evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
PART ONE • Referred to by Wigmore as evidence by “autoptic
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Rule128: General Provisions
Section 1. Evidence defined. — Evidence is the means,
sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)
Section 2. Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in
all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise
provided by law or these rules. (2a)
Bustos v. Lucero: R128, §1 provides the legal definition of
evidence – Evidence is the mode and manner of proving
competent facts in judicial proceedings.
Proof: result or effect of evidence.
Proof of such fact: when requisite quantum of evidence of a
particular fact has been duly admitted and given weight
Factum probandum: ultimate fact; fact sought to be
established. Refers to the proposition
Factum probans: evidentiary fact; fact by w/c the factum
probandum is to be established. Refer to the materials which
establish that proposition
Law of evidence
• fundamentally a procedural law (Bustos v. Lucero)
• §5[5], Art. VIII, Consti: SC shall promulgate rules
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure w/c shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade & shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights
o new rules may be validly applied to cases pending
at time of such change (Aldeguer v. Hoskyn)
o BUT in criminal cases, if alteration of evidence rules
would allow reception of lesser quantum of
evidence than what the law required at the time
the offense was committed in order to convict =
retroactive application is unconstitutional for being
ex post facto
primarily found in RoC (R 128-133)
special laws (Ex. RA 4200 [Anti-Wiretapping Law], Code of
Commerce, CC)
Consti – see Part B.
The rules of evidence are specifically applicable ONLY in
judicial proceedings.
• Quasi-judicial proceedings: the same apply by analogy,
or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient (R1 §4) EXCEPT where the governing
law or that particular proceeding specifically adopts the
rules of evidence in RoC
Classification of evidence according to form
1) Object (real) evidence (§1, R130)
That which is directly addressed to the senses of the
court and consists of tangible things exhibited or
demonstrated in open court, in an ocular inspection, or
at a place designated by the court for its view or
observation of an exhibition, experiment or
demonstration.
• The ascertainment of the controverted fact is made
through the direct use of the different senses of the
presiding magistrate or his authorized delegate.
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preference,” i.e. by presenting in open court the
evidentiary articles for the observation or inspection
of the tribunal
2) Documentary evidence (§§2-19, R130)
Evidence supplied by written instruments or derived
from conventional symbols, such as letters, by which
ideas are represented on material substances.
• Specific definition found in §2, R130
3) Testimonial evidence
That which is submitted to the court through the
testimony or deposition of a witness
Other classifications of evidence
1) Relevant, material, and competent evidence
a) Relevant evidence: evidence having any value in
reason as tending to prove any matter provable in
an action
b) Material evidence: evidence directed to prove a fact
in issue as determined by the rules of substantive
law and pleadings
c) Competent evidence: one that is not excluded by
the Rules, a statute, or the Constitution
Test of relevancy
The logical relation of the evidentiary fact to the fact in
issue, i.e. whether the former tends to establish the
probability or improbability of the latter
Materiality of evidence
Determined by whether the fact it intends to prove is in
issue or not, w/c is in turn determined by the substantive
law, the pleadings, the pre-trial order and by the
admissions or confessions on file
2) Direct and circumstantial evidence
a) Direct evidence: that which proves the fact in
dispute w/o the aid of any inference or
presumption
b) Circumstantial evidence: the proof of (a) fact/s from
which, taken either singly or collectively, the
existence of the particular fact in dispute may be
inferred as a necessary or probable consequence
3) Cumulative and corroborative evidence
a) Cumulative evidence: evidence of the same kind
and to the same state of facts
b) Corroborative evidence: additional evidence of a
different character to the same point
4) Prima facie and conclusive evidence
a) Prima facie evidence: that which, standing alone,
unexplained, or uncontradicted, is sufficient to
maintain the proposition affirmed
b) Conclusive evidence: that class of evidence which
the law does not allow to be contradicted
5) Primary and secondary evidence
a) Primary evidence: that which the law regards as
affording the greatest certainty of the fact in
question. Referred to in RoC as the best evidence
b) Secondary evidence: that which is inferior to the
primary evidence and is permitted by law only
when the best evidence is not available. Also called
substitutionary evidence
6) Positive and negative evidence
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a) Positive evidence: when the witness affirms that a
fact did or did not occur
b) Negative evidence: when the witness states he did
not see or know of the occurrence of a fact
Positive testimony is entitled to greater weight since the
witness represents of his personal knowledge the
presence or absence of a fact. In negative testimony,
there is a total disclaimer of personal knowledge, hence
without any representation or disavowal that the fact in
question could or couldn’t have existed or happened.
When a witness declares of his own knowledge that a
fact did not take place that is actually positive testimony
since it’s an affirmation of the truth of a negative fact.
RIANO:
Not every circumstance which affords an inference as to the
truth or falsity of a matter alleged is considered evidence.
• Not evidence if it’s excluded by the law or RoC even if it
proves the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue.
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• Ong Chia v. Republic: The rule on formal offer of
evidence is not applicable to a case involving a petition
for naturalization.
• Sasan, Sr. v. NLRC: Technical rules of evidence are not
binding in labor cases.
• Bantolino v. Coca Cola Bottlers, Inc.: The rules of
evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies where decisions may be reached
on the basis of position papers only.
Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of
evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings,
nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial
evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence
cannot be disregarded. (Marcelo v. Bungubung)
Application of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
The provisions of the REE apply to all civil actions and
proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases.
(§2, R1, REE)

Definition under §1, R128 significantly considers “evidence” Scope of the rules of evidence
not as an end in itself but merely as a “means” of ascertaining The rules of evidence in the RoC are guided by the principle
the truth of a matter of fact. of uniformity. As a general policy, the rules of evidence shall
be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings. (§2,
Purpose of evidence R128)
Ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact in a judicial
proceeding (§1, R128) Evidence in civil cases v. Evidence in criminal cases
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
Evidence is required because of the presumption that the CASES
court is not aware of the veracity of the facts involved in a The party having the burden Guilt of accused has to be
case. It is incumbent upon the parties to prove a fact in issue of proof must prove his claim proven beyond reasonable
through the presentation of admissible evidence. by a preponderance of doubt (§2, R133)
evidence (§1, R133)
When evidence is required; when not required Offer of compromise is not An offer of compromise by
• Where no factual issue exists in a case, there is no need an admission of any liability, the accused may be received
to present evidence because where the case presents a and is not admissible in in evidence as an implied
question of law, such is resolved by the mere application evidence against the offeror admission of guilt, EXCEPT in
of the relevant statutes or rules of this jurisdiction to (§27, R130) criminal cases involving
which no evidence is required. quasi-offenses (criminal
• When the pleadings in a civil case do not tender an issue negligence) or those allowed
of fact, a trial need not be conducted since there is no by law to be compromised
more reason to present evidence. Case is ripe for judicial Generally there is no The accused enjoys the
determination through a judgment on the pleadings per presumption of innocence constitutional presumption of
R34 for or against a party EXCEPT innocence (§14, Art. III,
• Evidence may be dispensed with by agreement of the in certain cases provided for Constitution)
parties. The parties to any action are allowed by the by law
Rules to agree in writing upon the facts involved in the
litigation and to submit the case for judgment upon the Distinction between evidence and proof
facts agreed upon, without the introduction of evidence.
• Evidence is not required on matters of judicial notice (§1,
• Evidence is the medium or means by which a fact is
proved or disproved.
R129) and on matters judicially admitted (§4, R129)
• Proof is not the evidence itself. It is merely the probative
Applicability of the rules of evidence effect of evidence and is the conviction or persuasion of
§4, R1 provides for the non-applicability of RoC, including the mind resulting from a consideration of the evidence.
necessarily the rules of evidence, to certain specified o Proof is the effect of evidence because without
proceedings. evidence there is no proof.
o Bare allegations unsubstantiated by evidence are
• Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical not equivalent to proof.
niceties of the rules obtaining in a court of law.
• CSC conducts its investigations for the purpose of Positive and negative defenses
ascertaining the truth without necessarily adhering to GENERAL RULE: Positive evidence is more credible than
technical rules of procedure applicable in judicial negative evidence.
proceedings. • Reason: the witness who testifies to a negative may have
forgotten what actually occurred, while it is impossible to

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remember what never existed. (Gomez v. Gomez-
Samson)
A denial evidence is the weakest defense and can never
overcome a positive testimony particularly when it comes
from the mouth of a credible witness. (People v. Mendoza)
• Evidence that is negative is self-serving in nature and
cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of
witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.
(People v. Larranaga)
• Denial, like alibi is an inherently weak defense vis-à-vis
positive identification.
Factum probans and factum probandum
Evidence signifies a relationship between two facts, namely:
a) the fact or proposition to be established (factum
probandum); and
b) the facts or material evidencing the fact or proposition to
be established (factum probans).
Factum probandum: the fact to be proved; the fact which is
in issue and to which the evidence is directed.
Factum probans: the probative or evidentiary fact tending to
prove the fact in issue
The factum probandum in a certain case may be affected by
the judicial admissions of a party.
• Ex. If the defendant in a suit based on a culpa aquiliana
theory admits his negligence in his answer to the
complaint, there is no more need to prove negligence.
Hence, negligence ceases to be a factum probandum in
the case.
If the factum probandum “signifies the fact or proposition to
be established,” then matters of JN, conclusive presumptions
and judicial admissions cannot qualify as parts of the factum
probandum of a particular case, because such matters need
not be established or proven.
In practical terms, the factum probandum in a civil case refers
to the elements of a cause of action from the point of view of
the plaintiff and the elements of the defense from the
defendant’s standpoint.
Example: Suit for collection of a sum of money – in the
absence of any admission by the defendant,
• The factum probandum of the plaintiff would be:
1) The existence of the debt of the defendant
2) The maturity of the debt
3) The demand made by the plaintiff upon the
defendant to pay
4) Failure to pay despite the demand
• The factum probandum for the defendant: the fact of
payment of the obligation or the prescription of the debt
or the elements of any defense he may interpose
Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. v. Tanjangco
For a tort case under CC 2176, plaintiff has to prove:
1) Damages suffered by the plaintiff
2) The fault or negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond
3) The connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred.
In a criminal case, the factum probandum includes all matter
that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt in
order to justify a conviction.
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Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
of these rules. (3a)
Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. — Evidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters
shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact
in issue. (4a)
Requisites for admissibility of evidence (§3)
1) It must be relevant to the issue sought to be proved
• §4: Evidence is relevant when it has “such a relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence.”
• Relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and
human experience
2) It must be competent
• §3: Evidence is competent when it “is not excluded
by the law of these rules.”
• Competency is determined by the prevailing
exclusionary rules of evidence
Restated by Wigmore – axioms of admissibility:
1) That none but facts having rational probative value
are admissible
2) That all facts having rational probative value are
admissible unless some specific rule forbids their
admission
Note: under this concept, relevant evidence is any class
of evidence which has “rational probative value” to
establish the issue in controversy.
Admissibility of evidence is determined at the time it is offered
to the court (§35, R132)
• Object or real evidence is offered to the court when the
same is presented for its view or evaluation (ex. Ocular
inspections or demos)
• Documentary evidence formally offered by the
proponent immediately before he rests his case
• Testimonial evidence offered by the calling of the witness
to the stand
Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be made
at the time such evidence is offered, or as soon thereafter as
the objection to its admissibility shall be considered waived.
• Objections to object or real evidence must be made
either at the time it is presented in an ocular inspection
or demonstration or when it is formally offered.
• Objections to documentary evidence must be made at
the time it is formally offered.
• In the case of testimonial evidence, objection to the
qualifications of the witness should be made at the time
he is called to the stand
o If the witness is otherwise qualified, the objection
should be raised when the objectionable question
is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features became apparent by reason
of such answer.
Doctrines or rules of admissibility sanctioned by SC
• Conditional admissibility
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Where the evidence at the time of its offer appears to be
immaterial or irrelevant unless it is connected with the
other facts to be subsequently proved, such evidence
may be received on condition that the other facts will be
proved thereafter, otherwise the evidence already given
will be stricken out.
o This doctrine was applied by SC in a criminal case
and in a civil case subject to the qualification that
there should be no bad faith on the part of the
proponent. – Such a qualification appears necessary
to avoid unfair surprises to the other party.
• Multiple admissibility
Where the evidence is relevant and competent for two
or more purposes, such evidence should be admitted for
any or all the purposes for which it is offered provided it
satisfies all the requirements of law for its admissibility
therefor.
RIANO:
Ex. Depending upon the circumstances, the declaration
of a dying person may be admissible for several
purposes:
o Dying declaration (§37, R130)
o Part of the res gestae (§42, R130)
o Declaration against interest (§38, R130)
Ex. The statement by a bus driver immediately after the
collision that he dozed off while driving may be
admissible as:
o An admission under §26, R130; or
o As part of the res gestae per §42, R130
• Curative admissibility
Treats upon the right of a party to introduce
incompetent evidence in his behalf where the court has
admitted the same kind of evidence adduced by the
adverse party
What should determine the application of the rule of
curative admissibility are:
1) Whether the incompetent evidence was seasonably
objected to, and
2) Whether, regardless of the objections vel non, the
admission of such evidence will cause a plain and
unfair prejudice to the party against whom it was
admitted.
o Lack of objection to incompetent evidence
constitutes waiver by the party against whom it
is introduced but does not deprive the
opposing party of his right to object to similar
rebutting evidence. However, this technical
rule should be relaxed if one party would suffer
a plain and unfair prejudice.
RIANO:
It is submitted that in our jurisdiction, the principle of
curative admissibility should not be made to apply where
the evidence was admitted without objection because
the failure to object constitutes a waiver of the
inadmissibility of the evidence. In our jurisdiction,
inadmissible evidence not objected to becomes
admissible.
Stonehill v. Diokno: Documentary evidence, illegally obtained,
is inadmissible on a timely motion or action to suppress.
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• Same rule now also applies to illegally obtained
confessions.
Collateral matters
Matters other than the facts in issue and which are offered as
a basis for inference as to the existence or non-existence of
the facts in issue.
Not all collateral matters are prohibited by the Rules.
• Where the collateral matters are relevant to the fact in
issue because “they tend in any reasonable degree to
establish the probability or improbability of the fact in
issue,” evidence of such collateral matters is admissible.
• What the Rules prohibit is evidence of irrelevant
collateral facts.
Circumstantial evidence
• Evidence of collateral facts or circumstances from which
an inference may be drawn as to the probability or
improbability of the facts in dispute
• Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and, if
sufficient, can sustain a judgment.
• Evidence of relevant collateral facts
Admissibility is an affair of logic and law, as admissibility of
evidence is determined by its relevance and competence. On
the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence,
once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation w/in the
guidelines provided in R133 and the decisional rules of the
SC.
While evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little
or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have
evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule
forbids its reception.
NOTE: Special rules of evidence regarding electronic
documents have been introduced by the Electronic
Commerce Act (RA 8792)
RIANO:
Liberal construction of the rules of evidence
• §6, R1
• Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and applied
so as not to frustrate substantial justice. (Quiambao v.
CA) However, to justify relaxation of the rules, a
satisfactory explanation and a subsequent fulfillment of
the requirements have always been required. (Barcenas
v. Tomas)
No vested right in the rules of evidence
Reason: the rules of evidence are subject to change by the SC
pursuant to its powers to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure (§5[5], Art. VIII,
Constitution)
The change in the rules of evidence is, however, subject to
the constitutional limitation on the enactment of ex post facto
laws (§22, Art. III, Constitution)
B. Rules of Exclusion
1. Secs. 2 & 3, Art. III, Consti
§2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
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and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
§3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety and order require otherwise as prescribed
by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
NOTE: right against self-incrimination can’t be invoked in
situations covered by immunity statutes (ex. RA 1379 grants
immunity to witnesses in proceedings for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired property; PD 749 grants immunity in
bribery and graft cases)
2. Sec. 12, Art. III, Consti
§12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
3. Sec. 17, Art. III, Consti
§17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
4. Sec. 201, Tax Reform Act of 1997
§201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. - An
instrument, document or paper which is required by law to
be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted or
transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be
recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of
transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any
court until the requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto
and cancelled.
5. RA 4200, Anti-Wiretapping Law
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND
OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
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Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or
not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record,
disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of
any communication or spoken word secured either before or
after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by
this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided,
That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence
in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or
who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts
declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who
violates the provisions of the following section or of any order
issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation
shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment
for not less than six months or more than six years and with
the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
from public office if the offender be a public official at the time
of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an
alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall
render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is
authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of
the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding
sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage,
provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in
the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit
sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the
Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act
No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against
national security: Provided, That such written order shall only
be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and
the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes
enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however,
That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to
sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior
proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be,
have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution
of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that
there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
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The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of
the person or persons whose communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard,
intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or
telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the
telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of
the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record
the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken
words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be
prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The
authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the
order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of
issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the
court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is
in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within
forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the
order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or
sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of
the peace officer granted such authority stating the number
of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each
recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in
the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the
whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that
all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or
package deposited with the court. The envelope or package
so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed,
or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon
order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon
motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the
person or persons whose conversation or communications
have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to
mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial
jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be
executed.
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
RA 4200 prohibits the admission in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation of any
communication or spoken word or any information procured
by wiretapping and related means specified in said law
EXCEPT in the cases therein specially permitted.
RIANO:
§4, RA 4200
The provisions of §1, RA 4200 does not consider it unlawful
to record open and public communications. What the law
protects are private conversations and communications. It’s
considered unlawful to a) secretly overhear, b) intercept, or c)
record private communication or spoken word when doing
so is w/o the authority of all the parties to such private
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communication. If only one party authorizes the recording
and the other does not, there is a violation of the law.
6. RA 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits
AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO,
DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION AND
PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR.
Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Government to give encouragement to the people to deposit
their money in banking institutions and to discourage private
hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks
in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of
the country.
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in
bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its
political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may
not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a
banking institution to disclose to any person other than those
mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning
said deposits.
Section 4. All Acts or parts of Acts, Special Charters, Executive
Orders, Rules and Regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon
conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or
a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in
the discretion of the court.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
7. Sec. 55, RA 8791: General Banking Act of 2000
Section 55. Prohibited Transactions.
55.1. No director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank
shall -
(a) Make false entries in any bank report or statement or
participate in any fraudulent transaction, thereby
affecting the financial interest of, or causing damage to,
the bank or any person;
(b) Without order of a court of competent jurisdiction,
disclose to any unauthorized person any information
relative to the funds or properties in the custody of the
bank belonging to private individuals, corporations, or
any other entity: Provided, That with respect to bank
deposits, the provisions of existing laws shall prevail;
(c) Accept gifts, fees, or commissions or any other form of
remuneration in connection with the approval of a loan
or other credit accommodation from said bank;
(d) Overvalue or aid in overvaluing any security for the
purpose of influencing in any way the actions of the
bank or any bank; or
(e) Outsource inherent banking functions.
55.2. No borrower of a bank shall -
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
(a) Fraudulently overvalue property offered as security for a
loan or other credit accommodation from the bank;
(b) Furnish false or make misrepresentation or suppression
of material facts for the purpose of obtaining, renewing,
or increasing a loan or other credit accommodation or
extending the period thereof;
(c) Attempt to defraud the said bank in the event of a court
action to recover a loan or other credit accommodation;
or
(d) Offer any director, officer, employee or agent of a bank
any gift, fee, commission, or any other form of
compensation in order to influence such persons into
approving a loan or other credit accommodation
application.
55.3 No examiner, officer or employee of the Bangko Sentral
or of any department, bureau, office, branch or agency of the
Government that is assigned to supervise, examine, assist or
render technical assistance to any bank shall commit any of
the acts enumerated in this Section or aid in the commission
of the same. (87-Aa)
The making of false reports or misrepresentation or
suppression of material facts by personnel of the Bangko
Sental ng Pilipinas shall be subject to the administrative and
criminal sanctions provided under the New Central Bank Act.
55.4. Consistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405,
otherwise known as the Banks Secrecy Law, no bank shall
employ casual or non regular personnel or too lengthy
probationary personnel in the conduct of its business
involving bank deposits.
8. Secs. 16 & 18, PD 946
Section 16. Rules of Procedure. The Courts of Agrarian
Relation shall adopt uniform rules of procedure on matters
not provided for in this Decree in order to achieve a just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding filed before them. The rules of Court shall not be
applicable to agrarian cases, even in a suppletory character. It
is the spirit and intention of this Decree that the Courts of
Agrarian Relations shall utilize and employ every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in
accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities of law and procedure. To this
end, each Court of Agrarian Relations shall have the authority
to adopt any appropriate measure or procedure in any
situation or matter not provided for or covered by this Decree
and in the uniform rules of procedure of the Courts of
Agrarian Relations. All such special measures or procedures,
and the situations to which they are applied shall be reported
to the Supreme Court by the individual Judges through the
Executive Judge who shall furnish copies of such reports to all
the other Judges.
Where there is doubt in the application of uniform rules or in
the construction and interpretation of this Decree or of any
contract between the parties, the doubt shall be resolved in
favor of the tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers,
owner-cultivators, amortizing owner-cultivators, the
Samahang Nayon, compact farms, farmers' cooperatives and
other registered farmers' associations or organizations.
In criminal and expropriation cases the Rules of Court shall
apply.
7
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In the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may
be allowed and are admissible in evidence.
Direct testimonies of witnesses shall be in narrative form
subject to cross examination.
In cases where the tenurial status of a person is in issue, the
Court of Agrarian Relations shall not issue an order restraining
the actual tiller from cultivating the land, or impounding the
harvest without providing him with at least fifty percent of the
net harvest.
Should the impounding of the harvest be at the instance of
the landholder, he shall file a cash bond to be fixed by the
Court, to answer for such damages as may be suffered by the
tiller who is found to be a lawful tenant. In case of the
malicious denial of the tenancy relationship by the
landholder, he shall be subject to the payment of exemplary
damages equivalent to at least the value of the harvest
impounded.
Where a party is a tenant-farmer, agricultural lessee or tiller,
settler, or amortizing owner-cultivator, he shall be entitled to
the rights of a pauper and/or indigent litigant and the
privileges of an indigent litigant under Republic Act
numbered sixty hundred and thirty-five without further proof
thereof. He shall continue to enjoy such status as pauper
and/or indigent litigant in the appellate courts and until the
case is finally disposed of.
An agricultural tiller, tenant or lessee who has been allowed
to litigate as a pauper and/or indigent litigant shall be entitled
to the issuance of a duly certified copy of the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing, which shall be given to
him free of charge. Any undue delay in the transcription of
the stenographic notes or in the issuance of a duly certified
copy of said transcript in favor of said party and any charging
of fees against him in connection therewith shall be dealt
with administratively.
Section 18. Appeals. An appeal may be taken to the Court of
Appeals by giving an oral or written notice of appeal with the
trial court within the period of fifteen (15) days from notice of
order or decision. A copy of the written notice of appeal shall
be served within the same period upon the adverse party. In
case the notice of appeal is orally made, the clerk of court
shall reduce the same to writing, which shall be signed by the
appellant and a copy thereof served within the same period
by the clerk of court to the adverse party.
In case a motion for reconsideration is filed within that period
of fifteen (15) days, the notice of appeal shall be filed within
ten (10) days from notice of the resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration. Only one motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed a party.
The Court of Appeals shall affirm the decision or order or the
portions thereof appealed from if the findings of fact in the
said decision or order are supported by substantial evidence
as basis thereof, and the conclusions stated therein are not
clearly against the law and jurisprudence. The Court of
Appeals shall not be precluded from taking into consideration
any issue, question or incident, even if not raised, if resolution
thereof is necessary for a complete and just disposition of the
case.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
The Court of Agrarian Relations shall forward to the Court of
Appeals the complete records of the case within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a notice
of appeal, if no motions for reconsideration are filed. In the
event that motions for reconsideration are filed, the records
shall be forwarded to the appellate court within a like period
from receipt by the party concerned of denial of the last
motion for reconsideration.
Appeal shall not stay the decision or order except where the
ejectment of a tenant-farmer, agricultural lessee or tiller,
settler, or amortizing owner-cultivator is directed.
Upon receipt of the records of the case from the Court of
Agrarian Relations, the Court of Appeals may, if it deems
necessary, require the parties to file simultaneous memoranda
within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
notice; the appellate court shall decide the case within thirty
(30) days from receipt of said records or memoranda.
No motion for rehearing or reconsideration shall be allowed
in the Court of Appeals.
All cases of the Courts of Agrarian Relations now pending
before the Court of Appeals shall remain in the Division to
which they have been assigned, and shall be within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of this Decree: Provided, however,
That if the decision or order be an affirmance in toto of the
dispositive conclusion of the judgment appealed from, then
the Court of Appeals may, instead of rendering an extended
opinion, indicate clearly the trial court's findings of fact and
pronouncements of law which have been adopted as basis
for the affirmance.
Upon the effectivity of this Decree, the Court of Appeals shall
designate at least two (2) of its Divisions to which all appealed
agrarian cases shall be assigned, and these cases shall have
priority over other cases.
The decisions or orders of the Court of Appeals may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari only on questions of law, within a non-extendible
period of thirty (30) days from receipt by the appellant of a
copy of the decision or order.
In cases before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, the RoC
were not applicable even in a suppletory character, except in
criminal and expropriation cases (§16, PD 946)
• NOTE: such procedure has been SUPERSEDED by
provisions of RA 6657
C. Cases
KNAPP V. STATE, 79 NE 1076 (1907)
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N evidence relevant of a particular
item if it tends to support whether proof of that evidence
would assist to resolve the central issue of a case – YES.
Evidence of the old man’s death was relevant.
While it is laid down in the books that there must be an open
and visible connection between the fact under inquiry and
the evidence by which it is sought to be established, yet the
connection thus required is in the logical processes only, for
to require an actual connection between the two facts would
be to exclude all presumptive evidence… Within settled rules,
the competency of testimony depends largely upon its
tendency to persuade the judgment… As said in 1 Wharton,
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Evidence… § 20: "Relevancy is that which conduces to the
proof of a pertinent hypothesis." In Stevenson v. Stewart
(1849)… it was said: "The competency of a collateral fact to be
used as the basis of legitimate argument, is not to be
determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it may
afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is enough if these
may tend, in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry, or to
assist, though remotely, to a determination probably founded
in truth."…
STATE V. BALL, 339 SW 2D 783 (1960)
• Wigmore: The mere possession of a quantity of money is
in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of
money charged as taken, because in general all money
of the same denomination and material is alike, and the
hypothesis that the money found is the same as the
money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be
receivable.
• In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the
record that the money in Ball's possession at the time of
his arrest came from or had some connection with the
robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his
impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden
affluence (State v. Garrett), the evidence was not in fact
relevant and in the circumstances was obviously
prejudicial for if it did not tend to prove the offense for
which the appellant was on trial the jury may have
inferred that he was guilty of another robbery.
MAMBA V. GARCIA, 359 SCRA 426 (2001)
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded
conversation between Bulatao and the two police officers is
erroneous. The recording of private conversations without
the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of RA
4200 …and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding. The law covers even those recorded by persons
privy to the private communications, as in this case. Thus, the
contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied upon to
determine the culpability of respondent judge.
MARQUEZ V. DESIERTO, 359 SCRA 772 (2001)
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N petitioner may be cited for indirect
contempt for her failure to produce the documents
requested by the Ombudsman - And whether the order of
the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the
questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on
secrecy of bank deposits (RA 1405)
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA
1405) would reveal the following exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases
against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, RA 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held
in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera
inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending
investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and
(g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the
Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed,
there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified,
the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending
case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank
personnel and the account holder must be notified to be
present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover
only the account identified in the pending case.
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:
Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as
amended, declares bank deposits to be “absolutely
confidential” except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or
general examination of a bank that is specifically
authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank
fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being
committed and that it is necessary to look into the
deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor
hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided
that the examination is for audit purposes only and the
results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before
any court of competent authority. What is existing is an
investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what
the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for
additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et.
al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending
case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank
account for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.
The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable
torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any
private individual liable for damages for any violation of the
rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications. The RPC
makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to
dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act,
and the Intellectual Property Code.
EJERCITO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 509 SCRA 190 (2006)
The accused claimed that information about his bank
accounts i.e. trust funds, was obtained in violation of the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law (RA 1405) and moved to have
them be excluded as evidence. HELD: RA 1405 nowhere
provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall
render the evidence there from inadmissible in evidence. If
Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive
remedies for its violation, the court would encroaching upon
the prerogatives of congress if it authorizes a remedy not
provided for by statute. Absent a specific reference to an
9
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exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to read
such a provision into the act.
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to RA
1405, otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Law, applicable
in cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder. The
“fruit of the poisonous tree” principle, which states that once
the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the “fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply
in cases of unlawful examination of bank accounts. RA 1405
does not provide for the application of this rule. At all events,
the Ombudsman is not barred from requiring the production
of documents based solely on information obtained by it from
sources independent of its previous inquiry.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N the Trust Account No. 858 and
Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 are excepted from the
protection of R.A. 1405 – NO. Plunder is excepted from the
protection of RA 1405 otherwise known as The Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Law
RA 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.
However, the protection afforded by the law is not absolute.
There being recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted
Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply,
to wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of
a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
xxx
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino: “Section 2 of [RA 1405] allows
the disclosure of bank deposits in cases where the money
deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Inasmuch as
Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed at recovering the amount
converted by the Javiers for their own benefit, necessarily, an
inquiry into the whereabouts of the illegally acquired amount
extends to whatever is concealed by being held or recorded
in the name of persons other than the one responsible for
the illegal acquisition”
In light then of the Court’s pronouncement in Union Bank,
the subject matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank
accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but
must include those accounts to which the money
purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged
to have been transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings
Account No. 0116-17345-9 in the name of Ejercito fall under
this description and must thus be part of the subject matter of
the litigation.
Hence, these accounts are no longer protected by the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law, there being two exceptions to
the said law applicable in this case, namely: (1) the
examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation. Exception (1) applies since the
plunder case pending against former President Estrada is
analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception
(2) applies because the money deposited in Ejercito’s bank
accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same
plunder case.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
doctrine or the exclusionary rule, which states that once the
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”)
derived from it is also inadmissible, applicable in cases of
unlawful examination of bank accounts – NO. The “fruit of
the poisonous tree” doctrine or the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable in cases of unlawful examination of bank
accounts.
Ejercito’s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to
the instant case fails. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere
provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall
render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in
evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that “[a]ny
violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction,
to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of
not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the
discretion of the court.”
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary
rule applies in principle to cases involving R.A. 1405, the Court
finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case. The
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine presupposes a violation
of law. If there was no violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant
case, then there would be no “poisonous tree” to begin with,
and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.
Hence, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” principle, which states
that once the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible, does
not apply in this case. In the first place, R.A. 1405 does not
provide for the application of this rule. Moreover, there is no
basis for applying the same in this case since the primary
source for the detailed information regarding Joseph Victor
G. Ejercito’s bank accounts – the investigation previously
conducted by the Ombudsman – was lawful.
II. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
A. Judicial notice (§§1-3, R129)
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During
the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper
court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case. (n)
10
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Judicial notice
The cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly
take and act on without proof because they already know
them
JN is based on considerations of expediency and
convenience. It displaces evidence since, being equivalent to
proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to
achieve and, therefore, makes such evidence unnecessary.
(Alzua vs. Johnson)
JN of a fact may be taken by a court
a) on its own motion, or
b) when it is requested or invited by the parties or either of
them to do so.
In either case, the court may allow the parties to be heard on
the matter in question. It has been held, however, that the
power to take JN must be exercised with caution and every
reasonable doubt on the subject must be resolved in the
negative.
Rule regarding judicial notice of ordinances
• Municipal courts required to take JN of ordinances of the
municipality or city wherein they sit
• RTCs must take such JN only
a) when required to do so by statute; and
b) in a case on appeal before them and wherein the
inferior court took JN of an ordinance involved in
said case
• Appellate courts may also take JN of municipal or city
ordinances not only where the lower courts took JN
thereof but because these are facts capable of
unquestionable demonstration.
For the same reason, courts may take JN of administrative
regulations.
Courts are required to take JN of the decisions of the
appellate courts but not of the decisions of coordinate trial
courts, nor even of a decision or the facts involved in another
case tried by the same court itself, unless the parties introduce
the same in evidence or where the court, as a matter of
convenience, may decide to do so.
JN court required to take ≠ personal knowledge of judge
• A fact may be of JN and not be of the judge’s personal
knowledge, and vice versa, as this rule refers to facts
which “ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.”
Question as to what are the laws of a foreign state is one of
fact, not of law.
• Foreign laws may not be taken JN of and have to be
proved like any other fact
o Exception: where said laws are within the actual
knowledge of the court such as when they are well
and generally known or they have been actually
ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the
parties claim otherwise.
• To prove a foreign written law, the requirements of §§24
& 25, R132 must be complied with (by an official
publication or by a duly attested and authenticated copy
thereof)
o Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
 SC noted that while certain exceptions to the
requirements in §§24 & 25, R132 for proof of
foreign law have been recognized, the
evidence presented for that purpose in this
case is unacceptable.
 Instant case – petitioner submitted affidavit of
NY attorney which doesn’t even state the
specific NY law on the issue of damages
involved, but merely contained the affiant’s
interpretation and opinion of the facts of the
case vis-à-vis the alleged law and jurisprudence
therein. Further, said affidavit was taken ex
parte abroad and the affiant never testified in
court.
• Provisions of foreign law may also be the subject of
judicial admission under §4, R129.
• To prove an unwritten foreign law, the provisions of §46,
R130 supply the evidential sources or remedies.
• GENERAL RULE: Absent any of the foregoing evidence
or admission, the foreign law is presumed to be the
same as that in the Philippines – doctrine of processual
presumption
RIANO:
JN is based on the maxim, “what is known need not be
proved,” hence, when the rule is invoked, the court may
dispense with the presentation of evidence on judicially
cognizable facts.
Function of JN
To abbreviate litigation by the admission of matters that need
no evidence because JN is a substitute for formal proof of a
matter by evidence
When JN is mandatory
A matter of JN may either be mandatory or discretionary.
When the matter is subject to a mandatory JN, no motion or
hearing is necessary for the court to take JN of a fact because
this is a matter which a court ought to take JN of.
Matters subject to mandatory JN
1. The existence and territorial extent of states
2. The political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality of states
3. The law of nations
4. The admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals
5. The political constitution and history of the Philippines
6. The official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines
7. The laws of nature
8. The measure of time
9. The geographical divisions.
When JN is discretionary
The principles of discretionary JN will apply where the ff.
requisites are met:
1. The matter must be one of common knowledge
2. The matter must be settled beyond reasonable doubt (if
there is any uncertainty about the matter, then evidence
must be adduced)
3. The knowledge must exist within the jurisdiction of the
court
11
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Cases
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. V. CA, CTA (2000)
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
the contents of the records of other cases, even when such
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
heard or are actually pending before the same judge."
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may
take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST V. GUERRERO (2003)
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact
are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are
in dispute. The resolution of whether a foreign law allows
only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as
far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter
of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to
whether NY law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims
present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be
resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under §24 of R132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an
official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or
copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the
legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of
the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
• CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS (Asiavest Limited v. CA)
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in
accordance with the above rule, however, the Supreme
Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel
Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude
the presentation of other competent evidence to prove
the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme
Court considered the testimony under oath of an
attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted
verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who
stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. Accordingly, in line
with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in
considering the pertinent law of California as proved by
the respondents witness. In that case, the counsel for
respondent testified that as an active member of the
California Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the revenue
and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked
by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as
regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the
witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the
California Internal and Revenue Code as published in
Derrings California Code, a publication of Bancroft-
Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence by
respondents. Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it
was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a
foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition
of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule
of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for
favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances,
the Court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written
proof offered. Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the
Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be
competent proof of that law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s
personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case
vis-à-vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any
law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of
various US court decisions do not constitute proof of the
official records or decisions of the US courts. While the Bank
attached copies of some of the US court decisions cited in the
Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24
of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign
courts.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to
prove NY law and jurisprudence. However, because of the
failure to comply with §24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a
foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden
affidavit did not prove the current state of NY law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what NY law and jurisprudence are on the matters at
issue.
PEOPLE V. RULLEPA (2003)
Several cases suggest that courts may take “judicial notice” of
the appearance of the victim in determining her age.
• On the other hand, a handful of cases holds that courts,
without the requisite hearing prescribed by §3, R129 of
the RoC, cannot take judicial notice of the victim’s age.
• Judicial notice signifies that there are certain “facta
probanda,” or propositions in a party’s case, as to which
he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be
taken for true by the tribunal without the need of
evidence. Judicial notice, however, is a phrase
sometimes used in a loose way to cover some other
judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually known
under other names, are frequently referred to in terms of
judicial notice.
• The process by which the trier of facts judges a person’s
age from his or her appearance cannot be categorized
as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon
convenience and expediency for it would certainly be
superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties
and the court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of
facts which are already known to courts. As Tundag puts
it, it “is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them.” …When the trier of facts observes
the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age,
he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is
conducting an examination of the evidence, the
evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a
process militates against the very concept of judicial
notice, the object of which is to do away with the
presentation of evidence.
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• This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A person’s
appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object
evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the
court. [§1, R130]
• A person’s appearance, as evidence of age (for example,
of infancy, or of being under the age of consent to
intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so,
the tribunal may properly observe the person brought
before it. Experience teaches that corporal appearances
are approximately an index of the age of their bearer,
particularly for the marked extremes of old age and
youth. In every case such evidence should be accepted
and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In
particular, the outward physical appearance of an
alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a
contrary rule would for such an inference be
pedantically over-cautious. Consequently, the jury or the
court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the
age of persons in court by observation of such persons.
The formal offer of the person as evidence is not
necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a
party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him
before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit
is properly refused.
• There can be no question, therefore, as to the
admissibility of a person’s appearance in determining his
or her age. As to the weight to accord such
appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down
guideline no. 3.
• Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative
with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a),
(b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between
the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the
court can easily determine from the appearance of the
victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance
corroborates the relative’s testimony.
• As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be
proved, the person’s appearance, as object evidence of
her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age
becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such
doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
• This is because in the era of modernism and rapid
growth, the victim’s mere physical appearance is not
enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme
penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the
minority of the victim should be not only alleged but
likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the
victim’s age in the present case spells the difference
between life and death.
LANDBANK V. BANAL (2004)
The RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents'
property is P703.14K, merely took judicial notice of the
average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending
before it and applied the same to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or
consent of the parties.
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
same court or before the same judge. They may only do so
"in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the
opposing party," which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to
all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes
judicial notice of a certain matter.
PIGAO V. RABANILLO (2006)
We agree with respondent. We cannot take cognizance of
this document – the conditional contract to sell between
Bernabe and the PHHC alleged to be the pro-forma contract
used by PHHC with its applicants - which petitioners are
presenting for the first time. This document is not among the
matters the law mandatorily requires us to take judicial notice
of. Neither can we consider it of public knowledge nor
capable of unquestionable demonstration nor ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions. We have
held that:
Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled
and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court. The
power of taking judicial notice is to be exercised by
courts with caution. Care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists and every reasonable doubt on
the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Consequently, for this document to be properly considered
by us, it should have been presented during trial and formally
offered as evidence. Otherwise, we would be denying due
process of law to respondent:
It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that
which has been formally offered. xxx If [petitioners] neglected
to offer [any document] in evidence, however vital [it] may
be, [they] only have themselves to blame, not respondent
who was not even given a chance to object as the
documents were never offered in evidence.
B. Judicial admissions
1. §4, R129
Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or
written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
Judicial admissions may be made in:
a) The pleadings filed by the parties;
b) In the course of the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations; or
c) In other stages of the judicial proceeding, as in the pre-
trial of the case.
Admissions obtained through depositions, written
interrogatories, or requests for admission are also considered
judicial admissions.
To be considered as a JA, the same must be made in the
same case in which it is offered.
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Judicial admissions made in one case are admissible at the
trial of another case provided they are proved and are
pertinent to the issue involved in the latter, unless:
a) said admissions were made only for purposes of the first
case, as in the rule on implied admissions and their
effects under R26;
b) the same were withdrawn with the permission of the
court therein; or
c) the court deems it proper to relieve the party therefrom.
§4, R129, as amended, now includes superseded pleadings
as judicial admissions.
JAs cannot be contradicted by the admitted who is the party
himself, unless they were made through palpable mistake or
no such admission was made or, in the case of a pre-trial
admission in civil cases, to prevent manifest injustice.
Admissions made by the parties in their pleadings, or in the
course of the trial or other proceedings, do not require proof
and cannot be contradicted by them unless proved to have
been made through palpable mistake. (Sta. Ana. v. Maliwat)
Facts subject of a stipulation or agreement entered into by
the parties at the pre-trial of a case constitute judicial
admissions by them which, under this section, do not require
proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to
have been made through palpable mistake. (Lim v. Jabalde)
When the parties in a case agree on what the foreign law
provides, these are admissions of fact which the other parties
and the court are made to rely and act upon, hence they are
in estoppel to subsequently take a contrary position. (PCIB v.
Escolin)
2. §8, R10
Sec 8. Effect of amended pleadings. — An amended pleading
supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions
in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against
the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not
incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed
waived.
3. §§1-4, R26
R24: Admission by Adverse Party
Sec. 1. Request for admission. — At any time after issues have
been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party
may file and serve upon any other party a written request for
the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material
and relevant document described in and exhibited with the
request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of
fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be
delivered with the request unless copies have already been
furnished. (1a)
Sec. 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless,
within a period designated in the request, which shall not be
less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such
further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to
whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to
the court by the party requested within the period for and
prior to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in
the preceding paragraph and his compliance therewith shall
be deferred until such objections are resolved, which
resolution shall be made as early as practicable. (2a)
Sec 3. Effect of admission. — Any admission made by a party
pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending
action only and shall not constitute an admission by him for
any other purpose nor may the same be used against him in
any other proceeding. (3)
Sec. 4. Withdrawal. — The court may allow the party making
an admission under the Rule, whether express or implied, to
withdraw or amend it upon such terms as may be just.
4. CC 12, 2035
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the
rules of evidence.
Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall
be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
5. FC 48, 60
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment. (88a)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed. (101a)
Cases
ATILLO III V. CA (1997)
GEN RULE (R129.4): JA is conclusive upon the party making it
and does not require proof
EXCEPTIONS:
• When it’s shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake
• When it’s shown that no such admission was in fact
made
o This exception allows one to contradict an
admission by denying that he made such an
admission
A party’s testimony in open court may override admissions he
made in his answer.
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REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2003)
• A written statement is nonetheless competent as an
admission even if it’s contained in a document which is
not itself effective for the purpose for which it’s made,
either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party
thereto, or by reason of not being signed, executed or
delivered.
• Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable
against him.
• Imelda’s failure to specifically deny the existence, much
less the genuineness and due execution, of the
instruments bearing her signature, was tantamount to a
judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution
of said instruments.
• An admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and
becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is
interposed by the adverse party or not.
PEOPLE V. LACSON, 413 SCRA 20 (2003)
Lacson is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA
and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings before
the SC. [Present case made by way of appeal under R45, as
such, present recourse a mere continuation of CA
proceedings]
HERRERA-FELIX V. CA (2004)
Admissions made in a motion are judicial admissions which
are binding on the party who made them. Such party is
precluded from denying the same unless there is proof of
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CLEMENA V. HEIRS OF IRENE BIEN (2006)
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He
cannot thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in
those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its
discretion and because of strong reasons to support its stand,
may relieve a party from the consequences of his admission.
LUCIANO TAN V. RODIL ENTERPRISES (2006)
An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted
by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to
him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection
is interposed by a party or not.
III. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
A. Object (Real) Evidence
Sec. 1. Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those
addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is
relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined
or viewed by the court. (1a)
Where an object is relevant to a fact in issue, the court may
acquire knowledge thereof by actually viewing the object, in
which case such object becomes object (real) evidence, or by
receiving testimonial evidence thereon.
An ocular inspection conducted by the judge w/o notice to
or the presence of the parties is invalid, as an ocular
inspection is part of the trial. (In re Hon. Rafael C. Climaco)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Instances when court may rely solely on testimonial evidence
(no need for object [real] evidence)
1. Showing/exhibiting object is against public policy, morals
or decency
2. Requiring viewing amounts to delay, inconvenience,
unnecessary expenses disproportionate to the object’s
evidentiary value
3. Such object (real) evidence would be confusing or
misleading
4. The testimonial or documentary evidence clearly
portrays the object in question to render viewing
unnecessary
Court may exclude the public from the viewing of indecent
object, if such viewing is necessary in the interest of justice
Object (real) evidence includes any article or object which
may be known or perceived by the use of any of the senses.
When documents are object (real) evidence
If the purpose is to prove
• their existence or condition,
• the nature of the handwritings thereon,
• to determine the age of the paper used, or the
blemishes/alterations thereon, as where falsification is
alleged.
Otherwise, they are considered documentary evidence, i.e. if
the purpose is to establish the contents or tenor thereof.
The physical examination of a person may be conducted by
the court, or under its direction, to show
• the nature, extent or location of injuries,
• his physique,
• his facial features to determine his resemblance and
possible relationship to another,
• his racial origin,
• his probable age, or
• in the case of a woman, to establish the fact of
pregnancy.
RIANO:
Object or real evidence is exactly what its name suggests –
the real thing itself like the knife used to slash the victim’s
throat, the mangled fender of a truck rear-ended by a
bulldozer, etc.
Object evidence appeals directly to the senses of the court.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of
truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence – where the physical evidence runs counter to the
testimonial evidence, the physical evidence should prevail.
(BPI v. Reyes, 2008)
Object evidence is not taken in isolation. It is weighed in
relation to the testimony of a witness. Also, in giving credence
to a testimony, the court takes into consideration the physical
evidence. If the testimony bears a striking similarity with the
physical evidence, the testimony becomes worthy of belief.
(People v. Larrañaga)
Requisites for admissibility of object evidence
1. Evidence must be relevant
2. Evidence must be authenticated
3. The authentication must be made by a competent
witness
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• This is to comply with the element of competence
as an essential ingredient of admissibility.
• After its authentication, the object needs to be
offered in evidence at the appropriate time.
4. The object must be formally offered in evidence
• Formal offer of evidence is a vital act before the
admission of evidence because the court “shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered”
The right against self-incrimination cannot be invoked against
object evidence – no testimonial compulsion involved
Categories of object evidence
1. Unique objects: objects that have readily identifiable
marks
2. Objects made unique: objects that are made readily
identifiable
3. Non-unique objects: objects with no identifying marks
and cannot be marked
Chain of custody
The third category (non-unique objects) refers to those
objects which are not readily identifiable, were not made
identifiable or cannot be made identifiable (ex. Drops of
blood or oil, drugs in powder form, etc.). Under this situation,
the proponent of the evidence must establish a chain of
custody.
• Purpose of establishing chain of custody: to guarantee
the integrity of the physical evidence and to prevent the
introduction of evidence which is not authentic (Lester v.
State)
o BUT where the exhibit is positively identified the
chain of custody of physical evidence is irrelevant
(State v. Clifford)
• There must be links to the chain – the people who
actually handled or had custody of the object
o Each link must show:
 how he received the object;
 how he handled it to prevent substitution; and
 how it was transferred to another
o Each of the handlers of the evidence is a link in the
chain and must testify to make the foundation
complete
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody
rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. …the exhibit’s
level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering –
w/o regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise
not – dictates the level of strictness in the application of the
chain of custody rule. (Lopez v. People, 2008)
Chain of custody in drug cases
• Par. 1, §21, Art. II, RA 9165: The apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the
DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
• A mere statement that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the evidence is not enough. It must be accompanied
by proof. (People v. Dela Cruz, 2008)
Demonstrative evidence
It represents or demonstrates the real thing. Consider: does
the evidence sufficiently and accurately represent the object it
seeks to demonstrate or represent? If it does, the evidence
would be admissible.
Photographs
Under the electronic evidence rules, photographic
evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be
admissible in evidence provided:
a) It shall be presented, displayed and shown to the
court; and
b) It shall be identified, explained or authenticated by
either
i) The person who made the recording, or by
ii) Some other person competent to testify on the
accuracy thereof
In determining whether photographs should be
admitted, a trial judge must determine whether they are
relevant, and whether a proper foundation has been
laid.
Motion pictures and recordings
Rules that apply to photographs generally apply to these.
In the case of tape recordings, the witness should
identify the speakers, state how he recognizes their
voices and that the recording was not taken in violation
of the Anti-Wiretapping Law (RA 4200).
Admissibility requirements for tape recordings:
1. The recording device was capable of taking
testimony;
2. The operator of the device was competent;
3. No changes, additions or deletions have been
made;
4. The testimony was elicited and voluntarily made
w/o any kind of inducement;
5. Establishment of authenticity and correctness of the
recording;
6. Identity of the speakers; and
7. The manner of the preservation of the recording
Diagrams, models and maps
Aside from the requirement of relevance, a diagram,
model or map must be identified by a witness who is
familiar with what the evidence depicts, and that the
same is an accurate representation of the scene it
portrays… The question as to the sufficiency of the
authentication is a matter of judicial discretion.
X-ray pictures
Admissible when shown to have been made under
circumstances as to assure their accuracy and where
relevant to a material issue in the case
• X-rays properly authenticated by the x-ray
technician or the physician who testifies to the
competence of the person taking it, the procedure
taken and that the x-ray picture shown is that of the
person, the anatomical part or the object involved
in the case.
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Scientific tests, demonstrations and experiments
Matter subject to judicial discretion. In-court reenactment
of material events by witnesses has been held
permissible to help illustrate the testimony of a witness.
Ephemeral electronic communications
These forms of communications refer to telephone
conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming
audio, and other forms of electronic communication, the
evidence of which is not recorded or retained. (§1[k], REE)
• Shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or by one who has personal
knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of
such witness, other competent evidence may be
admitted.
View of an object or scene
An inspection or view outside the courtroom should be
made in the presence of the parties or at least with previous
notice to them… Such is part of the trial since evidence is
thereby being received.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. BARDAJE (1980)
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more
eloquently than any number of witnesses put together.
SISON V. PEOPLE (1995)
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when
presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced.
• The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a
correct representation or reproduction of the original,
and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in
portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
• Photographs can be identified by the photographer or
by any other competent witness who can testify to its
exactness and accuracy.
The use of the photographs by some of the accused to show
their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of
the exactness and accuracy thereof.
PEOPLE V. RULLEPA (2003)
• When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a
person to ascertain his/her age, he is not taking judicial
notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an
examination of the evidence, the evidence being the
appearance of the person. Such a process militates
against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of
which is to de away with the presentation of evidence.
• A person’s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as
object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses
of the court.
PEOPLE V. YATAR (2004)
A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not
change throughout a person’s lifetime.
• Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving there was
physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If
properly collected from the victim, crime scene or
assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to
place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
B. Documentary Evidence
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. — Documents as evidence
consist of writing or any material containing letters, words,
numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written
expression offered as proof of their contents. (n)
RIANO:
Categories of documents as evidence
1. Writings
Ex. Wills, written contracts
2. Any other material containing modes of written
expressions
Ex. Those which are not traditionally considered as
writings but are actually objects but which contain
modes of written expressions
NOTE: for such writings or materials to be deemed
documentary evidence, the same must be offered as proof of
their contents.
When a contract is presented in court to show that it exists or
simply to establish its condition, it is not offered to prove
its contents.
Depending upon the specific purpose for which the contents
of the document is offered, there are certain inevitable issues
which may arise in connection with the admissibility of the
document aside from the issue of relevance.
Whenever documentary evidence is involved, the best
evidence rule, parol evidence rule, and hearsay rule, or any
one of these rules may come into play.
Case:
YAP V. INOPIQUEZ, JR. (2003)
It is a basic rule of evidence that between documentary and
oral evidence, the former carries more weight.
1. Best Evidence Rule (R130.3-8)
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. —
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of
the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control
of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office. (2a)
Sec. 4. Original of document. —
(a) The original of the document is one the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at
or about the same time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of
business, one being copied from another at or near the
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time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally
regarded as originals. (3a)
Document: a deed, instrument, or other duly authorized
paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth.
Documentary evidence: that which is furnished by written
instruments, inscriptions and documents of all kinds.
Best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence,
operates as a rule of exclusion – secondary (or
substitutionary) evidence cannot inceptively be introduced as
the original writing must be produced in court
EXCEPTIONS
1. Original lost/destroyed/cannot be produced in court
w/o bad faith on offeror’s part
2. Original in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice
3. Original consists of numerous accounts or documents
which can’t be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole
4. Original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office
Non-production of original document = presumption of
suppression of evidence.
BER applies only when the contents of such document is the
subject of inquiry.
When a document is presented to prove its existence or
condition, it is offered as real, not documentary,
evidence.
In criminal cases where the issue is not only WRT the
contents of the document but also as to whether such
document actually existed with the participation therein
as imputed to the accused, the original itself must be
presented.
Where the transactions have been recorded in writing
but the contents of such are not the subject of inquiry,
BER doesn’t apply.
WRT documents prepared in several copies through the use
of carbon sheets, the SC has held that each carbon copy is
considered an original provided that the writing of a contract
upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party
sought to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the
sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by
the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or
exposed impression. (People v. Tan)
If the issue is the contents of the telegram as received by the
addressee, then the original dispatch received is the best
evidence. On the issue as to the telegram sent by the sender,
the original is the message delivered for transmission. If the
issue is the inaccuracy of transmission, both telegrams as sent
and received are originals.
RIANO:
BER a.k.a. “original document” or “primary evidence” rule
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
It comprehends a situation where the evidence offered is
substitutionary in nature when what should be offered is the
original evidence.
GEN RULE: the original of a writing must be produced.
No reason to apply the BER when the issue does not involve
the contents of a writing
• BER cannot be invoked unless the contents of a
writing is the subject of judicial inquiry
Purpose of BER: prevention of fraud or mistake in the proof of
the contents of a writing. Basic premise – the need to present
to the court the exact words of a writing where a slight
variation of words may mean a great difference in rights
When document is merely collateral in issue
A document is collateral in issue when the purpose of
introducing the document is not to establish its terms but to
show facts that have no reference to its contents like its
existence, condition, execution or delivery.
Waiver of BER
BER may be waived if not raised in the trial.
What to do to apply BER
1. Determine the matter inquired into.
• Procedural compliance: requires presentation of the
original document
• So long as the original is available, no other
evidence can be substituted for the original
2. What if the original cannot be presented in evidence?
a. Find an adequate legal excuse for the failure to
present the original
• Instances when the original does not have to
be produced even when the contents of the
doc are the subjects of inquiry (R130, §3):
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to
be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.
b. Present a secondary evidence sanctioned by RoC
Present the original, except when you can justify its
unavailability in the manner provided for by the RoC.
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
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Requirements for secondary evidence to be admissible
There must be proof by satisfactory evidence of:
1. Due execution of the original
Proven through the testimony of either:
a. The person/s who executed it;
b. Person before whom its execution as
acknowledged; or
c. Any person who was present and saw it executed
and delivered or who thereafter saw it and
recognized the signatures, or one to whom the
parties thereto had previously confessed the
execution thereof
2. Loss, destruction, or unavailability of all such originals
This may be proved by anyone who, in the judgment of
the court, had made a sufficient examination in the
places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document was and has been unable to find
it, or who has made any other investigation sufficient to
satisfy the court that the document is indeed lost.
Intentional destruction of the originals by a party who,
however, had acted in good faith doesn’t preclude his
introduction of secondary evidence of the contents
thereof.
3. Reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the original
When the original is outside the court’s jurisdiction,
secondary evidence is admissible. (PNB v. Olila)
Where the law specifically provides for the class and quantum
of secondary evidence to establish the contents of a
document, or bars secondary evidence of a lost document,
such requirement is controlling.
Reconstitution of documents by the court through secondary
evidence is governed by Act No. 3110.
RIANO:
Under R130.5, secondary evidence may be admitted only by
laying the basis for its production. This requires compliance
w/ the ff.:
1. Offeror must prove the execution and existence of the
original document
2. Offeror must show the cause of its unavailability
3. Offeror must show that the unavailability was not due to
his bad faith.
Burden of proof in establishing loss or destruction of the
original is on the proponent of the secondary evidence.
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody
or control. — If the document is in the custody or under the
control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to
produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of
its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. —
A party who calls for the production of a document and
inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence. (6a)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
No particular form of notice is required, as long as it fairly Cases:
apprises the other party as to what papers are desired. Even
an oral demand in open court for such production at a VDA. DE CORPUS V. BRABANGCO (1963)
reasonable time thereafter will suffice. Such notice must, It’s not necessary, in order to admit evidence of the contents
however, be given to the adverse party, or his attorney, even of lost instrument, that the witnesses should be able to testify
if the document is in the actual possession of a third person. with verbal accuracy to its contents; it is sufficient if they are
able to state it in substance. It’s enough if intelligent witnesses
Where receipt of the original of a letter is acknowledged on a have read the paper and state substantially its contents and
carbon copy thereof, there’s no need for a notice to the other import with reasonable accuracy.
party to produce the original of the letter. (Phil Ready-Mix • To insist on complete verbal accuracy would be in effect
Concrete Co. v. Villacorta) Note that the duplicate copy, if to prohibit entirely the proof of lost documents by
complete, is itself an original copy and the only point in issue recollection.
is the receipt of the basic original copy thereof.
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC. V. FERRER (1968)
The adverse party’s justified refusal or failure to produce the Requisites for admissibility of secondary evidence when the
document doesn’t give rise to the presumption of original is in the custody of the adverse party:
suppression of evidence, or create an unfavorable inference, 1. Opponent’s possession of the original
against him. It only authorizes the introduction of secondary • It is enough that the circumstances are such as to
evidence. indicate that the writing is in his possession or under
his control
Where such document is produced, that document is not 2. Reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original
necessarily admissible in evidence, UNLESS the requisites for • It’s not required that the party entitled to custody of
admissibility are present. the instrument should, on being notified to produce
it, admit having it in his possession.
Rule of production of Rule of production of • Secondary evidence is admissible where he denies
documents under R130 documents under R27 having it in his possession. The party calling for such
Procured by mere notice to Situation: document is either evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the
the adverse party – req’ts for assumed to be favorable to case of loss.
such notice must be the party in possession 3. Satisfactory proof of its existence
complied w/ as condition thereof or that the party 4. Failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in
precedent for subsequent seeking its production is not court
introduction of secondary sufficiently informed of the
evidence by the proponent contents of the same COMPANIA MARITIMA V. AFWU (1977)
- Presupposes that - Production of such Original writings must be produced EXCEPT when original
the doc to be produced doc is in the nature of a consists of numerous accounts or documents which cannot
is intended as evidence mode of discovery and be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
for the proponent who can be sought only by sought to be established from them is only the general result
is presumed to have proper motion in TC, of the whole. Voluminous character of the records should be
knowledge of its but is permitted only established. The records should also be made accessible to
contents, secondary upon good cause adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be
evidence thereof being shown tested on cross-examination.
available in case of its
non-production DE VERA V. AGUILAR (1993)
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original
Requisites for BER exception 3 (numerous accounts/docs) to documents were actually lost or destroyed. Prior to
apply introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent
1. Voluminous character of the records must be must establish the former existence of the instrument.
established • Correct order of proof: existence, execution, loss,
2. Such records must be made accessible to the adverse contents.
party so that their correctness may be tested on cross- • The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any
examination person knowing the facts.

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a
public record. — When the original of document is in the
custody of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
All originals (duplicates or counterparts) must be accounted
for before using copies.
• No excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be
regarded as established until appears that all of its parts
are unavailable.

This section complements exception 4 to BER. By specific
provision of R132, such document may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record (§24), and in the case
of an authorized public record of a private writing, the same
may also be proved by a copy thereof attested by the legal
keeper of the record (§27).
CITIBANK N.A. MASTERCARD V. TEODORO (2003)
• Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence
to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must
prove the ff:
1. existence or due execution of the original;
2. loss and destruction of the original or the reason for
its non-production in court; and

19
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
3. on the offeror’s part, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.
• Correct order of proof: existence, execution, loss,
contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order
may be changed if necessary.
• When more than one original copy exists, it must appear
that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court before secondary evidence can be
given of any one. A photocopy may not be used
without accounting for the other originals.
TENEBRO V. CA (2004)
There is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a
condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere
fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present.
Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite
different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a
marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the
invalidity of a marriage.
BPI V. CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE (2004)
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear,
positive and convincing evidence. Under the BER as applied
to documentary evidence like the checks in question, no
secondary or substitutionary evidence may inceptively be
introduced, as the original writing itself must be produced in
court. But when, w/o bad faith on the offeror’s part, the
original checks have already been destroyed or cannot be
produced in court, secondary evidence may be produced.
Even WRT documentary evidence, the BER applies only when
the contents of a document – such as the drawer’s signature
on a check – is the subject of inquiry.
LEE V. PEOPLE (2004)
The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world
of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as
reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate
or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the
BER. The rule does not apply to proof of facts collateral to the
issues
CONSOLIDATED BANK V. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS
The only actual rule the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today
is the rule requiring the production of the original writing.
(McCormick) In light of the dangers of mistransmission,
accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection,
largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the
writing itself, the preference for the original writing is justified.
2. Parol Evidence Rule (R130.9)
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
20
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(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
PER is based upon the consideration that when the parties
have reduced their agreement on a particular matter into
writing, all their previous and contemporaneous agreements
on the matter are merged therein. (De Guzman v. Calma)
Parol evidence: any evidence aliunde, whether oral or
written, which is intended or tends to vary or contradict a
complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a
document
PER doesn’t apply, and may not properly be invoked by either
party to the litigation against the other, where at least one
party to the suit is not a party or privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and doesn’t base a claim or assert a
right originating in the instrument of the relation established
thereby. Thus, if one of the parties to the case is a complete
stranger to the contract involved therein, he’s not bound by
this rule and can introduce extrinsic evidence against the
efficacy of the writing. (Lechugas v. CA)
Parol evidence rule Best evidence rule
Prohibits the varying of the Prohibits introduction of
terms of a written agreement substitutionary evidence in
lieu of the original doc,
regardless of W/N it varies
the contents of the original
Applies only to documents Applies to all kinds of writings
contractual in nature
Exception: wills
Invoked only when the Invoked by any part to an
controversy is between the action regardless of W/N
parties to the written such party has participated in
agreement, their privies, or the writing involved
any party directly affected
thereby (e.g. cestui que trust)
For the parol evidence to be admissible, the mistake or
imperfection of the document, or its failure to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the
agreement must be put in issue by the pleadings.
An intrinsic ambiguity in the written agreement is now
required to be put in issue in the pleading in order that
parol evidence therein may be admitted.
Mistake under the first exception refers to a mistake of fact
which is mutual to the parties, or where the innocent party
was imposed upon by unfair dealing of the other.
Imperfection includes an inaccurate statement in the
agreement, or incompleteness in the writing, or the presence
of inconsistent provisions therein.
There is latent ambiguity when the writing on its face
appears clear and unambiguous but there are collateral
matters or circumstances which make the meaning
uncertain, or where a writing admits of 2 constructions
both of which are in harmony w/ the language used.
(Ignacio v. Rementeria)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Patent or extrinsic ambiguity is such ambiguity which is
apparent on the face of the writing itself and requires
something to be added in order to ascertain the
meaning of the words used.
Purpose of second exception: to enable the court to ascertain
the true intention of the parties or the true nature of the
transaction between the parties. Under the third exception
which in effect authorizes an inquiry into the validity of the
agreement, PE may be admitted to show the true
consideration of a contract (CC 1354), or the want or illegality
thereof, or the incapacity of the parties, or the fact that the
contract was fictitious or absolutely simulated, or that there
was fraud in the inducement.
No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest
therein may be proved by parol evidence. (CC 1443)
Reformation of a contract, as a relief, is regulated by CC 1359-
1368.
Related provisions
a. Express trusts on immovables (CC 1443)
Art. 1443. No express trusts concerning an immovable or any
interest therein may be proved by parol evidence.
b. Statute of Frauds (CC 1403, 1405)
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless
they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by
one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as
set forth in this number. In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by
action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum,
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a
secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage,
other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or
things in action, at a price not less than five
hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive
part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences,
or some of them, of such things in action or pay at
the time some part of the purchase money; but
when a sale is made by auction and entry is made
by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of
the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold,
terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and
person on whose account the sale is made, it is a
sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale of real property or of
an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving
consent to a contract.
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Art. 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred
to in No. 2 of Article 1403, are ratified by the failure to object
to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same, or by
the acceptance of benefit under them.
Cases
MAULINI V. SERRANO (1914)
The prohibition against the introduction of parol evidence…
was designed to prevent alteration, change, modification,
variation or contraction of the terms of a written instrument
admittedly existing EXCEPT in cases specifically named
therein.
The prohibition does not apply where the purpose of the
parol evidence is to show:
• That no written contract ever existed,
• That the minds of the parties never met on the terms of
such a contract,
• That they never mutually agreed to enter into such a
contract, and
• That there never existed any consideration upon which
such an agreement could be founded.
PALANCA V. FRED WILSON & CO. (1918)
The introduction of evidence to explain circumstances under
which an agreement was made is permitted when it is
necessary to explain intrinsic ambiguity.
• Written agreement presumed to contain all the terms,
nevertheless does not exclude other evidence of the
circumstances under which the agreement was made,
or to which it relates, or to explain an intrinsic ambiguity.
ROBLES V. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS (1927)
The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a
writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of
extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous
collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such
evidence may be received, regardless of W/N the written
agreement contains reference to such collateral agreement.
WOODHOUSE V. HALILI (1953)
Plaintiff’s act or statement was sought to be introduced to
prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, w/
which or by which he secured the other party’s consent
thereto. These are expressly excluded from the PER.
• Where parties prohibited from proving said
representations or inducements, on the ground that the
agreement had already been entered into, it would be
impossible to prove misrepresentation or fraud.
• The PER expressly allows the evidence to be introduced
when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the
pleadings.
LAND SETTLEMENT DEVT. V. GARCIA PLANTATION CO., INC.
When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon
the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a
condition precedent, such may be established by parol
evidence.
PNR V. CFI OF ALBAY (1978)
Where there is no allegation in the complaint that there was
any mistake or imperfection in the written agreement or that
it failed to express the true intent of the parties, parol evidence
is inadmissible to vary the terms of the agreement.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
• However, if the defendant set up the affirmative defense
that the contract mentioned in the complaint does not
express the true agreement of the parties, then parol
evidence is admissible to prove the true agreement of
the parties.
LECHUGAS V. CA (1986)
The PER does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by
either party to the litigation against the other, where at least
one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party
to the written instrument in question and does not base a
claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby.
• PER not applicable where the controversy is between
one of the parties to the document and third persons
• Thus, if one of the parties to the case is a complete
stranger to the contract involved therein, he’s not bound
by this rule and can introduce extrinsic evidence against
the efficacy of the writing.
INCIONG, JR. V. CA (1996)
The PER does not specify that the written agreement be a
public document.
LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. V. CA (2004)
While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless
there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had
been made by petitioners in this case.
BALUYOT V. POBLETE (2007)
When the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, it is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the
contents of the agreement itself.
Interpretation of Documents <not in outline>
Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal
meaning. — The language of a writing is to be interpreted
according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its
execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all
provisions. — In the construction of an instrument, where
there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction
is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. (9)
Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and
particular provisions. — In the construction of an instrument,
the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a
general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is
paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a
general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. — For the
proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances
under which it was made, including the situation of the
subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that
the judge may be placed in the position of those who
language he is to interpret. (11)
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. — The terms of a
writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and
general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that
they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar
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signification, and were so used and understood in the
particular instance, in which case the agreement must be
construed accordingly. (12)
Sec. 15. Written words control printed. — When an
instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a
printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former
controls the latter. (13)
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining
certain writings. — When the characters in which an
instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the
language is not understood by the court, the evidence of
persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who
understand the language, is admissible to declare the
characters or the meaning of the language. (14)
Sec. 17. Of Two constructions, which preferred. — When the
terms of an agreement have been intended in a different
sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail
against either party in which he supposed the other
understood it, and when different constructions of a provision
are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the
most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was
made. (15)
Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right. — When an
instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in
favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to
be adopted. (16)
Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage. — An instrument
may be construed according to usage, in order to determine
its true character. (17)
Rules for interpretation of contracts are provided by CC 1370-
1379. For the rules on interpretation or construction of wills,
see CC 788-794.
C. Testimonial Evidence
1. Qualification of Witnesses (R130.20)
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make their known perception to others,
may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case,
or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law,
shall not be ground for disqualification. (18a)
GEN RULE: all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses
RIANO:
Testimonial or oral evidence: Evidence elicited from the
mouth of the witness as distinguished from real and
documentary evidence
Competence of a witness refers to his personal qualifications
to testify. It also includes the absence of any factor that would
disqualify him from being a witness.
The admission of any evidence requires its identification.
• Identification precedes authentication. Without a
witness, no evidence can ever be authenticated.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Presumption in favor of competence of witness
GEN RULE: a person who takes the stand as a witness is
presumed to be able to testify.
• A party who desires to question the competence of a
witness must do so by making an objection as soon as
the facts tending to show incompetency are apparent.
Basic qualifications of a witness
1. He can perceive; and in perceiving
• The witness must have personal knowledge of the
facts surrounding the subject matter of his
testimony
2. He can make known his perception to others.
• Involves 2 factors:
a. The ability to remember what has been
perceived; and
b. The ability to communicate the remembered
perception
• When deaf-mutes are competent as witnesses:
a. Can understand and appreciate the sanctity of
an oath;
b. Can comprehend facts they are going to testify
to; and
c. Can communicate their ideas through a
qualified interpreter
Add the following:
1. He must take either an oath or an affirmation
• R132, §1 requires that the examination of a witness
in a trial or hearing shall be done xxx under oath or
affirmation
2. He must not possess the disqualifications imposed by law
or the rules
Credibility of a witness refers to the weight and the
trustworthiness or reliability of the testimony.
• A prevaricating witness or one who has given
contradicting testimony is still a competent witness. He
may be competent, but his testimony may not be given
much weight by the court or no weight at all if the court
deems him not worthy of belief.
• Drug abuse will not render a person incompetent to
testify. It becomes relevant only if the witness was under
the influence of drugs at the time he is testifying or at the
time the events in question were observed. This may
serve as ground for attacking the credibility of the
witness.
• Questions concerning the credibility of a witness are best
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Related provisions
a. CC 821
Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses
to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony. (n)
b. §17, R119, RoC
Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When
two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission
of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting
its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to
be discharged with their consent so that they may be
witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution
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to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
Case:
RECTO V. REPUBLIC (2004)
Requirements of a child’s competence as a witness:
a. Capacity of observation
b. Capacity of recollection
c. Capacity of communication
There is no showing that as a child, claimant did not possess
the foregoing qualifications. It’s not necessary that a witness’
knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in
adulthood.
2. Mental capacity or immaturity (§21, R130)
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. — The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
(Dis)qualifications of witnesses are determined as of the time
said witnesses are produced for examination in court or at the
taking of their depositions.
WRT children of tender years, it’s submitted that their
competence at the time of the occurrence to be testified
to should also be taken into account, especially if such
event took place long before their production as
witnesses.
The phrase “unsound mind” includes any mental aberration,
whether organic or functional, or induced by drugs or
hypnosis. Mental unsoundness of the witness at the time the
fact to be testified to occurred affects only his credibility.
Nevertheless, as long as the witness can convey ideas by
words or signs and give sufficiently intelligent answers to
questions propounded, s/he is a competent witness even if
s/he is feeble-minded, a mental retardate, or a schizophrenic.
Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses when they can
understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath, can
comprehend facts they’re going to testify to and can
communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter.
(People v. Hayag)
Considerations of court in determining competency of child
witness – his/her capacity
1. At the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that
he could receive correct impressions thereof;
2. To comprehend the obligation of an oath; and
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
3. To relate those facts truly at the time he is offered as a
witness
NOTE: the court should take into account his capacity for
observation, recollection, and communication. (Republic v.
CA)
Unless a child’s testimony is punctured w/ serious
inconsistencies as to lead one to believe that he was
coached, if he can perceive and make known his perception,
he is considered a competent witness. (People v. Cidro)
RIANO:
The mental incapacity of the witness at the time of his
perception of the events subject of the testimony does not
affect his competency as long as he is competent at the time
he is produced for examination to make known his
perception to others.
• His incapacity at the time of perception, although
without legal effect on his competency to testify, would
concededly have an adverse effect on his credibility.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. DEAUNA (2002)
GEN RULE: lunatics or persons affected w/ insanity are
admissible as witnesses, if they have sufficient understanding
to apprehend the obligation of an oath and are capable of
giving correct accounts of the matters that they have seen or
heard WRT the questions at issue.
PEOPLE V. MACAPAL, JR. (2005)
Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A
mentally retarded person may be a credible witness. The
acceptance of his/her testimony depends on the quality of
his/her perceptions and the manner s/he can make them
known to the court.
PEOPLE V. SANTOS (2006)
Trend in procedural law – give wide latitude to courts in
exercising control over questioning of a child witness
• Child witnesses may testify in narrative form and leading
questions may be allowed by TC in all stages of the
examination if the same will further the interest of justice.
3. Marital disqualification (R130.22)
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
In order that the marital disqualification rule will apply, it’s
necessary that: 1) the marriage is valid and existing as of the
time of the offer of testimony (Arroyo v. Azur), and 2) that the
other spouse is a party to the action.
Objections to the competency of the spouse presented
to testify against the other may be waived as in the case
of other witnesses generally.
Under R130.22, the marital DQ in criminal cases is limited to
crimes committed against the other or the latter’s direct
descendant/ascendant.
RIANO:
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This rule is based on society’s intent to preserve the marriage
relations and promote domestic peace. Prohibiting a
testimony in favor of the spouse is intended to discourage the
commission of perjury.
Marital DQ rule under R130.22 forbids the husband or wife to
testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse except in those cases authorized by the rule.
The rule does not prohibit a testimony for or against the other
after the marriage is dissolved.
If testimony for or against the other spouse is offered during
the existence of the marriage, it does not matter if the facts
subject of the testimony occurred or came to the knowledge
of the witness-spouse before the marriage. The affected
spouse may still invoke the rule by objecting to the testimony
as long as the testimony is offered during the marriage.
Nothing in the tenor of the rule allows a contrary view.
The benefit of the rule may be waived and it may be waived
impliedly or expressly.
The testimony covered by the marital DQ rule not only
consists of utterances but also the production of documents.
(State v. Bramlet)
EXCEPTIONS to the Marital DQ Rule
A spouse may testify for or against the other even without the
consent of the latter in the ff. instances:
1. In a civil case by one against the other; or
2. In a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other, or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants.
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong
upon the person is too narrow xxx. The better rule is that,
when an offense directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs
the conjugal relations, it comes within the exception to the
statute. (Ordoño v. Daquigan, quoting Cargill v. State)
Where the civil case is between a spouse and the direct
descendants or ascendants of the other, the marital DQ rule
still applies.
Cases:
LEZAMA V. RODRIGUEZ (1968)
Where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging her and
her husband with collusive fraud, she cannot be called as an
adverse party witness, as this will violate the marital DQ rule.
ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ (2005)
Specific reasons for the Marital DQ Rule (spousal immunity):
1. Identity of interests between husband and wife
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is a
consequent danger of perjury
3. Policy of the law = to guard the security and confidences
of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of
justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other
NOTE: where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained, these considerations no longer apply.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
4. Dead Man’s Statute (R130.23)
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of
adverse party. — Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind. (20a)
Survivorship DQ Rule, a.k.a. Dead Man’s Statute
Constitutes only a partial DQ as the witness is only prohibited
from testifying on the matters therein specified, unlike the
marital DQ rule which is a complete and absolute DQ
Requisites for DMS to apply
1. Witness offered for examination is a party plaintiff, or the
assignor of said party, or a person in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted
Such plaintiff must be the real party in interest. As such,
the rule has no application to mere witnesses
2. The case is against the executor or administrator or other
representative of a person deceased or of unsound mind
It’s necessary that the defendant is being sued and
defends in such representative capacity, and not in his
individual capacity. However, even if the property
involved has already been judicially adjudicated to the
heirs, they are still protected under this rule against such
prohibited testimony as they are considered as the
representatives of the deceased (Goñi v. CA)
The rule applies regardless of whether the deceased
died before or after the suit against him is filed,
provided he’s already dead at the time the
testimony is sought to be given (Babao v. Perez)
The protection of the rule would include the heirs
of the deceased defendant who are substituted for
the latter under R3.16, and the guardians of
persons of unsound mind who are sued in such
representative capacity under R96.3.
3. The case is upon a claim or demand against the estate of
such person who is deceased or of unsound mind
The rule doesn’t apply where it’s the administrator who
brings an action to recover property allegedly belonging
to the estate (Tongco v. Vianzon), or the action is by the
heirs of a deceased plaintiff who were substituted for the
latter (Ardina v. Alejandro)
4. Testimony to be given is on a matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind
Includes any matter of fact w/c bears upon a transaction
or communication between the witness and the
decedent even though without the presence or
participation of the latter (Stuart v. Lord)
Purpose of DMS: discourage perjury and protect the estate
from fictitious claims.
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The prohibition does not apply where the testimony is
offered to prove a claim less than what is established
under a written document (Icard v. Marasigan), or is
intended to prove a fraudulent transaction of the
deceased (Ong Chua v. Carr), provided such fraud is first
established by evidence aliunde
When DMS disqualification is waived
If the defendant doesn’t timely object to the admission of
such evidence or testifies on the prohibited matters (Asturias
v. CA) or cross-examines thereon (Tongco v. Vianzon)
RIANO:
The object of the rule is to guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction on the part of
the surviving party and thereby put the parties upon equal
terms. (Tan v. CA)
The rule will not apply:
• Where the plaintiff is the executor or administrator as
representative of the deceased or if the plaintiff is the
person of unsound mind
• When the action brought is not “against” the estate, or
not upon a claim or demand “against” the estate – the
claim, from the tenor of the rule, is by its nature civil
because the estate itself cannot be criminally liable
The rule does not prohibit testimony by a mere witness to the
transaction between the plaintiff and the deceased and who
has no interest in such transaction. Thus, offering the
testimony of a so-called “disinterested witness” is not a
transgression of the rule since the prohibition extends only to
the party or his assignor or the person in whose behalf the
case is prosecuted.
The rule does not altogether intend to keep the witness out
of the stand altogether. The witness is merely precluded from
testifying on particular topics.
The survivorship DQ rule is intended to benefit the estate of
the deceased or insane person. Hence, this protection may
be waived by:
a. Failing to object to the testimony; or
b. Cross-examining the witness on the prohibited
testimony; or
c. Offering evidence to rebut the testimony.
Cases:
TONGCO V. VIANZON (1927)
The object and purpose of [DMS] is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction
in question on the part of the surviving party. The law was
designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed
to suppress the truth.
• The law does not apply and a witness is competent to
testify when the actions were not brought ‘against’ the
estate, or upon claims ‘against’ the estate.
MENDEZONA V. VDA. DE GOITIA (1930)
The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim
against the decedent’s estate from testifying upon a matter of
fact w/c took place before the death of the deceased.
• Underlying principle of prohibition: to protect the
intestate estate from fictitious claims
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
• This protection should not be treated as an absolute bar
or prohibition from the filing of just claims against the
decedent’s estate.
ICARD V. MASIGAN (1941)
FROM RIANO: The witness is merely precluded from testifying
on particular topics. A testimony favorable to the estate or to
the insane person is not barred since the rule is designed to
protect the interest of the estate of the deceased or insane
person.
• FROM CASE: Where the purpose of the oral testimony is
to prove a lesser claim than what might be warranted by
clear written evidence, to avoid prejudice to the estate of
the deceased, the law has no reason for its application.
LICHAUCO V. AG&P (1949)
Inasmuch as [DMS] disqualifies only parties or assignors of
parties, the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are
not disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation
which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against
the estate of a deceased person as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person.
GO CHI GUN V. CO CHO (1955)
An exception to [DMS] is where the decedent had been
guilty of fraud. The rule has been adopted to promote justice
and not to shield fraud. In the case of Ong Chua v. Carr,
before the testimonies of witnesses were allowed to be
introduced the fraud perpetrated by the deceased had been
established beyond all doubt, not by mere preponderance of
the evidence alone.
• Aside from the fact that fraud must be proved as a fact
by a clear preponderance of evidence because fraud is a
criminal charge, there is an added ground in the case at
bar for requiring a high quantum of proof of the fraud.
ASTURIAS V. CA (1963)
[DMS] waived where no timely objected has been made
against the admission of such evidence and one of the
petitioners was made to testify on such prohibited matters
covered by the exclusion rule.
GUERRERO V. ST. CLAIRE’S REALTY & CO. (1983)
DMS does not apply:
• To a witness who is not a party or assignor of a party or
a person in whose behalf a case is prosecuted
• Where the case is not a claim or demand against the
estate of a deceased person
GOÑI V. CA (1986)
Waiver [of DMS] occurs where:
• Representative of estate takes plaintiff’s deposition, OR
counsel for rep cross-examines plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceased’s lifetime; AND
• Rep files a counterclaim against plaintiff
DMS can’t be invoked where party testifies as to
communications made or contracts entered into w/ the
agent of the decedent while the latter was alive.
RAZON V. IAC (1992)
DMS may not be invoked when the case was not filed against
the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims
against the estate. Granting that petitioner’s testimony [as
regards the true nature of transaction w/ the deceased] is
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within the prohibition of DMS, private respondent is deemed
to have waived the rule.
SUNGA-CHAN V. CHUA (2001)
DMS provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction.
5. Privileged communication (R130.24)
Objections under the DQ rules can be invoked only by the
persons protected thereunder and may be waived by said
persons in the same manner, either expressly or impliedly.
a. Marital communications [R130.24(a)]
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage,
cannot be examined without the consent of the other as
to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants;
xxx
Requisites for DQ by reason of marital privilege to apply
1. Valid marital relation
2. Privilege is invoked WRT a confidential communication
between the spouses during said marriage
3. The spouse against whom such evidence is being
offered has not given his/her consent to such testimony
RIANO:
Since the application of the rule requires a confidential
information received by one spouse from the other during
the marriage, information acquired by a spouse before the
marriage even if received confidentially will not fall squarely
with R130, §24(a) but divulging the same may be objected to
under R130, §22 upon proper objection as long as the
information is sought to be revealed during the marriage
through a testimony for or against the affected spouse.
Confidential information received from a third person is not
covered by the privilege.
Communications in private between H & W are presumed to
be confidential.
• BUT if a third person (other than a child of the family) is
present with the knowledge of the communicating
spouse, this stretches the web of confidence beyond the
marital pair, and the communication is unprivileged.
• If children of the family are present this likewise deprives
the conversation of protection unless the children are
too young to understand what is said.
Marital DQ Rule (R130.22) Marital Privileged
Communication Rule
[R130.24(a)]
Does not refer to Refers to confidential
confidential communications received by
communications between one spouse from the other
the spouses. during the marriage
Includes facts, occurrences Applies only to testimonies of a
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
or information even prior confidential nature received by presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as
to the marriage – in this one spouse from the other implied consent.
sense, it is broader because during the marriage – does not
it prevents testimony for or include acts merely observed b. Attorney-client privilege [R130. 24(b)]
against the spouse on any by the spouse UNLESS such Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
fact and not merely a acts are intended as a means communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
disclosure of confidential of conveying confidential matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx
information communication by one to the (b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
other examined as to any communication made by the client
Can no longer be invoked The privilege does not cease to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
once the marriage is just because the marriage has with a view to, professional employment, nor can an
dissolved ended attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
The prohibition is a What is prohibited is the without the consent of the client and his employer,
testimony for or against the examination of a spouse as to concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
other matters received in confidence acquired in such capacity;
by one from the other during xxx
the marriage
Preliminary communications made for the purpose of
Cases: creating the attorney-client relationship are within the
privilege
US V. ANTIPOLO (1916)
For the information to be confidential, it must be made The communications covered by the privilege include verbal
during and by reason of the marital relations and is intended statements and documents or papers entrusted to the
not to be shared with others. Without such intention, attorney, and of facts learned by the attorney through the act
common reason suggests that the information is not or agency of his client.
confidential.
• Instant case: in a prosecution for murder, the wife was Atty-client privilege DOES NOT APPLY to communications:
allowed to testify as to her husband’s dying declaration 1. intended to be made public;
regarding the identity of the assailant because there was 2. intended to be communicated to others;
no intent of confidentiality in the information. The 3. intended for an unlawful purpose;
declaration is intended to be communicated after the 4. received from third persons not acting in behalf of or as
husband’s death because it was made in the furtherance agents of the client; or
of justice. 5. made in the presence of third parties who are strangers
to the attorney-client relationship
PEOPLE V. CARLOS (1925)
Where a privileged communication from one spouse to Period to be considered for application of the privilege = that
another comes into the hands of a third party, w/o collusion date when the privileged communication was made by the
and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed
the privilege is extinguished and the communication, if in the past or WRT a crime intended to be committed in the
otherwise competent, becomes admissible. future.

PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO (1947) RIANO:

Reasons for prohibition:
a. Identity of interests
b. Consequent danger of perjury
c. Policy of law w/c deems it necessary to guard the
security and confidences of private life even at the risk of
an occasional failure of justice, and w/c rejects such
evidence because its admission would lead to domestic
disunion and unhappiness
d. Where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the other’s
hostile testimony
EXCEPTIONS:
• In civil actions between the spouses
• In criminal cases for offenses committed by one against
the other
REASON FOR EXCEPTIONS: Where marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there’s no more harmony to be
preserved or peace and tranquility w/c may be disturbed
LACUROM V. JACOBA (2006)
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be
waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its
Requisites:
1. A communication made by the client to the attorney or
an advice given by the attorney to his client
2. The communication or advice must have been given in
confidence
3. The communication or advice must’ve been given either:
a. In the course of the professional employment; or
b. With a view to professional employment
Perfected attorney-client relationship not required for the
privilege to exist – enough that the communication or advice
be “with a view to” professional employment
• Hence, the privilege is extended to communications
made for the purpose of securing the services of counsel
even if the counsel later refuses the professional
relationship.
• Insertion of the clause “with a view to” includes
preliminary negotiations within the privilege
The privilege of a client to keep communications to his
attorney confidential is predicated upon the client’s belief that
he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and has manifested
his intention to seek professional legal advice.

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evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
• It is enough if he reasonably believes that the person
consulted is a lawyer, although in fact he is not as in the
case of a detective pretending to be a lawyer. (People v.
Barker) For the privilege to exist, payment of a fee is not
essential. (US v. Landorf)
The privilege is not confined to communications regarding
actual pending cases. The communications may refer to
anticipated litigations or may not refer to any litigation at all.
The privilege does not extend to communications where the
client’s purpose is the furtherance of a future intended crime
or fraud, or for the purpose of committing a crime or a tort or
those made in furtherance of illicit activity.
Under the last link doctrine, non-privileged information, such
as the identity of the client, is protected if the revelation of
such information would necessarily reveal privileged
information.
The statements of the client need not have been made to the
attorney in person.
• Those made to the attorney’s secretary, clerk or
stenographer for transmission to the attorney for the
purpose of the professional relationship or with a view to
such relationship or such knowledge acquired by such
employees in such capacity are covered by the privilege.
Before the statements of the client and the advice of the
attorney can be deemed as privileged, the same should have
been intended to be confidential. There can be no attorney-
client privilege where the information is given with the
expectation that it will be revealed to others.
In relation to the attorney, the privilege is owned by the client.
If the client waives the privilege, no one else including the
attorney can invoke it.
The protection of the privilege will generally survive the
client’s death.
Cases:
BARTON V. LEYTE ASPHALT (1924)
When a document, containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the
adversary, it is admissible in evidence. Where the authenticity
of such a document is admitted, the court will take no notice
of the manner in which it was obtained.
ORIENT INSURANCE V. REVILLA (1930)
The introduction in evidence by one party of part of a writing
[privileged matter] makes the whole document admissible –
privilege is waived as to other parts of the same writing.
UPJOHN COMPANY V. US (1981)
The attorney-client privilege applies when the client is a
corporation.
• If the employee making the communication, of whatever
rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take
a substantial part in a decision about any action which
the corporation may take upon the advice of the
attorney, …in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation
when he make his disclosure to the lawyer, and the
privilege would apply.
REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (1996)
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• Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer’s advice.
• Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability,
his identity is privileged.
• The content of any client communication to a lawyer lies
within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of
the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance.
• The lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer’s
loyalty to his client extends even after the termination of
the relationship.
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN (1997)
The rule on attorney-client privilege has always referred to
“any communication,” without distinction or qualification.
There is no particular mode by which a confidential
communication shall be made by a client to his attorney.
• The privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney, but
extends as well to information communicated by the
client to the attorney by other means.
For the application of the privilege, the period to be
considered is the date when the privileged communication
was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or WRT a crime intended to be
committed in the future.
• If the client seeks lawyer’s advice WRT a crime the former
has committed, he is given the protection of the privilege
which cannot be broken by the attorney w/o the client’s
consent.
• The same privilege does not attach with regard to a
crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in
the future and for purposes of which he seeks the
lawyer’s advice.
For lawyer-client communication to be privileged, it must be
for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching.
MERCADO V. VITRIOLO
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential. The communication made
by a client to his attorney must have been transmitted for the
purpose of seeking legal advice.
c. Physician-patient privilege [R130. 24(c)]
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of
the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment
given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable
him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;
xxx
Requisites:
1. The physician is authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics;
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
2. The information was acquired or the advice or treatment
was given by him in his professional capacity for the
purpose of treating and curing the patient;
3. The information, advice or treatment, if revealed, would
blacken the patient’s reputation; and
4. The privilege is invoked in a civil case, whether the
patient is a party thereto or not
The privilege DOES NOT APPLY where:
1. the communication was not given in confidence;
2. Communication is irrelevant to professional employment;
3. the communication was made for an unlawful purpose;
as when it’s intended for the commission or
concealment of a crime;
4. the information was intended to be made public; or
5. there was a waiver of the privilege either by provisions of
contract or law
RIANO:
The privilege applies to a civil case, whether the patient is a
party or not.
Rationale: to encourage the patient to freely disclose all the
matters which may aid in the diagnosis in the treatment of a
disease or an injury
The information which cannot be disclosed refers to:
1. any advice given to the client;
2. any treatment given to the client;
3. any information acquired in attending such patient
provided that the advice, treatment or information was
made or acquired in a professional capacity and was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
4. that the information sought to be disclosed would tend
to blacken the reputation of the patient
The rule doesn’t require that the physician-patient relationship
be a result of a contractual relationship.
It’s necessary for the operation of the privilege that the
physician is acting in his “professional capacity” and that the
advice or treatment is given or acquired in such capacity.
The privilege does not apply to shield the commission of a
crime or when the purpose is an unlawful one.
The privilege survives the death of the patient.
The privilege may be waived by the patient. There could also
be a waiver by operation of law or of the rules.
Rule 28: Physical and Mental Examination of Persons
xxx
Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege. — By requesting and obtaining a
report of the examination so ordered or by taking the
deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any
privilege he may have in that action or any other involving
the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every other
person who has examined or may thereafter examine him in
respect of the same mental or physical examination. (4)
Under R28, the results of the physical and mental
examination of a person, when ordered by the court, are
intended to be made public, hence they can be divulged in
that proceeding and cannot be objected to on the ground of
privilege. Also, results of autopsies or postmortem
examinations are generally intended to be divulged in court,
29
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aside from the fact that the doctor’s services were not for
purposes of medical treatment.
Cases:
LIM V. CA (1992)
The privilege is not violated by permitting a physician to give
expert opinion testimony. Such opinion must exclude from his
consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired
through the physician-patient relationship.
KROHN V. CA (1994)
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery, or obstetrics. He is simply the patient’s husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners. Clearly, this does not fall within the claimed
prohibition.
d. Priest/minister-penitent privilege [§24(d), R130]
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the
person making the confession, be examined as to any
confession made to or any advice given by him in his
professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest
belongs;
xxx
The privilege requires that the communications were made
pursuant to a religious duty enjoined in the course of the
discipline of the sect or denomination to which they belong
and must be confidential and penitential in character, e.g.,
under the seal of the confessional.
RIANO:
The person making the confession holds the privilege.
• The priest or minister hearing the confession in his
professional capacity is prohibited from making a
disclosure of the confession without the consent of the
person confessing.
o Note: the priest or minister must be duly ordained
or consecrated by his sect.
The privilege also extends to any advice given by the minister
or priest. NOTE: the communication must be made pursuant
to confessions of sins.
• Where the penitent discussed business arrangements
with the priest, the privilege does not apply.
e. State secrets [§24(e), R130]
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of
office or afterwards, as to communications made to him
in official confidence, when the court finds that the
public interest would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
Requisites:
1. The communication was made to the public officer in
official confidence; and
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
2. That public interest would suffer by the disclosure of
such communication, as in the case of State secrets.
Where no public interest would be prejudiced, this rule does
not apply.
RIANO:
National security matters and State secrets are confidential. A
court will most likely uphold the privilege.
Cases:
BANCO FILIPINO V. MONETARY BOARD (1986)
Tapes and transcripts of Monetary Board deliberations on the
closure of BF may be confidential, but they are not necessarily
absolute and privileged. There’s no specific provision in the
Central Bank Act w/c prohibits absolutely the courts from
conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are
relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending
before it.
RA 7653 (New Central Bank Act), §16. Responsibility. -
Members of the Monetary Board, officials, examiners, and
employees of the Bangko Sentral who willfully violate this Act
or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of
malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the performance of his duties shall be held liable
for any loss or injury suffered by the Bangko Sentral or other
banking institutions as a result of such violation, negligence,
abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
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enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused
were exempted from the right to information. (Chavez v.
PCGG)
Presidential communications fall under the protection of
executive privilege.
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
f. Parental and filial privilege
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a)
Both parental and filial privileges are granted to any person,
which privileges against compulsory testimony he can invoke
in any case against any of his parents, direct ascendants,
children, or direct descendants.
Related provision: CC 215
Art. 215. Each spouse shall proportionately bear the family
expenses.
Case:
PEOPLE V. INVENCION (2003)
The rule on filial privilege refers to a privilege not to testify,
which can be invoked or waived like other privileges.
g. Newsman’s Privilege (RA No. 53, as amended
by RA 1477)

Similar responsibility shall apply to members, officers, and
employees of the Bangko Sentral for: (1) the disclosure of any
information of a confidential nature, or any information on
the discussions or resolutions of the Monetary Board, or
about the confidential operations of the Bangko Sentral,
unless the disclosure is in connection with the performance
of official functions with the Bangko Sentral, or is with prior
authorization of the Monetary Board or the Governor; or (2)
the use of such information for personal gain or to the
detriment of the Government, the Bangko Sentral or third
parties: Provided, however, That any data or information
required to be submitted to the President and/or the
Congress, or to be published under the provisions of this Act
shall not be considered confidential.
Under RA 53, the publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter
of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any
news report or information appearing in said publication
which was related in confidence to him, unless the court or a
House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the security of the State.
Case:
IN THE MATTER OF FARBER (1978)

Neri v. Senate: for the claim of executive privilege to be

invoked, there must be a formal claim of the privilege, lodged
by the head of the department which has control of the
matter, and that a formal and proper claim of the privilege
requires a precise and certain reason for preserving
confidentiality, but Congress must not require the executive
to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to
compel the disclosure of the information which the privilege
is meant to protect.

SENATE V. ERMITA (2006)

Executive privilege: the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress

There are certain types of information which the government

may withhold from the public like military, diplomatic and
national security secrets.

Secrets involving military, diplomatic and national security

matters and information on investigations of crimes by law
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evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
PART TWO
Section 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration
I. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS made in the presence and within the hearing or observation
of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
A. Admissions against Interest declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if
not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so,
1. §§ 26 & 32, R130 may be given in evidence against him.
Section 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in Requisites to be admissible against a party as an admission by
evidence against him. (22) silence:
1. He must have heard or observed the act or declaration
ADMISSION: any statement of fact made by a party against of the other person
his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he 2. He must’ve had the opportunity to deny it
contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. 3. He must’ve understood the statement
4. He must’ve had an interest to object, such that he would
Requisites for admission to be admissible: naturally have done so if the statement was not true
1. Involves matters of fact, not of law 5. The facts were within his knowledge
2. Categorical and definite 6. The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his
3. Knowingly and voluntarily made silence is material to the issue
4. Adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be
self-serving and inadmissible The rule on admission by silence applies where a person was
surprised in the act (US v. Bay) or even if he is already in the
Self-serving declaration: one which has been made custody of the police (People v. Ancheta)
extrajudicially by the party to favor his interests. It is not • Voluntary participation in a reenactment of the crime
admissible in evidence. conducted by the police is considered a tacit admission
of complicity. (People v. Tia Fong)
Self-serving testimony: the extrajudicial statement of a party o However, for a reenactment to be given any
which is being urged for admission in court. It does not evidentiary weight, the validity and efficacy of the
include his testimony as a witness in court. It has no confession must first be shown. (People v. Navoa)
application to a court declaration.
• Where the statement was not made in anticipation of a The rule applies to adverse statements in writing if the party
future litigation, the same cannot be considered self- was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the
serving. declarant. However, if there was no such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while
Flight from justice is an admission by conduct and the party would’ve immediately reacted by a denial if the
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt. Also, statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt
evidence of attempts to suppress evidence, as by destruction response can generally not be expected if the party still has to
of documentary evidence or eloignment of witnesses, are resort to a written reply.
admissible under the same rationale.
• Eloignment: causing the disappearance or non- The rule does not apply if the statements adverse to the party
availability of witnesses were made in the course of an official investigation (US v. de
la Cruz)
Admission Confession
A statement of fact which A statement of fact which 2. §13, R132
does not involve an involves an acknowledgment Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of
acknowledgment of guilt or of guilt or liability inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be
liability impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
May be express or tacit Must be express statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
May be made by third Made only by the party statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of
persons and, in certain cases, himself and, in some the times and places and the persons present, and he must
are admissible against a party instances, are admissible be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
against his co-accused allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to
Admission Declaration against interest him concerning them. (16)
Need not be made against Made against the proprietary
the party’s proprietary or or pecuniary interest of the Leading question: one w/c suggests to the witness the
pecuniary interest, although party answer desired.
it will greatly enhance its
probative weight if it be so Misleading question: one w/c assumes facts not in evidence
made or w/o sufficient basis or w/c assumes testimony or proof w/c
Made by the party himself Made by a person who is has not been given.
and is a primary evidence either deceased or unable to
and competent though he testify A leading question propounded to a witness may, by
be present in court and reacting to an inference in his mind, cause him to testify in
ready to testify accordance w/ the suggestion by the question; his answer
Made any time Made ante lite motam
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evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
may be ‘an echo of the question’ than a genuine recollection
of events. (Escoto v. Pineda)
Leading questions may be permitted in the examination of a
witness who is immature; aged & infirm; in bad physical
condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to,
court proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-
minded; confused & agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed
while on the stand; lacking in comprehension of questions or
slow to understand; deaf & dumb; or unable to speak or
understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar
therewith. (People v. Dela Cruz)
Gen rule: a party who voluntarily offers the testimony of a
witness in the case is bound by the testimony of said witness.
Exceptions:
1. Hostile witness;
2. Where the witness is the adverse party or the
representative of a juridical person w/c is the adverse
party; and
3. When the witness is not voluntarily offered but is
required by law to be presented by the proponent, as in
the case of subscribing witnesses to a will. (Fernandez v.
Tantoco)
A party can impeach the adverse party’s witness by:
1. Contradictory evidence
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
3. Evidence of bad character
4. Evidence of bias, interest, prejudice, or incompetence
A party can peach his own witness only by:
1. Evidence contradictory to his testimony
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
In the case of hostile witnesses, adverse party witnesses or
involuntary witnesses, they can also be impeached by other
modes of impeachment, aside from contradictory statements
and prior inconsistent statements made by them.
Contradictory evidence: other testimony of the same witness,
or other evidence presented by him in the same case, but not
the testimony of another witness
Prior inconsistent statements: oral or documentary statements
made by the witness sought to be impeached on occasions
other than the trial in which he is testifying.
How to impeach a witness by prior inconsistent
statements: by laying the predicate
1. Confront him w/ such statements, w/ the
circumstances under w/c they were made;
2. Ask him whether he made such statements; and
3. Give him a chance to explain the inconsistency.
o Unless the witness is given the opportunity to
explain the discrepancies, the impeachment is
incomplete. (US v. Baluyot) However, such
defect in the impeachment of the witness is
deemed waived if no objection on that ground
is raised when the document involved is
offered for admission. (People v. Molo)
It is believed that if the prior inconsistent statement appears in
a deposition of the adverse party, and not a mere witness,
that adverse party who testifies may be impeached w/o
laying the predicate, as such prior statements are in the
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nature of admissions of said adverse party. Thus, under
R23.4(b), the deposition of an adverse party may be used by
any party for any purpose, i.e. as evidence for the latter or to
impeach or contradict said party deponent through
inconsistent statements therein.
Where a witness’ previous statements are offered as evidence
of an admission, and not merely to impeach him, the rule on
laying a predicate does not apply (Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v.
Hashim) and the same would apply to like statements of a
party to the case
Cases:
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. V. ANTIGUA BOTICA RAMIREZ (1932)
Admission made in testimony was adverse to his interest –
considered judicial admission
PEOPLE V. PARAGSA (1978) [Sir: BAD DECISION]
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an
implied admission of the truth of statements uttered in his
presence is applicable in criminal cases.
• Requisites:
a. Must appear that party heard and understood the
statement
b. He was at liberty to interpose a denial
c. Statement was in respect to some matter affecting
his rights or in which he was then interested, and
calling, naturally, for an answer
d. The facts were within his knowledge
e. The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn
from his silence would be material to the issue
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO (2001)
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or
implied by the other person.
• Jones explains that the “basis for admissibility of
admissions made vicariously is that arising from the
ratification or adoption by the party of the statements
which the other person had made.”
• In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started
to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support
from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus,
Exec. Sec. Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel
to advise petitioner to consider the option of “dignified
exit or resignation.” Petitioner did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave
the country. Petitioner’s silence on this and other related
suggestions can be taken as an admission by him
RUFINA PATIS FACTORY V. ALUSITAIN (2004)
• Being an admission against interest, the documents are
the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of
the facts in dispute. Rationale for rule – presumption that
no man would declare anything against himself unless
such declaration was true
• It does not matter that the admission was self-serving
when it was made, so long as it is against the party’s
present claim.
ESTATE OF JESUS S. YUJUICO V. REPUBLIC (2007)
A hydrographic map is not the best evidence to show the
nature and location of the lot subject of a land registration
application; it is derived from a hydrographic survey which is
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
mainly used for navigation purposes. [Ocular inspections
trump map]
B. Compromises
1. §1(f), R116
2. §§ 1 & 2, R118
The amendment regarding the inadmissibility of a plea of
guilty later withdrawn or an unaccepted offer to plead guilty
to a lesser offense is a consequence of the present provisions
in criminal procedure on plea bargaining. [§1(f), R116; §§
1&2, R118]
3. §27, R130
Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil
cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any
liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may
be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a
plea of guilty to lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence
against the accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other
expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in
evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury.
CIVIL CASES
As a rule, an offer of compromise in a civil case is not a tacit
admission of liability and cannot be proved over the objection
of the offeror, unless such offer is clearly not only to “buy
peace” but amounts to an admission of liability, the offered
compromise being directed only to the amount to be paid.
(El Varadero de Manila vs. Insular Lumber)
CRIMINAL CASES
An offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt,
although the accused may be permitted to prove that such
offer was not made under consciousness of guilt but merely
to avoid the risks of criminal action against him.
While rape cases can in effect be compromised by actual
marriage of the parties since criminal liability is extinguished,
an offer to compromise for a monetary consideration, and
not to marry the victim, is an implied admission of guilt.
An offer of marriage by the accused, during the investigation
of the rape case, is also an admission of guilt. (People v.
Valdez)
People v. Manzano: the attempt of the parents of the accused
to settle the case with the complainant was considered an
implied admission of guilt – ?! Note: attempt to settle made
during trial. May fall under §29, R130
Criminal cases involving criminal negligence, or the quasi-
offenses contemplated in RPC 365, are allowed to be
compromised under the amendment to this section, hence
an offer of settlement is not an implied admission of guilt.
Good Samaritan doctrine
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An offer to pay or the actual payment of the medical, hospital
or other expenses by reason of the victim’s injuries is not
admissible to prove civil or criminal liability therefor.
4. §204, RA 8424, Tax Reform Act of 1997
In prosecutions for violation of the internal revenue laws,
such offers of compromise are not admissible in evidence as
the law provides that the payment of any internal revenue tax
may be compromised, and all criminal violations may likewise
be compromised, except those already filed in court and
those involving fraud.
5. §§ 2, 4, 6, & 10, PD No. 1508
Amicable settlement at barangay level
Cases:
VARADERO V. INSULAR LUMBER (1924)
GEN RULE: offer of compromise is inadmissible
EXCEPTION: where amount named in the offer to accept a
certain sum in settlement appears to have been arrived at as
a fair estimate of value, it is relevant (thus admissible)
PEOPLE V. GODOY (1995)
Generally, an offer of compromise in a criminal case is
admissible as evidence against the party making it.
• However, the accused may show that the offer was
made merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or some other reason justifying a claim
that the offer was not an admission of guilt
PEOPLE V. LAMBID (2003)
Plea for forgiveness is analogous to an attempt to
compromise, and an offer of compromise by accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt
BATULANON V. PEOPLE (2006)
Offer of compromise by accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt in criminal cases EXCEPT in
cases involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those
allowed by law to be compromised.
C. Res Inter Alios Acta (§§ 28 & 34, R130)
Section 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a)
First branch of the rule of “res inter alios acta alteri nocere
non debet”
Exceptions:
1. §29: Where the third person is a partner, agent, joint
owner, joint debtor or has a joint interest with the party
2. §30: Third person is a co-conspirator
3. §31: Third person is a privy of the party
Section 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent
or knowledge; identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like. (48a)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Second branch of res inter alios acta (first branch is R130 § 28:
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another)
• Applies to both civil and criminal cases
• Strictly enforced in all cases where applicable
GEN RULE: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did
not do the same or similar thing at another time.
EXCEPTIONS: Where evidence of similar acts may prove
a. a specific intent or knowledge
b. identity
c. a plan/system/scheme
d. a specific habit
e. established customs, usages, and the like
Evidence of another crime is admissible in a prosecution for
robbery where it has the tendency to identify the accused or
show his presence at the scene of the crime (People v. Irang,
People v. Liera)
Evidence of another crime is inadmissible where the
evidence is to prove that the accused committed
another crime wholly independent of that for which he
is on trial. (People v. Asinas)
RIANO:
The rule prohibits the admission of “propensity evidence,”
evidence that tends to show that what a person has done at
one time is probative of the contention that he has done a
similar act at another time. Evidence of similar acts or
occurrences compels the defendant to meet allegations not
mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his defense,
raises a variety of relevant issues, and diverts the attention of
the court from the issues immediately before it. Hence, the
evidentiary rule guards against the practical inconvenience of
trying collateral issues and protracting the trial and prevents
surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants. (Cruz v. CA)
The admissibility of similar acts or previous conduct would
depend on the purposes for which such conduct or acts are
offered.
Cases:
ALVIZO V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2003)
Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. The existence
of the assent of minds involved in a conspiracy may be, and
from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the
court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of
some complete whole. Proof of conspiracy most frequently
made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only
PEOPLE V. GAUDIA (2004)
Alleged offer of compromise by defendant’s parents cannot
prejudice defendant per res inter alios acta
• their actions can’t affect him as he was not a party to
said conversation
• it was not shown that he was privy to the offer they
made to the victim’s mother
D. Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
1. Admission by a co-partner or agent
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a. §29, R130
Section 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the
scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against
such party after the partnership or agency is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule
applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor,
or other person jointly interested with the party.
Requisites for application:
1. That the partnership, agency, or joint interest is
established by evidence other than the act or
declaration;
2. The act or declaration is within the scope of the
partnership, agency, or joint interest; and
3. Such act or declaration must have been made during
the existence of the partnership, agency, or joint interest
Refer to CC 1803 (on partners), 1910 (agents), 487 (co-
owners), and 1222 (solidary debtors).
As a rule, statements made after a partnership has been
dissolved do not fall within this exception.
• Where the admissions are made in connection w/ the
winding up of the partnership affairs, said admissions are
still admissible as the partner is acting as an agent of his
co-partners in said winding-up.
The phrase “joint debtor” should be understood according to
its meaning in the common law system from which the
provision was taken, that is, in solidum, and not
mancomunada. (Jaucian v. Querol)
b. §23, R138
Admissions by counsel are admissible against the client as the
former acts in representation and as an agent of the client,
subject to the limitation that the same should not amount to
a compromise (§23, R138) or confession of judgment.
(Acenas v. Sison)
Cases:
ACENAS V. SISON (1963)
Attorney for defendants agreed to judgment on confession
against his clients: records do not show that he had authority
to confess judgment – such must be clear. R127.21 of the old
RoC states that special authority is needed to compromise
their client’s litigation
PHIL. JOURNALISTS, INC. V. NLRC (2006)
A judgment approving a compromise agreement cannot
have the effect of res judicata upon non-signatories since the
requirement of identity of parties is not satisfied – the union
has no authority to compromise the individual claims of
members who didn’t consent to the settlement
2. Admission by conspirators (§30, R130)
Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration
of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act of declaration. (27)
This rule applies only to extrajudicial acts or statements and
not to testimony given on the witness stand at the trial where
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
the party adversely affected thereby has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. (People v. Serrano)
• The requirement that the conspiracy must preliminarily
be proved by evidence other than the conspirator’s
admission applies on to extrajudicial admissions. (People
v. Nierra)
An admission by a conspirator is admissible against his co-
conspirator if:
1. Such conspiracy is shown by evidence aliunde;
2. The admission was made during the existence of the
conspiracy; and
3. The admission relates to the conspiracy itself.
Note: These are not required in admissions during the trial as
the co-accused can cross-examine the declarant (People v.
Serrano) and, besides, these are admissions after the
conspiracy has ended. (People v. Vizcarra)
Existence of conspiracy may be inferred from:
• The acts of the accused
• The confessions of the accused
• Prima facie proof thereof
Where there is no independent evidence of the alleged
conspiracy, the extrajudicial confession of an accused cannot
be used against his co-accused as the res inter alios acta rule
applies to both extrajudicial confessions and admissions.
(People v. Alegre)
Extrajudicial admissions made by a conspirator after the
conspiracy had terminated and even before trial are not
admissible against the co-conspirator, EXCEPT:
1. if made in the presence of the latter who expressly or
impliedly agreed therein as, in the latter case, it would be
a tacit admission under §32;
2. where the facts in said admission are confirmed in the
individual extrajudicial confessions made by the co-
conspirators after their apprehension;
3. as a circumstance to determine a witness’ credibility; or
4. as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the
latter’s participation in the offense.
In order that the extrajudicial statements of a co-accused may
be taken into consideration in judging the testimony of a
witness, it is necessary that the statements are made by
several accused, the same are all in material respects identical,
and there could have been no collusion among said co-
accused in making such statements. (People v. Badilla)
Cases:
PEOPLE V. CABRERA (1974)
Statement not made during the existence of the alleged
conspiracy, but after said alleged conspiracy had already
ceased – rule on admission by conspirator can’t be availed of
PREAGIDO V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2005)
R130.27 applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations, not
to testimony given on the witness stand at the trial where the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
3. Admission by privies (§31, R130)
Section 31. Admission by privies. — Where one derives title to
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former. (28)
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Requirements to be admissible:
1. Relation of privity between the party and the declarant
2. Admission was made by the declarant, as predecessor-in-
interest, while holding the title to the property
3. Admission is in relation to said property
Privity in estate may have arisen by succession by acts mortis
causa or by acts inter vivos.
RIANO:
“Privies”: persons who are partakers or have an interest in any
action or thing, or any relation to another
Cases:
CITY OF MANILA V. DEL ROSARIO (1905)
Where one derives title to real property from another, the
declaration/act/omission of the latter in relation to the
property is evidence against the former only when made
while the latter holds the title
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2003)
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent
bind all of them pursuant to §§29 and 31, R130 of the Rules
of Court. The declarations of a person are admissible against a
party whenever a “privity of estate” exists between the
declarant and the party, the term “privity of estate” generally
denoting a succession in rights. Consequently, an admission
of one in privity with a party to the record is competent.
E. Confessions
1. §33, R130
Section 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him. (29a)
Confession: a categorical acknowledgment of guilt made by
an accused in a criminal case, without any exculpatory
statement or explanation.
May be oral or in writing
• If in writing, it need not be under oath
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made while the
accused was under arrest does not render it inadmissible
where the same was made and admitted prior to the 1973
Constitution.
May be judicial or extrajudicial
• Judicial confession: one made before a court in which
the case is pending and in the course of legal
proceedings therein and, by itself, can sustain a
conviction even in capital offenses
• Extrajudicial confession: one made in any other place or
occasion and cannot sustain a conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti (R133.3)
o Any form of coercion renders the extrajudicial
confession inadmissible
o The extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding
only upon himself and is not admissible against his
co-accused.
 EXCEPTIONS:
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
a. Co-accused impliedly acquiesced in or
adopted said confession by not
questioning its truthfulness
b. Accused persons voluntarily and
independently executed identical
confessions without conclusion
(interlocking confessions), corroborated by
other evidence and without contradiction
by the co-accused who was present
c. Accused admitted facts stated by
confessant after being apprised of such
confession
d. They are charged as co-conspirators of
the crime confessed by one of the
accused and said confession is used only
as corroborating evidence
e. Confession is used as circumstantial
evidence to show the probability of
participation by the co-conspirator
f. Confessant testified for his co-defendant
g. Co-conspirator’s extrajudicial confession is
corroborated by other evidence of record
Requirements for confession to be admissible:
1. Confession must involve an express and categorical
acknowledgment of guilt
2. Facts admitted must be constitutive of a criminal offense
3. Given voluntarily
• Confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The
onus is on the defense to prove that it was
involuntary for having been obtained by violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency
• Why involuntary confessions are inadmissible
o Unreliable
o Humanitarian considerations
o Legal considerations of their being violative of
the constitutional right against self-
incrimination
4. Intelligently made
5. No violation of §12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
• Waiver of right to counsel during custodial
investigation must be made with the assistance of
counsel
• When the accused was merely told of his
constitutional rights and asked if he understood
what he was told, but he was never asked whether
he wanted to exercise or avail himself of such rights,
his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible.
• Where the verbal extrajudicial confession was made
without counsel, but spontaneously made by the
accused immediately after the assault, the same is
admissible not under the confession rule, but as part
of the res gestae, aside from the consideration that
no custodial investigation was involved.
Inadmissible evidence termed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”
refers to object, not testimonial evidence; it also refers to an
object seized in the course of an illegal search and seizure. It
does not refer to testimony or a confession obtained through
an illegal arrest.
2. §3, R133
Section 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for
conviction. — An extrajudicial confession made by an
accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
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Refer to notes under previous part (R130.33).
Corpus delicti: the body or substance of the crime
The actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged. It’s a common fact made up of 2 things: a) the
existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the
criminal charge, and b) the existence of a criminal agency as
the cause of the act or the result.
Proved when the evidence on record shows that the
crime prosecuted had been committed
A mere voluntary extrajudicial confession uncorroborated by
independent proof of the corpus delicti is insufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction. There must be independent
proof of the corpus delicti. The evidence may be
circumstantial but, just the same, there should be some
evidence substantiating the confession. (US v. de la Cruz)
3. §§ 12 & 17, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. COMPIL (1995)
Right to counsel attaches upon the start of investigation
(when investigating officer asks questions to get info etc.). At
such point, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel. The belated arrival of the lawyer, even if prior to the
signing of the uncounseled [extrajudicial] confession does not
cure the defect.
PEOPLE V. WANG CHUEN MING (1996)
Signatures of the accused on the boxes [they were made to
sign while at NAIA and again on bags when already taken in
custody], which are tantamount to uncounseled extrajudicial
confessions, are inadmissible as evidence for being
unconstitutional.
PEOPLE V. SUAREZ (1997)
Doctrine of interlocking confessions (EXCEPTION to RIAA and
hearsay rule
• Although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only
against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of his co-accused.
• Where confession is used as circumstantial evidence to
show the probability of participation by an accused co-
conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence
against him.
PEOPLE V. BASE (2000)
Requirements for extrajudicial confession to be admissible:
a. Voluntary
b. Made with assistance of competent and independent
counsel
c. Express
d. In writing
PEOPLE V. ULIT (2004)
Statement made to barangay chairman is admissible in
evidence – defendant was not under arrest or under
custodial investigation when he gave his statement
• Barangay chair not a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying §12(1 & 3), Art. III of Constitution
PEOPLE V. TOMAQUIN (2004)
A barangay captain who is also a lawyer cannot be
considered independent and competent counsel within
§12(1 & 3), Art. III of Constitution, as RPC152 deems a
barangay captain as a person in authority (therefore he can’t
be independent in such instance)
PEOPLE V. RAPEZA (2007)
A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily
shown to ave been obtained w/in the limits imposed by the
Constitution. The extrajudicial confession must also be tested
for voluntariness (that is, if it was given freely by the
confessant w/o any form of coercion or inducement).
II. CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE
A. Similar acts/unaccepted offer
1. §§ 34 & 35, R130
Section 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent
or knowledge; identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like. (48a)
Section 35. Unaccepted offer. — An offer in writing to pay a
particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or
specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money,
instrument, or property. (49a)
This section is merely an evidentiary complement to the rule
on tender of payment.
2. CC 1256
CC 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has
been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor
shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of
the thing or sum due.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the
following cases:
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1) When the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not
appear at the place of payment;
2) When he is incapacitated to receive the payment at the
time it is due;
3) When, without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt;
4) When two or more persons claim the same right to
collect;
5) When the title of the obligation has been lost. (1176a)
Such tender of payment must, however, be followed by
consignation of the amount in court in order to produce the
effects of valid payment. (McLaughlin v. CA)
Cases:
US V. PINEDA (1918)
GEN RULE: evidence of other offenses committed by a
defendant is inadmissible.
• AN EXCEPTION: it’s permissible to ascertain defendant’s
knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence.
o If defendant has on more than one occasion
performed similar acts, accident in good faith is
possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and
fraudulent intent may even be established. There’s
no better evidence of negligence than the
frequency of accidents.
PEOPLE V. ASINAS (1929)
GEN RULE: evidence is not admissible which shows or tends
to show that the accused in a criminal case has committed a
crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on
trial.
• One crime does not (tend to) prove another, UNLESS
there’s such a relation between them that proof of one
tends to prove the other.
PEOPLE V. IRANG (1937)
GEN RULE: evidence of another crime by a defendant is
inadmissible in a prosecution for robbery
EXCEPTION: when it’s otherwise relevant, as where it tends to
identify defendant as perpetrator of robbery charged, or
tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of
the crime at the time charged, or when it’s evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime
NICOLAS V. ENRIQUEZ (1955)
Where the previous sexual relations sought to be proved
were far removed in point of time from the illicit act [of
concubinage] now complained of, and took place when
there was as yet no legal impediment to the same, they give
no rational basis for the inference that they would be
continued after complainant’s marriage had created such
impediment and made continuance of sexual relations
between defendants a crime.
BOSTON BANK V. MANALO (2006)
The fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the
balance of the purchase price of lots purchased by them in
120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence
that XEI also agreed to give respondents the same mode and
timeline of payment.
III. HEARSAY RULE
A. Testimonial knowledge (§§ 36-47, R130)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules. (30a)
HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE (R130.36)
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of
the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not
on the witness stand.
Why hearsay evidence is excluded
The party against whom it is presented is deprived of his right
and opportunity to cross-examine the persons to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. Consequently, if a party
does not object to the hearsay evidence, the same is
admissible, as a party can waive his right to cross-examine.
(People v. Ola)
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a
fact in issue but when no objection is interposed thereto,
it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given
the importance it deserves. (Manliclic v. Calaunan)
However, it has also been held that hearsay evidence
not objected to may be admissible but, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value and, as
opposed to direct primary evidence, the latter always
prevails. (People v. Valero, People v. Williams)
Where the statements or writings attributed to a person not
on the witness stand are being offered not to prove the truth
of the facts stated therein but only to prove that those
statements were actually made or those writings were
executed, such evidence is not covered by the hearsay
evidence rule. The witness who testifies thereto is competent
because he heard the same or saw the execution of the
document, as these are matters of fact derived from his own
perception and the purpose is only to prove either that the
statement was made or the tenor thereof. (People v. Cusi Jr.,
Cornejo Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, Sebastian Sr. v. Garchitorena)
Thus, a witness may testify to the statements made by a
person if, for instance, the fact that such statements were
made by the latter would indicate the latter’s mental
state or physical condition – doctrine of independently
relevant statements, that is, independent of whether the
facts stated are true or not, they are relevant since they
are the facts in issue or are circumstantial evidence of the
facts in issue.
Examples: those made by a person
- showing his state of mind (mental condition,
knowledge, belief, intention, ill will, and other emotion)
- which show his physical condition, as illness and the
like
- from which an inference may be made as to the state
of mind of another (knowledge, belief, motive, good or
bad faith, etc. of the latter)
- which may identify the date, place, and person in
question
- showing the lack of credibility of a witness
(Estrada v. Desierto, Resolution on MR)
Newspaper clippings or facts published in the newspapers
are hearsay and have no evidentiary value unless
substantiated by persons with personal knowledge of said
facts. (People v. Aguel)
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RIANO:
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends,
in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of
some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it (Estrada v. Desierto).
Although hearsay evidence presupposes lack of personal
knowledge of the truth of the fact asserted by a witness, the
purpose for which the evidence is offered is a vital element of
hearsay evidence. It is the purpose for which the evidence is
offered which would determine whether the same is hearsay
or not.
Hearsay, as defined by R801[c] of the Federal Rules of
Evidence: a statement (oral or written assertion or nonverbal
conduct intended by the person as an assertion), other than
the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Elements of hearsay evidence
1. Out-of-court statement
• Implied from an out-of-court statement is the fact
that the witness has no personal knowledge of the
matter testified to.
2. Repeated and offered by the witness in court to prove
the truth of the matters asserted by the statement
• Where a statement is not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted but is offered for an evidentiary
purpose not dependent on the truth of the matters
asserted, the statement is non-hearsay.
Hearsay evidence Opinion evidence
One that is not based on Based on the personal
one’s personal perception knowledge or personal
but based on the knowledge conclusions of the witness
of others to prove the truth based on his skill, training, or
of the matter asserted in an experience (R130 §49)
out-of-court declaration
(R130 §36)
Where a statement is not offered for the truth of the contents
of the conversation, but only to show that it was made, then
the statement is not hearsay.
As long as an out-of-court statement is offered for a non-
hearsay purpose (a purpose other than to prove the
truth of the matter asserted), the statement is admissible
if it has relevance to the matter in issue.
Cases:
RICHMOND V. ANCHUELO (1905)
Defense witness told by defendant, “Plaintiff agreed to cure
me for PhP 200, no charge if successful” – this is hearsay (and
as such inadmissible), as the witness didn’t know that plaintiff
made such statements. All he knows is that defendant told
him that’s what plaintiff said.
LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC. V. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO.,
INC. (2005)
Unless the affiant is presented as a witness, an affidavit is
considered hearsay.
• EXCEPTION: independently relevant statements
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
A report made by a person is admissible if it’s intended to
prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements.
Independent of the truth or falsity of the statement given
in the report, the fact that it has been made is relevant.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
The ban on hearsay does not include statements which are
relevant independently of whether they are true or not, like
statements of a person to show, among others, his state of
mind, mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will,
and other emotions.
Kinds of independently relevant statements:
a. Those statements which are the very facts in issue
b. Those statements which are circumstantial evidence of
the fact in issue
i. Statements of a person showing
his state of mind (mental condition, knowledge,
belief, intention, ill will, and other emotions)
ii. Statements of a person which
show his physical condition, as illness and the like
iii. Statements of a person from
which an inference may be made as to the state of
mind of another (knowledge, belief, motive,
good/bad faith etc. of the latter)
iv. Statements which may identify
the date, place and person in question
v. Statements showing the lack of
credibility of a witness
B. Specific Exceptions
11 Exceptions to Hearsay Rule (R130.37-47)
a. Dying declarations
b. Declaration against interest
c. Act or declaration against pedigree
d. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
e. Common reputation
f. Part of the res gestae
g. Entries in the course of business
h. Entries in official records
i. Commercial lists and the like
j. Learned treatises
k. Testimony or deposition at a former trial (Regalado:
logically, this is not an exception to the hearsay rule, for it
requires for its admissibility that the party had either
cross-examined or had the opportunity to cross-examine
the witness at said former trial)
These exceptions are warranted by the necessity for such
evidence and/or the assumption that, in the ordinary course
of events, the same are trustworthy.
NOTE: §28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
(AM No. 00-4-07-SC) – special exception to the hearsay
rule in child abuse cases
Hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted
act of sexual abuse may now be admitted in any criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of
cross-examination by the adverse party. The admissibility of
such hearsay statements shall be determined by the court in
light of specified subjective and objective considerations
which provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child
witness.
RIANO:
Requisites
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1. The proponent shall make known to the adverse party
the intention to offer such statement and its particulars to
provide him a fair opportunity to object
2. If the child is available, the court shall, upon motion of
the adverse party, require the child to be present at the
presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-
examination by the adverse party
3. When the child is unavailable (deceased, suffers from
physical infirmity, mental illness, loss of memory, or
because the child will be exposed to severe
psychological injury), the fact of such circumstance must
be proved by the proponent and the hearsay testimony
shall be admitted only if corroborated by other
admissible evidence
In this connection, the court is allowed to admit videotape
and audiotape in-depth or disclosure interviews as evidence,
provided it is shown that a) the child witness is unable to
testify per §28(c) of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness; and b) the interview was conducted by duly trained
members of a multidisciplinary team or representatives of law
enforcement or child protective services, in situations where
child abuse is suspected, so as to determine whether child
abuse occurred.
Aside from the above requirements, the ff. foundational
matters must be established:
a) the party offering the videotape or audiotape, must
disclose the identity of all individuals present and at all
times includes their images and voices;
b) that the statement was not made in response to
questioning calculated to lead the child to make a
particular statement or is clearly shown to be the
statement of the child and not the product of improper
suggestion;
c) that the videotape and audiotape machine or device
was capable of recording testimony;
d) that the person operating the device was competent to
operate it;
e) that the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct;
and
f) that the recording has been duly preserved. (§29. Rule
on Examination of a Child Witness)
1. Dying declaration (R130.37)
Section 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying
person, made under the consciousness of an impending
death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death. (31a)
1) DYING DECLARATIONS
a.k.a. ante mortem statement or statement in articulo mortis
Requisites
1. That death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of
the fact
A declaration will be deemed as having been made
under the consciousness of imminent death, in
consideration of:
a) The words or statements of the declarant on the same
occasion;
b) His conduct at the time the declaration was made (US
v. Virrey); or
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
c) The serious nature of his wounds as would necessarily
engender a belief on his part that he would not survive
therefrom (People v. Avila, People v. Sarabia), especially
where he died an hour thereafter (People v. Brioso,
People v. Garcia, People v. Araja).
The intervening time from the making of the declaration
up to the actual death of the declarant is immaterial, as
long as the declaration was made under the
consciousness of impending death (US v. Mallari) which
is a question of fact for the trial court to determine
(People v. Extra), and as long as no retraction was made
by the declarant until his demise. Where the gravity of
the wound did not diminish, the admissibility of the
dying declaration is not affected by the fact that the
declarant died hours or days later (People v. Devaras) or
even 14 days later (People v. Jacinto). It is the belief in
impending death at the time the statement was made,
and not the rapid succession of death, that renders the
dying declaration admissible. (People v. Sabio)
However, the time interval between the declaration and
the death of the declarant may be taken into account
where the declaration is ambiguous as to whether the
declarant believed that his death was imminent when
he made such declaration. Thus, where the declarant
stated that he would not die if treated, such statement
indicates an awareness of death and the nature of his
wound and his death an hour later qualifies such
statement into a dying declaration, or, at least, as part of
the res gestae (People v. Antonio).
Where, shortly after he was wounded, the victim
was asked as to whether he believed he would die
and to which he replied “I cannot ascertain” and he
died the following day, his statement is admissible
both as part of the res gestae and as a dying
declaration. (People v. Gueron)
Where the viction, when asked as to whether he
thought he would die, replied:
- “I don’t know,” his declaration was not made
under the consciousness of his imminent death and
does not qualify as an ante mortem statement,
although the same was admitted as part of the res
gestae since it was made immediately after the
incident. (People v. Laquinon)
- “It all depends,” and his condition had
progressively improved, his statements thereafter
cannot be considered as a dying declaration.
(People v. Lanza)
2. That the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death
Statements referring to the antecedents of the fateful
encounter (People v. Bustos) or opinions, impressions or
conclusions of the declarant (State v. Horn) are not
admissible; but all facts relating to the cause of such
death are admissible whether the same are in favor or
against the accused (US v. Clemente, US v. Antipolo,
People v. Martinez).
3. That the declaration relates to facts which the victim is
competent to testify to
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4. That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the
declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry
After a dying declaration is proved and admitted as such, its
credibility and weight should be determined by the courts
under the same rules used in testing the weight and
credibility of any other testimonial evidence. (People v. Aniel,
People v. Ola)
Such factors as where the facts narrated by the declarant
have occurred under circumstances of surprise, rapidity,
and confusion, should not be lost by oversight, because
the accuracy of his observation of the occurrences
before him could be blurred by such disorder and
rapidity of events and, therefore, he could be mistaken in
his identification of his assailant. Taking into
consideration, too, that the source, accuracy and
completeness of the declarant’s knowledge as to the
facts by him asserted could not be tested by cross-
examination, a dying declaration has to be accepted
with utmost care and should be considered in light of all
the facts proved in the case. (People v. Mallare)
A dying declaration may be oral or written or made by signs
which could be interpreted and testified to by a witness
thereto. The [spouse] of the declarant may testify to the same,
either for the prosecution or as a defense witness, and this
does not violate the marital privilege as a dying declaration is
not considered a confidential communication between the
spouses (US v. Antipolo). If the ante mortem statement was
made orally, the witness who heard it may testify thereto,
without necessarily reproducing the exact words as long as
he can give the substance thereof, and if the deceased had
an unsigned dying declaration, the same may be used as a
memorandum by the witness who took it down (People v.
Odencio).
A dying declaration may be attacked on the ground that any
of the requisites for its admissibility are not present, and the
same may be impeached in the same manner as the
testimony of any other witness on the stand (US v. Castellon,
People v. Malacon, People v. Aniel). American jurisprudence is
to the effect that dying declarations are on the same footing
as testimony of a witness on the stand and whatever would
disqualify such witness would also make such declarations
incompetent evidence (People v. Sanchez, Donnelly v. State)
RIANO:
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying
declaration is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to
utmost credence since no person aware of his impending
death would make a careless and false accusation. It is thus
admissible, to provide the identity of the accused and the
deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and
the circumstances under which the assault was made upon
him. The reason for its admissibility is necessity and
trustworthiness (People v. Cerilla).
As presently worder, R130 §37 no longer places any
limitation on the type of action in which a dying declaration
may be introduced. As long as the relevance is clear, a dying
declaration may now be introduced in a criminal or a civil
action and the relevance is satisfied where the subject of
inquiry is the death of the declarant himself.
A mere consciousness of death is not enough… the declarant
must be conscious that the death is near and certain, and
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
what is said must have been spoken in the hush of its
impending presence.
Apart from the statements of the declarant, consciousness of
an impending death may be established by other
circumstances such as the nature of the injury and the
conduct of the declarant... the declarant’s belief that he is
going to die soon may be shown circumstantially by the
obvious fatal quality of the wound, by the statements made
to the victim by the physician that his condition is hopeless, or
by some other circumstances (People v. Silang Cruz, People v.
Chan Lin Watt)
A dying declaration may be attacked in the same manner as
one would do to a testimony in open court.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. SABIO (1981)
It is the belief in impending death at the time the statement
was made, and not the rapid succession of death, that
renders the dying declaration admissible.
PEOPLE V. LAQUINON (1985)
• When the deceased was in doubt as to W/N he would
die, his dying declaration is not admissible as an ante-
mortem declaration.
• A dying declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae
when the declarant’s statement was made immediately
after the incident and he had no sufficient time to
concoct a charge against the accused.
PEOPLE V. DE JOYA (1991)
To be admissible, a dying declaration must be complete in
itself – the statement of any given fact should be a full
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning in respect of such fact.
PEOPLE V. COMILING (2004)
An ante-mortem statement is evidence of the highest order. It
is doctrinal that when a person is at the point of death, every
motive of falsehood is silenced.
MARTURILLAS V. PEOPLE (2006)
The fact that the victim’s statement constituted a dying
declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part
of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present.
2. Declaration against interest (R130.38)
Section 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration
made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to
be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons. (32a)
2) DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
Requisites
1. Declarant is dead or unable to testify
2. The statement relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant
3. At the time he made said declaration the declarant was
aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid
interest
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4. Declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true
Declarations against interest Admissions against interest
Those made by a person Those made by a party to a
who is neither a party nor in litigation or by one in privity
privity with a party to the suit. with or identified in legal
They are secondary evidence interest with such party
but constitute an exception
to the hearsay rule
Admissible only when the Admissible W/N the
declarant is unavailable as a declarant is available as a
witness witness
A declaration against interest is the opposite of a self-serving
declaration (a statement favorable to or intended to advance
the interests of the declarant). Consequently, a self-serving
declaration is inadmissible as being hearsay if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness.
A declaration admitting that he was the one who killed the
victim, made by a declarant who died shortly thereafter, is
admissible where another person was subsequently charged
as the killer of the same victim, under the theory that said
declaration was one against the penal interest of the
declarant (People v. Toledo and Holgado). This would be a
justifiable theory since under our penal laws a person
criminally liable is also civilly liable, and is sustained under the
present amended rule which does not delimit or distinguish
as to the interest against which the declaration is made.
RIANO:
As a rule, the interest against which the declaration may have
been made should be either a pecuniary or moral interest,
but in our jurisdiction, the declaration could be against one’s
penal interest because if one admits to a crime, he is also
civilly liable, a liability that is pecuniary (People v. Toledo).
Cases:
VIACRUCIS V. CA
Previous recognition by a party in physical possession of the
property in dispute of the ownership in another constitutes a
declaration against the interest of the former and may be
received in evidence not only against such party who made
the declaration or his successors in interest but also against
third persons.
FUENTES, JR. V. CA
Requisites of declaration against interest:
a. Declarant must not be available to testify
b. Declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
declarant
c. Circumstances must render it improbable that a motive
to falsify existed
PAREL V. PRUDENCIO
The theory under which declarations against interest are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that
the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such
evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such
declaration asserts facts against his own pecuniary or moral
interest.
3. Pedigree (R130.39)
Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by
birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and
the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree. (33a)
3) ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
The pedigree of a person may be proved by the act or
declaration of a relative
Requisites
1. The actor or declarant is dead or unable to testify
2. The act or declaration is made by a person related to the
subject by birth or marriage
3. The relationship between the declarant or actor and the
subject is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration
Relationship must be preliminarily proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence. The rules do not require any
specific degree of relationship, but the weight to which
such act or declaration is entitled may be affected by the
degree of relationship.
4. The act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or
prior to the controversy
RIANO:
The declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence
if the relationship is shown by evidence other than the
declaration.
Cases:
GRAVADOR V. MAMIGO
• Although a person can have no personal knowledge of
the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he
had learned it from his parents and relatives and his
testimony in such case in an assertion of a family
tradition.
• Made ante lite motam by a deceased relative,
[declaration in verified pleading as to petitioner’s age] is
at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the
intendment and meaning of [R130.39]
TISON V. CA
GEN RULE: where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not
from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the
relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not
be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact.
EXCEPTION: requirement of other proof than declarant’s
statements as to relationship does not apply where it is
sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not
merely to establish a right through his declarations to the
property of some other family member.
4. Family tradition (R130.40)
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.
— The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to
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the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (34a)
4) FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING
PEDIGREE
Requisites
1. The witness testifying thereto must be a member, by
consanguinity or affinity, of the same family as the
subject
2. Such reputation or tradition must have existed in that
family ante litem motam
A person’s statement as to his date of birth and age, as
he learned of these from his parents or relatives, is an
ante litem motam declaration of a family tradition
(Gravador v. Mamigo). Such statement prevails over the
mere opinion of the trial judge (US v. Agadas) but
cannot generally prevail over the secondary statement of
the father (US v. Evangelista).
Cases:
FERRER V. DE INCHAUSTI
The law does not require that the entries in [deceased’s
daybook] be made at the same time as the occurrence of
those events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is
not subject to the defect attributed to it.
PEOPLE V. ALEGADO
The word “pedigree” under R130.39 includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these facts occurred and the names of the
relatives.
Requisites before evidence on pedigree will be admissible:
a. Controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the
members of a family
b. That the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the
person concerned existed previous to the controversy
c. The witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
regarding the pedigree of the person must be a
member of the family of said person
5. Common reputation (R130.41)
Section 41. Common reputation. — Common reputation
existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public
or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting
marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence.
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received
as evidence of common reputation. (35)
5) COMMON REPUTATION
General reputation; the definite opinion of the community in
which the fact to be proved is known or exists; the general or
substantially undivided reputation, as distinguished from a
partial or qualified one, although it need not be unanimous.
Character Reputation
The inherent qualities of a The opinion of him by others
person
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
Under R130 §41, the character of a person is permitted to be Refers to
established by his common reputation. a) Spontaneous statements in connection with a startling
occurrence relating to that fact and in effect forming part
Admissible to prove the ff. cases (NOTE: In any of the three thereof
cases, it is necessary that the common reputation existed ante
litem motam.): Requisites
1. Facts of public or general interest more than 30 years old 1. The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence
Matters of public interest Matters of general interest 2. The statements forming part thereof were made
Those of national interest Those affecting inhabitants of before the declarant had the opportunity to
a particular region or contrive
community 3. The statements refer to the occurrence in question
and its attending circumstances (People v. Siscar).
The common reputation of such matters, which is required to
have existed ante litem motam, must likewise be >30 years Further, only such statements as appear to have been
old and, therefore, can be established only by persons who involuntarily and simultaneously wrung from the witness by
have had knowledge of that fact for such length of time, or the impact of the occurrence are admissible. (People v.
by monuments and inscriptions existing for that length of Tulagan)
time.
Res gestae in connection Dying declarations
2. Marriage with a homicidal act
3. Moral character May be that of the killer Can be made only by the
himself after or during the victim
Common reputation may be established either by the killing (People v. Reyes) or
testimonial evidence of competent witnesses, by monuments that of a third person
and inscriptions in public places, or by documents containing The statement may precede, Made only after the
statements of reputation. accompany, or be made homicidal attack has been
after the homicidal act was committed
While, as a rule, the reputation of a person should be that committed
existing in the place of his residence, it may also be that Justification in the Trustworthiness of
existing in the place where he is best known. Also, the spontaneity of the statement declaration based upon its
character of a place as an opium joint may be proved by its being given under an
common reputation in the community. (US v. Choa Chiok) awareness of impending
death
Common reputation is hearsay like any other exception to the
hearsay rule, but is admissible because of trustworthiness While the victim’s statements may not qualify as a dying
(Reg. v. Bedfordshire) declaration because it was not made under the
consciousness of impending death (People v. Palamos), it may
While common reputation in the community may establish a still be admissible as part of the res gestae if it was made
matter of public or general interest, marriage or moral immediately after the incident (People v. Reyes, People v.
character, it cannot establish pedigree. This is established by Abboc, People v. Pascual, People v. Araja) or a few hours
reputation in the family and not in the community. thereafter (People v. Tumalip, People v. Lanza, cf. People v.
Balbas). However, where the elements of both are present,
Case: the statement may be admitted both as a dying declaration
and as part of the res gestae (People v. Balbas, People v.
CITY OF MANILA V. DEL ROSARIO Cortezano).
[V’s testimony, w/c consisted of what he had learned from
some of the oldest residents in that section of the city] was The interval of time between the startling occurrence and the
introduced by the City of Manila apparently for the purpose statement depends upon the circumstances; but such
of proving that the city was generally considered the owner statement must have been made while the declarant was
of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual under the immediate influence of the startling occurrence,
ownership. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the hence it is generally required to have been made immediately
“common reputation” referred to. Common reputation is prior or subsequent to the event. However, if the declarant
equivalent to universal reputation. was rendered unconscious after the startling occurrence, his
statements relative thereto upon regaining consciousness are
6. Res gestae (R130.42) still part of the res gestae regardless of the time that
Section 42. Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person intervened in between.
while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances If the statement was made under the influence of a startling
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, event and the declarant did not have the opportunity to
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to concoct or contrive a story, even if made 9 hours after the
the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as killing, the statement is admissible as part of the res gestae
part of the res gestae. (36a) (People v. Berame).

6) PART OF RES GESTAE Statements or outcries as part of the res gestae have been
Res gestae: literally means “things done” admitted to establish the identity of the assailant (People v.
Alban, People v. Diva), to prove the complicity of another

43
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
person in the crime (US v. David), and to establish an
admission of liability on the part of the accused (People v.
Reyes, People v. Gondayao).
RIANO:
The admissibily of a spontaneous statement is anchored on
the theory that the statement was uttered under
circumstances where the opportunity to fabricate is absent.
The statement is a reflex action rather than a deliberate act,
instinctive rather than deliberate.
b) Statements accompanying an equivocal act, otherwise
known as verbal acts, on the theory that they are the verbal
parts of the act to be explained.
Requisites
1. The res gestae or principal act to be characterized must
be equivocal
2. Such act must be material to the issue
3. The statements must accompany the equivocal act
4. The statements give a legal significance to the equivocal
act
Such verbal acts must have been made at the time, and not
after, the equivocal act was being performed unlike
spontaneous exclamations which may have been made
before, during or immediately subsequent to the startling
occurrence.
Term “verbal act” is used to denote that such statements
are the verbal parts of the equivocal act of which such
statements are explanatory, hence they constitute part of
this form of res gestae.
Notes taken regarding a transaction by a person who is not a
party thereto and who has not been requested to take down
such notes are not part of the res gestae. (Borromeo v. CA)
RIANO:
Objections to the admissibility of verbal acts depend upon
W/N the proponent has established the foundations for
admissibility. The objector has to consider the ff:
1. Is there an act that is equivocal or ambiguous?
2. Will the statement accompanying the ambiguous or
equivocal act explain the act or give legal significance to it?
3. Is the equivocal act material to the issue?
4. Does the statement accompany the equivocal act?
Cases:
PEOPLE V. LUNGAYAN
Complainant’s revelation cannot be considered as part of the
res gestae – her statement must be spontaneous and made
at a time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct
her own story.
PEOPLE V. LATAYADA
The utterances separately made by the victim to each of the
witnesses were correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae,
since they had been made immediately after a startling
occurrence and had complied w/ the ff. requirements:
a. Statements were spontaneous;
b. Made immediately before, during, and after the startling
occurrence; and
c. They related the circumstances thereof.
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DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED COMPANIES V. RMN
The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did
not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness
who heard the declarant complies w/ the ff. requisites:
a. The principal act (res gestae) is a startling occurrence;
b. Statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
c. The statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
7. Entries in the course of business (R130.43)
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made
at, or near the time of transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty. (37a)
7) ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
Requisites
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, out of
the country or unable to testify
2. Entries were made at or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer (Figueras v. Serrano)
3. Entrant was in a position to know the fact stated in the
entries
4. Entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual,
moral, or religious (US v. de Vera)
5. Entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty (FM Yap Tico & Co., Ltd. v. Lopez Vito,
Chapman v. Garcia)
If the entrant is available as a witness, the said entries will not
be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, but they
may nevertheless be availed of by said entrant as a
memorandum to refresh his memory while testifying on the
transactions reflected therein. (R132 §16; Cang Yui v.
Gardner)
In the presentation and admission as evidence of entries
made in the regular course of business, there is no overriding
necessity to bring into court all the clerks or employees who
individually made the entries in a long account. It is sufficient
that the person who supervises the work of the clerks or
other employees making the entries testify that the account
was prepared under his supervision and that the entries were
regularly entered in the ordinary course of business (Yek Tong
Fire & Marine Insurance v. Gutierrez)
RIANO:
The exception is commonly encountered in breach of
contract suits and suits for collection of a sum of money.
Rules on Electronic Evidence also expressly exempt business
records from the hearsay rule (R8 §1).
Entries in the payroll, being entries in the ordinary course of
business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under R130 §43
(Sapio v. Undaloc Construction)
Cases:
CANQUE V. CA
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Requisites for corporate books to be admitted in evidence
<see notes above>
SADAGNOT V. REINIER PACIFIC INT’L SHIPPING
The ship’s logbook is the official record of a ship’s voyage w/c
its captain is obligated by law to keep. The entries made in
the ship’s logbook by a person performing a duty required by
law are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the
logbook.
8. Official records (R130.44)
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of
a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. (38)
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that such records or certificates should be authenticated as
private writings (US v. de Vera). At any rate, the copy of the
certificate transmitted to the public officer as required by law
becomes a public document and a certified copy thereof is
admissible in evidence without prior authentication (US v.
Evangelista).
Cases:
US V. QUE PING
Exhibits in the nature of entries in public records, made in the
performance of their duty by public officers, are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. Such documents,
however, are not conclusive evidence. Their probative value
may either be substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence.

8) ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS PEOPLE V. SAN GABRIEL

Requisites
1. The entries were made by a public officer in the
performance of his duties or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law (Africa
v. Caltex)
2. Entrant had personal knowledge of the facts stated by
him or such facts were acquired by him from reports
made by persons under a legal duty to submit the same
(Salmon, Dexter & Co. v Wijangco)
3. Such entries were duly entered in a regular manner in
the official records
Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are
only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. They are
not conclusive.
ESCOBAR V. LUNA
Certifications issued by government offices (and certified to by
authorized personnel who were clothed with authority and
duty to issue such certifications), without testimony of the
person giving the certification, is sufficient and competent
evidence w/c is an exception to the hearsay rule per R130.44.
This section should be read in conjunction w/ R132.28 which
allows the admission of said document.

An official record may be a register (US v. Que Ping), a cash 9. Commercial lists (R130.45)
book (US v. Asensi), or an official return or certificate (Manalo Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of
v. Robles Trans) statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
Entries in official records Entries in the course of published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the
business truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
The entrant, if a private It is sufficient that the entrant published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
individual, must have acted made the entries pursuant to and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
pursuant to a specific legal a duty, either legal,
duty (“specially enjoined by contractual, moral, or 9) COMMERCIAL LISTS AND THE LIKE
law”) religious
No such requirement for the To be admissible, the person Examples: mortality tables, accepted actuarial and annuity
admissibility of entries in who made such entries must tables
official records be dead or unable to testify
Case:
Baptismal certificates or parochial records of baptism are not
public or official records and are not proof of relationship or PNOC SHIPPING V. CA
filiation of the child baptized (Fortus v. Novero, Arde v. Requisites for commercial lists:
Anicoche). a. It’s a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged
in an occupation;
The entrant must have been competent with respect to b. Such statement is contained in a list, registet, periodical
the facts stated in his entries. Consequently, while the or other published compilation;
priest who officiates at a baptism acts pursuant to a legal c. Said compilation is published for the use of persons
duty in recording the facts of such baptism in a register, engaged in that occupation; and
such entries in the register are not admissible to prove d. It’s generally used and relied upon by persons in the
the date of birth of the child or its relation to particular same occupation.
persons (Remigio v. Ortiga), as the entrant priest was not
competent to testify with respect to the truth of these 10. Learned treatises (R130.46)
latter facts. Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise,
periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or
After the promulgation of GO No. 58 and the passage of Act art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter
No. 190, church registries are no longer public writings. stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness
However, they are admissible as evidence of the facts stated expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement
therein WRT marriages solemnized by the priest without the in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his
necessity of calling him. CC 68 requires the solemnizing officer profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)
to keep a record of such marriages. It is necessary, however,
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evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
10) LEARNED TREATISES
Requisites
1. Court takes judicial notice thereof; OR
2. The same are testified to by an expert witness
Legal treatises are now properly included in this exception to
the hearsay rule.
RIANO:
History books, published findings of scientists fall within this
exception if an expert on the subject testifies to the expertise
of the writer or if the court takes judicial notice of such fact.
Case:
ESTRADA V. NOBLE
The Ballantine Scale of Values, w/c was embodied in a bill the
President sent to Congress for enactment in 1945, has been
repeatedly applied by Philippine courts in numerous cases. It
is, therefore, an official document whose publication
constituted a leading event of general interest and whose
provisions are widely known and have played an important
part in the contemporary political history of the country, of
which courts could take judicial cognizance.
11. Prior testimony (R130.47)
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.
— The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or
unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party
who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a)
11) TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER
PROCEEDING
Requisites
1. Witness is dead or unable to testify (Guevara v. Almario)
2. His testimony or deposition was given in a former case
or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the
same parties or those representing the same interests
3. The former case involved the same subject as that in the
present case, although on different causes of action
4. The issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is
the same issue involved in the present case
5. The adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness in the former case
Subsequent failure or refusal to appear at the second trial, or
hostility since testifying at the first trial, does not amount to
inability to testify. Such inability should proceed from a grave
cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old
and has lost the power of speech. Where the witnesses in
question are available, but they refused to testify, they do not
come within the legal purview of those “unable to testify”
contemplated in R130 §47 (Tan v. CA, Toledo Jr. v. People)
The admissibility of a prior judgment, and not the previous
testimony, in a criminal action is governed by different rules. A
judgment in a criminal proceeding …cannot be read in
evidence in a civil action against a person not a party thereto
to establish any fact therein determined. The matter is res inter
alios and cannot be invoked as res judicata (Almeida
Chantangco v. Abaroa). Such judgment may only be
admitted in evidence in a civil case by way of inducement, or
to show a collateral fact relevant to the issue in the civil action
46
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(Ed. A. Keller & Co. [Ltd.] v. Ellerman & Bucknall, City of Manila
v. Manila Electric)
Said judgment cannot, in a civil action arising from the
commission of a crime, or in which the commission of said
crime is collateral, be admitted to prove plaintiff’s cause of
action, or defendant’s defense, and whatever findings of fact
are made by the TC in the decision are not binding upon the
parties to the civil action. The judgment can only prove that a
certain defendant has been convicted of a crime and
sentenced to the penalty therein imposed (Arambulo v.
Manila Electric). Whatever informal expressions of views were
made by the court therein have no probative value. They
amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which
is not part of the judgment (Rebullida v. Estrella)
Judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in
evidence in the civil action to establish any fact therein
determined even though both actions involve the same act
or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not
the same and different rules of evidence are applicable to
each case (Manantan v. CA, citing Almeida Chantangco v.
Abaroa)
However, it was subsequently held that a judgment of
conviction, in the absence of collusion between the
accused and the offended party, is binding and
conclusive upon the person subsidiarily liable not only
with regard to his subsidiary liability but also with regard
to the amount thereof (Miranda v. Malate Garage). Said
judgment is accordingly admissible in evidence in the
civil action brought to enforce said subsidiary liability (cf.
Pajarito v. Señeres)
Cases:
SALES V. SABINO
As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition
is anchored on the ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e.,
the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent at the time his testimony is
offered.
• But as jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that
opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during
the taking of the deposition; for normally, the
opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a
party at the time the testimonial evidence is actually
presented against him during the trial or hearing.
• In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during
the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be
considered a waiver of the right to object to its
admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. In
participating, therefore, in the taking of the deposition,
but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence,
petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions. He is
not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of
the deposition just because he participated in the taking
thereof.
MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN
Though R130.47 speaks only of testimony and deposition, it
does not mean that documents from a former case or
proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be
admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that
have been admitted.
IV. OPINION RULE
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
A. R130.48-50
Section 48. General rule. — The opinion of witness is not
admissible, except as indicated in the following sections. (42)
Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a
witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he shown to posses, may be
received in evidence. (43a)
Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a
witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in
evidence regarding —
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity;
and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the
emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
GEN RULE (R130.48): witness’ opinion is inadmissible
EXCEPTIONS
1. Opinion of expert witnesses on matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he
possesses (R130.49)
2. Opinion of ordinary witnesses (R130.50) re:
a. Identity of person about whom he has adequate
knowledge
b. Handwriting he is sufficiently familiar w/
c. Mental sanity of person he’s sufficiently acquainted
w/
d. Emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person he has observed
e. Ordinary matters known to all men of common
perception, such as the value of ordinary household
articles (Galian v. State Assurance Co., Ltd.)
Expert witness
One who belongs to the profession or calling to which the
subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses
special knowledge on questions on w/c he proposes to
express an opinion.
• There’s no definite standard of determining the degree
of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order
to testify as an expert.
• Following factors must be present:
a. Training and education
b. Particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the
case
c. Presentation of authorities or standards upon which
his opinion is based
When expert evidence is admissible
1. the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise,
and
2. the witness has been qualified as an expert.
GEN RULE: expert evidence regarded as purely advisory in
character
Hypothetical questions may be asked of an expert to elicit his
opinion. Courts, however, are not necessarily bound by the
expert’s findings.
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• W/N courts are bound by the testimony of an expert
depends greatly upon the nature of the subject of
inquiry. It’s only where the subject of inquiry is of such a
technical nature that a layman can possibly have no
knowledge thereof that courts must depend and rely
upon expert evidence.
The value of expert testimony depends largely on the extent
of the experience or studies of the witness.
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends
upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing w/c would
ordinarily escape detection by an untrained observer.
The results of blood grouping tests on the filiation of a child,
competently conducted by qualified persons, are admissible
and conclusive on the non-paternity of a person over the
child.
The testimony of a witness skilled in the unwritten law of a
foreign country is not necessarily binding on our courts.
B. R132.22
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to
be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a)
This section merely enumerates the methods of proving
handwriting but does not give preference or priority to a
particular method.
C. Rule on DNA Evidence
People v. Vallejo adopted the ff. guidelines to be used by
courts in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence:
1. how samples were collected;
2. how they were handled;
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;
4. procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
5. whether the proper standards and procedure were
followed in conducting the tests; and
6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the test.
The present rule recognizes the validity of and gives official
recognition to DNA test results arising from properly
conducted standards and procedures in the collection,
handling, and analysis of the samples by a qualified analyst.
TCs should require at least 99.9% as the minimum numerical
estimate for the likelihood or probability of paternity.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. DURANAN
If the mother of an offended party in a rape case knows the
party’s physical and mental condition, how she was born,
what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, she
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
is competent to testify on the matter even though she is not a
psychiatrist.
• A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the
(in)sanity of another, when based upon conversations or
dealings he has had with such person, or upon his
appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental
condition, w/ the witness’ own knowledge and
observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed
facts, as the basis for his opinion.
ILAO-QUIANAY V. MAPILE
Courts are not bound by expert testimonies. The problem of
the evaluation of expert testimony is left to the discretion of
the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in
the absence of an abuse of that discretion.
PEOPLE V. UMANITO
• DNA print or identification technology is recognized as a
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or
to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological
evidence is available.
• The determination of whether Umanito is the father of
AAA’s child, which may be accomplished through DNA
testing, is material to the fair and correct adjudication of
the instant appeal. Under §4 of the New Rule on DNA
Evidence, the courts are authorized, after due hearing
and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing.
V. CHARACTER AS EVIDENCE
A. R130.51
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally
admissible; exceptions: —
(a) In Criminal Cases:
1) The accused may prove his good moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged.
2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove
his bad moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged.
3) The good or bad moral character of the offended
party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability
of the offense charged.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in civil case is
admissible only when pertinent to the issue of character
involved in the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14, (46a, 47a)
Rules on admissibility of character evidence
1. Criminal cases
• Prosecution may not at the outset prove the
accused’s bad moral character w/c is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
However, if the accused in his defense attempts to
prove his good moral character, prosecution can
introduce evidence of such bad moral character at
the rebuttal stage.
• The offended party’s good or bad moral character
may always be proved by either party as long as
such evidence tends to establish the (im)probability
of the offense charged.
2. Civil cases
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Either party’s moral character cannot be proved UNLESS
it’s pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case
3. Both civil and criminal cases
A witness’ bad moral character may always be proved
by either party, but not evidence of his good character,
unless it has been impeached.
WRT the nature or substance of the character evidence w/c
may be admissible, the rules require that:
• As to the ACCUSED, such character evidence must be
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged (ex. In estafa or perjury, where a person’s moral
trait for honesty or probity is involved)
• As to OFFENDED PERSON, it’s sufficient that such
character evidence may establish in any reasonable
degree the (im)probability of the offense charged
• As to WITNESSES, such character evidence must refer to
his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity, that
is, as affecting his credibility
EXCEPTION: Proof of murder victim’s bad character is
inadmissible if the crime was committed through treachery or
premeditation, in the same manner that the rape victim’s bad
moral character is inadmissible if the crime was committed by
violence or intimidation.
RIANO:
Character: the aggregate of the moral qualities w/c belong to
and distinguish an individual person; the general results of
one’s distinguishing attributes.
B. R132.14
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. — Evidence of
the good character of a witness is not admissible until such
character has been impeached. (17)
C. §6, RA 8505
Section 6. Rape Shield. - In prosecutions for rape, evidence of
complainant's past sexual conduct, opinion thereof or of
his/her reputation shall not be admitted unless, and only to
the extent that the court finds, that such evidence is material
and relevant to the case.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. BABIERA
While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that
he acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to have
been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition,
the proof must be of his general reputation in the community
and not of isolated and specific acts.
PEOPLE V. SOLIMAN
While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to
determine the probability or improbability of the commission
of an offense, such is not necessary in murder, where the
killing is committed through treachery of premeditation. The
proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide
cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary."
PEOPLE V. CHENG
Loose morals per se is not a ground to discredit a witness.
There must be clear indications militating against her
credibility other than her being a person of ill repute.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
CSC V. BELAGAN
• Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by
testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character
or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party
who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself
in the same position as any other witness, and may be
impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.
• Settled is the principle that evidence of one’s character or
reputation must be confined to a time not too remote
from the time in question.[24] In other words, what is to
be determined is the character or reputation of the
person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not
at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.

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evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
PART THREE The burden of proof is fixed by the pleadings. The plaintiff’s
claim w/c he must prove is spelled out in his complaint.
I. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS Defendant’s defenses which he must likewise prove are
found in his answer to the complaint. The burdens of proof of
A. Burden of proof (R131.1) both parties do not shift during the course of the trial.
Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a Ex. Burden of proof to establish that defendant owes plaintiff
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to remains w/ the latter; burden of proof to establish that
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence the loan has been paid remains w/ defendant
required by law. (1a, 2a) throughout the litigation

Equipoise rule
Burden of proof: onus probandi
Refers to a situation where the parties’ pieces of evidence are
Obligation imposed upon a party who alleges the existence
evenly balanced or there’s doubt on which side the evidence
of facts necessary for the prosecution of his action or defense
preponderates. In such case, the decision should be against
to establish the same by the requisite quantum of evidence.
the party w/ the burden of proof.
Where burden of proof is on the plaintiff and the evidence
Quantum of evidence required:
does not suggest that the scale of justice should weigh
• Civil cases: preponderance of evidence in his favor court should render verdict for defendant.
• Criminal cases: evidence of guilt beyond reasonable In a criminal case, the equipoise rule provides that where the
doubt evidence is evenly balanced, the constitutional
• administrative cases: substantial evidence (only such presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as accused.
sufficient to support a conclusion) NOT APPLICABLE where the evidence presented is not
equally weighty, such as where prosecution evidence is
Burden of proof Burden of evidence overwhelming
Doesn’t shift – remains Shifts from party to party
throughout the trial w/ depending upon the Cases:
the party upon whom exigencies of the case in the
it’s imposed course of the trial PEOPLE V. PAJENADO
Generally determined by Generally determined by In criminal cases burden of proof as to offense charged lies
pleadings filed by a party developments at the trial, or w/ prosecution, and a negative fact must be proved if it is an
by the provisions of the essential ingredient of the crime – burden of proof w/
substantive law or procedural prosecution to prove that the firearm used by the accused in
rules w/c may relieve the committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.
party from presenting
evidence on the fact alleged SAMBAR V. LEVI STRAUSS & CO.
(i.e. presumptions, judicial In civil cases, the burden of proof may be on either the
notice & admissions) plaintiff or the defendant. It is on the latter, if in his answer he
alleges an affirmative defense, which is not a denial of an
In both civil and criminal cases, the burden of evidence lies essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one
w/ the party asserting an affirmative allegation. Negative which, if established, will be a good defense – i.e., an
allegations don’t have to be proved except where such are “avoidance” of the claim, which prima facie, the plaintiff
essential parts of the COA or defense in a civil case, or are already has because of the defendant’s own admissions in
essential ingredients of the offense in a criminal case or the the pleadings.
defenses thereto. (Industrial Finance v. Tobias)
PEOPLE V. MACALABA
GEN RULE: prosecution has burden of proving the criminal GEN RULE: if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative
charge if it’s predicated on a negative allegation or that a allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element
negative averment is an essential element of a crime of a crime, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
charge.
What need not be proved
1. Facts w/c are of judicial notice (R129) EXCEPTION: Where the negative of an issue does not permit
2. Facts w/c are judicially admitted (R129) of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately
3. Facts w/c are presumed (R131) within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi
• Presumption: an inference of the existence or non- rests upon him.
existence of a fact which courts are permitted to
PEOPLE V. FLORENDO
draw from the proof of other facts
The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as
a. Presumptions of fact: derived wholly and
an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear
directly from the circumstances of the
and convincing evidence.
particular case by means of the common
experience of mankind
RUDECON MGMT. CORP. V. CAMACHO
b. Presumptions of law: reduced to fixed rules
In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against
and form a part of the system of jurisprudence
lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly
o Conclusive/absolute presumptions
preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon
o Disputable/rebuttable presumptions
the complainant.
RIANO:
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evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE V. TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING
In the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff.
B. Presumptions (R131.2-4)
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are
instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord
at the time of commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them. (3a)
Pars. a & b: estoppel in pais.
Under the doctrine of estoppel, the person making the
representation cannot claim benefit from the wrong he
himself committed.
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced;
No constitutional objection to a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human
conduct, and declaring what evidence shall be sufficient to
overcome such presumption. Legislature may provide for
prima facie evidence of guilt provided there be a rational
connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts
presumed. (People v. Mingoa)
Requisites for application of presumption that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced
1. The evidence is material
2. The party had the opportunity to produce the same
3. Said evidence is available only to said party
When this presumption doesn’t apply
• Evidence in question is equally available to both parties
• Evidence is merely corroborative, cumulative, or
unnecessary
• Suppression is not willful
• The suppression is an exercise of a privilege
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the
latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been
paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a
receipt for the later one is produced;
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CC 1176 also lays down presumption that interest has been
paid if the principal is received by the creditor without
reservation
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer
of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person
possess, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the
payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has
paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly
appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were
laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like
manner that all matters within an issue raised in a
dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the
arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a
sufficient consideration;
(t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made
before the instrument was overdue and at the place
where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the
regular course of the mail;
Facts needed proven before an inference of guilt from
possession of recently stolen goods can be made
1. The crime was actually committed
2. It was committed recently
3. Stolen property found in the possession of the accused
4. Accused is unable to satisfactorily explain his possession
thereof
Necessary to conclusively prove possession that:
1. Possession must be unexplained by any innocent
origin
2. Possession is fairly recent
3. Possession is exclusive
Similar rationale to par (j): if a person had in his possession a
falsified document and he made use of it, taken advantage of
it and profited thereby, the presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification (People v. Sendaydiego)
For presumption in par (v) to arise, it must be proved that the
letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid and that
it was actually mailed (Nava v. CIR), and if said letter wasn’t
returned to the sender, it’s presumed that the addressee
received it (Sebastian v. WCC)
R13.10 states that service of pleadings by mail is complete
upon the expiration of 10 days after mailing, unless the court
provides otherwise, while service by registered mail is
complete upon actual receipt by the office w/in 5 days from
date of first notice, the service is complete at the expiration of
such time. However, there must be conclusive proof that a
first notice was sent to the addressee as the presumption that
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
official duty has been regularly performed does not apply to
this situation. (Barrameda v. Castillo) If, however, the
postmaster certifies that such notice was sent, such
presumption arises and overrides the addressee’s contrary
claim. (Ferraren v. Santos)
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of
ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order
that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all
purposes including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage,
or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in
armed hostilities, and has been missing for four
years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and whose existence has not
been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present may contract
a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already
death. In case of disappearance, where there is a
danger of death the circumstances hereinabove
provided, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before
marrying again, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in the Family
Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Except for subpar 4, this paragraph is taken from CC 390 &
391. A view is held that WRT the ordinary but continued
absence of 7/10/5 years contemplated in the first 2
subparagraphs, the absentee is presumed to have died at the
end of said period, but that in the qualified absence where
the absentee was in danger of death under the
contemplated circumstances therein, the absentee is
presumed to have died at the time he was exposed to such
danger or peril – at the start of the 4-year period stated
therein. The distinction assumes significance in questions of
successional rights to the absentee’s estate arising from his
presumptive death.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a
contract of copartneship;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
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benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman
who are not capacitated to marry each other and who
have acquire properly through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry, such
contributions and their corresponding shares including
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are
equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother
contracted another marriage within three hundred days
after such termination of the former marriage, these rules
shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after
the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within the three
hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following
the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within the three
hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
Par (dd) was taken from CC 259, which provided for
presumptions of paternity, except that the former now
includes termination of the prior marriage for causes other
than the death of the husband, in line with FC 168.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is
usual with things of the nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be
printed or published by public authority, was so printed
or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain
reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country
where the book is published, contains correct reports of
such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to
convey real property to a particular person has actually
conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary
to perfect the title of such person or his successor in
interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons
perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and
there are no particular circumstances from which it can
be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of
the sexes, according to the following rules:
1) If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is
deemed to have survived;
2) If both were above the age sixty, the younger is
deemed to have survived;
3) If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the
former is deemed to have survived;
4) If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be
different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the
sex be the same, the older;
5) If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other
between those ages, the latter is deemed to have
survived.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Requirements for presumption of survivorship in par (jj) to
arise
1. The deaths occurred in a calamity
2. There are no particular circumstances from which it can
be inferred that one died ahead of the other.
Thus, regarding the third rule, if one is a one-day old child
and the other is 61 years old, it can’t be presumed that the
child survived, in view of the second requirement.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons
who are called to succeed each other, as to which of
them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior
to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of
proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same
time. (5a)
The presumption is the same as the rule in CC 43 except that
it omits the last clause therein w/c states “and there shall be
no transmission of rights from one to the other,” since said
clause is a rule of substantive law as to the effect on the rights
of the parties.
Par (kk) Par (jj)
Not required that the parties Parties must’ve perished in a
perished in a calamity calamity
Only applies in questions of Applies only where the
successional rights deaths occurred during a
calamity and applies to cases
not involving successional
rights
Provides a presumption of Provides for presumptions of
simultaneity in the deaths of survivorship
the persons called to
succeed each other
Sec. 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. — There is
no presumption of legitimacy of a child born after three
hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the
separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation. (6)
Exact copy of CC 261 – should properly apply when the
dissolution of the marriage is by reason of causes other than
the husband’s death. The separation may be a legal
separation or a separation de facto (Garcia v. Revilla). Said
provision has been substantially reproduced in FC 169.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. MAGBANUA
It is true that a government doctor’s post-mortem
examination is presumed by law to have been regularly
performed. This rebuttable presumption, however, cannot be
successfully invoked in the present case, it appearing that the
examining doctor was remiss in the performance of his duties
as a medico-legal officer.
MABUNGA V. PEOPLE
• Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of
recently stolen goods can be made, however, the
following basic facts need to be proven by the
prosecution: 1) that the crime was committed; 2) that
the crime was committed recently; 3) that the stolen
property was found in the possession of the defendant;
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and 4) that the defendant is unable to explain his
possession satisfactorily.
• For purposes moreover of conclusively proving
possession, the following considerations have to be
emphasized: 1) the possession must be unexplained by
any innocent origin; 2) the possession must be fairly
recent; and 3) the possession must be exclusive.
ONG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
The constitutional assurance of the right against self
incrimination likewise cannot be invoked by petitioners. The
right is a prohibition against the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused. It is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. In
this case, petitioners are not compelled to present themselves
as witnesses in rebutting the presumption established by law.
They may present documents evidencing the purported bank
loans, money market placements and other fund sources in
their defense.
PILIPINAS BANK V. GLEE CHEMICAL LABORATORIES
The presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is not conclusive. As provided under R131.3, such
presumption is rebuttable.
• In this case, the testimony of petitioner’s own witness
destroyed this presumption by admitting that when the
document was notarized, C.Y. and M.H. did not appear
before the notary public. Hence, the notary public did
not witness C.Y. affixing his signature on the document.
Such notarization is useless since there is no truth
whatsoever to the notary public’s statement or
acknowledgment that the person who executed the
document personally appeared before him and the
same was his free and voluntary act.
SURTIDA V. RURAL BANK OF MALINAO
The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is
to create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the
legal presumption or the prima facie case created thereby,
and which if no proof to the contrary is presented and
offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is,
but by the presumption, the one who has that burden is
relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in
support of the averment, because the presumption stands in
the place of evidence unless rebutted.
II. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
A. Examination of witnesses
1. R132.1-2
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The
examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall
be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless
the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the questions calls for
a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall
be given orally. (1a)
Section 2. Proceedings to be recorded. — The entire
proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the questions
propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the
statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel,
or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by
means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of
recording found suitable by the court.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the
official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as
correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct
statement of such proceedings. (2a)
GEN RULE: To be admissible, the testimony of the witness
must be given in open court.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. In civil cases, by depositions per R23 & 24
2. In criminal cases, by depositions or conditional
examinations per R119.12-15 & R123.1, or by the records of
the preliminary investigation, under R115.1(f)
Mere presentation of the affidavits of prosecution witnesses
subject to cross-examination is not allowed by RoC. (People v.
Estenzo)
Testimony of witness should be elicited by questions of
counsel. Nevertheless, court itself may propound questions
either on direct or cross-examination of the witness (People v.
Moreno), or may suggest questions that should be
propounded by counsel (E. Michael & Co., Inc. v. Enriquez)
Court should be given reasonable leeway to ascertain
the truth – extent to which such examination may be
conducted rests in its discretion and won’t be controlled
in the absence of abuse of discretion to the prejudice of
either party (People v. Manalo)
A witness’ testimony in court cannot be considered self-
serving since he can be subjected to cross-examination. (Co v.
CA)
Self-serving evidence: one made out of court and is
excluded on the same ground as hearsay evidence, i.e.
deprivation of the right of cross-examination
2. §36, BP 129
Per BP 129, summary procedure may be authorized by the SC
in special cases like ejectment, traffic law violation, etc.
• SC may adopt simplified procedures which may provide
that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in
lieu of oral testimony.
3. Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
Examination of child witness
• Presented in a hearing or any proceeding
• Done in open court
• Answer of witness shall be given orally, unless witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer
• Court may exclude the public and persons who don’t
have a direct interest in the case (including press) when
the child is testifying.
• Court may appoint a facilitator (child psychologist,
psychiatrist, social worker, etc.) if it determines that the
child is unable to understand or respond to questions
asked
• Testimony shall be recorded
4. Rule on the Conduct of Pre-Trial (AM No. 03-1-09-
SC)
Cases:
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PEOPLE V. GO
• The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to
appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the
adverse party the opportunity o f cross-examination. It is
only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may
have a true idea of his countenance, manner and
expression, which may confirm or detract from the
weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition
of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate
observation and memory, and his deportment and
physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can
only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies
orally in court. Indeed, the great weight given the
findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is
based upon his having had just that opportunity and the
assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the
credibility of the witnesses.
• Lapse of time is a matter that the trial court would
consider in weighing the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies.
PEOPLE V. BISDA
• An oath is defined as an outward pledge, given by the
person taking it that his attestation or promise is made
under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God.
The object of the rule is to affect the conscience of the
witness and thus compel him to speak the truth, and
also to lay him open to punishment for perjury in case
he willfully falsifies. A witness must be sensible to the
obligation of an oath before he can be permitted to
testify.
• It cannot be argued that simply because a child witness
is not examined on the nature of the oath and the need
for her to tell the whole truth, the competency of the
witness and the truth of her testimony are impaired…
• If a party against whom a witness is presented believes
that the witness is incompetent or is not aware of his
obligation and responsibility to tell the truth and the
consequence of him testifying falsely, such party may
pray for leave to conduct a voire dire examination on
such witness to test his competency. Any objection to
the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time
such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the
objection to its admissibility becomes apparent,
otherwise the objection will be considered waived and
such evidence will form part of the records of the case as
competent and admissible evidence.
B. Rights of a witness
1. R132.3
Section 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. — A witness
must answer questions, although his answer may tend to
establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a
witness:
1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting
questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor;
2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice
require;
3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent
to the issue;
4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to
a penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by
law; or
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his
reputation, unless it to be the very fact at issue or to a
fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed.
But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous final
conviction for an offense. (3a, 19a)
A witness cannot refuse to answer questions material to the
inquiry even if it may tend to establish a claim against him.
When he may validly refuse to answer:
1. Under the right against self-incrimination, if his
answer will tend to subject him to punishment for
an offense; or
2. Under the right against self-degradation, if his
answer will have a direct tendency to degrade his
character UNLESS
a. such question is directed to the very fact at
issue or to a fact from which the fact at issue
would be presumed, or
b. it refers to his previous final conviction for an
offense
WRT accused in criminal cases, R115.1(e) provides for his
right against self-incrimination – he may refuse to take the
stand altogether, but in other cases or proceedings, a party
may be compelled to take the stand although he may object
to incriminating questions. (Suarez v. Tengco) The accused
also has the right against self-degradation.
The right against self-incrimination is available in criminal, civil,
or administrative cases. (Bermudez v. Castillo) It extends to
administrative proceedings with a criminal/penal aspect.
(Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners)
The right against self-incrimination is granted only in favor of
individuals – corporations cannot invoke that privilege as
questioned testimony can come only from a corporate officer
or EE who has a personality distinct from that of the
corporation. (Hale v. Henkel)
The right against self-incrimination, which may be invoked by
the accused, may be with reference to the offense involved in
the same case wherein he is charged or to an offense for
which he may be charged and tried in another case; WRT a
witness, the offense involved is one for w/c he may be tried in
another case. In either instance, the right should be
seasonably invoked and may be waived.
Seemingly conflicting decisions
Where, in a prosecution for falsification, the accused took the
stand and testified denying his authorship of the alleged
falsified signature, on cross-examination he can be compelled
to give a sample of his handwriting and it was not a denial of
his right against self-incrimination. (Beltran v. Samson)
Where, in a disbarment case, the complainant on cross-
examination denied authorship of certain handwritten letters,
she could not be compelled to give samples of her
handwriting as it would amount to a denial of her right
against self-incrimination in a possible charge for perjury.
(Bermudez v. Castillo)
Reconciliation of the two decisions
Beltran case: accused opened the issue on his direct
examination. As such, he waived his right against self-
incrimination on the issue, and could be cross-examined
thereon like any other witness.
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Bermudez case: testimony given by complainant who, unlike
an accused person, could not refuse to testify without an
unfavorable inference being drawn against her. She did
not open the issue in her direct examination as it was
raised during cross, thus she didn’t waive the privilege
against self-incrimination of her own volition or by acts
imputable to her.
GEN RULE: Witness granted the right against self-
incrimination.
EXCEPTION: immunity statutes wherein the witness is granted
immunity from criminal prosecution for offenses admitted in
his testimony
Classes of immunity states – see Galman v. Pamaran next
page
2. §8, RA 1379
Sec. 8. Protection against self-incrimination. Neither the
respondent nor any other person shall be excused from
attending and testifying or from producing books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda and other records on the
ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or
otherwise, required of him may tend to incriminate him or
subject him to prosecution; but no individual shall be
prosecuted criminally for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after
having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise,
except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt
from prosecution and conviction for perjury or false testimony
committed in so testifying or from administrative proceedings.
3. PD 749
GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION TO GIVERS OF
BRIBES AND OTHER GIFTS AND TO THEIR ACCOMPLICES IN
BRIBERY AND OTHER GRAFT CASES AGAINST PUBLIC
OFFICERS
Sec. 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about
any violation of Articles 210, 211, and 212 of the RPC; RA
3019, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code
and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other
provisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty
on the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws,
rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and
other forms of official abuse; and who willingly testifies
against any public official or employee for such violation shall
be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense
with reference to which his information and testimony were
given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information
and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided; that this
immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the
information and testimony are given against a person who is
not a public official but who is a principal, or accomplice, or
accessory in the commission of any of the above-mentioned
violations: Provided, further, that this immunity may be
enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that
he offered or gave the bribe or gift to the public official or his
accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving; and Provided, finally,
that the following conditions concur:
1. The information must refer to consummated violations of
any of the above-mentioned provisions of law, rules and
regulations;
2. The information and testimony are necessary for the
conviction of the accused public officer;
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the
possession of the State;
4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its
material points; and
5. The informant or witness has not been previously
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Sec. 2. The immunity granted hereunder shall not attach
should it turn out subsequently that the information and/or
testimony is false and malicious or made only for the purpose
of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the public
officer denounced. In such a case, the public officer so
denounced shall be entitled to any action, civil or criminal,
against said informant or witness.
xxx
Cases:
GALMAN V. PAMARAN
Classes of immunity statutes
a. Use immunity: prohibits use of witness’ compelled
testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection w/
the criminal prosecution of the witness
• Merely testifying and/or producing evidence
doesn’t render the witness immune from
prosecution despite his invocation of the right
against self-incrimination. He’s merely saved from
the use against him of such statements or evidence
w/c he had been compelled to produce
notwithstanding his having seasonably invoked said
right against self-incrimination
b. Transactional immunity: grants immunity to witness from
prosecution for an offense to w/c his compelled
testimony relates
PD 1886 grants only use immunity. Hence, dictates of fair play
demand that Generals Ver & Olivas should’ve been informed
of their rights to remain silent by the Agrava Board.
HERRERA V. ALBA
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case
or from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the
belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right
against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to
evidence that is “communicative” in essence taken under
duress. The SC has ruled that the right against self-
incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial
evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence
taken from his body when it may be material.
ROSETE V. LIM
As a rule, only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to
take the witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand
does not generally apply to parties in administrative cases or
proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer if
incriminating questions are propounded. But there is an
exception – a party who is not an accused in a criminal case
is allowed not to take the witness stand in administrative
cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal
proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is the
opinion of the Court that said exception applies to parties in
civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the suit is
criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to
take the witness stand. It is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls.
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• Thus, for a party in a civil case to possess the right to
refuse to take the witness stand, the civil case must also
partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding
C. Order of examination
1. R132.4-10
Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. —
The order in which the individual witness may be examined is
as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent.
Sec. 5. Direct examination. — Direct examination is the
examination-in-chief of a witness by the party presenting him
on the facts relevant to the issue.
Sec. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be
cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters
stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with
sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse,
and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
Sec. 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. — After
the cross-examination of the witness has been concluded, he
may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or
supplement his answers given during the cross-examination.
On re-direct-examination, questions on matters not dealt with
during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in
its discretion.
Sec. 8. Re-cross-examination. — Upon the conclusion of the re-
direct examination, the adverse party may re-cross-examine
the witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and
also on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in
its discretion.
A witness may be cross-examined not only upon matters
testified to by him on his direct examination, but also on all
matters relevant to the issue. (Cupps v. State)
Where the witness is an unwilling or hostile witness so
declared by the court or is an adverse party, the cross-
examination shall only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief. This is the same as the limitation of the
cross-examination of an accused who testifies as a witness in
his own behalf.
When the question w/c assumes facts not on record is asked
on cross-examination, it’s objectionable for being misleading;
if on direct examination, it’s objectionable for lack of basis.
When cross-examination is not and cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party who
offered the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby
rendered incompetent and should be stricken from the
record. (Bachrach Motor v. CIR)
Where, however, in a criminal case the prosecution
witness was extensively cross-examined on the essential
elements of the crime and what remained for further
cross-examination was the matter of price or reward w/c
was treated therein as merely an aggravating
circumstance, his failure to appear for further cross
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
thereon will not warrant the striking out of his direct
exam, especially since further cross could not be
conducted due to the witness’ subsequent death, a
circumstance not attributable to the prosecution. (People
v. Seneris) Same rule followed where prosecution
witness was extensively cross-examined on material
points and thereafter failed to appear and could not be
produced despite a warrant for his arrest. (People v.
Gorospe)
RIANO:
Basic purposes of cross-examination:
1. Bring out facts favorable to counsel’s client not
established by the direct testimony
2. To enable counsel to impeach or to impair the witness’
credibility
If witness dies before his cross-examination is over, his
testimony on the direct may be stricken out only WRT the
testimony not covered by the cross-examination.
Sec. 9. Recalling witness. — After the examination of a witness
by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be
recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may
require. (14)
Where all sides in the case have concluded witness
examination, his recall for further examination is discretionary
w/ the court as the interest of justice requires. However,
where such examination has not been concluded, or if the
recall of the witness was expressly reserved by a party w/ the
approval of the court, then his recall is a matter of right.
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A question
which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed,
except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible
answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender
years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director,
or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not
yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which he
has previously stated. It is not allowed.
Leading question: one w/c suggests to the witness the
answer desired.
• A leading question propounded to a witness may, by
reacting to an inference in his mind, cause him to testify
in accordance w/ the suggestion by the question; his
answer may be ‘an echo of the question’ than a genuine
recollection of events. (Escoto v. Pineda)
• Leading questions may be permitted in the examination
of a witness who is immature; aged & infirm; in bad
physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or
unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced;
unsophisticated; feeble-minded; confused & agitated;
terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand;
lacking in comprehension of questions or slow to
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understand; deaf & dumb; or unable to speak or
understand the English language or only imperfectly
familiar therewith. (People v. Dela Cruz)
Misleading question: one w/c assumes facts not in evidence
or w/o sufficient basis or w/c assumes testimony or proof w/c
has not been given.
RIANO:
Leading questions are not appropriate in direct and re-direct
examinations particularly when the witness is asked to testify
about a major element of the cause of action or defense.
As to a child witness, R132.10 should be deemed by §20 of
the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness. Under the latter
rule, the court may allow leading questions in ALL stages of
examination of a child under the condition that the same will
further the interests of justice.
2. R115.1(d)
Sec. 1. Rights of accused at trial. – In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: xxx
d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to
cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination.
His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him;
Cases:
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION V. PROV. OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
A party may cross-examine a witness on matters not
embraced in his direct examination. But this does not mean
that a party by doing so is making the witness his own
accordance with [law].
VERTUDES V. BUENAFLOR
Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits
the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to
remain in the record.
PEOPLE V. SANTOS
A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may
propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the
witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may
tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the
other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths
which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
D. Impeachment of witnesses
1. R132.11-15
Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness
may be impeached by the party against whom he was called,
by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by
evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not by evidence
of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by
the examination of the witness, or the record of the
judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (15)
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. — Except
with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to
impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so
declared by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse
interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled
the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness
who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party
presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He
may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse
party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject
matter of his examination-in-chief. (6a, 7a)
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent
statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by
evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must
be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present, and he must be asked
whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to
explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be
shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them. (16)
GEN RULE: a party who voluntarily offers the testimony of a
witness in the case is bound by the testimony of said witness.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Hostile witness;
2. Where the witness is the adverse party or the
representative of a juridical person w/c is the adverse
party; and
3. When the witness is not voluntarily offered but is
required by law to be presented by the proponent, as in
the case of subscribing witnesses to a will. (Fernandez v.
Tantoco)
A party can impeach the adverse party’s witness by:
1. Contradictory evidence
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
3. Evidence of bad character
4. Evidence of bias, interest, prejudice, or incompetence
A party can impeach his own witness only by:
1. Evidence contradictory to his testimony
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
In the case of hostile witnesses, adverse party witnesses or
involuntary witnesses, they can also be impeached by other
modes of impeachment, aside from contradictory statements
and prior inconsistent statements made by them.
Contradictory evidence: other testimony of the same witness,
or other evidence presented by him in the same case, but not
the testimony of another witness
Fairness demands that the impeaching matter be raised in
the cross-examination of the witness sought to be
impeached by allowing him to admit or deny a matter to
be used as the basis of impeachment by contradictory
evidence.
Prior inconsistent statements
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Oral or documentary statements made by the witness sought
to be impeached on occasions other than the trial in which
he is testifying.
• How to impeach a witness by prior inconsistent
statements: by laying the predicate
1. Confront him w/ such statements, w/ the
circumstances under w/c they were made;
2. Ask him whether he made such statements; and
3. Give him a chance to explain the inconsistency.
o Unless the witness is given the opportunity to
explain the discrepancies, the impeachment is
incomplete. (US v. Baluyot) However, such
defect in the impeachment of the witness is
deemed waived if no objection on that ground
is raised when the document involved is
offered for admission. (People v. Molo)
It is believed that if the prior inconsistent statement appears in
a deposition of the adverse party, and not a mere witness,
that adverse party who testifies may be impeached w/o
laying the predicate, as such prior statements are in the
nature of admissions of said adverse party. Thus, under
R23.4(b), the deposition of an adverse party may be used by
any party for any purpose, i.e. as evidence for the latter or to
impeach or contradict said party deponent through
inconsistent statements therein.
Where a witness’ previous statements are offered as evidence
of an admission, and not merely to impeach him, the rule on
laying a predicate does not apply (Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v.
Hashim) and the same would apply to like statements of a
party to the case
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. — Evidence of
the good character of a witness is not admissible until such
character has been impeached.
See R130.51
Sec. 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial
or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any witness
not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear
the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause
witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from
conversing with one another until all shall have been
examined. (18)
The power of exclusion applies only to the witnesses and not
to the parties in a civil case. The same right against exclusion
also applies to the accused in a criminal case.
A party to an action has a right to be present in court
while his case is being tried, and the rule authorizing the
exclusion of witnesses during the trial cannot be
understood to extend to him. (Paez v. Berenguer)
If the witness violates the order of exclusion, the court may
bar him from testifying (People v. Sandal) or give little weight
to his testimony, aside from his liability for contempt.
Contrarily, it is within the power of the trial judge to refuse to
order the exclusion of the principal witness of the
government during the hearing of a criminal case and it may
not, on that count alone, be considered as an abuse of his
discretion. (People v. Lua Chu)
2. R23.4
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Sec. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of
a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence,
may be used against any party who was present or
represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due
notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:
a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the
purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of
deponent as a witness;
b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time
of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation,
partnership, or association which is a party may be used
by an adverse party for any purpose;
c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may
be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:
(1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness
resides at a distance more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was
procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that
the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age,
sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party
offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon
application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest
of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open
court, to allow the deposition to be used; and
d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a
party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all
of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any
party may introduce any other parts.
Case:
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. MORANTE
Under R132.13, a witness may be impeached by showing
that such two contradicting statements are under oath. In
order to impeach his testimony to be inconsistent with the
sworn statement, the sworn statement alleged to be
inconsistent with the subsequent one should have been
shown and read to him and, thereafter, he should have been
asked to explain the apparent inconsistency.
E. Reference to writing (R132.16-18)
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A
witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a
fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his
direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his
memory and knew that the same was correctly written or
recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who
may, if he chooses, cross examine the witness upon it, and
may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from
such writing or record, though he retain no recollection of
the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or
record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution. (10a)
First sentence = “revival of present memory.” Applies if the
witness remembers the facts regarding his entries and is
entitled to greater weight
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Second sentence = “revival of past recollection.” Applies
where the witness does not recall the facts involved, and is
entitled to lesser weight
This provision applies only when it is shown beforehand that
there is a need to refresh the memory of the witness. The
memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness
does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as
such, because the witness has just the same to testify on the
basis of refreshed memory.
Where the witness has testified independently of or after
his memory has been refreshed by a memorandum of
the events in dispute, such memorandum is not
admissible as corroborative evidence, since a witness
may not be corroborated by any written statement
prepared wholly by him. Exception = when the proper
predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down.
(Borromeo v. CA)
Sec. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in
evidence, the remainder, the remainder admissible. — When
part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is
given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same
subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a
detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is
given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be
given in evidence. (11a)
Similar rule provided for in use of depositions – see R23.4(d)
Sec. 18. Right to inspect writing shown to
witness. — Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may
be inspected by the adverse party. (9a)
Cases:
CANQUE V. CA
• Under R132.10, the memorandum used to refresh the
memory of the witness does not constitute evidence,
and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason
that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis
of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness
has testified independently of or after his testimony has
been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in
dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence.
• As the entries in question were not made based on
personal knowledge, they could only corroborate her
testimony that she made the entries as she received the
bills.
PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ
The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts
merely put into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared
statements which she merely confirmed as true. The
questions were indeed carefully phrased and sometimes
based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make JONALYN
understand the import of the questions. In the same vein, the
prosecution’s referral to JONALYN’s Sinumpaang Salaysay to
refresh her memory was also reasonable. The purpose of
refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the
witness and her present testimony to be put fairly and in their
proper light before the court.
III. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
A. Public documents
1. R132.19, 23-30
Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their
presentation evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except
last wills and testaments; and
c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to the entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Under the rules of evidence, official documents are “public
documents.” Those acknowledged before persons authorized
to administer oaths are public documents but are further
governed by Sec. 30, while commercial and private
documents fall under “private documents.”
Private documents required by law to be entered in
public records are considered as public documents and
are subject to Sec. 27.
GEN RULE: Public documents generally include notarial
documents and are admissible in evidence w/o the necessity
of preliminary proof as to its authenticity and due execution
(Antillon v. Barcelon)
EXCEPTION: where a special rule of law requires proof
thereof despite its being a document acknowledged in
accordance w/ Sec. 30, as in the case of probate of notarial
wills where the testimony of the attesting witnesses are still
required for its probate (R132.76 & 30)
Requisites for admissibility of copy of foreign official document
1. Attested by the officer having legal custody of the
records or by his deputy; and
2. Accompanied by a certificate of the Philippine diplomatic
or consular representative to the foreign country
certifying that such attesting officer has the custody of
the document
• This requirement is intended to justify the giving of
full faith and credit to the genuineness of a
document in a foreign country (Valencia v. Lopez)
A document, to be public, must be an official written act of a
public officer.
If a private writing itself is inserted officially into a public
record, its record/recordation/incorporation into the public
record becomes a public document, but that does not make
the private writing itself a public document so as to make it
admissible w/o authentication. (Republic v. Worldwide
Insurance)
A claim for the enforcement of a foreign judgment can be
brought only before the regular courts and not in an
administrative agency. A foreign decision purporting to be
the written record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country is a public writing under R132.19(a), and
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must be proved in accordance w/ Secs. 24 & 25 of the same
Rule.
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter. (24a)
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court. (26a)
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. — Any public record,
an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not
be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon
order of a court where the inspection of the record is
essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27a)
A public record cannot be removed from the office in w/c it is
kept w/o a court order, such as a subpoena duces tecum,
and even the court cannot order its removal therefrom.
EXCEPTION: when essential to the just determination of
a pending case
NOTE that this rule refers only to a public record an official
copy of w/c could be made available to the interested part
and is admissible in evidence.
§24: requirements for admissibility in evidence of a foreign
public document.
Absent the attestation of the officer having the legal
custody of the records and the certificate to that effect by
a Philippine foreign service officer, a mere copy of the
foreign document is not admissible as evidence to prove
the foreign law. (Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. CA)
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. — An authorized
public record of a private document may be proved by the
original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that
such officer has the custody.
Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed
by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry. (29)
Sec. 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial record
may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in
the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties,
or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the
proceedings. (30a)
RIANO:
Judicial record: the record of judicial proceedings. Includes
official entries or files, official acts of a judicial officer, and
judgment of the court
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law,
may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of
the execution of the instrument or document involved. (31a)
Public documents may be proved by:
1. The original copy;
2. An official publication thereof; or
3. A certified true copy thereof
When a CTC is presented, § 24 & 25 provide what should
appear in the certification or attestation of said true copy and
w/c must have the documentary stamp affixed thereto in
order to be admissible (§201, RA 8424), UNLESS specifically
exempted therefrom, as in the case of baptismal/birth
certificates of contracting parties to a marriage (FC 13). It’s
presumed that the requisite stamps have been affixed to the
original copy of a document where only the carbon copies
thereof are available. (Mahilum v. CA)
Where the SPA is executed and acknowledged before a
notary public or other competent officer in a foreign country,
it can’t be admitted in evidence in Philippine courts UNLESS
it’s certified as such in accordance w/ R132.24 by a secretary
of the embassy or legation, consul-general/consul/vice-
consul/consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in w/c the
record is kept of said public document and authenticated by
the seal of his office. (Lopez v. CA)
The probative value of public instruments depends on the
kind of document that is presented in evidence. (Dupilas v.
Cabacungan)
Only baptismal certificates issued by the priests during the
Spanish regime are considered public documents. (Adriano v.
de Jesus) However, a baptismal certificate issued after the
Spanish regime is a private document and cannot even be
considered prima facie evidence of the fact that gave rise to
its execution – the fact of baptism and the date thereof – and
is therefore hearsay and inadmissible evidence even as to the
date of baptism unless the priest who performed the
baptismal rites and made the certificate is produced. (People
v. Barcebal)
Baptismal certificates are not sufficient to prove paternity
(Arde v. Anicoche) or voluntary recognition of a child.
(Berciles v. GSIS)
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NOTE: While recognizing the primacy of a birth certificate as
proof of the victim’s age, SC held that in the absence of such
evidence, the victim’s minority may be proved by other
documentary evidence such as her baptismal certificate or
other authentic records. (People v. Llandelar)
A death certificate is not proof of the cause of death, its
probative value being confined only to the fact of death, and
the statement therein contained regarding the duration of
illness and the cause of death are mere hearsay. (Sison v. Sun
Life Assurance)
BUT it has been held that a death certificate is admissible
to prove the residence of the deceased at the time of his
death. (Garcia Fule v. Malvar)
2. CC408
CC403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
article, a daughter above twenty-one but below twenty-three
years of age cannot leave the parental home without the
consent of the father or mother in whose company she lives,
except to become a wife, or when she exercises a profession
or calling, or when the father or mother has contracted a
subsequent marriage. (321a)
Cf. CC 402. Majority commences upon the attainment of the
age of twenty-one years. The person who has reached
majority is qualified for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by this Code in special cases.
3. §201, RA 8424
NIRC, Sec. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. -
An instrument, document or paper which is required by law
to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted
or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be
recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of
transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any
court until the requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto
and cancelled.
Cases:
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP. V. NLRC
• The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the
POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country, and therefore a public writing under
R132.20(a)
• Also, the Dubai decision is accompanied by a document
which purports to be an English translation of that
decision, but that translation is legally defective. R132.34
requires that documents written in a non-official
language (Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence
unless accompanied by a translation into English or
Spanish or Filipino.
PEOPLE V. LAZARO
Either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession
of illegal firearms. Moreover, the rule on hearsay evidence
admits of several exceptions. One such exception is that
provided for under R130.44 (Entries in official records).
Relative to this provision, R132.28 of the same Rules allows
the admission of the said document.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
MONTEVERDE V. PEOPLE
A private document acquires the character of a public
document when it becomes part of an official record and is
certified by a public officer duly authorized by law.
SORIANO V. GALIT
Public documents by themselves may be adequate to
establish the presumption of their validity. However, their
probative weight must be evaluated not in isolation but in
conjunction with other evidence adduced by the parties in
the controversy, much more so in this case where the
contents of a copy thereof subsequently registered for
documentation purposes is being contested.
DELFIN V. BILLONES
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. Nevertheless, this
presumption is disputable and is satisfactory only if
uncontradicted, and may be overcome by other evidence to
the contrary.
SEVILLA V. CARDENAS
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.
B. Private documents (R132.20-22, 32-33)
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that
which it is claimed to be. (21a)
Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document
not necessary. — Where a private document is more than
thirty years old, is produced from the custody in which it
would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by
any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other
evidence of its authenticity need be given. (22a)
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to
be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a)
R132.20-22: rules on authentication of private documents
Doctrine of self-authentication
Where the facts in the writing could only have been known
by the writer
Rule of authentication of the adverse party
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Where the reply of the adverse party refers to and affirms the
transmittal to him and his receipt of the letter in question, a
copy of which the proponent is offering as evidence
Instances when authentication of a document is NOT
required
1. The writing is an ancient document, under the requisites
of §21
2. The writing is a public document or record per §19
3. It’s a notarial document acknowledged, proved, or
certified in accordance w/ §30
4. The authenticity and due execution of the document
has been expressly or impliedly admitted by a failure to
deny the same under oath, as in the case of actionable
documents per R8.8
The authenticity and due execution of a private document
are proved, inter alia, by evidence of the genuineness of the
handwriting of the maker
Genuineness of maker’s handwriting proved by:
1. A witness who actually saw the person writing the
instrument (§20[a])
2. A witness familiar w/ such handwriting (§22) and
who can give his opinion thereon, such opinion
being an exception to the opinion rule (R.130.50[b])
3. A comparison by the court of the questioned
handwriting and admitted genuine specimens
thereof (§22)
4. Expert evidence (R.130.49)
§22 merely enumerates the methods of proving handwriting
but does not give preference or priority to a particular
method (Lopez v. CA)
Sec. 32. Seal. — There shall be no difference between sealed
and unsealed private documents insofar as their admissibility
as evidence is concerned. (33a)
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial
language. — Documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of
proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have
such translation prepared before trial.
PD 155 (1973) provides that “the Spanish language shall
continue to be recognized as an official language in the
Philippines while important documents in government files
are in the Spanish language and not translated into either
English or Pilipino language.”
1987 Consti: the official languages are Filipino and, until
otherwise provided by law, English, w/ the regional
languages as auxiliary official languages in the region
Cases:
BARTOLOME V. IAC
Under R132.21, the due execution and authenticity of a
private writing must be proved either by anyone who saw
the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the
handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness.
CEQUEÑA V. BOLANTE
• An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30
years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3)
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of
suspicion. It must on its face appear to be genuine.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
• Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule
on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not
automatically become a public document just because it
contains a notarial jurat.
• By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.
MALAYAN INSURANCE V. PNWC
Under R132.20, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it
executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized
the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.
JIMENEZ V. COMMISSION ON ECUMENICAL MISSION
R132.22 explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a
comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom
the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge."
PAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SALES V. CA
The presumption of regularity does not hold true with respect
to the [notarized] Marital Consent which is a private writing. It
is subject to the requirement of proof under R132.20 which
states the Marital Consent was merely a jurat, and thus a
private document whose execution and authenticity required
proof under R132.20.
C. Alteration in documents (R132.31)
Sec. 31. Alteration in document, how to explain. — The party
producing a document as genuine which has been altered
and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part
material to the question in dispute, must account for the
alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by
another, without his concurrence, or was made with the
consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise
properly or innocent made, or that the alteration did not
change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails
to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence.
Cases:
CABOTAJE V. PADUNAN
<Restated the provision>
CIRELOS V. HERNANDEZ
The party producing a document as genuine which has been
altered in a part material to the question in dispute must
account for the alteration.
D. Rule on Electronic Evidence
Rule 5. Authentication of Electronic Documents
Sec. 1. The person seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving
its authenticity.
Sec. 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private
electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means:
a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person
purported to have signed the same;
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b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or
devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or
by law for authentication of electronic documents were
applied to the document; or
c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Sec. 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. - A
document electronically notarized in accordance with the
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered
as a public document and proved as a notarial document
under the Rules of Court.
Cases:
ASUNCION V. NLRC
Handwritten listing and unsigned computer printouts which
are unauthenticated are unreliable. The SC has consistently
required some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition
for the admission of documents.
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS V. SALUD
• Text messages are covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the
REE, which provides: "Ephemeral electronic
communication refers to telephone conversations, text
messages ' and other electronic forms of communication
the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
• Under Section 2, Rule 11 of REE, “Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or who has
personal knowledge thereof.”
IV. OFFER AND OBJECTION (R132.34-40)
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (35)
Sec. 35. When to make offer. — As regards the testimony of a
witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is
called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the
presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall
be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in
writing. (n)
The literal import of §34 has been relaxed in the sense that
evidence not formally offered can be admitted by the TC
provided the ff. requirements are present:
1. The same must’ve been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and
2. The same must’ve been incorporated in the records of
the case
The formal offer of testimonial evidence at the time the
witness is called to testify is necessary to enable the court to
intelligently rule on any objection to the questions asked. As a
rule, the proponent must show its relevance, materiality, and
competence, and the adverse party must promptly raise any
objection thereto. (People v. Ancheta)
RIANO:
When formal offer of evidence is not required
1. In a summary proceeding, as it’s a proceeding where
there’s no full-blown trial
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
2. Documents judicially admitted or taken judicial notice of
3. Documents, affidavits, and depositions used in rendering
a summary judgment
4. Documents or affidavits used in deciding quasi-judicial or
administrative cases
5. Lost objects previously marked, identified, described in
the record, and testified to by witnesses who had been
subjects of cross-examination in respect to said objects
Sec. 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence offered orally
must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within
three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period
is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. — When it
becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the
examination of a witness that the question being
propounded are of the same class as those to which
objection has been made, whether such objection was
sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the
objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party to record his
continuing objection to such class of questions.
Sec. 38. Ruling. — The ruling of the court must be given
immediately after the objection is made, unless the court
desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the
question presented; but the ruling shall always be made
during the trial and at such time as will give the party against
whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation
presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not
be stated. However, if the objection is based on two or more
grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of
them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon. (38a)
Sec. 39. Striking out answer. — Should a witness answer the
question before the adverse party had the opportunity to
voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is
found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain the objection
and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out
of answers which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise
improper. (n)
Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. — If documents or
things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the
offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the
record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state
for the record the name and other personal circumstances of
the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. (n)
Parties who offer objections to questions on whatever
ground are entitled to a ruling at the time the objection is
made, unless they present a question with regard to which
the court desires to inform itself before making its ruling. In
that event, it’s perfectly proper for the court to take a
reasonable time to study the questions raised by the
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objection, but a ruling should always be made during the
trial.
The courts should consider the evidence only for the
purpose for which it was offered (People v. Abalos)
The trial courts should permit all exhibits presented by the
parties, although not admitted, to be attached to the records
so that, in case of appeal, the appellate court may be able to
examine the same and determine the propriety of their
rejection. (Oliveros v. Oliveros)
However, it has been held that where documentary
evidence was rejected by the TC and the offeror did not
move that the same be attached to the record, the same
cannot be considered by the appellate court (Banez v.
CA), as documents forming no part of proofs before the
appellate court cannot be considered in disposing of the
case (De Castro v. CA); otherwise, that would infringe
upon the adverse party’s constitutional right to due
process of law. (Tinsay v. Yusay)
Where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the
attorney offering the evidence, the court may, as a rule, safely
accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that
the proof offered will be connected later. (Prats & Co. v.
Phoenix Insurance)
The purpose for w/c the evidence is offered must be specified
because such evidence may be admissible for several
purposes under the doctrine of multiple admissibility, or may
be admissible for one purpose and not for another, otherwise
the adverse party can’t interpose the proper objection.
Evidence submitted for one purpose may not be considered
for any other purpose. (People v. Diano)
A document or writing which is admitted merely as part of
the testimony of a witness (and not as an independent
evidence) does not constitute proof of the facts related
therein. (Sheraton-Palace Hotel v. Quijano)
Identification of Formal offer of documentary
documentary evidence evidence
Made in the course of the Only when the proponent
trial and marked as exhibits. rests his case and formally
Evidence identified at trial offers the evidence that an
and marked as exhibits may objection thereto may be
be withdrawn before formal made.
offer thereof or may not at all
be offered as evidence
Documents which may have been marked as exhibits during
the hearing but w/c were not formally offered in evidence
cannot be considered as evidence nor can they be given any
evidentiary value. (Vda. De Flores v. WCC)
However, it has been held in a criminal case for
kidnapping w/ murder that even if there was no formal
offer of the exhibits but the same have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and the exhibits
have been incorporated in the records of the case, said
exhibits are admissible against the accused. (People v.
Mate)
§37 provides that the repetition of objections to the same
class of evidence is not required. The party may just enter a
general and continuing objection to the same class of
evidence and the ruling of the court shall be applicable to all
such evidence of the same class. It has been held that the
court itself may motu proprio treat the objection as a
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
continuing one. (Ed. A. Keller & Co., Ltd. v. Ellerman &
Bucknail)
An erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the TC is
not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there
are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if
the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted, wouldn’t have
changed the decision (People v. Bande); otherwise a new
trial is warranted by reason of such erroneous ruling w/c
goes into the merits of the case and would’ve affected the
decision (US v. Villanueva).
If the TC erroneously ruled out the evidence and
discovered such error before the judgment had become
final or before and appeal therefrom had been
perfected, it may reopen the case. (Tinsay v. Yusay)
The TC rulings on procedural questions and on admissibility
of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in
nature and may not be the subject of separate appeals or
review on certiorari. These are to be assigned as errors and
reviewed in the appeal taken from the TC on the merits of the
case. (Gatdula v. People)
RIANO:
An objection must point out the specific ground of the
objection, and if it does not do so, no error is committed in
overruling it.
An objector must be explicit as to the legal ground he
invokes. He cannot simply manifest that he is interposing an
objection. He has to precisely state the exclusionary rule that
would justify his opposition to the proffered evidence.
The rule is that a specific objection is always preferred over a
general one. However, it does not impose an absolute ban
on general objections. There is no compelling need to specify
the ground, “if the ground for exclusion should have been
obvious to the judge or to counsel.” (AmJur)
Objections may be formal or substantive.
• Formal objection: one directed against the alleged
defect in the formulation of the question (Examples of
defectively formulated questions: ambiguous,
argumentative, etc.)
• Substantive objection: objections made and directed
against the very nature of the evidence, i.e. it is
inadmissible either because it is irrelevant or incompetent
or both
An objection must state the specific ground relied upon and
be timely (made at the earliest opportunity).
Cases:
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN V. COMORPOSA
Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would
sanction the admission of evidence that has not been
formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is
applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the
rule on summary procedure – cases in which no full-blown
trial is held.
CABUGAO V. PEOPLE
Where a party fails to object to evidence when offered, he is
deemed to have waived his objection thereto. Consequently,
the evidence offered may be admitted.
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YU V. CA
It is apparent [from R132.40] that before tender of excluded
evidence is made, the evidence must have been formally
offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence
is made, the evidence must have been identified and
presented before the court.
VALENCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
• Admission of additional evidence is addressed to the
sound discretion of the TC.
• A motion to reopen presupposes that either or both
parties have formally offered and closed their evidence.
PAREL V. PRUDENCIO
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a
settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a
party.
RAMOS V. DIZON
In People v. Napat-a, we relaxed [R132.34] and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered
by the trial court provided the following requirements are
present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have
been incorporated in the records of the case.
TAN V. PEOPLE
SC has ruled that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if
not made at the time such evidence is offered, shall be
deemed waived. However, in all cases where said rule had
been applied, the assailed testimonial or object evidence had
been duly presented during the course of the trial.
V. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
A. Civil cases (R133.1)
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In
civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts
to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with
the greater number. (1a)
§1 & 2 give the rules on the requisite quantum of evidence in
civil & criminal cases.
Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from
a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself.
And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and
probable as to make it easy to believe. (People v. Baquiran)
To be believed, evidence should be in accord with the
common knowledge and experience of mankind. (People v.
Acusar)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
GEN RULE re TC findings on credibility of witnesses: TC
findings won’t be disturbed on appeal, as it was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard and observed
the demeanor of each witness. (People v. Baao)
EXCEPTION: when the TC has plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value w/c, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. (People v. Realon)
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: where the issue
revolved around the identification of the accused or the
credibility of witness and one judge heard the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses but a different judge
penned the decision – the latter, not having heard the
testimonial presentation, wouldn’t be in a better position
than the appellate courts to make such determination
(People v. CA)
The matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness
stand is best and most completely performed by a trial judge
who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony
in light of the defendant’s behavior, demeanor, conduct, and
attitude at the trial. (People v. Magallanes)
TC shouldn’t discredit a witness by the supposed
expression of lack of sincerity in his face. Facial
expressions are not necessarily indicative of one’s
feelings. TC should’ve made it appear in the record and
allowed the witness the opportunity to explain why he
was showing such an expression on his face. (People v.
Enriquez)
As a general rule, the number of witnesses should not in and
by itself determine the weight of evidence, but in case of
conflicting testimonies of witnesses, the numerical factor may
be given certain weight. (Caluna v. Vicente)
A party’s failure to present merely corroborative or cumulative
evidence doesn’t give rise to any adverse or unfavorable
presumption. (People v. Quilino)
Credibility of a witness: his integrity, disposition, and intention
to tell the truth in the testimony he has given as distinguished
from the credibility of his testimony. (People v. Rivera)
Competency of a witness is one thing, and it is another to be
a credible witness. Courts allow a person to testify as a
witness upon a given matter because he is competent but
may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his
testimony. (Arroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo)
The demeanor, the emphasis, gestures, and inflection of the
voice of a witness, while testifying, are potent aids in the
proper evaluation of his credibility. (US v. Macuti)
When a witness makes 2 sworn statements gravely
contradicting each other, the court cannot accept either
statement as proof. The witness by his own act of giving false
testimony impeaches his own testimony and the court should
exclude it from all consideration. (US v. Pala) This is different
from the situation wherein the testimonies of 2 witnesses
contradict each other, in w/c case the court shall adopt such
testimony w/c it believes to be true. (US v. Lasada)
The fact that a person has reached the “twilight of his life” is
not always a guarantee that he would tell the truth. It’s also
quite common that advanced age makes a person mentally
dull and completely hazy about things which have happened
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to him and, at times, it weakens his resistance to outside
influence. (People v. Juarez)
The record of a preliminary investigation constitutes no part
of the final proceedings in a cause, unless it’s presented in
evidence. The facts adduced therein are evidence only for the
purpose of testing the credibility of witnesses. (US v. Grant)
When a witness may be said to be biased
When his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that
he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his
statements, or to suppress or pervert the truth, or to state
what’s false.
Bias: that w/c excites the disposition to see and report matters
as they are wished for rather than as they are.
When the witnesses on both sides are equally interested or
otherwise biased, especially if there’s no numerical
preponderance on either side, bias ceases to be a
consideration in determining where the weight of evidence
rests. Credit should be given to the one whose demeanor
and manner of testifying convinces the court of his credibility.
(People v. Watin)
The testimonies of interested witnesses are not necessarily
biased, incredible or self-serving, although their interest may
to some extent affect their credibility. (People v. Lardizabal)
The testimony of a co-conspirator or accomplice, while
admissible, must be scrutinized with great caution because it
comes from a polluted source and is subject to grave
suspicion. (People v. Aquino)
The conviction of an accused may be based on the testimony
of one witness alone provided such testimony is clear and
convincing. (People v. Olais) The offended party’s testimony is
not essential to convict an accused if there are already other
evidence to prove the latter’s guilt. (People v. Juliada) The
prosecution is not obliged to present each and every person
who witnessed the occurrence but only a sufficient number
to prove the commission of the offense. (People v. Marasigan)
Inconsistencies or contradictions on mere details in the
testimony of a witness don’t materially impair the credibility of
such witness. (People v. Modelo) Inconsistencies in their
testimony on insignificant details don’t affect their credibility as
to the material points; rather, they indicate veracity (People v.
Viñas) and only tend to bolster the probative value of such
testimony.
The non-production of a corroborative witness without any
explanation given why he wasn’t produced weakens the
testimony of the witness who named that corroborating
witness in his testimony. (People v. Abonales)
Affirmative testimony is stronger than negative testimony.
Negative testimony of a witness cannot prevail over the
positive statements of persons who were eyewitnesses of the
fact w/c is the subject of investigation. (Vda de Ramos v. CA)
Delay of a witness in revealing to the authorities what he
knows about a crime does not render his testimony false, for
the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most
people and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal
case. (People v. Untalasco Jr) More than this, there is always
the inherent fear of reprisal, which is quite understandable
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
especially if the accused is a man of power and influence in
the community. (People v. Catao)
The refusal of a person to submit to investigation to
explain the innocent role he professes is inconsistent
with the normal reaction of an innocent man. (People v.
Bunsol)
The mere relationship of the witness to the victim does not
impair his positive and clear testimony nor render the same
less worthy of credit (People v. Berganio), UNLESS there’s a
showing of improper motive on the part of said witnesses.
(People v. Jabeguero)
Affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open
court declarations because they are oftentimes executed
when the affiant is at a high pitch of excitement and when
his mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a
fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has just
transpired. An affidavit is only prima facie evidence of weak
probative force and should be received with caution.
(Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation)
These rules don’t apply where the omission in the
affidavit refers to a very important detail such that the
affiant would not have failed to mention it (People v.
Anggot), or the self-contradictions and inconsistencies
are on very material and substantial matters. (People v.
Amon)
The infirmity of affidavits as a species of evidence is a matter of
judicial experience. Generally, an affidavit is not prepared by
the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant’s statements. Omissions and
misunderstandings by the writer are frequent particularly
under circumstances of hurry or impatience. (People v.
Mariquina)
To prove conspiracy, prosecution need not establish that all
the parties thereto agreed on every detail in the execution of
the crime or that they were actually together at all stages; it is
enough that, from the individual acts of each accused, it may
reasonably be deduced that they had a common plan to
commit the felony. (People v. Catao) However, the same
degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required
to support a finding of conspiracy. (People v. Tumalip)
The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be
proved in an evident and incontestable manner. They must
be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense.
(People v. Tiongson)
The quantum of evidence necessary to prove self-defense or
defense of a relative is “clear and convincing” evidence. If the
evidence for the defense is of doubtful veracity, conviction of
the accused is imperative. (People v. Berio)
For alibi to be given credence, it must not only appear that
the accused interposing the same was at some other place,
but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
crime scene at the time of its commission. (People v. Gerones)
Such defense becomes weaker if uncorroborated; worse still if
it could’ve been corroborated by other persons mentioned
by the accused but such corroborative testimony has not
been presented. (People v. Brioso)
While, as a rule, the defense of alibi deserves scant
consideration, it may be duly entertained if predicated
on substantial and reliable evidence sufficient to
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engender reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused. (People v. Gerones)
Where one accused withdraws his appeal after realizing the
futility of his defense, and the other escapes from
confinement thereby causing the dismissal of his appeal, said
acts are unmistakable signs of guilt. (People v. Aquiedo)
Tax declarations or the payment of real estate taxes on the
land are not conclusive evidence of ownership of the
declarant or payor. (De Guzman v. CA)
Tax receipts are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership but if accompanied by open, adverse, and
continued possession in the concept of owner of the
property, they constitute evidence of great weight in
support of a claim of ownership over said property by
the possessor thereof or his privies. (Tabuena v. CA)
Flight is evidence of guilt and of a guilty conscience. (US v.
Alegado) The converse, however, is not true.
As a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is
immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does not
have to be proved. (People v. Tiengo)
Instances when evidence of motive is relevant or
essential
1. Where the assailant’s identity is in question (US v.
McMann)
2. To determine the voluntariness of the criminal act
(People v. Taneo), or the sanity of the accused
(People v. Bascos)
3. To determine from which side the unlawful
aggression commenced, as where the accused
invoked self-defense wherein unlawful aggression
on the part of his opponent is an essential element
(US v. Laurel)
4. To determine the specific nature of the crime
committed
5. To determine whether a shooting was intentional
or accidental, the fact that the accused had
personal motives to shoot the victim being a
weighty consideration (People v. Martinez Godinez)
6. Where the accused contends that he acted in
defense of a stranger, since it’s essential, for such
defense to prosper, that the accused wasn’t
induced by revenge, resentment or other evil
motive
7. Where the evidence is circumstantial or
inconclusive and there’s doubt whether a crime has
been committed or whether the accused has
committed it (People v. Nicolas)
In some cases, motive is necessary not only for the procedural
requirement on the quantum of proof but as virtually an
element of the offense, such as to prove malice of the
accused in libel or slander (US v. Bustos). The true motive of
the conduct of the accused explains and supplies the element
of malice and, correspondingly, proves his criminal intent.
People v. Pineda: non-exhaustive list of danger signals that
the out-of-court identification of suspects may be erroneous
even though the method used is proper
1. The witness originally stated that he couldn’t identify
anyone
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
2. The witness knew the accused before the crime but
made no accusation against him when questioned by
the police
3. A serious discrepancy exists between the witness’
original description and his actual description of the
accused
4. Before identifying the accused at trial, the witness
erroneously identified some other person
5. Other witnesses of the crime fail to identify the accused
6. Before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to
identify him
7. Before the commission of the crime, the witness had
limited opportunity to see the accused
8. The witness and the person identified are of different
racial groups
9. During his original observation of the offender, the
witness was unaware that a crime was involved
10. A considerable time elapsed between the witness’ view
and his identification of the accused
11. Several persons committed the crime
12. The witness failed to make a positive trial identification
Res ipsa loquitur: the thing speaks for itself
The fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise
a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for the defendant to
meet w/ an explanation. The doctrine is simply a recognition
of the postulate that as a matter of common knowledge and
experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences
may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury, in
the absence of some explanation by him.
Note that this doctrine is considered as merely
evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. Its
application doesn’t dispense with the requirement of
proof of negligence. It’s simply in the process of such
proof, permitting the plaintiff to present enough of the
attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating
an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby
place on the defendant the burden of going forward
with the proof to the contrary. (Ramos v. CA)
Cases:
HABAGAT GRILL V. DMC-URBAN PROPERTY DEVELOPER
“Preponderance of evidence” means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. Where the evidence presented
by one side is insufficient to ascertain the claim, there is no
preponderance of evidence. In criminal cases in which the
quantum of evidence required is greater than in civil cases,
the testimony of only one witness – if credible,
straightforward, and worthy of belief – is sufficient to convict.
HUN HYUNG PARK V. EUNG WAN CHOI
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court,
the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court
denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to
the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of
evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such
aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the
demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant
the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far
presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
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insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of
evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is
insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not
follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a
preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the
demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case
generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an
acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil
aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such
determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must
perforce continue.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the
court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.
B. Criminal cases (R133.2-4)
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2a)
See notes under R133.1
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for
conviction. — An extrajudicial confession made by an
accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
Refer to notes under R130.33.
Corpus delicti: the body or substance of the crime
The actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged. It’s a common fact made up of 2 things: a) the
existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the
criminal charge, and b) the existence of a criminal agency as
the cause of the act or the result.
Proved when the evidence on record shows that the
crime prosecuted had been committed
A mere voluntary extrajudicial confession uncorroborated by
independent proof of the corpus delicti is insufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction. There must be independent
proof of the corpus delicti. The evidence may be
circumstantial but, just the same, there should be some
evidence substantiating the confession. (US v. de la Cruz)
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction even in
capital offenses, except when the law specifies the species
and quantum of evidence.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Not only the prior and coetaneous actuations of the accused
in relation to the crime but also his acts or conduct
subsequent thereto can be considered as circumstantial
evidence of guilt.
While the motive of the accused is generally immaterial not
being an element of the crime, such motive becomes
important when the evidence of the crime is purely
circumstantial.
RIANO:
A conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude
each and every hypothesis consistent w/ innocence. If the
totality of the circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable
doubt the possibility of innocence, conviction is proper.
Cases:
UNGSOD V. PEOPLE
• Circumstantial evidence: that w/c goes to prove a fact or
series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if
proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue.
• Standard that courts should observe in appreciating
circumstantial evidence, as discussed in People v.
Modesto:
“No general rule can be laid down as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case
will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent,
and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.
It has been said, and we believe correctly, that the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person. From all the circumstances,
there should be a combination of evidence which in the
ordinary and natural course of things leaves no room for
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.”
MARTURILLAS V. PEOPLE
Conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of
proof that, excluding the possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that
degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.
PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA
To sustain a conviction under a single prosecution witness,
such testimony needs only to establish sufficiently: 1) the
identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and 2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.
PEOPLE V. DEL MUNDO
On the non-presentation of the informant, the rule is that his
presentation in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the
conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution
because his testimony would merely be corroborative and
cumulative. Informants are generally not presented in court
because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their
invaluable service to the police. Here, the agents directly
testified regarding the entrapment, and the testimony of the
informant would merely have been corroborative
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PEOPLE V. PADUA
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld,
provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person.
C. Administrative cases (R133.5)
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
Substantial evidence doesn’t necessarily mean preponderant
proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion (Biak-na-bato Mining Co. v.
Tanco), or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. (EO 292)
Cases:
REYES V. MANGINO
• It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden
of proof that the respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant.
• Even in administrative cases, the Rules of Court requires
that if a judge should be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge. The judiciary to which the respondent
belongs demands no less. Before any of its members
could be faulted, competent evidence should be
presented, since the charge is penal in character. Thus,
the ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule
where the charge on which removal is sought is
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, or
incompetence. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
RAMOS VDA. DE BRIGINO V. RAMOS
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Such findings deserve full respect and,
without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified
or reversed.
D. Credibility of witnesses
RIANO:
Credibility of the witness refers to the believability of the
witness and has nothing to do with the law or the rules. It
refers to the weight and trustworthiness or reliability of the
testimony.
• Questions concerning the credibility of a witness are best
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court as it is
in the best position to observe his demeanor and bodily
movements.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. DOMINGCIL
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
The evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses
is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.
PEOPLE V. ALCANTARA
We have followed the rule in accord with human nature and
experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial
matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the credibility
of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to
conscience and numbing to senses.
ysr
PEOPLE V. MONTEIRO
The trial court should have applied R133.7 on evidence on
motion. In Sapida v De Villanueva, the SC had ruled that
“while the court may rule upon motions solely on the basis of
affidavits and counter-affidavits, if the affidavits contradict
each other on matters of fact, the court can have no basis to
make its findings of facts and the prudent course is to subject
the affiants to cross-examination so that the court can decide
whom to believe.”

E. Termination of presentation of evidence (R133.6)

Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. — The
court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon
any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so
full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be
reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this
power should be exercised with caution. (6)

The court has the power to stop the introduction of

testimony which will merely be cumulative. (Guinea v. Vda de
Pamonal)

Case:

PEOPLE V. SUBIDA
While justice must be administered with dispatch, the
essential ingredient is that the proceedings must be orderly
expeditious and not merely speedy. The judicial conscience
certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on
prosecution evidence just because the presentation of the
defense evidence had been barred by technicality.
• Records show that respondent was present during the
trial and presumably was ready to continue with the
presentation of his evidence and the testimony of his
witnesses. He had no inkling why his counsel did not
appear for trial. That the absence of his counsel could
not have been deliberate is evidenced by the fact that it
was only he who was absent.

F. Evidence on motion (R133.7)

Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. — When a motion is based on
facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter
on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective
parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (7)

While the court may hear and rule upon motions solely on
the basis of affidavits or counter-affidavits, if the affidavits
contradict each other on matters of fact, the court can have
no basis to make its findings of fact and the prudent course is
to subject the affiants to cross-examination so that the court
can decide whom to believe. (Sapida v. De Villanueva)

Cases:

BRAVO, JR. V. BORJA

Evidence of petitioner's minority was already a part of the
record of the case [copy of birth cert attached in his
memorandum in support of the motion for bail]. It was
properly filed in support of a motion. It would be a needless
formality to offer it in evidence. Respondent Judge therefore
acted with grave abuse of discretion in disregarding it.

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