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SECTION 1 Neither RA 8981 (PRC) that provides for the power of the
Marcos v Manglapus
FACTS:
Former president Marcos and his family wanted to
return to the Philippines, however, their return was barred by
the incumbent president Aquino because under the present
circumstances, their return poses a threat to national interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President have the power to
impose a ban without a statute authorizing it?
HELD:
Yes. The president, upon whom the executive power
is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from
the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her
to comply with her duties under the present Constitution.
Soliven v Makasiar
FACTS:
Petitioner Beltran argues that “the reason which
necessitates presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit. He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of a
complaint-affidavit, she may be bringing herself under the trial
court’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Does the incumbent President’s immunity from suit
prevent her from suing?
HELD:
No. The grant to the president of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to ensure the exercise of presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distractions,
considering that being the Chief Executive, require all the
office-holder’s time and undivided attention. However, this
privilege may be invoked only by the holder of the office, not
by any other person in the President’s behalf.
Review Center Association of the Phils v Ermita
FACTS:
On June 2006, the PRC conducted the Nursing Board
Examinations nationwide. A report reach the PRC that
handwritten copies of two sets of examination were circulated
during the examination period among examinees reviewing at
the Gapuz Rewview Center and Inress Review Center.
On September 8, 2005, PGMA issued EO566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and
operation of all review centers and similar entities in the
Philippines.
On November 3, 2006, the chairman of CHED
approved CHED Memo Order 49, s2006.
ISSUE:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise of
Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHED’s
jurisdiction
HELD:
Yes. EO 566 expands the coverage of RA 7722
(CHED) which includes both public and private institutions of
higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all
post-secondary educational institution. A review center is not
an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722.
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PRC to regulate review centers.
OSG’s contented that PGMA was merely exercising
her executive power to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed and further argues that PGMA was exercising her
residual powers under EO 292, particularly Sec. 20, Title I of
Book III which provides:
“Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President
shall exercise such other powers and functions
vested in the President which are provided for under
the laws”
ISSUE:
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the
Executive’s rule-making power.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative
power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
Legislative powers is the authority to make laws and alter or
repeal them, and this power is vested with the Congress under
Sec. 1, Art VI, 1987 Constitution.
Province of North Cotabato v GRP Peace Panel
FACTS:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and MILF, through their respective peace negotiating
panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The signing of the
MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not
materialized.
ISSUE:
What [subject of these consolidated cases] is the
extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace
process?
HELD/RATIO:
The authority of the President to conduct peace
negotiation with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In
Sanlakas, the issue was the authority of the President to
declare state of rebellion – an authority which is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution. The SC held in Marcos v.
Manglapus, “xxx unstated residual powers which are
impled from the grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited
to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of
the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to
limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses
under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation
of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating
to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.
[the MOA-AD was declared unconstitutional on the
ground that the same exceeded what is allowed in the
Constitution – autonomous regions and not BJE]
Bariago v. Philippine Truth Commission
FACTS:
President Aquino III found a need for a special body
to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly

committed during the previous administration. On July 30,
2010, he signed EO No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010
ISSUE:
Whether the creation of the Truth Commission is
within the powers of the Chief Executive?
HELD:
Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President,
it maintains intact what is traditionally considered within the
scope of “executive power”. Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers so enumerated in the Constitution.
The Truth Commission is a mere ad hoc body formed
under the Office of the President primarily tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed during
the Arroyo administration. In DOH v. Camposano, it was held
that the Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, the President has the obligation to ensure that all
executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the
law.
[EO No. 1 was declared unconstitutional insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause]
SECTION 13
Doromal v Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commisioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) was
charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA3019) Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings
and position as president and director of the Doromal
International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted
bids to supple P61M worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and air-conditioning equipment to the
DECS and NMYC.
Doromal contented that the information should be
quashed because of the absence of any document signed
and/or submitted to the DECS bearing his signature.
ISSUE:
Does the fact that the accused, a PCGG
Commissioner, has not signed any document submitting to
DECS a bid of the family corporation of which he is a member
justify quashing the information?
HELD: The quashal is not justified.
RATIO:
Sec. 13, Art VII, of the 1987 Constitution provides
that “the President, Vice-President, the members of the
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not… during
(their) tenure,… directly or indirectly… participate in any
business. The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in
the Civil Service Law (PD 807, Sec. 36, subpar.24) that
“Pursuit of private business… without the permission required
by Civil Service Rules and Regulations” shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil
service.
[On suspension, the laws command that he shall be
suspended from office pendente lite. His approved leave of
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absence, whther it be for a fixed or indefinite period, is not a
bar to his preventive suspension]
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, President Aquino Issued EO 284,
allowing members of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department to hold two positions (not more than two
positions) in the government and government corporations,
and received corresponding compensation.
Petitioners seek the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of EO 284.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, EO 284 runs counter to Sec. 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
“The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.”
HELD:
EO 284 is unconstitutional as it expand the
exceptions under which the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants, may
hold other office. It should be noted that the Constitution
provides for officials designated an as ex-officio officer.
Dennis Funa v Executive Secretary
FACTS:
On October 4, 2006, PGMA appointed respondent
Maria Elena Bautista as Undersecretary of the DOTC and was
designated as Undersecretary for Marine Transport of the said
department.
On September 1, 2008, Bautista was designed as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator,
MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of
Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other
office or employment. Petitioner likewise asserts the
incompatibility of two posts (DOTC Usec for Maritime
Transport and MARINA Administrator).
On February 2, 2009, Bautista assumed the MARINA
Administration post and relinquish of her post as DOTC Usec.
Hence, rendering the current issue moot and academic. Also,
the respondent contended that it was “designation,” and
temporary at that, and was never really “appointed” as OIC
Administration of MARINA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of
MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Usec for
Maritime Transport and MARINA Administrator to which she
had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription
against duel or multiple offices of Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.

HELD:
[The issue is moot and academic, but for the sake of
argument, the Court opted to resolve the issue at once]
The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista
as OIC Administrator of MARINA, in a concurrent capacity
with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Her reliance on the “appointive” and “designation” is
misplaced. The Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple
offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding
of the office, and not to the nature of appointment of
designation.
SECTION 15
Aytona v Castillo
FACTS:
Outgoing President Garcia on December 19, 1961,
made about three hundred fifty (350) “midnight” or “last
minute” appointments. These appointments were ad interim,
made during the Congress is not in session. On December 30,
1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed
office and the next day issued AO 2 recalling, withdrawing,
and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President
Garcia after December 13, 1961 (date of Macapagal
proclamation).
Aytona was appointed ad interim Governor of the
Central Bank by President Garcia on December 29, 196 and
took his corresponding oath. On January 1, 1961, President
Macapagal appointed Castillo as ad interim Governor of the
Central Bank.
Aytona was prevented from holding office and as a
consequence he instituted a quo warranto, challenging
Castillo’s right to office. Castillo contended that the
appointment of Aytona had been revoked by AO 2 of
Macapagal.
ISSUE:
Whether the new President had the power to issue the
order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by
the past President, even after the appointees had already
qualified?
HELD:
Yes (given the circumstances)
Normally, when the President makes appointments
the consent of CA, he has benefit of their advice. When he
makes ad interim appointments, he exercises special
prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of
his selection either previous consultation with the members of
the Commission or thereafter explaining to them the reason of
such selection. The Court is aware of many precedents to the
effect that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be
reconsidered, especially where the appointee has qualified.
Under the given circumstances, mass ad interim
appointments (350), the authorities must admit of exceptional
circumstances justifying revocation.
In Re: Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. MA
Valenzuela and Hon. PB Villarta as RTC Judges
FACTS:
Valenzuela and Vallarta received from Malacanang
their copy of appointment dated March 30, 1998 as RTC
Judges (within two months preceding the next Presidential
elections, May 11, 1998).
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 15, Art VII, applies on the
appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta as RTC judges?
HELD:
Yes. Sec 15, Art VII applies to the judiciary.
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta
on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief
Justice on May 14, 998) were unquestionably made during the
period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the
operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments
which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or
influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the
judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no
showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the
making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On
the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public
policy for the prohibition against appointments made within
the period of the ban.
Arturo de Castro v JBC and PGMA
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of CJ R. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming of presidential
elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually
happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.
ISSUES:
1. May the incumbent President appoint his successor,
considering that Sec 15, Art VII (Executive Department)
of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety?
2. What is the relevance of Sec 4 (1), Art. VIII (Judiciary
Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any
vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence there if, to the matter of appointment of his
successor?
HELD:
Prohibition under Sec. 15, Art VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to
other appointments to the Judiciary (in effect holding that In
Re: Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta superseded. The
Court held that the records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commissions reveal that the framers devoted
time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicated that the
organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitution were not arbitrary or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect the intention and
manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
Article VI (Legislative Department), Article VII (Executive
Department) and Article VIII (The Judicial Department) – the
arrangement is a recognition of the principle of separation of
powers.
SECTION 16
Binamira v Garrucho
FACTS:
A petition for quo warranto by Ramon Binamira
which seeks his reinstatement too the office of the General

Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority which he caims
to have been removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure. Binamira was designated by Jose Gonzales
(then Minister of Tourism and Chairman of PTA Board).
On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded
by respondent Garrucho (new Sec of Tourism). PD 564
(Philippine Tourism Authority) provides that the General
Manager shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines. It appearing that Binamira was designated by the
then Minister of Tourism, not by the President, the latter
issued a memorandum invalidating the designation of
Binamira and further designating in concurrent capacity as
general manager Garrucho.
ISSUE:
Is the removal of petitioner Binamira a violation of
his security of tenure?
HELD:
No. Binamira was merely designated to the position
and not appointment. Moreso, that he was designated by the
then Minister of Tourism, to which under the law, should be
appointed by the President. Appointment involves the exercise
of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated.
Legally speaking, it was no possible for Minister Gonzales to
assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
President.
Sarmiento v Mison
FACTS:
The petitioner, Sarmiento, seek to enjoin the
respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office
of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, on the ground
that the latter’s appointment is unconstitutional by reason of
its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mison’s appointment is
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by
the Commission on appointment?
HELD:
The respondent’s appointment is constitutional and
valid. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint:
1. The heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
2. All other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provide for by law;
3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint;
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officer are initiated by nomination and,
if the nomination is confirmed by CA, the president appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups, does not require the
consent of CA.
The position Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (bureau head) is not among the first group, and may
be appointed without the necessity of CA’s consent.
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Bautista v Salonga
FACTS:
On August 27, 1987, the President designated herein
petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chairman of
CHR and on December 17, 1988 extended to her permanent
appointment as Chairman of the Commission.
On January 13, 1989, Bautista received a letter from
the CA requesting her to submit to the CA certain information
and documents as required by its rules in connection with the
confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of CHR.
Bautista, in her letter reply, stated that CA does not have
jurisdiction to review her appointment. In turn, the CA
Secretary informed petitioner Bautista that her ad interim
appointment as Chairman of CHR was disapproved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Commissioner of
Human Rights requires the consent of CA?
HELD:
The appointment of the Chairman and
Commissioners of the CHR does not require the consent of the
CA, as it does not belong to the group where CA’s consent is
necessary for their appointment.
Quintos-Deles v Commission on Appointment
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles were appointed as
Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art VII,
Sec 16, par 2 and Art XVIII, Sec 7 of the Constitution. On
April 18, 1988, the petitioner with four other appointed
sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their oaths.
Due to the opposition insisted of some congressmen-members
of the CA, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first
be confirmed by the CA before they could take their oaths and
assume office.
Quintos-Deles, in a special civil action for
prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel
the respondent CA to allow the her to perform and discharge
her duties as a member of House of the Representative
representing the Women’s Sector and to restrain the
respondent from subjecting her appointment to the
confirmation process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitution requires the
appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the CA?
HELD:
The power of the President to appoint sectoral
representatives remains directly derived from Section 7,
Article XVIII of the Constitution (and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution) which
is quoted in the second "Whereas' clause of Executive Order
No. 198. Thus, appointments by the President of sectoral
representatives require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments in accordance with the first sentence of Section
16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the point, petitioner
Deles' appointment was issued not by virtue of Executive
Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph
2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require
submission to the confirmation process.

Calderon v Carale
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1989, RAA 6715, amending the
Labor Code (PD442) was approved, which provides “xxx The
Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments xxx”
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino
appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC
representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The
appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter
upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said
appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued
Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the
places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and
legality of the permanent appointments extended by the
President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the
Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
appointments extended by the president to government
officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD:
No, Congress may not, by law, add to the list of
officers that requires that confirmation of the CA.
As interpreted in the Mison case, confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is required exclusively for the
heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, such as the members of the various
Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law
and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
is required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to
expand the list of officers whose appointments must be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase
"and other officers required by law" at the end of the first
sentence, or the phrase, "with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments" at the end of the second sentence.
Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to
provide for such additions
Tarrosa v Singson
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner
questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as
Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having
been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section
6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as
the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. Section 6,
Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
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“(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall
be the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the
Bangko Sentral shall be head of a department and his
appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. xxx”
ISSUES:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
appointments extended by the president to government
officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD:
As held in Calderon v. Carale, Congress cannot by
law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of
other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
Flores v Drilon
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order.
Petitioners, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of
Sec. 13 “xxx That for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall
be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority xxx” infringes on the constitutional and
statutory provision: Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution,
which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through
the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed
the Mayor to the subject posts.
Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on
the appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d),
itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman
of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA,
although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint
the Mayor of Olongapo City.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Congress pursuant to Sec 13, par (d)
of RA 7227 encroached the appointing authority of the
President.
HELD:
Yes. The power of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing
appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the
choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the
appointing power.
When Congress clothes the President with the power
to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time
limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once
the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to
appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications

of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest
the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his
discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the
qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one
individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
Luego v Civil Service Commission
FACTS:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer
11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino
Solon on February 18, 1983. 1 The appointment was described
as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it
as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest
filed by the private respondent and another employee, and
provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against
the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor
any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect
the approval of the appointment." On March 22, 1984, after
protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be
decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private
respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be
appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the
Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon
Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is
hereby revoked." The private respondent was so appointed on
June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The
petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now
before us to question that order and the private respondent's
title
ISSUE:
Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to
disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on
the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD:
The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary
but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution.
The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as
he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent
Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it
temporary.
Pobre v Mendieta
FACTS:
The controversy started, on January 2, 1992, when
the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC
Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A.
Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and
Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate
Commissioner of the PRC.
On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino
appointed the petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as
the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman. Mariano A. Mendieta, as
the Senior Associate Commissioner, contended that he was
legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC.
Pobre disputed Mendieta's claim on the ground that
only the President of the Philippines, in whom the appointing
power is vested by law and the Constitution, may name the
successor.
The petition raises an issue regarding the proper
construction of the provision in Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 that:
". . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the
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unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate
Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the
expiration of his term, resignation or removal," whereby the
legality of Pobre's appointment as PRC Chairman may be
determined.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the President to appoint "those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint." The law that authorizes him to
appoint the PRC Commissioner and Associate
Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2, which provides that
the Commissioner and Associate Commissioners of the PRC
are "all to be appointed by the President for a term of nine (9)
years, without reappointment, to start from the time they
assume office”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Pobre violative
any provision of PD 223.
HELD:
The appointment is valid and is not violative of any
provision of PD 223.
P.D. 223 applies only to the unexpired term of the
Chairman/Commissioner, the underlined clause: "at the
expiration of his term, resignation or removal" can not
possibly refer to the Chairman/Commissioner for it would
contradict the first clause providing that he will be succeeded
by the senior Associate Commissioner "for the unexpired
portion of his term only." There can be no more "unexpired
term" to speak of if the Chairman stepped down "at the
expiration of his term." It is more logical to assume that the
underlined clause refers to the senior Associate Commissioner
who should serve only up to "the expiration of his term,
resignation or removal." Hence, the preposition "at," which
appears to have been used inadvertently, should be understood
to mean "until" so that the provision will read thus:
“. . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the
unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate
Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner until the
expiration of his term, resignation or removal. (Sec. 2. P.D.
223)”
Arturo de Castro v JBC and PGMA
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of CJ R. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming of presidential
elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually
happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.
ISSUE:
Whether the President – any president – may appoint
a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and does not counter run
to the provision of the Constitution?
HELD:
Yes. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. She is now

left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up
the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90
days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply
with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to
settle the controversy.
SECTION 17
Drilon v Lim
FACTS:
Drilon, the Secretary of Justice, on appeal to him,
declared the Ordinance No. 7794 or the Manila Revenue
Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
policy.
The City of Manila, in a petition for certiorari, RTC
revoked the Secretary’s resolution, sustained the said
ordinance, and more importantly declared Sec 187 of the LGC
as unconstitutional be of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice
the power of control over local governments in violation of
local autonomy as mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines power of supervision over local governments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 187 of the LGC is violative of the
Constitution provisions of local autonomy and the President’s
power of supervision of local governments?
HELD:
No. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the
tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both
of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a
tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version
of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the
ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment.
He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the
said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing
their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and
the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the
doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate
or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself
does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion
to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he
may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the
prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the
doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed. Secretary Drilon did
precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
Villena v Secretary of Interior
FACTS:
The Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the
request of the Secretary of Interior, conducted an inquiry into
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the conduct of Mayor Villena, as a result of which the latter
was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious
abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of law
profession. The respondent recommended to the President of
the Philippines the suspension of Villena to prevent possible
coercion of witnesses and such was granted.
Villena petitioned for the issuance of preliminary
injunction. Among others, he argued that the act of respondent
in suspending him from office and in preferring charges
against him and in designating a special investigator is null
and void. He contended that the respondent by suspending
him, has exercised control over local government when that
power has been taken away from the President of the
Philippines by the Constitution.
The petitioner argues that the power of suspension is
expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code
to the provincial governor. It does not however mean that the
grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of
the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance,
counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that
the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the
petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal
(sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised
conformably to law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Interior has the
power of suspension of the petitioner, an exercise of the power
of control over local government and hence violative of local
autonomy?
HELD:
The President of the Philippines is invested with the
authority to suspend the petitioner, and it appearing that he
had verbally approved or at least acquiesced in the action
taken by the Secretary of the Interior, the suspension of the
petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or
ratification of the act of the Secretary of the Interior by the
President of the Philippines. The head of a department is a
man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he
appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the
executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that
he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of
administration of the entire Executive Department.
Lacson-Magallanes Co Inc v Pano
FACTS:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes as a permittee and actual
occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Davao.
Magallanes, in 1953, ceded his rights and interest to a portion
of the above public land to plaintiff, the said portion was
officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and
declared agricultural land in 1954. In 1955, Pano and nineteen
others applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the released
area. Plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales
application covering the entire released area and this was
protested by Pano and other upon averment that they actual
occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales
application. The Director of Lands rendered a decision in
favor of the plaintiff and a motion for reconsideration by Pano
was denied. On appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, held that the appeal was without merit.
The case was elevated to the President. On 1958, The
Executive Secretary, “by authority of the President” decided
the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of
Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Plaintiff contented that the decision of the Director
of Lands “as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when
approved” by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources (Sec. 4 CA 141), claiming that this statute is
controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has no power to modify,
affirm, revise, reverse or set aside the decision of the Director
of Lands as affirmed by the Sec of Agriculture and Natural
Resource pursuant to Sec 4 of CA 141?
Whether or not the power exercised by the Executive
Secretary is an undue delegation of power?
HELD:
The President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive
departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the
privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls
and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over,
confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department
secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the
President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a
department secretary
The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus
gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the
Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order".
City of Iligan v Director of Lands
FACTS:
On October 5, 1965, The President Macapagal issued
Proclamation 469 providing for the grant, donation and
transfer of parcels of land in favor of Iligan City. On October
22, the Mayor of Iligan wrote the Director of Lands to inform
him that the City of Iligan is the owner in fee simple of loats
by virtue of Proclamation 469 and requested that the said
property be excluded from the proposed auction sale. No
action was taken on this request for exclusion. A preliminary
injunction was issued by the court as prayed for in the
complaint on December 1965.
On August 1966, President Marcosissued
Proclamation 94 “excluding from the operation of
Proclamation 469 certain portions of the land embraced
therein, situated in Iligan and declaring the same open to
disposition under Public Land Act.
After trial on merits, the trial court rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction of December 1965. Appeal to the CA,
in a resolution issued wherein the records of the case were
certified to this Court as the issue of the validity of any
executive order and the errors or the questions of the law
raised are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to
donate the said public land to such a province, municipality,
branch or subdivision of the government?
HELD:
Yes. Such power of the President is recognized under
Section 69 aforecited of the Public Land Act. The President of
the Philippines may execute contracts in favor of any
province, municipality or other branch or subdivision of the
government who shall need any portion of the land of the
public domain open to concession for educational, charitable
or other similar purposes, in the form of donation, sale, lease,
exchange, or any other form.
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RE: CONTROL. Director of Lands who has direct
executive control among others in the lease, sale or any form
of concession or disposition of the land of the public domain
subject to the immediate control of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and considering that under
the Constitution the President of the Philippines has control
over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, etc., 15
the President of the Philippines has therefore the same
authority to dispose of portions of the public domain as his
subordinates, the Director of Lands, and his alter ego the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Gascon v Arroyo
FACTS:
An “Agreement to Arbitrate” was entered into by and
between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, and ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President,
Eugenio Lopez, Jr.
This is an action to annul and set aside the said
agreement entered into by the Executive Secretary.
HELD:
As Chief Executive, the President was (and even
now) "assisted by a Cabinet" composed of Ministers (now
Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to the
President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as
heads of the various departments, are the assistants and agents
of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in
person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
heads of such departments performed in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Executive Secretary had the power and authority to
enter into the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS- CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of
the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid
agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the
Philippines, as a party thereto.
Kilosbayan v Dominguez
Supervision and control include only the authority to:
a) act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by
law or regulation to a subordinate;
b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts;
c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units;
d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs; and
e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.
Administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the
department or its equivalent to:
a. generally oversee the operations of such agencies and
insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and
economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities;
b. require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of
management audit, performance evaluation and inspection
to determine compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department;

c. take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions, including rectification
of violations, abuses and other forms of mal-
administration;
d. review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies
but may not increase or add to them.
SECTION 18
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v Zamora
FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in
Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings,
the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the
Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of
crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to
execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the
presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by
which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan,
would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under
the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous
directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum,
dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the
AFP and the PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President
expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation
in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention
program including increased police patrols. The President
further stated that to heighten police visibility in the
metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking
his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines
in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and
for a reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved.
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join
the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols
around the metropolis.
HELD:
Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in
the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions
must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion
and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not
required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces.
The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary,"
the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The
implication is that the President is given full discretion and
wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as
compared to the two other powers.
The President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which
may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-
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the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property.
It is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest
upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the
petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was
gravely abused, the President’s exercise of judgment deserves
to be accorded respect from this Court.
Olaguer v Military Commission
FACTS:
On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were
charged for subversion upon the recommendation of the
respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval of the
respondent Minister of National Defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not military commissions or tribunals
have the jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses allegedly
committed during martial law when civil courts are open and
functioning.
HELD:
Civilians placed on trial for offenses under general
law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or
military process. Judicial power is vested by the Constitution
exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts
as are duly established by law. Military commissions, or
tribunals, are not courts and do not form part of the judicial
system.
A military commission or tribunal cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law,
over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as
long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any
judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned.
Sanlakas v Executive Secretary
FACTS:
They came in the middle of the night. Armed with
high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three
hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere
apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003.
Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded,
among other things, the resignation of the President, the
Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the
President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion" and
calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
HELD:
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling
out power the Constitution does not require the President to
make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article
VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty

days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least
a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-
four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
The above provision grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated powers."
From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out
power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the
exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or
rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such
power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in
the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that
'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the
armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.'"
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18,
Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests
the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but,
first and foremost, with Executive powers
Gudani v Senga (HELLO GARCI SCANDAL)
FACTS:
On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon
(Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to
appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled
on 28 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics
concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the
public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the
surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone
conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and
an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had
been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member,
of "Joint Task Force Ranao" by the AFP Southern Command.
"Joint Task Force Ranao" was tasked with the maintenance of
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peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of
Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.
On 27 September 2005, a directive from PGMA was
received by Gen. Senga, subsequently, the latter, through a
letter, informing the senator that "no approval has been
granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear" before
the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started,
and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.
Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enjoining them and other
military officers from testifying before Congress without the
President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief
against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in
preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated
within the military justice system in connection with
petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive.
On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005,
President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order
No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG notes that the E.O. "enjoined
officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval."
HELD:
The ability of the President to prevent military
officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations
as in executive privilege.
The refusal of the President to allow members of the
military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial
relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal
order sanctions a modality by which members of the military
may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend
the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief.
The remedy lies with the courts.
David v Arroyo
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the
declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these
petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017.
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari
and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation
No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5),
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very
freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence,
such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among
some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s
Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in
a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and

take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present
danger.
Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits
to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to
the President’s mind were organized for purposes of
destabilization, are cancelled.
ISSUE:
Constitutionality of PP 1017 and GO 5.
RATIO/SUMMARY:
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of
PP 1021 – a supervening event – would have normally
rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP
1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly
in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP
1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already,
there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly
PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become
"unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues
raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be
resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President
for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The
proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.
However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to
direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not
related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by
the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of
a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility
and private business affected with public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It
is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-
Chief – addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the
provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid
standard – that the military and the police should take only the
"necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of
terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined
and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed
deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been
denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to
guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the
limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of
G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts
narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless
arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2)
the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards
on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical
seizures of some articles for publication and other materials,
are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court
cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions
on the individual police officers concerned. They have not
been individually identified and given their day in court. The
civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal
Informations have not been presented before this Court.
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Elementary due process bars this Court from making any
specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means
to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves.
How to give the military the power it needs to protect the
Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is
one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state.
During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth
and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be
arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people’s liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the
theorists who studied the various competing political
philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the
authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital
principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits
to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the
government to the governed.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The
Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In
addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national
emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize
the President to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides
a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement
PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and
Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless
search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its
articles for publication and other materials, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Kulay-an v Tan
FACTS:
On 15 January 2009, three members from the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul,
Sulu.
On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the
ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which then
organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis
Committee later called Sulu Crisis Management Committee,
convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur
Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces
component was headed by respondents General Juancho
Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The PNP
component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent
Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police Deputy Director for
Operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM).

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency
Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from
different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding
areas of Patikul. The organization of the CEF was embodied in
a "Memorandum of understanding" entered into between three
parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by
Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National
Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag.
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued
Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09),
declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. 13 It
cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said
declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the
Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which
bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters
and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not issued by Provincial Governor Tan,
Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the
Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Whether or not the Provincial Governor is not
authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his
command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to
his own private army.
HELD:
The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief
powers dictate that they are exercised by One President.
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional
precept of One President is the notion that there are certain
acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the
president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or
prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to
which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The
President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced
only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the
second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution.
Respondent provincial governor is not endowed
with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency
and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President.
Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF
pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force;
the organization of private citizen armies is proscribed.
Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that:
Private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled.
All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense
Forces (CHDF) not consistent with the citizen armed force
established in this Constitution shall be dissolved or, where
appropriate, converted into the regular force.
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SECTION 19
Torres v Gonzales
FACTS:
Before 1979, Torres was convicted of the crime of
estafa (2 counts) and was sentenced to imprisonment and to
pay an indemnity. The maximum sentence would expire on
November 2000.
On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted
the petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner
would “not again violate any penal laws of the Philippines.
Should this condition be violated, should this condition be
violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon
and was released.
On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the
conditional pardon of the petitioner upon recommendation of
the Board of Pardons. The record before the Board showed
that petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa,
convicted with sedition which is subject of an appeal, and a
letter report from the NBI showing a long list of charges
brought against the petitioner. The petitioner was subsequently
arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired
portion of his sentence.
Petitioner claims that he did not violate his
conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of the 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of
sedition. He contends that he was not given am opportunity to
be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and
this deprived of due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be
validly arrested and recommitted to for violation of the terms
of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance
of his original sentence.
HELD:
No. The grant of pardon and the determination of the
terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
conditional pardon, and the proper consequence of such
breach may either be purely executive act (under Sec 64(i) of
the Revised Adm Code) which is not subject to judicial
scrutiny, or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon (Art 159 of the
RPC). Where the President opts to proceed under Sec 64(i),
RAC, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Monsanto v Factoran
FACTS:
Petitioner Monsanto was Assistant Treasurer of
Calbayog City. She was convicted of estafa through
falsification of public documents and sentenced to
imprisonment, to pay a fine and to indemnify the government
in a decision by the Sandiganbayan. While the case was
pending appeal in the SC, she was granted absolute pardon
and “restored to full civil and political rights” by the then
President Marcos. The Ministry of Finance agreed to reinstate
her without necessity of a new appointment provided this was
done not earlier than the date of her pardon. However, on
April 15, 1986, the new administration held that she was not
entitled to automatic reinstatement on the basis of the pardon

granted to her. Her motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner brought this action to the SC. Petitioners theory is
that general rule on pardon does not apply to her because she
was extended clemency while her case was pending in the SC.
She contended that without final judgment on conviction, the
accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not match.
HELD:
(1) Petitioner was granted pardon under the 1973
Constitution, as amended, which by deleting the requirement
that pardon could be granted only after final conviction,
impliedly authorized it to be granted even before conviction.
The 1987 Constitution reverted back to the former rule,
requiring final conviction as a condition for the grant by the
President of pardon, However, it is immaterial when the
pardon was granted. For the result would be the same. By
accepting the pardon, the petitioner is deemed to have
abandoned her appeal, which result that the judgment of
conviction of the Sandiganbayan became final.
(2) Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding
from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and
not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a
deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and
delivery is not complete without acceptance. A pardon looks
to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for
the past.
NOTES ON THE CASE:
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual
from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to
all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost of
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be
constantly kept in mind lest we wise track of the true character
and purpose of the privilege.
People v Salle Jr
FACTS:
On November 18, 1991, Francisco Salle Jr and Ricky
Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals of a compound crime of murder and destructive
arson and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay indemnity. The appellant
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. However, Salle filed an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The court required his
counsel to verify the voluntariness of the said motion.
In the manifestation of his counsel, she informed the
court that her verification disclosed that Salle signed the
motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression
that the motion was merely a bureaucratic requirement
necessary for his early release following the grant of a
conditional pardon by the President on December 9, 1993. She
further informed that Court the Mengote was, on same dates
granted a conditional pardon and released him from
confinement, and that he immediately left for his province
without consulting her. The Court granted Salle’s motion to
withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his
acceptance of the conditional pardon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditional pardon granted to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of
conviction by the trial court is enforceable?
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HELD:
The “conviction by final judgment” limitation under
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits
the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from conviction by the trial
court. Government agencies and instrumentality concerned
must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed
from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal before
an application shall be processed. The acceptance of the
pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the
appeal.
Garcia v COA
FACTS:
Petitioner was summarily dismissed from service on
the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of
the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication in administrative cases for the loss of several
telegraph poles. Petitioner did not appeal from the decision.
Based on the same facts obtaining in the
administrative action, a criminal case for qualified theft was
filed against petitioner. The court rendered its decision
acquitting the petitioner of the offense charged. The acquittal
of the petitioner was founded not on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit
the offense imputed to him.
Petitioner sought reinstatement to his former position,
but was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications. Hence,
he pleaded to the President for executive clemency which was
then granted. Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA
a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1 April 1975
(date of dismissal) to March 12, 1985 (date of reinstatement).
It was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the
payment of back wages after having been reinstated to the
grant of executive clemency?
HELD:
Yes. we have firmly established the general rule that
while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is
as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does
not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. It does
not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil
rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it
cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for
appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of
the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not
generally result in automatic reinstatement because the
offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to
back wages.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the
individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man
and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the
offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he
did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party
from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby
restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, petitioner was found
administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently
dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted
by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the

very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of
petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not
commit the offense imputed to him.
Llamas v Orbos
FACTS:
Petitioner Llamas was Vice-Governor of Tarlac who
assumed the position of governor when Governor Ocampo
was found guilty by DILG of a violation of Ra 3019 and
meted a penalty of suspension of 90 days. Administrative
conviction was based on complaint filed by petitioners and
other charging Ocampo with executing loan agreement with
Lingkod Tarlac Foundation for the amount of P20M, which is
a non-stock and non-profit organization headed by the
governor as chairman and his brother-in-law as executive
director, trustee, and secretary. Loan was claimed to be
advantageous to the government. Motion for reconsideration
was filed by Ocampo and was denied by DILG. On March 19,
1991, Ocampo issued “admistrative order” wherein he
signified intention to continue in the office at his residence in
the belief that pendency of appeal to the Executive Secretary
precluded finality as executor of the DILG order. The
Executive Secretary issued a resolution granting executive
clemency to Ocampo, Llamas filed petition claiming that
executive clemency could only be granted by the President in
criminal cases, and not administrative cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not executive clemency may be granted
on either criminal case or in administrative case?
HELD:
According to the petitioner, “after conviction by final
judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, but he himself
describes the governor as one “convicted in an administrative
case” and thus actually concedes that “conviction” may be
used either in a criminal or administrative case. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the President which
is sole exclusion of impeachment cases.
If the President can grant reprieves, commutation
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases,
with more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases which are less serious than criminal
offenses? However, the power of the President to grant
executive clemency in administrative cases refers only to
administrative cases in the Executive branch and not in the
Judicial and Legislative branches of the government.
Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the
different Executive departments are mere adjuncts of the
President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the
President until countermanded or reprobated by her. In this
case, the President in the exercise of her power of supervision
and control over all executive departments may substitute her
decision for that of her subordinate. It is clearly within the
power of the President not only to grant “executive clemency”
but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate
against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the
facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the
alleged executive clemency was granted.
Kapunan v CA
FACTS:
Petitioners face criminal charges in connection with
the 1986 killing of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Chairman
Rolando Olalia and his driver, Leonor Alay-ay. These
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T
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consolidated petitions asks to reconsider whether petitioner are
immune from prosecution for Alay-ay/Olalia slayings byy
reason of a general grant of amnesty issued by the President
Ramos to rebels, insurgents and other person who had
committed crimes in furtherance of political ends. CA had
held that they had not.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of amnesty extinguished
their criminal liability?
HELD:
Kapunan’s Certificate of Amnesty states:
This is to certify that EDUARDO E. KAPUNAN, JR.
was granted AMNESTY for acts constituting Rebellion on
March 23, 1995 pursuant to the provisions of Proclamation
No. 347, issued on March 25, 1994 by His Excellency,
President Fidel V. Ramos.
The amnesty granted to Kapunan extends to acts
constituting only one crime, rebellion. Thus, any inquiry
whether he is liable for prosecution in connection with the
Olalia killings will necessarily rely not on the list of acts or
crimes enumerated in Section 1 of Proclamation No. 347, but
on the definition of rebellion and its component acts.
Legaspi’s Certificate of Amnesty states:
This is to certify that the amnesty application (No. A-
270) under Proclamation No. 347 of MR. OSCAR E.
LEGASPI, filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Metro
Manila, was GRANTED by the NATIONAL AMNESTY
COMMISSION en banc on 13 November 1995 subject to the
qualification that the grant of amnesty shall cover only those
offenses which Mr. Legaspi disclosed in his application. In his
application, Mr. Legaspi stated that he participated in the
1987 and 1989 coup attempts, for which respective acts, he
was charged with mutiny before a General Court Martial and
Rebellion (which was archived) before the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court. Mr. Legaspi further stated in his
application that he went on AWOL in 198.
The limited scope of the amnesty granted to Legaspi
is even more apparent. At most, it could only cover offenses
connected with his participation in the 1987 and 1989 coup
attempts.
Proclamation No. 347 operates only to the extent of
entitling the criminal to apply for amnesty. The actual grant of
amnesty still depends on the NAC’s determination as to
whether the applicant is indeed entitled to amnesty. In
Kapunan’s case, the grant of amnesty extended to him pertains
only to the crime of rebellion.
the grant of amnesty was specifically limited to his
participation in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts against the
Aquino administration. The murders took place in November
1986. They were supposedly intended to create an atmosphere
that would facilitate an immediate coup d’etat. It is difficult
for the Court to appreciate at this point how the Olalia/Alay-ay
killings were connected with the 1987 or 1991 coup attempts,
though Legaspi is free to establish such a connection through a
trial on the merits.
SECTION 21
Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading
FACTS:
Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee
of several shipments of onion and garlic .Some shipments
came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In as much as
none of the shipments had the certificate required by Central
Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the

goods thus imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture
proceedings.
The Collector of Customs of Manila rendered a
decision on September 4, 1956, declaring said goods forfeited
to the Government and — the goods having been, in the
meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds.
Decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of
Customs on December 27, 1956. Court of Tax Appeals, which
reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs and
ordered that the aforementioned bonds be cancelled and
withdrawn.
The forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan
cannot be justified under Executive Order No. 328, not only
because the same seeks to implement an executive agreement
— extending the effectivity of our Trades and Financial
Agreements with Japan. (the said executive agreement was
made without the concurrence of 2/3 of the Senate).
ISSUE: Treaties v Executive Agreement
HELD:
The concurrence of said House of Congress is
required by our fundamental law in the making of "treaties"
(Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]),
which are, however, distinct and different from "executive
agreements," which may be validly entered into without such
concurrence.
Treaties are formal documents which require
ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate.
Executive agreements become binding through executive
action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by
Congress.
International agreements involving political issues
or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character
usually take the form of treaties. But international
agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out
well-established national policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature
usually take the form of executive agreements.
15
Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to
regularly update petitioners and this Court on the status of
their investigation.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible
error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent?
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains
preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a
concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the
matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued
during his or her tenure.9 The Court subsequently made it
abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case
likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution,
that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her
incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in
the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions.

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY

Lourders Rubrico et. al. v PGMA et. al.

FACTS:
This case started with the alleged abduction of
Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she
and her daughters were made to endure by military men.
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25,
2007 was originally filed before this Court. After issuing the
desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified
written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for
summary hearing and appropriate action.
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31,
2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review, disposing of
the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents
were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition
with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir.
Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp.
Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Nevertheless, in order that petitioners’ complaint will
not end up as another unsolved case, the heads of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police
are directed to ensure that the investigations already
commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to
justice. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the

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