March 1995 Decision and
the 23 June 1995 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission are SET
ASIDE.
As the NLRC decision itself indicates, the dismissal of petitioner was based on
Art. 282 (a) and (b) of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes: (a) serious misconduct or wilful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employers or
representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the
employer of his duties.
As early as Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company v. Court of Appeals, and
recently, in Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, we ruled that:
Wilful disobedience of the employer’s lawful orders, as a just cause for
dismissal of an employee envisages the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1)
the employee’s assailed conduct must have been wilful being characterized by a
“wrongful and perverse attitude”; and (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties
which he had been engaged to discharge.
While it may be true that complainant has been leaving his work area without
permission, this Arbitration Board finds that complainant’s habit of going to the
toilet in the morning during production is merely a call of nature and by force of
habit he had to relieve himself. Whether or not the complainant relived himself is
not the issue. The call of nature is a reasonable reason for him to leave his work
area. Although complainant is not entirely without fault since he has been leaving his
workplace without permission from his supervisor and his disrespect towards his
superiors as borne out by the reports of his supervisor and guards, the infraction
committed by the complainant is not so grave that would warrant the ultimate
penalty of dismissal.

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 Armando G. Yrasegui, petitioner vs. Philippines Airlines, Inc., respondents
G.R. No. 168081. October 17, 2008.

Facts:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who
was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to
166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an
extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he
lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without
pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL
decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies
with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for
weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to
report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of
weight check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative
Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists
that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to
attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him
“which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were
considered terminated “effective immediately.”
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view
of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be
complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
performance of his duties.

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 NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally
dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is
obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes
of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.

Issue:
Whether or not he was validly dismissed.

Held:
YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion
than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep
the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims
that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992
clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude,
determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my
weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of
the company physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of
his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be
unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
“[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This
element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized
just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in
Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons
of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex,
religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The
qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test
of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ
is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory
job performance.”
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to
safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the

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aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of
discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for
cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of
social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

Reynaldo Valdez, petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations Commission and

Nelbusco, Inc., respondents
G.R. No. 125028. February 9, 1998.

Facts:
Sometime in December, 1986, petitioner was hired by private respondent as
a bus driver on commission basis, with an average earning of P6,000.00 a month. On
February 28, 1993, the airconditioning unit of the bus which petitioner was driving
suffered a mechanical breakdown. Respondent company told him to wait until the
airconditioning unit was repaired.Meanwhile, no other bus was assigned to
petitioner to keep him gainfully employed.
Thereafter, petitioner continued reporting to his employers office for work, only
to find out each time that the airconditioning unit had not been repaired. Several
months elapsed but he was never called by respondent company to report for
work. Later, petitioner found out that the bus formerly driven by him was plying an
assigned route as an ordinary bus, with a newly-hired driver.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent for
illegal dismissal, with money claims for labor standard benefits, and for
reimbursement of his bond and tire deposit. He claimed that the reason why
respondent company did not allow him to drive again was due to his refusal to sign
an undated company-prepared resignation letter and a blank affidavit of quitclaim
and release.
Private respondent, on the other hand, admitted that it told petitioner to wait
until the airconditioning unit of the bus was repaired. However, private respondent
alleged that after the bus driven by the petitioner broke down due to his fault and
negligence, the latter did not report for work. He supposedly informed the
management later that he was voluntarily resigning from his employment in order to
supervise the construction of his house. Consequent to his resignation, petitioner
demanded the return of his cash bond and tire deposit. Respondent company

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required him to secure the necessary management clearance and other pertinent
papers relative to his resignation. Instead of complying with those requirements,
petitioner filed the instant complaint.
Labor Arbiter ruled that complainant was illegally dismissed.
NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and directing respondent to
reinstate complainant back to work but without backwages. Should reinstatement
be not possible, respondent shall pay complainant separation benefits equivalent to
one (1) month pay for every year of service computed up to the time he was
temporarily laid-off and to refund to him the cash bond and tire deposit. All other
claims are denied for lack of merit.

Issue(s):
1. Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to back wages and separation pay
starting from the time he was laid off.
Ruling:
1. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
petitioner was not illegally dismissed and in consequently deleting the award of back
wages. It is especially so, since this case does not present such complicated issues as
would mislead it into committing the errors complained of.
Under Article 286 of the Labor Code, the bona fide suspension of the operation
of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six months shall not
terminate employment.Consequently, when the bona fide suspension of the
operation of a business or undertaking exceeds six months, then the employment of
the employee shall be deemed terminated. By the same token and applying said rule
by analogy, if the employee was forced to remain without work or assignment for a
period exceeding six months, then he is in effect constructively dismissed.
The Solicitor General opines that, strictly speaking, Article 286 does not apply to
this case, contrary to the position taken by respondent (NLRC). Of course, it is true
that since private respondent operated a fleet of buses, its entire business
operations were not suspended, whether we speak of either a bona fide suspension
or not. The so-called floating status of an employee should last only for a legally
prescribed period of time. When that floating status of an employee lasts for more
than six months, he may be considered to have been illegally dismissed from the
service. Thus, he is entitled to the corresponding benefits for his separation , and this
would apply to the two types of work suspension heretofore noted, that is, either of
the entire business or of a specific component thereof.
The other allegation of private respondent that petitioner voluntarily resigned
from work obviously does not deserve any consideration. It would have been illogical
for herein petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal
dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said complaint.
Resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a
situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service, and, that he has no other choice but to disassociate himself
from his employment. Resignation is a formal pronouncement of relinquishment of

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an office. It must be made with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied
by an act of relinquishment
2. Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, an employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full back wages, inclusive of
allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.